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MX Missile Basing

September 1981

NTIS order #PB82-108077

.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 81-600133

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402

Foreword

This report, prepared at the request of the Technology Assessment Board,reviews the various ways in which the new MX intercontinental balIistic missilecould be based, and assesses the technical issues, the advantages, and the disad-vantages associated with each major option. I n order to do so, OTA explored a widevariety of military technologies and issues, ranging from antiballistic missile defenseto antisubmarine warfare to the impact of major construction projects on aridWestern lands. OTA has made every effort to apply comparable assumptions andcriteria to the various options assessed, and to be explicit about identifying ques-tions which simply cannot be resolved on technical grounds alone. Our purpose is toassist Members of Congress in evaluating particular basing modes of interest tothem, and to permit comparison of alternatives.

OTA identified a wide variety of possible basing modes and evaluated them interms of: technical risk; degree of survivability; endurance; contribution to weaponeffectiveness; effectiveness of command, control, and communications; arms con-trol impacts; institutional considerations; impacts on the deployment region; costs;schedule; and impact on stability The concluding section of chapter 1 compares theleading options in terms of a variety of criteria used, and it is apparent that a finalchoice depends in large measure on the relative weight assigned to these criteria.Five basing modes were found that appear feasible and offer reasonable prospectsof survivability, but none of them is without serious risks, high cost, importantuncertainties, or significant drawbacks. No basing mode appears Iikely to offer sur-vivability for the MX much before the end of the current decade

Much of the research done for this assessment required the use of classifiedsources. The material in this unclassified report is believed accurate, balanced, andcomplete but security requirements have at times made it necessary to omit some ofthe supporting technical analysis. OTA will shortly publish a classified annex to thisreport, which wilI be available to qualified requesters.

OTA is grateful for the assistance of its MX Missile Basing Advisory Panel, thecooperation of various components of the Department of Defense; the cooperationof the General Accounting Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Con-gressional Research Service; the assistance of other U.S. Government agencies; andthe support of numerous individuals.

#~ d ~..JOHN H GIBBONSDirector

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MX

Stan

Missile Basing Advisory Panel

Harry Woolf, ChairmanDirector, Institute for Advanced Study

ley Al brecht WilIiam KincadeProfessor and Editor of Rural Society Executive DirectorDepartment of SociologyBrigham Young University

Stephen T. BradhurstDirectorNevada MX Project Field Office

Russell E. DoughertyGeneral, USAF (retired)Executive DirectorAir Force Association

Sidney D. DrellProfessor and Deputy DirectorStanford Linear Accelerator Center

Henry M. FoleyProfessorDepartment of PhysicsColumbia University

Kenneth E. FosterAssociate DirectorOffice of Arid Lands StudiesUniversity of Arizona

Sanford GottliebKensington, Md.

Daniel O. GrahamLt. Gen., USA (retired)Director of Special ProjectsAmerican Security Council

Arms Control Association

Gordon KirjassoffPresidentEdwards and Kelcey

Kenneth C. OlsonProject ManagerUtah MX Coordination Office

Kenneth SmithLockheed Chief Engineer (retired)

John ToomayMajor General, USAF (retired)

WilIiam Van CleaveDirectorDefense and Strategic StudiesUniversity of Southern California

J erorne WiesnerInstitute ProfessorMassachusetts Institute of

Technology

James R. Woolsey, Esq.Shea & Gardner

Note The Advisory Panel provided advice and comment throughout the assessment, but the members do not necessarily approve,disapprove, or endorse the report for which OTA assumes full responsibility

Iv

MX Missile Basing Project Staff

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTAEnergy, Materials, and International Security Division

Peter SharfmanProgram Manager, International Security & Commerce Program

Project Director (from january 1981 )

Jeremy Kaplan Project Director (to January 1981 )

Ashton Carter Forrest R. Frank* Antoinette Kassim* *

Marc Messing* Theodore Postol * Robin Staff in

A d m i n i s t r a t i v e S t a f f

Helena Hassell Dorothy Richroath Jackie Robinson

Contractors

Abt AssociatesBooz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.Lynda Brothers**Energy and Resource Consultants, Inc.The Institute of EcologyGerald GarveyBarbara M. Heller

OTA Publishing Staff

Horizons Technology, lnc.Hydra Corp.John Muir InstituteJ. Watson Noah, Inc.Science Applications, Inc.Peter Zimmerman* *

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

John Bergling Kathie S. Boss Debra M. Datcher Joe Henson

‘ 0TA contract personnel‘ ‘0TA consultant

ContentsChapter

1.

2

3.

4.

5.

6,

7.

8.

9.

1 0

11,

12.

S u m m a r y . .

Multiple Protect ive S h e l t e r s

B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e D e f e n s e

Launch Under Attack , .

Small Submarine Basing of MX

A i r M o b i l e M i s s i l e .

Surface Ship Basing of MX .

Land Mobile MX Basing. .

D e e p U n d e r g r o u n d B a s i n g .

Page

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

Command, Control, and Communications (C’) . . . . . . . . .

D i v e r s i t y o f U . S . S t r a t e g i c F a c e s

Arms Control Considerations and MX Basing

AppendixesA. Letter of Request .

. . . . . 277

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

Options . .......311

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325B. MX Missile ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..328C. Acronyms and Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....330

Chapter 1

SUMMARY

Chapter 1

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Air Force is developing a new inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) known asthe MX (fig. 1). Because the hardened “silos” inwhich existing ICBMS are based are consideredincreasingly vuInerable to a Soviet attack as aresuIt of the improving accuracy of Soviet m is-siles, Congress and the Department of Defense(DOD) have agreed that a more survivablemode than hardened silos shouId be found forbasing any new missile. OTA has examined avariety of ways in which such a missile couldbe based,

The purpose of this study is to identify MXbasing modes and to assess the major advan-tages, disadvantages, risks, and uncertaintiesof each. At the outset of this study, OTA

Figure 1 .—MX Missile Characteristics

Missile Description

Length 71 feetDiameter 92 Inches (7 feet 8 Inches)Gross weight 1$2,000 IbsNumber of reentry vehicles 10

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

reviewed all the basing modes that could beidentified, including those addressed in pastDOD studies. On the basis of criteria of tech-nical feasibility and the likely ability of eachbasing mode to provide survivability against arange of plausible Soviet threats, the Iist wasnarrowed to 11 basing modes that were ana-lyzed in detail, This report presents theseanalyses, and also states briefly why otherpossibilities were rejected. Detailed analysesnarrowed the range to five possibiIities:

1. multiple protective shelter (MPS) basing inseveral variants,

2. antiballistic missile (ABM) defense of MPSbasing,

3. launch under attack,4. basing on small submarines, and5. basing on large aircraft.

There is a variety of criteria against whichthese basing modes can be evaluated, thoughthere is no general agreement about theirrelative importance. Indeed, since no basingmode ranks highest against all the commonlyused criteria, deciding how to choose andweigh the criteria of evaluation is the essenceof choosing a basing mode. To help Membersof Congress assign the most weight to thosecriteria they consider most important, OTA hascompared these five basing modes separatelyagainst these criteria in the last section of thissummary chapter.

OTA was requested by the TechnologyAssessment Board to examine only basingmodes for the MX missile. For this reason, theanalysis does not address the questions ofwhether and why the missile itself is needed, orthe relative merits of deploying additionalnumbers of existing Minuteman III or Trident Imissiles. During the course of the study theBoard requested that an analysis of rebasingthe existing Minuteman i i i missiles in MPS toincrease their survivability be included. Sincethe large size of the MX missile limits the waysin which it could be based, OTA surveyed bas-

3

4 . Mx Missile Basing

ing modes that might be used for smaller mis-siles, but found none so attractive as to lead usto seek a change in our terms of reference. It isimportant to note that much of OTA’S analysisis premised on the accuracy of U.S. intelli-gence about the capabilities and growth ofSoviet strategic forces. Due to the studyboundaries, OTA’S criteria of analysis andcomparison tend to use, rather than criticallyevaIuate, conventional wisdom about how

modes, Congress should choose. OTA is there-fore able to present the relevant technical in-formation regarding each possibility withoutthe need to make and defend a choice. Thisstudy provides data, analyses, and explana-tions that will assist Congress to understandand evaluate the forthcoming Reagan admin is-tration proposal, whether this proposal turnsout to be a reaffirmation of the existing pro-gram as shaped by the Carter administration, a

strategic nuclear forces support U.S. national relatively minor modsecurity. change in direction.

OTA does not have a recommendation as towhich basing mode, or combination of basing

f icat ion, or a major

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

1. There are five basing modes that appearfeasible and offer reasonable prospects of pro-viding survivability and meeting established per-formance criteria for ICBMS. They are: 1) MPSbasing of the type now under development bythe Air Force or in one of several variants. MPSbasing involves hiding the missiles among amuch larger number of shelters, so that theSoviets would have to target all the shelters inorder to attack all the missiles. If there weremore shelters than the Soviets could effective-ly target, then some of the missiles would sur-vive. This approach was the choice of theCarter administration, and one variant of MPSis now under engineering development by theAir Force. 2) MPS basing defended by a low-altitude ABM system known as LoADS (LowAltitude Defense System); 3) reliance onlaunch under attack so that the missiles wouldbe used before the Soviets could destroy them;4) basing MX on small submarines; and 5) air-mobile basing in which missiles would bedropped f rom w ide-bod ied a i rc ra f t andlaunched while falling. As described below,each of these alternatives has serious risks anddrawbacks, and it is believed that choosingwhich risks and drawbacks are most tolerableis a judgment that cannot be made on tech-nical grounds alone.

2. No basing mode is likely to provide asubstantial number of survivable MX missilesmuch before the end of this decade. WhiIe somebasing modes would permit the first missiles tobe operational as soon as 1986 or 1987, thesemissiles could not be considered more surviv-able than the existing Minuteman missiles untiladditional elements of the basing system werein place.

3. MPS basing would preserve the existingcharacteristics and improve the capabilities ofland-based ICBMS, but has three principal draw-backs.

●

●

MX missiles based in MPS would providebetter accuracy and endurance, and com-parable responsiveness, time-on-target con-trol, and retargeting capability, when com-pared to other feasible basing modes.Survivability depends on what the AirForce calls “preservation of locationuncertainty” (PLU), that is, preventing theSoviets from determining which sheltershold the actual missiles. PLU amounts to anew technology, and while it might wellbe carried out successfully, confidence inPLU will be limited until prototypes havebeen successfully tested. Even then Iinger-ing doubts might remain.

Ch. l—Summary ● 5

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MPS basing cannot ensure the survivabili-ty of the missiles unless the number ofshelters is large enough relative to the sizeof the Soviet threat. The “baseline” systemof 200 MX missiles and 4,600 shelters wouldnot be large enough if the Soviets chose tocontinue to increase their inventory of war-heads. If the trends shown in recent Sovietforce modernization efforts continue intothe future, an MPS deployment of about350 missiles and 8,250 shelters would beneeded by 199o to provide survivability.Although the number of missiles andshelters needed depends on what theSoviets do, the Ieadtimes for constructionare so long that decisions on size must bemade before intelligence data on actual,as distinct from possible, Soviet programsare avaiIable.MPS would severely impact the socioeco-nomic and physical characteristics of the de-ployment region. At a minimum, the de-ployment area would suffer the impactsgeneral ly associated with very rapidpopulation growth in rural communities;but larger urban areas would also be af-fected by economic uncertainties regard-ing the size of the MPS construction workforce and its regional distribution. Thephysical impacts of MPS would be charac-teristic of the impacts of major construc-tion projects in arid regions; but becausethe grid pattern of MPS would mean thata very large area would be close to con-struction activities, it is possible thatthousands of square miles of rangelandcould be rendered unproductive.

4. None of the variants of MPS would reducethe risks and uncertainties associated with PLU orsignificantly alter the number of shelters re-quired. However, split basing or the selection of adifferent deployment area would mitigate theregional impacts. The variants that OTA exam-ined include changes from horizontal to verti-cal shelters, from “individual cluster” to “vaI-Iey cluster” basing, and from Utah/Nevadabasing to basing divided between Utah/Nevadaand west Texas/New Mexico. A further variant

would be to construct additional silos in theexisting Minuteman basing areas to create aMinuteman/MPS system. This constructionwould be substantially cheaper than the pro-posed MX/MPS system, but would not be sig-nificantly quicker to construct.

5. A LoADS ABM system could effectively dou-ble the number of shelters in an MPS deploymentprovided two conditions were met. A LoADSsystem would have a high probability of shoot-ing down the first Soviet warhead aimed ateach MX missile, forcing the Soviets to attackeach shelter with two warheads. The condi-tions for LoADS’ effectiveness are: 1 ) PLU bothfor the MX and for the LoADS defense unit,and 2) survival and operation of the defense inthe presence of nearby nuclear detonations.Since the LoADS defense unit must be con-cealed in a shelter and must be indistinguish-able from the missiles and the decoys, LoADSdeployment would compound the difficultiesof PLU. These difficulties would be greater stillif the LoADS addition were not planned at thetime the MPS system was being designed. TheLoADS defense unit would be required to en-dure nuclear effects of a severity unprece-dented for so complex a piece of equipment.

A LoADS deployment would require theUnited States either to seek amendment of, orto withdraw from, the ABM Treaty reached atSALT 1.

6. Basing MX missiles in silos and relying onlaunching the missiles before a Soviet attackcould destroy them (launch under attack, or LUA)would be technically feasible, but it would createextreme requirements for availability of, andrapid decisionmaking by, National Command Au-thorities. A substantial upgrading of existingwarning and communications systems wouldbe required to ensure this capability against adetermined Soviet attempt at disruption, Reli-ance on this capabiIity wou Id, however, im-pose extremely stringent requirements that thePresident be in communication with both thewarning systems and the forces, and that anunprecedentedly weighty decision be made ina few minutes on the basis of information sup-

6 ● MX Missile Basing

plied by remote sensors. Finally, there wouldalways be concern about whether the systemwas really immune to disruption or errors.

7. MX missiles based on small submarineswould be highly survivable. Submarine-based MXwould not be significantly less capable than land-based MX, but submarine-basing would involve areorientation of U.S. strategic forces. An MXforce based on small diesel-electric or nuclearsubmarines operating 1,000 to 1,500 miles fromthe U.S. coast could offer weapon effective-ness (i. e., accuracy, responsiveness, time-on-target control, and rapid retargeting) almost asgood as land basing and would probably beadequate to carry out any strategic mission. Acommand, control, and communications (CJ)system to support submarine basing would bedifferent from that used for landbasing butwould not necessarily be less capable. How-ever, submarine basing of MX would changethe relative importance of land- and subma-rine-based strategic forces. Although OTAcould find no scientific basis for predictingsuch an occurrence, the possibility cannot beexcluded that an unexpected Soviet capabilityin antisubmarine warfare that threatened theU.S. force of Poseidon and Trident submarinesmight also threaten a force of MX missiles onsmall submarines. The cost of providing 100MX missiles on alert at all times on a small sub-marine force would be roughly comparable tothe cost of the baseline MPS system, andwould be less than the cost of an MPS systemsized to meet a larger Soviet threat. A signifi-cant problem is that such a force of small sub-marines could not be constructed quickly; ex-isting U.S. submarine construction programsare already behind schedule, and delays mightarise from using shipyards which are not nowbuilding submarines. It is therefore unlikelythat initial MX deployment on small sub-marines could take place before 1990. How-ever, the first MX missiles deployed would besurvivable even before the rest of the deploy-ment was complete.

8. An air-mobile MX-carried on wide-bodiedaircraft and launched in midair—would be surviv-able provided the aircraft received timely warn-ing and took off immediately. Its dependence on

prompt response to timely warning of subma-rine-launched ballistic missile attack wouldgive such a force a common failure mode withthe bomber force. (Removing dependence onwarning by means of continuous airborne alertwouId be prohibitively expensive; acquisitionand “1O years of operation for such a forceCould cost $80 billion to $100 billion (fiscalyear 1980 dollars). ) On the other hand, an airmobile force could not be threatened by theSoviet ICBM force unless the Soviets deployedman}’ more ICBM missiles than they nowpossess and used them to barrage the entireCentral United States. The outcome of such anattack wouId be insensitive to Soviet improve-ment in the fractionation and accuracy of theirICBMS. An air mobile MX force could not en-dure long after an attack if the Soviets at-tacked every airfield on which such planescould land to refuel, In this case, the NationalCommand Authorities would have to “use orlose” the MX missiles within 5 to 6 hours of aSoviet attack. Providing endurance by increas-ing the number of airfields at which the planescould refuel would be enormously expensive($10 billion to $30 billion for up to 4,600 air-fields), and growth of the Soviet threat toplausible levels for the 1990’s would require somany airfields that they would essentially fillthe continental United States. The aircraftwouId have to take off to launch their missiIes,which couId mean slow response time, longerwarning for the Soviets of a U.S. strike, and thepossibility that the Soviets would mistakedispersal during a crisis for preparation for aU.S. first strike. Warning, communications,and guidance systems for an air-mobiIe forcecould be complex.

9. The problems associated with other basingmodes studied by OTA appear more substantial.An ABM defense of MX missiles based in fixedsilos against a large Soviet threat would re-quire the use of a complex system based onfrontier technology and potentially vulnerableto Soviet countermeasures. The technical risksappear too high to support a decision today torely on such a system for MX basing. BasingMX on surface ships appears to offer no seri-ous advantages and significantly less sur-vivability than submarine basing. Basing MX in


“superhardened” shelters (e. g., very deepunderground) would Iikely involve a period ofseveral days between a launch order and theactual launch of the missile. Rail mobile MXwould involve problems of force managementand vu Inerabiity to peacetime accidents orsabotage Road-mob i I e basing appears infeasi-ble because of the size of the missile; off-roadmobile basing appears to offer few advantagesand several drawbacks compared to MPS.

10. In comparing MPS, MPS with LoADS, LUA,small submarine basing, and air mobile, it isfound that:

●

●

●

●

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●

All offer reasonable prospects for feasibil-it y and survivabiIity MPS depends for sur-revivability on concealing its location (PLU)which creates a degree of technical risk,and which wouId be become stiII morecliff i cult if LoADS is used to defend MPSAll are compatible with high weapon ef-fectiveness for the MX missile, althoughMPS, MPS with LoADS, and LUA wouldprovide slightly better accuracy than sub-marine basing or air mobile.MPS would endure in an operational con-dition for a long time if it survived; smallsubmarines would endure for severalmonths; air mobile might endure for onlya few hours, depending on the nature ofthe Soviet at tack; the endurance ofLoADS would depend on the speed andeffectiveness of surviving Soviet recon-naissance and retargeting capabilities;LUA would have no endurance at all.All are compatible with adequate C3, butobtaining such C3 for any of them wouldrequire time, effort, and money.MPS could complicate future arms con-trol. MPS with LoADS would requireamending or withdrawing from the ABMTreaty reached at SALT 1. LUA, small sub-marines, and air mobile appear compati-ble with existing arms control concepts.MPS, or MPS with LoADS, would have animpact on both the socioeconomic andphysical environment in the deploymentregion that would be so great as to be dif-ferent in kind from the impacts of any of

the other systems. LUA would have vir-tually no environmental impact. Impactsfrom submarine basing and air mobilewould be relatively small and Iimited tothe areas of the operating bases,

Assuming a requirement for 100 survivingMX missiles, costs of baseline MPS, sub-marine basing, and air mobile would beroughly comparable: costs of acquisitionand 10 years of operations for nominaldesigns are estimated to be roughly $40billion (fiscal year 1980 dollars). RebasingMinuteman III in an MPS mode wouldcost 10 to 20 percent less. Growth in theSoviet threat would require increases inthe costs of MPS systems, but not in theothers. If the Soviet threat grew to a levelOTA considers plausible for 1990, theUnited States could assure survivability ofthe MX/MPS either by adding LoADS (atan additional cost of $10 billion to $15billion) or by expanding the number ofshelters and MX missiles (at an additionalcost of $15 billion to $20 billion). Con-tinued growth of the Soviet threat into the199o’s would drive the cost of survivabili-ty as high as $80 billion. Costs of LUAwould be the lowest: procurement of theMX missiles, modification of existing silos,and upgraded C3 and warning systemscould be $20 billion cheaper than thealternatives.

MPS could provide a small, nonsurvivableforce by 1986 or 1987, and a large, sur-vivable force by about 1990 MX deploy-ment relying on launch under attackcould begin in 1986, but completion ofnecessary upgrading of warning and C3systems would require several yearslonger. Air mobile could be deployed nearthe end of the decade. MPS with LoADScould be available around 1990, Smallsubmarines could be deployed beginningaround 1990, and would be survivableimmediately, Thus, none of the basingmodes could close the so-called “windowof vulnerability” before the end of thedecade,


ELEVEN POSSIBLE BASING MODES

1. MX/MPS—The CurrentBaseline System

I n the fall of 1979, the Carter administrationselected a basing mode for MX and decided toproceed with full-scale engineering devel-opment. This design envisages the deceptivedeployment of 200 MX missiles in 4,600hardened concrete shelters. If the Sovietscould not know which shelters contained theactual MX missiles and which containedmissile decoys, they would have to target all4,600 shelters in order to attack all 200missiles. The baseline system would be locatedin the Great Basin area of Nevada and Utahand could be expanded by building additionalshelters, additional missiles, or both.

The shelters would be spaced roughly 1 mileapart, and arranged in a linear grid pattern.(Fig, 2 illustrates the schematic layout of asingle cluster. ) Each of the 200 missiles wouldbe based in separate clusters of 23 shelters.The missiles would be transportable withineach cluster but could not be moved from onecluster to another without removing largeearthen barriers. Each shelter would resemblea garage or loading dock; the truck transport-ing a missile or decoy would back up to theshelter entrance, and insert the missile ordecoy horizontally. Each cluster would thuscontain 1 MX missile, 22 decoys, 23 shelters, 1large transporter truck, and 1 maintenancefacility. The truck would shuffle the missileand the decoys among the shelters in such a

Figure 2.—Conceptual Cluster Layout

w

23 protective sheltersper cluster “

t y p i c a l

SOURCE U S Air Force


way that the Soviets wouId be unable to deter-mine which shelter contained the missile.M iss i les wou ld a lso be t ranspor ted fo rmaintenance or, possibly, to facIitate armscontrol verification.

The MX missile in MPS basing has beendesigned to set a new standard in militarycapability. Its accuracy would be unprece-dented, It could be rapidly retargeted in avariety of ways, and would have precise time-on-target control. MPS basing wouId give MX avery high alert rate and a long postattack en-durance. As a system, MX/MPS would performits military function providin g that two condi-tions were met: 1 ) preservation of locationuncertainty for the missile, and 2) adequatesize to meet the Soviet threat.

Preservation of Location Uncertainty (PLU)

The multiple shelters cannot ensure survivalof the requisite number of missiles if the Sovietsfind out which shelters contain the missiles. PLUtherefore involves making certain that theobservable characteristics of missiles anddecoys are so nearly identical that an outsideobserver cannot distinguish them, This designentails a major new engineering task, driven bythe high sensitivity of present-day and futuresensors and by the many observable signs of themissile’s presence. As an example of PLU en-gineering, the missile decoy might contain anappropriate quantity and distribution of high-permeability metal to help make it impossibleto distinguish the missile from the decoys bymeans of a metal detector.

Dealing with this and dozens of other poten-tially observable signatures makes PLU theequivalent of a new technology, which is widein scope and intensive in detail. It would requirethe integration of administrative, operational,and technical considerations. One cannot haveconfidence in the success of this “new technol-ogy” before equipment prototypes are field-tested, because even fine details of missilesignatures are important for adequate missileconcealment. Furthermore, after the system isfully designed, tested, and deployed, lingeringdoubts could remain that would limit confi-

8 3 - 4 7 7 0 - 2

dence in the system. Even small doubts could beimportant, since a catastrophic breakdown inPLU (e. g., a technique whereby the Sovietscould determine the exact location of themissiles by satellite observations) would make itrelatively easy to attack all the MX missiles; amore Iimited breakdown, while not imperilingthe entire system, could improve the effec-tiveness of a Soviet attack and reduce theweight of a U.S. retaliation. On the other hand,the Soviets’ task of “breaking” PLU could bedifficult as well. For the Soviets to attack thesystem on the basis of their own counter-PLU ef-forts might entail considerable risk and uncer-tainty on their part.

Except during missile transport, the proposedbaseline system would not restrict public ac-tivities outside the 2.5-acre sites surroundingeach shelter, While barring the public from alarger area might be infeasible, restrictions onpublic activities, including mineral explorationand development, could be necessary. From atechnical standpoint, the nature and extent ofthese restrictions depends on the degree of suc-cess of the Air Force PLU program.

Adequate Size in theFace of Threat Growth

The principle of an MPS system is that sur-vivability is maintained by having moreshelters than the enemy is able to target. It istherefore necessary to estimate the number ofRVS (reentry vehicles carrying a nuclearwarhead) which the Soviets could use to attackthe MX/MPS system, and to ensure that thenumber of shelters is sufficiently large. Sincethe Soviets have other high-priority targets(bomber bases, submarines in port, etc.) andpresumably want to retain a force in reserve,the number of RVS available to attack MXwould be somewhat less, perhaps several thou-sand RVS less, than the total number of SovietRVS.

Any effort to estimate the size of and com-position of future Soviet forces is highlyuncertain — U. S. intelIigence is far fromperfect, and in some cases the Soviet leadersthemselves may not yet have made key deci-

10 MX Missile Basing

sions. OTA has sought an approximation of thethreat by making a series of conservativeassumptions, most notably that the trends ofthe 1970’s in the rate of Soviet developmentand deployment of their ICBM force continuethrough the 1980’s and the 1990’s. On thisassumption, it is estimated that the Sovietscould have 6,000 to 7,000 RVS available to at-tack MX/MPS by 1990, and 11,000 to 12,000RVS available by 1995. By the year 2000,15,000or more Soviet RVS could be aimed at anMX/MPS deployment. This assumes that ap-proximately 3,000 additional Soviet RVS wouldbe reserved for other counterforce targets,such as Minuteman silos, and that an addi-tional force of Soviet strategic weapons wouldbe allocated to attack or threaten U.S. cities,industry, and conventional miIitary forces.

One can calculate the approximate numberof shelters needed to ensure the survival of 100MX missiles against the projected Soviet threat(fig. 3). For example, if we assume the 1990threat of 7,000 RVS targeted against MX, an 85-percent probability of RVS reaching theirtargets, a deployment of 1 missile for each 23

Figure 3.— MPS Shelter Requirement(100 Surviving Missiles)

Number ofshelters

15,300

12,500

8,250

4,600

1990

2,700 7,000 12,000 15,300Soviet RVS targeting MX

Assumptions:. 1 missile for every 23 shelters● Damage expectancy 0,85 Feasible Soviet threat growth

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

shelters, and no ballistic missile defense, thenthis would require a deployment of 360 mis-siles among 8,250 shelters. Similarly for the1995 threat of 12,000 RVS, the same survival re-quirement could be met with 550 MX missilesamong 12,500 shelters.

An alternative assumption is that, faced withthe threat that MX would pose to their silos,the Soviets would devote their efforts to pro-viding survivable basing for their existingICBM force, rather than to expanding their RVinventory in order to attack MX/MPS.

The existing schedule for the baseline casecalls for completion of 4,600 shelters by 1989,although it does involve some optimisticassumptions. Continuation of the planned con-struction rate (roughly 100 shelters per month)would mean that it would be 1992 before thelevel of 8,250 shelters was approached, and bythen 8,250 could be insufficient. By 1995 thenumber of shelters constructed (at a rate of100 per month) would be just under 12,000— still somewhat less than the number of avail-able Soviet RVS. Clearly, a response to a Sovieteffort to overwhelm MX calls for either anABM system (discussed below) or a higher con-struction rate.

A large MPS system which was too small toretain survivability couId stilI have some valueas a means of limiting Soviet options. It wouldstilI oblige the Soviets to use a large fraction oftheir strategic forces to destroy a somewhatsmal ler fraction of U.S. strategic forces.However, if the Soviets “fractionate” – i.e.,put a larger number of smaller warheads ontheir large missiles —then the Soviets might bewilling to accept an unfavorable exchangeratio because they could “afford” to expend alarge number of RVS in order to destroy asmaller number of RVS that constituted the en-tire U.S. ICBM inventory. I n any case, it is clearthat an MPS that was far too small, say half asmany shelters as available Soviet RVS, couldnot be considered at al I survivable, and wouIdbe of little greater value than single shelterbasing.

With the same reasoning, an MPS systemthat requires a number of years to build would

Ch. l—Summary ● 1 1

not reach survival value until the number ofoperational shelters exceeded the number ofSoviet RVS available to attack them, If oneassumes that the number of available SovietRVS may grow from year to year, then the timewhen U.S. MPS construction actually beganand the rate at which shelters were con-structed would both be critical. Since buildingadditional shelters would require time, in-cluding time to plan the additional buildingprogram, the United States would require aprediction several years in advance of the sizeof the Soviet threat against MX.

The Air Force has estimated that a construc-tion rate of 2,000 shelters per year (about 165per month) would not exceed projected con-struction resources, although there would bean additional $400 m i I I ion in front-end costs(e.g., additional cement factories). Assumingthis construction rate, to start construction in1986 would bring the United States to the re-quired shelter level sometime in 1991, and itmight not be difficult to stay ahead thereafter.However, it would be necessary to decide by1983 (or 1984 at the latest) that a 2,000 shelterper year construction rate would be needed,and it is not clear that by 1983 the UnitedStates will have a reliable estimate of the paththat Soviet ICBM deployment will have takenby 1990. Furthermore, )the United States couldnot first buiId a 4,600-shelter system and thendecide to expand it if it proved to be too small,unless the United States were prepared todefer survivability into the mid-1990’s. There-fore, the completion date, size, regional im-pact, and cost of an MPS system would all de-pend in part on what the Soviets chose to do,and on the accuracy of the U.S. estimates offuture Soviet programs.

It is possible that the Soviet decision aboutwhether to attempt to overwhelm MX/MPSwith large numbers of RVS would depend onSoviet estimates of their chances for success.U.S. construction of MX/MPS at the baselinerate might tempt the Soviets to deploy moreRVS in order to “stay ahead, ” while a U.S. deci-sion to build a larger deployment at an ac-celerated rate might persuade the Soviets thatdeploying many more RVS was pointless. In

this case, the expansion of the program wouldmake itself unnecessary, but the United StateswouId probably realize this only after incur-ring the greatly increased costs and regionalimpacts of expansion

Regional Impacts

The regional impacts of the proposed MPSbasing system would be severe and could in-clude the long-term loss of thousands ofsquare mi les o f productive range lands,However, the severity of these impacts wouldresuIt as much from the site selection criteriaas from the nature of the basing system andcould be mitigated, in part, by variants of theproposed system.

MPS construction would require a workforce ranging in size anywhere from 25,000 to40,000, depending on construction techniques,program decisions, and the total number ofshelters required by 199o. The total associatedpopulation could be as high as 250,000 people.Because MPS siting criteria require minimumpopulation densities, this influx of peoplewouId necessarily overwhelm the social in-frastructure and severe impacts would resultwithin the deployment area. The overall im-pacts would include potential economic bene-fits; bu t exper ience w i th rap id g rowththroughout the West suggests that most ofthese benefits would go to in-migrants withspecialized skills, while unemployed residentsof the deployment area, women, minorities,and Indians would be least likely to benefit. Atthe same time, the economic restructuring o fthe region would adversely impact many localbusinesses. The cultural values of isolatedcommunities with integrated social structureswouId also be subject to severe disruption.

I n the larger urban areas on the periphery ofthe deployment area, MPS would have dif-ferent effects. Although these areas mighthave sufficient social infrastructures to absorbrapid population growth, uncertainties regard-ing the potential size of the MPS related popu-lation increase and their geographic distribu-tion would preclude effective growth manage-


ment. As a result, investment planning in both the resource and manpower requirements con-the public and the private sectors would prob- tribute to delays in energy project schedules.ably fail to minimize the adverse impacts ormaximize the potent ial benef i ts of MPS l-he physical impacts of MPS would neces-deployment. Finally, smaller communities af - sarlly involve the disruption of 200 squarefected by planned energy developments in sur- miles of land area for construction of shelters,rounding areas could be impacted by MPS if roads, and support facilit ies (fig. 4). In a

Figure 4.— Potential Vegetative Impact Zone



deployment area with moderate rainfall andagricultural productivity, the major impacts ofconstruction might be confined to the loss ofthose lands and related wildlife habitat, butother lands temporarily disturbed by construc-tion activities probably could be revegetated.In “least productive” agricultural lands suchas the Great Basin, however, the arid environ-ment would inhibit revegetation and effectscouId spread to adjacent lands. I n the absenceof irrigated revegetation, or if subjected tocontinued disruption from PLU surveillanceactivities and random off-road vehicles, theselands would not recover. Consequently, thou-sands of square miles of productive rangelandcouId be desolated and the ecology of the en-tire region irreversibly degraded,

Institutionally, the use of Federal landswould raise many complicated questions oflandrights, oil and gas leases, mining claims,grazing permits, and Indian land claims, result-ing primarily from potential conflicts betweenPLU requirements and economic activitiessuch as mineral exploration and development.If private lands are used, most of these ques-tions could be circumvented by negotiation ofeasements with explicit provisions for PLU,def ini t ions of compatible land uses, andcovenants regarding the resale of propertiesand rights, although the process of negotiationmight delay the project schedule.

Civilian Fatalities

OTA arranged for calculat ions of thenumber of civilian fatalities due to radiationfallout that would result from a Soviet nuclearattack on an MPS deployment in Utah andNevada. The results depend to a very largedegree on windspeed and direction, causingcalculated fatalities to range from less than 5million to more than 20 million. However, itseems quite probable that a Soviet nuclear at-tack on MX wouId be Iikely to include Minute-man and Titan missile fields, strategic bomberbases, and submarines in port. Because theseexisting targets are distributed over a largearea, the added fallout-related fatalities due tothe additional targets in the MPS fields wouldhave a likely range from less than 1 million to 5

million. Total fatalities for this general attackhave been estimated to range from 25 millionto 50 million people.

Fatalities due to fallout would be a majorpart, but not the only measure, of damagecaused by a nuclear attack. For a discussion ofother consequences, and of the uncertaintiesinvolved, see OTA’S earlier study, The Effectsof Nuclear War.

cost

All present cost estimates must be qualified;apart from the usual uncertainties of esti-mating future costs of unprecedented pro-grams (which means that all estimates have atleast a 10-percent error factor), there are somedesign decisions that have not yet been madethat would have an impact on costs. Neverthe-less, OTA reviewed the Air Force cost esti-mates and prepared an independent estimateusing a comparable methodology. OTA’S esti-mate of $37.2 billion (fiscal year 1980 dollars)for acquisition costs of the system is within 10percent of the Air Force estimate of $33.8billion (fiscal year 1980 dollars) and is withinthe accepted range of uncertainty. I n order topermit fair comparison with other possible bas-ing modes, an estimate was made for the costof: (a) acquisition plus (b) operating costs be-tween initial operating capability (IOC) andfinal operating capability (FOC), plus (c) thecost of operating the full system for 10 yearsafter FOC. This 10-year Iifecycle cost was $43.5billion (fiscal year 1980 dollars). Note thatneither the Air Force estimate nor the OTAestimate includes the costs of mitigating re-gional impacts. The socioeconomic impactscould amount to several billion dollars, whichwould be divided in some way among the AirForce, local and State governments, and in-dividuals and firms in the area. The costs of ir-rigation to permit revegetation, if this wereundertaken, could be several billion additionaldolIars.

OTA also estimated the cost of an expandedsystem. The estimated cost of a system of8,250 shelters and 360 missiles, completed by1990 is $62.4 billion (fiscal year 1980 dollars).

14 . MX Missile Basing

The cost of a system of 12,500 shelters and 550missiles, completed by 1995, was estimated at$82.6 billion (fiscal year 1980 dollars).

At the request of the Senate AppropriationsCommittee, the Congressional Budget Office(CBO) made similar estimates. Their assump-tions were coordinated with OTA, but theymade use of an Air Force parametric costmodel. CBO estimates of system acquisitioncosts for 325 missiles in 8,570 shelters (the leastcostly mix for the 1990 threat) were $49 bilIion(fiscal year 1980 dollars), compared to OTA’Sestimate of $52.9 billion for acquisition costs.For the 1995 OTA projected threat, CBO esti-mated a system acquisition cost for 4 1 0missiles and 13,510 shelters (the least costlymix) of $66 bill ion (fiscal year 1980 dollars),compared to OTA’S estimate of $71.1 billionfor acquisition costs. CBO further estimatedthat if a LoADS ABM system were deployed tomeet the 1990 threat, system acquisition costsfor 225 missiles, 5,370 shelters, and 225 LoADSdefense units (the least cost mix) would beabout $44 billion (fiscal year 1980 dollars), orabout 10-percent less than an undefended sys-tem for the same threat level.

Schedule

The present Air Force schedule calls for IOCin mid-1986, and FOC by the end of 1989. OTAreviewed the milestones which this schedulewould require, and believes that the schedulefor IOC, while possible, is quite optimistic. Anyunforeseen delays, including delay in a firmadministration decision on MX basing modeafter July 1, 1981, would almost certainlyresult in slippage in IOC. On the other hand, adelay of some months in IOC need not lead toa corresponding delay in FOC. Slippage in IOCby 1 year, without significant change in FOC,would increase acquisition costs by about $1billion (fiscal year 1980 dollars). OTA considersthis a likely scenario.

2. MX/MPS: Vertical Shelters

There is technical disagreement overwhether MPS should have horizontal or ver-tical shelters. On the one hand, if missiles need

to be quickly relocated, it appears that missilerelocation takes less time with horizontalshelters than with vertical shelters becausemissile insertion for horizontal shelters issomewhat simpler. On the other hand, theUnited States has more experience with, andunderstanding of, vertical shelters; and poundfor pound of concrete, vertical shelters aremore resistant to nuclear weapon effects thanhorizontal shelters. As a result, less land areamight be required for a given number ofshelters. Still, it appears that with adequatefield tests, horizontal shelters could be built towithstand the expected nuclear environmentwith confidence.

There is no particular reason to believe thatPLU, arms control verifiability, or addition ofan ABM system would be significantly easieror more difficult if a shift were made fromhorizontal to vertical shelters. However, abouta year of intensive engineering developmenthas taken place on the basis of a decision touse horizontal shelters. Much effort has goneinto design of PLU and ABM components, andthis effort would have to be done over. Apartfrom the loss of time, real confidence in ver-tical shelter PLU or vertical shelter ABM wouldhave to await the results of this design effort.

OTA estimates that the Iifecycle costs for a4,600 vertical shelter system with a 1989 FOCwould be reduced by about $1.5 billion (fiscalyear 1980 dolIars) if the shift were made to ver-tical shelters now.

3. Valley Cluster Basing

A variant of the baseline system, that hasreceived serious consideration within D O D

during the first part of 1981, is to replace “in-dividual clusters” with “valley clusters. ” Thischange would mean creating a single largecluster i n each valIey, establishing the roads sothat it would be possible to move a missile be-tween any two shelters in the same valley. Thisapproach is in contrast to the baseline arrange-ment in which only 1 missile has access to eachgroup of 23 shelters, and each missile can beplaced only in one of its “own” 23 shelters.Valley clustering would not alter the design ofthe missiles, shelters, or transporter trucks.


This change would have the following ef-fects:

1. I t would require fewer maintenancefacilities. Instead of 1 facility per clusterof 23 shelters (required because the trans-porter trucks could not carry missilesfrom one cluster to another), there couldbe only one or two facilities per valley.This would save money in both construc-tion and operation.

2. It would require fewer transporter trucks.Instead of one transporter per missile, itwould be possible to have one transporterfor several missiles. This would savemoney, but it would mean that reshufflingall the missiles and decoys would takelonger, and it would limit the possibility of“dash to shelter” as a fallback mode ifPLU were broken.

3. It would have only marginal effects onPLU.

4. It could make arms-control verificationmore difficult. While it would probablynot affect the difficulty of clandestinelyintroducing additional missiles into thedeployment area (i.e., putting missiles inshelters that are supposed to containdecoys), it would make it most difficult toverify after the fact that such cheatinghad or had not taken place. Since thisdrawback is the same as the drawback ofsaving money by eliminating the so-called“SALT ports” (openable hatches in thetops of shelters designed to facilitateverification), valIey clusters and elimina-tion of SALT ports (which would savemoney) appear to some as an attractivecombination.

5. Valley clusters would not change the prin-cipal regional impacts.

On balance, shifting to valley clusters, ifcombined with the elimination of SALT ports,might save close to $2 billion (fiscal year 1980dollars), at the cost of slower reshuffling andmore difficult verification.

4. Split Basing MPS: Nevada/Utahand West Texas/New Mexico

Split basing would locate half of the sheltersin the Great Basin of Nevada and Utah, andhalf in the Southern High Plains of west Texasand New Mexico. The rationale would be tomitigate the adverse regional impacts— bothsocioeconomic and physical — by making thedeployment in each region smaller.

Split basing would mitigate some of theadverse impacts of MPS. The mitigation wouldarise from the l ikel ihood that the rapidchanges created by MX/MPS constructioncould be below thresholds where they becomedif f icul t or impossible to manage in theavailable time. However, if the baseline shelternumber (4,600) and construction rate (roughly1,200 per year) proved inadequate, then splitbasing would probably not mitigate the im-pacts, but might make system expansion easierbecause plenty of suitable land would bereadily available. Split basing could com-plicate issues of land acquisition, since theland to be used in Nevada and Utah is largelypublic land, while the land in west Texas andNew Mexico is largely in private hands.

Split basing would increase the costs of bothconstruction and operation by about 7 to 10percent.

5. MX/MPS With a LoADS ABM System

An alternative to increasing the number ofshelters in the face of an expanded Sovietthreat would be to provide the MPS systemwith a ballistic missile defense. The Army’sLoADS has been proposed for the role ofdefending an MPS system.

The LoADS defense unit (DU) (fig. 5), con-sisting of a tracking radar and nuclear-armedinterceptor missiles, would be designed to fitin the shelters and appear just like an MXmissile or a decoy to outside observers or sen-


Figure 5.— LoADS Defense Unit After Breakout(human figure indicates scales)

SOURCE. Off Ice of Technology Assessment

sors. A DU would be hidden in each cluster ofshelters and programed to defend the sheltercontaining the MX missile. The DU might alsohave to defend itself. When it became ap-parent that a Soviet attack was on the way, theDU would break through the top of the shelterand prepare to fire.

The Soviets would have to target twowarheads at the shelter containing the MXmissile, since the first one would be inter-cepted by LoADS with high probability. Sincethe Soviets would not know which shelter con-tained the MX, they would have to target twoRVS against each of the shelters in the cluster.Thus, addition of LoADS to the baseline MPSsystem would double the price the attackerwould have to pay to destroy an MX missilefrom 23 to 46 RVS. The effect would be thesame as doubling the number of shelters whilekeeping the number of missiles the same.

It is possible to have high confidence thatLoADS would exact a price of 2 RVS per shelter

if the locations of LoADS DUS and the MXmissiles could be concealed and if the DUcould be hardened to survive the effects ofnearby nuclear detonations. This confidence,conditional upon successful deception and nu-clear hardness, results both from advances inballistic missile defense (BMD) technology inthe last decade and from the relatively modestgoal of exacting from the Soviets one more RVper shelter.

Successful deception would be essential forLoADS defense, since if the Soviets found outwhich shelter contained the DU, they could at-tack. that shelter first, force the DU to use upall its interceptors in self-defense, and then at-tack. the remaining shelters using one RV pershelter. The situation would be far worse ifdetection of the DU somehow made it feasiblefor the Soviets to locate the MX missile as well.Since the DU would be a functional object–not just a decoy that could be designed in anyway that would make it indistinguishable from


a missile to Soviet sensors— PLU wouldbecome considerably more complex if LoADSwere added to MX/MPS, It would probably benecessary to alter some features of the MXmissile canisters and the decoys to mimicdistinctive features of the LoADS DU. Becauseof this possibility, a deferred decision todeploy LoADS (made after the dimensions ofthe future Soviet threat became clearer) wouldentail more risk and cost unless the MPSsystem had been designed with the LoADS ad-dition in mind.

The LoADS DU would have to survive andoperate in a nuclear effects environment un-precedented for so complex a piece of equip-ment. Measures taken to protect the DU wouldfurthermore have to be consistent with thesevere design constraints imposed by PLU. It isnot possible to have confidence that the goalsof PLU and nuclear hardening can be met —separately, much less simultaneously— untildetailed design and testing are done.

There is a variety of ways in which theSoviets might respond to deployment ofLoADS, involving both special attack strat-egies and new weapon systems, which couldpose a threat to the defense’s effectiveness.These so-called “reactive threats” are dis-cussed in chapter 3 of this report and itsclassified annex. The risks to LoADS’ effec-tiveness (in forcing the Soviets to target eachshelter twice) from these threats appear to bemoderate.

Because LoADS would be integrated intothe MPS system, the environmental impactswould be essentialIy the same as for baselineMX/MPS.

LoADS DUS that were mobile or that con-tained more than one interceptor missile perDU could not be developed outside of thelaboratory, tested, or deployed within theterms of the ABM Limitation Treaty reached atSALT 1. Pursuing this option from the presenttechnology development stage into prototyp-ing or deployment would require amendmentor abrogation of the Treaty. The diplomaticand political consequences of seeking amend-ment or unilaterally withdrawing from the

Treaty are beyond the scope of this study.Amendment or abrogation would give theSoviets the legal right to develop and deployan ABM system of their own. A Soviet ABMdeployment might create a situation in whichthe United States felt it needed more survivingMX missiles, and hence a larger deployment, tobe sure of destroying defended Soviet targets.

6. MPS Deployment of Minuteman Ill

A related possibility would be to constructadditional silos or shelters in the existingMinuteman I I I fields, and modify the Minute-man I I I missiles to permit them to be movedaround deceptively and concealed among theavailable shelters. The rationale for such anoption would be to use the MPS concept tomake the existing Minuteman I I I missile sur-vivable, thereby saving time and money. Sucha system might replace MX altogether, or itmight serve as a precursor system, with MXgradually replacing Minuteman III missiles inthe new MPS field. It could also serve as an in-terim measure, providing survivable land bas-ing until some other mode of MX basing wasread y.

Such a system appears to be technicallyfeasible. The existing Minuteman III missilesand launch-support equipment would be can-nisterized separately to facilitate movementamong protective shelters. New transportersfor the Minuteman missiles and associatedequipment would have to be procured, androads in the deployment area wouId have to beupgraded. It would also be necessary to designa system for maintaining Minuteman PLU simi-lar to but not identical to the system of main-taining PLU for the MX. Minuteman PLU wouldhave similar technical risks and uncertainties,although the institutional problems would bealtered by the predominance of private lands.The regional impacts would be simi lar lyaltered, and OTA’S analysis suggests that boththe range of likely impacts and the probabilityof extremely severe impacts would be reduced.It would be possible, at additional cost, toreplace the existing guidance system with thenew AlRS (advanced inertial reference sphere)

18 . MX MissileBasing

guidance system being designed for MX; thiswould upgrade the military capability of Min-uteman I I I to the level of the MX missile, ex-cept that since each missile would carry fewerwarheads, more missiles would be required foran equivalent capability.

Cost and schedule are of particular interestin considering an MPS rebasing of MinutemanI II, since this basing mode was originally pro-posed as a “quick fix.” Assuming a firm deci-sion in july 1981, it appears that MinutemanMPS could not be deployed on a faster sched-ule than MX/MPS. Because of the need to repli-cate for Minuteman the design work alreadydone on PLU for MX, and the need to begin theenvironmental impact statement and land ac-quisition processes, construction for Minute-man rebasing probably could not begin beforethe spring of 1985, and FOC for a survivable5,800-shelter Minuteman MPS system wouldprobably be in the spring of 1989, Cost of aMinuteman MPS would be less than the cost ofMX/MPS, OTA estimates that Minuteman MPSsystem composed of 5,800 shelters and 667missiles, which would have roughly equivalentsurvivabiIity to baseline MX/MPS and existingsilo-based Minuteman, couId be built andoperated for about $36 billion, or roughly $7billion less than MX/MPS (fiscal year 1980dollars). This figure would include reopeningthe Minuteman production line to provide testmissiles and spares, but would not include thecost of retrofitting the MX guidance system(AIRS) on to the Minuteman Ill missiles. If thesystems had to be augmented (whether by ex-pansion, by adding LoADS, or both) to meet anexpanded Soviet threat, the cost advantage ofMinuteman III MPS would diminish somewhat.

Expanding a Minuteman MPS system tomaintain survivability against an expandedthreat would require a substantial increase inthe total number of U.S. multiple independent-ly targeted reentry vehicle ICBMS. This wouldrun counter to the approach to offensive armscontrol which both the United States and theSoviets have espoused during the last decadeof SALT negotiations.

7. Launch Under Attack

Another approach to MX survivability (or,for that matter, Minuteman survivability) is tobase the missiles in fixed silos, accept thevuInerabiIity of these siIos, and resolve tolaunch the missiles before Soviet RVS could ar-rive to destroy them (fig. 6 gives the attacktimeline of LUA. ). Such a posture is known aslaunch under attack (LUA). Adopting this ap-proach to basing MX would mean choosing torely on LUA.

To have high confidence in the technicalaspects of LUA, the United States would haveto begin by substantially upgrading the sys-tems that provide warning of an attack andemergency communications. OTA’S analysis

indicates that providing sensors and com-munications I inks that were highly reliable inthe face of Soviet efforts to destroy or disruptthem is feasible but would require time,money, and continued effort. Almost all im-provements in this area could be deployed bythe end of the decade at a cost of severalbillion dollars. The total cost of this basingmode, including the MX missiles, might beabout half that of baseline MPS. Some of thesystems required for LUA would be desirable,or perhaps even necessary, for other basingmodes as well.

Once this were done, we could have highconfidence that LUA was technically feasibleprovided that National Command Authorities(i.e., individuals empowered to order thelaunch of the MX missiles) were in communica-tion with a command post at the moment theSoviet attack was detected so that they couldassess its meaning, decide how to respond, and

Figure 6.— Attack Timeline

Time (minutes)

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment.


communicate a launch order to the forces in ashort period of time. Whether the PresidentwouId be available at al I times for this pur-pose, or delegate his most awesome authorityto someone who was, is clearly not a matter oftechnology but of decision at the highest levelof government.

Apart from this question, LUA has several at-tractive features as an MX basing mode.Because existing silos could be modified foruse by MX missiles, there need not be any ma-jor environmental or societal impact. The costwould be lower than for any other MX basingmode, and deployment could take place assoon as MX missiles were produced. LUAwould preserve familiar features of silo basing,including weapon effectiveness as measuredby accuracy, time-on-target control, retarget-ing capability, and the like; familiar forcemanagement procedures; and familiar armscontrol verification procedures. The sametargets (and perhaps more) would be availablein the first few minutes of a war as in the firstfew hours or days. An LUA force could there-fore participate in U.S. war plans in any roleexcept that of a secure reserve force.

Reliance on LUA also has some seriousdrawbacks. Decision time would be very short.Depending on the circumstances, decision-makers could lack crucial information regard-ing the extent and intent of the Soviet attack —e.g., information about targets which theSoviets had chosen not to attack. Such in-formation could be necessary to gauge theproper response. Decisionmakers would alsolack an interval between attack and responseduring which an effort could be made to assessintelligence information, consider diplomaticmeasures, and signal the intent of the U.S.response.

No matter how much money and ingenuitywere devoted to designing safeguards for theU.S. capability to launch under attack, andeven if these safeguards were very robust in-deed, it would never be possible to eradicate alingering fear that the Soviets might find someway to sidestep them.

Finally, despite all safeguards, there wouldalways remain the possibility of error; depend-ing on the nature of the error, it couId mean asuccessful Soviet first strike against MX or itcouId mean a nuclear war started by accident.

8. Silo-Basing With an ABM Defense

For defending a relatively small number oftargets such as MX silos, an ABM system thatoperates outside the atmosphere is preferablein theory to a low altitude defense system. Thisis because an exe-atmospheric (or “exe”)defense could intercept many RVS headed fora single silo, whereas after a small number ofintercepts an endo-atmospheric (“endo”) sys-tem would find further defense precluded bythe effects of its own and attacking nuclearweapons. A combination of exo and endo — aso-called layered defense — is an attractiveconcept because the principal limitation ofeach layer could be alIeviated by the presenceof the other: the exo defense would break upthe dense and structured attacks which couldotherwise overwhelm an endo defense, whilean endo defense could cope with the relativelyfew enemy RVS that would almost certainly“leak” through the exo defense.

The Army’s concept of exo defense, calledthe “Overlay, “ is in the technology explorationstage. No detailed design is available, such asexists for LoADS. In outline, the concept con-sists of interceptor missiles roughly the size ofoffensive missiles, equipped with infrared sen-sors, and carrying several kill vehicles, alsoequipped with infrared sensors. The intercep-tors would be launched into space, where theinfrared sensors would detect approachingRVS as warm spots against the cold back-ground of space. The kill vehicles would bedispatched to destroy the RVS either by col-liding with them directly or by deploying a bar-rier of material in their path.

Because no specific system based on theOverlay concept has been worked out, it is notpossible to analyze in detail the effectivenessof the Overlay in various attack scenarios. It is


clear that high efficiency would be required ifit were to be able to defend a small number ofMX missiles against a large Soviet attack.There are at present many uncertainties aboutwhether the Overlay could achieve the highperformance it would require to satisfy theneeds of MX basing. These uncertainties con-cern both the underlying technology and thedefense system as a whole. The technical riskassociated with layered defense based on theOverlay is therefore high–substantially higherthan the risk associated with LoADS.

In addition to uncertainties and consequentrisk associated with the Overlay, there is a po-tential “Achilles’ heel” in the vulnerability ofinfrared sensing to decoys and other penetra-tion aids. Unlike the LoADS radar, which couldmeasure the weight of approaching objectsafter they entered the atmosphere, the Over-lay’s infrared sensors would measure theirtemperature characteristics. Lightweight de-coys could be made which resembled in theirtemperature characteristics the heavier RVS.

The Overlay is not a system that is devel-oped and ready for the role of defending silo-based MX. As the concept matures, it will haveto deal with the fundamental problem of de-coy discrimination as welI as with the design ofa specific working system. For the moment, itwould be quite risky to rely on the Overlay, oron layered defense, as the basis for MX basing.

As in the case of LoADS, development ordeployment of an Overlay or layered defensewould require amendment or abrogation of theABM Treaty reached at SALT 1.

9. Basing on Small Submarines

It would be technically feasible to build,deploy, and logistically support a fleet of smallMX-carrying diesel-electric-powered subma-rines. These submarines could operate within1,000 to 1,500 nautical miles of three bases,located on the east and west coasts of the con-tinental United States and on the coast ofAlaska. These submarines would be highly sur-vivable against all existing antisubmarinethreats, and against all future antisubmarinewarfare technologies which OTA was able to

project. An alternative means of propulsion,using inexpensive low-powered nuclear reac-tors, is also possible.

At present, no detailed design exists for asubmarine force specifically optimized tohave flexibility, responsiveness, and accuracycomparable to that of the ICBM leg of theTriad. In order to provide a basis for analyzingthe degree to which these attributes could beachieved in a submarine-based MX, OTA haspostulated a system optimized for this pur-pose. The system postulated uses proven tech-nologies and existing U.S. Navy operationalpractices wherever possible, and therefore dif-fer:; in some respects from the “SUM” conceptdeveloped by Sidney Drell and Richard Gar-win.

l-he system assessed by OTA would consistof 51 moderate-sized diesel-electric subma-rines, each of which carries 4 MX missiles (fig.7). The missiles in their capsules would be car-ried horizontally outside the pressure hull.During normal operations about 28 subma-rines wouId be at sea at alI tiroes, whiIe the re-mainder would be in port for refits or over-

Figure 7.—ConceptualSubmarine-Launch MX Missiles



hauls, The submarines would have pressurehull displacements comparable to those ofexisting U.S. and Allied diesel-electric subma-rines. If an operational need arose, the sub-marines would have sufficient size, speed, andendurance to operate at distances in excess ofthe proposed 1,000 to 1,500 nautical milesfrom bases.

Small submarine basing raises two quite dif-ferent kinds of issues. The first class of issuesrelates to whether or not small submarine bas-ing is appropriate for MX; the second class ofissues are technical questions about the extentto which such a basing mode would enable Xto meet the requirements for which it is beingdesigned.

Placing the MX missile on board submarineswould mean that well over half of the U.S.strategic force of the 1990’s would be sub-marine-based. This wouId obviously exacer-bate the problems that would develop if–contrary to expectations —the Soviets were todevelop an antisubmarine warfare capabilitythat was effective against ballistic missile sub-marines. It would not be possible to build anew fleet of submarines without an expansionof U.S. submarine shipbuilding capacity. Itwould be necessary for three shipyards that donot now build submarines to learn how to doso. Submarine construction is complex, and in-volves more exacting quality control than sur-face ship construction. Delays could occur ifthe shipyards have difficulties in implementingthe necessary quality control and constructiontechniques, or if the industrial base supplyingcertain critical materials is not expanded fastenough. Problems could be encountered inrecruiting and retaining enough skilled anddedicated personnel to man such a fIeet.

There is no particular reason why the ex-isting Minuteman force would have to betaken out of service as soon as MX was de-ployed on submarines, and so the land-basedICBM leg of U.S. strategic forces would con-tinue to exist. (Existing plans for, and OTAanalyses of, other basing modes assume the

continued operation of Minuteman after MXdeploy merit.) However, its relative weightwould be diminished, and this could havepolitical significance. There is a school ofthought which holds that basing a major por-tion of U.S. strategic forces on U.S. soil (so-called “sovereign basing”) makes a significantcontribution to deterrence. Moreover, chang-ing the relative weight of land- and sea-basedforces would create institutional problems forboth the Air Force and Navy.

On the other hand, submarine basing of MXcould lend an element of stability to the armsrace, since a Soviet counter would involve in-creasing their already high level of effort in theapparently unpromising area of strategic anti-submarine warfare rather than increasing thenumber of their nuclear weapons. Submarinebasing would be fully compatible with existingarms control concepts and verification pro-cedures. The technical risks would be low.

OTA’S analysis focused on those aspects ofsubmarine basing where it is possible to makecomparisons with other basing modes: surviva-bility, accuracy, responsiveness (including theeffectiveness of command, control, and com-munications), environmental impact, cost, andschedule.

Chapter 5 contains an extensive discussionof the issue of submarine survivability. In brief,OTA could find no existing technology, and notechnology believed to be on the horizon,which offers any promise for permitting an ef-fective Soviet attack on a fleet of small MX-carrying submarines. However, the possibilitythat the Soviets may discover and deploy someantisubmarine warfare technology which can-not be foreseen cannot be excluded. If thiswere to happen, the differences between theTrident fleet (a small number of high-speedboats operating in an enormous deploymentarea) and the MX fleet (a large number ofslower boats operating relatively close to theUnited States) could make it more difficult,and perhaps impossible, for the Soviets todeploy an antisubmarine warfare force capa-ble of attacking both U.S. ballistic missile sub-marine forces.


“Endurance” is defined as the ability to sur-vive for weeks and months assuming that asystem has survived for a few days. The smallsubmarines which OTA envisaged would haveto return to a port (or conceivably an at-seatender) 1 to 4 months after an attack, depend-ing on how long each submarine had alreadybeen at sea when the attack took place.

Submarine-based MX missiles could achieveaccuracies close or equal to the engineering-design requirements for the land-based MXmissile. While it appears likely that land-basedMX accuracies would exceed these require-ments, submarine-based systems may wellhave such high damage expectancies againstvery hard targets that further improvements inaccuracy would not have military significance.

OTA could find no reason to believe that theconstruction of three new submarine baseswould have environmental impacts unlikethose associated with comparable construc-tion projects in coastal areas. In this case, theimpacts would be confined to the immediateareas surrounding the three operating bases,and should be manageable.

Any estimate of the cost of small submarinebasing can only be approximate, since nodetailed design exists. Acquisition cost of thesystem described here is estimated to be about$32 billion (fiscal year 1980 dollars), withanother $7 billion to operate the system until2000.

Construction of submarines is a complexand specialized task, involving rigorous quali-ty control and specialized materials not nor-mally required for shipbuilding. At presentthere are only two shipyards in the UnitedStates capable of building submarines, andboth are backlogged. Bringing additional ship-yards to the point where they could build sub-marines, and obtaining the necessary parts andmaterials, could perhaps involve substantialdelays. OTA estimates that the first such sub-marine could not be operational before 1988at the very earliest, with 1990 a more realisticdate. Four more years would be needed beforethe force reached the number of 51. Efforts toaccelerate this schedule (or, if things went

wrong, to maintain this schedule) could delayother, existing submarine construction pro-grams. However, the first MX missiles de-ployed on small submarines would be highlysurvivable, in contrast to other basing modeswhich would attain survivability only aftermost or al I of the force was operational.

10. Surface Ship Mobile

Another approach to seeking survival bymobility at sea is to base the MX missiIes on afleet of surface ships. Such a fleet would bedesigned to have an appearance similar tomerchant shipping, and to hide itself either inbroad expanses of the ocean or among theother ships in crowded shipping lanes. Thetechniques for lowering missiles over the sideof a ship and launching them from the waterare well-established, although other launchingmodes might prove preferable.

Most of the points noted in the previous sec-tion about shifting the weight of U.S. strategicforces from land to sea apply. Unlike subma-rines, the surface ships wouId have a securityproblem in making certain that third partiesdid not attempt to seize the MX missiles. Theships would have to have a considerable capa-bility for self-defense. The need for defensiveweaponry could make it more difficult to dis-guise the ships.

An examination of the way in which such aforce of surface ships might operate revealsnumerous operational problems, which in-teract with the task of assuring survivability.Briefly, the Soviets could destroy any MX-carrying surface ship which they could locateor, having located, trail. OTA’S analysis (ch. 7)assumes that by the 1990’s the Soviets woulddeploy a large force whose purpose was tolocate and trail such ships, and finds that insuch a case the proportion of a fleet of suchships which would be located and under trailmight fluctuate greatly from day to day.Hence, although attacking such ships would bea formidable task for the Soviets, the UnitedStates could not have confidence in the surviv-abiIity of surface-ship mobile MX.


While cost and schedule estimates cannotbe precise for a system that has never beendesigned in detail, it is estimated that surface-ship acquisition costs would be comparable tothose of a fleet of small submarines. Annualoperating costs would be SIightly higher thanthose of small submarines. These differencesare within the range of expected error A sur-face ship fleet might be operational a year ortwo before a submarine fleet. Given thegreater survivability of submarine basing, itwould seem to be preferable to surface shipbasing if sea mobile basing is chosen.

11. Air Mobile

Air mobile MX would be a system of greatoperational complexity, and therefore there isa corresponding wide choice of specific con-cepts. The lowest cost concept would consistof 75 or so wide-bodied aircraft, each carryingtwo MX missiles, maintained on strip alert atairfields located in the Central United States.

Such a “dash-on-warning” air mobile forcecould be highly survivable. The principalthreat to the force would be submarine-Iaunched ballistic missiles (S LBMS) launchedfrom positions near U.S. coasts. Such an attackcould arrive in the vicinity of the alert airfieldswithin 15 minutes of launch and seek to de-stroy the aircraft before they could take offand escape. However, if a high-alert posturewere accepted for the force, meaning that theaircraft took off immediate/y upon t ime/ywarning of SLBM attack, almost the wholeforce would survive even if a large number ofSLBMS were launched from positions near U.S.coasts (see fig 8). The Soviet SLBM force ispresently incapable of such an attack. Air-mobile basing could therefore stress Sovietstrategic forces where they wouId be least ableto respond in the short term.

Nevertheless, the difference between sur-vival and destruction of the force would be avery few minutes, depending on timely tacticalwarning. I n this respect an air mobile ICBMforce would replicate a significant failuremode of another leg of the strategic Triad —the bomber force.

Figure 8.—Survivability v. Escape Time(8 EMT on Each Airstrip, 2 PSI Aircraft)

100,)

80

60

I

. .40 —

20 —

o I 1 I I t I0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Aircraft escape time before arrival of SLBM attack (minutes)SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

ICBMS, arriving later than the SLBMS, couldnot threaten the survivability of the force as awhole, since by that time the aircraft wouldhave been in flight long enough to be dispersedover a wide area. Effective barrage attack ofthis area would require the Soviets to buildmany more large IC BM missiles than they nowpossess and use them to barrage a m i I I ion or sosquare miles. The outcome of such an attackwould be insensitive to both the fractionation(the apport ioning of the missi le payloadamong a small number of Iarge-yieldt[ge-yield RVS or alarger number of smaller yield RVS) and to theaccuracy of Soviet ICBM forces.

The principal disadvantage of a dash-on-warning force—the need for reliable, timelywarning—could in principle be removed byhaving the aircraft maintain continuous air-borne patrol. However, even with a new air-craft designed for low fuel consumption, thecost of operating such a force would be pro-hibitive. A continuously airborne force of 75aircraft (1 50 MX missiles) couId cost $80 biIIionto $100 billion (fiscal year 1980 dollars) to ac-quire and to operate for 10 years after fulldeployment (FOC).

A second crucial problem for an air mobileforce concerns the question of postattack en-durance. After a few hours of flight, the air-craft would have to land and refuel. Since theirhome airfields would be destroyed, they would


have to find other places to land and await fur-ther instructions. This problem could beavoided completely if the United States werewilling to adopt a policy of “use it or lose it”for the few hours of unrefueled flight. Thereare also several hundred civilian and militaryairfields in the United States capable of servic-ing large aircraft. Many of these airfields arelocated close to urban areas. If the Sovietswished to deny postattack endurance to anair mobile fleet—tantamount to forcing theUnited States to “use it or lose it” –they wouldhave to attack these airfields. A serious effortto bui ld more austere recovery airstr ipsthroughout the country than the Soviets pos-sessed ICBM RVS to destroy them would beenormously expensive, would have substantialenvironmental impact, and would be com-pletely impractical if the Soviet threat grewlarge. For instance, 4,600 airfields spaced 25miles apart would fil l the entire 3 millionsquare miles of the continental United States.

There could conceivably be some value inhaving more airfields suitable for air mobileoperations than the Soviets had SLBM RVS.These could be useful if the United Statesdoubted the reliability of its SLBM warningsensors and wished to relax the force’s alertposture (since, in a crisis, false-alarm takeoffmight be mistake~ by the Soviets for prepara-tion to launch the MX missiles), or if the fleetwere somehow “spoofed” into taking off (thusmaking a portion vulnerable as the aircraftwere forced to land). A force with this dispersaloption could cost $10 billion to $20 billion(fiscal year 1980 dollars) more than a wide-bodied jet force with no recovery airfieldsbeyond existing large civilian and military air-fields.

Thus, the lowest cost air mobile systemwould exclude extra recovery airfields beyondthose large civilian and military airfields whichexist at present. Although OTA has not per-formed detailed cost and schedule analysis forsuch an air mobile option, it appears that thecost of a force with 75 aircraft (150 MX mis-siles) on alert would be comparable to the costof the baseline MPS system and could be de-ployed in a comparable time.

An air mobile force would also require seve-ral supporting systems. First and foremostwould be reliable sensor systems for timelywarning of Soviet attack. Providing such sys-tems would be technically feasible but wouldrequire time, money, and continued effort. Thecomplex force management needs of the airmobile force after attack would require acomparably complex communications system.Last, providing for missile accuracy compara-ble to land basing would require use of theGlobal Posit ioning Satel l i te system or aGround Beacon System.

COMPARISON OF BASINGMODES

As we have indicated above, OTA’S techni-cal analysis of MX basing modes does not sup-port a clear or simple choice, All of the basingmodes reviewed have strengths and weak-nesses. This section presents the criteria OTAhas identified for the purpose of analysis, anduses them to compare the five most feasibleoptions. Since no basing mode ranks highagainst all criteria, choosing among them de-pends on the relative weight attached to each.

Technical Risk

Technical risk refers to the level of confi-dence that one can have at this time that thesystem will perform the way it is supposed to.

There are significant risks associated withtwo of the five basing modes considered. PLUwill represent an area of significant technicalrisk for MPS basing until prototypes have beentested, and could be a subject of lingeringdoubts even afterwards. The use of LoADSwith MPS would compound this risk. An addi-tional technical risk for LoADS concerns therequirement that LoADS operate in a nuclearenvironment of unprecedented severity, in-ducting high-yield nuclear donations roughly amiIe away.

The risks of LUA arise not from technicallydifficult problems, but from the uncertaintiesof the interface between men and machines.

..Ch. l—Summary ● 25

Survivability y

A force is “survivable” if its destruction by aSoviet first strike is infeasible, Some basingmodes aim at protecting the entire force whileothers accept some attrition and size the sys-tem to assure an adequate number of survi-vors Survivability would be of critical impor-tance to deterrence in either of two scenarios.The first is that the Soviets considered an all-out war inevitable, and were consideringwhether strikin g first would Iimit the damagesuch a war would cause to the Soviet Union.The second is that the Soviets sought to con-trol the outcome of a crisis by partialIy disarm-ing the United States while deterring theUnited States from responding. In either case,it wouId be important that the United Statescould feel confident that the Soviets woulddoubt their ability to destroy a relatively largeproportion of U S. strategic feces All the MXbasing modes are designed to provide thisassurance, but they do so in different ways. Forthis reason, they create somewhat differentrisks,

A timely decision to launch under attackwouId prevent the Soviets from destroying themissiles before they were used Air mobile MXwould become vulnerable if the United Statesfailed to receive and act on adequate warning,a faiIure mode which it wouId share with thebomber leg of the Triad. The MPS systems (in-cluding the MPS/LoADS combination) wouldbecome vulnerable if PLU broke down, andwou Id a I so become vu I nerable whenever thesize of the MPS system was too smalI relativeto the Soviet threat. This latter occurrence isnot so much a question of technology as it is aquestion of the judgment and optimism of U. Spolicy makers: a rapid growth in the Sovietthreat could make MPS vulnerable unless theUnited States had decided to expand the sys-tem before Soviet intentions had becomeclear. Small submarines do not appear to bevulnerable, either now or in the foreseeablefuture, However, if an unforeseen Sovietbreakthrough in antisubmarine warfare oc-curred, it is possible that it would threatenboth small submarines and the Trident/Posei-don leg of the Triad.

LUA would become progressively less vul-nerable as improved warning and communica-tions systems were brought online. MPS (withor without LoADS) wouId become SurvivableonIy after the n u mber of shelters deployed Sur-passed the number of Soviet RVS available toattack them Small submarines. would behighly survivable when first deployed

Endurance

Ensurviveand

durance is defined as the capabil as an integrated system — both mthe communications needed to

them — for an extended period after a nuclear

ty toss i Ies

use

attack, assuming that the system survives theattack itself. An LUA system wouId clearlyhave no endurance,

An air mobile system would not endurelonger than 5 to 8 hours unless the Sovietschose not to attack the airfields at which theMX-carrying aircraft could land and refuel.LoADS could be ineffective against a secondattack. SmaII submarines with diesel-electricpropuIsion wou Id endure from 1 to 4 months atsea, and longer if provisions were made forreplenishment N u c I ea r-e I ect r i c propu Is ioncouId provide longer endurance for smalI sub-marines. MX,’ M PS is designed to endure i n alow-power mode for many months after an at-tack.

Weapon Effectiveness

This criterion addresses the question of howwell MX in the various basing modes couldsupport those aspects of U.S, nuclear weaponsemployment policy which have previouslybeen the specialty of the ICBM leg of theTriad, including ability to destroy hardenedSoviet targets (accuracy and time-on-targetcontrol), strike rapidly on command (respon-siveness), and support a doctrine of flexibleresponse (retargeting capability),

Land-based systems (MPS, MPS with LoADS,and LUA) will continue to set the standard foraccuracy, time-on-target control, responsive-ness, and rapid retargeting. MX based on smallsubmarines would be almost as good, and in-

deed would most probably be close to or equalthe design requirements for MX. There wouldbe few if any military missions of importancefor which a submarine-based MX (given feasi-ble upgrades in guidance systems, navigationalaids, and C J systems) would be significantlyless capable than land-based MX. Air mobilebasing would sacrifice a degree of respon-siveness because of the need for the aircraft totakeoff before launching the missiles, wouldrequire external navigation aids to achievehigh accuracy, and management of a dispersedair mobile force could be very complex.

Command, Control, andCommunications (C3)

Reliable communications impervious toSoviet attempts at disruption are needed forcommanders to assess the status of the MXforce, retarget the missiles if desired, andtransmit launch commands. The technicalmeans to accomplish these tasks, as well as thetasks themselves, couId be very different in thepreattack, transattack, and postattack periods.

There are distinct and important differencesfrom basing mode to basing mode regardingboth the technical means to support effectiveC 3 and potential vulnerabilities. In each case,it appears that with adequate funding and ef-fort, acceptable technical solutions are avail-able, though it would be extremely difficult tosecure any C3 system against any and all con-tingencies. On balance, OTA has found noclear technical reason for preference amongthe basing modes on the basis of C3.

Arms Control Considerations

The choice of basing mode could affectarms control in several ways. First there is thequestion of whether a given basing mode con-flicts with U.S. obligations under a treaty nowin force. Also of interest are possible conflictswith treaties signed but not ratified. Apartfrom specific treaty provisions, the UnitedStates has a longstanding policy that strategicsystems should be amenable to verification.The impacts of MX basing on future arms con-trol negotiation are speculative. They involve

not only the negotiability of future arms con-trol agreements, but also incentives whichmight be created for increasing or reducing thelevel of strategic armaments.

Deployment of a LoADS ABM system indefense of MPS would require amendment of,or U.S. withdrawal from, the ABM Treatyreached at SALT 1, though much predeploy -ment work could be done within the terms ofthe Treaty. In general, the five basing modeswe are comparing appear compatible with theprovisions of SALT 11. MX/MPS has beendesigned specifically to be compatible withthis proposed Treaty.

A future arms control agreement that per-mitted MPS basing but Iimited the number ofmissiles could be verified if the system weredesigned from the outset with this in mind. Anagreement permitting the deployment of theMX missile on small submarines or aircraftCouId be verified using established proceduresand nationaI technical means.

MPS basing could complicate future armscontrol negotiations. Detailed understandingsabout deployment procedures and peacetimeoperations, not previously included in armscontrol agreements, could be required for theUnited States to verify limits on a Soviet MPSdeployment. Because MPS deployments mustbe large in order to be survivable, MPS basing

CouId tend to provide incentives for continu-ing increases in numbers of strategic arms, andcomlicate efforts to seek agreements Iimitingor reducing these numbers. Moreover, MPSwould necessariIy focus attention on numbersof RVS.

Institutional Constraints

The Navy has shown little interest in smallsubmarine basing of MX, and the Air Force op-poses it. The LoADS ABM concept would notchallenge existIng roles and missions, but itwouId require early and close Army/Air Forcecooperation, MX/MPS would strain the abilityof Federal, State, and local jurisdictions toplan and coordinate adequate provision ofsocial services and environmental protection.

0Ch l—Summary ● 2 7

Impacts on the Physical Environment

MPS systems would have considerablygreater physical impacts than the other basingmodes considered In the Great Basin ofNevada and Utah these impacts would be par-ticuIarly severe and could include the long-term loss of thousands of square miles of pro-ductive rangelands. Although the qualitativeimpacts of both split basing and MinutemanMPS would be essentialIy the same, the magni-tude of these impacts would be significantlyreduced by split basing and couId be reduced further by basing in the northern Minutemanfields Impacts of air mobiIe basing wouId resuIt from airfield construction, but severe im-pacts would be unlikely The impacts of sub-marine basing would be site-specific and con-fined to the areas where operating bases wouldbe built, but could be significant within theseareas The i m pacts of LUA as a basing modewould be minimal

Socioeconomic Impacts

The magnitude of MPS construction wouldhave major impacts on the socioeconomicstructure of any deployment area selected onthe basis of minimum popuIation criteria Fur-thermore, uncertainties regarding the size andthe distribution of the work force populationwould make advance planning so difficult thateffective mitigation of adverse impacts would

be unlikely These impacts would be mostsevere in the case of MPS in Nevada and Utah,but would also accompany split basing orrebasing of Minuteman I I I

The impacts of air mobiIe and submarinebasing would be confined to the areas whereoperating bases were built, and might bepositive or negative depending on the charac-teristics of the areas chosenno impact

costs

OTA has compared costs

LUA wouId have

on the basis of“lifecycle” cost, which includes both the costof acquiring the system and the cost of opera t-ing it untiI 2000

The baseline MX MPS system of 200” missiIesand 4,600 shelters was sized to provide ade-quate survivability against a particular Sovietthreat For costing purposes OTA has sized theother systems to provide equivalent surviv-ability against a comparable threat. If theSoviet threat should grow, MPS systems (in-cluding MX defended by Lo ADS and Minute-man,MPS) would have to grow accordingly.Submarine basing, air mobiIe basing, andreliance on LUA would not

Table 1 summarizes OI” A cost estimates forthe basing systems T h e l i f e c y c l e c o s t o f

baseline MPS (4,600 shelters with 200” missiles),

Table 1 .—Summary, Lifecycle Cost Estimates for Basing Options(billions of fiscal year 1980 dollars)

MX/MPS M X / M p S

M X / M P S e x p a n d e d e x p a n d e dbasel ine 1990 threat 1995 threat

Number of shelters 4,600 8,250 12,500IOC/ FOC (calendar year’)” 87/89 87189 87194Number of deployed

m i s s i l e s 200 359 544

MX/M PSvert ical MXIMPS SmalI MM Ills h e l t e r s s p i l t b a s i n g s u b m a r i n e MPS

4,600 4,600 51* 5,80087/89 87/89 89/95 87/90

200 200 204 667D e v e l o p m e n t $ 9172 $ 9.372 $ 9.572 $ 9.172 $ 9.172 $ 7.225 $ 2.527I n v e s t m e n t . 27999 43,557 61.512 26.500 30109 24862 28,037

Total acquisition ... $37171 $52.929 $71.084 $35.672 $39,281 $32.087 $30.564Operating and support

t o y e a r 2 0 0 0 $ 6.308 $ 9482 $11486 $ 6.308 $ 6.526 $ 7160 $ 5907Lifecycle cost to 2000 $43479 $62411 $82570 $41.980 $45807 $39247 $36471

MM Ille x p a n d e d1990 threat

10,40087/91

900$ 250043200

$45700

$ 7.700$53400

MM Ille x p a n d e d1995 threat

1 5 , 5 0 0

87/94

1,100$ 2.50060400

$62.900

$ 9500

$72400

‘Submarines

SOURCE Of office of Technology Assessment

smalI submarines, and air mobiIe are aII about$40 bill ion (fiscal year 1980 dollars) OTAestimates that split basing wouId cost about 7percent more. Rebasing Minuteman I I I wouldbe about $7 billion less expensive than thebaseline MX/MPS systems LUA would be con-siderabIy Iess expensive than the others, evenafter very SU stantial upgrading of warningand communications systems.

Against an increased Soviet threat, the costof MPS would grow. If the Soviets devotedsubstantial effort to threaten MPS, and if theU.S. response was to increase the number ofshelters and missiles, then the Iifecycle cost tothe year 2000 of $43 billion for the baselinesystem (OTA estimate in fiscal year 1980dollars) might have to grow to $58 billion to$62 billion by 1990 and to $78 billion to $83billion by 1995. Adding LoADS instead of in-creasing the number of shelters could cutcosts: a Congressional Budget Office studyestimates that using an optimal mix of LoADS,additional shelters, and additional missileswould save about 10 percent against the 1990threat and about 18 percent against the 1995threat.

Note that efforts to make the survivabilityof air mobile independent of warning bymeans of airborne alert, or to give air mobilesome endurance by building additional disper-sal airfields, wouId drive its cost u p very sharp-ly.

Schedule

The advocates of each of these basingmodes project initial operating capabilities inthe mid- to late 1980’s. These projections arebased on rather optimistic assumptions, andthe record of U.S. development of weapon sys-tems in the recent past suggests that scheduleSIippages are Iikely.

In considering schedule it is necessary todistinguish among three dates for each possi-ble basing mode.

1. Initial operating capability (IOC) refers tothe date at which the first missiles wouldenter the active strategic force This date is

sign if i cant from the viewpoint of the overalIstrategic balance, and concern with howperceptions of this balance may affect U S.d i p l o m a c y

FUI I operating capability (FOC-) refers to thed a t e when t h e I as t miss iles a n d bassing facili-ties would become active

Survivability refers to the date when thedeployed system is judged to be adequatelysurvivable against the then-existin g Sovietthreat. This date is significant from the view-point of reversing the effects of the growingSoviet capability to destroy the Minutemanforce in a first strike.

Depending on the basing mode and the growthin the Soviet threat, survivability could coin-cide with IOC, could coincide with FOC, orcouId come at a date between them.

Because considerable engineering develop-ment has been accomplished for MX/MPS, itcould probably achieve IOC in 1987. Minute-man MPS could not have an IOC before 1986,even though the missiles already exist, becauseof the need for an environmental impact state-ment, site selection, land acquisition, and theneed to design a PLU system before startingconstruction. FOC dates for MPS systemswould depend on the size of the Soviet threat.Reasonable FOC dates are 1989 or 1990 if 200missiles and 4,600 shelters prove to be enough,and a Minuteman MPS of comparable sizeC Ould be completed at about the same time.So long as the threat kept growing, the systemcould never be completed in the sense thatcostruction could stop. However, survivabiI-ty could be achieved before Soviet threatgrowth and U.S. construction stopped, For ex-ample, a 1990 threat of 7,000 Soviet RVS cou Idbe met by an MX/MPS system of some 8,250shelters and 360 missiles. These could be com-pleted by 1990 provided that a firm decision tobuild at that rate were made in late 1982 orealrly 1983— before firm evidence of Sovietbuilding plans is likely to be available. To re-tain survivability after 1990 would require abuilding program that kept pace with any con-tinuing growth in the Soviet threat.

Ch l—Summary 29

LUA could begin, in principle, as soon as MXm i ssiles could deployed, but upgradedwarning and communication systems mightnot be developed until the end of the decade.

Adding LoADS to MPS would probably notaffeet FOC significant I y Submarine-based MXIOC could be as early as 1988, but 1990 seemsmore Iikely. An FOC for submarines appearsachievable as early as 1992, but OTA believesthat 1994 would be more realistic However,since submarine basing wouId achieve survi-vability at the IOC date rather than the FOCdate, submarine basing might well achieve sur-vivability sooner than any of the other basingmodes despite the fact that its IOC could wellbe the latest

While OTA has not performed scheduleanalyses for air mobiIe, it appearsmobiIe system might also be deploend of the decade

Stability

MX basing could affect stability

that an airyed by the

n three dif -ferent senses In the first, survivability (which istreated separately above) enhances stability byavoiding a situation in which the Soviets mightstart a war because they expected to obtain anadvantage by destroying vulnerable U.S.forces. Second, MX basing should, if possible,minimize the risks that a war might startbecause of accident or miscalculation during acrisis. Finally, MX basing could affect the in-centives which shape future nuclear weapondeployment decisions: this is called arms racestabi I it y

MPS basing introduces the prospect of an in-creasing number of U S. shelters and missilesin response to an increasing number of SovietRVS. From the U.S. point of view, keeping pacewith a growing Soviet threat could be costly

and would put a premium on determining andprojecting the number of Soviet RVS For theirpart, the Soviets would be tempted to expandtheir RV inventory, taking advantage of theirexisting throwweight to overwhelm the U.S.MPS deployment On the other hand, theSoviets would be concerned about the effectsof a growing MX deployment on the surviva-bility of their own ICBMS.

LoADS ABM deployment could permit anMPS deployment to attain survivability againsta given threat level with a smaller number ofMX missiles; in this sense it would contributeto arms race stability. On the other hand, itcould reopen the qualitative arms race in ABMtechnologies and offensive penetration tech-niques (including larger numbers of offensiveweapons) which the 1972 A BM Limitation ionTreaty sought to foreclose,

SmalI submarine basing would be survivableand might force the Soviets to redirect their ef-forts from building offensive weapons to inten-sify antisubmarine warfare research. Sincestrategic antisubmarine warfare appears veryunpromising, this would be stabilizing. How-ever, if the Soviets did achieve an antisub-marine warfare “breakthrough,” it would behighly destabilizing.

LUA poses the risk of failure during peace-time or during crisis which could lead to ac-cidental war. U. S deployment of a new missilein a nonsurvivable basing mode could alsocreate a Soviet perception that in a crisis theUnited States might choose to strike firstrather than wait to launch under attack.

Air mobile would be survivable and wouldtherefore not create incentives for the Sovietsto expand their ICBM force. However, its de-pendence on timely warning could create ten-sion in a crisis.

Chapter 2

MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE SHELTERS

Chapter 2.— MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE SHELTERS

Page

Overview 33

Theory of Multiple Protective Shelters, 34Preservation of Location Uncertainty, 35Sizing the MPS System 40Weapon Character ist ics for MPS ., 44

The Air Force Baseline 45System Description. 45SALT Monitoring Operations 58Siting Criteria 59Roads 61Physical Security System 61Land Use Requirements 64Water Availability 67Physical Impacts. 68Socioeconomic Impacts 73Regional Energy Development . . 81System Schedule. 82System Cost 84Cost and Schedule of Expanding the

MX/MPS . . ., 86Split Basing 89

Vertical Shelters 92Shelter Hardness. 92M i s s i l e M o b i l i t y 9 3PLU . . . . . 94costs. . . 94Arms Control. ,, 96

Page

Some Previous MX/MPS Basing Modes. 97The Road able Transporter-Erector-

Launcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97The Trench . . . . . . . 99

Minuteman MPS and Northern PlainsBasing ,, . ......101

Missile Modifications 101Cost and Schedule ,. 102

Civilian Fatalities From a CounterforceMPS Strike .. 103

LIST OF TABLES

Table No Page2.3.4,5.

6.7.8.9.

10.

11.

P h y s i c S i g n a t u r e s o f M i s s i l eMPS Example . . . . . .Monitoring TimelinePrincipal Exclusion/Avoidance CriteriaU s e d D u r i n g S c r e e n i n g .Candidate Areas . .Water Required for MX .Water Uses. . . . . . . . .Cost Overruns in Large-Scale ProjectsEstimated and Actual ConstructionWork Forces for Coal-FiredP o w e r p l a n t s . . . . .S y s t e m T i m e S c h e d u l e

364259

5961686877

7883

Table No. Page

12. Air Force Baseline Estimate 4,600Shelters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

13. Comparison of Air Force and OTA CostEstimates ....... . . . . . . . . 86

14. Land Use Requirements . . . . . . . . . 8715, FuIl-ScaIe Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . 8816. Lifecycle Cost of 4,600, 8,250, and

12,500 Shelters to the Year 2005 . . . . . . 8817. Air Force Estimates of Additional Split

Basing Costs. . . 9018, Lifecycle Costs for Horizontal and

Vertical Shelters Deployed inNevada-Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

19. Minuteman MPS Costs. . . . . . . . . . .102

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure No. Page9. Mu l t ip le Pro tec t i ve She l te rs . . . 33

10. Preservation of Location Uncertaintyand System Design . . . 39

11. Peak Overpressure From l-MT Burst . . 4012. Surviving Missiles v. Threat Growth

for MPS Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4213. MPS Shelter Requirement for

Projected Soviet Force Levels . . 4414. System Description . 4615. Launcher . . 4716. Missile Launch Sequence. . . . . . . 4717. Cannister Construction . . 4818. MX Protective Shelter Site 4919. MX Protective Shelter . . . . . . . 5020. Transporter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5021. Missile Launcher and Simulator—

Transfer Operations. . . . . . . 5122. Mass Simulator and Launcher

Exchanges . . . . . . . . . 5123. Mass Simulator . . . . . . . . . 5224. Cluster Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5225. Shelter and Road Layout . . . . . . . . . . . 5326. Command, Control, and

Communications System . . . . . . . . . . 5427. Electrical Power Distribution. . . . 5528. MX-Cannister/Missile Launch Sequence 5629. Transporter Rapid Relocation Timeline 5730. Dash Timeline . . . . . . . 5831. Geotechnically Suitable Lands. . . . . . . 6032, Road Construction Profiles . . . . . . . . 6233, Area Security . . . . . . . . . 6334, Point Security. . . . . . 6335. Hypothetical MPS Clusters in

Candidate Area . . . . . . . 6536. Potential Vegetative Impact Zone. . . . 71

Figure No. Page37. Construction Work Force, Operating

Personnel, and Secondary Populations. 7538 . Base l ine Work Force Es t imates 7639. Comparison of Onsite and Total

Construction Work Force. . . . . . 7740. Construction Work Force: High-Range

Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7841. Range of Secondary Population

Growth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7942. Range of Potential Population

Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8043. Cumulative Energy Activity

in the West . . . . . 8244. proposed Split Basing Deployment

Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8945. Summary Comparison of Long-Term

Impact Significance Between theProposed Action and Split Basing . . 91

46. Vertical Shelter . . . 9247. Transporter for Vertical Shelter . 9448. Remove/Install Timelines for

Horizontal and Vertical Shelters . 9549. Dash Timeline for Horizontal Shelter. . 9650. Readable Transporter-Erector-

Launcher . . . . 9851. Trench Layout . . . . . . . . 9952. MX Trench Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10053. Minu teman/MPS Schedu le . . . .10254A. Population Subject to Fallout v.

Wind Direction (Range: 500 rim). .. ..10354B. Population Subject to Fallout v.

Wind Direction (Range: 1,000 nm) .. .10454C. Population Subject to Fallout v.

Wind Direction (Range: 1,500 nm) .. .10454D. Population Subject to Fallout V.

Wind Direction (Range: 2,000 nm) .. .10455. Downwind Distance v, Total Dose .. .10556. Crosswind Distance v. Total Dose .. .10557A. MX in Texas and New Mexico:

Population Subject to Fallout v.Wind Direction (Range: 500 rim). .. ..106

57B. MX in Texas and New Mexico:Population Subject to Fallout v.Wind Direction (Range: 1,000 nm) .. .106

57C. MX in Texas and New Mexico:Population Subject to Fallout v.Wind Direction (Range 1,500 nm). .. 106

57D. MX in Texas and New Mexico:Population Subject to Fallout v.Wind Direction (Range 2,000 nm). .. 107

58A. Downwind Distance v. Total Dose —500 KT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........107

58B. Downwind Distance v. Total Dose—250 KT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 107

Chapter 2

MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE SHELTERS

OVERVIEW

The multiple protective shelter (MPS) con-cept seeks to maintain the capabilities of afixed land-based ICBM force, while protectingthe force from Soviet attack, by hiding the m is-siles among a much larger number of missileshelters (see fig. 9). If the attacker does notknow which shelters contain the missiles, allthe shelters must be attacked to ensure thedestruction of the entire missile force Thus,the logic of MPS is to build more shelters thanthe enemy can successfully attack, or at leastto make such an attack unattractive by requir-ing the attacker to devote a large number ofweapons to attack a relatively smalIer force.

In this chapter, the theory, design require-ments, and some of the outstanding issues ofMPS are addressed I n particular, the technicaland operational requirements of hiding themissiIes among the shelters, forma I I y known aspreservation of location uncertainty (PLU), areexamined This wouId be a new task for missiIeland basing, and it is now appreciated as oneof the more challenging aspects of MPS. ThecompatibiIity of the missiIes’ location uncer-tainty with arms control monitoring is also dis-cussed

Figure 9.— Multiple Protective Shelters (MPS)


Inherent in the strategy of MPS is that thenumber of shelters constructed be keyed to thesize of the Soviet threat. Growth i n the numberof accurate Soviet warheads wouId require alarger deployment of missile shelters to main-tain the same expected survival rate for U.SmissiIes. The sensitivity of missiIe survival andshelter number to the size of the Soviet threatis discussed by performing severaI MPS cal-culations related to possible Soviet growthThe consequences of an “undersized” MPS area I so exam i ned, and shelter number require-ments are calcuIated.

These issues, keeping the missiles suc-cessfuIIy hidden and determining the propersize of the MPS, are common to any MPS-basing mode, and are analyzed in detail in thesection on the theory of MPS.

Much of this chapter is devoted to specificdesigns for an MPS, with a great deal of atten-tion devoted to the Air Force’s baseline sys-tem. This system has been in full-scale engi-neering development since September 1979,and was modified in the spring of 1980 to in-cIude a horizontaI loading dock configurationfor the missile shelter. As proposed, thebaseline system consists of 200 MX missilesamong 4,600 concrete shelters, with each m is-sile deployed in a closed cluster of 23 shelters.These shelters would be spaced about 1 mileapart and arranged in a linear grid pattern.Each shelter would resemble a garage, orloading dock, into which a missile could be in-serted horizontally. Missile location uncertain-ty would rely on the use of specially designedmissile decoys of similar, though not identical,physical characteristics to the real missile, andthe employment of operational proceduresthat would treat missile and decoy alike. Largetransport trucks could shuffle missiles anddecoys among the shelters in order to keep theprecise location of the missiles unknown tooutside observers. Descriptions are providedof the Iayout and operation of this basing, m is-

33


sile mobility and the “dash” option, command,control, and communications (C3), and esti-mates for system cost and schedule Air Forcecriteria used for siting the MX, and its regionalimpacts are also addressed.

In the discussion of regional impacts, em-phasis has been on two particular issues. Be-cause the A i r Force has aIready completed ex-tensive studies and has published almost sovolumes of materiaIs (MX: Milestone II, FinalEnvironmental impact Statement; DeploymentArea Selection and Land Withdrawal A cquisi-t ion, Draft Environmentl Impact Statement;and MX: Environmental Technical Reports)relating to the environmental impacts of MX/MPS basing, no attempt has been made tocatalog the potential environmental impacts,to evaluate independently all of those impactsidentified by the Air Force, or to critique theAir Force environmental impact statements(EISs), Instead, those documents have beenused as resources, and attempts have beenmade to draw attention to those issues that arebelieved to be of most importance to the con-gressional decision making process, For moredetailed information on particular impactsassociated with MPS, reference should bemade to the Air Force E I S documents and com-ments by the States of Nevada and Utah.

A variation of the proposed system would besplit basing, where the system would be de-ployed in two noncontiguous regions of thecountry: the Great Basin area of Utah andNevada, and the border region between Texasand New Mexico, This basing scheme wouldmitigate the regional impacts, at some addi-tion to system cost.

In addition to discussions of the Air Forcebaseline system and split basing, several alter-native MPS designs are examined. All of thesehave been studied in the past, but rejected by

the Air Force for various reasons. These de-signs incIude housing the MX missiIe in con-ventional Minuteman- like vertical shelters,rather than the horizontaI shelters of the A i rForce basel inc. Greater hardness against nu-clear attack could be achieved with verticalshelters; however, missile mobility would besomewhat simpler with horizontal shelters.

Two previous baseline modes for the MX arealso) discussed: the “trench” design, where themissile wouId reside in a long concrete-hard-ened tunnel several feet underground, and theso-called “ roadab le TE l , ” the immed ia tepredecessor of the present baseline, where themissile and transporter were structuralIy inte-grated, and therefore had greatly enhancedmolbiI it y.

Another possibility would be the deploy-ment of Minuteman /// missiIes in an MPSmode, by constructing a large number of add i-tional vertical shelters in the present Min-uteman missiIe fields. Proponents of thissystem claim it would provide an acceleratedscheduIe for a survivabIe land-based missiIeforce, since Minuteman missiles, support in-frastructure, and most roads are already avail-able. Mod if i cations to the Minuteman misslIewouId be required to deploy it in a mobiIemode, and many additional shelters and mis-sile transporters would need to be built. Theextent of these and other modifications is ad-dressed, as is system cost and schedule forcompletion.

Finally, several calculations of civil ianfatalities resulting from a Soviet attack on MXdeployment in multiple protective shelterfields are presented. These calculations helpaddress the question of the extent to which aSoviet strike against an MPS deployment couldindeed be regarded as “ Iimited, ”

THEORY OF MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE SHELTERS (MPS)

A land-based missile force in MPS relies for site force with confidence, will be forced toits survivability on the assumption that the at- target al I or most of the shelters if it is nottacker, in order to destroy the adversary’s mis- known which of these shelters contains the

Ch. 2—Multiple Protective Shelters 35

missiles. MPS thus tries to draw a distinctionbetween miss i le and target , by “ immers ing”the missiIe force in a “sea” of shelters.

MPS can also be regarded as “anti-MIRV”basing Just as MIRV (mult iple independentlytar-gettable reentry vehicle) technology allowsone to attack many targets with one miss i Ie,MPS forces the attacker to devote many war-heads to destroy one real target.

For this strategy to work, the tasks of“hiding” the missiles among the shelters andproperly sizing the MPS system for a givenlevel of survivability involve two key require-ments Since the nature of these two tasks issimilar for all MPS basing modes, their detailsand impIications are discussed in this sectionof the chapter.

Preservation of Location Uncertainty(PLU)

Inherent in the strategy of MPS is that allshelters appear to the attacker as equally Iike-Iy to contain a missile This assumption is im-portant, since if the attacker were to find outthe location of alI the missiIes, it wouId defeatthe design of the system For the planned 200MX missile deployment, for example, it couldmean targetting as few as 200 reentry vehicles(RVS), one RV per MX missile, which is a smallportion of the Soviet Union’s arsenal. The taskof PLU — or keeping the missile locationsecret — is essential to successful MPS deploy-ment. With increased study of this issue overthe last few years, the defense community hascome to realize the magnitude of the PLU task.What makes PLU so challenging is that It is amany faceted problem, dealing with a varietyof missile details Moreover, PLU must bemade an integral part of the design process atevery level. Furthermore, the present expecta-tion is that the design process for PLU will beongoing throughout deployment, with continu-ous efforts at enforcing and improving missilelocation uncertainty through improved PLUcountermeasures and operations,

To accomplish this task of missile conceal-ment, it is necessary to eliminate all indica-

tions, or signatures, that could give away thelocation of the missile One such set is the setof alI physical signatures of the missiIe andassociated missile equipment. This set includesweight, center of gravity, magnetic field, andmany others By utiIizing these physical signa-tures, missile location might be inferred bymaking measurements outside the shelter ormissile transporter, looking for those signa-tures that could distinguish location of themissile. Such signatures span the spectrum ofphysical phenomena, many with a range of de-tectability of hundreds of miles, if not ade-quately countermeasure.

A second set of missile signatures to beeliminated are operational signatures The taskhere is to eliminate all operating proceduresthat could distinguish the missile and therebybetray its location. Otherwise, missile place-ment might be inferred by observing personneloperations.

Internal information is a third set of sig-natures. This set includes the piecing togetherof many observations to arrive at a pattern rec-ogn it ion of data from which one can infermissile location.

Soviet espionage efforts aimed at breakingPLU wilI also be likely, and counterintelligenceefforts may be necessary.

Signatures

PHYSICAL SIGNATURES

The physical signatures of the missile runinto the scores, with the magnitude and rangeof each dependent on design detaiIs and mate-rial construction of the missile, shelter, andtransporter. Against each of these signaturesthat might compromise missile location it isconsidered desirable to design and install a setof specific countermeasures. These counter-measures include simulating missile signatureswith decoys, masking or reducing the mag-nitude and range of the signatures, and confus-ing an outside observer by engineering a set ofsignatures that vary randomly from decoy todecoy in order to make it more difficult todetermine which shelters contain the missiles.

36 ● MX Missle Basing

Table 2 is a generic list of associated missilesignatures present for any MPS system. A briefdiscussion of them is included here along withsome possible countermeasures. A more de-tailed list and analysis is included in the clas-sified annex.

1, Seismic/ground tilt results from the forceof missile weight on the ground, both as seis-mic waves set up by the motion of the missilein transit, and static measures of its mass, suchas the tilt of the ground in the missile’s prox-imity, The seismic signature is particularlysignificant while the missiIe is in transport be-tween shelters, since seismic waves can prop-agate for miles, with a falloff in wave ampli-tude that varies inversely with distance.Ground tilt caused by depression of the groundunder the missile-laden transporter falls offsomewhat faster with an inverse square law,and a maximum ground depression of theorder of thousandths of an inch. The resultingground tilts are measurable at a distance, Acountermeasure for this signature may includea mass decoy.

2. Thermal sources arise from heat gener-ated by electrical equipment associated withthe missile, such as fans, heaters, and other en-vironmental control systems. A measure of thisheat is the power consumed by each shelter,typically 10 to 20 kilowatts (kW) at full oper-ating power, Countermeasures for this sig-nature might use thermal insulation and dum-my powerloads at the unoccupied shelters.

3. Acoustic sources are due to such items ascooling fans and missile transfer operations atthe shelter site. This signature might be coun-termeasure by simulation, such as suitablyemplaced recording and playback devices.

Table 2.—Physical Signatures of Missile

● Seismic/ground tilt ● Nuclear● Thermal ● R a d a r● Acoustic ● Gravity● Optical ● Magnetic

● Chemical ● ElectromagneticSOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

4. Optical signatures are significant primari-ly while the missiIe is in transport. Assumingthat the transporter is covered, so that themissile is not directly visible, concern must beshown for the modal oscillations of the missiletransporter in a loaded v. unloaded condition,tire deformation, exhaust smoke, and vehiclesway angle around corners. Sensors that mightpick up this distinction range from sophisti-cated optics aboard a high flying plane toground-based lasers or even observation withbinoculars at a distance. A possible counter-measure for this signature is a massive decoyof the same weight and simiIar vibrationalcharacteristics to the missile.

5 Chemical signatures are due to the routinevolatiIe chemical release from the missile,such as propel I ant, coolant, plasticizers, andozone. The missile transporter exhaust maya Isc) differ for a loaded v. unloaded case.Chemical concentrations are expected to be ashigh as 1 part per million (ppm), and methodsof detection include laser scattering infraredabsorption, Raman spectroscopy, and takingonsllte samples for later analysis, Counter-measures may include simuIated effIuents anda massive decoy load for the missiIe trans-porter,

6. The nuclear warhead on the missile has itsown signature characterized by a set of gam-ma ray spectral lines particular to the plu-tonium isotopes contained in it. The warheadmaterial also emits neutrons. UsefuI counter-measures incIude radioactive shielding,

7. Radar is a potential signature due to thelarge radar cross section of metal objects asso-ciated with the missiIe, such as launch equip-ment. I n addition, distinguishing the modaloscillations of the transporter due to differentIoacls may be radar detectable from a distanceof severaI hundred miIes. Countermeasures forradar include a massive missile decoy, and re-liance on the metal rebar and a steel Iine forthe shelter as well as earth overburden toradar-shield its contents,

8. Gravity field and field gradient measure-ments should be able to detect the mass of themissiIe at a range of several hundred feet.

Ch. 2—Multiple Protective Shelters ● 3 7

Mass simulation is the most direct counter-measure to this threat

9. Magnetic field anomalies due to the largeamounts of metal i n the missiIe-launchingequipment, if unshielded, can be detected by amagnetometer. Such detection techniques areanalogous to magnetic anomaly detection ofsubmarines, and simiIar countermeasures canbe utilized. A missile decoy containing anappropriate quantity and distribution of highpermeability (magnetic) metal might be usedto help prevent an observer from distin-guishing it from the missile.

10. Electromagnetic emissions generated bymissile equipment during normal operationsare another potential signature. I n addition,radio frequency communication involving themissile could lead to missile location deter-minat ion by radio direct ion-f inding tech-niques Electrical transients may also be de-tectable Countermeasures to these signaturesmight consist of simulatin g powerl ine c o n -sumption by installing dummy loads inside theshel ter , and communicat ing wi th the miss i ledur ing normal operat ion over secure bur iedcable, rather than radio

The task for a potential attacker to defeatMPS by utilizing these signatures depends onthe range of the signature to be exploited, thecovertness needed to COIIect and transmit thedata, and the degree of security provided forthe MPS deployment area Presently plannedsecurity arrangements for the shelters are com-monIy reterred to as point security, Pointsecurity allows public access to all but a smallrestricted area around the shelter, and there-fore allows access relatively close to the mis-sile shelter Area security, on the other hand,would restrict access to most of the de-ployment area

Designing PLU for short-range observation,which is anticipated for point security, is moredemanding than for long-range surveillance,since most, though not a 11, of the missile sig-natures are signiticantly stronger at closerange For example, magnetic anomaly detec-tion, which relies on measurement of magnetictield gradients, falls off as the inverse cube of

the distance from the source. This means thatthe strength of this signature at 100 ft is morethan 1 million times as intense as this signaturewould be at some 2 miIes away. Since close-inthe magnetic details of the source becomemore important, the distribution of magneticmaterial in the decoy is more critical for ade-quate deception than it would be for distantobservation.

I n addition to the short-range signatures,there are also long-range signatures, such asdetailed motions of the missile transporter andseismic waves, that are measurable at manym i Ies.

The range of missile signatures stronglydetermines the degree of covertness that anagent must employ to collect missile locationinformation. A signature that is visible at longranges might require Iittle or no cover toobserve. I n particuIar, long-range signatureswouId be particuIarly threatening if observ-able by satellite, since security wouId have Iit-tle effect; and the impact on PLU would becatastrophic if such signatures could not besuccessfuIly countermeasure. Similarly, sig-natures that are measurable at several miles ortens of miles are also particularly threatening,since security sweeps would be impracticalover so large an area, even if possible. I n thecase of long-range surveillance, the number ofsensors needed would be small compared tothe number of shelters, with the precise num-ber dependent on signature range. It is notclear whether covert operation of sensorswould pose a problem to the Soviets if theyfound a signature that was observable at suchranges On the other hand, short-range sig-natures wouId require some degree of covert-ness, perhaps by an implanted sensor, a road-side van, or “missile sensing” done under theguise of another activity, such as mining. OncemissiIe location is determined there are anumber of ways to transmit the informationcovert I y.

For short-range shelter surveillance, manyemplaced sensors, on the order of thousands,would be necessary to seriously degrade PLU,since a large portion of the shelter deployment


would require independent observation. Thistask could pose a severe problem for theenemy agent. I n addition, the areas proximateto the shelter would quite likely be subjectedto frequent sweeps by security forces. On theother hand, covert sensors that could detectmissile presence in the transporter, while themissile is in transport, could be much moreserious. Since point security wouId not securethe roads, implants in the roads must beprevented from determining the contents ofthe transporter. In a Iinear cluster arrange-ment, for example, if PLU on the transporterwere to fail, then one missile-sensing deviceplanted in the middle of the cluster would beable to determine which half of the clustercontained the missiIe, thereby effectively re-ducing the number of shelters in half, There-fore, PLU is particularly important for thetransporter, and it must be constantly supple-mented by security sweeps of the road net-work.

The Air Force program for deal ing with phys-ical missiIe signatures consists of several ap-proaches, the first of which is to eliminate thesignatures, if possible, by system design. Forexample, if one construction material has asmaller signature than another, using the firstmaterial might be preferable, An example ofthis might be the use of nonferromagnetic ma-terial, if practical, rather than iron, in order toreduce or eliminate the magnetic signature.

These technical design requirements due toPLU have been established for the launcher,the mass simulator, the protective shelter, andthe transporter. The Iist of these requirementsneeded to countermeasure the missile/launch-er signatures, some of which were Iisted in theprevious section, and the many others that aresystem- particular, is a very long Iist, that is dis-cussed more fuIIy in the classified annex to thissect ion

The second approach to countermeasurephysical signatures after attempting to designthem away could be to attenuate the signatureby shielding. For example, heavy materialshields gamma radiation. Thermal insulationmight be used for heat signatures, and so forth.

A signature that cannot be designed away orattenuated might conceivably be masked orjammed, For example, a real signature that ismeasurable might be masked by an additionallarge, possibly random signal, thereby makingit more difficuIt to extract the real missiIesignature from ,the “noise. ”

If these approaches were not feasible, an at-tempt to simulate the signature by the use of adecoy might be employed. This simulation isone of the purposes of the MX mass simulator,which will be placed in all of the unoccupiedshelters, and in the transporter when simulat-ing missile transport, Since the simulator isdesigned to weigh the same as the missile/launcher, it automatically countermeasuresthose signatures that arise from total weight.A S discussed in the classified annex to this sec-tion, additional simulations wiII be required.

Finally, there can be physical security for

the deployment area that would consist ofmonitoring the area and sweeps for sensorsthat might compromise missiIe location

OPERATIONAL SIGNATURES

In addition to physical missile signatures, itis necessary that routine procedures of missiIetransport and maintenance do not expose thelocat ion of the miss i le , Th is cons iderat ionmeans that when carrying out missile-relatedand mass-simulator-related operations, person-nel must do the same things, in the same timeinterval , with the same equipment at al I sites.For example, when it becomes necessary toreturn the missiIe from maintenance to theshelter, the transporter must visit all of theshelters and either deposit or simulate depositof the missile. I f the operator knows in whichshelter he is depositing the missile, care mustbe taken that any actions on his part, such asoutward behavior or conversation with col-leagues, do not give clues to missile location.

INTERNAL INFORMATION

T h i s c a t e g o r y i n c l u d e s p i e c i n g t o g e t h e rmany observat ions to ar r ive at any pat ternrecognition of data from which one may infermissiIe location, To deal with this considera-

Ch 2—A4u/t/p/e Protective She/tefs . 39

ponents is underway now Smallfor signatures will be done in the

Figure 10. —Preservation of Locationand System Design

f 1

sca I c testinglatter halt of

Uncertainty

Character ize

I , - .slgnat ure

tSystem

+

1 >

+ 1

Determinebasellne d i s c r i m i n a t e s

Characterizethreat

v r f ? ?Evolved Select Considerbase- Test counter. counter-Ilne measures measures

+ & b +

SOURCE U S AIr Force

1 ~~1 thr~ljgh the $prtng of 1982, with fllll-~c ~1~’testing in the latter- part of 1982 through 1‘)8 3These testj wi I I be crit [( a I in the des Ign of th~~tran 5porter J ncj ma $~ $ i m u I ator, as ~vel I d \ forthe entire P1 U task

Assessment of PLU

Assessing the feasibll ity of the Pi-U effort isa d i f f i c u I t task [- i rs t, I t Is ~ ~E> n u i n e I v n w

problem, a n d not a s] m p I e extra po I a t i o n ofpast e n g i n e e r i n g effort~ SI nce m issi Ie sig-na tu re~ and their cou n t~lrmea ~u res sens I t ive I vde~)end o n the det a i I ed d e~ ign ot t h(~ ~~~tem, i ti \ d i f f i c u I t and c a n be m Is I e ad i ng to m a k e gen-era I statenlent~ about PLU

Afo physical ana I ysIs IS known that can arguet h a t PLU is a phyfic~l l} ir-npossible ta~k I t sa n a I yses and countermeasures rest on WC I 1-u nderftood physic a I pr i n c i p] t’~ U nt I I re( ent I y,however, there has been no research and dt~-velopment program on P 1- U, nor have therebeen fu Ii-scale field tests to val Idate many ofthe conjectures (ind ana Iyt lcal tools needed todesign the sy~tenl I n terms of PLU scopc~, it~deta i 1- i ntens ive c h ara cter, and 5 i m pl y as a newtechn ica I problem, comparable previous ex-perience or data are not ava i Idbie to ~LI Ide Injudging its fea~ibi I ity I t IS t rue that there IJ~orne a na I ogy with submarine detect Ion andl o c a t i o n I ndeecj, some PL LJ signatur(~~t mostnotably magnetic, are corm mon with iu b-mar i nes. St i I I, there are two i m port a n t d I \t i n c -tions First, in antisubmarine wart~~re (A$W),there is no present neecj to d i sc ri m i nat(~ t I1[J ac -tua I submarine from a decoy, a Ithough re\olv-i ng a $U bm a r i ne s i gn at u re from a noisy back-ground may be one of the lead tasks Sec end,at a technical level, the details conf rontcdwith PLU and ASW are quite distinct Th(’ en-vi ron ments and media are different, and there Ieva nt signatures and the ava i I a b I(’ c~ i sta n ceat which the measurements can be performedare different (much closer for MPS) S i replystated, solving the tech n i ca I A SW p rob I emdoes not significantly help solve PLU, ctnd viceversa

I n addition, it is not known at this point oftechn ica I PLU work, how feasible [t wi I I be to


eliminate, attenuate, mask, simulate, or ran-domize all of the missile’s signatures, or whatthe residual signatures will be. Since this is adetailed engineering task, confidence cannotbe obtained until full-scale field tests havebeen done, when missile signatures can bemore retiably identified and analyzed.

Thirdly, it may not be possible to be certainthat PLU has not been broken by the Soviets; abreak (or even a small fracture) of PLU maylikely be a silent event. For all the scores of sig-natures that have been successfulIy counter-measure, it takes only one accessible uncoun-termeasured signature to imperil the sur-vivability of the entire missile force. On theother hand, it is reasonable to expect that per-sonnel running a vigorous program to monitorPLU in operation will be more aware of com-promises in the system than an outside agentwouId Iikely be, Furthermore, a compromise inPLU would not necessarily be catastrophic,since a breach in PLU for several shelters oreven several missiles would not significantlythreaten the entire force. I n any case, con-fidence in our having PLU is an important fac-tor in its own right. In addition to being basedon knowledge of our own system, confidenceis also a state of mind, and not always easy tojudge or predict,

Finally, the extremely high value of theknowledge of missile location must be em-phasized. Because this knowledge holds thekey to MX survival in a Soviet attack, avigorous Soviet effort in this area shouId be ex-pected, underscoring the technical and opera-tional importance of the PLU effort. The AirForce effort for PLU, which several years agomay have underestimated its scope and dif-ficulty, has more recently proceeded with aprogram that is comprehensive and realistic inits approach. However, whether this or anyother program will succeed in developing atechnology that wiII successfully keep the mis-sile hidden is a technical assessment that can-not be made at this point, at least until full-scale hardware exists and can be tested for allmissiIe signatures,

Sizing the MPS System

For MPS to provide a given degree of sur-vivability to its missiIe force, an adequatenumber of shelters must be deployed so thatthe entire system can absorb an attack, andstilI leave the required fraction of the missileforce intact. Determining the number of shel-ters to be built and the deployment area of thesystem depends on a number of factors: thehardness and spacing of the shelters, the accu-racy and reliabiIity of enemy missiIes, the num-ber of threatening warheads, and the size andsurvival requirements of the U.S. missile force,

Since the idea of MPS is not to build ashelter that can survive a direct hit, but onethat can survive the effect of direct hits on itsneighboring shelters, the requirements forshelter hardness are much less than for thetypical Minuteman silo.

The overpressure experienced by the shelterdepends on its distance from the nucleardetonation(see fig. 11). For any MPS system,

Figure 11 .— Peak Overpressure From 1-MT Burst

10’ 1 o’ 10” 10’

Ground range (ft)SOURCE RDA

Ch, 2—Multlple Protective Shelters ● 41

there is a tradeoff between shelter hardnessand shelter spacing. The harder the shelter ismade, the closer the shelters can be spacedand still withstand the effects of nearby nu-clear detonations. Conversely, the fartherapart the shelters are spaced, the less hard theshelters need be made. I n practice, the shelterspacing and hardness combination is deter-mined by cost trade-offs between increasedshelter hardening (that requires a larger shelterand more concrete) and increased shelter spac-ing (that requires more roads and buried com-munications and electrical connections be-tween shelters), in order to reach a cost mini-mum solution.

The reliability and accuracy of enemy mis-siles are also important factors for decidinghow many protective shelters to build, Reli-ability is the probability that the missile, whengiven the order to fire, will fire and operateproperly along its trajectory. When planningfor shelter deployments, more shelters willclearly be needed for a high enemy missiIereli-abiIity than for a low one. Missile reliabilitiesare typically between O 8 and and 1.0, andtheir effect on vulnerability calculations willbe illustrated later in this section.

Missile accuracy is a measure of the mis-sile’s abiIity to land a nuclear warhead on itstarget TypicalIy, missile accuracy is measuredin terms of CEP, or circuIar error probable. CE Pis defined as that distance from the targetwithin which half of the warheads would landif target ted A large CEP means a less accuratemissiIe; a smalI CE P means a more accuratemissi le.

Missile Accuracy depends on a variety offactors, both internal and external to themissile The heart of the missile’s guidance Iiesin its inertial measuring unit (I MU). Placed inthe upper stage of the rocket, the IMU sensesmissile accelerations throughout the boostphase, integrates the signals to get velocityand position data, and uses this data to nav-igate the missiIe to the warhead’s releasepoint Contributions to target miss, called theerror budget, include the following items:

● smalI errors of instrumentation and cali-brat ion,

● knowledge of initial position and velocityof missiIe,

● I MU platform alignment,● knowledge of gravity for the launch point

region and missiIe trajectory,● knowledge of target Iocation,● RV separation from the missile bus, and● errors during atmospheric reentry.

Knowledge of the missile’s CE P and reliability,and the hardness of the target, allow the pro b-abiIity to be calcuIated that the target wiII bedestroyed in an attack There are standardtables for this caIcutat ion, but for present pur-poses, the following formula is adequate torthe probability that a reliable RV will destroyits target, or pk:

P

k = 1 – exp1 26(YH

where

Pk = the probability of killY = the yield of the weapon, in megatonsH = the hardness of the shelter, in thousands of p\ I

CEP = circular error probable, In kilofeet (thousands of

f t )

For example,

Yield Y = 1 MTHardness H = 600” PSI (or () 6 thousand psi)

C E P = 1,800 ft (or 1 .8 k ilofeet)

then

Pk = 50% (or 0.5

This answer corresponds to the fact that the 600psi contour for a 1 MT detonation occurs atthe 1,800-ft contour. Since, by definition ofCEP, half of the time the weapons would fallwithin 1,800 ft of the target, and halt of thetime they wouId falI outside 1,800 ft, then theprobability of k ill is exactly so percent

Typically, modern intercontinental ballisticmissile (ICBM) accuracy is much better thanthis, and for shelters of hardness less than1,000 psi, the probabiIity of k i I I (given theproper yield) is close to 100 percent (or 1 .0).Furthermore, the furture trend is for pk to be soclose to one that the expectation of destroyinga I most any such target is approximately equalto the retiabiIity of the attacking missiIe


An MPS Calculation

A typical MPS calculation is now performedSuppose the reliability of the attacking missilet i m e s i t s P k ( w h i c h i s t h e e x p e c t a t i o n o fdestroying the target) is 0.85, for example. Sup-pose further that there are 4,000 attacking war-heads of I-MT yield each. The expectation isthat this attack can destroy (4,000) x (0.85) =3,400 shelters. Therefore, after such an attack,an MPS force of 6,800 shelters would have halfof the shelters remaining. Without the at-tacker’s knowledge of missile location it couldbe expected that half of the missile forcewould also survive (see table 3).

To address the sensitivity of missile survivalto the size of the threat, using the above exam-ple as a base case, the percentage of survivingmissiles v, number of threatening RVS is shownhere in figure 12. As before, a reliability of 0.85and a pk close to one is assumed. The numberof surviving misslIes falls off Iinearly with in-creasing numbers of attacking RVS at the rateof 0.85 shelters per RV, until RV number equalsshelter number, 6,800 At this point, 1,020shelters wouId remain, or 15 percent of themissile force would survive, If the attackerchooses, and if he has the warheads, he can at-tack with a second round of RVS. Assumingthat he does not know which shelters he de-stroyed during the first round, he attacks all ofthe shelters again, with a 15-percent efficiencyof targeting among the shelters that are stillstanding (since 15 percent of the shelters sur-vived after the first round). Ideally the secondslope is 15 percent of O 85, or 0.1275 sheltersdestroyed per RV, but fratricide effects (be-

Table 3.—MPS Example

Assume: –

● 200 MX missiIes● 4,000 attacking warheads● 0.85 probability of kill times reliability

Requirement:● 50% survival of missiIe force

Shelters vulnerable:● 4,000 x 0.85 = 3,400 shelters

Shelters required:● 3,400/50°/0 = 6,800 shelters (assuming perfect PLU)


Figure 12.—Surviving Missiles v. Threat Growthfor MPS Example

100 %

(Example: P k x reliability = O 85)—

c

I

15% —

2 % —

4,000 6,800 13,600

Number of reentry vehicles attacking


tween the first and second rounds) might flat-ten out this second slope significantly.

The rationale for MPS in this hypotheticalexample can be seen in the following way, Sup-pose the MX missile were deployed in an MPSwith a ratio of 1 missile per 34 shelters. This de-ployment includes a total of 200 MX missiles,with 2,000 Mk 12A warheads, It wouId take, onthe average, 34 perfect attacking RVS todestroy an MX missile with its 10 warheads, ora ratio of 3.4 attacking RVS to destroy 1 MX RV(assuming we had perfect PLU). This ratiowould be in contrast to undefended silo bas-ing, where it wou Id take at most two RVS (for amuch harder shelter), to destroy 1 MX missilewith its 10 RVS, or a ratio of 1 to 5, in favor ofthe attacker.

Shelter Requirements

This discussion is completed by addressing

actual MPS shelter requirements for the MX setby the size of the possible Soviet threat. As dis-cussed earlier, any MPS system is sized, in part,to the opposing threat; there is no absolutenumber of shelters that will guarantee safetyfor the missile force, but only a number rel-ative to the opposing number of nuclear war-heads. Therefore, for MPS to be survivable, itshould be keyed to and keep pace with theevolving Soviet threat. Given the size and char-


based on actual MX cost models suggest thatthe ratio of 1 to 23 is not far from cost-optimum. Shelter number requirements areshown in figure 13. This graph shows that foran undefended MPS, approximately 8,000shelters will be needed by 1990, and that by1995, an adequate MPS will require approx-imately 12,500 shelters. (The knee in the curveoccurs on the chart where reliability aloneguarantees the required number of survivingMX missiles.)

Past the point of 8,000 to 9,000 shelters, itmay be decided to deploy a ballistic missiledefense, such as LoADS. It will become ap-parent that LoADS effectively doubles theprice that the attacker must pay to destroy anMX missile in an MPS deployment. Therefore,if LoADS performs properly, an 8,000 shelterdeployment with LoADS defense would beequivalent to a 16,000 shelter, undefendedMPS deployment, and is commensurate withour projections for Soviet threat growth in the1 990’s,

Figure 13.— M PS Shelter Requirement for ProjectedSoviet Force Levels (100 Surviving Missiles)

Number ofshelters

15.300

12,500

8,25C

4 6 0 0,—-2,700 7,000 12,000 15,300

Soviet RVS targeting MX

Assumptions● 1 mlsslle for every 23 shelters● Damage expectancy O 85


In addition to properly sizing the MPS sys-tem, it is also necessary that it keep pace withthe expanding Soviet threat, so that it is largeenough to meet the threat at any given time i nits deployment. An expanding MPS that lagsbehind the Soviet force growth is not an effec-tive deployment. Therefore, the rate of shelterconstruction should be chosen to keep up withthe expected rate of Soviet growth. For an8,000 shelter requirement by 1990, and an IOC(initial operating capability) for 1986, it wouldmean buiIding shelters at the rate of 2,OOO peryear, instead of the presently planned rate ofabout 1,200 per year. After 1990, additionalshelters would need to be built at the rate ofabout 1,000 per year. Alternatively, a LoADSdefense would need to be installed. It shouldbe pointed out that the decisions on shelterconstruction rate and LoADS defense are long-Ieadtime items, and the decision to proceedwouId need to be made several years prior toconstruct ion.

Weapon Characteristics for M PS

Because the MX missile is stationary in anMPS basing, except for the periodic reloca-tions during missile maintenance, the weap-on’s characteristics are essentiaIIy the same asfixed-silo ICBM basing. Thus, the systempossesses a very high alert rate. It also has aquick and flexible response with a very hardtarget capability. The communications sys-tems available are many and redundant, in-cluding land Iines during peacetime and war-time radio links. Furthermore, the missile forceis not dependent on strategic or tactical warn-ing, unlike the bomber/ALCM leg of the Triad.It also has the highest potential for enduranceand is capable of operating in a dormant (lowpower) mode for long periods of time with self-contained power supply (batteries),

Moreover, fixed land-basedditionally set the standardcuracy, for several reasonsprevious Iist of contributions

ICBMS have tra-for missile ac-

Recalling theto missile CEP,

Ch. 2—Multiple Protective Shelters ● 45

three relevant items are. 1 ) knowledge of initialposition and velocity of the missile, 2) IMUplatform alignment, and 3) the value of gravityin the launch point region and along themissile’s trajectory Because the missile launchposition is fixed, its position and velocity areknown with great precision. Similarly, beingstationary easily allows the IMU to keep trackof its alignment In addition, gravity mapsneed to be prepared for the Iimited area in theproximity of the launch point These itemstend to make pure inertial guidance much

simpIer for fixed missiIe basing than for comtinuously mobiIe basing that must u palate posi-tion coordinates and velocity by external aidsif sufficiently accurate gravity data are notava i table.

For MPS, once the missile is relocated, theguidance platform needs to go through arecaIibration and reaIignment The require-ment to reacquire CEP (i .e , highest accuracy)after relocation is 2 hours.

THE AIR FORCE BASELINE

The Air Force baseline system for the MXmissile is an MPS system for a force of 200 MXmissiIes to be deployed i n the Great Basin re-gion of Utah and Nevada. It would deploythese missiles among 4,600 hardened concreteshelters, a ratio of 23 shelters per missile. Inthe present design, the shelters would be laidout in clusters of 23: one missile per cluster;200 clusters in all. Large, specially constructedtransporter trucks would move the missileswith in the cluster to help preserve location un-certainty and to transport the missiIe to main-tenance when the missile is in need of service.

The present schedule calls for an initialoperating capability (IOC) of 10 clusters (10MX missiles in 230 shelters) for 1986, and a fulloperating capability (FOC) for the completesystem in 1989: an average construction rate ofabout 1 cluster per week, or 1,200 shelters peryear, Testing of the missile itself is planned tobegin early 1983, with a schedule of 20 flighttests before IOC.

This section begins with a detailed designdescription of the system, including missileand launcher equipment, shelters, transporter,and cluster layout. Land use requirements,based on siting criteria, needs of physicalsecurity, and other elements of the system arediscussed, as are the regional impacts, bothphysical and socioeconomic, water availabili-ty, and impacts on regional energy growth.Finally, system schedule and cost for the cur-rent baseline system and the expanded systems

are analyzed. The section is concluded with atreatment of a split-basing mode for MPS.

Discussions of preservation of location un-certainty (PLU) for the missiIe, and determiningadequate shelter number, i.e., sizing the MPS,are covered in the previous section on thetheory of MPS.

System Description

Figure 14 shows the general layout of the de-ployment and assembly area.

The missile is first assembled in an area out-side the deployment area. The missiIe isassembled stage by stage, into a close-fittingmissile cannister, that provides environmentalcontrol, allows for ease of handling duringtransport, and supports “cold” launch ejectionfrom the capsule. This cannisterized missile isthen joined with a specially constructed mis-sile launcher. The launcher (fig. 15) that isdeployed along with the missile as a structural-ly integrated unit, consists of the launchingmechanism that erects the missile for launch,radio receivers for communication, and sur-vival batteries after an attack. The launcheralso contains an environmental control unitfor continuous temperature, humidity, anddust control. The Iauncher’missile assembly isdesigned to weigh about 500,000 lb, and it is in-troduced into the shelter cluster where it isdeposited in the cluster maintenance facility(where minor repairs also can be performed

46 ● MX Misslle Basing

Figure 14.—System Description

Minimum shelter transportationspacing-5,000 ft

Designated assembly area


the cluster main-when necessary). Fromtenance facility, the Iauncher/missile unit isthen moved to its protective shelter via aspecialIy designed and engineered transporter,which is also assembled in the assembly areaand moved to its own cluster. In the currentdesign, each of the 200 clusters will have onecluster maintenance facility and one launcher-lmissile transporter, for a total deployment of200 c luster maintenance fac i l i t ies and 200t ran sporters. A l ternate des igns under con-sideration call for “clustering the clusters, ” sothat fewer cluster maintenance facil i t ies andtransporters, perhaps one quarter of those thata r e p r e s e n t l y p l a n n e d , w i l l n e e d t o b edeployed.

Once the missile is placed in its shelter it re-mains there until movement is necessary,

either for reasons of missiIe or launcher main-tenance, changing missile location if necessaryfor preservation of location uncertainty, or forarms control monitoring by satellite. The samet ran sporter also installs a missile/launcherdecoy, called a mass simulator, into the other22 shelters that do not contain a missile. Thepurpose of the mass simulator is to make it im-possible for an outside observer to determinewhether a missile or a mass simulator is in agiven shelter (or transporter), at a given time,by duplicating many of the physical char-acteristics of the missile with launcher

Throughout the missile deployment areathousands of miles of roads would be con-structed to connect the shelters, clusters, andassembly area; in add it ion, thousands of milesof underground fiber optic cable would pro-

Ch. 2—Multiple Protective Shelters . 47

Figure 15.—Launcher

AFTequipmentmodule

I

Cannister

Forwardequipment Imodule

ILengthDiameteWeight


vide peacetime commun

155 Feet110 Inches

500,000 Pounds

cat ion with the mis-siIe launcher The tiber optics wouId alsotransmit reports on missile and launcherstatus, and couId transmit the order to Iaunchthe missile. Since these land-line commu-nicantions couId be easily interrupted and de-stroyed in a nuclear attack, the MX fields relyon backup radio communication Iinks be-tween the launcher and higher authority Anairborne Iaunch controI center (ALCC), alwayson airborne alert, would serve as a radio relayfor two-way communicat ion with higher au-thority Other radio Iinks presently designed in-to the system that do not rely on the ALCC forrelay, support one-way communication fromhigher authority to the missile launcher. Allradio signaIs are picked u p by a medium fre-quency (MF) antenna, buried nearby eachshelter

Since the missile is stored in a horizontal

position whiIe in the shelter, the missile launchsequence wiII involve opening the shelter door,a partial egress of the missile/launcher so themissile portion of the launcher is fully outsidethe shelter, erection of the missile to a nearvertical position by the launcher, and finallyejection of the MX missiIe from its launch can-nister by generated vapor pressure and subse-quent missile engine ignition (see fig 16)

Figure 16.— Missile Launch Sequence

Launcher emerged and erected to launch position


Along with the above mentioned elements,the Air Force baseline includes two MX op-erating bases, including housing areas and air-fields, three to six area support centers, andother support facilities.

These elements are now discussed in detail.For notational purposes the term “launcher”wiII refer to the missiIe-cannister-launcherassembly.


Missile Cannister and Launcher

The missile cannister is a hardened tubularstructure (fig. 17) designed to house the missilehorizontally prior to launch, and to providethe impulse, in the form of high pressuresteam, to eject the missile from the cannister, aprocedure known as cold launching. The mis-sile is supported in the cannister by a series ofpads to restrain the missile and reduce loadson it during transport and nuclear attack. Thepads are arranged as a set of circumferentialrings along the motor casings. The high pres-sure steam for missile ejection is generated bya water cooled gas generator, producing pres-sures sufficient to eject the missile from thecannister with an exit velocity of approx-imatey 130 f t/see.

The launcher assembly (see fig. 15) is madeup of several components, and several sec-tions. These parts include a forward section,consisting of a forward shock isolation systemto help cushion the missile during nuclear at-tack, and a set of rollers for transferring themissile to and from the transporter and pro-tective shelter. The middle section of thelauncher holds the missile/cannister assembly,

Figure 17 .—Cannister Construction

/\ /

Aluminumsplice band

and the aft section contains command, con-trol, and communications gear, emergencybatteries, and a second set of rollers for missiletransfer. Total weight of the missile-launcherunit is expected to be about 500,000 lb,

Erection of the cannister for launch isachieved by a SIiding block and connecting rodIinkage, initiated by a pyrotechnic actuator.

Protective Shelter

The protective shelter would house and con-ceal the launcher and would be designed toprotect it during nuclear attack. Essentially, itwouId be a cylinder of reinforced concrete, ap-proximately 170 ft long, and lined with 3/8 inchsteel to protect the missiIe against nuclearelectromagnetic pulse effects. It would have a14.5-ft inner diameter and 21-inch thickness; itwouId be buried under 5 ft of earth, with an ex-posed concrete and steel door 10 ft off theground, as shown in figures 18 and 19. A garagetype structure, the shelter would house thelauncher hor izontal ly ; hence the name,horizontal shelter.

In the present design, allowance is made tohave two plugs installed in the roof of eachshelter Removing the plugs would allow selec-tive viewing of the shelter contents by satelliteto help assure arms control verifiability.

A fence around each shelter would enclose2.5 acres, an area also guarded by onsite intru-sion sensors and remote sensors as part of thephysical security system.

The shelter support equipment, including

environmental control, AC/DC conversion, andemergency batteries, would be housed outsideeach shelter, but within the fence.

Transporter

The transporter would be a manned road-able vehicle that would carry the launcherwithin a cluster between shelters and thecluster maintenance facility (see fig. 20). It isalso designed to transport the mass simulator,and to perform the exchange of launcher withsimulator whiIe parked at the protect iveshelter.SOURCE. U S Air Force

Ch. 2—Multlple Protective Shelters ● 49

Figure 18.— MX Protective Shelter Site

The transporter would be a heavy vehicle,weighing 1.1 mill ion lb unloaded, and 1.6 mil-lion lb when loaded with the launcher or masssimulator. It would be about 200 ft long, 31 fthigh, and would require 26 tires. The transport-er’s cargo bay would be constructed to hold alauncher and mass s imulator , or two masssimulators, at the same time for purposes ofexchange at a shelter (see f ig. 21) This ex-change is to be accomplished by providing twosets of rolling surfaces in the transporter, onefor the launcher and one for the mass simu-lator, and an elevator inside the transporter toposition the cargo for transport (see fig. 22).Transfer of the cargo at the shelter site wouldbe accomplished by an electrically poweredrolI transfer.

Like the shelter, the transporter is designedto have two ports on its roof to permit selec-

tive viewing of its contents for purposes ofarms control verification.

The transporter is designed to protect itselfand its contents from the electromagneticpulse of a high altitude nuclear burst, but itwouId otherwise be vuInerable to nuclear at-tack. Power to the transporter would be sup-plied by 10 drive motors and 2 turbo genera-tors. It would have a 15 mph capability onlevel road, and would have automatic guid-ance with manual override. It would be man-ned during all transport activities.

Mass Simulator

The MX mass simulator would be an arch-shaped structure made of reinforced concrete(see fig 23). It is designed to match the launch-er’s weight (500,000 lb), center of gravity loca-

50 . MX Missle Basing

Figure 19.— MX Protective Shelter

SOURCE. U S Air Force

Figure 20.—Transporter tion, external magnetic characteristics, and

Characteristics

Length: 201 feet

Width: 16 feet (over tires)25 feet (overall)

Height: 31 ft 6 in.

Weight: 1,600,000 Pounds(loaded)

Tires: 26

Drive motors: 10

other signatures, so that when it occupies ashelter, or when it is carried by the transporter,it could not be distinguished from the missileby an outside observer, Square openings, ornotches, are located in the top of the simuIatorarch, and aligned with the plugs in the shelterroof, so that during arms control verificationactivity, when all of the shelters are occupiedby mass simulators and the shelter plugs areremoved, a satelIiteopenings in the massobserve the absenceshelter.

The mass simulatorwith running gear to accomplish its roll trans-fer into and out of the transporter. Therewould be a separate, upper ledge in the shelterto support the simulator. For reasons of PLU,

could see through thesimulator, and therebyof the launcher in the

also would be provided

the simulator’s running gear and its axial loca-SOURCE U S Air Force tion wouId be the same as the launcher.

Figure 21 .— Missile Launcher and Simulator—Transfer Operations

Simulator-simulator transfer

Simulator

Simuiator-launcher transfer

Simuiator

Launcher

I

I


Cluster Layout

Each cluster would contain 23 shelters, ar-ranged more or less along a Iinear string, andconnected by a cIuster road (see fig. 24). Spac-i ng between adjacent shelters would beapproximately 5,200 ft, with a minimum spac-ing of 5,000” ft In addition to the 23 shelters,

La

Figure 22.— Mass Simulator (MS) andLauncher Exchanges

I

Shelter

MS #1

MS #2

MS/MS fake exchange

A

porter

Launcher/MS exchangeSOURCE U S Air Force

m a In-each cIuster would contain a clustertenance faciIity (CM F), where minor repair-s onthe launcher could be accomplished, and thatcould house the transporter when not in use,Most o f the t ime the c lus ter would be un-manned, except for maintenance activities,SALT verification, and security patrols

Simulator


Figure 24.—Cluster Layout


Within each valley, the shelters would be ar-ranged in a close-packed hexagonal pattern(see fig. 25). The lattice is not completelyfilled, having approximately one-third fewershelters than the spacing actually allows. The

Diameter 150 inches

Length 155 feet

Weight 500,000 pounds

reason for this design is that the confluence ofthe shock fronts from the nuclear detonationsat the vertices of the hexagon could be suffi-cient to destroy a missile placed in a shelter atthe center of the hexagon. Consequently, thiscenter shelter has been left out. In the event ofa Soviet effort to increase their n umber of mis-sile RVS, it is presently contemplated thatthese “gaps” in the hexagonal layout will be“backfil led” with additional shelters. If theSoviets fractionate their warheads, thus de-creasing the individual warhead yields suffi-ciently, backfilling could be feasible.


The C3 system (see fig, 26) is divided into two

categories: peacetime and wartime. Thepeacetime/preattack C3 system would consistof a centralized command control located inthe operational control center (OCC), at thebase, and a communications network spannedby an extensive underground grid of fiber optic

Ch. 2—Multiple Proctive Shelters ● 5 3

Figure 25.—Shelter and Road Layout

5,200-ft spacing


cable between the OCC and al I of the missilelaunchers The OCC would be in continuoustwo-way communication with higher author-ities, incIuding the airborne national commandposts (Looking Glass, NEACP, etc ) and the Na-tional Military Command System (NMCS) Thefiber optic cable system would have a highdata rate (48 kilobits/sec) with a relatively longattenuation length, Because fiber optic cableis a dieletric, it is resistant to electromagnet Iosspulse (EMP) effects By making the cable suffi-ciently thick, a protective metal sheath mightnot be required to protect it against gophers,gerbils, and the like, Each Iine contains threefibers (one for communication in each direc-tion and one spare) PLU would be maintainedby uniform formatting and message protocolsfor missiles and simulators The entire systemwould require about 11,000 miIes of cable,

The peacetime C3‘ system is not intended tosurvive a nuclear attack, since the operationalcontrol center would be a primary target, andfiber cable connectivity would be interruptedby cratering. The postattack C’ system wouldtake over at this point. The postattack systemwould consist of an airborne launch control

center (ALCC), that wouId have two-way com-m u n i cation with the missile force via MF(medium frequency) radio The ALCC’ planewouId a I ways be airborne, with a backup ALCCon strip aIert. Each shelter would have buriedbeside it a 600 ft crossed M F dipole antenna,that would serve as a receiving and transmit-ting antenna The transmitt ing power at thesheIter is 2 kW, and with a soil propagationloss of – 30 db, wouId transmit 2 watts effe-tive radiative power MF was chosen, in partto combine the advantage of high frequencydata rates with low frequency propagationthrough ionized, nucIear environments. In ad-dition, MF does not propagate through (or, atleast, is greatly distorted by) the ionosphere,making reception intentionaIIy difficult bysateIIite. In the present design, MF wouId bethe only means by which the missiles could“talk” to command authority Therefore, whenthe ALCC would no longer be operational, thelauncher would not be able to report back tohigher authority,

In addition to two-way MF radio, the base-line is designed to have one-way radio com-munication from higher authority directly t o


Figure 26.—Command, Control, and Communications System

VLF/HF

cable

Protective Structure

Launcher C3

MF transceiverVLF HF ReceiversMicroprocessorCrypto

Shelter C3

Fiber optic modemHardened LF VLF MF antennaMicroprocessorCrypto


the launcher via high frequency (HF) and verylow frequency (VLF) when the ALCC is nolonger airborne (in-flight endurance of theALCC is about 14 hours). Two-way communica-tion between higher authority and the launch-er via H F is presently contemplated, so that thelauncher can give status and report back whenthe ALCC is not operational. We should pointout that even if two-way H F were installed itwouId not necessariI y assure continus, long-haul communication. Because the ionospherewould be disturbed for a period of hours afterthe initial attack before slowly recovering,long-haul HF via ionospheric skywave cannot

Characteristics

Command and Control

PreattackOperational control centerAlternate operational

control center OCCCAOCC

PostattackAirborne Launch ControlCenter (ALCC)Airborne National Command Post/National Command Authorities(ABNCP/NCA)

Communications

PreattackFiber optic cableUHFCVHF voicePAS SAC DINCAFSATVLF MF*HF

PostattackVLF MF/HF

always be depended on (Adaptive HI tech-niques wouId not sol VP the interruption oftransmission, a I though it couId recover morequickly than conventional H F ) H F antennaswould probably have to be added to thesystem In addition to the buried MF antennas,since using the same MF antenna for HFtransmission would incur a variety of technicalproblems,

To help assure receipt of the launch com-mand by all of the launchers from the ALCC,the launcher that first received the messagewould rebroadcast the same message by MF

Power Supply System

Figure 27. —Electrical Power Distribution

56 ● MX Mlsslle Basing

Figure 28.— MX.CannisterlMi ssile Launch Sequence

4 Earth berm

Cannisterlmissile full egress

M

u b ~ l l ~

~ 1 1 1

.

.

.-,-

1!..

1Missile cannister -

Launch position

Y


6. The missile is expelled from the cannister porters could also be used for relocation ofby the hot gas steam generator, at an exitvelocity of about 130 ft/sec.

7. The missile’s stage 1 fires,

The entire missile launch sequence is designedto require several minutes.

Missile Mobility

In the baseline system, the transporters areintended primarily to move missiles betweenthe cluster maintenance facilities and sheltersfor the purposes of maintenance, supportingarms control verification, and PLU, The trans-

missiies among cluster shelters (but not be-tween clusters). Because there are 200 trans-porters and 200 missiles, it would be possibleto move al I of the missiles at the same time,although this is considered very unlikely be-cause it wouid leave all of the force outsidethe /protective shelters and exposed to a pre-emptive attack.

Another possibility would be to keep a frac-tion of the missi Ie force on transporters, on theroad. When the warning of an attack came, theon-road missile force would “dash” into thenearest shelters.


There is some advantage to these mobilityoptions, but there are limitations as well. If apartial or complete breakdown of PLU issuspected, then any number of missiles can berelocated in new shelters, This relocationwouId be performed by a visit of the missiletransporter to each shelter, where it wouldeither simulate or perform a n authentic missiIepickup or deposit The time it would take toperform this operation for the entire missileforce has been estimated to be about 9 to 12hours, after which time the missile could be ina different position so that previous Iocat ioninformation possessed by the enemy would beinvalid Figure 29 shows the timeline for this“rapid” relocation, A decision to relocate allof the missiles at the same time would beunIikely, in view of the earlier discussion.Depending on how PLU was broken, this re-location might or might not reestablish thelocation uncertainty If PLU had been brokenby long-term efforts at data collection or es-pionage or both, then rapid relocation couldreestablish PLU If, on the other hand, theenemy could locate the missiles through tech-nical or other means in a short time, then noamount of relocation would reestablish PLU.

The second mobility option, the “dash” orhide-on-warning option, would place a portionof the missiIe force on the road, i n motion orparked near a shelter Upon warning of attack,the manned transporter would dash to thenearest shelter, deposit the launcher, and backoff from the shelter so that the missile couldegress and launch The time estimate for thisoperation is SIightly u rider 6 minutes, whichwould be required to respond to warning of asubmarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) at-tack, and secure the missile in the shelterbefore the attacking warheads arrive

The dash timeline for this operation isdisplayed in figure 30. Since the transporter isnot designed to withstand an SLBM attack, itcannot be used after the attack. The ad-vantage of this option is that it acts as a hedgeagainst a complete breakdown of PLU, so thatat least a fraction of the missile force mightsurvive the initial attack This option assumesthat the attacker does not know the location ofthe missile at the time of the attack This mayor may not be true, since it depends on theability of his reconnaissance to observe trans-porter location, and use this information to

Figure 29. —Transporter Rapid Relocation Timeline

Time (minutes)Task o 100 200 300 400 500 600

I I I I I ICMF activities

‘ 540I

9 Hrs -In

ITravel to shelter site 17 17 I

I1II

:

I I

Dwell time at shelter 138It

sites (23 sites — I 11 ;

maximum) I 1I I

Travel time 368 ~ ; 2 3(between 23 shelter 1 :sites 1 ,

Travel to CMF 17 5 4 0

ICMF activities u

Total travel time = 17 + 368 + 17 = 402 minutes



Figure 30.— Dash Timeline

Task

Command initiation 2

Travel time 231

Open closure and position 37transporter for transfer

Prepare for transfer 12

Remove simulator 28

Emplace launcher 46

Remove transporter 5

Secure protective shelter 23


Time (seconds)100 200 300 350

I I III

II

I

- 2 3 3I

196 233

I i2 4 5

I

1

I I

II

328 350II1

target the shelter into which the missile wouldseek cover. Without commenting on the pres-ent Soviet capabilities to accomplish this task,it might not be wise for the United States torely on dash as a substitute for PLU. The job ofreal-time reconnaissance and retargeting ofshelters in order to defeat the dash option isnot technically infeasible, although it may behigh-risk in the near future. Thus, reliance ondash may be a useful hedge against a loss ofPLU in the near term, but its long-term pros-pects are more uncertain.

Secondly, af ter a f i rst at tack, recon-naissance would be able to locate the trans-porter. Since the transporter would be locatednext to the occupied shelter, the attackerwould know the location of the dashed missile,and could attack it on the next wave or bybomber force if the MX missile were notlaunched in the time remaining.

Finally, since dash relies on warning of at-tack, it would have a common failure modewith the bomber force, again underscoring the

importance of maintaining a PLU-perfect sys-tem, rather than relying on missile mobility asa hedge.

SALT Monitoring Operations

The basic need to verify missile numbers foran MPS deployment, without compromisingmissile location uncertainty, is satisfied byallowing the means to count missile numbersWithout determining specific missiIe location.

This capability is being designed into the sys-tem, by following a slow, open, and observablemissile and launcher assembly process in theassembly area. This process would allow na-tional technical means to observe each missileconstructed in the assembly area, before it isdeployed in a shelter cluster. Second, there is aunique paved connecting road between theassembly area and the deployment area, and aspecial transporter vehicle to move the missiIeand launcher to the deployment area, Third,the missiles and launchers would be confinedin clusters, with cluster barriers that would

Ch, 2—Multiple Protective Shelters ● 59

make removal and replacement of launchersand missiles observable by satelIite.

To further facilitate SALT monitoring of themissile force by national technical means(NTM), plugs in the roof of each shelter havebeen designed as part of the system. The moni-toring process would proceed as follows:

2.

3.

4.

The transporter deceptively relocates themissile from the shelter to the clustermaintenance facility, leaving a mass simu-lator in each shelter of the cluster.Special vehicles would clear the 5-ft over-burden on top of the shelter, and the twoSALT concrete ports would be removedfrom the top of the shelter, exposing thecontents of the shelter to satelIite recon-n a issance,The shelters would be left in this con-figuration for 2 days to accommodateNTM viewing,The SALT ports would be replaced, theoverburden restored, and the missiIe re-turned to one of the shelters. The es-timated timeline for this process is il-lustrated in table 4.

Siting Criteria

There are three fundamental siting criteriathat apply to any MPS site selection process:

●

●

first, large areas of relatively flat land arenecessary to permit clusters of sheltersand to allow transport of the missilesamong shelters;second, for the purpose of minimizingconstruction costs, it is desirable to have

Table 4.—Monitoring Timeline

Remove missile 1 day (12 working hours)

Remove SALT ports 1 day (12 working hours)

NTM inspection 2 days

SALT port replacement 2 days

Replace missile 1 day (12 working hours)

Total 7 days—

areas with minimal water resources andhardrock formations near the surface; andthird, for the purpose of minimizing thenumber of people displaced or otherwiseimpacted by construction and to mini-mize threats to PLU from public activities,it is desirable to have a low-populationdensity area,

The siting criteria indicated in table 5 reflectthese principal considerations:

On the basis of these screening criteria, theAir Force identified 83,000 mi 2 of geotechnical-Iy suitable lands throughout the WesternUnited States and defined six candidate areasfor “militarily logical deployment” that were

Table 5.—Principal Exclusion/Avoidance CriteriaUsed During Screening

Category Criteria definition

Geotechnical Surface rock and rock within 50 ft.

Surface water and ground water within50 ft.

Cultural and Federal and State forests, parks,environmental monuments, and recreational areas.

Federal and State wildlife refugees,grasslands, ranges, and preserves.

Indian Reservations.

High potential economic resourceareas, including oil and gas fields,strippable coal, oil shale and uraniumdeposits, and known geothermalresource areas.

Industrial complexes such as activemining areas, tank farms, andpipeline complexes.

20 mi. exclusion radius of cities havingpopulations of 25,000 or more.

3.5 mi. exclusion radius of cities havingpopulations between 5,000 and25,000.

1 mi. exclusion radius of cities havingpopulations less than 5,000.

Topographic Areas having surface gradientsexceeding IO% as determined frommaps at scale 1:250,000.

Areas having drainage densities aver-aging at least two 10 ft. deepdrainages measured parallel to con-tours, as determined from maps atscale of 1:24,000.

SOURCE U S Air Force SOURCE. U.S. Air Force


subsequently evaluated on the basis of dis-tances from coasts (to reduce the potentialeffectiveness of sea-based forces), distancesfrom national borders (to reduce vulnerabilityto “unforeseen threats”)* as well as com-patibility with local activities and the sense of

Congress that the basing mode for the MXmissile should be restricted to location on theleast productive land available that is suitablefor such purpose. ”

Figure 31 indicates the areas of geotech-nically suitable lands identified by the AirForce.

Of these areas, the Great Basin of Nevadaand Utah and the Southern High Plains of west

Figure 31 .—Geotechnicatly Suitable Lands

() ~

t’ui MM Wing VI

/ ’ \ . — — . —

) ) - J ‘ ‘ – – –

/ I I\ -

/ I Northern Weat Plains- > - Wheatgrasa-Needlegraaa-BIU@em1

Mojaveand Jo

White Sands

Scale

o 100 200 300 400Miles

O 100 200 300 400 500 600Kilometers

New Mexico Semidesert Grassland w \

Trans. Pecos ChihuahuanShrubsteppe uSOURCE U S Air Force

Ch, 2—Multiple Protective Shelters ● 6 1

Texas and New Mexico were identified as theonIy “ reasonabIe risk” areas, and the Nevada/Utah location was selected by the Air Force asthe preferred area for MX/MPS.

Table 6 indicates the “candidate areas”identified by thepredominant vegeregion.

Air Force along with theative characteristics of the

Roads

The MPS will have a substantialwork of approximately 8,000 miIes.

The designated transportation

road net-

net work(DTN), consisting of paved asphalt roads, 24-ftwide with 5-ft shoulders, wil I connect theassembly area with each cluster, and will totalbetween 1,300 and 1,.500 miles. Inside eachcluster will be roads connecting alI the sheltersand the cluster maintenance facility. About6,200 miles of these cluster roads will be con-structed, 21 -ft wide with 5-ft shoulders Iders. Theseroads will be unpaved and treated with dustsuppressant, and are designed to support themissiIe transporter. Large earth berms will pre-vent movement of the transporter between theDTN and the cluster roads. In addition, some1,3oO miles of smaller support roads in thecluster area will be built to connect shelterclusters and support SALT-related activities,Figure 32 illustrates the construction profilesof the different roads.

Physical Security System

The Air Force has examined two basic sys-tems for MPS security: area security, invoivingrestricted access and continuous surveiIlanceof the cluster areas; and point security, involv-ing restricted access only to the missileshelters, command facilities, and other mili-tary facilities. Figures 33 and 34 compare theconfigurations of point and a red securitysystems.

Under area security, each cluster of shelterswould be bordered by a warning fence andposted notices. Only authorized personnelwould be permitted in the posted area, andtheir movements would be continuously moni-tored by remote surveiIlance. Security forceswould be available at all times for dispatch tounauthorized intrus ions. To prevent the im-plantation and operation of sensors from air-craft, the airspace over the deployment areawould also be restricted to an altitude of 5,000ft, and controlled to an altitude of 18,000 ft(i.e., a permit would be required).

Under the point security system, each mis-sile shelter would be surrounded by a fencedarea of 2.5 acres, and only those 2.5-acre sitesand necessary military facilities would be ex-cluded from public access. Although the clus-ter roads would be separated from the pavedDTN roads by earth berms to prevent move-ment of the missile transporters, the berms

Table 6.—Candidate Areas

Population Private landArea State Ecosystem Urban Rural ownership

Great Basin NV/UT Desert shrub/sagebrush/range 4,922 1,215 <10%Mojave Desert CA Desert shrub/range 51,811 21,980 < 10%Sonoran Desert AZ Desert shrub 77,670 13,183 10%Highlands AZ/N M/TX Semidesert grassland/desert shrub 57,361 9,449 >50%Southern High Plains TX/NM Plains/rangeland 83,921 15,504 950/0Central High Plains CO/KA/NE Mixed grass prairie 54,479 15,123 >9570Northern Great Plains MT/ND Mixed grass prairie Unavailable Unavailable

SOURCE U.S Air Force


Figure 32.— Road Construction Profiles

Roads

Designated assembly area

Protectiveshelter

k

,,,1.*

. --I \

I1

\/

P

5’0” Shoulder1 r 5’0” Shoulder

,1 ,24’ ,t I

I I I Iit . .& I ‘Ust Pa ’’’ ave+e+ :

Aggregate base~J

~COmpacted fill

Bituminous surfacing

Designated transportation network (paved)

5’0” Shoulder1 r

5’0” Shoulder

iI I , )4 ‘I I

21 ‘-30’ I 1I I I II t

/Dust palliative I I

I I

- — -

~ j- -

Existing groundlineAggregate base

Cluster road (unpaved)

5’0” Shoulder

7; - 1 0 ’ - 2 0 ’ J 15 ’ 0 ’ ’s h 0 u’ d e r

I 1I 1I I Dust palliative I ~I I

#1

1 I I I

Existing groundline ~ J ~ Compacted fillAggregate base

Support roads (unpaved)

SOURCE U.S Air Force

would be otherwise passable and the public ● four area support centerswould have nominally unrestricted access toall unfenced portions of the deployment area.

To accomplish this task, the physical securi-ty system would include the following safe-guards and activities in the deployment area:

● j n t r u s i o n s e n s o r s a n d a c c e s s m o n i t o r s a tthe (unmanned) shelter sites and clustermaintenance faciIities,

● a large number (2,300) of smalI radars forcluster surveillance,

that wouldhouse helicopters for 30-minute responsetime to cluster-area sensor alarms, and

. roving ground patrols of 20 two-manteams.

Because there would be unrestricted groundmovement, there would also be no restrictionson airspace.

The manning estimate for security police,that includes deployment area patrols, areasupport center, helicopter crews, and base per-

Ch. 2—Mu/tiple Protective Shelters ● 63

Figure 33.— Area Security

Fenced area \

4 ,n fenced

deployment region

\\

Fenced area


Figure 34.— Point Security

ExplosiveRestricted

/Unfenced


sonnel is about 2,300, or about 25 percent ofthe entire manning estimate. This percentage issimiIar to that at the Minuteman wings.

At the same time, unrestricted public accessto the deployment area would require in-creased security measures to counter againstportable or emplaced sensors. Attempts wouldbe made by the security force to deter personswho might be involved in planting sensors formissile detection, attempting to penetrate thesites, or sequentialIy visiting a number ofshelters. Such measures also might includeescorts accompanying al I transporter move-ments, and would, presumably, include fre-quent “security sweeps” to detect implantedsensors.

Furthermore, it is likely that additional con-trols would have to be exercised on activitieswithin the deployment area. The Air Force hasstated that restrictions on public use of thedeployment area would not be necessary, andthat ranching and mining activities could pro-ceed “up to the fences. ” However, mineral ex-ploration and mining activities pose problemsfor PLU security, For example, modern geo-logical exploration and development utilizesophisticated electronic equipment, and testfor the same types of chemical, electrical, andmagnetic signatures as would be associatedwith the MX missile. I n the event that poten-tially detectable differences exist between MXmissiles and the decoys, unrestricted uses ofgeologic testing equipment would pose securi-ty threats,

Increased traff ic due to the necessity ofsecurity sweeps to protect against the covertimplantation of sensors in the areas sur-rounding roads and shelters wou Id, however,substantially increase impacts on the physicalenvironment.

President Carter decided against the use ofan area security system and directed the AirForce to proceed with point security in 1979,The Air Force presently believes that areasecurity wouId be infeasible and unnecessary,Nonetheless, OTA’S assessment of the tech-


nical problems associated with PLU suggestsseveral implications for the security system re-quirements of MPS. First of all, it is possible, asthe Air Force maintains, that engineering solu-tions to the problems of missile and decoys imi l i tude w i l l pe rmi t po in t security asplanned. Alternately, as has been noted, it ispossible that problems of PLU technology willmake MPS vulnerable to detection regard les<of security measures. Thirdly, it is possible thatweaknesses in PLU technology could be offsetby an area security system. Finally, it is pos-sible that uncertainties in PLU technologywould warrant operational restrictions onpublic activities within the deployment area,but outside the fenced exclusion areas estab-lished for point security, If Federal lands areused, this possibility raises questions regardingpublic access to public lands. For example,mineral explorations that ut i l ize highlysophisticated techniques and equipment forthe measurement of magnetic, gravitational,geochemical, and seismological charac-teristics could pose threats to PLU security ifthey involved the systematic coverage of areascontaining many shelters. Livestock operationscouId be affected by routine PLU activities(such as security sweeps during calvingseason); and any interference with livestockoperations or mineral activities could lead toIitigation claims.

Land Use Requirements

addition to this land, however, 60 mi2 of landW ould be requ i red fo r suppor t fac i l i t i es and122 mi2 would be necessary for roads. Thetotal land area defined by the perimeter of theindividual clusters would be approximately8,000 mi2, and the total deployment areawouId be in the range of 12,000 to 15,000 mi2.

Figure 35 il lustrates the relation of in-dividual clusters to the basing area.

Under a point security system, only the 1 9m i2 of missile shelters, maintenance facilities,and operating bases would be fenced and ex-cluded from public access. Otherwise, it is AirForce policy:

to guarantee civilian access to all butthe fenced portions of the MX deploymentarea. This means that c iv i I i ans wiII haveessentialIy the same access priviIeges tothe deployment area that they haveaIways had. AgricuIture can take placeright up to the shelter fences, and camp-ing, hunting, and mining can continuewithout hindrance by the Air Force.

A potential confIict with this policy exists tothe extent that Department of Defense safetyregulations would require a safety zone ofapproximately 1 mi2 around each missileshelter; but this reguIation would only Iimit theconstruction of habitable structures within thesafety zone, and waivers could be sought fortemporary structures necessary for mining orgeologic exploration.

Thus, the total land requirement for MPSwouId involve an area of 12,000 to 15,000 mi2for the baseline system, of which 8,000 m i2 o rmore wouId be restricted from public accessunder an area security system, and less than 35

mi 2 wouId be restricted from public accessunder the proposed point security system, I neither event, however, approximately 200 mi2of land would be converted from existingrange to missile sites, roads, and operatingbases.


Figure 35.— Hypothetical MPS Clusters in Candidate Area

CarsonCity

\ \ \

I. - l

\

—

II

Las Vegas

I I


I n the proposed deployment area of Nevadaa n d U t ah, virtually all of the lands involvedwouId be federaIIy owned Iand under rider the ju-risdiction of the Bureau of land Managementof the Department of the Interior (BLM) anduse of the Iands for MPS would require con-gressional action pursuant to the Engle Act (re-quiring congressional review of land with-drawals i n excess of 5,000 acres for miIitarypurposes) Additionally, pursuan t to theFederal Land Policy and Management Act, theSecretary of the Interior would have to ap-prove permits for rights-of-way or withdrawalsfor roads, raiIways, pipelines, powerlines, andother construction-related activities.

In the event that non-Federal lands might beused, it wouId be necessary to acquire these

lands through lease, purchase, easement, orcondemnation. I n either case, however, provi-sions would have to be made for the initialwithdrawal of lands substantially in excess ofthe minimum requirements, to allow site-spe-cific engineering studies and flexibiIity i n finalsiting determinations for shelters, roads, andpermanent facilities.

In its simplest form the implications of theseland use requirements are twofold. First, thenecessary withdrawal of lands, whether tem-porary or in perpetuity, and whether of privatelands or public lands, will require the nego-tiated settlement of a wide variety of propertyclaims and constitutionally protected rights. Inthe proposed basing area of Nevada and Utah,these claims would include patented mining


claims (that are defined as legal propertyrights), oil and gas leases, BLM grazing permits,water rights, and Native American land rights;all of which are potentialIy Iitigious matters.

BLM Grazing Permits

In the case of BLM grazing permits, for ex-ample, BLM has authority for the integratedmanagement of Federal range resources underthe Taylor Grazing Act of 1934. The carryingcapacity of the lands is defined in terms ofanimal unit months (AU MS, or the amount offorage needed for the complete sustenance ofa single cow or horse or five sheep or goats fora single month). Allotted grazing rights aredetermined on the basis of the relative carry-ing capacities of private and public lands.Thus, the market value of private lands is tiedto allotments for Federal land grazing permits,that are in turn defined by the carrying capaci-ty of the land. The Air Force has estimated thatMPS would affect less than 1 percent of theallotted AUMS in the proposed deploymentarea by dividing the total deployment Iandarea (20,000 m i 2, by the amount of area remov-ed from use (200 mi2). In fact, however, thelands removed from use would be drawn large-ly from the prime grazing lands between thebottomlands and benchlands of the valleys.Even if it were to be assumed that there wouldbe no impacts on the range land beyond those200 miz directly removed from use, it is clearthat the effects on livestock operations wouldbe disproportionately great, and the value ofprivate ranchlands would be diminished as aresult. Similarly, these claims would be com-plicated by any effects of MPS developmenton the water rights that are integrally relatedto the carrying capacities of both the publicand private lands.

Oil and Gas Leases

Although legally distinct, both oil and gasleases, and hardrock mining claims, posesimilar institutional problems. Under theMineral Leasing Act of 1920, Federal landswere made available for oil and gas explora-tion and development. Significant oil and gas

leasing occurs in the proposed deploymentarea and estimates of the potential reserveswithin the overthrust Belt that cuts throughmany of the canal idate areas suggest the poten-tial for greatly expanded exploration and de-velopment within the next decade. The AirForce policy clearly is intended to permit vir-tually unimpaired oil and gas exploration; butconstraints on activities resulting from PLU re-strictions could result in Iitigable claims.

Hardrock Mining Claims

‘Similary, MPS security requirements couldresult in litigiable claims based on hard rockmining activities. Unlike oil and gas activitieson the Federal lands, that are leased rights,hardrock mining claims under the 1872 MiningAct are patent claims; i.e., legal title of thepublic lands are transferred by Governmentdeed into private ownership. As such, patentedmining claims create private property intereststhat are compensable, and to the extent thatconflicts arise with MPS construction and op-erations, these claims wouId have to be set-tled. Unpatented mining claims present similarproblems.

The problem of mining activities is par-ticularly significant because current activitieswithin the proposed deployment area includegold, silver, copper, molybdenum, uranium,fluorspar, barite, alunite, and beryllium; andexploration activities for new deposits utiIizestate-of-the-art sensing equipment for detec-tion of physical anomalies essentially the sameas those involved in PLU discrimination.

Native American Claims

There are a number of complex NativeAmerican issues that are related to the pro-posed Nevada-Utah basing area, probably themost significant of which is the land claim ofthe Western Shoshone. The Western Shoshoneclaim that much of the land in the Great Basinwas never ceded to the United States and right-fully still belongs to them pursuant to the Trea-ty of the Ruby Valley, This claim could be set-tled in many ways ranging from a cash settle-


ment to establishment of a new reservation,but failure to resolve the matter (which is cur-rently In the courts) couId leave a cloud on pre-sumed Federal ownership of the proposed de-ployment area.

Other Indian land claims involve the des-ignation of a future reservation for the re-cently created Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah (re-s u l t i n g f r o m t h e a m a l g a m a t i o n o f s e v e r a lSouthern Paiute bands and their restoration toa trust status in the 96th Congress), and possi-ble disruption of the small Moapa Reservation(Southern Paiute) and Duckwater Reservation(Western Shoshone). Disruption of Indianwater rights couId also lead to Iitigable claims,and the desecration of sacred ancestral landswould clearly violate the protections of theNative American Religious Freedom Act

Water Ava i lab i l i t y

In the arid lands of the West, water avail-ability is a controversial issue for all growthand development: first, because the physicalavailabliity of water is Iimited; second, be-cause physicalIy available water may be un-suitable for proposed uses; and third, becauseInstltutional requirements for water rights arecompIex and often ambiguous

In the case of MPS, relatively high-qualitywater would be required for construction ac-tivities such as concrete preparation, revegeta-tion, and domestic uses, and lower qualitywater could probably be used for aggregatewashing, equipment cooling, and dust control.

The Air Force has estimated the total waterconsumption of MPS baseline between 310,000and 570,000 acre-feet including construction,and a 20-year operation I period, with a peakdemand of 45,000 acre-feet per year (AFY) inthe late 1980’s and an annual requirement of15,000 to 18,000 AFY during operations.

These estimates include requirements forthe deployment area, operating bases, trans-portation systems, support facilities, irrigationof shelter sites and domestic uses of the workforce, but do not include additional water forreveget at ion of other disturbed lands or es-

timates of larger work force populations. Interms of other large-scale projects, these requirements are roughly comparable to the requirements of large-scale coal-fired power-plants, that require about 10 AFY/MWe, andsynthetic fuel plants, for which estimates ofproposed facilities run from 4,000 to 20,000AFY.

For the purpose of minimizing conflicts withexisting water users, the Air Force has pro-posed using unallocated deep ground water re-serves and has conducted preliminary tests ofground water resources. However, the use ofdeep water reserves poses several problems. Inthe proposed basing area of Nevada and Utah,the interbasin geology and hydrology is socomplex that neither the resources of the deepacquifers nor their relationship to existing sur-face waters can be known with precision.Therefore, if ground water resources are uti-lized, effects on surface water and existingal locations would be difficult to predict. It isapparent, nonetheless, that if ground water re-sources are utilized, certain impacts and trade-offs will be involved:

in some areas, water tables would belowered and both the energy requirementsand the costs of pumping water would bei n creased;surface seeps, streams, and wetlandsmight be reduced or eliminated, thus af-fecting livestock, habitat, and dependentspecies;dislocation of existing surface and groundwater rights could be extensive and leadto subsequent litigation; andparticularly serious water shortage prob-lems and conflicts with prior users appearlikely in the vicinity of the proposedoperating base at Coyote Springs.

Moreover, uncertainties regarding these prob-lems are compounded by the fact that short-comings in monitoring and recordation yieldonly approximate figures in water depletionand water rights.

On the other hand, if the estimated needs ofMPS are compared to the existing surfacewater allocations of the proposed deployment


area, it is apparent that sufficient water existsto accommodate the proposed baseline sys-tem. In comparison with an estimated annualwater requirement of 15,000 to 18,000 AFY foroperations and 45,000 AFY for peak year con-struction, there are 900,000 AFY of currentlyallocated water rights in the deployment area,and an estimated 300,000 AFY are allocatedfor future energy and mineral development,(See tables 7 and 8.)

Because the economic value of water is sub-stantially greater for synthet ic fuels andenergy development than regional agriculture,proposed energy projects have been able topurchase necessary water rights from willingselIers (as in the case of the IntermountainPower Project scheduled for construction inDelta, Utah, for which rights to 40,000 AFY

Table 7.— Water Required for MX

A c r e - f e e t Year Construction Operation Total

19811982198319841985198619871988198919901991199219931994

2000

1681,2476,807

19,07526,74438,61437,65326,74412,9063,7312,152

761262

0

0

0165510

1,7813,7606,4059,545

13,92517,61520,16620,16620,16620,16620,16620,166

1681,4117,317

20,85731,82545,01847,19940,66931,46423,58522,31920,92820,47520,16620,166

SOURCE Air Force figures Include DDA, OB, transportation system. support faCilities irrigation of shelter sites, and domestic uses for operationspersonnel and their dependents

Table 8.—Water Uses

Irrigation 827,223

Livestock 2,514

Energy and minerals 65,330

Urban/industrial 13,593

Total 908,660

Future energy and minerals (period not indicated) 297,074

SOURCE MX Siting Investication Water Resources Program Industry ActivityInventory Nevada. Utah, Prepared for U S D A F BMO/NAFB, byFugro National, Inc ,02, September 1980

have been purchased). Presumably the AirForce would be able to find willing sellerswith in the MPS deployment area.

“The United States could acquire existingwater rights by eminent domain (condemna-tion) if Congress were to authorize such ac-tions. However, even if existing land and waterrights were not condemned, it is possible, giventhe scope of MPS requirements, that land-owners, lessees, grazing permit ters, andholders of existing water rights could contendthat their rights had been either “taken” (andfile claims for fair and just compensation), or“ injured” (resulting i n a legal claim for dam-ages based on tort and trespass law).

on the other hand, OTA’s assessment in-dicates that ranching (and possibly mining) op-erations in the proposed basing area wouldprobably close down in response to economicpressures, impacts on rangelands, and possiblePLU restrictions resulting from MPS develop-ment. Moreover, the laws and regulations ofboth Nevada and Utah provide for the transferof water rights on either a permanent orlimited-term basis. For this reason it is likelythat water would not be a limiting factor forMPS deployment unless it were necessary toconstruct more than 4,600 shelters or addi-tional water was necessary for revegetation ef-forts. The issue of revegetation, however, is ex-tremely controversial and pivotal to many ofthe physical impacts of MPS basing. Air Forceestimates of water requirements include somewater for revegetation of the missile sites, butno water for revegetation of disturbed lands.Since there are no established methods forrevegetation of arid lands without substantialirrigation, the total water required for re-Vegetaion couId far exceed al I avaiIable re-sources within the deployment area. Assureingan irrigation requirement of 1 AFY/acre, morethan 3 million acre-feet could be necessarybased on OTA’S calculations of possible landuse impacts.

Physical ImpactsAny large-scale construction projects in-

volve physical impacts that are dependent onsite-specific characteristics of the area. Con-

Ch. 2—Mu/tip/e Protective Shelters 6 9

struction generalIy necessitates direct physicalimpacts on the so i ls , vegetat ion, I ivestock,habitat, wildlife, water quality, air quality, andother environmental characteristics of aregion The severity of these impacts dependson their particular characteristics and theirmagnitude, on the abiIity of the ecosystem toadapt and recover from disturbances, and onvalues subjectively placed on the changes thatoccur I n the case of MPS basing, the expan-sive grid-pattern of the system, the magnitudeof the land-use requirements, and the utiIiza-tion of lands that have inherently limitedcapacity to absorb and recover from disturb-ances, could lead to widespread desolation ofthe deployment areas

The Air Force baseline proposal has been de-scribed as the largest construction project inthe history of man, and it would involve, at aminimum, the disruption of 200 m i2 of land formissiIe shelters, roads, and operating bases, aswet I as additional lands for temporary con-struction camps, haul roads, gravel pits, hold-ing areas, and other construction related ac-tivities. I n the absence of irrigated revegeta-tion, or the presence of prolonged drought, thelikelihood of these impacts would increase,possibly causing fugitive dust from decertifiedlands to contribute to drought conditions thatcouId affect agricuIturaI productivity outsidethe boundaries of the deployment area

As indicated above, MPS basing requires alarge deployment area, with a minimum of4,600 shelters spaced at 1 to 2 mile intervalsconnected by 6,000 to 8,000 miIes of roadsthroughout a geographic area of 12,000 to15,000 mi2 The construction of these facilitieswouId directly disrupt at least 200 mi2 of landsurface: but because arid or semiarid landswould be required and the impacts would bespread over a grid rather than confined to abounded area, the attendant impacts couldspread significantly.

Impacts on Soils and Vegetation

The native vegetation of arid lands is nec-essarily highly specialized and inherentlyfragile, resistant to drought but vulnerable tothe impacts of physical disturbance and vehic-

ular traffic. Throughout the arid and semiaridlands of the West, including the proposeddeployment area and most of the geotech-nically suitable candidate areas, “invader”species such as Halogeton and Russian Thistlehave colonized rangelands rapidly followingthe physical disturbance of lands and theremoval of native vegetation. These invaderspecies offer protection against further de-terioration of the soils by agents of erosion,but the protection is of Iimited value insofar asHalogeton does not provide nutritious forageand may be toxic to Iivestock. “Complete re-covery (of disturbed lands), ” the Air Force hasstated, “may take a century or more Longterm establishment of Halogeton could pre-vent reestablishment of native vegetation, andi reversibly degrade the value of vegetation forfuture wildlife and Iivestock use.’”

Alternately, if not colonized by Halogetonor other “invader” species, the arid, loose-packed soils are vulnerable to structural dis-ruption or compaction When compacted thesoils increase the frequency of water runoffand sheet-wash erosion, and when disruptedthe loose particles become susceptible to winderosion. I n either case, the effects of erosionfurther degrade the land by altering both thephysical and chemical profiles of the soil, andby impact ing adjacent lands through thealteration of water flows and the abrasion ofairborne particulates. Because arid lands gen-eralIy have relatively low levels of biologic ac-tivity, soils are slow to reform, native speciesare slow to return, and the alterations of theland are likely to be irreversible without sub-stantial human intervention.

The implications of these processes are ofparticular concern for MPS deployment be-cause of the scale of the project and the poten-tial for “spill-over” effects.

Although the Air Force claims to have beensuccessfuI in confining the impacts of MPS-type construct ion act ivities to designatedareas on test ranges, they have indicated that“a corresponding degree ot succes wiIl pro b-

Deployment Area Selection Land Withdrawal Acquisition


ably be u n Iikely (in the case of MX MPS) due tot h e m a g n i t u d e o f t h e p r o j e c t , ” { a n d t h eamount of disturbed land is Iikely to increasethroughout the c-obstruction stage whiIe add i-tionaI lands wouId be disturbed atter construc-t ion as a consequence of off-road vehicle usea n d continued erosion q

Thus, the Air Force has indicated that in theabsence of mitigation, “the significant adverseimpacts from vegetation clearing would rangefrom long-term to permanent, 5 Both as a re-sult of the magnitude of the project and theparticularly large interface between disturbedlands and undisturbed lands, the potential im-pacts could spread far beyond the 200 mi2

directly disturbed by construction of the mis-sile shelters, roads, and support facilities. TheDE IS indicates that “the large number ofcleared areas would result in a greater im-pact than would occur from the clearing ofonly a few such areas, ”6 and “the more dis-turbed area, the larger the amount of vegeta-tion lying around the perimeter of the clearedareas which wilI be subject to erosion andf looding ’” Consequently, the Air Force es-timated that vegetative clearing and the asso-ciated secondary impacts of construction ac-tivities could extend up to 0..5 miles frompoints of direct disturbance. Although thisfigure was considered in the DE IS only as“rough index, ” it clearly indicates the poten-tial for extensive disruption of the deploymentarea,

If a vegetative disturbance area of only 0.25miles from directly impacted lands is assumed,the construction of 8,000 miles of roads couldresuItin devegetation of 4,000 m i2 of land; andif a perimeter of 0.25 miles around each of the4,600 missile shelters is considered, an addi-tional 500 to 1,000 mi2 of land could be lost(depending on overlaps with the impact zonesof the roadways). Figure 36 i Illustrates thisissue.

On this basis, 5,000 mi2 of productive range-Iands could be lost in addition to lands im-pacted by operat ing bases, construct ioncamps, haul roads, gravel pits, other construc-tion related activities, and secondary develop-ment resulting from the population influxassociated with MPS construction and deploy-ment. If the impact perimeter is increased to0.5 miles, as considered in the DE IS, thebaseline system could impact 10,000 mi2. Andif it is assumed that the “periodic sweeps” re-quired by PLU activities would be concen-trated in roughly the same land areas within0,25 or 0.5 miles from MPS roads and missileshelters, then, as we have indicated, the im-pacts could be permanent.

To mitigate these impacts the Air Force hasproposed a variety of measures, including thereapplication , of surface soils where sub-surface soils are of lower quality; stabilizingslopes; securing mulches; planting vegetation;“minimizing) repeated disturbance of plantedareas from livestock and off-road vehicle(ORV) activity until vegetation is adequatelyreestablished;” and irrigating planted areasthat receive less than 8 inches of rainfall peryear.

These last two mitigation measures are par-ticuIarly important, not only because of theirvalue to successful revegetation, but alsobecause of the impacts they suggest onranching operations, water requirements, andthe costs of MPS deployment, As the Air Forcenot es:

Planting efforts usually fail in areas whichrecieve less than 8 inches of precitation an-nually (which includes roughly 80 percent ofthe projected disturbed area), unless irrigationis used Revegetation water is not incIuded inwater estimates presented in this report [EIS]and would increase requirements significant-I\/ q

In fact, if 1 AFY/acre is required for revegeta-tion, and 5,000 mi2 of land is disturbed by con-struction and secondary impacts, successfulrevegetat ion would require more than 3 mil-lion AFY. Even using much more conservative

9 4-99


Figure 36. —Potential Vegetative Impact Zone


assumptions, the DEIS notes that “a com-prehens ive revegeta t ion program wou ld bevery expensive. 10

These potential impacts of MPS develop-ment are especially significant in the contextof western regional development. During thepast decade, expanded energy developmentand population growth have greatly increased

+‘“1 10 Ibid

pressures on the physical environment to thepoint where they may be straining the region’slife support systems and there is increasingconcern about the potential spread of deser-tification throughout the region. Desertifica-tion generally refers to the degradation of aridlands to the point where they can no longersupport Iife, and it tends to break out, “usuallyat times of drought stress, in areas of naturallyvulnerable lands subject to pressures of land

use. ” 11 Estimates of U.S. lands vulnerable todesertification range from 10 to 20 percent ofthe continental United States, and the Presi-dent’s Council on Environmental Quality re-cently warned that the threat of continued de-sertification couId have “far-reaching implica-tions in terms of the Nation’s food and energysupplies, balance of payments, and its envi-ron merit. ” 2 Symptoms of desertification arealready present throughout many parts of thearid and semiarid West— including overdraftof ground waters, salinization of topsoils andwaters, reduction of surface waters, unnatural-ly high erosion, and desolation of native veg-etation 13 — and projected expansion of West-ern energy resources will involve continuedpressures throughout the region during thenext decade.

In this context, any number of alternate im-pact scenarios, inciuding expanded resourcedevelopment, rapid population growth, off-road vehicle traffic, or prolonged drought con-ditions, could contribute to increased deser-tification: but MPS in arid lands, because ofthe magnitude of its grid configuration, clearlyposes the greatest potential threat.

Weather Modification

Desertification within the deployment re-gion also raises questions of potential at-mospheric effects that are highly speculativeat this time, but which, because of their poten-tial implications for domestic agricultural pro-ductivity, deserve attention.

The Air Force has calculated that “fugitivedust” emissions from MPS construction (basedon 200 mi of land disturbance) would result intenfold to twentyfold increases in atmosphericparticulate, and violations of standards pro-mulgated u rider the Clean A i r Act, These em is-sions wouId degrade air quality over a widearea (includin g several national parks), andthere is a possibility that health problems

could result from spore-laden dust churned upfrom the desert soil,

other concerns, however, are suggested byrecent studies of atmospheric particulate thatsuggest that climatic effects may result fromincreasing aerosols of fine particulate in thelower atmosphere. While the back scattering ofsolar energy tends to decrease total atmos-pheric heating and thereby cool the lower at-mosphere, absorption of radiant energy by par-ticulate matter tends to increase the tem-perature while simultaneously acting as con-densation nuclei that adsorb moisture and re-tard cloud formation. The net result of theseeffects, depending on their relative mag-nitudes and a variety of other considerations,C OuId be to increase temperatures in the loweratmosphere and decrease precipitation. More-over, these effects may be most Iikely in aridregions, as evaporation from moisture in morehumid climates would tend to offset the in-creasing temperatures brought about by ab-sorption of radiant heat.

The long-distance transport of fine par-ticulates from desert regions of the world hasbeen well-documented, but the potential ef -feel-s of resulting climatic alterations areunknown. I f a causal relationship exists be-tween fugitive dust emissions and downwindweather mod if i cation, extensive fugitive dustemissions from MPS deployment in the GreatBasin could have substantial economic im-pacts on agricultural productivity outside thedeployment area; and as in other matters dis-cussed in this section, drought conditionsduring the construction period would exacer-bate the potential threats.

L e a s t P r o d u c t i v e L a n d s

Finally, in considering the physical impactsof MPS basing, it shouId be noted that theDepartment of Defense Supplemental Appro-priation Act of 1979 included “the sense ofCongress that the basing mode for the MX mis-sile should be restricted to location on theleast productive land available that is suitablefor such purpose. ”14 Accordingly, the pro-

Ch. 2—Mu/tiple Protective Shelters ● 73

posed deployment area in the Great Basin ofNevada and Utah reflects this criteria, It is notthe /east productive land among the ,geo-technically suitable areas; but it is among theleast productive, and is considerably less pro-ductive than the High Plains regions that ex-tend from Texas and New Mexico up throughColorado and Nebraska to Wyoming,

However, the more productive agriculturallands have an inherently greater capacity toabsorb the impacts of construction activitiesand, in contrast to the Great Basin, could berevegetated with relative confidence. For thisreason, the totaI amount of land lost to agri-cultural productivity might be considerablyless than in areas where revegetation is moredifficult. If it is assumed that 200 mi of {andwouId be lost in a grassland ecosystem andthat the market value of crops is $80/acre/yr,then the total economic loss associated withthis basing option would be approximately$10.2 million per year. And if twice as muchland would be lost to agricultural productivityin the Great Basin, with the market at approx-imately $5/acre/yr, then the net agriculturalloss would still be less than 10 percent of thelost crop value in a grassland ecosystem.Based on this rough estimation, 3,200 mi’ ofrangel and would have to be lost to equal thelost agricultural value of 200 mi2 of crop land.

Therefore r if the impacts of MPS construc-tion can be confined to the designated areasduring construction, and mitigation measuresare not very expensive, the economic costs ofdeployment in “least productive lands” wouldappear to be considerably less than i n moreproductive croplands. But if it is assumedeither that the impacts will spread in aridlands, or that mitigation measures to preventthe spread of impacts will be more than $10mill ion per year, the economic costs of “ leastproductive lands” are Iikely to be at least asgreat as the costs of using more productivelands


larger populations (at least 10,000-25,000 peo-ple) have the capacity to absorb greater popu-lation influxes without suffering adverse af-fects. To the extent that infrastructures ofhousing stock, schools, roads, sewers, healthcare facilities, and administrative services allexist prior to rapid growth, these facilitiesoften can absorb much of the population in-crease, and the marginal costs of expandingservices and facilities are relatively small.Insofar as the Air Force siting criteria for MPSexclude areas with cities of more than 25,OOOpeople within 20 miles, adverse socioeconomiceffects wouId be essentiaIIy unavoid able

Based on recent experience with Westernenergy resource development, these i m pactswouId include a restructuring of the local jobeconomy as new jobs are created and existingresidents change jobs in hope of new oppor-tunities and higher wages; changes in the life-style of relatively isolated and closely in-tegrated communities; inadequate housing,roads, sewers, schools, health care facilitiesand administrative services; regional wage andprice inflation; and increased stresses on in-dividuals, families and communities. It is alsoworth noting that local residents are usuallyunable to compete successfully with newmigrants for skilled labor positions and higherpaying jobs, and that few new jobs go to un-employed residents of the area, fewer still towomen and minorities, and virtually none toIndians.

As a consequence of the influx of newmigrants with a relatively high proportion ofwell-educated or skilled laborers, competitionfor jobs does not always benefit existing com-munity residents. Existing businesses are oftenunable to compete with the higher costs ofwage and price inflation; new small businessoperations are frequently unable to competewith the high capital costs and risks associatedwith meeting rapidly expanding business op-portunities; existing residents may resent theinflux of new residents and associated changesin community lifestyles; incoming residentsoften find adjustment to reduced levels ofsocial services and amenities difficult; and in-

creases in alcoholism and child abuse tend toappear as manifestations of these increasingcommunity pressures.

Finally, in the isolated ranching, mining, andfarming communities of the Western States,social ties between families and neighborstend to be especially strong, and both admin-istrative government and the provision ofsocial services may be deeply rooted in in-formal community mechanisms. This relation-ship is true in general throughout the isolatedcommunities of the Western States, and it isparticularly true of the Mormon communitiesof southern Utah, in which the integral rela-tionship between church, family, and com-munity wouId be profoundly disturbed by theinfIux of a large number of migrants who couldnot be assimilated into the fabric of thiscu It u re.

These issues are complicated by the factthat the Western States are in a process ofrapid growth and transformation, and that vir-tually all of the available Iiterature has beendrawn from experiences with western energyresource developments that have been rel-atively large in relation to the existing com-munity sizes, but that are relatively smalI incomparison with the manpower requirementsand geographic expanse of MPS. In contrast tolarge-scale coal-fired powerplants and syn-thetic fuel facilities with construction workforces of 2000 to 5,000 people, located atspecific sites that could be clearly defined inrelation to the surrounding communities, es-timates of the baseline construction workforce for MPS range from 15,000 to 25,000 peo-ple; and the Air Force is considering the use ofas many as 18 temporary construction campsspread throughout a geographic area of 15,000m i2 for construction of MPS, Furthermore,there is evidence to suggest that in several in-stances the net impact of rapid growth onsmall communities has been positive. Follow-ing the boom-bust cycles of rapid growth anddecline, the communities have readjusted tolifestyles closely resembling preimpact condi-tions, but with the added benefits of expandedfacilities resulting from an increased popula-tion base,

Ch, 2—Mu/t/p/e Protective Shelters ● 75

Thus, it might be the case that individualcommunit ies within the deployment areamight benefit from MPS deployment, or alter-nately, that the effects of MPS deploymentmight be indistinguishable from the effects ofaccelerated mineral resource and energy de-velopment in surrounding areas. I n general,however, it appears that the residents of smallcommunities in the deployment area would beunlikely to benefit from MPS development,and probably would face the loss of existingranching and mining operations within thearea

At the same time, the larger urban areas onthe periphery of the deployment area would beaffected by MPS development in a totally dif-ferent way Unlike small towns faced withneither the administrative nor the financialcapac i t i es to accommodate large-scalegrowth, larger urban areas with these capa-bilit ies would be faced with uncertainties r e-g a r d i n g t h e m a g n i t u d e a n d t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e

g r o w t h t h a t m i g h t o c c u r . u n l i k e l a r g e - s c a l e

energy developments in which clearly definedlocations for planned facilit ies reduce theuncertainties of planning decisions to ques-tions of timing, financing, and scale, themagnitude of MPS and geographic dispersionof the proposed development complicatesthese issues substantially

In contrast to large-scale powerplant devel-opments with construction work forces of2'000 to 4,000 people, estimates of the onsitework force required for MPS developmentrange from 15,000 to 25,000, and OTA’S anal-ysis indicates that actual construction workforce requirements could be as high as 40,000people In this case, the total population im-pacts of MPS could be in excess of 300,000people Because regional economic impactsare a function of the magnitude and distribu-tion of the work force population and asso-ciated growth, and the range of possible popu-lation impacts is so great, it is worth looking atthe basis for these figures in some detail.

Work Force Estimates

The Air Force has estimated that MPS con-struction wouId require a peak construction

work force of 17,000 workersIation of slightly more thanperiod of overlap betweentivities and initial operations

and a total popu-100,000 during aconstruction ac-

Figure 37 illustrates the approximate rela-tion between the population of the construc-t ion work force, operating personnel, and theirdependents.

I n fact, these figures represent conservativeestimates By the time the DE I S had been pre-pared, the construction work force figures hadbeen revised upwards almost 40 percent* –and they fail to reflect the uncertainties thatare associated with all of these estimates

Figure 38 illustrates the direct constructionwork force estimates (including onsite and“life support” labor) of the Air Force, the ArmyCorps of Engineers, and joint Air Force/ArmyCorps task force on manpower estimates. Fig-ure 39 illustrates the relationship between on-

-—‘ 1 he [)r,]t t f ni lronn~<’nt ‘I I I 11)1)<1( t \t ,Itt’nl{’nt on Artl,) ${JI(I(

t Ion w a ~ pu hl I >h(’d ,] 1( )n x m It h <In t’rr<] t ‘i iht’t~t M h I ( h ( ont,1 I n~’(j

re~’ I ~t’(1 work t or( (’ (>~t I m‘] t t~i h,1 itlci () n ,) I ( ) I n t t,1s k t [ ) r( t, { )t t h(’

Figure 37.—Construction Work Force, OperatingPersonnel, and Secondary Populations

110 I I

Direct andindirectpersonnel +dependent(1000s)

100 “

90 —

80 —

70 —

60 —

50 —

40 —

30 —

20 — Construction

10 —

o1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Year

SOURCE U S AIr Force


Figure 38.— Baseline Work Force Estimates24

-

22 - Legend

20 -— A C E‘ o — A . F .

18

16

14

12 —

10 —

8 —

--

6

4 -

2-

82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90Annual average direct construction work force (including life support)

A. F./DElS 1,150 2,000 4,450 10,800 17,050 15,450 13,050ACE 1,160 6,940 14,305

4,80019,750 23,730 16,900 12,670

A. F.IACE 2,035 5,590 9,5104,725

17,910 18,560 17,670 12,765 5,490

SOURCE A F /DEIS Chapter 1, Errata Sheet, Table 11

site construction labor estimates and estimatesof the total construction work force required.

Estimates of the costs and manpower re-quirements of major construction projects,however, have characteristically underesti-mated actual costs and manpower needs. Evi-dence from various studies of this problemsuggests that these overruns resuIt in part fromrevisions in engineering designs while con-struction is in progress, delays caused by latedeliveries of major components or bottlenecksin materials supplies, and difficulties in utiliz-ing manpower and materials efficiently on atime-urgent schedule. Tables 9 and 10 providetwo indices of these problems. Table 9 in-

dicates the average cost overruns in weaponssystems, public works projects, major con-struction projects, and energy process plants,and table 10 compares the projected and ac-tual manpower needs of large-scale coal-firedpowerpIants.

If all overrun factor of 73 percent is assumedon the basis of the average manpower overrunassociated with coal-fired power-plants in theWest * the manpower estimates for MX/MPSwould increase to more than 42,000. As a I so

‘ The average manpower overrum from coal p o w e r p l a n t s

I n the West is used here because it represents construction of a known technology (rat her than a new” technology) in the arid

West Other pro jec ts such as nuc lear powerp lant o r syn the t i c

f u e l p l a n t s i n v o l v e h i g h e r d e g r e e s o f n e w t e c h n o l o g h d e v e l o p -

ment

Ch, 2—Multiple Protective Shelters ● 7 7

Figure 39.—Comparison of Onsite and Total Construction Work Force

26

24

22

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

Legend

— — — C o n s t r u c t i o n o n l y

Total “.

.

\●

.

/

\●

● \

82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89

Year

Constructiononly 1,832 5,031 8,559 16,120 16,700 15,900 11,490 4,941Life support 203 559 951 1,790 1,660 1,770 1,275 549Assembly andcheck out o 400 1,000 3,550 6,000 6,000 5,900 5,750

Total 2,034 5,990 10,510 21,460 24,564 23,670 18,665 11,240


Table 9.—Cost Overruns in Large-Scale Projects

Actual cost/Type of system estimated costWeapons system ... . . . . . . . . . . 1.40-1.89Public works. ., ., ... ... . . . . 1.26-2.14Major construction ., ... ... . . 2.18Energy process plants. . . . . . . . 2,53

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1981


Table 10.—Estimated and Actual Construction an accelerated construction schedule and 73Work Forces for Coal-Fired Powerplants percent to allow for manpower overruns.—

-- Estimated Actual Percent ‘Plant (and State) peak peak change

A n t e l o p e V a l l e y - P o p u l a t i o n E s t i m a t e s(N. Dak.). . . . . . . . . . 840 1,370 + 63

Boardman (Oreg.) . . . 760Clay Boswell (Minn.) 900Coal Creek (N. Dak.). 980Laramie River (Wyo.). 1,390White Bluff (Ark.). 1,100

1,4821,5602,1132,2001,900

+ 83+ 73+ 91+ 58+ 72

Similar uncertainties affect estimates of thesecondary populations associated with theconstruction work force. Assumptions must bemade regarding the ratio of new secondary em-ployment (e. g., construction of new housing,grocery stores, gas stations, etc., ) by MPS con-

Figure 40.—Construction Work Force: High-Range Projection

65

60

55

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

—Legend: —

Baseline construction work forcePIUS 600/0

Plus 73 ”/0

●

●

●

✍

✎

●

●

82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89

Year

Baseiineconstructionwork force 2,034 5,990 10,510 21,460 24,S60 23,670 18,666 11240Plus SO% 3 a 9,884 16,816 34,336 39,296 37,872 29,864 17,964

Plus 73 ”/0 5,630 16,860 29,091 59,401 67,993 65,518 51,664 31,112


Ch. 2—Mu/tiple Protective Shelters ● 7 9

struct ion and operations, and addi t ionalassumptions must be made regarding thedemographic characteristics of the construc-tion work force. Despite the fact that the char-acteristics of western energy project construetion labor forces have been studied, significantuncertainties exist, and the popuIation impactsof MPS couId vary considerably depending notonly on the number of construction workers in-volved, but the relative numbers of single andmarried workers, and choices they make re-garding residential locations and commutingalternatives. Using the Task Force baseline es-

timate of construction work force size (see fig.38), figure 41 illustrates the range of secondarypopulation growth associated with the basecase assumptions using three different sets ofdemographic assumptions,

Finally, if these factors are considered inconjunction with one another, a wider range ofpopulation growth scenarios results. Figure 42illustrates the range of possible populationgrowth scenarios resulting from alternate as-sumptions regarding the location and demo-graphic characteristics of the primary work

Figure 41.— Range of Secondary Population Growth

# - - -120 . S c e n a r i o 1

- - S c e n a r i o 3 S c e n a r i o 5

/ ’105

/ \90

\

x

82 83

I ITable 2 summarizes these data:

Scenario 1 3,404(x 1 .73)

Scenario 2 2,839(x 1 73)

Scenario 3 4,356(x 1 73)

Scenario 4 2,493(x 1 .73)

Scenario 5 2,174(x 1 73)

1982

18,289

12,594

29,689

7,380

6,412

1983

Scenar io 1 0511 s ing le + 0.489 marr iedScenario 2 0375 single + O 25 married +Scenario 3, all workers marriedScenario 4. all workers singleScenar io 5 a l l workers shut t led

8 4 8 5 8 6

I 1 Year I

—

32,576 6 7 , 6 8 1 78,796

22,382 27,789 53,595

53,167 110,876 129,458

12,872 26,346 30,313

11 ,2?5 22,940 26,303

1984 1985 ‘- 1986

0375 shuttled

87 88

I I

—.

76 ,949 62,035

51!917 41,895

126,668 102,449

29,371 23,313

24,629 20,070

1987 1988

89

I

38,699

25,944

64,333

14,169

12,127

1 9 8 9

S O U R C E E R C p 2 0 / O f f i c e o f T e c h n o l o g y A s s e s s m e n t

“ /footnote from page 25



Figure 42.— Range of Potential Population Growth

360

340 —

320 —

300 —

280 —

260 —

240 —

220 —

200 —

180 —

160 —

140 —

120 —

100

t -80 —

60 “

40 —

20 / / — — ~ -- - *

0 I I 1 I

82

- Accelerated construction;73% overrun; all workersmarried 12,057

Accelerated construction50% 0 married workers 5,446A.F. base case; no over-runs; all workers shuttled 2,174

83 84 85 86 87 88 89

A c c e l e r a t e d c o n s t r u c t i o n ;73% overrun;all workers married

A c c e l e r a t e d c o n s t r u c t i o n50°/0 married workers

A . F . B a s e c a s e ;no overruns;all workers shuttled

82,179 147,166 306,904 358,339 350,617 283,578 178,073

29,262 52,121 108,289 126,072 123,118 99,256 61,918

6,412 11,225 22,940 26,303 24,629 20,629 12,127



Figure 43.—Cumulative Energy Activity in the West

SOURCE AbtlWest. 1981

neers, and experienced managers, is regardedas highly mobile and projected to be in shortsupply, the labor requirements of MPS con-struction could affect resource developmentthroughout this 10-State area. Training pro-grams are underway to offset some of theselabor shortages in several States, but they areunlikely to have a major effect on the short-ages because many of the skiIled positions re-quire training and experience (that are in turn

dependent on skilled instructors) and becausethe clemand for labor changes rapidly withconstruction plans and scheduIes.

System Schedule

The MX/MPS schedule is highly success-oriented and requires specific actions by Con-gress if both IOC and FOC are to be achieved.Given these actions and no major develop-


ment problems, it is possible both dates can beaccomplished. In all probability, however,some SIip in IOC shouId be expected. The cur-rent DOD review of basing options is delayingactions required to ensure even a possibility ofmeeting IOC Unless a timely decision is made,Ieadtimes required will inevitably cause adelay in achieving the IOC date.

Table 11 .—System Time Schedule

Land withdrawal appl icat ion f i led 7181Legislation to Congress ., . 1/82L e g i s l a t i o n a p p r o v a l 5182S A T A F a c t i v a t e d , . 1182Start construction to operating base 4182Firstmlsslle test flight . 1/83Misslesslle production contract award . 7183DSARC III-missile . 7183S t a r t c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d e p l o y m e n t a r e a 1/83First cluster available 8/85Ful l base support avai lable 9185Initial operating capability 7186

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessmen t

Most of the land required for the preferredAir Force basin g location for MX/MPS isFederally owned and under the control of theBureau of Land Management, Department ofthe Interior (DO I) Transfer of the necessaryland to DOD requires congressional approval.The schedule, as planned by the Air Force, ispredicated on a basing decision in June 1981,and allows a public comment period betweenJuly and October, with the legislative packageready for congressional consideration in jan-uary 1982 Final approval and land availabilityis scheduled for May 1982.

A June 1981 basing decision did not takeplace while the Air Force and DO I are explor-ing means of expediting the withdrawal ap-plication process, the application must bespecific in terms of base and deployment area,and both the land withdrawal application andcongressional enabling legislation will have toaddress complicated issues such as the landclaims of the Western Shoshone and Stateschool lands in Utah. Slippage of the landwithdrawal action would impact all otherdates associated with base and deploymentarea construction and Ieadtimes would also berequired to ensure adequate electric powersupplies, to purchase water rights where need-ed, and to obtain necessary permits, Although

it is difficult to assess the extent of slippagelikely to occur, it is doubtful that an IOC of1986 can be met, and system costs would esca-late along with any slippage in IOC, Fore-seeable slippages could also impact FOC, al-though a slip in IOC would not necessarily de-lay final operating completion,

The missile deployment and productionschedule may also present some problems. Aproduction decision is scheduled early in theflight test program, and, in fact, before themissile-cannister-shelter tests take place. I n ad-dition, long Ieadtime materials’ authorizationis scheduled to occur in February 1983, or 1month after first flight and 5 months beforethe production decision Problems in the flighttest program under these conditions couldlead to overall program delays, renegotiationof production contracts, and, perhaps, sub-stantially increased costs. It is also not clearthat the Air Force has the authority to releasecontracts for long leadtime material before theproduction decision is formalized

The countermeasures subsystem, both forthe missile and for the decoy system, also maypresent scheduling difficulties Long Ieadtimeitems for prototype systems were scheduledfor approval in April 1981. This has not oc-curred, and the delay wilI probably postponeinitial deliveries of prototype hardware andimpact on qualification tests and perhaps themissile test program itself.

The formal submittal of a budget estimatefor funding deployment area construction isscheduled for October 1981. This submittalwiII include an update of MiIitary ConstructionProgram (MCP) costs based on the outputs ofthe 1980 Systems Design Review a site-spe-cif ic estimates of protective shelter cost.Theuncertaintaties introduced by the DOD review of basing options tend to inhibit the deveopmentof background material and internal Air force- DOD review of the revised baseline estimates supporting the budget request Delays in thebasing decision may make it difficult for theAir Force to adhere to the normal budgetingscheduIe and prduce estimates with the de-gree of accuracy recuired red This problem wiII


—

be intensified if the basing decision is otherthan horizontal shelters in the Nevada-Utaharea

In OTA’S judgment, the IOC date is likely toslip 6 months to 1 year. A slip in IOC datewould increase costs by approximately $7smill ion per month, so that the anticipated in-crease in MX/MPS cost wouId be on the orderof $0.5 billion to $1,0 billion. Given a decisionto proceed with adequate funding on a year-to-year basis, OTA believes that the FOC datecould be achieved even with the IOC SIippage.This belief is predicated on the fact that fund-ing and procedural mechanisms are providedso that long Ieadti me resources can be mar-shal led for use when required,

System Cost

OTA had an independent cost assessmentconducted of the Air Force baseline system.The cost was estimated for all stages of thesystem, from development and investmentthrough operation and support for 10 years ofdeployment.

In determining system cost, it should beunderstood that the baseIine configuration forMPS is not yet firmly fixed, as certain tech-nological tradeoffs are still being consideredby the Air Force. The Air Force is in the processof updating costs, but until the baseline con-figuration is finalized, new estimates are con-sidered internal Air Force data and were notmade available for OTA’S analysis. In lieu ofthis data, the Air Force provided detailed brief-ings covering methods used to estimate costsand provided substantial backup material tosupport their previous estimate of $33.8 biIIion(fiscal year 1978 dollars) In addition, the draftenvironmental impact statement (DE IS), par-ticularly its technical appendices, contains ad-di t ional information useful for est imatin g

costs. Also, some of the design changesadopted as a result of the late-l 980 designreview have been incorporated into the es-timate. Inputs drawn from the backup materialsupplied by the Air Force have been used butapprop r iate ad jus tments have been made,

based on information contained in the DE IS

and other published sources. Therfore, a sys-tems configuration has been selectected as abasis for cost analysis that is compatible withAir Force plans but which is SIightly different indetail from the configurate ion used for the pre-vious Air Force estimate

There is some contusion about the Air Forcebaseline estimate A cost of $33.8 billion isoften quoted This dllar figure refers to thebaseline estimate, in constant 1978 dollars,and incIudes 1 ()-year O&S (operation and sup-port) costs for a tot alI lifecycle cost This figurewhen escaIated to 1980 dolIars is $399 biIIionIifecycle cost, with a total acquisition cost of$338 bilIion (This estimate also excludes thecost of i m pactmitigation ) The Air force'sbaseline estimate for the 4,600” shelter systemif shown in table 12

Table 12.—Air Force Baseline Estimate 4,600Shelters (June 1978) (billions of dollars)

FY78$ FY80$

Development (RDT&E) . . . . . . . . $ 6.7 $ 7.9

InvestmentAircraft procurement . . . . . . . $ 0.3 $ 0.3Missile procurement . . . . . . . 12.6 14.9Military construction . . . . . . . 9.0 10.7

Total investment ., . . . . . . . $21.9 $25.9Total acquisition. . . . . . . . . $28.6 $33.8

0 & s costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 5,3 $ 6,1

Llfecycle costs . . . . . . . . . . $33.8 $39.9SOURCE U S Air Force

Because of the controversy over these es-timates, it is important to understand the con-ditions under which they were developed, andtheir degree of accuracy. The MX Program hascons idered a wide variety of basing modes, in-cluding silos, trenches, and air mobile in add i-tion to the present horizontal plan. For eachbasing mode, several configurations werestudied and costed, an important considera-tion for each mode. In order to have a quick-response estimating capability with a reason-able degree of accuracy, a cost model was de-veloped by the Air Force. This model wasparametric, in which cost factors were de-veloped for specific characteristics (or param-eters) that describe a particular function, and

Ch. 2—Multiple Protective Shelters . 85

estimating. While it is not too difficult to es-timate the construction cost of a given struc-ture, the estimating process becomes verycomplex under the conditions that exist forMPS. First, the workers must be recruited out-side the deployment area since the skills andnumbers required probably do not exist local-ly. Because of this situation, temporary con-struction camps must be established and hous-ing, food, recreation, and heaIth care must beprovided for the workers. Everything from con-struction materials to loaves of bread must bebrought into the area over what is, at best, alimited transportation network. In addition,the technical facilities must meet exactin g

standards to ensure survivability, postat tacklaunch capability, and to protect PLU Thus, inaddition to construction workers, there mustbe managers and inspectors to ensure qualitycontrol, personnel to prepare food, truckdrivers to provide transportation, clerks to re-ceive and store materials, and a number ofother supporting personnel, Solid and liquidwaste must be disposed of i n an environmen-talIy acceptable manner.

Other are as where precise cost estimatesdifficult include:

MX missile. ‘The decision for full -scale pro-duct ion is scheduled to be made longbefore the flight test program is com- p I eted and before the missile/cannisterc o m b i n a t i o n h a s b e e n t e s t e d . S u c h a p r o - -

gram is feasible, but risks c o m p l i c a t i o n slate in the test program causing designc h a n g e s , d e I a y s , a n d p r o d u c t i o n c o s tcreases over those estimated.

Missile Decoy. This system, vitsl to the v iability of MPS is not yet fully designed Projected development and procurement cost are highly uncertain at this time.

Missile Transporter. This transporter will bethe largest truck-like vehicle ever con-structed and it includes highly sophis-ticated automatic controls, communica-tions, and decoy systems.

Command, Control, and Communications(C). Not all portions of this subsystemhave been specified at this time,


● Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Hardening. Itdoes not appear that sufficient attentionto quality control was reflected in theoriginal Air Force estimate. Welds on thesteel Iiners installed in the Safeguard ABMsystem for EMP purposes were found tobe a problem requiring special inspectionprocedures, The MPS documents do notdiscuss the welds required on the steelIiner installed in each shelter.

With the exception of construction issuesand the missile decoy, these uncertainties arenormal for advanced and complex weaponssystems at this stage of development. If theearlier Air Force estimate of $33.8 billion hasnot properly assessed the support required toaccomplish the construction program, the es-timate could be substantially low. An error inestimating the cost of individual protectiveshelters is greatly magnified because a mini-mum of 4,600 shelters is required. Similarly, in-adequate consideration of resources requiredto support the construction effort will be mag-nified because of the remoteness of the pro-posed deployment area.

Notwithstanding these uncertainties, a com-parison of the Air Force baseline estimate toOTA’S estimate has been made (see table 13).OTA estimates the total acquisition cost forthe Air Force baseline, with 4,600 shelters, is$37.2 billion (fiscal year 1980 dollars), and atotal Iifecycle cost of $43.5 billion. As pre-viously mentioned, the OTA estimate is $3.5billion greater than the 1980 baseline estimatedeveloped by the Air Force. This differentialincludes:

●

●

●

●

●

$06 billion in schedule contingency formissile RDT&E,$0.7 billion for engineering changes in sys-tem components,$0.6 billion in construction costs primarilyassociated with increased life supportcosts,$0.7 bill ion in A&CO costs reflectingmilitary pay for the Air Force personnel in-volved in this activity,$0.9 billion in other adjustments.

As indicated in table 13, the Air Force hasnot budgeted costs for the MX program forprogram management and its Site ActivationTask Force,

Cost and Schedule of Expandingthe MX/MPS

As noted above, the proposed 4,600-sheltersystem represents a baseline scenario. How-

Table 13.—Comparison of Air Force and OTA CostEstimates (billions of fiscal year 1980 dollars)

USAF OTAbaseline baselineestimate estimate

DevelpmentMissile related . . . . . . . . . . . . .Base related . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

InvestmentNonrecurring production . . . .Equipment procurement

Missile system . . . . . . . . . . .Transporter/vehicles . . . . . .Decoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .C3 . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . .

Ground power. . . . . . . . . . . .Physical security . . . . . . . . .Support equipment . . . . . . .Aircraft procurement. . . . . .

Total equipment & spares

Engineering change order. . . .Facilities construction . . . . . .Assembly and checkout . . . . .Program management. . . . . . .Site activation task force . . . .

Operating and supportReplenishment spares . . . . . .System modifications . . . . . . .Depot maintenance . . . . . . . . .Operations and maintenance.Military personnel . . . . . . . . . .Civilian personnel . . . . . . . . . .Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total Iifecycle cost ., . . . . . . . . .

$ 5.0252.839

.710$8.574

$ 1.110

4.9901.6342.3210.9150.5420.3351.6920.350

$12.779$ –

10.0351.318

$25.242

$ 0.6470.1870.2271.4802.0770.4100.1920.910

$6.130$39.946

$ 5.0252.8371.310

$9.172

$ 1.110

5.2261.6342.3210.9150.7560.3351.6920.439

$13.320

$0.66610.649

1.9950.2220.037

$27.999

$0.6470.2340.2271.6112.0770.4100.1920.910

$6.308$43.479


Ch. 2—Mu/tip/e Protective Shelters 87

● presently planned clusters are not back-filled in order to enhance survivability.

It seems possible to achieve the first goal,8,250 shelters in operation by 1990, providedthere are no serious missile or site develop-ment problems, and that a decision to proceedis made in the near future. A shelter comple-tion rate of approximately 2,000 per yearwould be required, This rate represents about atwo-thirds increase in the presently plannedconstruction rate (approximately 1,200 peryear). As in the baseline case of 4,600 shelters,however, schedule slippage is likely. An ex-panded program schedule would also be injeopardy unless funding and authority mech-anisms are provided so that the required re-sources can be programed and marshaled foruse when required.

While OTA does not have the informationavailable to detail alI resource requirementsfor the expanded program, no resource con-straints (construction materials, equipment, orskilled personnel) are anticipated providedthat sufficient leadtime is availble b e t w e e nthe decision to undertake the program andpeak construct ion periods The Nevada PowerCo., for example, cannot presently meet peakdemands for electric power and has existingpurchase agreements with outside utilities.Long-term agreements w i th the companywouId be required if commercial power is tobe used to support the construction and opera-tions phases of the MPS program as planned.other such commitments would be needed

Table 14.—Land Use Requirements

Acres Acres Acres

Shelters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,040 (17) 19,872 (31) 29,808 (46)Roads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74,824 (1 17) 134,683 (210)b 202,024 (315)’

OperatingBases and support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51,456 (80) 92,620 (144) 138,931 (217)

Direct lands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137,320 (214) 246.176 (386) 369,264 (576)Potential impact zoneb . . . . . . . . . . . 2,560,000 (4,000) 4,608,000 (7,200) 12,521,738 (19,565)

Numbers of shelters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,600 8,250 12,500aDoes not assume backfill

—

bThis figure is based on the 0.25 mile disturbance zone discussed on page 70 and represents both the potential arid lands lmpact zone and an approxlfnatlon of the land

area which might be subject to restricted use under an expanded PLU security program


Number of shelters

4-,600 8,2<0 12,500

DevelopmentM i : ; s i l e . . . . .B a s i n gOther. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

l-otal . . . . . . .

InvestmentMissile . . . . . . . . . . . . .C a n n i s t e r l l a u n c h e rTransporter .Const ructioniactlvat ionOther. .

l-otal ... .

O p e r a t i n g a n d s u p p o r tcosts

Anlual ... . . . . . . .

Lifecycle costsTo FOC . .To the year 2000. . . . . . .To the year 2005, . . .

Operating personnelM i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l .C iv i l i an pe rsonne l . .

l-otal . . . . . . . . .

$ 5.0 $ 5.0 $5.02.9 3.0 3.11.3 1.4 1.5

$ 9.2 $ 9.4 $ 9 . 6

$ 4.3 $ 6.1 $8.10.9 1.5 2.21.4 2.4 3.6

12.6 19.9 28.58.8 13.7 19,1

$28.0 $43.6 $61,5

$ 0.469 $ 0.719 $ 0,969

$38.6 $55.2 $77.7$43.5 $62.4 $82.6$45.7 $66.0 $87.4

10,900 16,450 22,0001,700 2,600 3,500

12,600 19,050 25,500—SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment



This method provides reasonable cost es-timates for comparative purposes. Time andinformation available for the estimate did not,however, allow for a full investigation of theimpact of the increased requirements forscarce resources (some missile materials andpropellants) or the potential impacts of eco-nomics or diseconomies of scale on the con-struction program. Final estimates, thereforecontain a significant degree of uncertainty andfurther analysis is required before actual fund-ing levels can be determined with precision.

Split Basing

The proposed MX/MPS basing plan calls forthe location of all shelters and support fa-ciIities over a broad geographic area. De-ployment clusters would be located in valleysof the Great Basin and would be separated bythe mountain ranges which separate thevalIeys; but the system would otherwise beoperationaIIy contiguous.

The “split basing” option would be similar inall functional respects except for the fact thata large area of nondeployment land would sep-arate the operational deployment areas. Inboth cases the same number of missiles,shelters, and land area would be involved, andin both cases there would be two operatingbases. Figure 44 shows the geographic distribu-tion of the proposed Air Force split basingalternative.

From an operational standpoint, there areno significant differences between contiguousbasing and split basing, Both alternatives re-

Figure 44.— Proposed Split BasingDeployment Areas

1’-

\ \ ———

- - ——— /.— — —— — ——,— — —— — — -

Legend

_ Suitable areas

u Unsuitable areas

0 Candidate sltlngregions

—— State boundary

SOURCE A F IDEIS

quire the same number of missiles, shelters,and operating bases; and both have the samefunctional requirements for command, con-trol, communications, security, and support.

From the standpoint of the costs of con-struction and the environmental impacts, how-ever, there are several notable differences,

First, construction of split basing would costapproximately 10 percent more than the base-line, as there would be some necessary du-plication in geotechnical investigations, inelectronic and mechanical systems, in trans-portation and logistics, and some additionalcosts in land acquisition resulting from theneed to negotiate easements or title for alarger percentage of private lands. (See table1 7.)

Second, impacts on both the physical envi-ronment and the regional economy could besubstantially different. Although the generalnature of the impacts would be fundamentallythe same as those resulting from the proposedbasing option, specific impacts could differ

83-4-7 - 1 -

90 ● MX M\ssile Basing

Table 17.—Air Force Estimates of Additional SplitBasing Costs (in millions of fiscal year 1980 dollars)

RDT&E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Geotechnical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Electronics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mechanical , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Airborne lunch control . . . . . . . . . . .Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Initial spares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mechanical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Electronics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Initial spares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(A&CO and training)

Milton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Real estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Road network.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Remote surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . .Construction O&S . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Training facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Design funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Designated assembly area and

contractor support area. . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$ 632716

5

. . . . . .59291028

15763

$1,761

. . . . . .$ 527

5311325441

465

. . . . . .

$ 121

2,171

$1,183

$3,475

SOURCE US Air Force

significantly based on the site-specific char-acteristics of the impact regions.

In general split basing would mitigate theimpacts on the physical environment by dis-persing the direct impacts, and could have theeffect of avoiding impacts on certain areasaltogether, or avoiding critical thresholds inpart icular instances. In regard to socio-economic impacts, split basing would com-plicate the issues of land-acquisition and in-tegrated planning, but offers the possibilitythat impact levels would be within the man-agement capabilities of more communities,and thus result in more beneficial impacts andfewer boomtown conditions.

In the case of socioeconomic impacts theremay be a third qualitatively different type ofimpact associated with split basing. In addi-tion to the reduction of adverse impacts noted,and cases in which the reduction in impacts ef-fectively eliminates the adverse impacts (e.g.,a case in which the reduced growth level re-

sulted not only in a reduction of the level ofovercrowding in schools, but reduction to alevel that presented no over-crowding), splitbasing could transform negative impacts intopositive impacts in instances where the level ofnew growth was with in the carrying capacity ofthe existing social infrastructure.

Thus, not only would the level of negativeimpacts be reduced, but in many smalI com-munities, and most Iikely in the larger townsclose to the operating base areas, negative im-pacts could become positive impacts,

Physical Impacts

Based on the Air Force resource analysisrelevant to the split basing option, it is ap-parent that split basing would have significant-Iy less impact on wildlife and the physical en-vironment than the baseline option. * (See fig.45,’)

There are, however, other complicating fac-tors regarding the proposed split basing op-tion. In the Great Basin of Nevada and Utah,virtually al I of the land is owned by the FederalGovernment, and the dominant economic ac-tivities (ranching and mining) are subject tolease and permit authorities. In the split basingdeployment area of New Mexico and westTexas, 95 percent of the land is in privateownership and is used primarily for cropproduction and livestock. The differences be-tween use of rangeland and cropland, and thedifferences between private and public owner-ship of the land, raise potentialIy significantquestions. First, as noted above, the use ofcroplands would take a greater amount of agri-cuItural land directly out of production; but,the higher productive capacity of the landwould also facilitate restoration of the im-pacted areas. AS a result, considerably lessland would be likely to be lost from produc-tivity.

‘ See D[ 15 ma(rll, and J(I p 1-1, includfng vegetat ion, habi tat ,

a n d p r o t e c t ed a n d e n d a n g e r e d spec Ies Add It Iorlal I y, the Alr

Eorce has Ind icated that impacts on the c haracterl~tlcs of the

prl~tlne environment, archaeological and historical sites, local

pc,pulations, and econornlc adjustment, would also be reduced

urlder the SPI It basing opt Ion


Figure 45.—Summary Comparison of LongTerm Impact Significance Betweenthe Proposed Action and Split Basinga b

Natural environment resources I

Proposed DDA (Nevada/Utah]

act ion 1 –OB (Coyote Spring Clark Co )(PA)

2– OB (Milford/Beaver Co

DDA (Nevada Utah)

Sp l i t bas ing DDA (Texas New Mexico)

1— OB {Coyote Spring Clark Co

2—OB (ClOVIS Curry Co )

Human environment resources I

Act Ion

Proposed DDA ( Nevada, Utah)

a c t i o n 1 – 06 (Coyote Spring Clark Co(PA)

2 OB (Milford Beaver Co )

DDA Nevada/Utahl

Sp i l t . DDA [Texas New Mexico]

b a s i n g 1 OB (Coyote Spring Clark Co

2 – OB (Clovis Curry Co )

No significant impact Low signif icance Moderate significance[gmflcance High significant impact

aWhile there may be an overall estimate of no impact or low impact when considering the DDA region as a whole it must be recognized that during short term Construe.tion activities specific areas or communities within or near the DDA could be significantly Impacted

bThe reduction in DDA size for Nevada\Utah under split basing does not neceddstily change the significance of impact on a specific resource Many Impacts occur in a

I imited geographic area which IS Included in both the full and spilt deployment DDAs, or are specific to the OB suitability zone

SOURCE U S Air Force/DEIS

Second, the legal basis for conducting nec-essary PLU activities is more clearly defined inrelation to privately owned lands than it is inrelation to public lands. In the case of privatelands, it would be necessary to negotiateeasements to allow for access to shelters andfo r pe r iod ic “ secur i t y sweeps” and in -vestigations; but the contractual basis for sucharrangements are unambiguous In the case ofthe public lands the necessity of periodicsweeps raises legal questions regarding possi-ble restrictions on public use or access topublic lands.

Finally, in terms of land acquisition, it isuncertain whether the political process of landwithdrawals necessary for use of the publiclands might be more or less cumbersome thanthe process of individual negotiations withprivate landholders. It does appear likely,however, that the process of acquiring landsthrough both the congressional land with-drawal process and private negotiations,would be more cumbersome than reliance onFederal lands alone.


VERTICAL SHELTERS

An al ternat ive to employing hor izontalshelters for MPS is to house the missiles inmore conventional vertical shelters. (See fig.46. ) Aside from the di f ference betweenwhether the missile is stored horizontally anderected to vertical for launch, or stored ver-tically in a ready launch position, there are

Figure 46. —Vertical Shelter

MobiIe operatisupport equip

F i x e d f o a m

— Missile capsu

Batteries and— egress ac tua t

SOURCE: U.S. Air Force

onalment

Ie

or

several important issues. One issue, andperhaps the primary one, is shelter hardness.Pound for pound of concrete, vertical sheltersare more resistant (harder) to the effects ofnearby nuclear detonations. Shelter responseis easier to analyze and we have more ex-perience in test ing and bui ld ing vert icalshelters. A second important issue is the easeand speed of missile movement, particularlythe insertion and removal times of the missileat the shelter. A horizontal shelter allows asimple roll transfer of the cargo between thetransporter and the shelter; transfer for a ver-tical shelter requires the additional transporteroperation of erecting the missile to vertical forinsertion and removal from the shelter. A thirdissue, arms control monitoring, is discussedbelow.

Shelter Hardness

There are several damage mechanisms to amissile from a nuclear detonation. Thesemechanisms are airblast, ground shock,electromagnetic pulse, radiation, and thermaleffects. Airblast resuIts from the intense com-pression of air at the explosion, that prop-agates away from the source as a supersonicshock wave. An airblast results in overpressuredestruction, and it is particularly severe onaboveground objects (such as the shelter doorof a horizontal shelter) that must withstand thereflected loads of the incident shock front. Fora vertical shelter, with a shelter door that isflush with the surface, there are no reflectedIoads, and door requirements are far lesssevere than for the horizontal shelter. In addi-tion, ovalling of the horizontal tube is a moreserious problem than is the compression on thevertical shelter.

The task of testing and modeling for dy-namic (wind) pressure is also more difficuIt forhorizontal than for vertical shelters. Becausethe dynamic flowfield for the horizontal caseis sufficiently complex, adequate simulationsare difficult. The result is a less complete ca-pability to test and validate a horizontalshelter design. Nevertheless, it is believed that


with a sufficiently comprehensive validationprogram, confidence in horizontal shelterhardness can be adequately established.

Ground motions result from the “air-slap” ofthe shock front hitting the ground as well aspropagation through the earth of upstreamcoupled energy. The damage mechanism ofdominant concern is the missile coming upagainst and forcibly hitting the shelter wallfrom the inside, as the shelter moves with theground, To design for this in a simple MPSshelter, the missile is given enough space in-side the shelter to move before coming upagainst the shelter wall. This space betweenmissile and shelter is called rattle space, andfor shelters several thousand feet distant froma 1-MT nuclear detonation, typical rattle spaceis tens of inches. Since at ranges of interestground shock motions are typically larger inthe vertical than horizontal direction, verticalshelters require less concrete than do horizon-tal shelters, since the inside diameter of theshelter does not need to be as large. In addi-tion, the missile is constructed to be moreresiIient to motions along its length than trans-verse to it.

For radiation and thermal effects, since theflux direction on the surface is along theground, more stringent requirements for thehorizontal shelter door are necessary than forthe surface-f lush vert ical door. Electro-magnetic pulse effects do not appear to dis-criminate strongly between horizontal and ver-tical shelters, although the greater radiation at-tenuation afforded by the vertical shelterwould ease hardness requirements for radia-tion-induced electromagnetic puIse,

In summary, it appears that building a sur-vivable horizontal shelter is a more demandingtask than would be the vertical shelter, andvertical shelters can be easily made more than1,000 psi hard, whereas the design and hard-ness validation of a 600 psi horizontal shelterpushes state of the art engineering, Neverthe-less, for an MPS system, this hardness shouldbe enough. MPS does not rely on the sheltersurviving a direct attack, but by surviving theeffects of an attack on neighboring shelters, Tothe extent that a fractionated threat would

reduce warhead yield, consideration might begiven to building a sufficiently hard verticalMPS, perhaps several thousand psi hard, inorder to wi thstand the increased threatwithout building more shelters. Nevertheless,because shelter kil l probabilit ies are ex-ceedingly sensitive to missile accuracy, andSoviet missile accuracies are projected to con-tinue to improve, hard vertical shelters stillwould not be likely to survive a direct attack.Therefore, shelter number requirements forvertical shelters might not be significantly dif-ferent from horizontal shelters. (This questionis more thoroughly addressed in the classifiedannex. )

Even though vertical shelters will be harder,the state of knowledge of electromagneticpulse effects is not considered firm enough toallow shelter spacing for any shelter designmuch less thay 5,000 ft, which is the currentspacing for baseline horizontal shelter MPS.However, there exists the possibility that ver-tical shelters could be more densely “packed”in the same area (e. g., by backfilling) andwould therefore require less land for the samenumber of shelters.

Missile Mobility

For the Air Force baseline, it is stated that asa hedge against a loss of PLU, the missileswould have the capability of rapid relocationand an on-road hide-on-warning capabilityagainst SLBM attack. This reliance on missilemobility makes missile transfer timelines im-portant to the choice between horizontal andvertical shelters. The relevant difference hereis the time required for insertion and removalof the missile. Because the transporter for thevertical system must perform missiIe raisingand lowering operations with a strongback,rather than the roll-transfer operation for thehorizontal system, the transporters for the twosystems are designed differently. (See fig. 4 7for the transporter designs that have beenstudied. ) Although a horizontal shelter trans-porter has not yet been constructed to testtimelines, an operational vertical shelteremplacer has been constructed and tested atthe Nevada Test Site (NT S). Remove and install


Figure 47. —Transporter for Vertical Shelter

Canisteremplacementhoist

I

0 0 0

Concreteshelter wall

I

--------- 7 - >- - - - - - - - - -

J

—Shelterdoor

Emplacement ofmissile canisterin vertical shelter


timelines for horizontal and vertical systemsbased on these transporter designs and on theNTS field tests as shown in figure 48, The ver-tical system timelines are based on extrapola-tion of test data, such as increased automa-tion, adding more hydraulic pumps for thestrongback Iift actuator, and so forth in orderto optimize transfer time. Horizontal systemtimelines are based on the current baselinedesign. Using these two transporter designsand the test figures, emplacement and removaltimes are slightly under 5 minutes for the hor-izontal system, and somewhat over 22 minutesfor the vertical system can be seen, It must beemphasized that these figures are based ongiven transporter designs; different timelinesmay be derived based on unfamiIiar designs.Also, the figure for vertical emplacement isbased only on design mechanical constraints.No consideration has been given to furtherconstraints that may be imposed by explosiveshandling,

Based on these figures, relocation time forthe vertical system is longer than for thehorizontal system, due only to the transfertimes. When adding travel times, relocationfor the horizontal system is about 9 hours, andfor the vertical system, 15 hours.

For hide-on-warning dash from the road, em-placement figures for the baseline horizontalare presented in figure 49 but none was avail-able for the vertical. Because of the very tighttimeline for the dash missile emplacement op-eration, it would necessarily take a very dif-ferent vertical system transporter to satisfy the2-minute insertion schedule needed to supportan SLBM-timeline dash. Among the currentconventional designs, only the horizontal sys-tem could support the SLBM dash.

PLU

Because most of our detailed understandingof PLU has come only in the last several years,when the baseline system has been horizontal,it is difficult to say with confidence if PLU pro-vides an adequate basis for preferring ahorizontal or vertical shelter. We do not knowas much about the signatures and counter-measures for the vertical system to make a re-liable comparison. It is almost certain, how-ever, that many of the countermeasures de-signed for the horizontal system wiII need tobe modified or completely replaced for a ver-tical system. The mass simulator will probablybe quite different. (An early design for a ver-tical simuIator, called the “chimes,” because itwas composed of four vertical rods, may notbe feasible because its vibrational modes aresimiIar to the discarded T E L simuIator con-cept; see pp. 97). Much PLU design work wouldhave to be done to resolve these questions.

costs

OTA estimated the cost of deploying the MXmissile in vertical shelters in the Great Basinregion of Nevada and Utah. The estimateassumes that, with the exception of shelter andtransporter costs, the costs associated with ver-tical shelters are the same as the costs asso-ciated with horizontal shelters, Thus, the costsof the missile, C3, physical security, groundpower, environmental control, support fa-Cilities, roads, and other support elements areconsidered to be independent of shelter designat least in total. Other ground rules include:


Figure 48.— Remove/lnstall Timelines for Horizontal and for Vertical Shelters

● Comparison — horizontal/vertica l systems— Co-locatable mass simulator

on site time— Horizontal

. Potential timeline increase due to PLU (O = 8 rein)

Position 1.08t ranspor te r

2.88Remove

3.25Install

Position road 4.43for travel

4.95Retract shield ❑

— Vertical- Superficial PLU analysis performed

Alignmentands t a b i l i z a t i o n =Closure removal andraise strong back -

12.4Install

RemoveInstall closure andlower strong back

Secure site


●

●

●

●

●

4,600 shelters;200 deployed missiles, one per cluster of23 shelters;shelter spacing of about 5,000 ft;approximately 8,000 miIes of roads; andIOC and FOC dates identical to MX/MPSin horizontal shelters.

The total construction costs of 4,600 verticaland horizontal shelters are $5.1 billion and$6.3 billion respectively (in fiscal year 1980dollars), a difference of $1.2 billion. Thesecosts were derived from the application of theAir Force DISPYIC model and cost inputs ap-plicable to the horizontal shelter program(materials costs). Horizontal shelter costs weretaken from material furnished by the Air Force.

20.5

22.5

The major differences between horizontal andvertical shelter costs result from differentmaterial requirements and construction costs.The following characteristics of the two typesof shelters illustrate the reasons for the dif-ferences:

HorizontalLength 171 ftInside diameter 145 ftWall thickness 21.0 inchesConcrete . 934 ydRebarsteel 35 tonsLiner steel 62 tonsMiscellaneous steel 21 tons

VerticaI122 ft (deep)

131 ft101 inches

254 yd ‘15 tons16 tons4 tons

Thus, 4,600 horizontal shelters would re-quire about 3. I million cubic yards more con-


Figure 49.— Dash Timeline for Horizontal Shelter

Time (seconds)Task 100 200 300 350

0

I I

Command initiation 2 III

Travel time 231 . , 233 II II I

Open closure and position 37 196 233transporter for transfer I

II

2 4 5I

Prepare for transfer 12 III# ;Remove simulator 28 273 ;

I8 :,Emplace launcher 46 319 i

I I

Remove transporter 5 b II

Secure protective shelter 23 3 2 8 i 3 5 0III

SOURCE U S ir Force

rete than vertical shelters and about 380,000tons more steel.

The transporter required for the verticalmode could be smaller than for the horizontalshelter (according to previous Air Force de-signs). This difference would result in a re-duction in cost of about $250 million to $500m i I I ion for the 200 transporters required.

The horizontal shelter program is estimatedto cost about $43.5 billion to the year 2000.This estimate includes $9.2 billion in develop-ment, $28 billion for investment, and $6.3 bil-lion for operating and support costs. A verticalshelter program would be about $1.5 billionless expensive, or a total of about $42 billionfor the Iifecycle covering the deploymentyears (IOC to FOC) and 10 years of full-scaleoperations. Table 18 shows a breakdown ofhorizontal and vertical shelter Iifecycle costs.

Arms Control

There are few differences, in principal, be-tween verifying an arms control agreement fora Vertical or horizontal MPS deployment, if thebasing mode has been designed with arms con-trol agreement verification measures. The keyarms control agreement verification tasksassociated with the basing mode include coun-ting the number of missiles deployed andmonitoring vertical shelter construct ion to en-sure that the shelters are not actually newICBM launchers.

So long as, at a minimum, the MX missileand its associated equipment are assembled inthe open and left exposed for a period of daysto permit accurate counting, the number ofmissiles and associated vehicles could be ade-quately verified. Deployment of the missilesand associated vehicles along a dedicated


Table 18.— Lifecycle Costs for Horizontaland Vertical Shelters Deployed in Nevada-Utah

(billions of fiscal year 1980 dollars)

Horizontal VerticalNumber of missiles deployedNumber of shelters . . . . . . . . . .

costsDevelopment

Missile ., . . . . . . . . .Basing . . . . . . . . . . . . .Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

InvestmentMissile/cannister/launcherTranspor t /veh ic les . . . .c’. ... . . . . . .Other equipment . . . . . . . . .Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . .A&CO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total investment

Operating and supportProcurement . . ... . .O&M . . ... . . . . . . .Personnel. . . . . . . . . .T r a i n i n gOther. ... . . ... . . . . .

Total O&SLifecycle costs .

2004,600

$ 5.02.91.3

$ 9.2

$ 5.21.60,95,5

10.62.02.2

$ 28,0

$ 0.91.82.50.20.9

$ 6.3$ 43.5

2004,600

$ 5.02.91.3

$ 9.2

$ 5.21.30.95.59.42.02.2

$ 26.5

$ 0.91.82.50.20.9—

$ 6.3$ 42.0

transportation network to the deployment areawould also permit counting of the missiles.These assembly and transportation proceduresare common to the horizontal and verticalshelter deployments, indicat in g that thesearms control monitoring aspects would appearto be the same.

However, the horizontal basing mode ap-pears to some analysts to be a more desirablebasing mode because it facilitates confirma-tion through direct observation that thosemissile shelters said to be empty of missiles donot in fact contain missiles. The Air Forcebaseline system relies on removable plugs inthe shelters to permit such direct observation.The incremental value of such observation toarms cont ro l agreement ver i f ica t ion is con-troversial.


SOME PREVIOUS MX/MPS BASING MODES

The Roadable Transporter-Erector- Launcher (TEL)

In the period between the start of full-scaleengineering development in September 1979,through the spring of 1980, the missile andlauncher were designed to be structurally in-tegrated with the transporter, into a roadablevehicle called the T E L, for transporter-erector-launcher. (See fig. 50. ) The entire TEL unit wasto be placed in the protective shelter. On com-mand to launch, the shelter door would open,the TEL would plow through any debris, erectthe missile to a near vertical position, andlaunch the missile,

The TEL could exercise several mobility op-tions. One mode, used for maintenance andrapid relocation, would have the TEL trans-ported, and shielded under a towed, wheeledvehicle called the mobile surveiIlance shield.

The surveillance shield would visit everyshelter, simulating a TEL insertion at each oneexcept for the shelter where it actually de-posits the TEL. This operation would bemanned. Travel to all shelters was estimated tobe about 12 hours, as in the current design.

A second mobiIity mode would permit a por-tion of the force to be on the road, under thesurveillance shield. This manned hide-on-warning operation would respond to SLBM at-tack warning, and secure the TEL at the nearestshelter before the attacking warheads arrived.Like the first mode, this is similar to thepresently designed capability,

The third mode of missile mobility wascalled the dash. Dash was to be an unmannedoperation. Upon receipt of warning of anICBM attack, the TEL would leave its shelter,unconcealed, and dash to another shelter

98 ● MX Mlsslle Basing

Figure 50.–Roadable Transporter- Erector.Launcher (TEL)


within the cluster. To be successful, this wouldhave to be done within the 30-minute flightt i m e o f a t t a c k i n g I C B M S . A r r a n g i n g t h es h e l t e r s i n a c l o s e d l o o p w o u l d f a c i l i t a t edashing into any other shelter in the cluster,This closed shelter arrangement with the dashoperation led to the colloquial term, “MXRacetrack. ” This last mobile option could notbe retained in the present “loading dock”design.

The most serious shortcoming of the TEL de-sign is the difficulty of maintaining PLU, ac-cording to Air Force analysis. The TEL shelter islarger than the present shelter design by 2 ft indiameter, and in order to have the possibilityof satisfying PLU, the shelter needed to beeven further expanded to be able to house acredible TEL simulator and still support thedash capability. Wi th the 16 .5 - f t i nnerdiameter shelter of the TEL design as a con-straint, al I decoys studied by the Air Force hada poor signature match to the TEL. One design

used two rods inserted between the inner andouter diameters of the shelter to act as aInissiIe simuIator. However, it was learned thatthe different vibration modes of the rods, aswelI as other d instinctive signatures, would beevident during transit, simulator insertion, andremoval. These arguments are quantitativelyplausible.

Concerning the three mobility options dis-cussed above, the first two are similar to theloading dock arrangement. For the third mo-bility option, unmanned dash, transferring theTEL during an ICBM flight time would leave itexposed during its transit to a coordinatedSLBM attack, since the TEL unit is not de-signed to survive such an attack. Typical hard-ness for such a vehicle wouId be in the range of5 to 10 psi, which lies approximately at the 1 to2 mile contour for an exploding SLBM war-head. If, as suspected, PLU had been brokenand the enemy knew the shelter Iocation of the


TEL, then it could be vulnerable to an SLBM at-tack during the dash operation.

Other than the transporter design, dash, thelarger shelter, and the closed cluster layout,this MPS design is the same as the presentbaseline system

The Trench

The trench was an even earlier design forbasing the MX missile, before MX entered full-scale engineering development In this mode,the missiIe, housed on an unmanned trans-porter and launcher, would reside in an under-ground concrete tunnel, out of public view,

(see fig. 51), As in multiple shelters, trench-basing the MX relied on keeping the missilelocation in the trench unknown to the at-tacker. The missile could randomly move inthe trench as an additional PLU measure Inorder to launch the missiIe, the transporterwould break through the roof and erect themissile, preparatory to launching.

Several trenches have been designed for MXbasing. Some trenches were continuouslyhardened, others were hardened in sections.Some trenches had single spurs in which themissile resided, and others had double spurs.Most trenches were designed with inside ribs to

Figure 51 .—Trench Layout

Transpor ter / launcher break ingthrough surface of trenchtrenrh

4,200 (1 ,280 m)/

/ w -

..

-\ -/’ 13 ft (3.96 m)

Plug to protect againstnuclear blast in tunnel



accommodate blast plugs, designed to protectthe missile (see fig. 52).

An early concern for trench basing was thepossibility that the trench tube would serve asa shock wave guide. Specifically, the fear wasthat in an attack on the trench, the shock wavepropagating down the tube (largely unat-tenuated due to the trench’s one-dimensionalgeometry) would result in conditions capableof breaching the blast plug and destroying themissile beyond a range where it presumablywould survive the internal airblast. Steps weretaken in trench design to protect the missilefrom the in-trench shock wave propagation.This design included stationing the missile intunnel spurs, so that the plug wouId experiencethe side-on overpressure and not the directrefIected shock.

A series of high-explosive blast tests on thetrench was performed at Luke-Yuma in 1977-

78 (HAVE HOST, T-series), to investigate theabove concepts for missile protection in thetrench. Results of the tests indeed validatedthe blast plug concept on a half-scale trenchtest, and vividly showed the reflected shockventing at the plug. Even more significant,analyses by the Defense Nuclear Agencyshowed that even in the absence of blast plugs,hot air ablation of the tunnel walls (as well asother mechanisms) would attenuate the wave,such that the pressure impulse transferred tothe plug would be approximately the same asif the trench were not even present.

A far more serious problem for the trenchwould have been PLU. Even though the missilewould not be visible, its motion on the trans-porter, 5 ft underground, would not be dif-ficult to detect. A large number of signatureswould enable an observer to establish its loca-tion. (For a generaI discussion of these sig-

Figure 52. —MX Trench Concepts

Minehybridtrench

Turningstructure

Launch



natures, see the earlier section “Theory of Moreover, security along the entire trenchMPS. ”) Therefore, missiIe-transporter simu- Iength probably also would be necessary,Iators would be necessary to install, at which which would make the system less acceptablepoint system cost would be a deterring factor. to the deployment region.

MINUTEMAN MPS AND NORTHERN PLAINS BASING

One means proposed to protect the sur-vivability of the Minuteman I I I component ofthe present land-based missile force is toredeploy these 550 missiles in an MPS systemsimilar to that proposed for the MX deploy-ment in Utah and Nevada, For this case, ver-tical shelters would be constructed in the ex-isting Minuteman base areas, The existingMinuteman missiles would be modified so thatthey could be moved more easily among ex-isting silos and the new ones. Like the MX/MPSbasing mode, survivability would be sought byconstructing more shelters than the Sovietshad warheads available to target them. As aweapon, the Minuteman I I I could be improvedto achieve MX design accuracy by backfittingthe MX guidance unit, Such a force could usethe existing Minuteman bases, public roads,and support infrastructure.

Missile Modifications

A number of minor modifications wouldneed to be made to the present Minutemanmissile, To facilitate the increased handling ofthe missile, it would be placed in a cannister.Attachment tabs, or their equivalent, would beinstal led on the stages to accommodate can-nisterization. The entire missile would betransported, unlike the present Minutemanmissile, which moves the first three stages andthe fourth stage, separately, I n addition, sev-eral attachments in the missile that wereoriginalIy built to accommodate vertical orien-tation of the missile, might need strengtheningto support horizontal motion of the missileduring transport. The Minuteman guidanceunit would also need modification, None ofthe modifications to the Minuteman missileappears infeasible,

Most technical risks associated with anMX/MPS deployment would also be a factorfor a Minuteman MPS deployment. Mostnotably, PLU would be Iikely to be as for-midable a task as for MX. Also, demands onsystem expansion due to an increased Sovietthreat would be similar to the case with MX,

Since the Minuteman missiles, roads, and in-frastructure are already available it mightseem possible that the cost and time needed toproceed with such a deployment could be sig-nificantly less than for MX baseline. To ex-amine this hypothesis, Minuteman deploy-ments, corresponding to the baseline MX/MPSdeployment and for expanded threats were ob-served, and estimates were formed for costand schedule. The cases are the following:

●

●

Case 1, Baseline. Encapsulate existing 550deployed Minuteman Ill missiles and 117MM Ill currently in storage and modify forMPS and cold launch. Modify the existing550 silos to accept the encapsulated missile.Build 5,250 new shelters, for a total deploy-ment of 5,800 shelters, spaced a minimum ofl-mile apart. Deploy 5,250 decoys, and onetransport for every two missiles. Reopen theMM I I I production line to replace missilestaken from storage. This mix of missiles andshelters would retain the same number ofsurviving Mark 12A warheads after a Sovietattack as the baseline MX/MPS system whendeployed in conjunction with a plannedMinuteman force of 350 MMIIIs and 450MM IIS,

Case 2, Expanded 1990 Threat. Deploy a costoptimum mix of Minuteman missiles andshelters, determined to be approximately900 missiles and 10,400 shelters.


Case 3, Expanded 1995 Threat. Deploy a costoptimum mix of Minuteman missiIes andshelters, determined to be approximately1,1 ()() missiles and 15,500 shelters for thisthreat level

Cost and Schedule

Cost estimates are given for these threecases and the A i r Force baseline system i ntable 19.

I n case 1, it is estimated that 5,800 shelterswith 667 MM I I I missiles could be constructedin the Northern Minuteman Wings for about $7billion (fiscal year 80 dollars) less than the AFbaseline system.

In case 2, corresponding to a 1990 Sovietthreat level of 7,000 RV’S the cost estimate is$534 billion for a system of 900 MMIII missilesand 10,400 shelters.

In case 3, corresponding to a 1995 Sovietthreat level of 12,000 RV’S, the cost estimate is$724 bill ion for a system of 1,100 MMIIImissiIes and 15,500 shelters.

The major cost drivers for these cases aremechanical systems (transporters and decoys,

Table 19.—Minuteman MPS Costs(billions of fiscal year 1980 dollars)

Missiles . .Shelters . . . . . .

costR&D ... . . . . . .

InvestmentNonrecurring .Missile . . . . . .Equipment . . . .Aircraft . . . . . .Engineeringchange ordersC o n s t r u c t i o nAssembly andc h e c k o u t . .Other. . . . . . . .

Totali n v e s t m e n t

O&S to year 2,000.

Lifecycle cost. .

Baseline

6675,800

$ 2.5

1.42.79.70.5

0.610.4

2.40.3

28.05.9

36.4

Expanded Expanded1990 Threat 1995 Threat

900 - 1,10010,400 15,500

$ 2.5 $ 2,5

1.4 1.45.3 7.4

14.8 21,70.5 0.5

1,1 1.515.7 21.7

4.1 5.90.3 0.3

43.2 60.47.7 9.5

5 3 . 4 72,4

primarily), construction, and assembly andcheckout in the investment phase, Operationsand maintenance and personnel costs drive theoperating and support phase. MMIII missileR&D effort is minimal in relation to MX,assuming a maximum dependence on the ex-isting Minuteman road network and C net-work, There would still need to be a substan-tial upgrading of the existing roads and newroads to the new shelters wouId be required.

If a decision to deploy Minuteman/MPSwere made in the summer of 1981 it is stillunlikely that IOC could be achieved before1987.

Assuming a period of 18-30 months for siteselection and land acquisition (including E ISpreparation), it could be possible to start con-struction on new silos in late 1984 or early 1985(see fig. 53) with a resultant IOC date of late1986 or early 1987. At the same time other ac-tivities that would have to proceed in parallelwould include:

● development of a missile decoy and PLU,● development of a transporter,● cold launch development, definition of additional C requirements,● upgrading of existing roads and construc-

tion of new roads to withstand the weightand length of a new transporter.

Schedule for FOC depends, in part, on peakconstruction rate. Assuming a peak construc-tion rate of 2,000 shelters per year, by October1986, FOC for Case 1 is projected to be 1989 or

Figure 53.— Minuteman/MPS Schedule

1 IGo-headdecision i

E i SI FSED

Igo-head

I I Land acqIi Facilities constrI I A Shelter constr

CY 1$81 I 1932 I 1$83 I 1084 I 1985 I

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment


1990 Case 2 and Case 3 FOCs are projected by1991 and 1994, respectively

An additional question which couId be sig-nificant, but which has not been anaIyzed, re-gards the cost associated with upgrading roadsto accommodate a deployment of MX missiIesin the Northern Minuteman fields I n contrast

to the Minuteman transporter, which wouIdweigh approximately 2 15,()()() I b loaded, theloaded MX transporter would weigh close to1 6 milIion I b Modification and opgrading ofroads to accommodate this transporter C Ould affect cost, scheduIe, and socioeconomic im-pacts

CIVILIAN FATALITIES FROM A COUNTERFORCE MPS STRIKE

Interest has been expressed concerning thelevel of civilian fatalities resulting from aSoviet nuclear attack on an MPS-based MX de-ployment. Specifically, because the number ofnuclear detonations in such an attack wouldrun into the many thousands of megatons,there is concern that civilian deaths resultingfrom radiation fat lout would be so large that itmight be questionable if such a n attack couIdin any sense be considered a “ limited counter-force” strike.

I n order to approach this problem, OTA ob-tained a series of calculations on resultantradiation doses over populated areas for anumber of cases involving a nuclear strike onan MPS field. These computations are regard-ed only as representative and approximate atbest. It is customary for such calculations toyield a wide range of results, and these are nodifferent, The reason for this range is thatresu Its are strongly sensitive to a number offactors, including wind speed and direction,wind shear, burst height of the weapon, andthe weapon’s fission fraction, It is not unusualto see variations in calculated fatality levels ofat least an order of magnitude for differingwind speeds. Furthermore, different computercodes for the same physical circumstances(winds, etc ) customarily yield results differingby a factor of 2 or 3. We have not attempted toresolve these differences, but have used a setof runs using the Weapons System EvaluationGroup (WSEG) code as typical among differentcodes. I n addition to these caveats, there aresome additional I imitations to these particularcalculations. First, these computations rely onan urban-only population data base, consisting

of 140 miIIion people Therefore, total fa-tal i ties wiII be underestimated because fa-talities in rural areas wilI not have beencounted. Second, because the number ofnucIear detonations wouId run into the manythousands, significant total doses depend onvery small dose levels from the individualweapons. Because data at these smalI doses isscant, the value of any of these faIlout modelsshould be suspect

As an illustration of our population database, we show in figs. 54 A-D the population in

Figure 54A.— Population Subject to Fallout v.Wind Direction

100Mx in Nevada and Utah

90 — Range: 500 nm

80 —

70 —

60 —

50 —

40 —

30 —

“o 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

Wind direction (in degrees)

SOURCE Lawrence Livermore Laboratory


Figure 54B.— Population Subject to Fallout v.Wind Direction

100Mx in Nevada and Utah

90 — Range: 1000 nm

70

60

n-. 50

t

20 —

10

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350



Figure 54C.— Population Subject to Fallout v.Wind Direction

MX in Nevada and Utah90 Range: 1500 nm

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

00 50 100 150 200 250 300 350



Figure 54D. —Population Subject to Fallout v.Wind Direction

100MX in Nevada and Utah

90 — Range: 2000 nm

80 —

70 —

Ec 60 —

.= 50 —


SOURCE: Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

the path of radiation fallout versus wind direc-tion, at distances from the MPS fields of 500,1,000, 1,500, and 2,000 nautical miles. In thesecharts, a wind direction of 00 is from north tosouth. Similarly, a wind direction of 1800 isfrom south to north. A wind direction of 2700points due east. In fig. 54A, the peak at 250represents the Los Angeles area, 800 cor-responds to the San Francisco Bay area, and soforth.

To determine the range of lethal fallout, andtherefore the magnitude of civilian radiationfatalities, figure 55 shows the dose, in rads,resulting from the detonation of a 1 -MT weap-on with downwind distance. These doses areplotted for a range of possible wind speeds,from 20 knots to 60 knots. For example, with 20knot winds, the one rad contour would extendto about 800 nautical miles (for a single l-MTweapon). This contour would extend to about1,400 nautical miles (or 1,600 statute miles)with 40 knot winds, and so forth. The 10- to 20-km altitude is the region where the mushroomcloud stabilizes and carries the bulk of the


Figure 55.— Downwind Distance v. Total Dose

4WSEG model as modified by Ruotanen

= . “ - . ? .

4

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24

Downwind distance (in hundreds of nm)


radioactive fallout. A survey of wind condi-tions for the proposed MPS deployment areashowed wind speeds at these altitudes thataveraged 30 to 40 knots, depending on season,with a typical wind direction of 2500 to 290i.e., f rom the wes t -sou thwes t to wes t -northwest. FinalIy, figure 56 shows the max-imum width of radiation dose contours withdiffering windspeed for a given wind shear.(This width occurs at approximately half of thedownwind range for a given dose.)

Civilian fatalities will depend on the prevail-ing winds, as well as the degree of protectiontaken by the populace. The 50-percent fatalitylevel occurs at about 450 rads and the 90-per-cent fatality level occurs at about 600 rads.(For our purposes, we use the rad and the rem,for roentgen-equivalent man, i t ter Change-ably. ) Second, the relation between exposedradiation dose and the actual absorbed dosedepends on the degree of protection affordedthe population at the time of attack. This iscommonly expressed as a protection factor,which is a direct proportionality between totaldose absorbed for a given state of protection(e. g., in the basement of a house) and the dose

Figure 56.— Crosswind Distance v. Total Dose

4WSEG model as modified by Ruotanen

3 Yield = 1,000KTWear= .4 MPH/Kilofeet

not-----

* $

-3 “ - ” ~ :“ . , ; ; < % ;

1 1 1 .-4

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500

Crosswind distance (in nm)


collected without any protection, such as outin the open. Typical protection factors varybetween one and 20 (see The Effects of NuclearWeapons, .3rd ., Samuel Glasstone and PhilipDoIan; Table 9.1 20)

An attack on MX in Nevada and Utah mightinvolve the de tona t ions o f 4 ,600 1 -MTweapons, spread over about 20,000 mi2. Basedon these graphs, total doses of 500 to 2,000rads for such a nuclear attack, correspondingto fatal doses for a protection factor of 1 to 4,might occur at a range of 500 to perhaps 1,500nautical miles from the origin of the attack,and depending largely on wind speed. Goingback to figures 54 A, B, and C, depending onwind direction as we I I as winds peed andpopulation protection, civilian fatalities couldrange from less than 1 million to more than 20million. For typical winds in a west or north-west direction, fatalities run from less than 5milIion for a 500 nautical miIe lethal range, upto 20 million to 30 million corresponding toour high lethal range of 1,500 nautical miIes.

It is important to note that these figures in-dicate the expected fatalities due to an attack

8 3 - 4 7 7 0 - B 1 - B


on the MX fields alone. However, it seemsprobable that a Soviet attack on MX would belikely to include Minuteman and Titan fields,strategic bomber bases and submarines in port.Because these existing targets are distributedover a large area the added fallout relatedfatalities due to the additional targets in theMPS fields would have a likely range from lessthan 1 million to 5 million. Total fatalities forthis limited counterforce attack have been es-timated to range from 25 million to 50 millionpeople

For an MPS deployment in Northern Texasand New Mexico, corresponding graphs ofpopulation at risk are shown in figures 57A-D.Windspeed and direction,for this area at rele-vant altitudes average 35 to 45 knots, and fromthe west, 2750 - 2800, With these winds, anuclear attack might resuIt i n fatalities of 10m i I I ion to 20 m i I I ion; however even a normalshift of wind direction couId resuIt i n fataIitiesof well over 40 million for an attack on MX/MPS alone

Figure 57A.— MX in Texas and New Mexico:Population Subject to Fallout v. Wind Direction

100 ‘

90 — Range: 500 nm

80 —

70 —

60 —

50 —

40 —

30 —

o 50 100 150 200 250 300 350



Figure 57B. —MX in Texas and New Mexico:Population Subject to Fallout v. Wind Direction

100

90 . Range: 1,000 nm

80 —

70

60

.

40

o 50 100 150 200 250 300 350



Figure 57C.— MX in Texas and New Mexico:Population Subject to Fallout v. Wind Direction

100

90 — Range: 1,500 nm

80 —

70

o 50 100 150 200 250 300 350




Figure 57D .—MX in Texas and New Mexico:Population Subject to Fallout v. Wind Direction

90

80

70

60

50

40

30I

Range 2,000 n m

0 50 100 150 200 250



Results on civilian fatalities wouldpenal in part on the Soviet responses to

300 350

also de-MPS If,

for example, the Soviets responded by buildingmore missiles, each carrying the same warheadyields as before, then the resulting radiationdoses would go up proportionately, If how-ever, the Soviets respond by fractionating theirwarheads, i.e., increasing the numbers of war-heads with diminished individual yields, thentotal radiation dose would most Iikely godown, and not up. This decrease occurs for tworeasons. First, fractionation customariIy re-duces total yield, resulting in less radioactivebyproduct of the weapon. Secondly, a loweryield weapon resuIts in a slightly lower altitudefor the radioactive mushroom cloud, andhence less fallout range, This distinction canbe seen quantitatively by comparing the onemegaton case in figure 55 with the 500 and 250kT cases shown in figures 58A&B.

Figure 58A .—Downwind Distance v.Total Dose—500 KT

4

WSEG model as modified by RuotanenYield = 500 KT

3 Shear =.4 MPH/KilofeetWind speeds

— 2 0 k n o t s2 - ---- —30 knots

— 4 0 k n o t s— 5 0 k n o t s

1 -

“

.

-2 -

-3 -

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24

Downwind distance (in hundreds of nautical miles)


Figure 58B .—Downwind Distance v.Total Dose—250 KT

4

3

2

1

0

-1

-2

-3

-4

WSEG model as modified by RuotanenYield = 250 KTShear =.4 MPH/KilofeetWind speeds

— 2 0 k n o t s---- —30 knots. . . . —40 knots. —50 knots — 6 0 k n o t s

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 2400

Downwind distance (in hundreds of nautical miles)


Chapter 3

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Chapter 3.— BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

PageOverview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....111

Technical Possibilities for BMD . ......111LoADS with MPS Basing. . . . . . . . . . . . .112The Overlay and Layered Defense of

Silo-Based MX. . . . . . . . . . . . .......11 3O t h e r B M D C o n c e p t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 3T h e A B M T r e a t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 3

Endoatmospheric Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . .114Technical Overview of

Endoatmospheric BAD. . . . . . . . . . . .114LoADS With MPS Basing. . . . . ........118O t h e r E n d o C o n c e p t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 6

Exoatmospheric and Layered Defense. ...129Technical Overview of Exo BMD .. ....129The Overlayand Layered Defense of

S i l o - B a s e d M X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 1

History of BMD and the ABM Treaty .. ...139The ABM Limitat ion Treaty . . . . . . . . . .140Application of ABM Treaty Provisions

t o M X D e f e n s e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 1Future ABM Limitation Negotiations ...142

LIST OF TABLES

Table No.20. Army’s LoADSCost Estimate,

October1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure No.59.

60.

61.62.

63.

64.

Comparison of Ballistic MissileDefense Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

. . . . 125

Page

. . . . 112LoADS Defense Unit BeforeBreakout. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119LoADSDefense Unit After Breakout. . .120Overlay/Underlay Layered DefenseSystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0. . . . .131Sensitivity of Layered DefensePerformance to Overlay Leakage. . ...134U.S. Defensive Arsenal Needed toAssure l,OOO Surviving U.S. ReentryVehicles ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..135

Chapter 3

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Bal l ist ic m i s s i

also called antterns —would seek

e defense (B MD) systems —ballistic missile (ABM) sys-k to ensure MX survivability

by destroying attacking reentry vehicles (RVS)either in space or after they entered the at-mosphere. Different BMD concepts can havevery different capabiIities and weaknesseswhich suit them for different MX basing rolesThus, it is important to keep clear the contextfor which the defense is intended, i.e , whetherit is desired to defend a large number of mul-tiple protective shelters (MPS) or a relativelysmaII number of siI os This chapter discussesthe technical aspects of the entire range ofendoatmospheric and exoatmospheric defensesystems but will concentrate on the two BMDconcepts most often discussed in the contextof a near-term decision regarding MX basing:the Low-Altltude Defense System (LoADS),

which is suited for the role of enhancing thesurvivability of MX in MPS; and the Overlaycomponent of a Layered Defense, appropriatei n theory for defense of MX based i n conven-tional silos.

There have been many changes in the tech-nical nature of BMD systems in the past dec-ade regarding both systems concept andunderlying technology. Systems contemplatedtoday are quite different f rot-n those discussedin the ABM debate of a decade ago. From atechnical point of view, therefore, the issuesrelevant to that debate have been replaced bya n entire I y new set of issues. Though there aremany paraIIels, intuitions based on previousacquaintance with BMD will not always berelevant — again from a purely technical pointof view — to the systems cent emplated today

OVERVIEW

Technical Possibilities for BMD

It is useful to distinguish BMD systems ac-cording to the altitude regime in which theytrack their targets and make their intercepts,since this Iargely dertermines the effectivenesspossible with such a system. Endoatmos-pheric — or “endo ” — defense systems performtracking and intercept within the sensible at-mosphere, from the Earth’s surface to about300,000-ft altitude, For various technicalreasons, U. S endo BMD efforts have concen-trated lately on the low-altitude regime, belowabout 50,000 ft Low-altitude endo systemssuch as LoADS are Iimited to making a smallnumber of intercepts over a given defendedtarget If the number of targets is relativelysmall, as in the case of silo basing, such defen-sive systems can only exact a small number ofRVS from the attacker Low-altitude systems bythemselves are therefore of limited valueunless the number of targets or aim points islarge, as with MPS basing. The very fact thattheir goal — forcing the offense to target a

small number of RVS at each aim point insteadof one — is modest, means that low-altitudesystems do notachieve this goaI

Exoat mospher

lave to perform very welI to

c — or “exe” – defenses trackand intercept RVS in space I n contrast to low-altitude endo defenses, exo systems can inprinciple intercept many RVS attacking thesame target Systems with an exo componentcan therefore in theory defend a small numberof targets such as silo-based missiIes from alarge attack However, this more demandingtask means that an exo system must be verygood indeed to accomplish it. Thus, an exosystem —even when accompanied by an endosystem in a “Layered Defense” — must have ahigher performance to do its job than a low-altitude system requires to do its more modestjob.

In addition to specifying the capabilities ofa BMD system, the altitude regime determinesthe type of sensor and interceptor required,

111


which in turn establishes the type of tech-nology required for the system and its poten-tial vulnerabilities (see fig. 59).

Endo systems normally employ ground-based radars and nuclear warheads to trackand destroy targets. Radar blackout caused bynuclear detonations in the atmosphere is not acrippling problem for low-altitude endo sys-tems, as it is for high-altitude endo systems,but it (along with other factors) imposes thelimitation discussed above that only a verysmall number of intercepts can be made withina small area. Operation in the dense air at lowaltitudes means that it is very difficult for anopponent to fool the defense with decoys.

Operation in space would allow exo defenseto make use of nonnuclear kill mechanismsand the tactic of preferential defense. Multiplekill vehicles can also be mounted on a singleinterceptor missile, resulting in some savingsgiven the cost of boosting defensive vehiclesinto space in the first place. Infrared sensorsare preferable to radars for exo defense. With-out the filtering effect of dense air within theatmosphere, exo sensors are vulnerable to of-fensive tactics making use of decoys and otherpenetration aids.

LoADS With MPS Basing

This use of BMD would be an alternative toincreasing the number of shelters in an MPS

system in the face of a growing Soviet threat.In the Air Force baseline horizontal MPS sys-tem, for example, a LoADS defense unit wouldbe hidden in one of the 23 shelters in eachcluster and programed to intercept the first RVapproaching the shelter containing the MXmissile. Since the Soviets would be presumednot tO know which shelter contained the MX,they would have to assume for targeting pur-poses that each of the 23 shelters contained anMX missile defended by LoADS. If the defensewere only able to intercept one RV over eachdefended shelter, the Soviets would have totarget two RVS at each shelter instead of one.Thus, LoADS would increase the attack pricefor an MX missile from 23 to 46 Soviet RVS.

It is possible to have high confidence thatLoAIDS could exact this price of 2 RVS pershelter if the locations of the LoADS defenseunit; and the MX missiles could be concealedand if the defense unit could be hardened tosurvive the effects of nearby nuclear detona-tions. This confidence, conditional on success-ful deception and nuclear hardness, resultsboth from advances in BMD technology in thelast decade and from LoADS’ relat ivelymoclest goal of exacting from the Soviets onemore RV per aim point.

Preservation of location uncertainty (PLU)would be made more difficult with the addi-tion of LoADS to the MPS system, since theLOADS ,defense unit, MX missile, and simu-

Figure 59.—Comparison of Ballistic MissileDefense Systems

“Exo” atmospheric “Endo” atmosphericdefense defense

rSafeguard

Overlayoparatingarea space atomosphere atmosphereType of

of sensorKIHmechanism Non-Nuclear Nuclear N u c l e a r


Ch. 3—Ballistic Missile Defense ● 113

I a t o r m u s t a l l h a v e i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e s i g -natures. The nuclear effects requirements forLoADS are unprecedented. The design goals ofPLU and hardening must furthermore be metsimultaneously. It is not possible to have con-fidence that these goals can be met untildetailed design and testing are done,

In addition to PLU and hardness, there arestylized attacks or “reactive threats” whichcould pose a long-term threat to LoADS. Theserisks are judged moderate,

The Overlay and Layered Defenseof Si lo-Based MX

The Army’s concept of Exo defense, calledthe Overlay, would consist of interceptors,about the size of offensive missiles, launchedinto space from silos. Each interceptor wouldcarry several kill vehicles that would be dis-patched, using infrared sensing, to destroy at-tacking RVS before they entered the atmos-phere. The Overlay could be deployed with anendo “Underlay” to make a Layered Defenseof silo-based MX.

High efficiency would be required of theOverlay if it was to be able to defend a smallnumber of MX silos against a large Soviet at-tack. The Overlay is in the technology explora-tion stage, and there is no detailed systemdesign such as exists for LoADS. There aremany uncertainties about whether the OverlaycouId achieve the high level of performance itwould require to satisfy the needs of MX bas-ing. These uncertainties concern both theunderlying technology and the defense systemas a whole. In addition, there is a potential“Achilles’ heel” in the vulnerability of theOverlay to decoys and other penetration aids.

For the moment it would be quite risky torely on the Overlay or Layered Defense as thebasis for MX survivability.

Other BMD Concep ts

This chapter will also discuss briefly otherBMD concepts which have been studied,

A concept called “Dust,” “Environmental,”or “Ejecta” defense involves burying “clean”nuclear weapons in the vicinity of missile silos.The bombs would be exploded on warning of aSoviet attack, filling the air with dust whichwould destroy Soviet RVs before they reachedthe ground. Though there is little technicaldoubt about the high effectiveness of dustdefense, there is considerable concern aboutpublic reaction to plans for the deliberatedetonation of nuclear weapons on U.S. ter-ritory.

Various low-altitude or “last-ditch” con-cepts based on simple or “novel” principleshave been proposed. Though perhaps relevantfor other BMD roles, these concepts do not ap-pear to have an application in MX defense,given the requirement to preserve a smallnumber of MX missiles against a large numberof Soviet RVS.

The Army’s Site Defense is a derivative ofthe Sprint component of the Safeguard de-fense system of a decade ago. Based on thetechnology of the 1970’s, Site Defense is pre-served as an option in the event of a decisionto field a BMD system based on known tech-nology in a short period of time. Though in-adequate for the role of MX defense, Site De-fense could be appropriate for other limitedBMD roles.

The ABM Treaty

The 1972 ABM Limitation Treaty was nego-tiated as part of the SALT I package of stra-tegic arms limitation agreements. A Protocolspecifying further I imitations was signed in1974. The Treaty is of unlimited duration but issubject to review every 5 years. In addition, theStanding Consultative Commission created bythe Treaty meets about every 6 months to re-view implementation of the provisions of theTreaty and to consider such matters as ‘theparties might wish to raise.

Briefly, the Treaty and Protocol allow de-velopment of some types of ABM systems butlimit their deployment to small numbers at


specified sites. Development of other types ofABM beyond the laboratory is forbiddenaltogether.

No meaningful defense of MX missiles,either in silos or MPS, would be permittedwithin the Treaty, since any such deploymentcould consist of at most 20 radars (18 small, 2large) and 100 interceptors confined to thevicinity of Grand Forks, N. Dak., or Wash-ington, DC.

Limitations on development constrain thetypes of ABM work that can pass beyond thelaboratory stage. Since LoADS consists ofradars and interceptors of the kind permittedby the Treaty, development of this system can

proceed without abrogation or renegotiationof the Treaty except where such developmentconcerns the specific features of mobility,more than one interceptor per launcher, or ahypothetical reload capability. Developmentof the Overlay interceptors can proceed to theextent of testing single kill vehicles on in-terceptors, but development of multiple killvehicles outside of the laboratory is forbidden. ‘Development of space-, sea-, or air-borne ABMsystem components outside of the laboratoryis also forbidden. The Treaty specifies that de-velopment of ABM systems based on “newtechnologies” unforeseen or unspecified at thet ime the t rea ty was d ra f ted canno t bedeployed.

ENDOATMOSPHERIC DEFENSE

Technical Overview ofEndoatmospheric BMD

Endoatmospheric —or “endo” – defense sys-tems perform tracking and intercept within thesensible atmosphere, from the Earth’s surfaceto about 300,000-ft altitude. It is important todistinguish high-altitude systems, which ac-quire and track their targets above about100,000 ft, from low-altitude systems, whichtrack and engage below 50,000 ft. The Sprintcomponent of the Safeguard system is an ex-ample of the former type and the Army’s pres-ent LoADS concept is an example of the latter.

Endoatmospheric defense normally employsground-based radars for tracking. Optical or in-frared sensors would be inappropriate for endooperation because, among other reasons, theycannot supply accurate range information andlow cloud cover or dust could obscure theirview of incoming RVS.

Nonnuclear k i l l is possible in the at-mosphere, but nuclear warheads provide amore certain kill mechanism. A nonnuclear killwouId require that the radar provide very ac-curate trajectory information to the intercep-tor or that the interceptor have its own sensor.Because the kill radius of a nuclear warhead is

much greater, less accurate information suf-f ices to guarantee RV destruction.

Neutrons released from a defensive nuclearwarhead provide the mechanism for disablingthe offensive RV. An RV warhead contains fis-sionable material that absorbs neutrons veryreadily: this is the property that allows thenuclear chain react ion to proceed when the RVis detonated. When the fissionable material inan incoming RV absorbed the neutrons fromthe defensive warhead, it would be renderedunable to detonate. Physical destruction of theRV would therefore not be necessary: thoughblast from the defensive warhead could play arole, it is a less certain kill mechanism. Theneutron kill is sure because the incoming RVmust contain neutron-absorbing material to doits job, and it is very difficult to shield againstneutrons. A relatively low-yield defensive war-head (tens of kilotons) could generate a neu-tron fIuence lethal to RVS at ranges of severalhundred feet from its detonation point. Thedefensive interceptor therefore would nothave to be very accurate to ensure disabling ofthe RV.

Use of nuclear interceptors does involvespecial procedures for their release, however.Release of offensive nuclear weapons must be


authorized by the National Command Au-thorities. The procedures for defensive nuclearrelease have not been worked out since theUnited States has no deployed, working BMDsystem.

Vulnerabilities of High-AltitudeEndo Defense

The radar for the endoatmospheric Sprintcomponent of Safeguard tracked incomingRVS above 100,000-ft altitude, Because of anumber of technical problems associated withsuch high-altitude operation, U.S. BMD effortsin recent times have tended to focus on thelow-altitude regime below 50,000 ft.

Target tracking and discrimination at highaltitudes requires radars which are large andexpensive, These radars, which must for costreasons be few in number, would make tempt-ing targets for a concentrated precursor attackdesigned to overwhelm the defense in the areaof the radars and penetrate to destroy them.The defense system would then be blind.

I n addition to the vulnerability of the radars,high-altitude endo defense suffers from twocrucial technical problems: target discrim-ination and radar blackout. Discriminationrefers to the ability to distinguish RVS from thebus and tank fragments which accompanythem and from light decoys or other pene-tration aids which an attacker could design toconfuse the defense. The defense would wastecostly interceptors if the radar mistook adecoy or other object for an RV, and an RVwould leak through if it were mistaken for anonlethal object. High-altitude systems likethe Sprint component of Safeguard wouldhave high wastage and leakage because of theintrinsic difficulty of radar discrimination inthe upper atmosphere. In the thin air at highaltitudes, objects reentering the atmospherewithout heat shields, such as bus fragments,have not yet started to burn up, and lightdecoys fall at the same rate as heavier RVSThe dense air in the lower atmosphere, on theother hand, acts like a filter: unshielded ob-jects burn up, and light shielded objects slowdown. I n either case the heavy shielded RV can

be distinguished after it has reached lowaltitudes.

Blackout occurs when the heat and radia-tion from a nuclear explosion ionize the sur-rounding volume of air. This ionization causesattenuation and reflection of radar signalspassing through the affected region. At thehigh altitudes where the Safeguard radarstracked their targets, blackout over large areasof the sky could be created by a rather smallnumber of detonations. An attacker was there-fore encouraged to launch a first salvo of war-heads fuzed to detonate at high altitudes,thereby blacking out the defense’s radars. Thenuclear warheads on the defense’s own inter-ceptors could also produce this effect. The at-tacker could then bring in his main attackbehind the protective blackout “shield.”

Advantages and Limitations ofLow-Altitude Endo Defense

Because of the vulnerability and cost of theradars and the severe technical problems ofdiscrimination and blackout for high-altitudeendo systems, U.S. efforts in endo defensehave tended to focus on low-altitude systems,which track targets and perform interceptsbelow 50,000 ft.

Low-altitude systems are relatively imper-vious to decoy attack because it is possible toassess the weight of a body falling throughdense air from its radar return. Weight is astrategically significant discriminant, since of-fensive boosters have limited throwweight. Be-yond a certain point, loading decoys onto amissile requires offloading RVS, a trade thatbecomes unfavorable for the offense if the de-coys must be heavy in order to fool the de-fense, The trade is clearly absurd (leaving asidethe fact that a decoy might be cheaper than anRV) if the decoy must be as heavy as the RVitself, for the RV at least stands a chanceof penetrating the defense and explodingwhereas the decoy does not.

The procedure by which a low-altitude radarobtains a falling object’s weight is difficult foreven the cleverest decoy designer to sidestep


because it is based on fundamental principleswhich is not within the power of the offense toalter: the presence of dense air at low alti-tudes and some basic laws of physics. The rateof fall of an object — RV, decoy, bus fragment,etc. —through the atmosphere is determinedby the ratio of its weight to its area, called itsballistic coefficient, The higher the ballisticcoefficient, the faster the object falls. Of twoobjects of equal area, the heavier will fallfaster because it has more force of gravity toovercome the resistance, or drag, of the air. oftwo objects of equal weight, the smaller ormore streamlined will fall faster because itdoes not have to push as much air out of itsway. Thus, a flat sheet of paper falls slowlywhereas the same sheet, when balled up, dropsrapidly.

By tracking an object, a radar can measureits rate of slowdown and therefore the ratio ofits weight to its area. In the thin air at highaltitudes, however, differences in ballisticcoefficient do not lead to large differences inrate of fall because there is not much drag. Atlow altitudes the differences are quite pro-nounced. Thus, discrimination on the basis ofballistic coefficient is more reliable at lowaltitudes.

Measuring the ballistic coefficient might notbe sufficient for discrimination, however, sincea small light decoy could have the same bal-listic coefficient as a large heavy RV. It wouldin fact be quite difficult to design decoyswhich matched the balIistic coefficient of anRV at low altitudes since the shape of the RV(and hence its ballistic coefficient) changes ina complex way as its heat shield ablates. But asa hedge against a very carefully designeddecoy, the defensive radar can employ anothertechnique, involving the disturbance made inthe air as the body passes through it, to obtainthe area of the falling body. Combining thearea with the ballistic coefficient gives thebody’s weight, a quantity that is not in the in-terest of the offense to match. Thus a low-altitude defense system which made use ofthese radar discrimination techniques wouldbe vir tual ly impossible to sidestep withdecoys, since the fundamental discriminant is

weight and the techniques rely on the basicproperties of gravity and hydrodynamics.

Radar blackout is not a crippling problemfor low-altitude systems as it is for high-altitude systems.

However, fireball effects impose a basiclimitation on the effectiveness of low-altitudedefenses. The ability of low-altitude or “deependo” systems such as LoADS to make multi-ple intercepts within a short time over thesame site — a conventional missile silo or ashelter in an MPS system — is severely con-strained, no matter how many interceptors thedefense deploys. This limitation arises bothfrom blackout in the regions of nuclear fire-balls and from trajectory perturbations suf-fered by follow-on RVS passing through theseregions. The technical nature of this problem,and the extent of the I imitations it imposes, arediscussed further in the Classified Annex. Evenif a hypothetical future technology allowedthe defense to overcome this fundamentalIimitation, there might st i l l be strategiesavailable to the attacker that were more effi-cient than saturation, such as precursor attackon the defense itself or use of various penetra-tion techniques.

How Good is Good Enough?

It is an important feature of low-altitudesystems that only aim to make an attackertarget one more RV at each aimpoint that theydo not have to be very capable to force an at-tacker to pay this price. In fact, if the defenseis only good enough that it succeeds in makingits single intercept more often than it fails —how much more often is irrelevant–the at-tacker will conclude that he makes better useof his RVS by targeting two RVS at a lessernumber of defended aimpoints than by tar-geting one RV each at a larger number. The at-tacker’s conclusion is not a result of con-servative offensive perceptions but of sobercaIcuIation.

To take an explicit, if oversimplified, exam-ple, suppose an attacker has 1,000 RVS totarget at 1,000 aim points, each of which isdefended by a defense system whose goal is a


single intercept per aimpoint. Suppose alsothat the defense performs so poorly that it suc-ceeds in making an intercept only 51 percentof the time and fails 49 percent of the time.The attacker has the choice of targeting all1,000 aimpoints with one RV (Case 1) or 500aimpoints with two RVS (Case 2). In Case 1, theattack destroys 490 aim points because the de-fense fails this many times. In Case 2, all 500aimpoints targeted 2-on-1 are destroyed byassumption. Thus the attacker concludes thathe actually does better by “doubling up” on asmaller number of aimpoints (Case 2). But thisis exactly what the defense seeks to force himto conclude.

Therefore, if the odds that a single-shotsystem actually makes its intercept are greaterthan 50 percent, it achieves its goal of forcingthe attacker to target one more RV at eacha impoint. Whether the odds are 51 or 99 per-cent is immaterial, since the offense does nothave the option of targeting fractions of RVS ateach aimpoint, but only one or two.

Once the limited single-shot goal is ac-cepted, a relatively poor system is as good as aperfect one. Although low-altitude endo in-terception is a very challenging task, defensesystems do not have to perform it very well ifthey accept a goal of only one intercept peraimpoint. This stands i n contrast to exo de-fenses, which aspire to a higher attack pricethan one RV per aimpoint. Such defenses arenot worthwhile unless their performance isvery good.

In the example above, the attacker wasgiven the choice between l-on-l and 2-on-1targeting of ballistic reentry vehicles. Stylizedattacks or “reactive threats” involving non-ballistic RVS, precursor barrages, radar in-terference, etc. pose another set of challengesto single-shot defenses which must be ana-lyzed on a case-by-case basis.

The Need for Leverage

A generic low-altitude defensive system thatcouId only claim a single RV per defended sitewould not be effective unless some additionaldefensive leverage could be found. One U.S.

defense unit (radar plus interceptor) would bea poor cost trade for a single Soviet RV unlessintercept of this single RV resuIted in the sur-vival of a defended target valuable to theUnited States. But this would only be the caseif the number of targets were so large that theSoviets could not afford to target multiple RVSat each one. If the number of targets weresmall, the Soviets could attack each withmultiple RVS, overwhelm the defense, and de-stroy the U.S. value at an extra price, relativeto the undefended case, of a small number ofRVS. For instance, 100 single-shot low-altitudedefense units defending 100 silos containingMX missiles would only be able to claim 100RVS from a Soviet arsenal of thousands.

Additional leverage for the low-altitude de-fense could be provided in three ways.

Deceptive basing, such as for LoADS in asso-ciation with MPS, would allow a small numberof defense units to force the Soviets to expenda large number of RVS because they would notknow which shelters were defended and wouldhave to assume that all 4,600 shelters con-tained MX missi les defended by LoADS.Therefore, 200 LoADS defense units capable ofa single intercept each would be able to exacta price of 4,600 RVS, forcing the Soviets to at-tack each shelter twice for a total of 9,200 RVS.

A so-called “cheap” or “simple” defensesystem such as Swarm jet, to be discussed later,could conceivably improve the cost tradeofffor single-shot defense, but the overall attackprice would still be small if the number ofdefended targets was small, as with silo basing.If the simple system were very inexpensive,one could conceive of deploying one defenseunit with each shelter in a MPS system. Thiswould have the same effect as deceptive bas-ing without the need for PLU. There does notas yet appear to be a simple interceptionsystem cheap enough to allow this possibility.However, dust defense could be cheap enoughto deploy in this way.

Last, a capable “Overlay” defense operatingoutside of the atmosphere would also be apowerful source of leverage for an associated“Underlay” endo defense. The Overlay (if ef-


fective) would thin the attack and break up thestructured Iaydowns of RVS needed topenetrate the Underlay. The Soviets wouldhave to target many RVS at each defended sitein order that a few leaked through in the rightsequence to penetrate the Underlay. Such anattack strategy based upon leakage throughthe Overlay would be costly of RVS and ex-ceedingly risky for the attacker.

Because of the need for extra leverage, pro-posals of low-altitude defense for MX missileshave focused on deceptive low-altitude de-fense for a many-aimpoint MPS basing systemor on Overlay/Underlay (Layered] defense for aforce of MX missiles deployed in a small num-ber of conventional silos.

LoADS With MPS Basing

LoADS Description

THE DEFENSE UNIT (DU)The LoADS defense unit (DU) would consist

of a radar, data-processor, and interceptormissiles. The radar would be of the phased-array type, operating at high frequencies andwith high power and narrow beamwidth for ex-tra anti jam capability. The data processorwould employ distributed processing for rapidthroughput of large amounts of trajectorydata. The interceptor missiles, roughly onequarter the length of an MX missile and half aswide, would be capable of extremely high ac-celerations and rapid change of direction, Theinertially guided interceptor would be directedat launch towards a predicted impact pointwith the RV but its course could be updated inflight as well. The interceptor would be armedwi th a low-y ie ld nuc lear warhead . Thetechnologies embodied in these elements ofthe DU represent significant advances beyondearlier U.S. endo BMD systems.

For the purpose of LoADS/MPS combinationbasing, the elements of the DU would bepackaged into cylinders capable of fitting intothe same spaces in the shelters and trans-porters occupied by the MX missiles and simu-lators (see fig. 60). The DU, MX cannister, andsimulator would be so designed that they pre-sented identical signatures to sensors which

the Soviets might use to distinguish them in theshelters or in transit, It would be essential tothe effectiveness of the LoADS/MPS com-bination that it be impossible to distinguishMX, DU, and simulator.

One DU would be deceptively emplaced ineach cluster of 23 shelters, along with the MXmissile and 21 simulators. The DU would beprogramed to defend the shelter containin g

the MX missile. Upon receiving warning of aSoviet attack, the DU would erect vertically,pushing the radar face and the interceptor can-nister through the roof of the shelter (see fig,61). The DU would then be ready to defend theshelter containing the MX. Breakout would bean irreversible process, since it would destroythe roof of the shelter. Various schemes havebeen studied to avoid breakout. For instance,the DU could roll out the door of the shelterand erect like the MX missile. But the DU inthis exposed position would be too vulnerableto destruct ive ef fects of nearby nucleardetonations. The broken-out DU would stillhave the protective shieldin g and structuralsupport of the remainder of the shelter.

It would be absolutely essential that thedefense received adequate warning that SovietRVS were approaching so that it could awakeelectronic equipment from its dormpnt stateand break out. It appears that this process ofreadying the LoADS DU could be performed ina short period of time. If achievable, thiswouId mean that it would not be necessary tohave warning sensors which detected a Sovietattack at the moment of launch, but only asthe attacking RVS approached the UnitedStates. This late warning would be easier toprovide than the early warning required to sup-port launch under attack or exo BMD. It wouldalso be easier to protect warning sensors ofthis type from a Soviet precursor attack. itmight also be desirable to have some informa-tion ,about the size of the attack before a deci-sion were made to break out. (This is discussedfurther in the context of Shoot-Look-Shoot inthe Classified Annex. ) Finally, the command,control, and communications to support time-ly breakout would require procedures andhard\ware immune to a determined Soviet ef-


Figure 60.— LoADS Defense Unit BeforeBreakout (human figure indicates scale)

Radar Batteries Data processing Interceptors


fort to disrupt them. Several technically feasi-ble approaches to these problems have beenproposed, and their provision would be essen-tial to effective defense.

LoADS OPERATIONThe LoADS DU in each cluster would be pro-

gramed to defend the shelter containing theMX missile, Since the Soviets would not knowwhich shelter contained the MX if PLU weremaintained, they would have to assume fortargeting purposes that each of the 23 shelterscontained an MX missile defended by LoADSLoADS would intercept the first RV attackingthe MX shelter, so the Soviets would have totarget each shelter twice in order to destroy theMX. LoADS would double the price the SovietswouId have to pay for an MX missile from 23 to46 RVS. Thus U.S. deployment of LoADS wouldbe essentially equivalent to doubling the num-ber of shelters in the MPS deployment whilekeeping the number of missiles the same.

deployment while keeping the number ofmissiles the same.

It is desirable for each DU to have morethan one interceptor in order that it could de-fend itself if it came under attack before theMX shelter did.

It would be essential that the location of theMX be unknown to the Soviets. It would alsobe necessary to conceal the location of theDU, since if this were known the Soviets couldattack the defense first, forcing it to use up itsinterceptors in self defense, Subsequent attackon the other shelters would find them un-defended.

LoADS WITH VARIANTS OF MPS

The operation of LoADS would be essen-tially unchanged if the MPS deployment wereorganized into “valley clusters” containingseveral missiles instead of discrete clusters of


Figure 61 .— LoADS Defense Unit AfterBreakout (human figure indicates scale)


23 shelters for each missile. A DU could still beprovided to defend each missile, and the at-tack price per missile would again be doubled.

From the point of view of LoADS defense,there would be significant tradeoffs betweenhorizontal and vertical shelter deployment butno clear reason to prefer one to the other. Forvertical shelters, it would be necessary to putthe radar and missile cannister in differentshelters, since they would be too large to fitside-by-side in a single shelter. There wouldhave to be a data link to connect the twoelements of the defense unit. Since the unitswould be moved from shelter to shelter peri-odically, the communicat ions equipmentwould have to connect all pairs of shelters,potentially a costly addition. The links wouldfurthermore have to be resistant to disruptionfrom nuclear effects. On the other hand,

breakout would not be required, since the de-fense could egress through the blast door ofthe vertical shelter. Matching four objects (MX,simulator, radar module, and interceptor can-nister) would be more difficult than three, butthere would be more design flexibility for theseparate radar module and interceptor can-nister because each would be, so to speak,“half empty. ” The extra room could be usedfor PLU countermeasures. Protecting the DUelements from nuclear effects could con-ceivably be easier for vertical shelter de-ployment.

It is not possible at this time to assess thesetradeoffs in detail, but it is not apparent thateither vertical or horizontal offers clear ad-vantages. More study has been made of thehorizontal alternative.

Ch. 3—Ballistic Missile Defense 121

LoADS Effectiveness

Active defense systems are very complex:the interception process is complicated, withmany distinct sources of leakage and wastage.There are many attack scenarios, offensivecountermeasures, and defensive counter-countermeasures to consider Analysis of theeffectiveness of a BMD system can thereforebe more involved than analysis of basingsystems that ensure survival of MX by passivemeans such as mobiIity, concealment, ordeception It is therefore important in assess-ing how well LoADS would do its job to be veryclear what that job is

Suppose LoADS sought to double the pricethe Soviets would have to pay to destroy anMX missile from 23 RVs to 46 RVs, In this case,LoADS would have the rather modest task ofintercepting the first RV targeted at the MXmissiIe within each cluster I n order to destroythe MX missile within a cluster, the Sovietswould have to target two RVS, or “double up, ”at each shelter, This assumes that PLU wouldbe successful and the Soviets would have noknowledge of the location of the MX or theDU.

In fact, LoADS could exact the price of 2RVS per shelter even if the defense systemwere rather inefficient. Roughly speaking, ifthe Soviets believed that LoADS would suc-cessfully intercept the first RV targeted at theMX shelter more than half of the time— that is,if the efficiency of LoADS were greater thanonly 50 percent — then the Soviets wouldcalculate that they made better use of theirRVS by doubling up on fewer shelters than bytargeting many shelters with one RV,

For example, suppose that the Soviets had6,900 RVS to target at 4,600 MPS shelters,(These numbers are chosen to make the arith-metic easy and for no other reason, ) Supposealso that LoADS were only 51-percent efficientin a 1 -on-1 attack: that is, if one RV weredirected against every shelter, LoADS wouldsuccessfully intercept 51 percent of the RVSdirected at the shelters containing MX. This isthe same as a leakage of 49 percent. Assumealso that all targeted Soviet RVS actually

arrived on target and further that if two RVS ar-rived at the MX shelter within a short space oftime, LoADS would not even attempt to inter-cept the second and the MX missile would bedestroyed,

The Soviets would have the choice of usingtheir 6,900 RVS either to target 100 clusters(2,300 shelters) with one RV and 100 clusters(2,300 shelters) with two RVS (Case 1 ) or to dou-ble up on 150 clusters (3,450 shelters) and leave50 clusters (1,150 shelters) untouched (Case 2).In Case 1, all 100 MX missiles targeted 2-on-1wouId be destroyed, and 49 of the missilestargeted l-on-l would be destroyed becauseLoADS would only be 51-percent efficient byassumption. Thus in Case 1 the Soviets wouIddestroy 149 MX missiles, In Case 2, the 150missiles targeted 2-on-1 would be destroyedand the remaining 50 untouched The SovietswouId therefore actualIy destroy more MX mis-siles by doubling up (Case 2), even thoughLoADS failed to make an intercept almost asmany times as it succeeded.

It therefore appears that LoADS would nothave to be very efficient to exact a price oftwo RVS from the Soviets. At the same time, itwouId be exceedingly difficuIt to exact a priceof several RVS.

So far, the analysis has considered only sim-ple 1 -on-1 or 2-on-1 attacks. The conclusion isthat, as far as these attacks are concerned, andassuming the DU survives nuclear effects to doits job and that PLU is maintained, it is possibleto have confidence that LoADS is capable ofits job. Although low-altitude interception ofRVS is a very challenging technical task, andthere are many uncertainties about LoADS op-eration and potential contributors to ineffi-ciency (radar and interceptor performance, RVradar cross sections, radar traffic handling,kill mechanisms, etc.), there are none whichshould stop LoADS from doing its job as wellas it needs to,

If the defense only sought to make one in-tercept over the MX shelter, then the UnitedStates could assume that the Soviets wouldpay the price of 46 RVS per MX missile if giventhe choice of l-on-l or 2-on-1 targeting. Could

—


t hey do be t te r by us ing spec ia l a t tackstrategies?

There are many such reactive threats toLoADS, For instance, decoys are a hypo-thetical threat: precision decoys seek to foolthe radar into intercepting them, while trafficdecoys simply aim to fool the radar longenough to consume precious data-processingtime. As discussed in the Technical Overview,the ability of radar to weigh falling objects atlow altitudes means that decoys are probablynot a serious threat to LoADS. Jammers de-ployed along with attacking RVS could seek toblind the radars. Maneuverable reentry vehi-cles (Ma RVs) could try to evade the inter-ceptor; and if MaRVs were provided withradar- homing devices, they might destroy theLoADS defense units before they had donetheir job. These reactive threats are discussedin the Classified Annex. Defense barrage,blackout, and exhaustion attacks are discussedunder Hardness to Nuclear Effects and its Clas-sified Annex, and Spoof and Shoot-Look-Shoot, both threats to deception, are discussedunder Preservation of Location Uncertainty[PLU) and its Classified Annex.

One can raise legitimate questions as towhether a prudent Soviet planner would useany of these techniques to sidestep LoADS, butthe defensive planner must fortify the systemdesign against all of them. The attractivenessof these special threats to Soviet plannerswould presumably be weighed against thebenefits they would derive from the simple ex-pedient of deploying two Soviet RVS for everyU.S. shelter. Detailed analysis of these specialthreats, presented elsewhere in this report orits Classified Annexes, indicates that some ofthem are worrisome and represent a long-termrisk to the effectiveness of LoADS/MPS.

Hardness to Nuclear Effects

The close shelter spacing–1 mile–meansthat LoADS must operate in a nuclear en-vironment of a severity unprecedented for socomplex and exposed a piece of equipment.Failure to meet the requirements could lead topronounced degradation in system perform-ance. It is also vital that measures taken to pro-

tect the DU do not betray its location, i.e.,break PLU. Providing for nuclear hardness re-quires detailed understanding of the expectednuclear environment and its effect on criticalmechanical and electrical components. Espe-cially important for LoADS, given the unprec-edented character of the hardness require-ments, is testing of actual equipment. DU de-sign and nuclear effects analysis—and, in thecase of LoADS, PLU analysis — must proceed inconcert. These studies are just beginning. Test-ing is required before it wilI be possible to haveconfidence that LoADS can meet its hardeningneeds, especialIy within the severe design con-straints imposed by PLU.

AS with the analysis of system effectiveness,it is important to have a clear idea of LoADS’hardening needs and of the consequences offailing to meet these needs. The key require-ments concern the survival of the DU, andespecially the radar, after it has broken out ofthe shelter and is waiting to intercept the RVtargeted at the MX shelter. Other concerns,probably less serious, are the hardness of theinterceptor as it flies to make its intercept andthe hardness of the DU before it breaks out.

HARDNESS OF THE DU AFTER BREAKOUT

For LoADS to do a single-shot job, no lessthan 46 Soviet RVS may suffice to destroy anMX missile. The attacker must either be madeto fail to destroy the DU before it has made itsintercept or be made to pay a heavy enoughprice to destroy the DU that nothing is gainedby trying.

The hardness of the broken-out DU defines a“keep-out zone” around the unit: RVS whichdetonate within the keep-out zone are as-sumed to destroy the DU and must be inter-cepted if they arrive before the DU has madeits intercept above the MX shelter. It is for self-defense that each DU should contain morethan one interceptor missile.

Inadequate nuclear hardening would meanthat the keep-out zone was too large. An il-lustrative, if presumably exaggerated, exampleconsists of a DU so soft that a detonationanywhere within its shelter cluster would im-


pair its function. In this case, the Soviets couldtarget a few RVS (perhaps of higher yield thanthose targeted at shelters) to arrive at randomlocations within each cluster a few secondsbefore arrival of the main attack. The main at-tack would consist of one RV on each shelter.The DU would have no choice but to interceptall of the precursors, for otherwise it wouId berendered inoperable, If there were as manyprecursor RVS as interceptors in the DU, thenall the interceptors would be used up in self-defense, The main attack would then find thecluster undefended, as though LoADS did notexist. The attacker would then have paid not46 RVS, but rather the undefended price of 23RVS plus just a few additional RVS to exhaustthe defense,

The defense suppression barrage describedabove is one of several scenarios where LoADShardness plays a crucial role, In all of thesescenarios, the attacker seeks to destroy an MXmissile for an attack price of less than 46 RVS,The results of a more detailed analysis, pre-sented in the Classified Annex, indicates thatthe 1-mile shelter spacing imposes severe re-quirements on the DU. Unlike the MX missile,protected by its steel and concrete shelter andseveral feet of earth, the DU is directly expos-ed to the nuclear effects. Not only must theDU survive, but its complex components mustfunct ion through the attack. Thus, someeffects— prompt radiation, certain effects ofelectromagnetic pulse (EM P), dust, etc. —which are not important for missiIe protectionare severe threats to LoADS. Defense per-formance, measured by vulnerability to thesestylized attacks, might be degraded ap-preciably by shortcomings in hardening.

Work on LoADS hardening so far has con-centrated upon defining quantitatively thenuclear effects which the DU must be able toendure, not providing design fixes for potentialvulnerabilities, Even defining the effects willrequire testing, since in some respects they ex-ceed the predictive power of computer simu-lation codes. Understanding the interaction or“coupl ing” of these effects to the peculiargeometry of the broken-out DU, to electronics,

and to radar performance wiII also requiretesting.

Nothing that is done to ensure its hardnessmust permit the DU to be detected when it is inthe shelter. If the Soviets were able to detectwhich shelter contained the DU, they couldtarget that shelter with a few precursors, forc-ing it to exhaust itself in self-defense. This andother threats to PLU are discussed in the nextsection. The important point is that hardeningthe DU —adding shielding, structural support,etc. — must not provide a signature whichwould allow the Soviets to detect the DU’Slocation. This synergism of hardness and PLUis a matter of testing and detailed design whichhas not yet been done.

Ensuring adequate hardness for the broken-out DU is thus a chalIenging task, and it wiII re-quire some time ‘before uncertainties can bereduced to levels where a final judgment ispossible.

It is important finally to note the constraintsthat would act upon the offense if it were toseek to exploit potential vulnerabilities inLoADS. If the Soviets were to fractionate so asto be able to target as many shelters as pos-sible, they would have to reduce the yields oftheir RVS. The lower yields would significantlyalleviate the nuclear effects on LoADS insome, though not all, circumstances. If on theother hand, the Soviets kept their yields highwith the aim of exploiting potential LoADSvulnerabilities, it would be difficult for themto fractionate their missiIes,

HARDNESS OF THE IN-FLIGHT INTERCEPTORAs the missile flew towards its intercept

point, it would be buffeted by the shock wavesfrom nearby detonations. Though the inter-ceptor has the ability to correct its course, ithas a limited duration of powered flight. Ifintercepting an RV at a relatively distant point,burnout would be complete before the inter-ceptor reached the RV, When coasting in thisway, it would have less ability to correct itscourse than when burning.

Interference with interceptor performancedue to nuclear effects such as shock waves is


one of the many contr ibutors to systemleakage. As described in the previous section,LoADS can tolerate a large leakage withoutimpairing its overall effectiveness. Thus in-flight nuclear effects might not serve to in-crease leakage above an acceptable point.However, interceptors flying out to attemptmultiple intercepts would be forced to fly in aseverely disturbed environment.

HARDNESS OF THE DU IN THE SHELTERIn the context of a Spoof or Shoot-Look-

Shoot attack, to be discussed in the next sec-tion, the DU might be required to survive aIight precursor attack before it broke out of itsshelter. I n this situation the DU would berelatively secure because it would be in theshelter and the scenario cal Is for a Iight attack.

Additional discussion of the problems withmeeting LoADS’ nuclear hardening require-ments can be found in the Classified Annex.

Preservation of Location Uncertainty (PLU)

Successful deception is vital to LoADS’defensive leverage. If the location of the DUwere known to the Soviets, they could exhaustthe defense with a precursor attack. A sub-sequent one-on-one attack would find theshelters completely undefended, What ismore, under certain circumstances, a break-down of PLU for the LoADS DUS could cause abreakdown of PLU for the MX missiles as well.In this case, the United States would be worseoff than if there were no defense at all.

For undefended NIPS, PLU appears to be acomplex and challenging technical enterprise,but no signatures of the MX missile have beenidentified which present clearly insurmount-able problems. PLU for the LoADS/MPS com-bination has not yet progressed this far, andthe problem will have to be reduced to a com-parable “acceptable” level of detail. In par-ticular, the design requirements imposed bynuclear hardening must be taken into account.

Even i f no “Achi l les’ heel , ” or grosssignature of the DU which is fundamentally in-compatible with PLU, is found, a complexengineering task faces the LoADS designer. In

the case of MPS alone, one is presented with200 missiles and the task of creating 4,600simulators which resemble the missiles in allobservable respects. The simulator is createdde novo r with no a priori constraints save tomatch the MX. The LoADS Defense Unit, onthe other hand, is a functional object withunique signatures, related to its operation,which cannot be suppressed. It wouId there-fore be virtually impossible to make the DUmatch a set of missiles and simulators whichwere not designed with the LoADS option inmind. The three objects — MX, simulator, andDU — must all be designed in concert.

PLU is therefore considerably more complexfor MPS defended by LoADS. It is too early totell whether deception can be arranged at all,but it is probable that the 200 missile can-nisters and 4,400 simulators would have to bealtered from ‘time to time as design and testingproceeded to accommodate distinctive fea-tures of the DU. The later that a decision weretaken to give LoADS a place in the design ofthe overall system, the riskier and more costlythe PLU process might become.

in addition to signatures, the operations bywhich the MXS and DUS were shuffled peri-odicalIy among the shelters must not betraythe location of either. It appears that accept-able “movement algorithms” can be devisedto preserve PLU for both MX and DU simul-taneously, whether the system were organizedinto individual clusters of 23 shelters or intolarger “valIey clusters. ” it should be noted thatif rapid reshuffle were required to redress ac-tual or suspected loss of PLU, extra time mightbe required, depending on the availability oftransporters, to move the DU as well as the MXmissiI e.

There is some concern regarding a tactic forattacking LoADS/MPS, called Shoot-Look-Shoot, whereby the Soviets could in principleinduce a breakdown of PLU. I f the Sovietslaunched a first wave of attacking RVS whichcaused the LoADS DUS to break out and ex-pose their locations to remote Soviet sensors, asecond wave could be targeted on the basis ofknown DU locations. They would then be able

Ch. 3—Ballistic Missile Defense 125

to destroy MX missiles at about the unde-fended price or even less. However, to sidestepthe defense in this way, the two waves of at-tacking RVS would have to be well-separatedin time. The Soviets wouId therefore have toreckon with the possibility that the UnitedStates wouId simply launch MX missiIes at theSoviet Union between waves rather than awaitthe outcome of a subtle Soviet strategy. Forthis and other reasons, reliance on Shoot-Look-Shoot would entail high risk to the Soviets, TheSoviets would presumably weigh these risksagainst the simpler expedient of buiIding moreRVS and attacking the shelters directly

There are two scenarios for which a SovietShoot-Look-Shoot capability could be in-tended. In the first (sometimes called “Spoof”)scenario, an initial attack on LoADS/MPS is in-tended to cause the DUS to break out of theirshelters. A second wave of RVS is then targetedon the basis of known DU locations. I n the sec-ond case, appropriate to long war scenarios, asecond attack is not necessarily planned at thet i me of the first, but after an initial exchange inwhich the DUS had broken out to perform theirdefensive job, the Soviets could sense the loca-tions of the exposed DUS. I n a subsequent ex-change, the remaining U.S. force would beleft essentially undefended. Shoot-Look-ShootwouId in this case mean that the LoADS de-fense did not have the endurance that the MXmissiIes themselves wouId have.

Since deception is necessary for defense ef-fectiveness, since the defense unit must breakout and expose itself to defend, and since theSoviets would know that a shelter defended inthe initial attack must have contained an MXmissile, a Shoot-Look-Shoot strategy wouldenable the Soviets to compensate for LoADSwith only a few hundred more RVS than theywouId need to attack an undefended MPS, pro-provided the U n i ted States did not Iaunch out be-tween the first and second waves CaIcuIationsof the outcomes of various Shoot-Look-Shootscenarios, and a discussion of the problemsfaced by the offense in mounting them and thedefense in countering them, are provided inthe Classified Annex.

Cost and Schedule

OTA has not performed independent costand schedule analysis for the LoADS/MPScombination. The data presented in this sec-tion were supplied to OTA by the Army’s Bal-listic Missile Defense Systems Command(BMDSCOM). Comments that accompanythese data are those of OTA and do not nec-essarily reflect opinions of BMDSCOM.

The Army’s most recent (October 1980) costestimate to deploy a LoADS defense for the4,600-shelter Air Force baseline MPS systemand operate it for 10 years is 8.6 bilIion con-stant fiscal year 1980 dollars. The $7.1 bilI ionacquisition cost would include the costs of theDUS, 200 separate transporters to move theDUS, a modest amount of construction ofoperating buildings in the deployment area,and program development and management.Operating costs are estimated at $153 millionper year. A detailed breakdown is presented intable 20. These cost estimates do not includethe costs of potential modifications to the AirForce baseline system in order to accom-modate LoADS nor the cost of additional tac-tical warning and threat assessment systemsand command, control, and communications(C) systems to support LoADS.

The present LoADS Program schedule isfunding- and Treaty-constrained, and preciseschedule information is classified. A schedule

Table 20.—Army’s LoADS Cost Estimate,October 1980’

(constant fiscal year 1980 dollars in billions)

Research, development, testing, andengineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.75

Defense units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.20Transporters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.13Military construction . . . . . . . . . . . 0.16System engineering and program

management . . . . . . . 0,54Other investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.32

Acquisition cost . . . . . 7.10Operations cost (10 years @ 0.15) . . . . . . . . . 1.53

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.63

aFrom figures supplied by Army BMDSCOM



that assumes that the decision to remove con-straints were not made until late in the decadeprovides for final operating capability (FOC)for the LoADS addition to MPS several yearsafter MPS FOC. This schedule would not re-quire amendment of the ABM Treaty reachedat SALT I until later in the decade.

An accelerated schedule, assuming an earlydecision and release from constraints, couldprovide for LoADS deployment on about thesame schedule as MPS deployment. This wouldrequire early amendment or abrogation of theABM Treaty and funding well above that nowprojected for the LoADS Program.

Other Endo Concepts

Other endo BMD concepts besides LoADShave been proposed and investigated. Dustdefense is technical ly feasible and verycapable but could have very low public appealas welI as a few potential technical drawbacks.Terminal or low-altitude defenses based on“simple” or “novel” concepts could be ade-quate as single-shot last-ditch defenses ofhardened targets against a small attack buthave not been proposed with the demandingMX role in mind. The Army’s Site Defense rep-resents the technology of the 1970’s and is in-adequate for the MX role.

Dust Defense

Dust defense–also called environmentaldefense – provides for burying “clean” nuclearweapons in silo or MPS fields and explodingthem shortly before attacking RVS arrive. Thedust and debris lofted into the air would de-stroy approaching RVS either by direct colli-sion with large earth fragments or by dust ero-sion of the RV’S heat shield. The detonationswould be placed so as not to damage theICBMS in their silos or shelters.

There are two possible ways of employingdust defense. In the first, nuclear weaponswould be buried north of each silo or shelterand exploded seconds before RV arrival. Smallradars placed north of each site would providethe detonation signal. The RV would be de-stroyed in passage through the dense plume of

debris thrown up immediately by the explo-sion. The dust cloud which forms a little laterat higher altitudes would provide additionalprotection for a longer period of time than thedebris stem, which falls back to Earth in a shorttime.

In the second scheme, a smaller number ofweapons of higher yield would be explodedthroughout the fields several minutes beforeRv arrival, The heavy debris would thus havefallen by the time the RV arrived, but by thattime the dust cloud would have formed. Sincethe dust cloud from a high-yield weapon canbe tens of miles in width and breadth, manysiIos couId be protected by a single dust cloud.Protection would last for approximately 20minutes after which another set of weaponswould have to be detonated to provide contin-uing protection.

The weapons detonated would destroy farmore megatonnage than they const i tutedthemselves, a fact which makes the deliberatedetonation of nuclear weapons on U.S. ter-ritory somewhat more palatable from thestandpoint of fallout. But a more importantfactor in reducing fallout is the possibility,much discussed in the 1960’s at the time of thePLOWSHARE Program studies of the peacefuluse of nuclear explosions, of constructingnuclear weapons which produce very Iittleresidual radioactivity.

Conventional nuclear weapons give rise toradioactive fallout in two ways. First, a certainfraction of the weapon yield is produced byfission. The fission products are unstable iso-topes which give off harmful radiation whenthey decay into more stable species. The restof the weapon yield is provided by fusion.Large numbers of neutrons are formed in thefusion process, and when these neutrons en-couunter ordinary material in the vicinity of thedetonation, they transform it into radioactivematerial.

Clean weapons reduce both sources of fall-out. First, the clean weapon is constructed insuch a way that very Iitle of the yield is due tofission, Second, one can surround the weapon

with material, such as berated water, which ab-


sorbs the fusion neutrons readily without be-coming radioactive Such a clean bomb is notas compact as an ordinary nuclear weapon. Itmight occupy the volume of a room. For thatreason, underground vauIts wouId be dug inthe silo fields to house the clean weapons. Inthis way the radioactivity from the clean explo-sions could be reduced to about one o n e -hundredth of the radioactivity from conven-tional nuclear weapons of equal yield

Though there is some uncertainty in thecomposition of the stems and dust cloudsformed in nuclear explosions (which cannot beentirely resolved within the Test Ban Treaty),there is general agreement that dust defense isan effective way to destroy attacking RVSThere appear to be no effective measures thatthe Soviets could take to protect their RVS.Moreover, large numbers of RVS could be de-stroyed within a short space of time i n thisway, a feat that is impossible for more conven-tional endo defenses

Potential drawbacks to dust defense, be-sides its perceived unpalatability, are the needfor warning, the need to provide multiple ex-plosions if the attack occurs in waves well-spaced in time, and the fear of error

The cloud variety of dust defense requireswarning because the weapons must be deto-nated sever-a I minutes before attacking RVS ar-rive. I n principle, the stem variety does not re-quire warning beyond that provided by itsradar, but it might be considered inadvisableto keep the system activated at all times, sincea radar malfunction in peacetime might causeinadvertent detonation Since warning is notneeded until late in the flight of the attackingRVS in either case, it is easier from the tech-nical point of view to provide an adequate sys-tem of this type than one which provides warn-ing at the time of missile launch. This type ofwarning is needed by alI endo defense systems.

An attack that came in waves could requiremultiple detonations. If backup weapons wereburied to provide the capability for multipledetonations, the weapons would have to bespaced far enough apart that the first detona-tion did not destroy the remainder One U.S.

response to a muItiple-wave attack would sim-ply be to launch in retaliation rather thanawait the next wave, Offensive missiles can bemade that can launch through dust cloudswithout damage. Dust defense could thereforeextend the timeline for launch under attack byforcing the Soviets to attack in two waves. Thefirst wave would be destroyed by the dust, andthe second wave could not be launched untilthe dust cloud had dispersed. The UnitedStates would have this extra time to decide ona reponse.

Error in the form of inadvertent or unau-thorized detonation of the buried weaponscouId be avoided by the same set of proce-dures which prohibit launch of offensive mis-siles. The real possibility of error Iies in a falsewarning message causing authorized detona-tion Fear of this type of error and proceduresto avoid it could lead to another type of error:failure to authorize detonation when the warn-ing information was correct, The problemshere are similar to those of a launch underattack system.

Dust defense could therefore be by far themost potent endo defense system. However, itis seldom taken seriously because of concernfor public reaction.

Simple/Novel Systems

Simple/novel systems is a catch-all for awide var iety of low-al t i tude or last-di tchdefenses of hardened targets. Examples go bysuch names as Swarm jet, Porcupine, GatlingGuns, SID CEP, Quickshot, SSICM, Bed ofNails, and Agile, The interceptors consist ofrockets, shells, or inert projectiles with orwithout nuclear warheads and guided by land-based radars or homing sensors. Not all aresimple, though many are novel indeed. LoADSitself could be classed with these systems,since it has a similar goal.

Because low-altitude defenses cannot guar-antee muItiple intercepts over a single target inrapid succession, they are inadequate to de-fend a small number of targets against a largeSoviet threat Indeed, most simple/novel sys-tems were conceived as cheap and quickly de-


ployable ways to increase the Minuteman at-tack price and create uncertainty for Soviettargeters.

Some simple/novel systems might thereforehave capabilities similar to LoADS, thoughnone has been studied in the depth that LoADShas A simple/novel system might therefore inprinciple be capable of replacing LoADS in theMPS basing role. This could come about eitherby providing a last-ditch system simple andcheap enough to deploy in association witheach of the 4,600 MPS shelters, or compactenough to fit into a shelter deceptively I ike theLoADS Defense Unit, However, none of theconcepts yet proposed combine confidence intechnical feasibiIty with low cost or smal I sizesuch that they would be attractive replace-ments for LoADS in the MPS role.

Because of the interest in simple/novel sys-tems, two of the most promising examples arediscussed briefly below,

SWARM JET

The Swarm jet concept consists of radars de-ployed north of each defended site and alauncher located near the site and containingthousands of spin-stabilized, rocket-propelledprojectiles, When the radar detects an attack-ing RV, the launcher pivots in the direction ofthe predicted intercept point and the projec-tiles launch into the threat tube in a swarm.Each projectile weighs a few pounds and is de-signed to destroy an RV completely in a hyper-velocity COII ision seconds before arrival at thesilo Swarm jet is designed to be constructedfrom already-available or easily manufacturedcomponents.

The object of the defense is to fill the sky inthe path of the attacking RV with enough pro-jectiles to assure high probability of collision.Though there is agreement among those whohave studied Swarm jet that collision with aprojectile will indeed destroy an RV, there isdisagreement about how may projectiles areneeded to assure a high collision probability.This disagreement translates into uncertaintyin the size and cost of an effective Swarm jetdeployment. Factors that enter into the uncer-

tainties are radar performance, the pointingand aerodynamic properties of the projectiles,and the effects of blast waves from precursoror nearby nuclear detonations.

Like other low-altitude defenses, Swarm jet isessentially a single-shot system and couldtherefore claim with confidence only one RVper si lo from an attacker. The Swarm jetlauncher might be too large to fit into an MPSshelter; if this were the case, the only way todeploy it with MPS basing would be to provideone Swarm jet unit for each shelter. This wouldbe costly but might deserve consideration ifdeception proves too cliff icult for LoADS/MPS.

AGILE INTERCEPTOR

The idea of an Agile interceptor is to getbeyond the single-shot limitation of low-alti-tude systems by providing an interceptor somaneuverable that it can intercept follow-onRVS after detonation of a first despite poorradar impact-point prediction due to firebal isand despite being thrown off-course by blastwaves and winds, This program is i n the re-search stage.

The goal of the Agile interceptor is to in-tercept a few, but not many, RVS over a singlesilo. Because its goal remains modest and be-cause the technology is yet unproved, this con-cept is considered unsuitable for MX defense.

Site Defense

The Army’s Site Defense is a derivative ofthe Sprint component of the Safeguard de-fense system of a decade ago. As a high-altitude endo system, it is susceptible toblackout, penetration aids, and direct attackon its few, large radars, as described in the7-echn;ca/ Overview. Based on the technologyof the 1970’s, Site Defense is preserved as anoption in the event of a decision to field aBMD system based on known technology in ashort period of time.

Though inadequate for the role of MX de-fense, Site Defense could be appropriate forother BMD roles. For instance, it could be usedas a “threshold defense” for some importantU.S. assets such as warning sensors. In the con-


cept of threshold defense, no pretense is made tempt to destroy the defended targets wouldthat the defense can ensure survival of the de- require such a Iarge attack as to constitute afended asset; its role is rather to increase the major provocation deserving of major U.S. re-attack price to the point where a Soviet at- sponse.

EXOATMOSPH ERIC AND LAYERED DEFENSE

Technical Overview of Exo BMD

Exoatmospheric — “exe” — defense holdshigh promise in theory because the long flighttimes of RVS outside the atmosphere and thelarge battlespace mean that many RVS tar-geted at the same site can be destroyed. Incontrast to low-alt i tude systems, systems withan exo component could in theory defend asmall number of targets such as MX silosagainst a large number of Soviet RVS, Addi-tional strengths of exo BMD are the feasibilityof nonnuclear kill, the posslbility of mountingmultiple interceptors on a single boosterrocket, and the concept of adaptive preferen-tial defense

Theoretical Advantages to Exo Operation

Nonnuclear kill is possible in space for sev-eral reasons First, the defensive sensors wouldhave a relatively long time–minutes, as op-posed to seconds for an endo defense— totrack their targets, and the trajectories ofattacking RVS would be predictable becausethey would be passing through empty space. Itwould therefore be possible for the interceptorto aim close enough to the RV that the largedestructive radius of a nuclear warhead wouldnot be necessary Deployment of barriers ofmaterial in the paths of approaching RVSwouId aIso be easier in the vacuum of space.Nonnuclear k i l l is preferable to nuclearmethods because a nuclear defense’s ownwarheads couId interfere with its sensors(assuming the offense did not employ its ownnuclear precursors), nuclear warheads arerelatively expensive and heavy, and activationof a nuclear defense would require proceduresfor authorized nuclear release.

Interceptors boosted into space for exo de-fense could also carry many individual killvehicles — much as a MIRV’d missiIe carriesmany RVS — resuIting i n some savings consider-ing the cost of putting defensive vehicles intospace in the first place. Multiple warheads onthe same interceptor are impractical for usewith in the atmosphere, where the engagementtimelines are too short to make multiple de-ployments feasible.

Preferential defense is a tactic for multiply-ing the effectiveness of a defensive system if itis only required to defend a subset of the tar-gets under attack, For instance, suppose MXmissiles were deployed amongst the six Min-uteman wings and that survival of the missilesin two of these wings against a Soviet attackwas considered a sufficient goal for the de-fense. The defense could then concentrate itsexo interceptors upon destroying RVS targetedat the two defended wings and abandon theother four wings to the attacker. Which twowings were chosen for heavy defense could bekept secret from the Soviets or decided by thedefense at the last minute, In their targetingplanning, the Soviets would be unable to con-centrate their RVS on the defended wings: theywould either have to do their targeting asthough all the wings were heavily defended orgrant the defense its goal of two survivingwings. Adaptive preferential defense thereforeeffectively multiplies the number of defensiveinterceptors, In this example the Soviets wouldbehave as though all six wings were defendedas heavily as the two singled out by the UnitedStates. Adaptive preferential defense is not aneffective tactic for endo systems because endointerceptors must be located near to the tar-gets they are defending. The presence of the


defense near the defended sites therefore givesthe game away.

Infrared Sensing

An exo system that used large ground-basedradars to acquire targets outside of the at-mosphere could be blinded by direct attack orhigh-altitude blackout, and the view of ground-based optical sensors, which would be inade-quate in any event, could be obscured byclouds and dust. It is therefore desirable to putthe defensive sensors into space, either on theinterceptors themselves or on other space vehi-cles. Space-based radars would be heavy,costly, and susceptible to jamming. For thesereasons, many exo concepts employ space-borne passive infrared sensors, which are rela-tively light and compact, However, infraredsensors are susceptible to offensive counter-measures such as decoys and other penetra-tion aids.

Layered Defense

Like endo systems, exo defense alone wouldbe indequate to defend a small number of tar-gets against a large number of attacking RVS.In this case, the reason is not saturation of thedefense, but the cumulative effect of leakage.It only takes one leaker to destroy a silo. Ifmany RVS were aimed at each silo, the oddsthat one would get through could be high evenif the probability that each individual RV wasintercepted were high. The defense could at-tempt to stanch this hemorrhage of leakers byattempting to intercept each RV more thanonce (assuming that the multiple interceptorvehicles targeted at the same RV would not in-terfere with one another). This tactic could beeffective but would drive the defense to enor-mous arsenals of interceptors.

If an endo defense were associated witheach silo, the combined exo/endo LayeredDefense would be more effective. The endosystem could catch leakers from the exo sys-tem and, moreover, the exo system would im-prove the performance of the endo systemsince it would break up the concentrated,

structured attack patterns which saturate endosystems. Thus, exo (Overlay) and endo (Under-lay) defenses in a Layered combination have asynergistic effect wherein the principal I imita-tion of each is alleviated by the presence ofthe other. An endo defense could also help toprotect the launch sites for the Overlay inter-ceptors from a disabling precursor attack. Itwould also be difficult for an attacker to de-signl decoys to confuse both the Overlay sen-sors and the Underlay sensors. However, sincedecoys are ineffective against low-altituderadar sensing anyway, an attacker would prob-ably concentrate his penetration aids againstthe Overlay and not try to fool both layers.Last, the tactic of adaptive preferential de-fense for the Overlay loses some of its attrac-tiveness when there is an Underlay because theUnderlay cannot adapt: it can only defend thearea (or individual silo) near which it is de-ployed. If the defense concentrates its Overlayresources on a subset of the silos and aban-dons the others to the attacker, then it leavesthe endo defenses associated with the aban-doned silos open to easy saturation and pene-tration. These endo resources—all bought andpaid for— are wasted, whereas the whole pur-pose of adaptive preferential defense was tomake optimum use of defensive resources.

The Importance of overlay Ieakage

In contrast to low-altitude systems, whichcan accept relatively high leakage and still doa single-shot job, high performance is requiredof the Overlay component of a Layered De-fense. Thus one must take seriously the manysources of leakage which can be present in thecomplex process of exo interception and alsothe possibility of having to face attacks involv-ing decoys and other penetration aids, In prac-tice, poor Overlay performance drives the de-fense to large inventories of interceptors inorder to maintain a given level of silo survival.The effect of this sensitivity to Overlay Ieak-age is best illustrated in the context of specificcalculations, Such calculations are presentedin the next section,

Ch. 3—Ballistic Missile Defense . 131

The Overlay and Layered Defenseof Silo-Based MX

Overlay Description

The Army’s concept of the exo componentof a Layered Defense — called simply the Over-lay– is in the technology exploration stage. Nodetailed system design is available as exists forLoADS.

In outline (see fig, 62), the concept consistsof interceptors roughly the size of offensivemissiles equipped with infrared sensors andcarrying several kil l vehicles (KVS), alsoequipped with infrared sensors. The multipleKVS would be mounted on the upper stage ofthe interceptor. The interceptors, of whichthere might be several hundred, would bebased in silos in the Central United States inthe same manner as offensive missiIes.

When attacking Soviet RVS were about two-thirds of the way through their flight to U.S.targets — about 10 minutes before impact — theinterceptors would launch into space, Whenan interceptor reached space, its infrared sen-sor would scan its field of view and attempt todiscriminate approaching RVS from tank andbus fragments and from decoys or other pene-tration aids. The infrared sensors would detectthese objects as warm spots —warm since theywere launched from the Earth — against thecold background of space.

Each KV would be assigned a target deter-mined to be a true RV and dispatched to in-tercept it. Using its own rocket power and in-frared sensor, the KV would home in on the ob-ject and destroy it either by colliding with itdirectly or by deploying a barrier of material inits path, Since the closing velocity of RV and

Figure 62.—Overlay/Underlay LayeredDefense System

Warning sensor

Reentry vehicles,

Underlay/

/

Intticeptor/ ~“ “ ; ” A P

interceptor z z . “ 9#/- / 1 1 f -i 3 /

\ / - c

Interceptor 1silofieids 8attie

manager



KV would be about 25,000 miles per hour, asmall fragment of material from the KV couldcompletely destroy the RV. Even a glancingblow could damage the RV’S heat shield,mean ing that it would either burn up or be car-ried off-course as it reentered the atmosphere.

System studies of the Overlay concept haveshown that performance would be improveddramatically by providing an additional sensorwhich would make an early assessment of thesize and nature of the attack, allowing in-terceptors to be assigned more efficiently toregions of space. One idea for such a forwardacquisition system (FAS) would be rocket-Iaunched infrared sensing probes lofted intospace as soon as warning sensors indicatedSoviet launches. The probes would arrive onstation within a few minutes and remain therefor a short time before falling back to Earth.During this time, they would relay informationon the trajectories of attacking RVS back tothe interceptor silo fields. Since at any onetime in the attack a number of probes wouldbe required to cover all the attack corridorsand their time on station would be limited, alonger lived FAS system might be required aswell. This might consist of infrared sensorsmounted on high-flying aircraft maintained oncontinuous alert and capable of several hoursof time on station. Alternatively, satellitescould perform an FAS function. However,neither of these longer liived FAS systemswould be as capable as the probe.

The data acquired by the FAS would be inte-grated and interceptors assigned by a CentralBattle Manager or by Wing Battle Managersassociated with each set of defended silos. Thebattle managers would decide on a defensestrategy and make interceptor assignments ac-cordingly.

The battle managers and their data linkswouId have to be immune to disruption by pre-cursor SLBM attack.

Last, an exo defensive system would requireearly, secure, and reliable warning of Soviet at-tack. Systems to provide this warning must beconsidered part of the Overlay architecture.

Risks to Overlay Effectiveness

The interceptors and kill vehicles, intercep-tor silos, FAS (probes, aircraft, or satellites),battIe managers, and communications systemsdescribed above wouId comprise an extremelycomplex defensive system. The system ar-chitecture remains to be worked out in detail,a n d m a n y technoIog y issues are yet u n re-solved, 1 n the absence of a detailed systemdesign, it is not possible to analyze in quan-t i tat ive detai l the effect iveness and vul-nerabilities of a Layered Defense system basedon the Overlay in the way that such analysis ispossible for LoADS. Analysis of the Overlay inthe context of MX basing must instead rely ona qualitative estimation of technical risk andthe sensitivity of Overlay performance to fac-tors which are yet unknown.

As in the discussion of LoADS effectiveness,this section begins by asking how well theOverlay must perform in order to guaranteeacceptable protection for silo-based MX mis-siles. Unlike a LoADS deployment with a sin-gle-shot goal, the effectiveness of a LayeredDefense based on the Overlay is very sensitiveto the details of system performance. Onemust therefore take seriously the uncertaintiesin overlay performance which exist at present.These uncertainties concern both the fun-damental technologies in the Overlay conceptand potential vulnerabilities in the workingsystem as a whole. For the moment, facing therelative immaturity of the Overlay conceptand a near-term decision regarding MX basing,it would be quite risky to rely on Layered De-fense as the basis for ensuring MX surviv-able it y.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LEAKAGE

“The ability of a Layered Defense to protectsilo-based MX missiIes against a massive Sovietattack depends sensitively on the performanceof the Overlay component. For LoADS/MPS,by contrast, the defense would achieve a sin-gle-shot goal even if interception failed almostas often as it succeeded.

The effectiveness of a Layered Defense is amatter of probabilities, and the confidence of


attacker and defender to acheive their goalscould depend not only upon the odds them-selves but upon how willing either side wouldbe to “play the odds” in a nuclear war, Thediscussion which follows is intended t. beiIIustrative only: the precise numbers com-puted depend upon the assumptions and amyriad of details, but the overall trends, in-d ica t ing the sensitivity to Overlay perform-ance, do not. The assumptions made here tendto be rather favorable to the defense.

An illustrative silo basing arrangement forMX might consist of 200 MX missiles deployedin Minuteman I I I silos, The total U.S. ICBMforce would then consist of 450 Minuteman I Is(one RV each), 350 Minuteman I I Is (three RVSeach), and 200 MX (10 RVS each, say), for atotal of 3,500 RVS in 1,000 silos. In what fol-lows it is convenient to take each silo to be atarget of equal value, as though all missileswere identical and carried between three andfour RVS. In actual fact, of course, the Sovietswould be Iikely to target, and the United Statesto defend, MXS more heavily than MinutemanIIIs and Minuteman 11 Is more heavily thanMinuteman I IS

Assume further that the Soviets deploy n o

penetration aids or alternatively that discrim-nation is pertect. This assumpt i on concedesquite a bit to the defense, as the section onDecoys and Other Penetration Aids shows.

There is a certain probability that the Over-lay will succeed in destroying an RV if it de-tects, tracks, and assigns a KV to it. Call thisprobability the “efficiency” of the Overlay;the leakage is one minus the efficiency. (It willbe necessary to assume that the probabilitiesthat individual intercepts succeed are statis-tically independent; this would not be true if,e.g , the KVS concerned originated on the sameinterceptor, ) A quite respectable value for theefficiency in the absence of Soviet penetrationaids would be 0.85 (85 percent); this valuewould assume achievement of al I of the Over-lay “specifications “ A more modest valuewould be 70 percent, and so percent would bedisappointing indeed. The point of this anal-ysis is to show how strongly the number of U.S.

RVS surviving Soviet attack depends on Over-lay efficiency.

The Underlay must also be specified. Heremany choices are possible, ranging from ahigh-altitude Site Defense to simple single-shot“terminal” defenses. Assume that associatedwith each silo is a low-a It itude defense with thecapability to make a single intercept 70 per-cent of the time, a second intercept 50 percentof the time, and no capabiIity to make three ormore intercepts above the same silo. This con-stitutes a rather large and costly deploymentand assumes effectiveness typical of low-altitude systems. A second endo intercept isallowed on the assumption that the secondleaker could follow the first with a time delay.

For the Soviet arsenal, targeted against bothMX and Minuteman, a range from 5,000 to12,000 (reliable arriving) RVS could be con-sidered; calculations wilI be done for a repre-sentative value of 8,000, Each arriving RV isassumed to have a single-shot kilI probabilityof one.

If the Soviets had 8,000 RVS and no reasonto target particular silos preferentially, theycould direct 8 RVS at each silo, timed to arrive(if they penetrate the defense) within a shorttime of one another. If the Overlay has an effi-ciency of 85 percent, then the probability thatall eight RVS aimed at a defended silo aredestroyed by the Overlay is 0.85 to the eighthpower or 0.27 (27 percent). The probability thatone RV penetrates is the probability that sevenRVS are intercepted (0.85 to the seventh power)times the probability that one penetrates (0,1 5)times the number of RVS (8) which have achance to penetrate, for a total probability of0.38 (38 percent). (The apparently paradoxicalresuIt that one RV penetrates more often thannone refIects the fact that zero penetrationcan only occur one way, whereas single pene-tration can occur eight different ways, ) Theprobability that two RVS penetrate is 24 per-cent.

Thus, 27 percent of the time the silo is safebecause all RVS are destroyed in space. Onegets through 38 percent of the time, but the


endo Underlay destroys this RV 70 percent ofthe time. Two RVS get through 24 percent ofthe time, but the first of these is destroyed T O

percent of the time and the second 50 percentof the time. Thus the overall probability thatthe silo survives is (0.27) + (0.7) (0.38) + (0.24)(0.7)(0.5) = 0.62, or 62 percent.

How many silos would actually be defendedat all depends on the number of interceptorsthe United States deployed. For instance, if theUnited States deployed 400 interceptors with10 KVS each, 500 silos could be defendedagainst the 8,000-RV Soviet attack. Since 62percent of the defended silos would survive, atotal of 310 silos or 1,085 RVS would survivethe attack. The Soviets would have expended8,000 RVS to claim 2,415 U.S. RVS, and over4,000 Soviet RVS would have arrived on theUnited States.

Suppose now that the Overlay efficiencywere not 85 percent, but only 65 percent. Theprobabilities of none, one, or two RVS pen-etrating to the Underlay are then 3, 14, and 26percent, respectively if the defense persists indirecting one KV at each RV. The result thattwo RVS can penetrate more often than onereflects the fact that there are more pairs o fRVS (28) than individual RVS (8). The higherprobabilities for multiple leakers means thatthe endo defense has a harder job. In this case,only 22 percent of defended U.S. silos survive.If 4,000 KVS were used to defend 500 silos, thetotal U.S. survivors would be 110 silos or 385RVS.

But this would not in fact be the best U.S.defense strategy if the Overlay efficiency werelow. A better result would be obtained by de-fending half as many silos with twice as manyKVS per silo, i.e., defending 250 silos anddirecting two KVS against each Soviet RV. Thisstrategy would result in 70 percent survival ofthe 250 defended silos, for a total of 175 silosor 613 RVS surviving. The Soviets would againhave paid 8,000 RVS, and over 6,000 RVS wouldhave arrived on the United States. The Under-lay defense at the 750 undefended silos wouldhave been saturated.

In this example, a 20 percent degradation inOverlay efficiency (from 85 percent to 65 per-cent) results in the number of U.S. survivorsbeing reduced by almost one-half. This effectdemonstrates that the effectiveness of LayeredDefense to protect silo-based missiles dependssensitively on the Overlay efficiency.

Figures 63 and 64 further demonstrate theimportance of Overlay efficiency. Figure 63shows that the number of U.S. survivors de-creases dramaticaIIy as the Overlay efficiencydegrades. Figure 64 shows that the size of thedefensive arsenal needed to assure survival of1,000 RVS (286 silos) quickly gets out of hand ifthe Overlay efficiency begins to slip. For afixed number of U.S. silos the sensitivity toOverlay performance is more pronounced thelarger the Soviet threat. For a fixed threat, thesensitivity is less pronounced the larger thenumber of U.S. aim points.

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES

Because of the sensitivity to performancedescribed above, one must take seriously theuncertainties which exist at this stage of the

Figure 63.—Sensitivity of Layered DefensePerformance to Overlay Leakage

(Soviet attack consists of 8,000 reentry vehicles)(U.S. deploys 400 overlay interceptors)

900-800

7 0 0 “

6 0 0 –

5 0 0 -

4 0 0 —

3 0 0 -

200 –

100 —

o I 1 I I 1O 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Overlay efficiency

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment

Ch. 3—Ballistlc Missile Defense ● 135

Figure 64.— U.S. Defensive Arsenal Needed toAssure 1,000 Surviving U.S. Reentry Vehicles

(Soviet attack consists of 8,000 reentry vehicles)

10,000“

9,000 - 900 —u8 , 0 0 0 - 8 0 0 —

7,000 - 700 —

6,000 - 6 0 0 —al

5,000 “ 5 0 0 —

4,000 - 4 0 0 —

3,000 “ 3 0 0 —o 2,000 - 2 0 0 —

1,000 “ = 100 —

o - 0O 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Overlay efficiency


Overlay’s development. Many aspects of theOverlay interception function require the fron-tier technologies of infrared sensor design,compact computer design, rapid computerthroughput, software architecture, small hom-ing and KV technology, and so on. The systemrequirements are demanding, and at al I stagesof the interception process advances must bemade to meet them. Furthermore the stagesare interlinked in such a way that failure at onestage could cause failures at others and de-grade overalI system performance signif-icantly, There is no reason to believe that,given time and money, the uncertainties inOverlay technology could not be reduced to apoint where a clearer estimation of the valueof an Overlay system for the protection of silo-based missiles could be made Nor is there anyparticular reason —with one exception, dis-cussed in the section Decoys and Othe rPenetration Aids – to believe that fundamentaltechnical problems will be encountered whichby themselves would constitute “Achilles’heels” for an Overlay defense. Indeed, there issome reason for optimism, since the neededtechnology elements fall into categories—compact data processing, infrared sensing,miniature guidance systems, homing, etc. — inwhich rapid progress is occurring now and

more is expected in the future. Rather, the risklies in the cumulative effects of shortcomingsin the performance of technology elements atmany stages of the interception process. Inmany cases the capabilities of today’s tech-nology falls short of the requirements of theOverlay by wide margins. Though progress canand should be expected, even small shortcom-ings couId uItimately prove significant, sincepoor performance in one area can inducefailure elsewhere, and the cumulative effectcould be to reduce total system performancebelow the high standard required for MX de-fense. Technology forecasting is always risky,and in the case of the Overlay one is simplyfaced today wi th an unknown quant i ty.Though the level of confidence in Overlaytechnology may in time increase to the pointwhere it could support a decision regardingMX basing, at the moment it appears quiterisky to depend on successful resolution of alloutstanding issues. The following discussionseeks to highlight unresolved technologyissues and convey a sense of the complexity ofexo defense.

The interception process begins when theprobes or other FAS vehicles survey the attack-ing “threat complexes, ” the clusters of RVS,bus and tank fragments, and possibly decoysor other penetration aids, which are boostedinto space by Soviet offensive missi les. I n alarge Sov iet a t tack there would be tens o fthousands o f such objects in the sky. Eachprobe sensor should have as wide a f ield ofv iew as poss ib le so that a smal l number o fthem can survey the whole sky. But a widefield of view means either a large sensor, whichis hard to protect from interfering backgroundfrom the Sun, Earth, atmosphere, and other ef-fects; or a slow scanning rate, which makes itdifficuIt for the sensor to correlate what it seeson one scan with what it saw on previousscans, essential for discriminating RVS fromother objects and for compiling accurate tra-jectory information. Unlike radars, infraredsensors cannot determine the ranges of distantobjects but only their angular positions in thesky. Range must be inferred from changes inthe angular positions of objects with time.Angular position must therefore be measured


very accurately, requiring precise orientationof the sensors in space. The threat complexesmight also be rather dense: a single spot in thesky could later resolve itself into several ob-jects. The probes must resolve all objects andobserve them long enough to attempt to dis-criminate RVS from nonlethal objects andcompute accurate trajectories. If all this isdone poorly or too late, too many interceptorswill be allocated to some regions of space andnot enough to others.

The probes must then “handover” their filesof objects to the interceptors, telling the in-terceptor sensors where to find each objectand what it looks like. The interceptors mustreacquire each object in their respective sec-tors, attempt discrimination again, and deter-mine how best to release their KVS. Again,poor performance at this stage degrades per-formance at the next,

Last, the interceptor sensors must hand overtargets to individual KVS. The KVS must thenmaneuver in such a way that they come withinlethal range of an RV approaching at 25,000mph The KVS must also be able to distinguishthe true RV from objects placed nearby. If thefirst intercept failed, a second wave of in-terceptors wouId have a very short time to per-form all the required functions. It is not clearin any event that it would be possible to tellwhich intercepts had failed on the first at-tempt.

The infrared sensors are the most delicateelement of the Overlay system. Infrared sen-sors can be disrupted by heat, nuclear radia-tion, and rocket exhaust gases. They wouldhave to be mounted on very sensitive gimbalsystems with accurate inertial guidance, ln-frared sensors measure the temperature char-acteristics of approaching objects. These char-acteristics depend sensitively upon the posi-tion of the object relative to the Sun and Earthand on the time of day, season, and weatherconditions on the Earth below. All of this datawould have to be made available to the sen-sors before they could interpret what they saw.Infrared sensors of great sensitivity are alsorather temperamental in that each behaves dif -

ferently and must be calibrated separately,and a given i I I urn i nation of the same sensorcan sometimes result in different output volt-ages. These latter factors introduce some fun-damental limitations in temperature resolu-tion, an important factor in discrimination.

SYSTEM ISSUES

In addition to the risk introduced by the hightechnology required, the Overlay as a systemcould have vulnerabilities much Iike thevulnerabilities of other basing modes. For in-stance, the Overlay would depend on tacticalwarning, since the system must begin to func-tion early in the flight of Soviet ICBMS. TheOverlay could thus share some of the potentialvulnerabilities of other basing systems whichdepend on warning such as launch underattack and air mobiIe MX. The battle manage-ment function requires survival of the com-mand centers and of secure, high-data-ratecommunications among the FAS, battle man-agers, and interceptor silo fields. The concernshere are similar to those regarding wartime sur-vival of our national military C systems. Also,as with LoADS, attention must be given to of-fensive tactics designed to confuse or bypassthe defense.

Limitations of the Overlay defense againstsubmarine-launched balIistic missiles (SLBMS),which couId attack the Overlay’s own com-ponents, are discussed in the Classified Annex.Leakers from a precursor ICBM attack mightalso threaten critical system elements.

In the absence of a specific system design, itis again not possible to estimate vuInerabilitiesprecisely. The interceptor silos and especiallythe probe silos would be few in number. Pres-ent Soviet SLBMS have limited silo-kill ingcapability, and they are not normally deployedin large numbers near U.S. shores. Still, theOverlay defense assets would be high-valuetargets for an SLBM precursor attack, and de-pending on their hardness they could be vul-nerable. Some thought has been given to pro-viding an endo defense for the Overlay mis-siles themselves. Softer targets such aspossible ground-based battle management


bunkers and their communications links couldbe vulnerable to less accurate SLBMS.

If strip-alert aircraft were used to supple-ment the probes or to serve as battle manage-ment centers, they would have the same vul-nerabilities as the bomber force and AirMobile MX. One must also consider an antisat-elIite threat if satellites were used to aid anFAS,

Care must also be taken to provide for sur-vival of the high-data-rate communicationslinking FAS, battle managers, and interceptorfields, The generic technical problems of pro-viding survivabiIity for communications aresimilar to the case of launch under attack andto the C systems of other basing modes.

A complex defensive system like the Over-lay must also reckon with offensive counter-measures. The most important of these is theuse of penetration aids, discussed in the nextsection. Other tactics are discussed i n the Clas-sified Annex,

Detailed study of vulnerabilities at the totalsystem level must wait until the Overlay con-cept is translated into a working design. Ex-perience with the national military C’ systemand studies of launch under attack, air mobileMX, LoADS/MPS, and other basing systemsgive an idea of the scope of problems whichcan be encountered when a complex MXbasing system faces a future Soviet threat. Forthe moment, the uncertainties in whether arobust wartime system can be fashioned fromthe Overlay concept are another source of riskto a decision to make Layered Defense thebasis for MX survivability.

Decoys and Other Penetration Aids

The Overlay concept is based on the prac-ticality of infrared sensing in space. However,infrared sensing is potentially critically vul-nerable to offensive countermeasures in theform of decoys and other penetration aids.Unlike the LoADS radar operating at low alti-tudes, which could measure the weight of ap-proaching objects, the Overlay infrared sen-sors would measure their temperature charac-teristics. Decoys able to fool the LoADS radar

83-477 0- - 8 1 - 1 0

must be heavy, and adding heavy decoys to anoffensive missile requires removing RVS, sincethe missile has Iimited throwweight. Measuringweight is therefore a strategically significantmethod of discriminating true RVS from de-coys, since the offense would presumably notchoose to offload RVS and replace them withequalIy heavy decoys. On the contrary, there isno impediment in principle to deploying ligh-weight decoys which have temperature char-acteristics indistinguishable from those of trueRVS. Temperature, which is fundamental tothe Overlay sensing method, is not a stra-tegically significant discriminant. The offensemight therefore be able to deploy a Iarge num-ber of excellent lightweight decoys on itsoffensive missiles without having to offloadmany RVS. This would call into question theeffectiveness of an exoatmospheric defense ofMX.

This section will indicate some of the ele-mentary physical principles that permit the de-sign of Iightweight penetration aids. It wilI alsoindicate the practical difficulties which the of-fense would face in mounting decoyed attacksas welI as those the defense wouId face incountering them. A more complete discussionis relegated to the Classified Annex.

To get a feeling for the importance of dis-crimination, consider the case if the offenseprovided along with each RV a sing/e perfectdecoy. A KV approaching the two objectswould then intercept the true RV 50 percent ofthe time. If the efficiency of the defense, asdefined in the last section, were 85 percent inthe absence of decoys, and if one KV were dis-patched against each RV/decoy pair, then thetrue RV would be intercepted only (0.85) (0.5)= 43 percent of the time. This low efficiency

(high leakage) would be catastrophic to thedefense, as figures 63 and 64 in the previoussection show. If on the other hand the defensedirected a KV at both the RV and the decoy,then the same number of U.S. silos would sur-vive as in the no-decoy case, but an arsenal ofdefensive missiles twice as numerous would berequired to produce this resuIt

In practice, no decoy is perfect, and on theother hand the offense could deploy many


more than one decoy with each RV. In practicealso, a tradeoff is made between leakage (in-tercepting the object judged most likely to bean RV and allowing an RV to penetrate if theguess is wrong) and wastage (interceptingeverything). In the case of the Overlay, theneed to keep leakage low means that the bestsolution for the defense is usually to accepthigh wastage. Thus, an offensive decoy deploy-ment would tend to drive the defense to largernumbers of defensive interceptors — in the ex-ample above, applied to the model in the lastsection, twice as many, or almost as many de-fensive missiles as offensive missiles.

INFRARED SENSING AND TEMPERATURE

A metal bar heated to very high tempera-tures glows white-hot. If its temperature islowered somewhat, it glows red-hot. if cooledfurther—to room temperature— it no longerglows in the visible part of the spectrum but atlonger wavelengths, in the infrared part of thespectrum. A room-temperature object thus“glows infrared” and can be “seen” by a detec-tor sensitive to infrared light.

An RV launched into space from the approx-imately room temperature condition of its siloforms a glowing spot against the dark (i.e.,cold) background of space. Infrared sensorscan measure both the color (i. e., the preciseshade of infrared light) and the brightness ofthe RV and of any other objects, such as de-coys, which accompany it. The color of the ob-ject reveals its temperature and its brightnessreveals its size and the type of material it ismade of. Decoy/RV combinations that appearto the infrared sensors to have identical colorand brightness cannot be discriminated.

In addition to the warmth it brings with itfrom the Earth, the object absorbs energy fromthe Sun above and the Earth below and losesenergy to cold space. Its color could thereforechange as it were warmed or cooled. In addi-tion to emitting light because of its tem-perature, the object also reflects infraredradiation from the Earth. An infrared sensortherefore senses the combination or sum of theemitted and refIected energy from the object.

T here is a relationship between the tendencyof a body to emit thermal radiation because ofits temperature and its tendency to reflectradiation which shines on it. For a body of agiven size (more precisely, surface area) at agiven temperature, the sum of its effectivenessin emitting radiation of a given wavelengthand in reflecting it is the same no matter whatthe body is made of. Therefore, the less in-frared radiation a body in space emits, themore it reflects from the warm Earth and viceversa. The relative emittance and refIectancedoes depend on the nature of the body, butonly on what the surface of the body is madeof and not what is inside it.

Using only these elementary principles ofphysics, it is a straightforward matter to designRV/ light-decoy pairs which appear identical toinfrared sensors. A wide variety of other ex-amples of penetration aids based on simplethermal properties of materials can also bedesigned. These are discussed at some lengthin the Classified Annex.

MEASURE AND COUNTERMEASURE

In practice, the situation is more complexthan simple physical principles alone would in-dicate, with many constraints and opportu-nities both for the offense and the defense.Despite these complexities, the fact remainsthat there is no principle and no detector thatcouId guarantee perfect Overlay discrimina-tion. The burden would thus rest with the de-fense to maintain i ts conf idence that i tsmethods of discrimination were adequate tomeet a decoy threat.

l-o begin with, there would be practical con-straints on the offense. Foremost among theseis the fact that the best results would be ob-tained by altering the RV to make it easier fora Iight decoy to match. Though these changesare minor, inexpensive, and need not affect RVperformance in the least, there could be somepsychological reluctance to tamper with thelethal RV for the sake of a nonlethal decoy. Itis also one thing to design the perfect decoyancl quite another to package it, mount it onan ICBM, and deploy it in space so that its

Ch, 3—Balllstic Missile Defense ● 139

deployment process and in-flight motions (as-suming these could be observed by the defensein an attack) resemble those of a true RV.

Constraints on the defense include the factthat infrared sensors are not perfect (i. e.,cannot determine brightness and temperatureprecisely, especially in the presence of back-ground) and they would not have a very longtime to observe objects in an engagement. Thetemperature characteristics of objects in spacefurthermore depend on the position of the Sunand Earth relative to the sensor and the time ofday and weather conditions on the Earth be-low. Overall, the interception process is dif-ficult enough even in the absence of decoys, asdiscussed in the last section.

Since there is no fundamental principle onwhich infrared sensors can rely to guaranteediscrimination, there could be value in someadvance knowledge of the type of penetrationaids the offense deployed. It is possible (likelyis too strong a word) that by observing flighttests, the defense could Iearn enough aboutthe offense’s penetration aids to devise a dis-

crimination scheme based on some distinctivefeature or detail of the offense’s design ordeployment procedure. However, since thereappears to be a wide variety of effective pene-tration aids which the offense could use, thisapproach based upon particulars rather thanprinciples could succeed for one penetrationaid but faiI for another.

Details and further discussion of penetra-tion aids, constraints, and tactics can be foundin the Classified Annex.

Overlay discrimination is a difficult prob-lem, the practical details of which are not un-derstood, though the principles are. Testing ofpenetration aids designed expressly and ex-clusively for the purpose of Overlay penetra-tion is required before it can be known wheth-er the perfect decoy of principle can be real-ized in practice and whether less-than-perfectdecoys still make defense based on infraredsensing too difficult and costly to undertake.For the moment, the very fact that effectivedecoys are possible counsels caution.

HISTORY OF BMD AND THE ABM TREATY

The development of ABM systems by theUnited States in the early 1950’s followed thedecision to begin development of ICBMS.During the mid-1 960’s, the johnson administra-tion proposed the deployment of the so-calledSentinel ABM system to provide both area andpoint defense against a limited nuclear attack.This proposed ABM system was reviewed in1969 by the Nixon administration which optedinstead for an ABM system to defend Minute-man siIos. Deployment of the Nixon adminis-tration’s Safeguard ABM system was begun inthe early 1970’s but was brought to a haltfollowing negotiation and ratification of theABM Limitation Treaty of 1972. The Treatywas subsequently amended by the Protocol of1974.

With the development of ballistic missiledefense, doubts about the long-term viabilityof international security based on a “balance

of terror” began to mount WhiIe alternativesto maintaining a balance of terror were ex-plored through a variety of formal and in-formal channels, by the mid-1960’s it seemedto many senior U.S. policy makers that somesort of arms Iimitation on balIistic missiledefenses would be preferable to either an ABMarms race or a major revision in the post-WorldWar I I “balance of terror”.

For example, Defense Secretary Robert S.McNamara noted:

Should they elect to do so, we have both theIeadtime and technology available to so in-crease both the quality and quantity of our of-fensive strategic forces –with particular atten-tion to highly reliable penetration aids—thattheir expensive defensive efforts wilI givethem no edge in the nuclear balance whatever.

But we would prefer not to have to do that.For it is a profit less waste of resources, pro-


vialed we and the Soviet can come to areal istic strategic arms-limitation agreement.

Even though Secretary McNamara had seri-ous reservations about ABM systems in gen-eral, he nevertheless proposed to deploy anABM system to defend the United Statesagainst some nuclear attacks. The SentinelABM system proposed by the johnson admin-istration included a long-range, high-altitudeexoatmospheric interceptor missile, the Spar-tan, guided to targets by a very large radar anda smaller, shorter range interceptor missile,called Sprint, also guided to its targets byradar. Both missiles were armed with nuclearwarheads which destroyed incoming reentryvehicles. The original johnson administrationproposal envisioned deployment of the Sen-tinel ABM System at some 14 sites includingICBM silo fields in Montana and North Dakotaas well as several major cities.

The Nixon administration reviewed the pro-posed Sentinel ABM system in light of bothU.S. strategic requirements and the intensepolitical opposition that arose over the poten-tial deployment of nuclear weapons adjacentto American cities and concluded that the useof Sentinel radar and interceptor componentsto defend U.S. Minuteman fields would be anappropriate and strategicalIy significant re-sponse to the Soviet deployment of an ABMsystem around Moscow. On March 14, 1969,President Nixon announced his plan to deployan ABM system to defend ICBM silos in Mon-tana and North Dakota:

This measured deployment is designed tofulfilI three objectives:

1. Protection of our land-based retaliatoryforces against a direct attack by theSoviet Union

2. Defense of the American people againstthe kind of nuclear attack which Com-munist China is likely to be able to mountwithin the decade,

Ch. 3—Balistic Missile Defense ● 141

In general, the ABM Limitation Treaty of1972, as amended by a Protocol negotiated in1974, prohibits ABM systems based on thetechnology deployed by the United States andthe Soviet Union in the late 1960’s and early1970’s, The Treaty as amended does permiteach side to deploy one ABM system for de-fense of either its national capital or an ICBMsilo field. The Treaty also permits continuedresearch and development on allowed ABMsystems, bans other types of ABM develop-ment, test, and deployment, and provides forfurther negotiations on specific limitations ofnew ABM systems based on technologies notdeployed in the 1970’s

Article I of the Treaty) prohibits ABM sys-tem deployments other than those specificallypermitted by subsequent articles of the Treaty.Article I I defines ABM system components. Ar-ticle I I 1, paragraph (b), permits the UnitedStates to deploy one ABM system with the fol-lowing characteristics:

● not more than two Iarge phased-array ABMradars,

● not more than 18 smalI phased-array ABMradars,

● not more than 100 ABM interceptor Iaunch-ers and not more than 100 ABM interceptormisslIes i n a deployment area having aradius of less than 150 kilometers centeredon the middle of an ICBM silo field.

Article IV of the ABM Limitation Treaty per-m its development and testing of ABM com-ponents at designated test ranges withoutcounting such components in the quantitativelimits established in article I I 1,

Article V of the Treaty bans the develop-ment, test, or deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, or land-mobile ABM sys-tems or components. Article V also bans thedevelopment, test, or deployment of ABMinterceptor launchers which contain more thanone interceptor or which are capable of auto-matic or semiautomatic interceptor reload.

Other official statements incorporated intothe legal restrictions of the ABM LimitationTreaty also affect future ABM system develop-ment, test, and deployment. Agreed statement(D) contains the following provision:

In order to insure fulf i l lment of the obliga-tion not to deploy ABM systems and theircomponents except as provided in Article I I Iof the Treaty, the Parties agree that in theevent ABM systems based on other physicalprinciples and including components capableof substituting for ABM interceptor missiles,ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created inthe future, specific limitations on suchsystems and their components would be sub-ject to discussion in accordance with ArticleXl I I and agreement in accordance with ArticleXIV of the Treaty. ’

Agreed statement (E) prohibits deployment ofABM interceptor missiles with more than oneindependently guided warhead.

The ABM Limitation Treaty Protocol nego-tiated in 1974 and ratified in 1976 furtheramended the ABM Limitation Treaty in the fol-lowing respects. Article III of the Treatyoriginal Iy permitted both the United Statesand the Soviet Union to deploy two ABM sys-tems in two deployment areas. One permittedsystem could defend an ICBM silo field;another could defend the national capital. Ar-ticle I of the 1974 Protocol limits each side toonly one ABM system deployment.

Article I I of the Protocol permits each sideto shift deployment of its permitted ABM sys-tem once. In the case of the United States, theprotocol would permit the dismantling anddestruction of the ICBM silo ABM defense sys-tem at Grand Forks and the relocation of theABM system to the Washington, D.C. area.

Application of ABM Treaty Provisionsto MX Defense

ABM systems deployed to defend MX arelimited by the ABM l-imitation Treaty of 1972(as amended by the 1974 Protocol) in two dis-tinct ways. First there are limitations on thedeployment of ABM systems. Second, there

‘I bid, p 143


are limitations on the development of newABM systems.

ABM deployments are limited by the ABMTreaty as amended in the following respects:

1

2

3.

4

5.

6,

7.

any U.S. ABM system may only be de-ployed in a c irc le of 150-km radiuscentered on the Grand Forks, N. Dak.,ICBM field;LoADS defense units could not be de-ployed if any system component were ex-plicitly not of a fixed type;since each LoADS unit would contain onesmall radar, no more than 18 LoADS DUScould be deployed under terms of theradar limitations of the ABM Treaty;the total number of LoADS or OverlayABM interceptor launchers and ABMinterceptor missiIes couId not exceed 100;LoADS defense units could not be de-ployed if each unit contained more thanone ABM interceptor launcher. Alterna-tively, even if each LoADS defense unitcontained only one interceptor launcher,it would stilI possess in principle auto-matic, semiautomatic, or rapid reloadcapability, barred by the Treaty;since each Overlay KV is an independ-ently guided warhead within the meaningof the Treaty, deployment of more thanone such warhead on each Overlay in-terceptor missile would be prohibitedunder provisions of agreed statement (E).deployment of space-based laser ABMsystems is explicitly prohibited by articleV of the ABM Treaty,

The development of future ABM systems isalso limited under terms of the ABM Limita-tion Treaty. The United States and the SovietUnion have defined development of ABMs forpurposes of the Treaty as follows:

The obligation not to develop such systems,devices or warheads only to that stage of de-velopment which follows laboratory develop-ment and testing, The prohibitions on develop-ment contained in the ABM Treaty would startat that part of the development process where

field testing is initiated on either a prototypeor bread-board model. 5

Thus, the following limitations would apply tothe development of specific ABM systemssuch as LoADS, Overlay, or even space-basedABM systems:

1.

2.

3.

mobi le components of ABM systemsdeveloped beyond the laboratory such asLoADS defense units would be banned;multiple independently guided KVS forthe Overlay could not be tested beyondthe confines a laboratory;development of unique components forspaced-based laser ABM systems wouldbe banned.

Future ABM Limitation Negotiations

The ABM Treaty provides that either sidemay propose amendments during semiannualmeetings or special meetings of the Standingconsultative Commission which was estab-lished to resolve questions of interpretation inthe Treaty as well as to supervise and resolvequestions of verification. The 1974 Protocolamending the Treaty arose out of just suchStanding Consultative Commission discus-sions. The Treaty, which is of unIimited dura-t ion, also provides for a formal review con-ference every 5 years at which time either sidemay propose changes or amendments. Thenext ABM Limitation Treaty Review Con-ference is scheduled for October 1982.

Present ABM options for the defense of MXdeployments are significantly constrained bythe Treaty from the standpoint of final en-gineering. Substantial research on new ABMsystems can be undertaken, and developmentand testing of ABM components whose pur-pose is to modernize the mothballed Safe-guard system can also be undertaken, Newradars, new interceptors, and new warheads

“ Ball Istlc MI$SIIP Defense, ” In U S Congress, House Commit-tee on Foreign Affalr$ and Senate Commi t tee on Foreign Rela-

t Ion 5, 4 rrrs C-on tro/ /mpa c t Statement J tor f I >ca / Year / 982( W a s h i n g t o n , D C U S ( g o v e r n m e n t Printing Office, 1981, p

195


for Safeguard are all testable and deployableunder terms of article VI I of the Treaty permit-ting modernization of existing ABM systems,Even development of directed energy weaponsfor possible use as ground-based ABM systemswould be permitted under terms of the Treaty,so long as deployment as modernization forthe Safeguard system was envisioned.

The United States might wish to explore thepossibility of further amending the ABM Lim-itations Treaty in a manner that would permitengineering development and possible de-ployment of the LoADS or Overlay ABM sys-tem as they are presently envisioned during thecourse of the 1982 ABM Limitation Treaty Re-view Conference. Reopening discussions of thesubstantive provisions of the ABM LimitationTreaty does, however, raise serious questionsin need of further analysis beyond the scope ofthe study.

The process of renegotiating the ABM Limi-tation Treaty is subject to uncertainty. TheSoviets, too, have an active ABM research anddevelopment program which is also con-strained by the ABM Limitation Treaty. Modifi-cations in the terms of the ABM LimitationTreaty which would permit the United Statesto proceed with development and testing nec-essary to advance the LoADS ABM technologyinto engineering and full-scale engineering de-velopment, or permit development of Overlaytechnology, would also permit comparabledevelopments in the Soviet ABM program.

Hence judgments of the technical, political,and military benefits to be gained by reopen-ing negotiations on ABM I imitations will haveto be made should some basing mode for theMX missile requiring ABM systems be con-templated.

Chapter4

LAUNCH UNDER ATTACK

—

Chapter 4.- LAUNCH UNDER ATTACK

PageOverview of Rationale for LUA and Possible Drawbacks . ..................147

Possibilities for LUA Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148Targets and Military Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................149Timelines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........150Overview ofTechnical Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........150Early Warning and Attack Assessment Systems. . . ....................151Command Posts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............154Communications Links. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........154Pindown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........156Procedures. . . . . . . . . ~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................156

Operational Possibilitiesfor LUA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ; . . . . . . . . . .. ...159Illustrative Soviet ICBMAttackson U.S. Silos Only. . . . . . . . ............159Illustrative Soviet ICBM/SLBM Attackon U.S. Silos and LUACapability

ExcludingWashington. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................160illustrative SovietlCBM/SLBM Attack on U.S. Siios, OtherMilitary

Targets , LUACapabi l i ty , andWashington. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161Attemptto Disrupt U.S. Technical Capabilityto LUA Precedes Soviet

Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........................161

SummaryofCritical lssuesfor LEA. . . . . . . . . . ..........................162information Availableto Decisionmakers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....163Decision Timelines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..163Possibil it ies forDiplomatic and OtherActivities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163Providingfor Launch Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...163Fear That U.S. LUACapability Could Somehow BeSidestepped . .........164RiskofError. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...164

LISTOF FIGURES

Figure No. Page65. AttackTimeline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................15066. Launch-Under-Attack System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......151

Chapter 4

LAUNCH UNDER ATTACK

Another approach to MX survivability is toaccept vulnerable silo basing and resolve tolaunch silo-based MX missiles before attackingSoviet reentry vehicles (RVS) could arrive todestroy them. This type of response to a Sovietattack is called launch under attack (LUA)Adopting this approach to MX survivabilitywould imply relying on LUA as opposed merelyto preserving it as a possibility The United

States now preserves the capability to LUA as amatter of stated doctrine, Some, though notall, of the other basing modes described in thisreport would also allow this capability to bepreserved. This chapter does not in any wayaddress the present U. S doctrine or the statusof means to support that capability, but onlypotential future systems of reliance on LUA.

OVERVIEW OF RATIONALE FOR LUA ANDPOSSIBLE DRAWBACKS

The chief attraction of LUA basing is that itcan be implemented faster and more cheaplythan other basing modes since there is no bas-ing “mode” to speak of. The United Statescould in principle put MX missiles in theMinuteman silos as they came off the assem-bly line, meaning MX deployment in the sec-ond half of this decade However, some of thehardware needed to support the LUA capa-bility (warning sens.ors, communications links,and the Iike) might have longer lead-times. AtruIy robust and dependable system mighttherefore take SIightIy longer to deploy.

Even with a wide range of sophisticated,redundant suppor t ha rdware– jus t abou teverything one could think of buying in theway of sensors and communications— theprice of an LUA system (excluding the missilesthemselves) would come to billions of dollarsrather than tens of bilIions as for other basingmodes. Some of the systems required for LUAwould in fact be desirable, perhaps evennecessary, to deploy with any basing mode.

This hardware– warning sensors, commandposts, and communications links–could bemade virtually impossible for the Soviets todestroy or disrupt. What cannot be assuredwith confidence is that competent NationalCommand Authorities (NCA) would in all cir-cumstances have access to this system in theshort LUA timeline; this is essentialIy a matter

of procedures and national policy, not tech-nology.

Because already-existing silos (or a smallnumber of new ones) couId be used, therewould be Iittle new construction and hencelittle environmental and societal impact.

LUA would preserve familiar features of silobasing, including weapon effectiveness asmeasured by accuracy, time-on-target control,and the Iike; famiIiar force management pro-cedures; and familiar arms control verificationprocedures.

From the point of view of strictly militaryutility, the possibilities for an LUA force differvery little from those available to a survivableforce, The same targets (and perhaps more)would be available in the first few minutes of awar as in the first few hours or days. Essentiallythe same targeting flexibility could be pro-vided with technicaIIy feasible hardware.

Reliance on LUA also has potentially seriousdrawbacks.

Depending on the circumstances, decision-makers could lack crucial information regard-ing the extent and intent of the Soviet attack —information necessary to gauge the proper re-sponse It is not clear, however, that much bet-ter information would always be available tothe commander of a survivable force within ashort period after a n uc I ear attack

147


Decisionmakers would also lack an intervalbetween attack and response during whichintelligence information could be assessed,diplomatic measures considered, and the in-tent of the U.S. response signaled — assumingthe circumstances of nuclear war permittedsuch things at al 1.

Decision time would obviously be veryshort. NCA would have to make unprece-dentedly weighty decisions in less than 15m i nut es.

To guarantee the LUA capability againstsome contingencies it might be necessary to

adopt unpalatable procedures regarding, forinstance, delegation of launch authority.

No matter how much money and ingenuitywere devoted to des ignin g sa feguards fo r theU.S. capability to launch under attack, andeven if the safeguards were very robust indeed,it would probably never be possible to erad-icate a Iingering fear that the Soviets mightfind a way to sidestep them.

Finally, despite all safeguards, there wouldalways remain the possibiIity of error, eitherthat missiles were launched when there was noattack or that they failed to launch when theattack was genuine.

POSSIBILITIES FOR LUA SYSTEMS

There is a wide variety of possibilities forLUA systems, and which is “best” is not reallya matter of technology but of doctrine, pro-cedures, and national policy. Doctrine deter-mines the types of attack which the system isdesigned to meet and those which it is not, Forinstance, it wouId be easier to configure anLUA system on the assumption that a Soviet at-tack would be directed at missile silos andperhaps other military targets but would notbe preceded by attack on Washington, IfWashington were attacked first, an LUA sys-tem designed on this assumption might fail.But since the intercontinental ballistic missile(ICBM) vulnerability problem is perceived gen-eralIy within the context of counterforce at-tacks excluding U.S. cities, it is not clear thatan LUA force must be required to meet such acontingency; in this case it might be thoughtthat an appropriate response could be ex-ecuted with surviving submarine, cruise m is-sile, and bomber forces. These are clearlyissues of doctrine. Regarding procedures— andto take a more extreme example— it wouldalso be easier to design an LUA system on theassumption that launch authority were vestedin certain circumstances in persons other thanthe President and other duly constituted NCAor even that the response to be made to aSoviet attack of a given sort were decided in

advance and, so to speak, “wired into” theICBM system.

Doctrine and procedures — issues of na-tional policy, not technology— more than any-thing else therefore determine the architectureof an LUA system.

This section outlines the technically feasiblehardware elements and procedures that couldgo into an LUA system. It seeks to give a senseboth of the breadth of possibilities and of thefundamental limitations. The next sectionshows how some of these elements mightcome into play in the circumstances of aSoviet attack. It should be emphasized thatwhat is being described here are elements of ahypotheticl future LUA system, not m e a n swhich support the present U.S. LUA capability.

The principal elements to analyze from thetechnical point of view are targets and themiIitary utility of an LUA force, the timelinesof possible attacks, early warning and attackassessment systems, command posts, andcommunications I inks. Possible procedures bywhich decisions could be made and launchorders given can be laid out, but a selectionamong them would be a decision for thehighest levels of political authority.

Ch. 4—Launch Under Attack ● 149

Targets and Military Utility

The first question to ask of an LUA force iswhether there are important and identifiabledifferences, in terms of the military effec-tiveness of a U.S. response to Soviet attack,between immediate LUA response and a de-layed response executed by a survivable force,Though there are some d inferences, on balanceit appears that Iittle or nothing from a purelymilitary point of view is sacrificed by im-mediate response,

In the first place, there would seem to be notargets which would be absent or untargetableearly in the war but which would somehow ap-pear later on, Thus, there can be from thispoint of view no disadvantage to retaliatingimmediately; on the contrary, it wouId seemthat a difference between early and delayedresponse, if one were to exist, wouId favor theearly response. The most stressing case for anLUA system is one in which the Soviet attackcame with no indications of preparation for at-tack before the actual launch of Soviet mis-siles. In this case, a prompt U.S. response coulddestroy other Soviet military assets before theyhad time to disperse from their ordinaryoperating bases. I f the Soviet attack camefrom a generated posture, some assets mightbe difficult to target, but this situation wouldnot necessariIy improve with time Even ifthere were significant Soviet target complexesthat “appeared” later, it is unlikely that theywould be hardened to such an extent that theirdestruction would require ICBMS, although ifthey were mobile a rapid response-time forU.S. attack could be useful. Such rapid re-sponse is most easily accomplished withICBMS, Even assuming the existence of targetswhich a survivable force could target but anLUA force could not, one must assume in addi-tion that the U.S. intelligence assets requiredto locate these targets would survive an initialSoviet attack.

As to the nature of the targets that should beassigned to an LUA MX force, the importantissue for this purpose is not what these targetsmight be, but how the selection might differfrom those assigned to a survivable retaliatory

force. Again, there do not appear to be signifi-cant differences. I n either case, the actual tar-gets attacked might well depend upon the na-ture of the Soviet provocation and have thegoal of inflicting on the Soviet Union a level ofdamage – measured overaI I — commensuratewith the damage anticipated from the Sovietattack, as well as the latter could be judged atthe time the U.S. decision to respond had to bemade. If Soviet silos were among the targetsmarked for destruction by the LUA force, onemight want to have some means for determin-ing which were still full and which empty, andone would also have to take the chance thatthe Soviets would themselves launch under at-tack when our missiles were in flight. Bothproblems exist for a survivable force as well. Inpractice it is likely that the same information,obtained at launch, would be used to supportretargeting to avoid attacking “empty holes”whether by survivable or LUA forces; the onlydifference would be the retargeting time avail-able. In practice it is also possible to guess inadvance which Soviet missiles would be usedin an attack on U.S. silos. There is also ananalytical basis upon which to question theutility of bothering with any sort of “emptyhole” retargeting. (It might even be thoughtdesirable to attack empty holes to preclude“reload,”) As to Soviet LUA, with a survivableforce there would be a time delay before re-taliation during which efforts could be madeto destroy Soviet sensors capable of indicatinga U.S. launch.

Since decisions would have to be madequickly, and since extensive ad-hoc retargetingwould be difficult to carry out in the short LUAtimeline, some preplanning would have to bedone regarding the responses to be made to agiven Soviet attack. Such preplanning wouldalso be done for survivable forces. To the ob-jection that such preplanning is unpleasant or“commits” the United States to certain typesof response, it can only be noted that the con-cept of deterrence presupposes, independentof the forces concerned, that Soviet attack willprovoke with high certainty a U.S. response.Whether the United States would actua l l ychoose to retaliate if deterrence failed cannot


be said on the basis of the forces deployed. Ofcourse, LUA allows Iittle time for reflection ifSoviet attack did occur.

There might be no need to have the entireU.S. ICBM force postured for LUA, Since a sur-vivable force of, say, 1,000 RVS might be con-sidered adequate for a delayed response, nomore than this number of RVS need be in-c luded in the force which “survives” bylaunching under attack.

Time lines

Soviet ICBMS take about a half hour tomake the journey from their silos to U.S. ICBMfields in the Central United States, The timefrom first launch to first impact could in prin-ciple be shortened by a small amount, but thiswould be likely to cause some degradation inaccuracy, A realistic Soviet laydown wouldalso occur over a span of time, from just under30 minutes until somewhat later.

Speaking roughly, receipt of the launch mes-sage or Emergency Action Message (E AM) bythe missile force as late as a few minutesbefore Soviet RVS arrive would be sufficient toguarantee safe escape of the missiles, Thisbrief time period would be accounted for bythe time taken for the EAM to be transmittedto the missile fields, decoded, and authen-ticated; the time taken to initiate the launchsequence; the time from first missile takeoff tolast; and the time needed for the last missile tomake a safe escape from the lethal effects ofthe incoming Soviet RVS.

Thus, the time available for ICBM attackassessment and decisionmaking” would be thehalf-hour ICBM flight time minus this smalltime period for missile launch.

Soviet submarine-launched RVS targeted atcommand posts and communication nodescould arrive earlier than the ICBMS. It isassumed here that the Soviets would notpossess submarine-launched ballistic missiles(SLBMS) deployed near U.S. coasts of suffi-cient accuracy and in sufficient numbers toconstitute themselves a primary threat to U.S.silos. Forward-deployed SLBM RVS could ar-

rive in the Central United States within 8 to 15minutes of launch and at coastal targets, suchas Washington, within 5 to 10 minutes. Thismeans that relatively soft targets such as com-mand bunkers and communications nodes, iftargetable, could be destroyed early in the at-tack. One of the principal goals of a robustLUA system must be to survive such a precur-sor SLBM attack in order to support executionof a launch decision,

Assuming simultaneous launch of SovietICBMS and SLBMS, the timetable which resultsis shown in figure 65.

The LUA timetable could be extended some-what by a “dust defense” such as described inchapter 3. In this scheme, the dust cloudformed by deliberate detonation of buriednuclear weapons in the silo fields wouIddestroy the first wave of Soviet RVS. TheUnited States would have unt i l the dustcleared — tens of minutes — since a second at-tack could not be mounted during this time.

Overview of Technical Requirements

In order to meet the timeline and attack con-straints outlined above, a U.S. LUA capabilitywould require warning and attack assessmentsensors impervious to disruption; survivablecommand posts to digest and organize sensorinformation; and secure, reliable communica-tions linking the command posts with thewarn ing sensors and with the missile fields. Themost important requirement, and the most dif-f i cult to meet in practice, would be providing aconnection from the survivable commandposts to NCA empowered to make launch deci-sions. This architecture is shown i n figure 66.

Figure 65. —Attack Timeline

. rsf@Qns1

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Time (minutes)


Ch. 4—Launch Under Attack 151

Figure 66.— Launch-Under-Attack SystemArchitecture

Warning andattackassessmentsensors


The paragraphs below indicate the range oftechnically feasible candidates for these sys-tem elements It will be apparant that no singleelement can be made survivable against a de-termined Soviet effort to disrupt it. One mustinstead make disruption as difficult and time-consuming as possible, provide redundantbackup systems, and seek to make price ofdisruption so high that Soviet attack on all U.S.LUA assets would virtualIy be cause itself to re-taliate against the Soviet Union.

Early Warning and AttackAssessment Systems

The important features of warning andattack assessment systems are when in thecourse of an attack they couId be expected toprovide information, what information theycould furnish at that time, and how difficult todisrupt they would be. In general, the first twofeatures are related in that the more completethe information they furnish, the later in the at-tack they do so. Timely information concern-ing the size and character of the attack wouldbe vital to the confidence a decision makercould have in his judgment to fire U.S. nuclearweapons at the Soviet U n ion. There wouId be apremium upon confirmation of the facts of the

situation from as many sources as possible. Forthis reason it is desirable to have sensors basedon a variety of distinct physical principles.

The following paragraphs outline in generalterms the important features of a wide rangeof warning and attack assessment systems thatthe United States could deploy to supportLUA. Since even in aggregate the cost of thesesystems would be less than the costs of otherMX basing modes, it is not inconceivable thatthe United States would deploy all of themand more.

Satellites

The booster motors of large ballistic mis-siles, which operate for some minutes afterlaunch, emit huge amounts of power (hundredsof kilowatts) in the short-wave infrared portionof the electromagnetic spectrum. This radia-tion could be detected by satellites at verygreat distances from the earth. It would be vir-tually impossible for the Soviets to concealthis evidence of their attack.

Such satellites could provide an accuratecount of the number of launches, the types ofmissiles launched (from comparing the bright-ness of their infrared emission to data fromtest launches), and at least the approximate(wing level)) locations of the launch points.This information could be available to U.S.command posts (discussed below) almost im-mediately. Several minutes more observationcouId lead to at least a very rough indicationof the intended targets, to the extent ofpredicting whether the Central United States(where U.S. silos are) only was under attack orwhether coastal targets were included as well.This information might suggest whether the at-tack was directed only at U.S. silos or whetherit was a massive attack on all U.S. targets,cities (many of which are on the coasts) in-cluded. It would not be possible on the basis ofthis early information to tell whether theSoviets had withheld attack on certain specifictargets, an indication of their intentions.

It would not be possibe to secure such satel-lites absolutely against attack on them, butsuch an attack could be made very difficult.


Though geosynchronous orbit would be mostconvenient for such satellites, it could perhapsbe desirable to deploy them in other, higher or-bits. Geosynchronous orbit is that unique orbit22,300 miles from the Earth at which the or-bital period of satelIites is equal to the rotationperiod of the Earth. Thus satellites in geosyn-chronous orbit remain over the same point onthe Earth’s surface as both they and the Earthgo round. A single satellite could thereforekeep watch over the Soviet Union at all times.Because of its convenience, however, geosyn-chronous orbit is somewhat crowded, It wouldtherefore be possible for the Soviets to stationa “space mine” near to a U.S. warning satelliteand answer in response to U.S. protests thatthe mine was in fact some other sort of satel-lite (e. g., communications) which it was conve-nient to position over the Soviet Union. TheUnited States would then not be in a positionto assert that the Soviets had no businessthere, because it wouId be quite plausible thatthey did have legitimate purposes for position-ing a satellite in this unique, convenient orbit.If on the other hand the U.S. satellites were inan orbit chosen more or less randomly fromamongst the infinite number of possible alti-tudes, we would be in a better position toassert that the only possible purpose for anearby Soviet satelIite must be to interferewith ours. The United States might then justifyon these grounds measures against such in-terference. Nonsynchronous orbit means thatmore than one satellite would be required tokeep continuous watch on the Soviet Union,however, since at any one time most of themwould be over other parts of the Earth.

Satellites could also be threatened by directattack from a missiIe Iaunched from the SovietUnion. However, the U.S. satellites could bepositioned high enough that it would takemany hours (18 or so) for an attacking vehicleto reach them. What is more, since the in-terceptor missiles required to reach high orbitswould be quite large, the Soviets would prob-ably launch them only from the Soviet Union.Most of the satellites would be on the otherside of the Earth when the first interceptor waslaunched, and launch of other interceptors

wouId have to be staggered so as to interceptthe rest of the satel l i tes as they “camea round. ” Direct-ascent anti satelIite attacks onhigh orbits would therefore present a timingproblem to the Soviets. The United StateswouId most certainly be aware that the satel-lites were under attack hours before they weredestroyed.

Measure can also be taken to insure the sur-vival of satellites. For instance, they could beprovided with sensors to allow them to deter-mine when they were under attack. They couldmaneuver to avoid a horning interceptor anddeploy decoys or chaff to confuse horning sen-sors. SatelIites at such distances from the Earthmight also be able to be hidden entirely bygiving them small optical, infrared, and radarsignatures. One might also hide dormant back-up satellites amongst a swarm of decoys; thesatelIite wouId be turned on when the primarysatelIites encountered interference, Last, back-up satelIites couId be deployed on missiIes i nsilos in the United States and launched intolow orbits to replace the primaries. Thesereconstituted satellites couId also be attacked,but it would take time for the Soviets to ac-quire data on their orbits, even assuming theUnited States allowed them unhindered opera-tion of the means to acquire this data. Some ofthese techniques for satelIite security are moreeffective than others.

Last, the United States might not choose toshow patience indefinitely with persistentSoviet attacks on our warning sensors, par-ticularly if we had chosen to rely on LUA as theguarantor of our land-based missiles,

Radars

Radars could be either land-based or de-ployed on oceangoing ships, Radars deployednear the United States wouId provide warninginformation rather later than satellites —perhaps 15 minutes or so after launch — butthey would provide much more accurate pre-diction of the impact points of attacking RVS,This information would be sufficient to de-termine which silo wings and which metro-politan areas were under attack.


Powerful radars of this sort would be ratherlarge and soft targets and therefore suscepti-ble to SLBM or even paramilitary attack, jam-ming is also a potential threat. An endo-atmospheric ballistic missile defense could beprovided around such radars. For instance, thePerimeter Acquisition Radar at Concrete,N Dak., happens to be in the area selected bythe United States as the only site where anABM system can be deployed within the ABMTreaty and Protocol. The purpose of such anABM system would not be to protect the radaragainst any level of attack, but to force theSoviets to send so many warheads to destroy itthat such an attack would constitute a majorprovocation

Sensor Aircraft

Aircraft carrying radars (similar to AWACSaircraft used for tactical purposes) or infraredsensors could be used either as a backup forother sensors, taking off from a strip-alertstatus at U.S. bases, or as a primary systemmaintaining continuous airborne patrol. Theaircraft could be on station within severalhours of takeoff and could provide detailed at-tack assessment inform at ion (similar incharacter to the land-based radars) withinabout 15 minutes of impact.

Such aircraft would be a hedge against dis-ruption of satellite or fixed land-based sys-tems If on continuous patrol, they would bevery resistant to balIistic missiIe attack.

Since the aircraft would take some time t oarrive on station if they were not maintainedon continuous airborne patrol, there could bea gap between destruction of the primary U.S.systems and reconstitution by the aircraft. Thisgap could be filled by rocket-launched probes.

Rocket-Launched Probes

These probes, carrying long-wave infraredsensors, wouId be simiIar to the probes pro-posed for the Overlay exoatmospheric ballisticmissiIe defense system to acquire its targets,They would arrive on station in minutes andprovide detailed attack assessment informa-tion simiIar to that provided by the aircraft un-

til they fell back to Earth about 20 minutes orso after launch. Housed in silos, they would bevulnerable only to nuclear attack. The probesilos could be located far from ICBM siIos sothat their launch could not be confused withICBM launch by Soviet warning sensors.

Nuclear Detonation Detectors

Since SLBM RVS could arrive on U.S. ter-ritory welI in advance of the ICBMS aimed atthe silos and before the time that a launchdecision wou Id have to be made, these detona-tions could provide further confirmation thatthe United States was under attack. Such de-tectors could be bolted on to large numbers ofsatellites deployed for other purposes Al-ternatively, U.S.-based sensor stations employ-ing seismic or electromagnetic pulse detectorscouId verify that the U.S. was under nuclear at-tack. It is very unlikely that natural phe-nomena couId mimic the effects of nucleardetonations.

Though the detonation of nuclear weaponson the United States would not by itself nec-essarily identify the Soviet Union as the at-tacker, the other warning systems would eitherindicate the origin of the attack or be of such anature that their disruption could be ac-complished only by the Soviets.

Covert Warning Sensors

It might be possible to deploy warning sen-sors the existence of which could reasonablybe kept secret from the Soviets. Even if this didnot actually turn out to be possible, it wouldbe a factor the Soviets would have to considerbefore they satisfied themselves that theUnited States would be without advancenotice of their attack.

Warning Sensors for SLBMS

So far discussion has concentrated on warn-ing of ICBM attack, AlI of the means describedso far are applicable to the SLBM case as wellThe satellites would give a launch count im-mediately and coastal SLBM radars impactpoint prediction within minutes of approach tothe coasts. Planes and probes would be rel-

B 8 3 - 4 7 7 0 - 8 1 - 1 1


atively inefficient in the SLBM role since manyof them would be required to cover all attackcorridors.

Command Posts

Fixed land-based command bunkers of ahardness sufficient to withstand attack evenby inaccurate SLBMS would be difficultt to con-struct. The United States now operates a net-work of fixed command posts including theNational Military Command Center (NMCC) inthe Pentagon, the Alternate National MilitaryCommand Center (ANMCC) at a rural site out-side Washington, Strategic Air Command (SAC)Headquarters in Omaha, and North AmericanAerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Head-quarters in Cheyenne Mountain, Colo. An im-provement on fixed sites would be to deploy afleet of wide-bodied aircraft with the nec-essary communications equipment to receiveand process warning information, commu-nicate with NCA, and launch U.S. silo-basedmissiles if given proper authorization. Some ofthese aircraft, called Airborne National Com-mand Posts (A BNCPS), could be on continuousairborne patrol and others on strip alert. TheUnited States deploys a fleet of such aircraft atpresent. If there were advance indication ofimminent Soviet attack, the President himselfor other NCA could take to the air in thesecommand posts.

Consideration might also be given to groundmobile command posts, disguised as vanstraveling the Nation’s highways.

Concerns could be raised about possiblemeans to destroy or disrupt such commandposts, but since they are considered for usewith just about all MX basing modes, any suchproblems would not distinguish LUA basing. Infact such disruption would be very difficultt.

Communications Links

Studies of command, control, and commu-nications (C 3) systems to support strategicnuclear forces of any kind, LUA or otherwise,indicate that there is a wide variety of pos-sibilities for wartime communications and just

as wide a range of means to disrupt and im-pede such communications. The nature of thedisruption would depend on the amount ofdamage done to U.S. communications installa-tions and the extent of disruption of the at-mosphere due to nuclear explosions. An LUAC‘ system would have an advantage over sys-tems supporting survivable basing because itwould be needed at a time when the UnitedStates had suffered less damage. On the otherhand, it would be at a disadvantage in thatthere might be little time to attempt to recon-stItute disrupted I inks.

Many of the same considerations apply tothe communications Iinks which applied to thewarning sensors. None can be protected ab-solutely against Soviet attack, but disruptioncan be made difficuIt, time consuming, andprovocative.

Communications links are required from thewarning sensors to the command posts, fromthe command posts to the missile fields, andbetween the command posts and responsiblelaunch authorities. The first two are easier tospecify than the last, since this last dependssensitively on where the launch authorities areassumed to be and upon whether they areunder attack or not. A fulIer discussion of theproblems of providing communications sys-tems to support strategic nuclear forces in gen-eral is contained in a separate chapter. The fol-lowing discussion seeks to sketch some of theconsiderations relevant to LUA.

Warning Sensors to Command Posts

It appears that satellite communicationswould be needed for this purpose, at least forthe warning satellites, since they would not beconnected to the command posts by Iine ofsight. The same cons ideations regarding sur-vivability apply here as for the warning satel-lites, but the situation is in some respectseasier. To avoid jamming and ionospheric dis-ruption due to high altitude nuclear detona-tions, these satellites could operate at milli-meter wavelengths. They couId be stationed inunusual, deep-space orbits so the SovietscouId have no pretense for stationing space


mines near them, and direct-ascent intercep-tors would require a long time to reach themSince the communications satellites would becheaper than the warning satellites, therecould be many of them. other measures —deep-space storage, concealed dormantsatellites, decoys, maneuverability, etc. — suchas described for the warning satellites couldalso be tried here, Rocket-launched reconstitu-tion satellites could be on-station in a shortperiod There are many U.S. communicationssatellites of al I sorts in space, and ar-rangements could also be made to use them ifthe primary system failed.

Fixed ground stations for the downlinkswould be vulnerable to attack, but such attackwouId at least be required to disrupt them,They could be proliferated throughout theUnited States and even defended with ballisticmissi le defense An improvement on f ixedground stations would use mobile ground ter-minals, highway-going vans with concealedreceiving dish and data processing equipment,Data could be transferred from ground sta-tions— fixed or mobile—to the airborne com-mand posts by radio (line-of-sight if necessary)and satelIite uplink

Ground stations would not be necessary atal I if arrangements were made for the airbornecommand posts to receive data in semiproc-essed form directly from the warning satellitesvia the communications satellites using milli-meter wave or laser I inks.

The sensor aircraft would use satellite linksto communicate with the command posts. Thefixed radars could use radio (line-of-sight ifnecessary) or satellite to send their data to thecommand aircraft. The rocket-launched probewouId be in Iine-of-sight with the commandposts and could communicate directly.

Command Posts to Missile Fields

If an order were given to launch MX missiIesfrom their silos, the command posts couldtransmit the EAM to the Iaunch control centersin the silo fields or directly to the silos by a

variety of means, including Iine-of-sight ultrahigh frequency (UHF) radio and satellite injec-tion. These methods provide for high probabil-i ty of correct receipt of the EAM withinminutes, even in a disturbed environment.

Between Command Posts and NationalCommand Authorities

This is the most difficult part of the com-munications system to specify, The reason forthis is not that technology does not providesolutions, but because these solutions coulddepend on where the NCA might be, which de-pends on who the NCA are, which in turn de-pends on what procedures are adopted forNCA continuity.

Roughly speaking, there are three cases toconsider. I n the first, the President or otherNCA is in Washington, and Washington hassurvived at least to the point in time where alaunch decison is required, Communicant ions inthis case can be by satellite or airborne relayusing a number of aircraft, maintained on stripalert in peacetime, which form a net over theUnited States for UHF line-of-sight commu-n i cations,

In the second case, the President or otherNCA is himself in a command airplane, Com-munications is by satelIite or airborne relay.

In the third case, Washington is destroyedand the President did not manage to make it toa survivable location, I n this case the impor-tant questions are, first: Who and where is theNCA and can it be arranged that they takecommand in time to launch under attack? andsecond: Does it matter if we could not LUA?since it might appear in this case that war wasnot going to remain Iimited and our othernuclear forces wouId be sufficient to acheiveU.S. objectives, The first is a question of pro-cedures and authority and the second of doc-trine. They obviously cannot be answered bytechnology assessment. Some suggestion ofalternative responses to these questions willbe made in the section below entitled Pro-cedures.


Pindown

Pindown refers to the possibility that theSoviets could force our missiles to remain intheir silos by threatening to explode nuclearweapons in their paths and destroy them inflight. In practice, however, pindown of silo-based MX would require a huge expenditure ofSoviet weapons for an uncertain result and istherefore not an important threat to LUA.

In a pindown attack, nuclear weapons fromSLEMs and, later in the attack but beforeICBM arrival on U.S. silos, low-trajectoryICBMs could seek to create an environmentlethal to U.S. missiles in flight. These warheadswould be exploded at high altitudes— about300,000 ft– in the flyout corridors above themissile fields. The relevant parameter here isthe number of weapons of a given yield whichmust be exploded every minute in the flyoutcorridors to ensure that any missile passingthrough them is destroyed or disrupted. Thedamage is caused by X-rays from the nuclearexplosions, and there are two possible killmechanisms. In the first, X-rays are depositedon the exterior of the missile and vaporize thesurface. When the surface layer is removed,the recoil momentum is transmitted throughthe missile as a compression wave which candamage the interior of the missile or blow thebackside off. The other method by which theX-rays could disrupt the missile is by causingionization in the electronic circuits of, for in-stance, the guidance computer.

The flyout corridors above the existingMinuteman wings are in fact rather large, andtheir precise dimensions can to some extent bemade uncertain to the Soviets. I n addition, theMX missile is planned to be much more resist-ant to X-rays than Minuteman. The Sovietswould also not know with confidence just howhard U.S. missiles were.

On the other side, if the Soviets were gen-uinely determined to try a pindown attack,they could design warheads especially for thispurpose. These warheads would not need heatshields since they would not reenter the at-mosphere. Thus a warhead of a given yield

wouId be Iighter, meaning more megatonnageon a given booster.

“The upshot of all this is that, if MX missileswere distributed throughout the Minutemanfields, the Soviets would have to explode hun-dreds of megatons per minute in the fIyout cor-ridors to guarantee pindown. If the Sovietsassumed that no U.S. launch decision couldpossibly be made until at least 10 minutes intothe attack, 15 to 20 minutes of pindown wouldbe required. Timing constraints would demandthat much of this megatonnage be launchedfrom submarines remote from their homebases. Pindown would therefore compete withother time-urgent missions of the forward-deployed Soviet submarine force and withsecure reserve missions of the remaining force.These time constraints, combined with thehuge numbers of weapons needed, make pin-down an unattractive, if not impossible, Sovietstrategy against LUA for s i lo-based MX.(Reckoning strictly on the size of deploymentarea, the amount of megatonnage required topin down MX in MPS basing would be aboutten times less than for silo basing.)

Procedures

For the U.S. threat to launch under attack tobe credible, procedures would have to be de-vised to guarantee that the president or otherNCA were able to communicate in timelyfashion with the command posts in a positionto receive attack assessment data from thesensors and execute the missile force. Theissue here is not whether the U.S. instrumentsof command would eventually reconstitutethemselves to wage and terminate a nuclearwar, but whether there would be continuity ofcommand in the first half hour of the war.Devising an acceptable set of procedures is amatter for decision at the highest levels ofpolitical authority. It is not the intention of thisdiscussion to suggest or speculate what theseprocedures might actual ly be should theUnited States adopt reliance on LUA, still lesswhat procedures support the present LUA ca-pability, but merely to set out the logicalpossibiIities.


These possibilities are quite distinct depend-ing on the circumstances of the attack I n par-t icular, i t matters whether the possibil i ty of at-tack was foreseen before the actuaI launch ofSoviet missi les (i .e. whether “strategic” warn-ing preceded “tactical” warning) or whetherthe attack was a “bolt from the blue” surprise.Realistic or not, much fear about reliance onLUA focuses on the second circumstance. Sur-prise attack is clearly most stressing as regardsthe physical capability of the United States tolaunch under attack.

It would also be vital whether the Soviet at-tack had the specific aim of disrupting the U.S.chain of command supporting LUA. As hasbeen discussed above, every effort can bemade to preclude the possibility that theSoviets could deny the LUA capability bymeans short ot physical attack upon the NCA,It appears that such efforts could be quite suc-cessful indeed: sensors, command posts, andcommunications links could be provided, withcost and effort, which were very difficuIt todisrupt. Thus, as a practical matter, the Sovietscould be faced with the choice either of per-mitting LUA or of attacking directly the U.S.political leadership. To make this choice theSoviets would have to ask themselves whetherthey preferred to be at war with a nation inpossession of intact national leadership andusable ICBMS or with a nation in possession ofneither. The U.S. perception of what theSoviets would intend in making such a choicecould affect the procedures the United Statesselected for its LUA system. For instance, if itwere agreed that the Soviets could not intendanything but total war if they were will in g

to “decapitate” the U.S. Government, then itmight be concluded that U.S. bombers, cruisemissiles, and SLBMS were sufficient weaponsto wage such a war. U.S. doctrine might thenstate: LUA seeks to deter Soviet attacks shortof decapitation; decapitation attacks are to bedeterred by threat of retaliation upon Sovietvalue. On the other hand, if the United Statesjudged such a doctrine to be inadequate, adetermined effort would have to be made todevise procedures which would permit LUA inal I circumstances, The United States might fur-ther judge it imprudent to state a doctrine

covering all possibilities, preferring to adduncertainty to the Soviet decision.

Questions of doctrine would thus have anobvious effect upon which procedures wereadopted for LUA basing and are just as ob-viously not susceptible to technical analysis,In what follows, it is assumed that the UnitedStates would wish to assure the LUA capabilityin al I circumstances, and various possibilitiesare explored to satisfy this wish. At the pointwhere these procedures are judged to becomeunacceptable, one has the choice of abandon-ing LUA basing altogether or determining thatthe circumstances in question would no longerrequire a “survivable” (via LUA) U S. ICBMforce.

The National Command Authority

NCA is the phrase used to describe theoperational institution of the U.S. Governmentresponsible for decisions to initiate the use ofnuclear weapons. The individuals who occupyinstitutional roles comprising the NCA arecalled the National Command Authorities (alsoNCA). These individuals consist of the Presi-dent and, upon his death or incapacitation, hissuccessors as designated by the Constitutionand the Presidential Succession Act; theSecretary of Defense and his successors; andthe joint Chiefs of Staff and their successors,these designated by Defense DepartmentreguIat ions.

The process by which the NCA might orderthe use of nuclear weapons by U.S. ArmedForces has for obvious reasons not been dis-cussed publicly. Hearings conducted by theHouse Foreign Affairs Committee in 1974made clear that no military officer may initiatethe use of nuclear weapons unless authorizedby the President or his successor. In practice, itappears that many of the procedures for NCAoperation are decided by each President onthe basis of personaI preference.

Attack With Advance “Strategic” Warning

In a period of crisis, it might become ap-parent either from Soviet statements, from in-telligence indications, or from estimation of


Soviet reaction to U.S. moves, that nuclear at-tack was imminent. Such advance warning iscalled “strategic” warning to distinguish itfrom warning indicating that an attack is ac-tually in progress (“tactical” warning).

One reaction to strategic warning would befor the President or other NCA to take to theair in airborne command posts for the durationof the crisis. There could be concern that thisaction, if made known, could heighten ten-sions and provoke panic in the U.S. public. Forthis reason the President himself might wish toremain on the ground and have a lesser officialassume airborne alert. Whether this could beaccomplished covertly could be questionedsince the command planes would be ratherdistinctive. Even disguising them to look likefreight aircraft would be pointless if they tookoff from military airfields Iike Washington’sAndrews Air Force Base. Disguising the move-ments of high U.S. officials from the press, par-ticularly under the circumstances, might alsoprove cliff i cult.

An alternative to providing a “survivable”NCA would be for the President to decide inadvance the responses to be made to certainsets of attack assessment data and order thatthese responses be executed unless he wereable to intervene to veto or change them. Theresponses would be transmitted to ABNCPS,the crews of which (presumably military of-ficers] would be the executors. Whether suchan arrangement would actually constitute del-egation of command authority to others is notclear, since the precise instructions could beencrypted and thus totaIIy unknown to the ex-ecutors.

Surprise Attack Without Decapitation

A “bolt from the blue” attack whose objectwas not to disrupt the U.S. chain of commandcouId in principle be dealt with by arrangingfor the President and other NCA to be at alltimes in instantaneous, reliable communica-tions with the command posts which monitorwarning data and launch the ICBMS. As a prac-tical matter, of course, account must be taken

of circumstances when the President is travel-ing abroad or shaking hands in a crowd.‘Though it would seem that adequate proce-dures could be worked out for such cases, theymight be burdensome and obtrusive for thePresident and other NCA.

Surprise Attack With Decapitation

l-his would be the most stressing circum-stance for a system of LUA. There are severalprocedures that couId be devised to meet thiscircumstance:

2.

3

LUA fails. This “response,” discussedpreviously, considers that this circum-stance, implying Soviet willingness to de-stroy the political leadership of the UnitedStates, would be outside of the range ofcontingencies for which ICBM “surviv-ability” is intended. U.S. doctrine could sostate or imply.

Responses decided on in advance by thePresident would be executed by ABNCPSun/ess the President or other NCA in-tervened to veto or change them. This op-tion is identical to the second optiondiscussed for the case of advance or “stra-tegic” warning except that in this casethese procedures would be in force at alltimes, even when no particular crisis wereoccurring. The character of the responseto be made to a given set of warning datacouId be encrypted and known only to thePresident. As a hedge against espionage orrevelation of the President’s choices, theinstructions could be arranged to estab-lish only the probabi l i t ies that certainresponses would be made, These probabil-ities couId be made to change on a day-to-day basis according to the world situation.The whole set of responses could be“wired into” the ICBM force or executedby the intervention of the crew of theABNCP.

Launch authority could devolve on thecrew of the survivable command posts.The NCA could override command post

Ch 4—Launch Under Attack ● 759

decisions if they survived and were in lengthened by preserving the option tocommunication. It has been suggested disarm missiles in flight if the NCA chosethat the time during which such NCA in- to veto or change a I au nch decision madetervention could take place might be by others.

OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITIES FOR LUA

This section illustrates the operational pos-sibilities for a system of reliance on LUA in theform of attack “scenarios “ These scenariosa i mat technicaI verisimititude, but no claim isimplied that what happens in them is in anyother sense plausible, much less acceptable.

The range of possible LUA scenarios is Iimit-Iess, and each could be embellished At eachjuncture, many different paths could be taken.The choices made here, when they have anyparticuIar ra t iona le a t a l l , a re made toilIustrate the workings of the technical hard-ware, It is not thought appropriate for a tech-nology assessment to adopt any other ap-proach.

All the scenarios described assume no ad-vance or “strategic” warning and that theUnited States makes every effort to preserveits capability to launch under attack,

As a reminder of the elements of the LUAsystem described in the previous section, thefollowing list is provided. It should be recalledthat these are elements of a hypothetic/future system to support reliance on LUA, notelements of the system that presently supportsthe U.S. LUA capability.

National Command Arthorities (NCA)Fixed Ground Command PostAirborne National Command Posts (ABNCPs), con-

tinuously airbornc or backup strip-alert at CentralU S airbases

Warning satellitesFixed ground radarsSensor ai rcraft , cont inous ly ai rborne or backup

strip -aIertRocket- launched sensor probesCoastal SLBM radars

N U Cl e a r d e t o n a t i o n d e t e c t o r s

Communcations s a t e l l i t e s , p r imary andreconstitutable

The scenarios are organized by timeline with,T = indicating the time in minutes

Illustrative Soviet ICBM Attackson U.S. SiIos Only

These “scenarios” iIlustrate the LUA time-Iines for pure countersilo attacks in which noeffort is made by the Soviets to deny the U.SLUA capability. One might imagine any num-ber of sequences of events leading up to theseattacks. The only important assumption forthese examples of LUA is that strategic warn-ing has either not been received or has notcaused the United States to assume an alert or“generated” posture. The first, smalI attack istermed a “demonstration” since, apart fromdestroying a subset of US, ICBMS, it wouldseem to have no clear purpose other than todemonstrate Soviet willingness to use nuclearweapons and to test U.S. willingness to re-spond, The Soviet attack in the second sce-nario is the standard “ Iimited counterforce”attack whose purpose is to destroy the U.S.ICBM force completely,

Illustrative Small “Demonstrate ion” Attack

T = O: Soviets launch fifty SS-18 ICBMS.

Interim: U.S. fixed and airborne commandposts receive satellite data indicating num-ber and type of missiles launched and Sovietsilo wings of origin. No evidence that SLBMSare included in the attack. Immediate meas-ures taken to open communications linkswith President or other NCA. BackupABNCPS, sensor aircraft, and perhaps otherforces alerted,

T = 5: Further satellite data indicates CentralUnited States as location of targets. Coastaltargets known to be excluded, but targets inCentral United States not further specified.Backup ABNCPS and sensor aircraft orderedto take off. Military commanders orderlaunch of infrared probe.


T

T

T

= 10: NCA in communication with commandposts and alerted to situation, Probe on sta-t ion and acquiring data.

= 15: Infrared and radar planes, probe, andland-based radars all indicate that attackconsists of about 500 RVS. Predicted impactpoints correlate with locations of three outof six U.S. ICBM wings, No evidence of anyother targets.

= 20: NCA orders no LUA since only half ofICBM force under attack, OR: NCA orderslaunch of 50 U.S. RVS targeted at SovietSS-18 and SS-19 silos. Simultaneously U.S.embassies, including Moscow, informed ofintent of U. S, response. OR: Et cetera.

Interim: U.S. ICBMS launch (if applicable).

T = 30: Soviet RVS impact U.S. silos.

Illustrative Full Attack on U.S. ICBMS

T = O: Soviets launch several hundred ICBMS.

Interim: As before.

T = 15: Aircraft, probe, and radars all indicate

T

attack of over 2,000 RVS targeted at allICBM wings. No evidence of other targets.

= 20: NCA orders launch of the half of theICBM force postured for LUA at Soviet silosand perhaps other military targets. OR: NCAorders entire ICBM force launched. OR: Etcetera.

T = 20-30: As before.

T

Illustrative Soviet ICBM/SLBM Attackon U.S. Silos and LUA Capability

Excluding Washington

= O: Soviets launch ICBMS at U.S. ICBMS.Simultaneously, SLBMS from submarinesnear U.S. coasts launch at fixed commandposts, fixed communications nodes, fixedsensors, and airfields supporting airbornesensors and command posts. All of thesetargets are assumed to be located in CentralUnited States or, if near coasts, not to be at-tacked. Coastal SLBM radars are not at-tacked since they collect most of their in-formation before they can be destroyed.

Interim: Continuously airborne ABNCP re-

1

T

ceives satelIite data’ indicating: number andtypes of ICBMs and silo fields of origin;number, type, and launch locat ions ofSLBMs. No information about intended tar-gets at this time; therefore not yet clearwhether Washington and other coastal tar-gets under attack. Immediate efforts takento open communications I inks with NCA.Back u p ABNCPS and sensor a i r c ra f tscrambIed.

T:5: Further satellite data indicates SovietICBMS and SLBMS targeted at CentralUnited States, not coasts; actual CentralU.S. targets not specified. Coastal radars,however, indicate SLBMS targeted at inlandfixed ground command posts and commu-n i cations nodes, radars, and airfields wherebackup ABNCPS and sensor aircraft arebased. One SLBM RV appears to haveballistic trajectory which will carry it farfrom any U.S. miIitary installation. Militarycommanders order Iaunch of infrared rocketprobe,

= 7: SLBM RV with “odd” trajectory bursts atvery high al t i tude over Eastern UnitedStates. No damage whatever to buiIdings orpopuIat ion from this very high-al t i tudeburst, but electromagnetic pulse and iono-spheric disturbances disrupt some long-range radio and I and Iine communications.SateIIite communications I inking NCA, fixedcommand posts, and ABNCPS is undis-turbed.

Interim: SLBM RVS impact Central U.S. targets.

T

Fixed command posts destroyed; commandshifts excIusively to ABNC P. Large numberof RVS targeted at fixed radars saturatesballistic missile defense; radar destroyed.Some, though not al 1, backup ABNCPS andsensor aircraft escape.

❑ 15: Sensor aircraft and probe indicate thatSoviet ICBMs are targeted at U.S. silo fieldsonly. Nuclear detonation detectors confirmSLBM detonations, Data made avaiIable toNCA.

I T=15-20: NCA concludes on basis of inform a-tion available that Soviet countersilo attack


in progress SLBM attack evidently at-tempted to deny U.S. LUA capability,

T = 20: NCA orders LUA.

Interim: U.S. ICBMs launch.

T = 30: Soviet ICBM RVS impact empty silos,

Illustrative Soviet ICBM/SLBM Attackon U.S. SiIos, Other Military Targets,

LUA Capability, and Washington

This attack adds the crucial ingredient ofdirect attack on Washington, It would seemreasonable to assume that if the Soviets werewilling to target the U.S. National Capital andpolitical leadership, they would target alsomilitary targets unrelated to the U.S. ICBMforce or LUA capability such as submarine andbomber bases. This assumption, made here,would not affect the U.S capability to LUAbut could make Soviet intentions clearer in theearly minutes of the attack.

T =0: Soviets launch ICBMS and SLBMS,

Interim: Satellites indicate ICBM and SLBM

T

launches. Number and type of ICBMSlaunched consistent with countersilo attack.Number of SLBM launches indicates deter-mined effort to destroy time-urgent U, S,miIitary capabiIity as well as LUA capability,Attack judged massive by command posts.Immediate measures taken to assurecommunications between NCA and ABNCP.Backup ABNCPS and sensor aircraft, as wellas strategic bombers, alerted.

= 5: Further satellite and coastal SLBM radardata indicate Washington under attack. im-pact expected at T = 10. NCA notifiedurgently by command posts.

Soon after. SLBM impacts on Washington.ABNCP loses contact with NCA. No pro-cedures to reconstitute NCA in time to LUA.LUA fails.

OR, as above, until:

T = 5: Peacetime procedures allow for full two-way communications between NCA andcommand posts at this time. Informed ofsituation, NCA authorizes LUA if Wash-

ington destroyed and makes choice amongretaliatory options. Crews of commandposts do not know character of responsechosen by NCA. NCA stays on the line.

Interim: Nuclear detonations on Washington.

T

T

NCA goes off the I inc.

= 12: ABNCP receives confirmation of nu-clear detonations on Washington and manyother U.S. targets from nuclear detonationdetectors.

= 15: Probe and sensor aircraft continue toindicate countersilo ICBM attack. ABNCPexecutes LUA according to NCA’S wishes.

Interim: U.S. ICBMS launch.

T = 30: Soviet ICBM RVS impact empty silos.

Attempt to Disrupt U.S. TechnicalCapability to LUA Precedes

Soviet Attack

This kind of “scenario” imagines a pro-longed “war of nerves” preceding actualSoviet nuclear attack in the course of whichthe Soviets attempt, by means contrived not toprovoke U.S. preemption, to destroy criticalhardware elements of the U.S. LUA capability.These hardware elements include warning sen-sors and communications I inks, but not theNCA. Scenarios like this are sometimes cited asreasons to distrust reliance on LUA.

No system of warning sensors and com-munications can be made absolutely resistantto disruption. Rather, the United States couldmake such disruption time consuming for theSoviets, thus removing any element of surprise,and requ ire that the means to disruption be ex-tensive, provocative, and even overtly hostile.As a practical matter, one can also make a sub-set of the system virtually immune to disrup-tion. Whether this residuum could be con-sidered sufficient to support a U.S. LUA de-cision is not clear, but it could impose on theSoviets the concern that even if they ac-complished the disruption of the rest of thesystem, the United States might still be able tolaunch under attack. Above all, of course, theSoviets would have to consider that before

.


their attempts at disruption had succeeded,the United States might preemptively attackthem or at least inflict comparable damage ontheir systems.

The satellites are the element which, whilesusceptible to disruption, would take thelongest to destroy. Direct-ascent antisatelliteinterceptors would take some 18 hours toreach the high orbits where the satelIites couldbe placed. The United States would thus haveample warning that disruption was in progress.As a practical matter, such high-altitude directattack would also be quite difficult for theSoviets to execute and would be subject tovarious U.S. countermeasures, as discussed inthe previous section. It would also seem thatSoviet preparations for such an attack couldscarcely be concealed; for one thing, theboosters required would be the size of SS-18sor Iarger.

Space mines are a means whereby the satel-lites could be destroyed instantly, once theMines were emplaced. As discussed in theprevious section, unusual orbits could bechosen for U.S. satellites. The United Statescould reasonably assert that Soviet placementof space vehicles in the same or nearby orbitscould have no other purpose than to disruptthe U.S. LUA capability.

1 n either case – direct-ascent interception orspace mines — there would be no question of“surprise” attack. The United States could inaddition possess the capability to launch a setof replacement satellites (perhaps less sophis-ticated and presumably in lower orbits) beforeSoviet disruption of the primary system werecomplete. These replacements, too, could beattacked, but this attack would also take time.

Supposing the United States permitted dis-ruption of its warning satelIites, still the air-

borne sensors, land-based (and perhaps ship-based) radars, and the rocket-launched probeW ould remain. One can conceive of threats(sabotage, close-in jammers) to the ground-based radars, but barring this, they could behardened to the point where their destructionrequired nuclear attack. The probes couId alsobe in hardened silos. Associated BMD systemscould increase the price of destruction byballistic missile attack.

Supposing now that the satellites and theradars and probes were destroyed, the sensoraircraft would still provide warning and attackassessment. It is generalIy believed that air-craft operating i n North American airspace inwartime would be difficult for the Soviets toattack. These aircraft could operate out oftheir home airfields and, presumably, civilianairfields for long periods. Thus in a period ofprolonged conflict, in which other U.S. sensorassets were destroyed and the United Stateswished maintain an LUA capabiIity, theseaircraft might provide enduring warning andattack assessment. Though not providing warn-ing of Soviet attack at launch, they wouId stiIIprovide notice of attack within 15 minutes ofthe time a launch decision was required. Underthe circumstances, U.S. decision makers wouldpresumably put themselves in a position tomake rapid decisions.

“Thus, a Soviet attempt to deny the U.S.warning and attack assessment capabilitycould be made exceedingly difficult and risky,if not impossible. A similar analysis could beperformed for the communications links de-scribed previously. Thus, vuInerabiIity of thetechnical elements of the LUA capability neednot be an “Achilles’ heel” for reliance on LUA.Whether the procedures supporting decision-making can be made as robust is another mat-ter, as has been discussed extensively.

SUMMARY OF CRITICAL ISSUES FOR LUA

This section summarizes the critical issues issues, and most certainIy judgments regardingthat might enter into a decision to rely on LUA them, are in the end nontechnical. Thoughas the guarantor of ICBM “survivability. ” As is technical analysis can further define theseapparent from this chapter, some of these issues, it cannot resolve them. Certain of these

Ch. 4—Launch Under Attack 163

issues apply in some measure to survivablebasing as well as to LUA; what matters for pur-poses of comparison are the differences be-tween the two types of basing. For instance,that certain circumstances of LUA are unpleas-ant is obvious, but it is not clear in al I casesthat they are improved by delaying response.

It must be borne in mind that the observa-tions made here apply to a hypothetical futuresystem of reliance on LUA, not the meanswhich support the present LUA capabiIity.

Information Available toDecision makers

Decisionmakers would require informationconcerning the extent and intent of a Soviet at-tack and confidence that this information wasaccurate. Technical analysis can specify whichdata might be available at certain times in thecourse of an attack but cannot suggest whatinformation might be considered adequateto support a decision to launch offensivemissiIes.

In general, the earlier in the attack a sensoracquired information, the less detailed itwouId be Thus, at the time of Iaunch, thenumber, type, and origins of boosters launchedcould be specified Several minutes later, itcouId be possible to determine whether the en-tire United States was under attack or just aportion thereof By midcourse (15 minutesfrom launch and 15 minutes before impact),the impact points of RVS could be predicted.The locations of detonations of submarine-Iaunched RVS on the United States might alsobe known By this time, only 5 to 10 minuteswouId remain for decision making

One might legitimately question whether, ifthe United States possessed a survivable ICBMforce, better information that this would beavailable to support a retaliatory decisionwithin a short time. That is, given the wide-spread confusion and disruption of commu-nications following even a small attack, the in-formation supplied by warning sensors in thefirst few minutes might in fact be the mostcomplete available for a long time after the at-tack. Deployment of a survivable force might

actualIy lead the United States to deploy fewerand less robust sensors than it would deploy itrelying on LUA, Thus, as a practical matter, theinformation upon which to gauge responsecould conceivably be less with survivableforces than with LUA

Despite the redundancy and technical va-riety of the warning sensors, there could bereluctance on the part of decision makers tobase launch decisions on information col-lected by such remote means.

Decision Timelines

Depending on the circumstance, the amountof time available for deciding on a response toSoviet attack could range from an upper limitof 20 minutes to no time at all. Meeting thistimeline would probably require at least someprovisional advance planning by the Presidentand other NCA.

Possibilityies for Diplomatic andOther Activities

The LUA timeline would leave no time fordiplomatic act iv i t ies between attack andresponse. At very least, such activity couldserve to signal to the Soviets U.S. perceptionsof their attack and the intent of any U.S.response, Communication with other govern-ments, U.S. overseas installations, and U.S.military forces worldwide might also be ac-complished at this time.

However, it is not clear to what extent thecircumstances of nuclear war, especially asregards disruption of communciations, wouldpermit such activities within a short period ofan initial attack anyway.

Providing for Launch Authority

Timely command decisions by authorizedNCA is clearly a requirement for reliance onLUA,

This requirement would be most difficult tosatisfy if the Soviets intended deliberately todestroy or “decapitate” the NCA. In this cir-cumstance, possible options might be: LUA


fails (not intended for this extreme case); provi-sion is made for very early NCA decision; deci-sions decided on i n advance by the NCA are ex-ecu ted by others if the NCA does not veto orchange them; launch authority is delegated toothers than the NCA.

Which of these options, if any, would be ac-ceptable is a matter not of technology but ofdecision at the highest levels of politicalauthority.

Even in the less extreme case in which no at-tack on the NCA is intended, provision must bemade for the NCA to be available at al I timesfor rapid decision. Such procedures might beonerous for the President and other NCA,

Fear That U.S. LUA Capability CouldSomehow Be Sidestepped

The analysis presented here indicates that,from a technical point of view, sensors andcommunications could, with money and ef-fort, be provided to make at least the technicalelements of the LUA capability exceedinglydifficult, if not impossible, for the Soviets todisrupt. Procedures to support decisionmakingare another matter, Even if both hardware andprocedures were devised which were veryrobust indeed, it might not be possible toeradicate completely a lingering fear that theSoviets might find some way to “sidestep” thesystem. These fears could become aggravatedat a time of crisis.

Risk of Error

There are two risks of error in a basingsystem of reliance on LUA: the risk that launch

Wouand

d take place when there was no attack,the risk that launch would fail to take

place when there was an attack.

Insofar as technology is concerned in theassessment of these risks, one can i n principlemake arbitrarily small the probability thatelectronic systems by themselves make eitherkind of error, though beyond a point efforts todecrease the chance of one error could in-crease the chance of the other.

But it would seem that the principal sourceof error might not be electronic or mechanicalmalfunction by itself, The odds that a sensorindicates something out of the ordinary mightbe quite high, but the chances that it indicatessomething resembling a plausible Soviet at-tack would be much smaller, The probabilitythat severa sensors based upon differentphysical principles indicated the same plausi-ble attack would be much smaller still. That is,electronic systems tend to make random,rather than highly structured, errors. On theother hand, electronic systems have a verylimited ability to correct errors once made.Human beings, by contrast, have a high ca-pacity to correct errors, but also a high ca-pacity to commit highly structured errors. Therisk of error for an LUA system would seemhighest when the human being’s ability tomake highly structured errors combines withthe machine’s limited ability to correct them.Mistakenly initiating a “simulated” attack by,e.g., loading the wrong tape into a computer,would be an error of this type. It is obviouslynot possible to set and enforce a bound on theprobability that such an error could occur inan LUA system.

Chapter 5

SMALL SUBMARINE BASING OF MX

Chapter 5.— SMALL SUBMARINE BASING OF MX

Submarine Basing of Strategic

Nontechnical Considerations

Technical Choices Leading to

Page

Missiles .. .167

. . . . . . . . . . 167

Small Submarines . . . ............169

Description and Operation of the SmallSubmarine System. . . . . . . . . . . . . .170

Introductory Remarks. . . . . . . ........170Overview . . . . . . . . . ...............171Communications System and

Operational Procedures . ..........173Submarine Navigation and Mapping

Needed for High Missile Accuracy .. .174Missile Guidance Technologies . . . . . . .175

Vulnerability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .176Tactical and Strategic Applications of

Antisubmarine Technologies . . . . .. 177Theory of Open Ocean Barrage . . . . . . .178Open Ocean Barrage With No

Information About SubmarineLocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....179

Open Ocean Barrage After Detectionof Snorkeling Submarines . . . . . . . . . 180

Searches With Technologies ThatObserve Nonsnorkeling Submarines. .182

Increased Range Acoustic Technologies. 184

Page

Increased Radar Search Using Satellites. 186Countermeasures to Radar Satellites .. .189War of Attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .189Van Dorn Effect . . . . . . . . . . .. ...190Theory of Trailing. . . . . . . . . . ........191Establishment of Trail at Port Egress. . .193Establishment of Trail Using Large Area

Open Ocean Search . . . . . . . . . .196Diesel-Electric Propulsion Technology. .197Nuclear Electric Propulsion . . . . . . . .198Concluding Remarks on the

Vulnerability of Submarines . . . . .199

Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Land-and Sea-Based Missiles . . . . . . . 199

Accuracy of Small Submarine Based MX .. 202

Accuracy of Star-Tracker-Aided InertiallyGuided MX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .205

Degradation in Accuracy After aSubmarine Navigation Fix. . . . . . .. ..206

Inertial Guidance Aided by Radio Update .207

Time on Target Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .208

Responsiveness of the Submarine Force. . .209

Endurance of Force. . . . . . . . . . .210

Cost and Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

System Size. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Final Sizing Consideration . . . . . . . . . . .

Location and Description of Bases. . . . .

TABLES

Tab/e No.21. SubmarineObservables . . . . . . . . . .22. Acoustic Sensors forSubmarine

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Nonacoustic Sensors for SubmarineDetection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Operational Factors Affecting RadarSearch of Submarine DeploymentAreas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Miss Sensitivities tolnitial Errors forICBMTrajectories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Comparisonof Hard Target KillCapabilities of Sea-Based MX WithDesign Requirements of the Land-Based MX . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . .Small Submarine 10-Year Lifecyclecost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Number of Submarines Required To

Page

. . 210

. . 212

. . 213

. . 213

Page. . 177

. . 177

. . 177

. . 182

. . 201

. . 203

. . 211

Keep 100 MX Missiles Continuously onStation v. Submarine In-Port Time .. ..213Estimated Characteristics of the SmallSubmarine Refit Site and the TridentRefit Site. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .214

FIGURES

Figure No. Page67, Nuclear and Nonnuclear Powered

6869

70

71

Submarines of Different Size . .......171Encapsulated MX Missile . ..........172MX-Carrying Diesel-Electric SmallSubmarine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 173Sequence of Events During theLaunch of an Encapsulated MX Missile. 173Number of Weapons Required to

Figure No. Page

72.

73.

74.

75.76.77.7879

80

8182

83.

84.

85<

86,

87

88

Destroy Submarines That Have BeenSighted Prior to a Preemptive Attack .. 179Potential Deployment Area Given1,000- and 1,500-nmi Operating Ranges 180Large Area Search With TechnologyThat Can Only Detect SnorkelingSubmarines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .181Sources of Reverberation That Limitthe Capability of High-Powered ActiveSonars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...183Potential Whale Sonar Targets . ......185Fishing Vessel Monitoring, ., . .......187Ground Track of Radar Search Satellite 188Van Dorn Ef fect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .191Active Acoustic Search for aSubmarine That Has DispensedDecoys Which Simulate a RefIectedSonar Signal From a Submarine Hull. .. 194Passive Acoustic Search forSubmarine That Has DispensedDecoys Which Simulate the Soundof a Submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , .195German Type 2000 Submarine . ......197Factors Affecting the Accuracy of aBallistic Missile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200Down Range and Cross Range Errorsof a Ballistic Reentry Vehicle at aTarget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....202Accuracy of Inertially Guided Sea-Based Missile at Different RangesFrom Targets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...202Accurary of Star-Tracker-EnhancedSea-Based Missile as a Function ofRange From Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .206Ocean Areas That Provide AdequateLine-of-Sight View of Ground Beaconson Continental U. S., Aleutian Islands,Alaska, and Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .208Ocean Areas That Provide AdequateLine-of-Sight View of Ground Beaconson Continental U. S., Aleutian Islands,Alaska, Hawaii, and Selected South SeaIslands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209Small Submarine Program Schedule. .. 211

Chapter 5

SMALL SUBMARINE BASING OF MX

SUBMARINE BASING OF STRATEGIC MISSILES

Strategic missiles are based on submarinesbecause submarines can be hidden in vast ex-panses of ocean, thereby gaining a high degreeof survivability. Currently, the United Statestakes advantage of the survivability of subma-rnes to deploy the Polaris, Poseidon, a n dTrident I missiles. Unlike attack submarines,whose primary mission is to protect convoys orattack enemy shipping, these balIistic missilecarrying submarines seek to avoid surfaceships and remain undetected, available forstrikes against enemy targets on command.The object of basing MX on submarines wouldbe to take advantage of the same survivabilitythat has been demonstrated by experiencegained with the Polaris and Poseidon systems.One major question addressed in this chapteris whether this survivability can be expected tocontinue into the 1990’s

MX has been conceived as a land-basedintercontinental ballistic missile (I CBM). Theland-based ICBM has historically had greateraccuracy, flexibility of targeting and rapidityof response than that of sea-based missiles. Asa land-based ICBM, the MX missile is expected

to set still a new standard in each of these at-tributes relative to previously deployed land-based missiles. The second technical questionthat is to be addressed in this chapter is the ex-tent to which this new standard of attributescould be preserved if the MX were insteadbased on submarines.

Deploying the MX at sea rather than on landwouId also raise questions about how impor-tant it is to mix and balance the different at-tributes of nuclear forces to best deter war.The different points of view are summarizedhere, but these issues cannot be resolved bytechnical anaIysis.

This chapter begins by noting some of theprinciple rationales and drawbacks of sub-marine basing of MX. Some of these issues,while clearly relevant, are just as clearly nottechnical issues per se. The following sectionsattempt to more closely define and analyzetechnical and operational issues that bear onthe problem of submarine deployment of alarge, flexible, counterforce ICBM like MX.The conclusions of these technical analysesare summarized in the last section.

NONTECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Much of the interest that has been shown insubmarine basing of MX is motivated by theperception that the survivability of a futuresubmarine force is Iikely to be insensitive tothe nature and size of the Soviet ICBM force.As long as the Soviets are not able to developan ability to localize and track submarines, theonly conceivable way they could preemptivelyattack the submarine force with ICBMS wouldbe to randomly barrage suspected submarineoperating areas. If the Soviet ICBM force wereto grow in its ability to deliver large amountsof megaton nage, submarine operating areascould merely be expanded in size to countersuch a threat. I n addition, the Soviets could

gain no additional ability to threaten the sur-vivabiIity of submarines through improve-ments of accuracy technology or through frac-tionating the warheads on existing or newICBMS. Thus, provided that submarines main-tain their ability to hide in vast expanses ofocean, there would be little or no way tothreaten their survivabi l i ty with ei ther asubstantial expansion, or wi th technicalimprovements, of Soviet ICBM forces. A deci-sion to deploy the MX missile at sea in sub-marines would therefore negate the effec-tiveness of the Soviet ICBM force as a meansof threatening the MX missile. This decisioncould diminish the political leverage that the

167


Soviets have bought with their modernizedICBM force by removing their abi l i ty tothreaten a major U.S. strategic weapon system.

A perspective that argues against the basingof MX on submarines holds that moving mis-siles off the land will result in fewer disincen-tives to an adversary who is contemplating theuse of, or the threat of using, nuclear weaponsas a means of extracting political concessionsfrom the United States. This perspective viewsthe basing of strategic missiles on land as in-surance against political blackmail. An adver-sary who attempts to gain political advantageby threatening U.S. strategic systems withnuclear destruction would, in effect, be forcedto threaten targets on American soil. Land-basing would make the price of attempts togain political leverage in this manner veryhigh, thus decreasing the likelihood of suchblackmail.

Some who argue this way also believe thatthe United States wouId lack the resolve to re-spond to Soviet threats unless it was clear thatthe continental United States was threatenedwith nuclear attack, They fear that such lackof resolve could make nuclear war easier foran adversary to contemplate, thereby makingit more Iikely.

Others disagree with these perspectives andargue that there is a beneficial effect of remov-ing potential targets from the continentalUnited States. Since there would be no cleargain in an unsuccessful attack against a surviv-able sea-based system, there would be no in-centive to attack strategic systems. They arguethat a land-based system that presents aserious threat to Soviet military systems couldinvite attack if a crisis deteriorated to thepoint where Soviet decisionmakers believedwar was unavoidable. I n such a circumstance,Soviet decisionmakers might attempt to limitdamage to their own systems by striking first.If a submarine-based system were untarget-able, a rational Soviet decisionmaker wouldbe denied such a choice. Thus, submarine bas-ing wouId have the stabilizing effect of forcinga wait-and-see attitude on decision makers dur-ing periods of international crisis.

A potentially serious drawback of basing MXmissiles on submarines is that the system couldshare a common mode of failure with Tridentand Poseidon if an unforeseen antisubmarinewarfare capabiIity emerged in the next 20years. Since the United States, with its substan-tial commitment to undersea warfare, hasbeen unable to identify or project any threat toballistic missile submarines, the significance ofsuch a potential drawback is difficuIt toevaluate.

Another potential drawback is that a subma-rine-based system would require highly skilledand trained personnel that are not currentlyavailable in the Navy. In order to meet addi-tional manpower needs, training centers wouldhave to be established and recruiting effortswould Id have to be expanded. I f the civiIianeconomy was healthy, competition for train-able people could make it difficult to attractthem into the Navy. It could also be difficult toretain personnel once they have developedskills because of the attraction of lucrativeciviIian jobs.

‘Submarine construction presents somewhatdifferent problems from that of surface shipconstruction. Past experience indicates that ifshipyards do not demonstrate a good deal ofcompetence constructing surface ships, theywiII have very great difficulties constructingsubmarines. Since the volume available forequipment and crew in a submarine is verysmall relative to that available on surfaceships, construction must be carefully plannedso that components can be put into crampedlocations in the proper sequence. Quality con-trol is also important since equipment andcomponents may be subjected to extreme con-ditions during the course of submarine opera-tions.

Constructin g a new fIeet of MX-carrying sub-marines wouId be a major undertaking. Threeshipyards not currently engaged in submarineconstruction would probably be needed toconstruct submarines if the full fleet is to bedeployed by 1992 or 1994. Each shipyardwouId have to be provided with a smalI teamof people experienced in submarine construc-

Ch. 5—Small Submarine Basing of MX ● 169

tion to help it make an orderly transition tosubmarine construction. Lack of experience insubmarine construction couId resuIt in pro-gram delays if the shipyards had not beencarefulIy chosen for their efficiency and com-petence or if they did not have adequate guid-ance on submarine construction techniques

Delays could occur in other submarine con-struction programs as well, if the base ofspecial materials required for submarine con-struction were not expanded to meet increaseddemands. It is also possible that if problemsdeveloped within the MX submarine program,talent, effort, and funding might also have tobe diverted from those programs.

Other problems could ar ise with otherelements of the project due to the timing ofthe missile development program If missiledevelopment were delayed a year by designchanges required for sea basing, it would beready for deployment in 1987 The design,development, and construction of a new class

of submarines could in theory be expedited toproduce lead ships by late 1987, but this ap-pears unlikely. If the program proceeded at arate more characteristic of recent strategicweapons programs, the lead ships would notbe deployed until 1990. The missile couldtherefore be ready for deployment severalyears before there are means to deploy themissile. It would be necessary to keep missilescientists, engineers, and managers availablefor the testing and monitoring phase of themissile deployment. These individuals mighthave to be retained at great cost until thedeployment is far enough along to assure thatunforeseen problems had not emerged.

These perspectives, among others, involvejudgments of a nontechnical nature and willnot be addressed further in this chapter. In-stead the focus will be on assessing the tech-nical strengths and weaknesses of a sea-basedMX system that was optimized to perform themissions usually ascribed to ICBMS.

TECHNICAL CHOICES LEADING TO SMALL SUBMARINES

If an MX-carrying submarine force is to bespecificalIy optimized to capture as many at-tributes of the land-based lCBM as possible,there are two attributes of the land-basedI C BM that suggest smaII submarines carrying afew missiIes are preferable to large submarinescarrying many missiles These attributes of theland-based missile are

1. fIexibility of targeting that does not com-promise survivability of unused missiIes inthe force, and

2. diversity in failure modes with the otherlegs of the Triad

Flexibility refers to a weapons system’s abili-ty to select and carry out preplanned attackoptions, or attack options that are subsets ofpreplanned attack options It also includes theabiIity to carry out ad hoc attacks against tar-gets that may be on the National Target DataInventory List or targets that are specified onlyin terms of geographical location

Since a large ballistic missile submarine car-ries military assets capable of delivering enor-mous destruction against an adversary’s tar-gets, it is itself a target of considerable militaryimportance, I f the submarine’s position wereto become known in wartime, there wouId be asubstantial incentive to attempt to destroy it.

If a flexible tar-getting strategy were adoptedfor a submarine force, submarines might beordered to fire a Iimited number of missiles atenemy targets. The firing of these missiIescould potentialIy reveal the position of thesubmarine to enemy surface ships at great dis-tances, to space-based sensors, radar systems,and possibly even sonar systems. The expectedpostlaunch survivability of a missile-carrying

submarine is therefore quite different fromthat of its expected prelaunch survivabilityThe flexible use of this force could thereforeresuIt in attrition that wouId compromise itsabiIity to continue the war or force termina-tion of the war


If flexibility of targetting is specificallydesired in a submarine force, it would be nec-essary to make the survivability of remainingmissiles as independen t o f previouslylaunched missiles as possible. This could bedone if the submarine force was made up of alarge number of submarines each carrying asmall number of missiles. If this were the case,then the wartime loss of submarines thatplaced themselves at risk by launching only afew of their missiles would not result in theloss of a large number of remaining unusedmissiles. The force would therefore be able tocarry out limited nuclear attacks without com-promising its ability to carry out subsequentmassive strike missions.

Another reason that submarine-based strate-gic weapons have been less flexible than land-based ICBMS in the past is that communica-tions with submarines have historically notbeen as good as those achievable with land-based systems. As will be discussed later in thischapter, f lexibi l i ty in targett ing could beachieved with the current submarine force if aconscious decision were made to acquire cer-tain kinds of communications capabilities andto adopt certain operational procedures.

Diversity in failure modes with other legs ofthe Triad is a more di f f icul t at tr ibute to

discuss, since it involves making judgmentsabout threats that have not yet been iden-tified. If the MX missile were deployed onsmall submarines, it seems more probable thatit would share a common failure mode withother submarine-based systems than would aland-based system. The likelihood of such abreakthrough must be considered remote inthe absence of any scientific evidence to sup-port such a possibility. However, if an unfore-seen antisubmarine capability developed inthe future, it is possible there could be quan-titative and/or qualitative differences betweensea-based Trident/Poseidon submarine forcesand submarine-based MX that could make thethreat less effective against such diverse typesof submarines. Small, slow-moving submarineswould in fact have certain signatures that aredifferent from those of larger, faster movingsubmarines. In addition, a fleet of many sub-marllnes poses both a qualitatively and quan-titatively different set of operational problemsto an antisubmarine force than does a fleet ofa few submarines. With this in mind, it couldbe argued that a fleet of MX-carrying sub-marines would increase the diversity of stra-tegic nuclear forces, making it less likely that asingle technology could threaten all three legsof the Triad.

DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION OFTHE SMALL SUBMARINE SYSTEM

Introductory Remarks

If the MX were to be deployed on a fleet ofsubmarines, there wouId be many engineeringand operational tradeoffs that would have tobe made if the fleet was to be an effectiveweapon system. 1 n order to establish conserv-ative bounds for what is Iikely to be achiev-able, OTA has postulated a system of subma-rines, operational procedures, and communi-cations that is specifically optimized to attainICBM-like flexibility and responsiveness whilestill basing MX on submarines. The system con-cept to be described and evaluated is based on

off-the-shelf technologies, and Navy oper-ational experience and practices whereverpossible. However, it should be expected thatif a national decision were made to deploy MXon submarines, many technical features of anew system of MX-carrying submarines wouldlikely be different from those postulated forOTA’S analysis of small submarine basing. Anew class of submarines would have to bedesigned and built. New and different pro-cedures would also be evaluated and devel-oped for the submarine operations. Such a vastenterprise as the design, construction, anddeployment of a new and modern strategic


weapon svstem could result in a system with rines to carry 100 alert MX missiles for deliveryfeatures differentdiscussed here

from the system that will be of highly accurate warheads against Soviettargets. It is believed that these submarines,

Overview

The submarine system to be described uses acombination of communications, navigation,and guidance technologies aimed at maximiz-ing flexibiIity of targeting, rapidity of re-sponse, and missiIe accuracy. Submarine oper-ational procedures are set up to allow sub-marines to carry out launch orders issued bythe National Command Authorities (NCA) rap-idly. There would always be enough subma-

while at sea, would be untargetable and im-pervious to Soviet preemptive actions (thisissue is discussed fully in the next section) Thissubmarine force is therefore optimized tocarry out missions similar to those commonlyascribed to ICBM forces.

The basing system would consist of a forceof 51 moderate-sized (see fig. 67) diesel-electric submarines each of which is armedwith four MX missiles. The submarines couldalso be powered with small, low-enrichment

Figure 67.—Nuclear and Nonnuclear Powered Submarines of Different Size

Nuclear poweredNR-1136’ X 13’

Nuclear poweredTrident42’ X 560’

OTA diesel-electric25’ X 342’

German Type 2000small diesel-electric25’ X 200’

Nuclear-turboelectricSSN-597 (Tullibee)

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment


nuclear reactors. During normal operations, 28submarines would be continuously at sea, Inperiods of crisis or international tension, sub-marines in refit (but not those in extended refitor in overhaul) could be surged from port toraise the at-sea numbers to 38 to 40. Thisdeployment would provide an additional 400warheads on station.

The MX missiles would be carried in steelcapsules approximately 80 ft long and 10 ft indiameter (see fig. 68), The capsules would becarried outside the pressure hull on the topside of the submarine’s huII (see fig. 69).

On a launch command (see fig. 70), hy-draulic actuators would open doors on the sub-marine’s fairings and straps within the fairingswould release the capsule. Soft ballast wouldthen be blown from the front end of the cap-sule causing it to rise and rotate toward thevertical. Upon sensing the ocean surface, thetop and bottom caps on the capsule would becut free, the missiles motors would ignite, and

the thrust of the first stage motor would propelthe missile from the capsule.

After missile flyout, a flotation collar and/ordrag surface would deploy from the e m p t y

capsule to slow its descent into the ocean. Thiswou Id lower the risk of a COIIision between theexpended capsuI e and the submarine.

The submarines would deploy from dedi-cated bases in Alaska and on the east and westcoasts of the continental United States, Eachbase would, on the average, have 5 to 6 sub-marines in port at al I times. The submarineswouId be at sea for 60 days and in port for refitand logistic support for 25 days.

The submarines would typically operate asfar as 1,000 nautical miles (nmi) from port.They would be designed to have sufficientspeed and endurance to operate at stiII greaterdistances from port (1 ,500 nmi or more) if suchoperations were deemed desirable. Each sub-marine would have an advanced submarine

Figure 68.—Encapsulated MX Missile

Shock isolation

Steel capsule

Small-diesel

Trident



Figure 69.— MX”Carrying Diesel. Electric Small Submarinea (3,300 tons submerged displacement)

Computer

Engine room Galley messing- - - - -

T l a u n c h T

Communicaton

Forward

II I

aSubmarlne design developed by consfdenng the characteristics of the most recent U S,.bwlt diesel submarines, the SS580, the SSG557 GROWLER Class REGULUSmlssl Ie submarine, current technology represented In the Federal Republ IC of Germany submarine designs (H DW Type.209 and Type-2000 designs), and other advancesdemonstrated In Swedwh and Nethedand designs Proven technologies incorporated Into design are maximum quletlng achewable by sound fsolation, a(r coupling ofelectrtc drive motor to screw shaft, faster recharging at lower snorkel noise levels, Increased battery capacity, microprocessor monitoring and management of powersystems, and smaller crew size


Figure 70.—Sequence of Events During theof an Encapsulated MX Missile

A

Launch

- “t ’


inertial navigation system (E SCM/SINS), avelocity measuring sonarsystem for interrogatingspenders, and equipmentthe Global PositioningLORANC.

(VMS), an acousticprepositioned tran-for taking fixes onSystem (GPS) and

Missile accuracy would be maintained main-ly with onboard submarine navigational equip-ment. This equipment would occasionally beupdated with the G PS or a covert system ofacoustic transponder fields. If the GPS weredestroyed by enemy action, the occasionalnavigational updates would be done with theacoustic transponder fields.

Communications System andOperational Procedures

The communications system and operatingprocedures would be configured so that thesubmarines in peacetime would constantly bereceiving communications from NCA through


trailing wire antennas and/or buoys that wouldconstantly receive shore to submarine very lowfrequency (VLF) communications. In addition,the submarines could also be in two-way com-munications with NCA using a covert, rapidand reliable high-orbit satellite transponderlink. This link would allow for the submarinesto report back to NCA and make possible highdata rate reception of information for rapidretargetting of the force.

Since shore-based VLF stations would prob-ably be destroyed if there was enemy preemp-tive action, communications with the sub-marines would then be maintained via sur-vivable airborne VLF relays, that could imme-diately replace shore-based VLF stations.These airborne relays would maintain radiosiIence and would be continuously airborneunless they were needed to replace shore-based VLF transmissions. Emergency ActionMessages (EAMs) could be routed from NCA,through either the shore-based VLF stations, orthe airborne VLF relays, to the submarines. (To-day these airborne relays are known asTACAMO aircraft. TACAMO is an acronym forTake Charge And Move Out).

If there was a need for high data rateretargetting, or for two-way communications,designated submarines would be ordered viathe VLF radio link to prepare for high data rateor two-way communications. I n order to dothis, the submarines would erect a mast abovethe ocean surface to permit communicationthrough the high-orbit satellites mentionedearlier.

If there was a need for the submarine to re-port back to NCA, the submarine could beam amessage through the satellite using a 5-inchdish antenna which would be mounted on amast.

The probability of an adversary detecting orintercepting such transmissions would be verylow for the following reasons. The radio fre-quencies used by the satellites would be in theextremely high frequency (E H F) radio band andwould have a wavelength of order several mil-limeters. Because the wavelengths are sosmall, EHF signals would be collimated into an

extremely tight beam by the 5-inch dish an-tenna. Only receivers in the path of the beamcould receive the transmissions from the sub-marine. Since the dish antenna would also beh igh ly d i rec t iona l fo r rece iv ing s a t e l l i t esignals, it would be effectively impossible tojam incoming signals from the satellite.

The satellites could be survivable againstsatellite attacks. The high-orbit satellites couldbe put in five times geosynchronous orbits(almost halfway to the Moon) and would bevery difficuIt to attack, even using large spaceboosters.

Earth-launched interceptors would take 16to 18 hours to reach the satellites, During thisperiod, the satellites could be maneuveredwhile they are out of sight of Soviet ground-tracking stations, forcing the space boosters tomake course changes beyond their propuIsiveendurance. If there was an extended period ofconflict and the United States did not want tokeep repositioning these satellites, the ground-tracking stations could be destroyed and thesatellites could be repositioned for a finalt i me.

Submarine Navigation and MappingNeeded for High Missile Accuracy

In order to have high missile accuracy, themissile guidance system must have accurateinformation on the missile’s initial velocity,position, and orientation immediately prior tolaunch. This information can be obtained fromnavigation systems on the submarine and fromgravity maps of the submarine operating areas.These systems will be briefly described hereand will be discussed again in detail in thesection on missile accuracy.

The submarines would maintain accurate in-formation on their position using an advancedsubmarine inertial navigation system ESGM/SINS. They could also measure their velocityvery accurately using a VMS. This informationwould be fed to the missile guidance systemprior to launch so that errors in missile ac-curacy due to velocity and position uncertain-ties would be minimal.

Ch. 5—Small Submarine Basing of MX 175

ESCM/SINS could be reset by making navi-gational fixes on the GPS. If the satellites weredestroyed by enemy action, the navigationsystem could instead be updated using any of150 covert acoustic transponder fields.

The acoustic transponder fields would belayed by submarines while on normal patrols.Typically, such operations would take severalhours. After laying a transponder field, the sub-marine would determine transponder positionsusing the ESGM/SINS or the GPS. The tran-sponder field couId be turned on using an en-crypted acoustic signal that could be sent fromthe submarine or by a small, powered, under-water drone deployed by the submarine, Smallboats could later use an encrypted acousticsignal to command the transponders to releasetheir anchors and float to the surface forretrieval. In this way, the transponder fieldscould be constantly shifted if the need arose.

Orientational information for the missileguidance system would be obtained with theaid of gravity maps of submarine operatingareas. These maps would be generated usingsatelIites, surface ships, and possibly sub-marines to measure gravity anomalies near thesurface of the ocean and in space.

Missile Guidance Technologies

There are three sets of missile guidancetechnologies that could be used to maintainhigh accuracy from sea. These are:

1. pure inertial guidance,2. star-tracker-aided inertial guidance, and3, radio-aided inertial guidance.

The strengths and weaknesses of these sys-tems will be described in more detail in thesection on missile accuracy.

Pure inertial guidance would essentially besimilar to that of the land-based missile, withsome of the methods of performing missileguidance calculations modified for sea basing.

Star-tracker-aided inertial guidance wouldbe similar to that of the land-based system butwith the aid of a star tracker to help correct forposition, velocity and orientational guidance

errors that accumulate during missile flight.These corrections are done by sighting on astar and comparing the star’s measured posi-tion to that of its expected position. The Tri-dent I missile uses a star tracker and experi-ence with this missile has demonstrated thatthis technology is very reliable and effective asa means of obtaining high accuracy with sea-based missiles.

Radio-aided inertial guidance depends onradio beacons to correct for position, velocity,and orientational guidance errors that occur inmissile flight. These corrections are done bysighting on a system of radio beacons.

The system of radio beacons used by themissile could be either on satellites (the GPS)or on the surface of the Earth (such a systemhas been called a Ground Beacon System(CBS) or an Inverted Global Positioning System(IGPS)

If a submarine-based system used radio-aided inertial guidance as a means of main-taining high accuracy, a GPS guidance fixcould be taken by missiles launched anywherewithin the deployment area. I n the event ofoutage of the GPS, which could occur if thesatellites were attacked, the secondary land-based IGPS could be used to maintain themissiles’ accuracy. However, if the groundradio beacons are used, the missiles mighthave to be launched within 400 to 500 miles ofthe ground beacons in order to get goodenough l ine of s ight contact to maintainmissile accuracy.

The system of ground radio beacons couldbe deployed along the coast of the continentalUnited States and Alaska. There would be alarge number of such beacons and a largernumber of decoys to make it costly for theSoviets to attack the beacons.

If the GPS were destroyed, and a launchorder was issued, some submarines might notbe close enough to the continental UnitedStates to use the radio ground beacons. If timepermitted, NCA could direct the remainingsubmarines to redeploy to areas within thecoverage of the ground beacons or direct themto any of 150 presurveyed acoustic trans-


ponder sites in the open ocean. The subma- the missile does not have a star tracker). Ifrines could obtain extremely accurate mea- there was not enough time to redeploy tosurements of both position and velocity at acoustic transponder fields, missiles could bethese presurveyed sites. Missile accuracies launched with position and velocity informa-achieved from these transponder fields could tion from the ESGM/Sl NS and VMS submarinebe slightly degraded relative to that achievable systems. Under these conditions, missile ac-with the aid of the radio beacons assuming curacy wouId be degraded stiII further.that the missile was only inertialIy guided (i. e.,

VULNERABILITY

The vulnerability of the force of submarinesto Soviet countermeasures depends on the na-ture and capability of the weapons systemsthat would be deployed, the strategy of theirapplication, and the amount of resources thatmight be committed against the submarineforce.

Potential threats to the submarine force fallinto several broad categories:

1. barrage attack using nuclear weapons;2. large area searches, followed by barrage

attack;3. large area searches, followed by attacks

using surf ace ships or aircraft;4. nuclear explosion generated giant waves

(Van Dorn Effect); and5. trailing of the submarine force, followed

by simultaneous attacks on all the sub-marines.

A barrage attack is a pattern bombing at-tack, using nuclear weapons. In its simplestform, it is a random pattern bombing of oceanareas in which the Soviets suspect submarinesare operating.

A variation of the barrage attack is an areasearch followed by a barrage attack. If a nadversary possessed a search technology thatwas only able to locate submarines approx-imately over an extended period of time, thenonly those areas of ocean in which the approx-imate locations of submarines were knownwould be attacked. if the area in which thesubmarines are localized was small enough, itis possible that the barrage could result in thedestruction of the submarine force.

If an adversary possessed still better searchtechnologies, capable of localizing submarineswell enough to send out surface ships or planesto attack the submarines, it would be possibleto sink the entire force of submarines with con-ventional weapons or a very small number ofnuclear weapons.

Still another way that a force of submarinesmight be attacked is to detonate large nuclearweapons in sufficiently deep water to generategigantic waves, If the waves were large enoughand the water shallow enough the waves mighttumble the submarines, causing sufficientdamage to sink them or render them inoper-able. The phenomenon associated with thegeneration of such large waves with nuclearexplosions is called the Van Dorn Effect.

If an adversary’s ability to search large areasrapidly was inadequate for attacking the forceby limited barrage or with surface ships orplanes, he might instead choose to trail all thesubmarines. once a significant fraction of thesubmarines were under trail, they could thenbe attacked at a prearranged time, resulting inthe destruction of the submarines and theirmissiIes,

A barrage attack against the entire operatingarea would require more than 30,000 high-yieldnuclear weapons. If the high-yield warheads onthe missiles were replaced with a larger num-ber of smaller warheads (i.e., if the adversaryfractionated his force) the area of ocean thatcould be barraged would be no greater.

If the adversary instead chose to generategigantic waves by detonating large nuclear

Ch. 5—Small Submarine Basing 01 MX ● 177

weapons in deep ocean waters, the submarineswould not be damaged unless they were in cer-tain shallow water areas on the ContinentalShelf.

All other means of attacking the force ofsubmarines depend on an ability to detect andlocalize, or trail, submarines with varyingdegrees of success. Table 21 lists possibleobservable that in principle accompany thepresence or operation of a submarine, Sensingtechnologies that could potentially detect thepresence of the observable listed in table 21are Iisted in tables 22 and 23. These technol-ogies were examined as possible methods fordetecting and localizing a fleet of slowlypatrolling dispersed ballistic missile subma-rines. All these technologies were found to fallinto one of two broad categories: sensing tech-nologies that do not appear to offer any possi-bi l i ty of detect ing submarines effect ivelyenough to be able to threaten the submarineforce by area search or trailing; and sensingtechnologies that could be spoofed, confused,or rendered useless with inexpensive and easyto implement countermeasures.

Tactical and Strategic Applications ofAnt i submarine Technologies

it should be noted that many sensing tech-nologies of great use in tactical antisubmarineoperations are of Iittle use in the strategic role.

Table 21 .—Submarine Observable

Acoustic radiated soundAcoustic reflected soundHeat (infrared signatures, surface scars from snorkeling

submarines, hydrodynamic transport of reactor heat toocean surface)

Electromagnetic disturbancesOcean surface effects (Bernoulli hump, snorkel or

periscope wake, trailing wire wakes, microwavereflectivity of the ocean surface)

Hydrodynamic wake effects (salinity, temperature,conductivity, density, etc.)

Erosion and corrosion productsChemical EffluentsIrradiated elements in sea waterMagnetic field disturbancesOptical reflectivity (blue-green lasers)LuminescenceBiological disturbances of marine life

Table 22.—Acoustic Sensors forSubmarine Detection

Submarine sonar systemsActive sonarsPassive sonars

Conformal arraysHull-mounted arraysTowed arrays

Fixed array networksPassive (sonobuoys and arrays)

Surface ship sonarsActive

Standard ship sonarsSemiactive

High-power low-frequency transmitters in combinationwith long-towed arrays

PassiveHull-mounted arraysTowed arrays

Plane, ship, or helicopter deployed sonobuoysActiveSemiactive

Sound source plus receiversPassive

Helicopter sonarsDipping sonars


Table 23.—Nonacoustic Sensors forSubmarine Detection

Infrared systemsSnorkeling scarsReactor heat

Optical systemsVisual observations

Snorkles or mastsWakesNear surface effects

Blue-green laserSynthetic aperture and pulse compression radars

Surface roughnessSnorkels or antennasHydrodynamic wakesBernoulli hump

Sniffing devicesSnorkeling effluents

Magnetic anomaly detectorsPassive microwave radiometers

Surface roughnessHydrodynamic wakes

Electromagnetic detectorsTurbulence sensing systemsTrace element detectorsActivation product detectors




For example, an attack submarine that is mov-ing at high speed in order to position itself toattack a battlegroup or convoy may be makingtens or hundreds of times more noise than thatmade by a slow-moving balIistic missile sub-marine. The close proximity of the fast-movinghostile submarine and the large amounts ofnoise associated with highspeed operationsmakes the attack submarine susceptible todetection by the battlegroup. If the attack sub-marine is detected by a passive sonar and it isnot possible for the sonar operator to deter-mine the range of the submarine from the bat-tlegroup, a plane or helicopter equipped with amagnetic anomaly detector could be sent outalong the direction of the sonar contact tolocalize the submarine. The aggressive tacticsrequired of the attack submarine result in thesubmarine increasing its detectability whilesimuItaneously bringing itself within closerange of potent ia l adversar ies. This c ir-cumstance is completely different from that ofthe balIistic missiIe submarine.

Theory of Open Ocean Barrage

A barrage attack is a pattern bombing at-tack, using nuclear weapons, of ocean areas inwhich the Soviets suspect submarines to beoperating. I n the absence of information onthe locations of submarines, they would haveto barrage millions of square miles of sus-pected operating area. It is also possible thatthe Soviets would attempt to gain informationon the approximate whereabouts of submar-ines by using large area search techniques. If,for instance, each submarine in the forcecould be contacted and localized once a day,during the process of a large area search, thenthe approximate locations of the submarineswould be known within a 24-hour saiIing dis-tance of those contact points.

Figure 71 illustrates just such a circum-stance. This diagram illustrates the results of apostulated large area search in the Gulf ofAlaska that results in the observation and lo-calization of four submarines in a period of 2days. Upon observing a submarine, the searchaircraft notes its location and continues on itssearch pattern. The submarine is assumed to

be patrolling at 5 knots and may be moving inany direction from the point of contact. TheresuIt is that the submarine’s location is knownwith less and less certainty as the submarinecontinues its patrol. I n the diagram, the area ofuncertainty associated with the most recentlyobserved submarine is represented by a point.The smallest circle represents the area of un-certainty generated by a submarine observed10 hours earlier. The next larger circle il-lustrates the area of uncertainty of a subma-rine observed the day before and the largestcircIe represents the area of uncertainty asso-ciated with a submarine observed 2 daysbefore.

The ability to perform such large areasearches is based on considerably more thanjust the dedication of military assets, A tech-nology must exist that gives a sufficiently highsearch rate so that the mean time between sub-marine localizations is smalI relative to thetime needed for the submarine to generate anarea of uncertainty sufficiently large to be im-possible to barrage. For example, if a searchtechnology existed that, on the average, wasable to localize every submarine i n the forceevery 24 hours, then each submarine would onthe average be be localized within a circle ofradius 120 miles (see fig. 71 for an illustrationof the size of the l-day area of uncertaintygenerated by a submarine assumed to patrol atan average speed of advance of 5 knots). Thesubmarine would, on the average, be known tobe somewhere within a circle of area 45,000nmi 2. If the kill radius of a nuclear weapon isof order 5 nmi, then 500 to 600 weapons wouldbe required to assure that the submarine wasdestroyed.

Of equal importance to large area searchcapability is a low false alarm rate. If one falsealarm were generated per hundred thousandsquare miles searched, there would be 20 to 30additional targets that would have to be at-tacked that were not submarines (assuming thedeployment area was of order 2 million to 3million mi2). If the average submarine contactrate were stiII every 24 hours but there were, inaddition, 20 to 30 false alarms among the tar-gets, 10,000 to 15,000 nuclear weapons would


Figure 71 .—Number of Weapons Required to Destroy Submarines That Have BeenSighted Prior to a Preemptive Attack

Four submarines seen in two days

Speed - 5 knots

Kill radius per weapon - 3.5 nmiTime since last observation

Just observed -1 RV10 hr, 7,800 nmi2, 196 RVS

1 day, 45,000 nmi2, 1,130 RVS

2 days, 181,000 nmi2, 4,500 RVS


be required to cover the false alarms. Thus, thefalse alarm rate must be very small or it will bedifficult to narrow down the number of targetsto a manageable level.

Finally of significance in the barrage attackis the number of warheads available to theadversary for purposes of barrage. If thenumber of weapons grows to a large enoughnumber, it may be necessary to expand thesubmarine operating areas or create decoys toincrease the number of false targets observedin an area search. For conceptual purposes, anapproximate rule of thumb would be 20,000 to25,000 nuclear weapons are required to bar-rage a million square miles of deep oceanoperating area. I n shallow water, the kill radiusassociated with the underwater detonation ofa nuclear weapon is considerably smaller thanthat in deep water. There is between 70,000and 90,000 mi2 of Continental Shelf area (ex-

cluding the Continental Shelf of the Gulf ofMexico but including the shelf area of the Gulfof Alaska) available for submarine operations;a pattern bombing attack of these areas wouIdrequire between 25,000 and 30,000 nuclearweapons because of the smaller kilI radius.

Open Ocean Barrage With NoInformation About Submarine

Locations

The submarines would operate in an area ofocean sufficiently large so that a significantfraction of them could not be damaged by pat-tern bombing with nuclear weapons. The de-ployment areas near the east and west coastsof the United States and the Gulf of Alaska areshown in figure 72. The outer boundaries in thefigure are 1,000- and 1,500-nmi arcs from Narr-gansett Bay, R. I., Anchorage, Alaska, San


Figure 72.—Potential Deployment Area Given 1,000- and l,500mmi Operating Ranges

‘ - ” - ” “ - ” - ” - ’ -

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

Diego, Cal if., and the Miller Peninsula, Wash.The exact boundaries of this area could varysignificantly with choice of base siting andoperational procedures. The operational areawouId be of the order of 2 milIion to 31/2 mil-I ion miles.

In testimony given to Congress, Garwin andDrell have suggested that a strategic nuclearweapon detonated at the proper depth in deepwater might destroy a submarine at a distanceof 5 miles. According to this estimate, anunderwater nuclear detonation could destroysubmarines within an area of ocean of about75 mi2.

Garwin and Drell have also stated that thisdamage range could be considerably smaller ifthe submarine were operating at a shallowdepth. If an open ocean barrage were at-tempted, a large number of missile launcheswould be observed on early warning sensors.The submarines could be ordered via the VLFradio I ink to move to shallow depths where theeffects of underwater nuclear explosionswouId be much shorter range. If this move-

operatingrange

ment were to occur, the effectiveness of thebarrage would be substantially reduced rela-tive to the numbers quoted in the paragraphabove.

Assuming the Soviets could deliver as manyICBM warheads against MX-carrying subma-rines as they could against a land-based MXsystem (i. e., 2,300 warheads) and the subma-rine damage range is 5 nmi, submarines oper-ating with i n an area of 200,000 miIes of oceancould be destroyed or rendered inoperable bya nuclear barrage attack. This attack wouldresult in the loss of two to three submarinesand their missiles if the submarine operatingarea was Iimited to only 3 m i I I ion m i 2.

Open Ocean Barrage After Detection ofSnorkeling Submarines

If a sensing technology with a very highsearch rate and a very low false alarm ratewere available, it is conceivable that sub-marines could be contacted often enough thatthe entire operating area would not have to be

Ch. 5—Sma/l Submarine Basing of MX 181

barraged in order to sink the submarines.Assume a search technology capable of de-tecting submarines only when they are snor-keling. This device could be a passive sonardetecting the diesel engine tonals or an air-borne radar detecting a snorkel mast. If 50 sub-marines were uniformly dispersed within 3mill ion mi2 of ocean, one submarine could beexpected in every 60,000 nmi2.

Figure 73 illustrates the concept of a largearea search as it would apply to an aircraftsearching for snorkeling submarines, since thesonar ship would be unlikely to detect a sub-marine operating on batteries. The same dia-gram could apply to a sonar ship. Although thesonar ship would move more slowly than anaircraft, it is possible that its detection rangewouId be greater. The resuIt might be that boththe sonar ship and the aircraft could have thesame search rate. As illustrated, if the searchplatform passes within detection range of asubmarine, the submarine may not be snorkel-ing and wouId therefore not be detected.

Also worthy of note is that the submarinecould have the ability to counterdetect thesearch platform before the search platform isclose enough to detect the submarine. This dis-covery could occur if the search platform is afast-moving surface ship (that makes a lot ofnoise) or a radar plane (that emits a signal thatis detectable at a greater distance than thesignal reflected from the snorkel).

In order to develop a more quantitative pic-ture of the possible outcome of a determinedlarge area search effort, the following assump-tions are made about a large area search ef-fort:

1. a search technique is available that cansearch 14,000 nmi2 per hour, This methodmight be an aircraft that flies at 350 knotsand can observe snorkels at 20 nmi oneither side of its flight track or a longrange sonar system that is towed at 14knots and can detect snorkeling tonals at500 nm i in each direction;

2. submarines snorkel 10 percent of thetime;

Figure 73.—Large Area Search With TechnologyThat Can Only Detect Snorkeling Submarines


3. the probability of detecting a submarinewhen it is in range is 50 percent;

4. the number of false detections is in-f in i tesimal relat ive to the number ofvalid detections, even though extremelylarge regions of ocean are being searchedrapidly; and

5. there are 100 units searching the 3-million-nmi deployment area 24 hours per day365 days per year.

These assumptions lead to a detection rate ofone submarine every hour by the 100 searchingunits in the 3-milIion-nmi2 deployment area.

If the position of each of these submarineswas recorded, then 1 hour after being detecteda submarine couId be anywhere within a 5-mileradius of its original position. At 2 hours thedistance will have grown to 10 miles, at 3 hours15 miIes, and so on.

The Soviet Union could then pattern bombeach area determined by the patrol radius of apreviously sighted submarine. If nuclear weap-ons with kill radius of 5 miles were used, one


weapon would be needed to guarantee the de-struction of the submarine seen 1 hour earlier,four weapons would be needed for the oneseen 2 hours earlier, nine for the one seen 3hours earlier, sixteen for 4 hours, and so on. Todestroy 20 submarines, 2,870 weapons wouldbe needed, 5,525 would be needed to destroy25 submarines and 9,455 weapons would beneeded to destroy 30 submarines.

It should be noted that passive sonars wouldnot be able to localize submarines at suchgreat distances since fluctuations in soundtransmission in the ocean make measuring dis-tances impossible. Cross fixing with multipleunits would almost never occur because offluctuations in the acoustic transmission ofsound in the ocean. It would be a common cir-cumstance that the sound would reach one ofthe sonar units, but not the other.

If the units were aircraft searching withradar, they wouId have to make long transits inorder to remain on station. The aircraft wouldhave to transit from bases to the submarinedeployment areas, search the areas, transitback home, and be refueled and repaired forthe next transit out. In order to maintain oneaircraft on station continuously, three to sixaircraft would be needed. Some typical baseloss factors (i. e., the number of platformsneeded per platform continuously on station)are shown in table 24 for turboprop aircrafttransiting from Soviet bases to operating areas.

Finally, it is absolutely necessary that falsealarm rates be extremely low in spite of thefact that vast areas of ocean must be searchedat a very high rate. As will be illustrated in thediscussion to follow, even low or moderatefalse alarm rates would render the most effec-tive area search useless.

Searches With Technologies ThatObserve Non snorkeling Submarines

It is conceivable that a search could be per-formed using a technology that was able todetect the presence of a submarine whether ornot it is snorkeling. Such technologies might in-volve the use of active acoustic technologiesor magnetic anomaly detectors. The nature ofthese technologies is that they are short range.For purposes of discussion it will be arbitrarilyassumed that the detection range of thesetechnologies would be about 5 miles. Thisassumption should not be taken as a true esti-mate of capabilities since that would dependon the acoustic properties of ocean areas,magnetic storms, sensitivity of sensors, prop-erties of the target submarine, etc.

Since the sensors being discussed in this casedo not require the submarine to be snorkelingto be detected, all submarines within thedetection range of the sensor could be as-sumed to be detected. If it is assumed that anaircraft must travel more slowly for magnetic

Table 24.—Operational Factors Affecting Radar Searchof Submarine Deployment Areasa

Operating area or Soviet naval Distance Time on station Transitingnaval facility or air base (nmi) (hours)b time (hours)c

Norfolk Murmansk 4300 Not possible —Norfolk Cuba 870 6.6 4.1Charleston Murmansk 4600 Not possible —Charleston Cuba 610 7.2 2.9San Diego Petropavlosk 3600 0.2 16.9Seattle Petropavlosk 2800 2.1 13.2Northwest Cuba 1400 5.4 6.6

AtlanticNortheast Anadyr 2300 3.3 10.8

PacificaTlrne on station and Iratlsll assumes BEAR bomber configured for long-range Surveillance.b~lgh altitude transit followed by low altitude searchCTrarlSl! speed Of 425 knots Tran.slt times Include transit 10 search area and transl! back to base.


Ch. 5—Small Submarine Basing of MX . 183

detection (say 100 knots) then it would be ableto detect every submarine within a 5-mileradius of it as it moves along, This assumptionmeans the aircraft could search a 1,000 nmiarea each hour it is operating (assuming aprobability of detection of one when a sub-marine is encountered), I n order to achieve thesame detection rate that the aircraft in theearIier exampl e achieved, 7 p la t fo rmsequipped with magnetic anomaly detectorswould have to be substituted for each of theradar aircraft. Thus, it would require 700 air-craft on station continuously, which means afleet of 2,100 to 4,200 aircraft dedicated onlyto search of the deployment area. If weatherdid not interfere with the search and sub-marines did not take advantage of surveiIlancedata supplied through VLF channels to avoidsearch platforms, then 5,525 warheads mightbe needed in addition to these forces in orderto destroy half of the postulated force of 50submarines.

Active acoustic search might be substitutedfor passive. Since the range assumed is 5 miles,and ships might travel at only 20 knots, itwouId require 35 ships to replace every radar

plane in the first example (assuming a prob-ability of detection of one if a submarine iswithin the detection range)

A serious problem associated with activeacoustic search would be the problem of falsetargets. Simply stated, a false target is an un-derwater phenomenon that generates a sonarsignal similar to that of a submarine. The ex-istence of false targets generates an additionalcomplexity in the large area search problemthat can catastrophically degrade the effec-tiveness of the search effort:

1. nonsubmarine targets may be incorrectlyidentified and tracked as possible subma-rine targets, and

2. submarine targets may be incorrectlyidentified as nonsubmarine targets,

Figure 74 illustrates the circumstance of anactive acoustic search, The surface ship has asound transducer that emits sound that scat-ters off objects in the water. Unfortunately forthe searcher, sound not only bounces off thesubmarine, but it also bounces off temperatureboundaries in the water, bubbles, plankton,

Figure 74.—Sources of Reverberation That Limit the Capability ofHigh-Powered Active Sonars



schools of fish, the ocean bottom, and theocean surface. 1 n particular, the sound thatreflects back and forth between the surfaceand the bottom of the ocean resuIts in an ex-tended and very intense echo. Since the sur-face area of the ocean floor and ocean surfaceare so great relative to the surface areapresented by a submarine target, the initialsound impuulse of the sonar returns Iike thedeafening echo from the walls of a cavernFrom the point of view of the sonar operator,each sound pulse is reflected by a myriad offalse targets and deafening echoes from the“walls” of the ocean, From this set of confuseddata, sound reflected from the hull of a subma-rine must be identified from sound reflectedfrom other “false targets” that could poten-tial I y be submarines.

Figure 75 is a chart of the number of whaletargets over 30 ft in length per 1,000 nmi thatcould potential Iy be mistaken for sonar targetsin the Western North Atlantic during themonth of September, Of all biological targetsin the ocean, whales are the most difficult todistinguish from submarines on sonar. Thesemarine animals resemble submarines in size,speed, acoustic characteristics, and certainmodes of behavior. When two or more whalesoccur together, as they frequently do, theyrepresent a very significant sonar target, Undernormal conditions whales swim at 4 to 8 knots,welI within the range of submarine patrolspeeds, and may fIee from manor naturaI”predator-s at speeds of more than 20 knots I naddition to returning submarine like sonarechoes, the power-fuItaiI flukes of whales pro-d u ce swimming sounds that resembIe thescrew ( i e , propelIer) noise of a submarine

Smaller fish can also have very large sonarcross sections because they have air-filledswim bladders that intensely reflect sound.When these fish collect into schools, they canpresent very convincing submarine-like sonarsignaIs.

If the submarine is moving, the reflectedsound from the hull will be slightly shifted infrequency relative to sound reflected from sta-tionary objects in the water. The frequencyshifted sound might be separable from other

sounds provided the submarine didn’t slowdown to reduce the the size of the frequencyshift. If the sonar platform speeded up in orderto get a higher search rate, the sound reflectedfrom the “walls” of the ocean would be shiftedin frequency. This would make it very difficultt. separate the frequency shifted “echo” fromreaI signals generated by moving targets.

If a submarine counterdetected an adver-sary performing an active acoustic search, thesubmarine could also turn toward or awayfrom the source in order to reduce the amountof reflected sound from the hull. The soundrefIection wouId be reduced because the inten-sity of sound reflected back toward the soundsource would be roughly proportional to thecross sectional area the submarine presents tothe source. Since the cross sectional areawouId be reduced by about a factor of 10, thesound refIected back to the acoustic searcherwouId also be reduced by a factor of 10 I n ad-d it ion, since the f rent or back of the submarinehas a more highly curved surface than the side,sound wilI be more diffusely reflected from thefront or back of the submarine then it wouldbe if it were reflected from the side. This sameprinciple of reducing detectability by causingrefIections to be diffuse is a I so of use in lower-ing the radar cross sections of aircraft.

Thus, there are many problems of both atechnical and operational nature that seriouslyhamper active acoustic technologies as ameans of searching out submarines.

Increased Range AcousticTechnologies

There are basically two ways that acousticsearch technologies might in principle bemade more efficient for long-range searchesfor submarines. One way would be to increasethe sensitivity of passive acoustics, the otherwouId be to increase the power of activeacoustics.

Unfortunately, the more power that activeacoustics puts into the water, the more soundreverberates through the ocean blinding theabiIity of the acoustic system to the smalIsignals from a submarine. Active acoustics can


F i g u r e — Potential Whale Sonar Targets (Western North Atlantic)

500

---6- No data available

I

II

300

200

,

- -

90° 80° 70°

+

60°

I

50°

SOURCE Oceanographic Off Ice, U S Navy


be very effective against submarines at shortrange, simply because the signal from a nearbysubmarine is so much more intense than back-ground signals. However, as the submarinemoves away from the active sonar, its intensitywill drop at least with the fourth power ofrange. Thus, if the submarine is twice as faraway, the signal from it wilI be 16 times weaker(24 = 16*). The background reflections from theocean surface and bottom will not change.Hence, it becomes more and more difficult todistinguish reflections from the hull of the sub-marine from the unwanted ocean reverbera-tions. Increasing the power of the sonar onlyincreases the unwanted reverberation alongwith the wanted signal, Thus, the nature ofsound propagation in the ocean presents a fun-damental limit to the increased capability ofactive acoustics.

Passive acoustics has similar barriers to in-creased performance. Passive acoustic sonarsmust discriminate the sound of a submarinefrom all the other sounds in the ocean. Thetotal radiated acoustic power of some foreignmodern submarines is measured in milliwatts.In a calm sea, the sound from one of these sub-marines at 100 yd would be equal to that ofocean wave and shipping background. No mat-ter how one improves the quality of detectorsand signal processing, the quietness of modernsubmarines and the noisiness of the ocean setfundamental barriers on the capability of long-range sonars against slowly patroning sub-marines,

* The fourth power law comes about as fol lows Sound em-

mitted from the sonar source and sound refIected from the sub-

marine on the average spread sphericaly at short range The In-

tensity of a sound wave that spreads sphericaIIy frorn a source

point WiII decrease as the square of the distance from that point

The intensity of found that ult imately arr ive back at the search

p l a t f o r m i S f i r s t d iminshed by a factor of d i s tance squared

before reaching the submarine, and then diminished by another

factor of distance squared after it iS reflected by the hull of the

submarine Thus, as the distance between the submarine and the the

search platform Inc reases, the ln tens i ty o f the s igna l that

uItimately arrives back at the search platform diminishes at least

as fast as the fourth power of that distance. If the effects of

sound absorption are also include, the intensity of the signal

r e c e i v e d f r o m t h e s u b m a r i n e w i l l d e c r e a s e d e v e n f a s t e r

fourth power law as the distance between submarine and search

platform increases

Increased Radar SearchUsing Satellites

Since large area search against snorkelingsubmarines is likely to be Iimited by the en-durance of aircraft and range of radars, it isconceivable that other more exotic platformscould be used for large area search. A high-resolution radar (i. e., synthetic aperture radar)has been flown on a satellite (Seasat-A had anL-band (25-cm wavelength) synthetic apertureradar) that has obtained a resolution of 25 mfrom altitudes of order 500 nmi. In principle,significantly higher resolutions are possible.Seasat was able to observe ships on the surfaceof the ocean with sufficient accuracy thatimage processing could resuIt in crude iden-tification of ship characteristics. Seasat was ,under certain conditions, also able to observethe hydrodynamic wakes of ships and the sur-face roughness of the ocean. Remarkable pic-tures of internal ocean waves, that impressthemselves through hydrodynamic coupling onthe roughness of the oceans surface, have beenobserved from Seasat radar reflectivity data. Itis reasonable to expect that higher resolutionradars can and will be built that could becapable of observing snorkeling submarines.

As an example of the surveillance capabilityof a low resolution synthetic aperture radarsystem, two photographs obtained through thecourtesy of M. L, Bryan of the Jet PropulsionLaboratory staff are presented in figure 76Photograph A was taken in the Bering Sea Testas part of the Fisheries Imaging Radar Surveillance Test Program. This photograph wa’taken using an airplane equipped with an Lband synthetic aperture radar. The small spoton the lower left portion of the photograph aresmalI japanese fishing boats operating a purseseiner (a large vertically suspended fishing netand the larger bright spots are mother shipsPhotograph B was taken on Seasat A orbi1291. It is the area off Newport Beach anOrange County in southern California. Thwhite streaks in the photograph are probablships. The bright and dark areas of ocean ardue to the changing roughness of the oceasurface and the angle of the radar return. Tl-multi ridged structures within some of th-


bright regions are surface manifestations ofinternal ocean waves that result in changes ofthe surface roughness and the radar reflec-tivity.

A high-resolution radar system searching avast and constantly shifting ocean surfacecould have a very high false alarm rate due torandom waves reflecting additional intensity,In addition, the capability of the radar wouldalso vary dramatically with the sea state (i. e.,size of waves and roughness of the ocean),since the ocean surface creates an intensebackground of reflected clutter that can bevery difficult to fiIter out.

The false target rate due to random wavemotion might be dramatically reduced by hav-ing the radar “repoint ” at the suspicioustarget. However, such a radar would requireconsiderably greater amounts of signal proc-essing in a technique already limited by signal

processing capabilities. Nevertheless, it is pru-dent to assume that signal processing andradars could be suff ic ient ly improved toobserve snorkeling submarines with a highdegree of confidence.

Figure 77 shows the ground track of a satel-Iilte that is at an altitude of 162 nmi and whoseorbit is inclined at 600 to the equator. Thisorbit is similar to that used by the SovietCosmos 954 radar satellite that entered theupper atmosphere over Canada on January 24,1978 (the actual orbital inclination of Cosmos954 was 65 O). Note from the figure that thesatellite coverage is predictably intermittent.[luring the 1.5-hour satellite period the groundtrack advances 22.50 on the Earth below andthe search pattern shifts to the west (note theorbits labeled one, two and three). After 16cycles the satellite arrives over the same pointon the Earth’s surface but it will only have

Figure 77.— Ground Track of Radar Search Satellite

60° inclination160-170 nmi altitude1.5-1.6 hr period



overfIown the deployment area on six or sevenorbits The satellite would spend about 4 to 5minutes over the deployment area during eachof the six to seven orbits. Thus, one satelIitespends no more than 25 to 35 minutes per dayover the deployment area. If two satelIites arein the same orbit but separated in phase by180 “, they would follow one another by 45minutes (i e , by half of the 90-minute orbitalperiod) .Thus, for six or seven orbits a day, sat-elIites would be over the deployment areaonce every 4S minutes Six to seven orbitstranslates to 9 hours per day (six orbits times1 5-hour orbital period) when satellites couldbe expected overhead every 45 minutes If twoother planes of orbits with two satellites eachare staggered so they wilI not overlap the firstplane of two satellites, then eight satelliteswould be required to cover the deploymentarea 8 minutes every 90 minutes. Covering thearea for 16 minutes every 90 minutes wouId re-quire 12 satellites and 32 minutes out of every90 minutes would require 24 satellites. Itwould thus appear that in order to cover thedeployment area 30 percent of the time, oforder 24 satelIites wouId be required.

If an eight-satellite constellation of radarsatellites was placed in orbit to cover thedeployment area, submarines could not snor-kel for periods of longer than 40 minutesbefore it would be necessary to secure snorkel-ing to hide from a satelIite. If 150 minutes ofsnorkeling were needed every day, eight satel-lites would force the submarines to snorkel forfour periods of 40 minutes each and 16 sat-elIites would drive the submarines to eight ornine periods of 18 minutes each. I f observationby a constellation of eight radar satellites hadto be avoided, the normal 150 minutes contin-uous snorkeling period wouId have to be ex-tended by 12 to 16 minutes due to the three tofour periods (of length 4 minutes each) thesatellites would be overhead. For 16 satellitesthe period could be extended to 180 minutesand for 32 satellites it could be extended tomore than 200 minutes. The submarines wouldtherefore have to be designed so they couldsnorkel for many successive short intervals.Current diesel-electric submarines may not becapable of this type of operation (modern sub-

marines may be able to interrupt snorkeling forperiods as short as the necessary 4-minuteperiods without serious losses in snorkeling ef-ficiency, but data on such procedures are notcurrently available) The power managementsystem of the small submarine might thereforehave to be configured so that the submarinescould snorkel efficiently for short periods oftime interrupted by stilI shorter periods of bat-tery operation. This approach would allowthem to avoid surveillance from a constella-tion of radar satelIites and would only mar-ginally affect the overall length of the snorkel-ing period.

Countermeasures to Radar SatellitesIf radar satelites were considered to be a

serious enough t h r-eat, Garwin and Drell havesuggested that the ocean couId be seeded w i t hradar refIecting objects that would be in-distinguishable from snorkels

If many false snorkel targets were deployedin waters near the continental United States, itcould make it easier for Soviet diesel-electricsubmarines to operate in U. S waters becauseU.S. naval forces could have as much d if fi-cuIty distinguishing faIse snorkels as wouId theradar satelIites. If the snorkels could not bedesigned to be distinguishable to U.S. navalforces, but not to space-based radars, such astrategic countermeasure could disrupt ourown tactical operations.

Another possibility would be jamming theradar satelIites from ground- or sea-based sta-tions. However, jamming could have interna-tional implications. Since the intermittentnature of the satellite orbits makes avoidanceof detection straightforward, neither of thesecountermeasures would likely be preferable tointermittent snorkeling.

War of AttritionAs mentioned in the introductory remarks to

this section, the strategy associated with agiven surveillance capability, coupled withavaiIabIemilitary resources, couId affect theoutcome of a preemptive attack on the forceof submarines. It is therefore possible that thesurveillance capability postulated in the sec-


tion on Open Ocean Barrage After Detection ofSnorkeling Submarines could be used to fight a“war of attrition” rather than attacking in onemassive barrage. A “war of attrition” approachto destroying the submarine force would sim-ply involve immediate attacks on the subma-rines whenever a snorkeling submarine isobserved. The outcome of this type of attackwould be considerably different from themethod discussed earlier of constant sur-veillance followed by a massive barrage at-tack. The time period over which the attackwouId take place wouId be days or weeks,rather than fractions of an hour Nevertheless,in order to assess the seriousness of such athreat, it is useful to get a sense of that timesca I e.

Let us assume that the Soviet Union is ableto keep 100 planes on station over a northwestAt lant ic operat ing area. This deploymentwould require the commitment of a fIeet ofbetween 300 and 600 planes constantly flyingthe 1,400 nmi transits to and from the operat-ing bases in Cuba. Assume for simplicity thatall the submarines are operating in a 3-million-mi operating area in the Northwest Atlantic.Then as estimated in the previous section, onesubmarine should be observed every hour ofoperation.

For purposes of discussion, assume thateach time a submarine is sighted it is attackedand sunk, and continental based U.S. forces donot react to this action at any point during theprocess. It could then be expected that approx-imately half the force of 50 submarines wouldbe destroyed in the first day. Since there nowwouId be half as many submarines distributedthroughout the deployment area, the rate atwhich submarines would be contacted and de-stroyed the next day would drop by two. ThiswouId then result in half the surviving sub-marines (about 12 submarines) being destroyedin the next day of operation. On the third day,the rate of contacts would drop again by twoand only six submarines would be left. Thiskind of circumstance is called a “war of attri-t ion” and was very successful against sub-marines in the North Atlantic during WorldWar I 1.

Another possibility is that a submarine isobserved once every hour but only ha If thetime the attack on the submarine results in itsdestruction. Then one fourth of the subma-rines are destroyed the first day (about 12 sub-marines), another 9 are destroyed during thesecond day’s operations, 7 the third day, 6 thefourth day, 4 the fifth day, etc. Thus, 5 days ofoperations resuIts in the destruction of 38 ofthe 50 submarines as compared to the previousexample where 43 submarines were destroyedin three days (it would take 7 days to destroy43 submarines using the assumptions in thecurrent example).

The “war of attrition” scenario would re-quire that the planes carry sufficient arma-ments to engage and sink submarines with ahigh probability. It would also require thatlarge relatively defenseless surveillance craftcouId continuously transit the 1 ,400-miIe routebetween Cuba and the submarine operatingareas, carrying out attacks on U. S, submarinesin airspace near the coast of the continentalUnited States, unopposed by American air andsea forces Another assumption is that sub-marines could not, and would not, defendthemselves with the aid of decoys or under-water to air missiles,

Van Dorn Effect

The Van Dorn Effect is the creation of ex-tremely high ocean waves over large areas of acontinental shelf by an appropriately placedmulti megaton nuclear detonation. The physi-cal basis for the Van Dorn Effect is as follows(see fig. 78). A wave created by an underwaterexplosion in uniform, deep water wilI divergeraidialIy untiI it moves into shallow water.when the water becomes shallow enough thewave energy is funneled into a smaller volume01

: water and the wave height grows in heightrelative to the height it wouId have had in deepwater. The shape of the Continental Shelf offthe eastern coast of the United States is suffi-ciently steep for an absolute increase in waveheight.

There is considerable uncertainty associatedwith the generation of Van Dorn waves. The


Figure 78.— Van Dorn Effect

Continental shelf

Nuclearexplosion


curvature , s teepness , and bot tom character-istics (i e , sand or rock) of the continentalslope could effect the size and formation ofwaves at different areas of the coast. The de-gree of underwater motion that submarines areIikely to be able to tolerate without losing theirabllity to launch missiles if also uncertain.

If a submarine were in sufficiently shallowwater, the water motion at the bottom of thesegiant waves would make it unlikely that thesubmarine wouId survive in good enough con-dition to be able to launch ballistic missiles Ifthe submarlne were operating off the Con-tinental Shelf, the water wouId always be deepenough that the Van Dorn Effect would not bea threat The Van Dorn Effect is therefore not aproblem for submarines operating off the Con-tinental Shelf

Because the nuclear explosions would haveto be generated in sufficiently deep water togenerate Van Dorn waves in the shallow water,there would be several hours’ warning beforethe arrival of these waves It any submarineswere operating in water too shallow to escapethe effect, and a Van Dorn attack were diag-nosed quickly, several hours would be avail-able for NCA to decide to launch missilesat risk.

Theory of Tra

It is conceivable that a c

Iing

etermined adver-sary couId review the method of continuoussurveillance followed by barrage and deter-mine that the Iikelihood of success is smallThe adversary might be particularly discour-aged after a review of the diversity, effective-ness, and cost of countermeasures relative tothat of his search and destroy effort It mighttherefore be concluded that an effort to con-tinuously trail the submarine force might bemore Iikely to meet with success.

To successfully trail a submarine, it isnecessary to have a device capable of sensingthe submarine with sufficient effectivenessthat some estimate of the position of the sub-marine relative to that of the trailer can bemaintained. It is also necessary that the devicebe difficult to spoof or jam and that it not besusceptible to simple countermeasures.

There are very few observable associatedwith the presence and operation of submarinesthat can be used to detect and track them. Themost effective and reliable of these, likemagnetic anomaly detection, tend to be veryshort range and cannot be operated too close-ly to a platform (like a surface ship or sub-


marine) that has its own magnetic signature.Longer range techniques (like sonar) tend to besubject to the constantly changing acousticproperties of the ocean. Acoustic trailingoperations are further complicated by thepossibility that the submarine could move intosound ducts, channels, and shadow zones, as ameans of suddenly “disappearing” from theview of the trailer. These ubiquitous soundducts, channels, and shadow zones are createdby in homogeneous ocean waters.

A final serious problem confronting thetrailer is the possibility the submarine willdeploy decoys, jammers, and/or spoofers tofurther complicate the problems of the trailer.Nevertheless, it is useful to examine some ofthe possibilities of trailing as a threat to theforce of smalI submarines.

The problem of trailing the submarine forcecan be broken into three major areas ofanaIysis:

1, initiating the trail,2. maintaining the trail, and3. destroying the submarine.

Once the submarine is within a few thousandyards, it is assumed that it can be destroyedwith a probability of one with conventionalmeans. This extraordinarily optimistic assump-tion presumes that the submarine under attacktakes no evasive actions and uses no devices toconfuse homing torpedoes or other devicesand that the weapon used against the sub-marine is 100-percent reliable.

According to these assumptions, the successor failure of the trailing operation would onlydepend on the ability to establish trail, and theability to maintain trail for a long enoughperiod of time that a significant fraction of thesubmarine force is on the average localized,Two extreme cases are useful to examine inorder to understand the significance of anability to establish and to maintain trail asseparate elements of the traiIing problem:

1, The probability of establishing trail is one,but the mean time a trail is held varies,

2. The probability of establishing a trail issmall, but the trail, once established, is

not broken for the remainder of the sub-marine’s at-sea period,

In case 1, for example, if the submarineswere always picked up successfuIly as theyegressed from port, then the average numberof submarines under trail wouId be equal tothe percentage of time each submarine washeld in trail during its patrol. For instance, ifthe submarines had a 60-day at-sea patrol andthe trail could be maintained for a period of 10clays, then one-sixth of the submarines wouldbe, on the average, under trail.

In case 2, the fraction of submarines suc-cessfully trailed is determined by the numberof submarines for which a traiI was success-fully initiated. In this case, if a trail were suc-cessfulIy established on egress from port one-sixth of the time, and maintained for the entireat-sea period, then one-sixth of the fleet wouldbe under trail at all times,

If one combines case one and two, andassumes that one-sixth of the submarines havetrails established on them as they egress fromport, and one-sixth of those submarines aremaintained on trail (because they are trailedon the average for 10 days out of 60), then one-thirty-sixth of the submarines (i. e., less than 3percent) can be expected to be under continu-ous trail. It is clear that both the ability tomaintain traiI and the ability to establish traiIare extremely important if there is to be anypossibility of maintaining contact with a sig-nIficant fraction of the force,

A more complete analysis of the trailingplroblem would include probabilities that trailsare established, broken, and reestablished. Inthe assessment that includes the possibilitythat a lost trail is reestablished, the possibleuse of muItiple sonars and magnetic anomalydetectors, surface ships using active andpassive sonar systems, etc., must also be in-cluded. In such a case, if the target submarineis recontacted by a search unit other than thetrailing unit (perhaps by a helicopter) the prob-ability that the search unit successfulIy handsthe contact back to the trailing unit (whichwouId have to be a ship or submarine i n orderto have endurance similar to the target) must


also be included in the analysis). Simulationsaccounting for such complexity have been per-formed. The models are technically complexand the results of the analysis are consistentwith conclusions drawn from insights gainedby examining cases 1 and 2. Since no new in-sights are gained with the additional com-plexity, and the models are mathematicallycomplex, these models will not be presented ordiscussed here.

Establishment of Trail at Port Egress

In order to establish a trail, it is necessary toknow the whereabouts of the submarine withina sufficiently small area of ocean that the sub-marine can be localized well enough to begintrailing operations. As discussed in other sec-tions, no technology has been identified thatappears to provide the ability to effectivelysearch large areas of ocean. Given this cir-cumstance, the trailer would have to seriouslyconsider attempting to trail at port egress,where submarines are initially localized, ifthere is to be any hope of success.

The trailer would have to use either anacoustic or nonacoustic sensing technology todetect and follow the submarine. This sensingtechnology would have to be both reliable anddifficult to counter. Since trailing operationswould have to be initiated at port egress,where substantial U.S. assets would be avail-able to help assure egress, the sensing tech-nology would also have to be unjammable andres istant to spoof ing f rom electronical lyequipped tugboats, submarines, or surfacecombatants that might aid in the egress.

The trailing of one submarine by anothercould be viewed as somewhat similar to thetrailing of a plane by a homing missile. Thehoming missile would either have to passivelysense some observable of the aircraft Iike heatfrom the engine, or actively illuminate the air-craft as with a radar. If the trailing missile isheat-seeking, the aircraft can disperse flareswhich the missile is unable to distinguish fromthe aircrafts engines. If the missile is radar-seeking, the aircraft can disperse chaff tocreate false radar targets to confuse the radar.

Another measure could simply be to jam theradar (which, depending on the radar, mightnot be so simple). Still another measure wouldbe for the aircraft to dispense a self-powereddecoy that would retransmit the radar signalfrom the trailing missile in a way that wouldmake the plane and the decoy indistinguish-able to the radar. Such a device (called theQuail) was deployed in limited numbers duringthe 1960’s on B-52s as an aid for use in confus-ing Soviet radars.

Such ideas have been applied in naval war-fare as well. During the Battle of the Atlantic,the Germans deployed an acoustic horning tor-pedo cal led the Zaunkoning. The Al l iedcountermeasures was to have convoy escortsstream noise emitting “Foxers” to create falsetargets and jam the acoustic homing torpedo’ssensing system.

If there were an attempt to trail a submarineusing passive sonar, for instance, trail could bebroken through the clever use of a “Foxer’’-likedevice. Such an operation could be done asfollows: A submarine being trailed may deploya small device that makes a sound similar tothe submarine. As the submarine proceeds for-ward, the device could be slowly played outbehind the submarine, making it appear to thetrailer that the submarine is moving more slow-Iy than it actually is. The trailer would thenhave to slow down in order to avoid risking acoll ision, resulting in an increased distancebetween the trailing and the trailed subma-rines. The device could also slowly increasethe intens i ty of the s imulated submar inesound, further convincing the trailer to in-crease his distance between him and his poten-tial adversary. At the appropriate time, the Iinecould then be cut or the trailing device shutoff. The trailer would only know that the sub-marine had disappeared from sonar contact.

A most likely technology of use to a trailerwould be an active or passive sonar. Activesonar at close range can be quite reliable(remember the distance to the fourth powersignal to noise relation). A problem with activesonar is that the trailer is more vulnerable toattack than the trailed, since the sonar isbroadcasting its own position.


Passive sonar is preferable to active sincethe trailer does not make himself quite sovulnerable to preemptive action or counter-maneuvers. However, if the submarine is quietenough, it will be exceedingly difficult to trailby passive means.

Figures 79 and 80 show another means ofmaking it difficult to establish trail against asubmarine using either active or passive sonar.The submarine (or accompanying tugboatsfrom the port) could deploy small torpedo-likedevices (similar, in principle, to the radar con-fusing Quails deployed by B-52s). These de-vices could be equipped with smalI taperecorders which simulate the sound of a sub-marine. EIectrical coiIs cou ld s imu latemagnetic and other signatures and a trans-ponder mounted on the device could simulatethe reflection of sound from the hull of a sub-marine. If the need arose, devices like thesecould not only be carried on submarines to aidin breaking trails, but they could be deployedin large numbers each time a submarine at-tempted egress from port. Devices deployedfrom the port could be preprogrammed tobehave like submarines and could regularly berecovered after each egress operation. Simple,

inexpensive, and recoverable devices could beconstructed using either battery or fuel celltechnology to simulate submarines egressingfrom port. The fuel cell device could be pro-gramed to behave Iike a submarine using an in-expensive microprocessor and would havegreat endurance. The device could be used todeceive trailers for days, if an operationalneed for such a capability arose. At some pre-programmed point it could turn around andcome back to port for recovery.

Sti l l another possible device that couldprove useful against a trailer using active sonarwould be a device similar to the German pil-Ienwerfer. The pillenwerfer was a device usedby German U-boats during World War Il. TheU-boats could eject this device during thecourse of an engagement and create a denseunderwater cloud of bubbles. Since soundwould be intensely reflected by the pil len-werfer bubble screen, active sonars could mis-take the cloud for a submarine or could notobserve the submarine maneuvering behindthe screen to escape.

Attempting to establish trail on a submarineegressing from a home port requires not only

Figure 79.—Active Acoustic Search for a Submarine That Has Dispensed DecoysWhich Simulate a Reflected Sonar Signal From a Submarine Hull



Figure 80.–Passive Acoustic Search for Submarine That Has Dispensed Decoys WhichSimulate the Sound of a Submarine

Noise from distantships, oil drilling,earthquakes, fish,rainstorms. ocean Noise reflected


“spoof proof” sensing devices with sufficientrange and reliability for “a trailing operation,but the technology must be difficult to jam.Jamming, while not as elegant as the methodof decoys, is at least as effective a means of“delousing” submarines as they egress fromport. This could be accomplished with smallsurface ships or preemplaced sound projec-tors . I f the t rai lers are us ing devices l ikemagnetic anomaly detectors, relatively mod-est-sized coil devices capable of distorting thelocal magnetic field could be emplaced in theegress region or towed by small ships. Thesewould, in effect, be magnetic jammers.

Still another tactic available for port egressoperations might be to use the 12-mile limit toforce the adversary to spread himself thin. Thesubmarines could proceed up or down thecoast well within territorial waters before pro-ceeding into the open ocean. Since the sub-marine would be in noisy shallow coastalwaters, it would be undetectable from outsidethe territorial limit. The adversary would vir-

tually have to commit thousands of ships to at-tempt to establish trail on port egress.

Finally, the logistics of establishing a picketin order to pick up egress ing submarinesshould not be neglected. Assets stationed out-side a port in order to try and pick up egressingsubmarines would have had to transit fromhome ports. This would mean that each shipwould have to spend a period of time coveringthe port access looking for egressing sub-marines, a period of time transiting back tohome ports for resupply and repair, and aperiod of time transiting back again to coverthe port. Enough ships and/or submarineswould have to be committed at all times to theport watch so that all the entrances, exits andcoast l ine which submarines could use foregress operations from the port would be con-tinuously covered. There must also be enoughexcess ships or submarines on station so thatall suspicious contacts can be prosecuted untilthey are determined to be false targets.


It should be clear that egress from port hassuch a rich diversity of countermeasures andtechnologies that it can effectively be con-sidered a nonexistent threat to any well-runsubmarine force.

Establishment of Trail Using Large AreaOpen Ocean Search

Since egress from port has such a variety ofoperational countermeasures and technol-ogies that favor the egressing submarine, anadversary may instead choose to combine alarge area search with trailing vessels at sea.

Again, for purposes of i l lust rat ion, i t i sassumed that 300 to 600 long-range aircraftequipped with radars that allow for a 14,000nmi2 per hour search rate transit from Cuba toa 3-million-nmi2 deployment area in the North-west Atlantic. This fleet of aircraft would belarge enough to maintain 100 aircraft on sta-tion, 24 hours per day. Between transit andsearch operations, these aircraft would con-sume more than 1.5 million gal of aviation fuelper day. As postulated earlier, such a searchmight produce a radar contact with 1 of the 50assumed submarines on the average of once anhour. This contact would occur when the sub-marine was snorkeling so the submarine wouldhave detected the radar signal and could bepresumed to recognize it had been sighted.

If the Soviets have, in addition, 1,000 shipsevenly distributed over the 3-mill ion-nmi 2

operating area, one ship will on the average beable to patrol a 3,000-nmi2 area of approx-imately 30-nmi radius. Assuming the ship is, onthe average, capable of arriving at the area ofcontact within 1 1/2 to 2 hours and the sub-marine has moved in a random direction at 10knots after being detected, the ship will haveto search an area of 700 to 1,2oO nmi2 by thetime it arrives in the vicinity of the aircraftradar contact. If the ship has sonar device witha 2- or 3-mile range and can search at 10 knots,it will be able to search about 40 to 60 nmi2

within the first hour of arrival at the locationwhere the submarine was first sighted. If thesubmarine is not found within the first hour ofsearch, it will have traveled another 10 nmi

from the point of sighting and would be some-where within an area of 2000 to 3,000 nmi2.

The probability of the ship picking up thesubmarine would be of order 0.03 to 0.08 andwould vary dramatically with how fast theships arrive at the point of aircraft sighting.Assuming that the probability of the ship es-tablishing trail is 0.08, then on the average, 2 ofthe 50 submarines would be picked up on traileach day of operation.

If the submarine were equipped with 10decoys, it could then attempt to break trail inthe following manner. If trail is established, asingle decoy could be released by the subma-rine, giving the trailer a one in two chance ofchoosing the correct target. If the correct tar-get is chosen, another decoy could be re-leased. Thus, by the time the submarine had re-leased its tenth decoy, the probability that trailis maintained would be about one in a thou-sand (210 = 1,024).

There are many variations on the openocean search followed by trailing. These varia-tions include the use of helicopters operatingfrom the on-station search ships and the use ofmultiple ships converging on sighting loca-tions. The assets that must be committed by anadversary, under optimistic assumptions ofgood weather and capable reliable sensors, isenormous relative to countermeasures. I n theabove case, the 50 submarines equipped with500 decoys are able to remain untrailed by anadversary who has committed a fleet of 300 to600 long-range surveillance aircraft, 1,000 sur-face ships, and sensors that surpass the per-formance capabilities of what is likely to beachievable.

As is indicated throughout the discussion onvuInerability, opportunities for obtaininginformation on the location of snorkeling sub-marines are far greater because of the in-creased noise output associated with snorkel-ing and the fact that a snorkel mast is exposedabove the ocean’s surface. Detailed analysisindicates that long-range passive detection ofmodern snorkeling submarines would not be athreat to the survivability of the force. Analysisindicates that nonacoustic search techniques


that might be able to detect snorkels will alsonot seriously affect the survivability of a fleetof diesel-electric ballistic missile submarinesdeployed within 1,000 to 1,500 nmi from thecontinental United States and Alaska.

Nevertheless, as remote sensing improvesand satellite surveillance becomes more com-plete, it is possible that concern about theneed to snorkel could arise. It is therefore ofinterest to describe some features of moderndiesel-electric propulsion systems and com-pare them to another proven propulsion tech-nology — nuclear propulsion.

Diesel-Electric Propulsion Technology

The diesel-electric propulsion system in theGerman-type 2000 powerplant is an example ofproven capabilities in modern nonnuclear sub-marines (see fig. 81). The submarine is designedto snorkel using four 1,400 RPM high-speeddiesel-driven generators simultaneously. Whenconfigured as an attack boat, it will snorkelless than 90 minutes out of 24 hours (assumingit snorkels with a 6-knot speed of advance andpatrols on batteries at 5 knots). If the sub-marine were configured as a strategic weaponsubmarine instead, additional power would be

Figure 81 .—German Type 2000 Submarine

I

— . Upper deck

2370 Metric Tons Displacement (Surf)


● X M i s s i l e B a s i n g

consumed due to increased hydrodynamicdrag on the missile fairings and added loaddue to the strategic weapon system and themissiles. The snorkeling period with these addi-tional loads would be about 2‘A hours per day(i.e., the submarine would snorkel about 10percent of the time). The submarine carries 960batteries which are energy-managed by a mi-croprocessor. The propulsion motor has a max-imum output of 7,500 kW and is double massisolated from the hull for silencing. The motoris air coupled to the shaft (for silencing) andthe shaft drives a seven-blade skewback pro-peller. When configured as an attack sub-marine, this boat has a top speed close to 25knots (which can be maintained for about 1hour).

When operating on batteries, any moderndiesel-electric submarine will, for all practicalpurposes, be close to acoustically undetect-able by passive means. Thus, the diesel-electrictechnology demonstrated in the Type 2000would easily fall within the assumed capabil-ities of the vulnerability discussion presentedearlier.

Nuclear Electric Propulsion

Small submarines that use nuclear propul-sion might have survivability superior to thosepowered by diesel-electric systems. * However,this would depend on the nature of any unfore-seen future threat that might emerge and istherefore dissicult to analyze.

It is generally acknowledged that nuclear-powered submarines are noisier than diesel-electric submarines. If the acoustic outputs ofnuclear-propelled strategic submarines werelarge enough to result in a threat to their sur-vivability (and they are not), proven technol-

‘It IS hard to say that a coastally deployed, small strategic submarine would be more or less survivable if it were nuclearpowered since its survivability would not depend on an ability tomaintain high speeds for extended periods of time, as might bethe case with attack submarines In addition, since the coastallydeployed submarines would always be relatively near the con-tinental United States, they would not have long transits to andfrom patrol areas In any case, the survivability of either diesel-electric and the nuclear-powered units would be so high that thechoice of propulsion system need not be of serious concern

ogy exists that would permit them to be equal-ly quiet.

Since the coastally deployed strategic sub-marine has modest power requirements rela-tive to those needed by longer range faster andmore versatile submarines, it is possible to usean inexpensive self-regulating TRIG A-type nu-clear reactor as a power source alternative todiesel-electric propulsion. The power systemwould employ fully developed reactor tech-nology used in conjunction with standard hard-ware and electronic components. Because ofthe self-regulating features of this type of reac-tor (and, in fact, any small low enrichmentreactor), the safety and control systems on thereactor would be very simple. The reactorwouId be natural circulation and conversion toelectricity could be accomplished using ther-moelectric modules (about 4 to 6 percent con-version efficiency is within proven technol-ogy). The reactor, with its shielding, wouldweigh about 100 tons. Since the reactor wouldgenerate electricity without the use of movingparts (neither generators or pumps), the sub-marine would be as quiet as an electric-pow-ered submarine and would never have tosnorkel.

The submarine could carry 550 tons of bat-teries as does the Type 2000 submarine since itwould need extra propulsion power on occa-sion. It would therefore have high-speed capa-bility similar to the Type 2000 until the bat-teries were drawn down. Quick rechargingwould be done with the aid of diesel-drivengenerators. Since quick recharging would rare-ly be required under normal operating cir-cumstances, the submarine would carry onlybetween 50 and 100 tons of diesel fuel.

The weight budget of the Type 2000 subma-rine indicates that a small submarine design ofthis type is well within proven technology. TheType 2000 carries close to 300 tons of fuel andthe modified TRIGA reactor weighs about 100tons. Care would have to be taken in the sub-marine design to account for differences inweight distribution dictated by a single largecomponent Iike a reactor.

A specific system design and the fabricationof a prototype would be required before a


reactor unit could be brought into service. Ifreactors were then produced at a rate of atleast six units per year, it would cost less than$20 million (1981 dollars) per unit. This figurewouId add only a marginal cost to the sub-marine.

If a decision were to be made to deploy MXmissiles on small submarines, such a propul-sion system would clearly be a competitor withdiesel-electric propulsion, both in terms of sur-vivability and cost. This deployment wouldhave to be considered by any design grouptasked with the problem of designing an MX-carrying system of small submarines.

Concluding Remarks on theVulnerability of Submarines

Antisubmarine warfare techniques andmethods is an area of high sensitivity due to

concerns about security. For this reason, thenumbers used in this section in conjunctionwith specific search technologies should in noway be construed as indicating the state of theart with regard to the sensing technologies dis-cussed. What this discussion has sought to dois provide the reader with a sense of the rich-ness, diversity, and complexity that accom-panies both submarine technologies and oper-ations. It should also be noted that all tech-nologies that could in principle or in practicebe used as a means to find submarines havenot been discussed. However, the conclusionsthat can be drawn about the survivability ofstrategic submarines from the present discus-sion in fact vastly overstate the vulnerabilityof these systems.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE ACCURACY OFLAND- AND SEA-BASED MISSILES

In this section, some of the factors that playa role in determining the accuracy of land- andsea-based ballistic missiles are presented inorder to establish a context for discussion inthe sections that follow.

A ballistic missile is a device that is ac-celerated to a velocity sufficient to reach atarget or set of targets without further propul-sion. Intercontinental range ballistic missiles(missi les with a range of order 6,000 miles)generally undergo powered flight for a periodof 5 to 10 minutes. Once powered flight iscomplete, the missile’s upper stage and reentryvehicles float toward a target, or a set oftargets, under the influence of gravity in thenear vacuum of space. In the final portion ofthe flight, the reentry vehicles enter the upperatmosphere and are subjected to very strongaerodynamic forces before finally arriving attargets.

During the initial stages of powered flight,guidance errors can be introduced by uncer-tainties in the missile’s velocity, position, and

orientation. The effects of these uncertaintiescan be understood if a comparison is drawnbetween the different stages of the ballisticmissile’s fIight with those of the fIight of a rocklaunched by a catapult. The powered phase ofthe ballistic missile’s flight can be thought ofas similar to the action of catapuIting the rockand the unpowered phase can be thought of asthe motion of a body in a gravitational field. Inthe unpowered phase, the motion of the bodyis entirely determined by the force of gravity.

Since the phase of powered flight is similarto that of the catapulting of a rock, if themissile is almost on course after the engineshave burned out, but the magnitude of its ve-locity is sl ightly in error, it wil l fall short orlong of the target (see fig. 82). If the missilevelocity is correct but the missi le is sl ightlymisaligned from its intended direction, it willalso miss the target. In addition, even if themissile is properly alined and has the correctspeed, if its launch point is moved with respectto the target, the missile will again miss itstarget.


Figure 82.— Factors Affecting the Accuracy of aBallistic Missile


The effects of uncertainties in the gravita-tional field also influence the missi le’s ac-curacy in the early stages of powered flight.When the missi le is initially launched, theforces that determine the motion of the missileare due to the thrust of the rocket’s enginesand the gravitational field of the Earth (aero-

dynamic forces are neglected here for sim-plicity). If the gravitational field is not knownin detail, the missile will end up, after launch,with a slightly different direction and velocitythan originally intended. Since this change oc-curs ear ly in the miss i le’s f l ight, a s l ightmisalignment in direction, or uncertainty invelocity, accumulates into a much largertarget miss as the missi le floats for greatdistances along its trajectory. As will be ex-plained later in this section, these velocity anddirection errors can be introduced due to lackof knowledge of the Earth’s gravitational field,as well as due to imperfections in differentelements of the missile system. If unaccountedfor, these errors can accumulate into signifi-cant miss distances at the target.

After the missile’s engines are turned off, itsmotion is determined by the gravitional fieldof the Earth. If the gravitational field is dif-ferent from that which is expected, the reentryvehicle will not follow the trajectory that hasbeen planned for it. For this reason, the missileguidance system must have data on the natureof variations of the Earth’s gravitational fieldalong the trajectory to the target.

Still later in the missile’s flight, the reentryvehicle enters the upper atmosphere andbegins to decelerate violently (this processusually begins at about 100,000 ft for a war-head flown at intercontinental ranges), In thisstage of flight, wind and rain can have an ef-fect on the reentry, as well as uneven ablation,body wobble, or misalinement. Errors that oc-cur in guidance during this stage of ballisticmissile flight are called “reentry errors. ”

Missi le accuracy is generally defined interms of the circle of equal probability (alsocalled the circle error probable) or CEP. TheCEP is the radius of a circle that is drawnaround the target in which, on the average,half of the reentry vehicles fired at the targetfall. There are two geometric contributions tothe CEP. The first is called the cross range ortrack error. This error is a measure of the missdistance perpendicular to the direction of themissile’s motion at the target. The second geo-metric contribution to the CEP is the downrange or range error, that is the miss distance


along the direction of the missile’s motion atthe target.

Table 25 shows the different contributionsto target miss for a missile which depends onpure inertial guidance at a range of 5,500 nmi.This table gives some indication of the impor-tance of initial errors in position velocity, andalignment in determining the missile’s CE P.Each of these error components contributes tothe down range and cross range errors as thesquare root of the sum of the squares (see fig.83). The CEP is then 0.59 times the sum of thedown range and cross range errors.

The major factors that contribute to the ac-curacy performance of any inertially guidedintercontinental range ball istic missi le (mis-siIes of nominal range of 6,000 nmi) can bebroken into the following categories:

1.

2.

3.

4.

uncertainties in the initial position, veloc-ity, and orientation of the missile at launch,boost phase guidance errors due to inertialsensing errors, and inertial computationalerrors,thrust termination errors at the end of theboost phase,velocity errors imparted to reentry vehiclesduring deployment by bus,

5.6.

7.

gravity anomaly errors,uncertainties in the position of targets (tar-geting errors), andatmospheric reentry errors.

Although the magnitude and importance ofeach of these factors in determining missile ac-curacy will vary (with missile design, missilerange, weather conditions over the target area,and the quality of gravitational data over theflight trajectory of the missile), all but two ofthese factors are in principle the same for bothland- and sea-based missiles.

Factors 1 and 5 account for most of thedifference in accuracy of land- and sea-basedsystems.

Since sea-based missiles are constantly inmotion, the missile must be provided with ac-curate information on its position, velocity,and or ientat ion. Th is necess i ty requi res anavigation system capable of providing infor-mation to the missile before it is launched. Thequality of this navigational data will affect theperformance of the missile.

The quality of gravitational data near thelaunch points of land- and sea-based missilesmay differ. If this is the case, this too will af-fect the accuracy performance of the missile.

Table 25.—Miss Sensitivities to Initial Errors for ICBM Trajectories

Error Component Miss SensitivitiesUnits Down Range Cross Range

Initial Down range m/m 1 0.0Posit ion Cross range m/m 0.1 0.7Error Vertical m/m 5.4 1.3

Initial Down range m/(cm/see) 40 9Velocity Cross range m/(cm/see) 2 10Error Vertical m/(cm/see) 22 6

Initial Level m/arcsec 46 21Alignment Azimuth m/arcsec 6 24

“These values apply to a 5500 nmi minimum energy trajectory CEP = .59 (Down range error + cross range error),

SOURCE. “Guidance System Application of MX Basing Alternatives” by Major G B Green/SAMSO and L N Jenks/TRW

83-477 0 - 81 - 14


Figure 83.—Down Range and Cross Range Errors of a BallisticReentry Vechile at a Target


ACCURACY OF SMALL SUBMARINE BASED MX

The object of having a missile with great ac-curacy is to have the ability to place warheadssufficiently close to very hard military targetsso that there will be a high probability of de-stroying them. The abil ity to do this wil l ingeneral depend on the nature and the qualityof the guidance technology used by a missilesystem and the range of that missile from itstargets.

The MX, as designed, is a purely inertialguided missile. In the following presentationthe accuracy of a sea-based MX that uses pure-ly inertial guidance will be discussed next, andthe accuracy of a sea-based MX that uses iner-tial guidance in conjunction with radio bea-cons will be discussed last.

Figure 84 is a graph of the CEP accuracymultiplier for a sea-based MX with pure inertia Iguidance. A CEP accuracy multiplier of 1.0 onthe graph means that the expected CEP of themissile at that range from target will be equalto the engineering-design requirements for theland-based MX. A CEP multiplier of 1.5 meansthat the CE P at that range will be 1.5 times that

Figure 84.—Accuracy of Inertially Guided Sea-BasedMissile at Different Ranges From Targets

Land-basedMX accuracymultiplier

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

Missile range (thousands of nmi)

SOURCE: U.S. Navy.

of the design requirements of the land-basedMX, and so on. At present, it appears likely thatthe land-based MX will have a smaller CEPthan that set for its design requirements, so aCEP multiplier of 1.0 does not necessarilymean accuracy equal to a land-based MX. Thegraph assumes that the submarine’s position isknown within a few meters and that it woulduse a velocity measuring sonar to measure its


velocity. None of the above assumptions pre-sent any operational problems for the sub-marine fleet (for reasons that will be discussedlater) and so this graph can be considered agood operational representation of achievableaccuracies at different ranges from targets.

In order to i l lustrate the significance ofrange from target effects for the small sub-marine-based MX missile, table 26 Iists a num-ber of cities in the Soviet Union in regions thatalso may have targets of military interest. Thenumber in the upper part of each of the boxesin the table is the range from one of the threesubmarine deployment areas to targets withinthe regions surrounding these cities. In thelower part of each box the expected hard tar-get kill capability of a sea-based MX is com-pared to that of the hard target kill require-ments for the land-based missile. It should bekept in mind that the accuracy requirementsset for the land-based MX result in very largesingle shot kill probabilities against targets ofgreat hardness. In fact, the single shot ki l lprobabilities used to compile table 26 are suf-ficiently large that differences described as“slightly better, ” “comparable,” and “slightlyworse” r-nay not be of military significance (seeClassified Annex for numerical details).

If targets in the region around Novosibirskwere to be attacked, warheads would have to

travel roughly 3,700 nmi to reach their targets.The graph in figure 83 indicates that for thatrange, warheads fired from the Gulf of Alaskacould have an expected accuracy at the targetSIightly better than the design requirements setfor the land-based MX. Missiles fired from theNortheast Pacific deployment area would haveslightly worse accuracy than that of the land-based design requirements and missiles firedfrom the Northwest Atlantic deployment areawould have still worse accuracy than thosefrom the Pacific area.

The significance of a slightly improved ordegraded hard target kill capability becomessti l l less significant for hard targets whichmerit attacks with more than one warhead. If,for instance, a single warhead fired from onesubmarine operational area had a probabilityof 0.95 of destroying a particular hard targetand a second warhead fired from a differentsubmarine operational area had a 0.85 kil lprobably against the same target, a 2-on-l at-tack would still have a greater than 0.99 prob-ability of destroying the target being attacked.This means that cross targeting could be per-formed from different operational areas withconsiderable fIexibility.

This point is applicable even for targets inareas that are extremely far from al I of the sub-marine operating areas. Even though these tar-

Table 26.—Comparison of Hard Target Kill Capabilities of Sea-Based MX”With Design Requirements of the Land-Based MX

Relative hard target kill capability

Range to target from launch area Gulf of Alaska Northwest Atlantic Northeast PacificMoscow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Semipalatinsk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vladivostok. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Novosibirsk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Minsk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Irkutsk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tashkent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tyuratam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4,200Comparable

4,000Slightly better





4,600Comparable

4,500Comparable


5,200Slightly worse

5,800Worse4,800

Slightly worse3,600

Slightly better5,200

Slightly worse5,600

Worse4,900

Worse

4,500Comparable

4,700Slightly worse


4,400Comparable

4,600Comparable


5,500Worse5,200Worse

a Numerical values available in the Classfied Annex



gets are at very great distances from all thesubmarine operating areas, and accuracy de-grades with distance from target, such targetswill still be subject to successful attacks fromsea-based missiles in the late 1980’s and early1 990’s.

The most extreme test of the system capa-bility shown on table 26 are targets in theregion surrounding Tashkent, in the extremesouthern region of the Soviet Union (Tashkentis about 200 miles from the Soviet Union’sborder with Afghanistan). Single warheadsfired from the Gulf of Alaska would have totravel about 4,600 nmi to targets in that regionand would have single shot kill probabilitiescomparable to the design requirements set forthe land-based MX. Missi les fired from theother two operating areas would have to tra-verse much greater distances (about 5,600 and5,500 nmi). The probability of destroying hardtargets in this region with a 2-on-1 attack usingmissiles from any combination of submarineoperating areas would differ by only a few per-cent. Thus, even in the extreme case of verydistant hard targets, 2-on-1 targeting wouldresult in an almost indistinguishable differencein capability to destroy very hard targets of im-portance.

If the targets were to be made still harder inan attempt to increase thei r surv ivabi l i tyagainst sea-based warheads with the yield ac-curacy combinations used to construct table26, it might be possible to gain several percentmore survivability against 2-on-1 attacks. Thesmall gains introduced by such a program,would be enormously costly and could bewiped out by additional possible improve-ments in accuracy.

Table 26 assumes that al l miss i les f i redagainst targets work, that is, it is compiledunder the assumption of 100-percent missilereliabil ity. If missi le reliabil ity is not betterthan the single shot kill probabilities, missilereliability wiII be more important a determi-nant of the hard target kill capability than ac-curacy. In the opinion of OTA, single shot killprobabilities from sea-based missiles could beso high by the 1990’s, that missile reliability,

not accuracy, wil l be the dominant factordetermining hard target kill capabilities.

The guidance technology assumed in table26 assumes minimal changes to the MX missileguidance system. The MX computation tech-niques used by the guidance system wouldhave to be optimized for sea basing ratherthan land basing and high frequency gravita-tional data of the quality expected to beavailable in the late 1980’s or early 1990’swould have to be known within a 200-nmiradius of the launch point. In addition, thedata summarized in table 26 assumes that thesubmarine would know its position to severalmeters and would use a velocity measuringsonar to update its velocity. Analysis per-formed by OTA indicates that the use ofvelocity measuring sonars does not introduceeither operational or vulnerability problemsfor the MX-carrying submarines. However, ifthe GPS were destroyed, the satellites wouldnot be avaiIable for position update im-mediately prior to missile launch. If the sub-marine did not take satellite position updateseveral hours prior to launch, knowledge of itsposition would be sufficiently degraded thatthe accuracy curve presented in figure 84could not be achieved against distant targets.This potent ial problem is , however, easi lysolved by proper force management.

If antisatell ite boosters or launches weredetected from American early warning sensors,the submarines could be informed over VLFchannels that an attack on the satelIite naviga-tion system could be in progress. In responseto this, the submarines would immediately pro-ceed to update their navigational systems inthe hours before the intercepts. While perform-ing the satell ite fix the submarines couldsimultaneously issue a “ready” signal to NCAvia the Deep Space Millimeter Wave SatelliteSystem. Since the submarines would be underorders to avoid all shipping at all times, itwould be extremely unlikely that a submarinecould not take a fix within the time periodbefore loss of the satellites.

In the unlikely event that one or two sub-marines were unable to take a fix before hostil-


ities began, they couId immediately proceed to

t h e n e a r e s t a c o u s t i c t r a n s p o n d e r f i e l d . T h i sw o u l d t a k e t h e s u b m a r i n e b e t w e e n 2 t o 3hours. If a launch order were given during thisperiod of time, submarines with sufficientlyaccurate guidance data couId be in a positionto launch without risk to the ship. Any sub-marine that had not reported a “ready” signal

tion. This could be done using VLF channels ifit only required reassignment of a prepackagedoption or it could require the high data ratesatellite I ink if ad hoc targets which are notlisted on the National Target List are to be at-tacked. This force management procedurecould therefore guarantee that the submarineforce could strike targets on short notice with

could immediately have its target package re- very higlassigned to one of the other submarines on sta-

ACCURACY OF STAR-TRACKER-AIDED

accuracy.

NERTIALLY GUIDED MX

Heretofore only the accuracy that is likelyto be attainable using purely inertial measure-ments as a means of guiding the missile is con-sidered. We now consider the additional ac-curacy that could be attainable if the inertialguidance system is updated using some formof external reference. First the use of startrackers is discussed, and then the use of radiobeacons, as means of updating the missile’s in-ertial guidance system in order to obtainhigher accuracy at greater ranges.

It is possible to mount a device on the mis-sile guidance platform that will allow it to takea fix on a star after it leaves the atmosphere.This technique is currently being used on thenew TRIDENT I missile and would be a mores igni f icant modif icat ion to the MX miss i leguidance system than that assumed in con-structing table 26, Such a modification coulddelay the deployment of the missile by a yearand cost several hundred milIion dolIars. How-ever, as wiII be discussed in the section onschedule, the submarines design and construc-tion schedule shouId pace the missile develop-ment. Delays in the research and developmentof the missile wouId therefore not be likely toaffect the date that the first missiles could beput to sea.

The broad band in figure 85 shows a conserv-ative estimate of the band of possible ac-curacies versus range for an MX-Iike missilewhich has been fitted with a star tracker, As infigure 84 the accuracy multiplier is definedwith respect to the engineering design require-

ments of the land-based MX missile. The upperpart of the band is the accuracy versus rangecurve that is very likely to be achieved in thelate 1980’s or early 1990’s. The three verticalarrows define the distances to Tashkent fromthe Gulf of Alaska, Northeast Pacific, andNorthwest Atlantic deployment areas. As canbe seen from the graph, it is very likely that alltargets in the Soviet Union could be attackedin the late 1980’s or early 1990’s from allsubmarine operating areas with accuraciesmarginally better or worse than that of theengineering design requirements of the land-based MX. The lower part of the band repre-sents a conservative estimate of what is possi-ble in the late 1980’s or early 1990’s if the ad-vanced MX inertial measurement unit is usedin conjunction with a star tracker. If this levelof performance is reached, all targets could becovered from all deployment areas with CEPsat least as good as the engineering design re-quirements of the land-based MX,

For purposes of reference to the earlier dis-cussion, the dashed line plotted in figure 85shows the accuracy multiplier versus range foran MX missile guided without the aid of a startracker. The hard target kill probabilities usedto construct table 26 and discussed earlier inthis section are derived from this curve. Sincethe addition of a star tracker to the inertialguidance package helps reduce certain range-dependent guidance errors during the earlystages of flight, the star tracker aided inertiallyguided missile displays a weaker degradation


Figure

Land-baseMX CEPmultiplier

85.—Accuracy of Star-Tracker=Enhanced Sea= Based Missile as aFunction of Range From Target

I

d

2000 4000 6000

Range (nmi)

SOURCE: U.S. Navy

of accuracy with range relative to that of thepurely inertial guided MX.

It should be noted that the star tracker ac-curacy versus range curve shown in figure 85 isderived on the basis of assumptions about theavailability and capability of certain technolo-gies relevant to guidance, quality of naviga-tional data at the time of launch, and knowl-edge of geophysical data around the launchpoint and along the missiles trajectory. Theassumptions are as follows:

position and velocity data at time of launch.Accurate data at time of launch could beobtained with the aid of: acoustic trans-ponders, velocity measuring sonars, and theGlobal Positioning System.2. Introduction of gravity gradiometers onsubmarines and/or quality high frequencygravity data within 200 nmi of the launchpoint. It is expected that these technologiesand data will be available in the period ofthe late 1980’s to early 1990’s.

1. An Improved Submarine Inertia! Naviga-tion System (SINS) and/or accurate initial

DEGRADATION IN ACCURACY AFTER ASUBMARINE NAVIGATION FIX

Because a star tracker enhanced, inertial It is expected that submarine inertial naviga-guided missile is able to obtain navigational in- tion systems will be considerably improvedformation by sighting on stars during its flight, even relative to their currently impressiveits accuracy at range is not as sensitive to navi- capabilities. Improvements in inertial guid-gational uncertainties introduced by the con- ance technologies, gravitationaly mapping andtinuous motion of its launch platform, as is the the use of star trackers on missiles is expectedcase with a purely inertial guided missile. to dramatically lengthen the time needed be-


tween navigational updates of the submarine or even weeks in order to maintain sufficientinertial guidance system. I n the 1990’s, naviga- capability to attack very hard targets from sea.tional updates would not be

INERTIAL

required for days

GUIDANCE AIDED BY RADIO UPDATE

The two sets of accuracy data so far dis-cussed are based on improvements in inertialguidance technologies that are used in missilesand in submarines, and on improved geodeticand gravitational data.

Another set of guidance technologies thatcould be used to obtain high accuracy withsea-based missiles without precise naviga-tional data at launch and extensive gravita-tional mapping is a system based on inertialguidance aided by updates from radio naviga-tion aids.

Radio updates could be taken with the aidof the GPS. They could also be taken with theaid of a system of ground radio beacons CBS(also refered to as an Inverted GPS), that couldbe emplaced on the continental United States.In the event that the GPS is attacked using an-tisatellite weapons, the GBS could providebackup radio navigation aids to the missiles infl ight. Unlike the GPS, the CBS would onlyoperate during a crisis, and could be madecostly to attack by constructing many radiobeacons and decoys.

The sea-launched missile could radio updateits inertial guidance system in three differentways, The missile could take a navigational fixusing GPS to update its inertial guidance sys-tem before it deploys its reentry vehicles fromthe missile’s post boost vehicle (i. e., the mis-sile’s bus). In the event of outage of the CPS,the navigational fix could instead be takenusing the ground beacons. I f the GPS weredestroyed and the ground beacons were usedas a backup system, it would be necessary totake a radio fix through the ionosphere. Thisradio fix might be disrupted if there werenuclear detonations occurring in the iono-sphere. In order to avoid disruptions of thistype, a radio fix could be taken before themissile reaches the bottom of the ionosphere,perhaps at an altitude of about 50 miles.

The first two of these methods should pro-vide MX accuracy at all ranges from Soviettargets. If the GPS were used, missiles could belaunched from anywhere in the submarine de-ployment area. If the ground beacons wereused, system accuracy would be degraded ifthe submarines were not with in 700 to 900 nmiof the continental United States. This degrada-tion would occur due to errors introduced intothe navigational update by poor line of sightgeometry on the ground beacons. Figure 86shows the areas of ocean from which a CE Pmultiplier of one could be achieved if groundbeacons were emplaced on the continentalUnited States, Alaska, Hawaii, and on theAleutian Islands. Figure 87 shows the addi-tional Pacific area from which the same CEPmultiplier could be achieved if the groundbeacons were also emplaced on the islands ofWake, Guam, Kwajalein, Palau, and Tafuna,Samoa.

If the ground beacons were used to updatethe missile guidance system before the missilereached the ionosphere (this update could benecessary if the GPS system had been de-stroyed and the ionosphere was disturbed bythe detonation of nuclear weapons) the sub-marines would have to be within 400 to 500miles of the continental coast if a radio updateis to be possible before the lower ionosphere isreached. Using this method of update, a CE Pmultiplier of 1.0 to 1.5 that of land-based MXmight be achievable. Unfortunately, calcu-lations on this type of update have not beenperformed in detail and a more accurate as-sessment of the capability of this type of up-date is not available.

In summary, a sea-based MX could beguided us ing purely inert ial measurementtechnologies or with inertial measurementtechnologies updated by sighting on stars orradio beacons. The star trackers offer a great


Figure 86.—Ocean Areas That Provide Adequate Line-of-Sight View of Ground Beacons onContinental U. S., Aleutian Islands, Alaska and Hawaii

90.001 I

– 70.00

– 90.00* 10.00 30.00 60.00 90.00 120.00 150.00 180.00 210.00 240.00 270.00 300.00 330.00 360.00

Longitude


advantage in that they are a self contained ele- By deploying a large enough system of groundment of the missile and have been demon- beacons and decoys as a backup to the satel-strated to be highly reliable. Radio beacons on Iite beacons, the risk from Soviet countermeas-satellites, and on land, also can be used for up- ures could be kept small.dating the missile’s inertial guidance system.

TIME ON TARGET CONTROL

If the submarine system is to attack hard Since the smal l submarine would carrytargets with more than one warhead, there is a missi les in external capsules that would beneed to control the time at which warheads ar- Iaunched at different depths under differentrive at targets with a high degree of accuracy. operational conditions, the exact time atThis control is needed so that the detonation which a missile flew out of the capsule couldof the first warhead will not interfere with the possibly effect the arrival of warheads atarrival the second warhead. targets. In practice, this problem could be


Figure 87.—Ocean Areas That Provide Adequate Line”of-Sight View of Ground Beacons onContinental U. S., Aleutian Islands, Alaska, Hawaii, and Selected South Sea Islands

90.00 1

—

m

– 90.00 ~ 1 I I 1 . . I I0.00 30.00 60.00 90.00 120.00 150.00 180.00 210.00 240.00 270.00 300.00 330.00 360.00

L o n g i t u d e


solved by assigning each missi le a time at lofted or depressed relative to the planned tra-which warheads are to arrive at targets. Uncer- jectory). Care would have to be exercised intainties in launch time could then be compen- the design of the fire control and guidancesated for by changing the missile’s trajectory package to assure that this could be done.(i.e., the missile trajectory could be slightly

RESPONSIVENESS OF THE SUBMARINE FORCE

The responsiveness of the submarine force is without warning. The time necessary for thesedetermined by the speed with which an Emer- calculations wou Id be of order a few minutesgency Action Message (E AM) could be trans- and would not be a factor I ikely to delay amitted to the force and the time required for launch.the submarines to launch their missiles. Thecalculation of trajectories to target sets must Therefore, the two time periods that wouldbe performed for both land- and sea-based mis- dominate the ability of the submarine force tosiles if targets are reassigned to a missi le respond rapidly to an EAM would be the time


period needed to receive the EAM and thetime period needed to prepare the submarinefor the launch of missiles. The EAM could bereceived in a preattack or transattack periodwithin a few minutes. If the submarines wereordered to execute a preplanned strike, alldata necessary for the strike would be avail-able at the reception of the EAM and the timerequired to initiate the strike would be deter-mined by the time that could be needed tobring the submarines to launch depth. Thistime could be several minutes.

If the ordered attack were not a preplannedoption, there could be two different categoriesof target sets chosen, those that are stored inthe guidance computer and those that are de-signated ad-hoc in terms of their latitude, lon-gitude and height of burst. If the target list re-quired a high data rate link, the VLF link would

ENDURANCE

I n the event of a protracted nuclear ex-change, surviving IC BMs might be required forstrikes weeks or months after an initial ex-change. These forces wouId be executed fromsurviving command and control centers usingwhatever communications c ha n n e Is wereava i I able.

The survival of command and control chan-nels and the availability of communicationschannels during a protracted nuclear exchangeis a common problem for both land- and sea-based forces. However, the endurance of theICBMS themselves would differ with the basingmode.

The small submarine could be constructedto have an at-sea endurance of more than 90days without support f rom tenders . I t i sassumed, based on U.S. Navy operating ex-

COST AND

The small submarine basing concept is envi-sioned as a fleet of 51 diesel-electric sub-marines, each of about 3,300 tons submerged

not be appropriate. In this circumstance, acoded message would be sent over VLF for aparticular submarine, or group of submarines,to come to depth and copy a new target Iistusing the EHF satelIite I ink Alternatively, ifthe submarine force were diesel-electric pow-ered (rather than nuclear powered), the frac-tion of the force that was snorkeling couldreceive the ad-hoc targets as well. After recep-t ion of data, which would take only a minuteor two over the EHF Iink, the submarines couIdimmediately prepare for Iaunch by proceedingto launch depth, provided the strategic weap-on system is configured to directly accept andval idate the data f rom the satel l i te I ink.Launch of the missiles could take place shortIythereafter. The rapidity of response of thesystem couId therefore be of order 10 to 15m i nutes

OF FORCE

perience, that a normal submarine patrolwould last for 60 days. This assumption meansthat for 30 days after an initial attack, no sub-marines would have to return to port. About 5percent of the missiles at sea would be lost dueto missile failures during this time. Sixty daysafter an initial exchange, about half the forcewould still be capable of remaining at sea. Ifthe missiles were not operated in a dormantmode (so that they could be fired on a minute’snotice rather than on an hour’s notice) about10 percent of the missiles could be expected tohave failed at the end of 60 days. Thus, 9weeks after an initial attack, the submarineforce could del iver about 400 warheadsagainst an enemy. By 12 weeks after an ex-change, the number of operational missiles atsea wouId have diminished to zero.

SCHEDULE

displacement. Each submarine would be capa-ble of carrying four externally encapsulatedMX missiles. The submarines would be manned


with a crew of about 45 members and would

o p e r a t e w i t h i n 1 , 0 0 0 t o 1 , 5 0 0 n m i o f t h r e ebases. One of the bases would be located onthe east coast of the continental United States,another would be on the west coast, and thethird would be located on the coast of Alaska.

The acquisition cost of the system of sub-marines, bases, navigational aids, and relatedoperational and support equipment is esti-mated to be about $32 billion (fiscal year 1980dollars). An operating and support cost of $7billion is estimated for a 10-year system life-cycle, The total cost of the system is estimatedto be about $39 billion. The details of this costestimate at the major subsystem level is pre-sented in table 27.

The deployment schedule for a system ofsmall submarines is shown in figure 88. Thisschedule would vary with the degree of com-mitment the nation makes to a new strategicweapon system. If the commitment is suchthat slippage is not allowed due to unforeseentechnical setbacks, funding cuts, environmen-tal law suits, or other actions that could re-quire congressional action, an initial opera-tional capability (IOC) in the middle of 1988could occur. It could even be possible to havea lead ship by the end of 1987, but this wouldrequire a very high degree of national commit-ment. A more realistic estimate based on areview of military programs over the pastdecade would place IOC in 1990. If IOC oc-

Table 27.—Small Submarine 10-Year Lifecycle Cost(billions of fiscal year 1980 constant dollars)

Cost element Number costRDT&E:

Submarine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — $0.422Missile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 6.056Sws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . – 0.400Capsule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 0.257Navigational aids . . . . . . . . . . . . — 0.090— . —

Total RDT&E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $7.225Procurement:

Submarine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 $ 6.682Basing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7.240Missile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470 5.419Sws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 2.397

Capsule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521 1.725Navigational aids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,500/3,000 1.399

Total procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - $24;862

Total acquisition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $32.087

Operating and support:IOC to FOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 2.392FOC to year 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.868

Total operating and support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ = . 1 6 0Total to year 2000 LCC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $39.247—

Average acquisition $/submarine, . . . . . . . . . . . $ 0 . 6 2 9Average LCC/submarine to year 2000. . . . . . . . . 0.770Average acquisition $/deployed missile . . . . . . 0.157


curred in 1988, full operational capability(FOC) could be achieved in late 1992. If themore realistic estimate of a 1990 IOC occurs,FOC would occur in early 1994.

It should be noted that the costing of thesubmarine system assumes Navy procurement

Figure 88.—Small Submarine Program Schedule

.; * . -.% .“ ‘ . ., ,

Missile avaikblllty ‘ : ‘ . . ‘e ‘ .“‘. ~ *: .$ *., - , - . ., >. j

B a s e m $ w * J q , . * -,i ’ .’-..

Submarine $ ~,Head ship proc. AInitial operations (IOC) AFull operations (FOC) (Ioc) A

(FOC)



practices for the MX missiles. In order to have100 missiles alert at sea at all times 470 mis-siles are obtained. The land-based Air Forcebaseline procures 330 missiles. The additionalmissiles are obtained since it is assumed thatNavy experience developing sea-based missileswould apply to the MX if it were deployed atsea. These missiles would be used in an exten-sive program of testing and evaluation similarto that of the Trident/Poseidon programs.

It should also be noted that three bases areincluded in the costing. Since the submarinespostulated for this system would have a con-siderable at-sea endurance, it would be possi-ble to deploy them from two bases instead ofthree. However, each of the bases would haveto be larger in order to handle additional sub-marines. These bases would normally servicenine to ten submarines instead of six to seven.

SYSTEM SIZE

The number of submarines acquired waschosen so that 100 MX missiles would be avail-able at sea for retaliation against the SovietUnion regardless of preemptive actions ontheir part. The choice of 100 surviving missileswas arrived at using the following reasoning:

The number of small submarines requiredfor a sea-based MX system is determined bythe perceived need to be able to attack apredetermined number of targets after anyenemy action. The number of targets that theUnited States could attack after a Soviet firststrike would depend on the number of missilesthat survive such an attack.

It is assumed that all at sea-submarineswould effectively survive an ICBM attack. Thisassumption is based on a review of the capabi1-ities of antisubmarine technologies and forces.A barrage attack is not considered a significantthreat for the following reasons:

The Air Force MX/MPS baseline has 200 mis-siles hidden among 4,600 shelters. For purposesof analysis, it is assumed that half of the Iand-based MX force will survive a determinedSoviet attack. This assumption would meanthat no more than 2,300 hard target capablewarheads landed in the MX/MPS fields closeenough to shelters to destroy them. A barrageattack with this number of warheads mightresult in the destruction of one to two sub-marines at sea. This does not represent asignificant attrition of the submarine force.

The number of small submarines required tomaintain 100 missiIes at sea in an “up” status is

determined by the number of missiles per sub-marine Mps, the fraction of missiles in an “up”status Fmu the fraction of the time a sub-marine is at sea during a patrol cycle Fas thefraction of submarines that are in overhaul oron restricted availability For and the fractionof submarines that are expected to survive anat-sea attack Fss. The total number of smallsubmarines N required to maintain 100 missiIesis then given by:

N 100

whereN = the total number of submarines required to deliver

1,000 RVSMps = the average number of missiles per submarineF = the fraction of submarines in overhaul or restricted

avaiIabiIityt = the traction of time submarines are at sea during a,,.

patrol cycleF mu = the fraction of missiles In an “up” status at seaF \\ = the fraction of the at sea submarines surviving

after an attack

Since the missiles would be in capsules ex-ternal to the hull of the submarine, they couldnot be serviced while the submarine is at sea.Hence, the failure of a missile at sea would putit in a down status for the remainder of the at-sea patrol.

The fraction of missiles available at sea dur-ing a patrol period of T days wilI be:

1 s T – (It

I

where 7 Is the mean t I me between failure o fthe missile and the is the Iength of time of the sub-marines is on patrol

Ch. 5—Small Submarine Basing 01 MX ● 213

Since each submarine will spend T days atsea and TIP days in port, the at sea availabilityof the submarine during a normal patrol cycleIs:

F l\T + ,,,

If a submarine spends 12 months in overhaulor in restricted availability during each 5-yearoperating period, then O = 0.8.

Table 28 presents the number of submarinesthat would be required to maintain 100 mis-siles on station for different patrol periods atsea and for different times in port for refit. It is

Table 28.—Number of Submarines Required To Keep100 MX Missiles Continuously on Station v.

Submarine In-Port Time

Patrol period (days). . . . . . . . . . 40 50 60Number of submarines at sea . 26 26 27Total submarine force size:a

12 days in port . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 (40) 41 (38) 40 (38)15 days in port . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 (42) 43 (40) 41 (39)18 days in portb . . . . . . . . . . . 47 (44) 45 (42) 43 (41)21 days in port . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 (47) 47 (44) 45 (45)24 days in portc . . . . . . . . . . . 52 (49) 49 (46) 46 (44)

a Total force numbers assume that 20 percent of att submarines will be inextended refit or overhaul and are therefore unavailable Numbers in parentheses assumes 15 percent of the force in overhaul or extended refit.

b Naval Sea Systems Command estimates minimum time in Port required for

refit IS 18 days.c OTA assumes 25 days in port for refit and handling of missiles


assumed that 100 percent of the submarinessurvive preemptive enemy action and that 20percent of the submarine force is either under-going overhaul or is in restricted availability.The numbers in parentheses assume 15 percentof the submarines are in overhaul or restrictedavailability instead of 20 percent. Thus, if itproved feasible to perform refit operations in18 days (instead of OTA’S assumed 25 days)and to have 15 percent of the submarines inoverhaul and extended refit, it would be possi-ble to maintain 100 missiles on station with afleet of 41 submarines, rather than the 51 sub-marines assumed by OTA. The at-sea factor isthe fraction of the submarine force that isalways at sea. It is defined as:

at-sea factor = F<,, (1 – F,,)

An at-sea factor of 55 percent is assumed inorder to estimate the total number of requiredsubmarines. This factor is also used to estimatethe number and size of base facilities requiredfor servicing submarines between patrols.

In order to provide 100 at-sea missiles (or al-ternatively 1,000 surviving warheads) at alltimes, the at-sea reliability of the missiles mustbe factored into the sizing of the fleet. It is pro-jected, from engineering requirements, that 95percent of the missiles at sea would be in an upstatus for a fleet of submarines with an at-seapatrol of length 60 days.

FINAL SIZING CONSIDERATION

In the final sizing of the system, it wasassumed, in order to establish a conservativecost estimate, that 10 percent of the missilesmight not function on a launch command andit would be necessary to maintain more than100 “up” missiles at-sea. This assumption

added 4 submarines to a procurement whichwould otherwise have been 47. The costs ofprocuring, operating and supporting additionalcrews, missiles, capsuIes, and strategicweapons systems is of the order of $1 billion to$2 billion.

LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION OF BASES

Base selection was limited to the continen- The perceived need for responsiveness, flex-tal United States since the submarine force is ibility, and weapon system effectiveness dic-designed to operate in deep ocean areas adja- tated that the submarines be able to movecent to the continental United States. rapidly to acoustic transponder fields to main-


tain accuracy in the event of outage of theGPS. A very large operating area would spreadthe acoustic transponder fields over a largearea of ocean, resulting in possible executiondelays due to long transits to transponderfields. In addition, time on station could bemaximized without the need of a submarinewith a high transit speed. It should be noted,however, that none of the above considera-tions truly dictate a need for such a limiteddeployment area.

The Gulf of Mexico was rejected as a de-ployment area for the folIowing reasons:diesel-electric submarine technology hasachieved a level of quieting that would notrestrict the submarines to acoustically shallowwater even if a large-scale advanced passivesonar threat emerged. The acoustically shal-low water of the Gulf of Mexico therefore of-fered no clear survivability benefits to offsetthe range/payload/accuracy missile perform-ance penalties associated with that deploy-ment area.

It is assumed that a detailed review of possi-ble base locations would be made if there wasa decision to deploy a fleet of small sub-marines. In order to provide a basis for esti-mating costs, three base locations on the eastand west coasts of the continental UnitedStates and Alaska were assumed. These are:

. Anchorage, Alaska

. Puget Sound Area, Wash.,● Narragansett Bay, R. 1.Each of the sites has problems of its own.

The arctic winters, long winter nights, and ex-treme weather at the Anchorage site wouldpose problems clearing ice, loading and offloading missiles, maintaining and refitting sub-marines, and supporting crews at the base. ThePuget Sound area already has a Trident base(Bangor, Wash.). Construction at the Narraga-nsett Bay site could be delayed due to competi-tion for the land from the Rhode Island Gov-ernment.

Other possible secondary sites could be:● San Diego, Cal if.,● Charleston, S. C.,● Kingsbay, Ga.

These possible sites also offer their ownproblems. San Diego would be unlikely to pro-

vide enough waterfront area without displac-ing existing Navy operations. Charleston andKingsbay could be too far south for the mostefficient deployment of submarines in thenorthern coastal areas of the Atlantic.

Since SSBN fleet support is shifting to Kings-bay, waterfront area may become available inCharleston for submarine support in Charles-ton while MX support might be provided at thenew SW FLANT facility at Kingsbay. Tradeoffstudies would have to be performed in order toevauate the sensibiIity of these options.

In order to develop a conservative estimateof the size, number, and cost of facilities at thesmall submarine base, an analysis of the Tri-dent base facility at Bangor was made. Approx-imately 85 to 90 percent of the Iand requiredfor the base is dictated by explosive weaponssafety requirements and facilities for handlingstrategic weapons. It was assumed that theamount of land required scaled with the num-ber of strategic weapons on the base. Thisnumber includes the missiles on the subma-rines, missiles stored for operational tests, andmissiles stored for demonstration and shake-down operations. These assumptions lead tothe conclusion that 4,450 acres would be re-quired for the base. other assumptions couldlead to a smaller less costly base but theywould only be justified if a more detailed feasi-bility analysis could be performed.

The size of the base arrived at for thecosting analysis is approximately 500 acreslarger than a base sized in an earlier study ofsmall submarine basing performed by the Sys-tem Planning Corp. for the Navy. Table 29compares the estimated small submarine basewith the Trident base at Bangor.

Table 29.–Estimated Characteristics of the SmallSubmarine Refit Site and the Trident Refit Site

Smallsubmarines Trident

Total area (acres) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,450 8,397Waterfront length (feet). . . . . . . . . . . . 11,630 4,248Number of submarines in port . . . . . . 5/6 3Number of explosive handling

wharfs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2Number of refit berths. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4/5 3Drydockets/graving docks . . . . . . . . . 1 1SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment.

Chapter 6

AIR MOBILE MX

Chapter 6.–AIR MOBILE MX

Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page

217

Three Air Mobile MX Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...219The importance of Missile Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219Continuously Airborne. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...219Dash-on-WarnDash-on-Warn

Survivabi l i ty . .

ng With “Endurance”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221ng Without’’Endurance” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........221

. . 222Aircraft Vulnerabilityto Nuclear Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..222ICBMBarrage of in-Flight Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .223SLBM Attack On Dash-on-Warn

Endurance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ngAirMobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......230Continuously Airborne. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .230D a s h - o n - W a r n i n g W i t h ’ ’ E n d u r a n c e ” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 0Dash-on-Warning Without “Endurance”. . . . . . . . . . . . .231

Support Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .231WarningSensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .231C o m m a n d , C o n t r o l a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n s ( C3 . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....231MissileGuidance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...232

F I G U R E S

89. Survivability v. Escape Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page

22690. Aircraft Survivability During Base Escape. . . . . . . . . . .22791. Aircraft Survivability During Base Escape. . . . . . . . . . .22792. Aircraft Survivability During Base Escape. . . . . . . . . . .22793. Aircraft Survivability During Base Escape. . . . . . . . . . .22794. Aircraft Survivability During Base Escape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........228

Chapter 6

AIR MOBILE MX

Air mobile basing offers the prospect of highsurvivability, since missile-carrying aircraft inflight would move much too fast to be tar-geted by Soviet missile forces. However, unlessthe aircraft were airborne continuously, theirsurvival would depend on taking off uponearly warning of attack. Moreover, they wouldhave to find surviving airfields to land and re-fuel if they were to have endurance, i.e., to bea useful force beyond the first few hours of awar.

This chapter discusses three concepts, dis-tinguished by their approaches to the prob-lems of dependence on warning for survivabili-ty and postattack endurance beyond the unre-fueled flight time of the aircraft. The basicconcept (cal led below “Dash-on-Warningwithout ‘Endurance’”) wouId consist of missile -carrying aircraft on strip alert at a number ofinland airfields. The force would take off on

warning of Soviet attack and would land andrefuel after a few hours at existing civilian andmilitary airfields unless the Soviets had de-stroyed these airfields. The second concept(“continuously Airborne”) would avoid theproblem of dependence on warning by main-taining the missi les in the air continuously.Such a system would be exceedingly expen-sive. The third concept (“Dash-on-Warningwith ‘Endurance’”) would attempt to addressthe problem of postattack endurance bybuilding a large number of recovery airfieldsthroughout the United States, forcing theSoviets to attack all of them in order to denyendurance to the force. This concept wouldalso be expensive. The base case, involvingdependence on warning and no provision forendurance beyond existing airfields, couldhave a cost comparabMPS system.

OVERVIEW

The lowest-cost, base case air mobile systemwould consist of 75 or so wide-bodied aircraft,each carrying two MX missiles, maintained onstrip alert at airfields located in the CentralUnited States. Such a “dash-on-warning” airmobile force could be highly survivable. Theprincipal threat to the force would be sub-marine- launched bal l i s t ic miss i les (SLBMS)launched from positions near U.S. coasts. Suchan attack could arrive in the vicinity of thealert airfields within 15 minutes of launch andseek to destroy the aircraft before they couldtake off and escape. However, if a high alertposture were accepted for the force, meaningthat the aircraft took off immediately on time-y warning of SLBM attack, almost the wholeforce would survive even if a large number ofSLBMS was launched from positions near U.S.coasts. The Soviet SLBM force is presently in-capable of such an attack, Air mobile basingcould therefore stress Soviet strategic forces

e to that of the baseline

where they would be least able to respond inthe short term.

Nevertheless, the difference between sur-vival and destruction of the force would be avery few minutes, depending on timely tacticalwarning. I n this respect an air mobiIe inter-cont inental bal l i s t ic miss i le ( ICBM) forcewould replicate a significant failure mode ofanother leg of the strategic Triad — the bomberforce.

ICBMS, arriving later than the SLBMS, couldnot threaten the survivabil ity of the entireforce, since by that time the aircraft wouldhave been in flight long enough to be dispersedover a wide area. Effective barrage attack ofthis entire area would require the Soviets tobuild many more large ICBM missiles than theynow possess and use them to barrage approx-imately 1 million square miles (mi 2). The out-come of such an attack wouId be insensitive

83-477 0 - 81 - 15 217


both to the fractionation (the apportioning ofthe missile payload among a small number oflarge-yield reentry vehicles (RVS) or a largenumber of smaller yield RVS) and to the ac-curacy of Soviet ICBM forces.

The principal disadvantage of a dash-on-warning force— the need for reliable, timelywarning—could in principle be removed byhaving the aircraft maintain continuous air-borne patrol. However, even with a new air-craft with lower fuel consumption, the cost ofoperating such a force would be prohibitive. Acontinuously airborne force of 75 aircraft (150MX missiles) could have a Iifecycle cost of $80billion to$100 billion (fiscal year 1980 dollars).

A second crucial problem for an air mobileforce concerns the question of postattack en-durance. After a few hours of flight, the air-craft would have to land and refuel. Since theirhome airfields would be destroyed, they wouldhave to find other places to land and await fur-ther instructions. Th i s p rob lem cou ld beavoided completely if the United States werewilling to adopt a policy of “use it or lose it”for the few hours of unrefueled flight. Thereare also several hundred civilian and militaryairfields in the United States capable of servic-ing large aircraft. Many of these airfields arelocated close to urban areas. If the Sovietswished to deny postattack endurance to an airmobi le f leet—tantamount to forc ing theUnited States to “use it or lose it”- they wouldhave to attack these airfields. A serious effortto bu i ld more aus te re recovery a i r s t r ip sthroughout the country than the Soviets pos-sessed ICBM RVS to destroy them would beenormously expensive, would have substantialenvironmental impact, and would be com-pletely impractical if the Soviet threat grewlarge. For instance, 4,600 airfields spaced 25miles apart would fill the entire 3 million mi2

of the continental United States. Closer spac-ing might be possible, but beyond a certainpoint the spacing would become so close thatlocal fallout from attack on one airfield wouldmake extended operations at neighboring air-fields impossible. Thus, cost aside, it might beimpossible to guarantee survival of usablerecovery airfields against a greatly expandedSoviet ICBM arsenal.

There could conceivably be some value inhaving more airfields suitable for air mobileoperations than the Soviets had SLBM RVs.These airfields could be useful if the UnitedStates doubted the rel iabi l i ty of i ts SLBMwarning sensors and wished to relax the force’salert posture (since, in a crisis, false-alarmtakeoff might be mistaken by the Soviets forpreparation to launch the MX missiles), or ifthe fleet were somehow “spoofed” into takingoff (thus making a portion vulnerable as theaircraft were forced to land).

There are about 2,300 airfields in the UnitedStates that, with upgrades, could accommo-date an air mobile force in the postattackperiod. However, to make use of most of them,it would be necessary to deploy smaller short-takeoff aircraft. Since the smaller aircraftcould only carry one MX missi le, twice asmany of them would be required to make aforce equivalent to a wide-bodied jet force.Between the cost of the aircraft and therecovery airfields, a force with this dispersaloption could cost $10 bil l ion to $40 bil l ion(fiscal year 1980 dollars) more than a wide-bodied jet force with no recovery airfieldsbeyond existing large civilian and military air-fields.

Thus, the lowest cost air mobile systemwould consist of wide-bodied jets, each carry-ing two MX missiles, with no extra recovery air-fields beyond those large civilian and militaryairfields that exist at present. The cost of sucha system would depend on whether it was de-sired to have 200 MX missiles on alert (100 air-craft), 100 surviving MX missiles (50 aircraft,assuming 100-percent survival with promptwarning and takeoff), or some other number.Although OTA has not performed detailed costand schedule analysis for such an air mobileoption, it appears that the cost of a force with75 aircraft (150 MX missiles) on alert could becomparable to the cost of the baseline multi-ple protective shelter system and could be de-ployed in a comparable time.

An air mobile force would also require sev-eral supporting systems. First and foremostwould be reliable sensor systems for timelywarning of Soviet attack. Providing such sys-

Ch. 6—Air Mobile MX ● 219

terns would be technically feasible but would L a s t , p r o v i d i n g f o rrequire time, money, and continued effort. The parable to (or evencomplex force management needs of the air would require the Gmobile force after attack would require a com- (GPS) system or aparably complex communications system. (CBS).

missile accuracy com-better than) land basingobal Positioning SatelliteGround Beacon System

THREE AIR MOBILE MX CONCEPTS

The Importance of Missile Size

The size and weight of the missile determinethe type and number of aircraft needed for anair mobile force. A large missile like MX wouldrequire a large aircraft, and only one or twomissiles could be carried by each aircraft.Large aircraft require long runways. Since thenumber of U.S. airfields with long runways is inthe hundreds, whereas the Soviet ICBM RV ar-senal is in the thousands, an air mobile fleetwith large aircraft could not count on findinglanding sites when fuel ran low several hoursafter a Soviet attack.

A smaller missile could be carried by smalleraircraft, and these smaller planes would havemany more possible sites — including unpre-pared surfaces, highways, and even waterwaysif fitted with pontoons—for postattack recon-stitution. On the other hand, a smaller missilewould carry fewer RVS, meaning that a small-missile air mobile force would require manymore aircraft in order that the total deploy-ment have as many RVS as a large-missi leforce. This large number of aircraft would inturn be costly.

There is thus a tradeoff in cost betweensmall and large missiles for air mobile deploy-ment. This study considers only the MX missile,capable of carrying 10 RVS to intercontinentalrange.

The ground-launched MX missi le weighs190,000 lb. For the purposes of air launch, thefirst stage of the MX could be modified to re-duce the missile weight to about 150,000 lbwith no penalty in range or payload. Thisweight reduction would allow large aircraft tocarry two MX missiles.

There are two reasons why an air-launchedmissile can be lighter than a ground-launchedmissile of equal range and payload. First, anair-launched missile begins its flight 10,000 to30,000 ft higher than ground-launched missilesand therefore does not need propellant tocarry it to that altitude. This effect is actuallysmall. A much larger contribution to weightreduction comes from the fact that a missilethat begins its flight at high altitude can ac-celerate faster. Ground-launched missiles mustaccelerate slowly because if they attained highspeed within the atmosphere they could bedamaged by dynamic pressures and aero-dynamic heating. Slow flight means that themissile uses much of its propel I ant just holdingitself up against the pull of gravity in the earlypart of its flight. An air-launched missile canaccelerate quickly because by the time it at-tains high speed the air is too thin to damageit.

The higher thrust-to-weight ratio of the air-Iaunched missile means that the MX first stagecouId be truncated to a point where the missileweighed only 150,000 lb. (A brand new missilecould probably be designed to attain MX capa-bilities at even lower weight. Cylindrical geom-etry would also not be necessary for a newmissile. )

For the purposes of this chapter, then, theMX miss i le with a smal ler f i r s t s tage and150,000 lb weight will be assumed.

Continuously Airborne

This concept might consist of a fleet of largeturboprop aircraft, each carrying two MX mis-siles, maintaining continuous air alert. The sizeof the deployment — a factor in cost—would


depend on whether it was desired to have 200alert missiles (100 airborne aircraft), 100 surviv-ing missiles (50 aircraft, assuming perfect sur-vivability), or some other number. The aircraftwould maintain relays of 8-hour patrols, with 2-hour turnaround for each aircraft at the end ofa patrol. Ocean patrol areas would remove theaircraft from congested overland air corridorsand minimize the consequences of accidentsinvolving the explosive propellants and nucle-ar warheads carried aboard.

Turboprop propulsion would reduce fuelconsumption and prolong patrol cycles rela-tive to conventional jet aircraft of the samesize. No large turboprop aircraft are presentlymanufactured in the United States, but itwould be technicalIy feasible to develop a newaircraft, with consequent cost and schedulepenalties. A four-engine turboprop aircraft ofabout 900,000-lb gross weight carrying two150,000-lb MX missiles might be capable of 14hours of unrefueled endurance and 2,500-milerange.

Continuously airborne operations would be,exceedingly expensive even for a turbopropaircraft. Such an aircraft might consume about4,000 gal (27,000 lb) of jet fuel per hour. At thepresent price of $1.1 7/gal, the fuel costs tomaintain 75 aircraft (150 MX missiIes) in the air24 hours per day, 365 days per year, would be$3 billion annually. Thirteen years of deploy-ment (the average of 5 years of start-up and 10years of full deployment) would mean a contri-bution of $39 billion to Iifecycle cost from fuelalone. Maintenance and crew costs would alsobe high.

The total Iifecycle cost of a continuouslyalert air mobile system is estimated in theCosts section to be in the neighborhood of $90billion (fiscal year 1980 dollars) even withoutprovision for postattack endurance. This costexceeds that of other basing modes by about afactor of 2.

Ch. 6—Air Mobile MX 221

Dash-on-Warning With “Endurance”

This concept calls for aircraft maintainingcontinuous ground alert at airstrips in the Cen-tral United States. A large number of addi-tional airstrips is provided throughout thecountry for the aircraft to land and refuel inthe postattack period.

A force of 150 aircraft, each carrying asingle MX missile, would require 50 or moreairfields, since the escape timeline would notpermit them to line up and wait their turn totake off. Single airstrips wide enough to allowtwo aircraft to take off simultaneously in op-posite directions would be ideal. Basing atleast 700 nautical miles (nmi) from U.S. coastswould seek to keep the aircraft as far as possi-ble from Soviet submarines. If the air mobileforce were not to displace other Strategic AirCommand alert aircraft nor be collocated withurban areas, some new airfield constructionwould be required. The airfields need not allbe major airbases: most could be relativelyaustere runways with modest support equip-ment, with major maintenance performed at afew main operating bases.

Assured survival of a large fraction of theforce against a large Soviet SLBM force de-ployed near U.S. shores would require highalert procedures. Since the difference betweensurvival and destruction would be measured inminutes, the crews would have to be preparedto start engines immediately on receipt of awarning message. This preparation might meanstationing the crews in the cockpits at alltimes, a duty that some could find unattrac-tive. Procedures calling for takeoff in responseto a first warning message (not waiting for con-firmation) would also imply a willingness toassume the consequences of an occasionalfalse alarm dispersal of the aircraft, carryingtheir propellants and nuclear warheads. If theaircraft were capable of launching their mis-siles only while airborne, dispersal in time ofcrisis could be interpreted by the Soviets aspreparation for a first strike.

Most studies of air mobile MX have con-sidered providing a large number of austereairstrips dispersed about the country for the

aircraft to land, refuel, and await furtherorders in the postattack period. The number ofairstrips of sufficient length, width, and hard-ness to accommodate aircraft of air mobileMX size is in the hundreds, whereas the num-ber of Soviet ICBM RVS that could destroythem in the first half hour of the war is in thethousands. It is therefore plain that the airmobile force could not expect to find airfieldsfor postattack endurance unless their numberapproximated or exceeded the number ofSoviet RVS. The “austere” postattack airfieldswould have to be widely spaced in order thatfallout from an attack on one field did not pre-vent the aircrews from remaining at adjacentfields for the hours or days of postattack en-durance sought by building them. Providing4,600 “austere” fields – equal to the number ofaimpoints in the baseline MPS system — couldresult in a cost of about $30 billion to $40 bil-lion to the air mobile deployment (see Costssection). If the airstrips were spaced 25 milesapart, 4,600 of them wouId entirely cover the 3million mi2 of the continental United States.The question of postattack endurance is dis-cussed further in the Endurance section.

If construction of a large number of austerefields were contemplated, it would be desir-able to minimize costs by deploying aircraftcapable of using short runways. Several studieshave discussed advanced medium short take-off (AMST) aircraft capable of carrying one MXmissile. “Stretched” versions of the YC-14/15have been considered as AMST candidates,but these aircraft were not originally intendedto carry loads as heavy as the MX missile. Theresulting designs called for rather extensivemodifications and for runway lengths some-what in excess of those normally consideredfor the AMST.

Dash-on-Warning Without “Endurance”(Base Case Air Mobile System)

Considerable cost savings could be achievedby abandoning the requirement for a largenumber of austere airfields for use in the post-attack period. Since runway length would nolonger be critical, conventional wide-bodiedjets could be used, meaning that each aircraft


could carry two MX missi les. Such a forcecould use civilian or military airports for post-attack operations or, if these airfields were de-stroyed, adopt a policy of “use it or lose it” forthe few hours of unrefueled flight time. Theimplications of such a policy are discussed fur-ther in the Endurance section.

Where it is necessary to be explicit in the fol-lowing, a Boeing 747 will be assumed as the airmobile carrier. A Lockheed C5 could also beused. A suitably modified 747 capable of carry-ing two 150,000-Ib MX missiles and their sup-port equipment would have a takeoff grossweight of about 900,000 lb and carry 200,000 lb

of fuel at takeoff. The aircraft would have anunrefueled flight time of 5 to 6 hours and arange of 2,000 to 2,500 miles. The missileswould be carried one behind the other alongthe length of the fuselage, and a “bomb bay”would have to be provided in the aft fuselagefor dropping the missiles out at launch. Sincemany commercial airlines are presently phas-ing some 747s out of their fleets, it is con-ceivable that used aircraft could be procuredand modified for the air mobile mission. Sincethe aircraft would rarely fly, there might not beany need to have new ones.

SURVIVABILITY

In comparison to other basing modes, airmobile has the attractive feature that its pre-launch survivability would be relatively insen-sitive to the size and nature of the Soviet ICBMforce. During the half hour it would takeSoviet ICBMS to arrive on the United States,the air mobile aircraft could have dispersed toan area so large that a barrage attack con-sisting of thousands of equivalent megatonswould not destroy a majority of the aircraft.The outcome of such an attack would further-more be insensitive to the number of warheadsdeployed on each Soviet booster and inde-pendent also of missi le accuracy. Thus, airmobile deployment would remove all advan-tage to Soviet fractionation and accuracy im-provements even if the Soviets were to con-template a massive barrage attack on the Cen-tral United States.

The true threat to a dash-on-warning airmobile force would come not from the SovietICBM force, but from SLBMS, that have a flighttime about half that of ICBMS when fired fromnear U.S. coasts. The area into which the air-craft could disperse in this time would bemuch smaller than the area they would coverat the end of a half hour, since the first fewminutes would be consumed by receipt of thewarning signal, engine start-up, taxiing, and in-i t ia l ly low-speed f l ight. St i l l , SLBM attackwould require a relatively large number of

Soviet submarines deployed near to U.S.shores. The present Soviet SLBM force is in-capable of such an attack. Thus, air mobilebasing would stress Soviet strategic forceswhere they would be least able to respond inthe near term.

An air mobile force could therefore behighly survivable. However, the difference be-tween survival and destruction of the forcewould be measured in minutes and would de-pend on receipt of reliable, timely tacticalwarning and high alert procedures. An airmobile ICBM force would share this sensitivitywith the bomber force. Moreover, if the air-craft were unable to find airfields to land andrefuel in the postattack period, their “survival”would be limited to the first few hours of thewar.

There are many uncertainties regarding sur-vival of aircraft to nuclear effects, and theresults of calculations are in certain respectssensitive to the assumptions, but the overallt rends support the general izat ions madeabove.

Aircraft Vulnerability to Nuclear Effects

Little of a definite nature is known about theeffects on aircraft of nearby nuclear detona-t ions. At low alt i tudes the dominant k i l lmechanism is probably the blast wave from

Ch. 6—Air Mobile MX | 223

the detonation and especially the gustingwinds that follow the shock front. These gustscould damage extended surfaces such as thewings and vertical stabilizer or cause enginestalling. Such effects would clearly depend onthe orientation of the aircraft relative to theposition of the detonation. At low altitudes(when escaping from their airfields) the aircraftwould be below the “Mach stem” or point onthe blast front below which the initial blastwave and the blast wave reflected from theEarth coalesce. For the low overpressures ofrelevance to aircraft, there is some uncertaintyin modeling the front below the Mach stem.These uncertainties could result in rather largevariations in the kill radius for aircraft of agiven nominal hardness. It is also necessary totake into account the time elapsed betweenthe detonation and the arrival of the shockfront at the in-flight aircraft. All considered, arange in hardness from 1 to 3 pounds persquare inch (psi) is probably appropriate.

At higher altitudes, the thermal radiationemitted by the detonation is probably lethal tothe aircraft at a greater range than the blastwave. As the altitude increases, a smaller frac-tion of the weapon yield appears as thermalradiation, but since the air is thinner the radia-tion is attenuated less rapidly. The radiation isalso deposited in a shorter time at high alti-tude. Melting or buckling of aerodynamic sur-faces could result. The effects could again de-pend on the orientation of the aircraft with re-spect to the detonation. Thermal fluences of20 to 40 calories per square centimeter (cat/c mz) or so are probably the limit for conven-tional aircraft with aluminum surfaces, butthermal hardening (at some weight penalty)could conceivably increase the thermal hard-ness as high as 100 cal/cm2. An optimum cruisealtitude, considering both blast damage at lowaltitudes and thermal flash at high altitudes, isprobably 10,000 to 15,000 f t.

In addition to the immediate damage doneby blast and thermal radiation, an air mobileforce could also be affected by electromag-netic pulse (EM P), dust lofted by groundbursts, and crew radiation dose.

EMP would not affect crews or airframes,but could disrupt electronic equipment. Thereis a considerable amount of effort to hardenother military aircraft to EMP, and it appearsthat with sufficient testing and attention todesign details, the risk of disruption can beminimized.

I m p a i r m e n t o f s e v e r a l a i r c r a f t f l y i n gthrough the dust cloud caused by the MountSt. Helens’ eruptions has raised concerns forsimilar effects on aircraft operating after anuclear attack involving a large number ofgroundburst weapons. Up to one-third of a mil-lion tons of dust per megaton of weapon yieldcould be lofted into the altitude range be-tween 40,000 and 60,000 ft. Though aircraftwould operate below this altitude, consider-able dust densities could exist at lower alti-tudes for long periods of time as the dust athigher altitudes settled. Turboprop aircraftmight fare better than conventional jet aircraftin these circumstances. However, this area isone of considerable uncertainty.

At the ranges from detonation where the air-craft itself would survive, the prompt radiationdose delivered to the aircrews would probablynot result in mission-impairing sickness. If theaircraft were required to remain at austerefields subject to local fallout in the postattackperiod, however, there could be some dangerof mission-impairing doses unless care wastaken in the choice of airstrips.

In the illustrative calculations that follow, itwill be assumed that, for a reference yield of1.5 MT, the lethal radius for an aircraft at lowaltitude (during escape) is about 8 miles and atcruise altitude (10,000 to 15,000 ft) about 6miles. These ranges correspond roughly to air-craft hardened to 1 to 3 psi overpressure and4 0 c a l / c m2 thermal f luence. I t s h o u l d b eremembered that there are considerable un-certainties in such calculations.

ICBM Barrage of In-Flight Aircraft

If the Soviets contemplated ICBM barrageattack on in-flight aircraft, either a continuous-ly airborne force or a dash-on-warning force,


expenditure of considerable megatonnagewould be required to destroy an appreciablenumber of ai rcraft . opt imum burst height

. would be at the aircraft cruise altitude (10,000to 15,000 ft, as discussed above). The outcomeof such an attack would be insensitive to bothweapon accuracy and fractionation of missilepayload, as discussed further in chapter 8. Be-cause of the burst height, there would be I ittleprompt fallout and less damage to groundstructures than for near-surf ace bursts.

Attack On Continuously Airborne MX Fleet

Five thousand l-MT weapons could destroyall aircraft within an area of about 600,000 miz.Since a continuously airborne air mobile fleetcould be dispersed over an ocean area totalingmillions of square miles, even a very large at-tack could not significantly reduce the force.If the aircraft could be tracked continuously(methods for tracking are discussed below),and the Soviets could retarget their ICBMScontinuously on the basis of up-to-the-minuteaircraft locations, the aircraft could travel farenough in the half-hour ICBM flight time toescape direct attack. For instance, if an air-craft cruised at 400 mph, at the end of a halfhour it could conceivably be anywhere withina circle of area 130,000 miz about the pointwhere it was located when the ICBMS werelaunched. A full 1,000 MT would therefore berequired to destroy it with certainty.

Attack On Dash-on-Warning Fleet

Within a half hour of takeoff, a fleet of airmobile aircraft located at bases within thenorth-central region of the United States atleast 700 nmi from the coasts could be dis-persed over an area totaling about 1 millionm i2. The Soviets could therefore destroy aboutone-eighth of the force (perhaps 20 or so MXmissiles) for each 1,000 MT expended. Destruc-tion of a sizable fraction of the force wouldtherefore require an enormous expenditure ofmegatonnage. It is not clear that such an at-tack would in any case be appealing to theSoviets in all circumstances, implying as itwould (for the low cruise altitude assumed)

widespread destruction in the entire CentralUnited States.

Advanced Threats to Airborne Aircraft

It is possible to imagine several means bywhich in-flight aircraft over the United Statescould be tracked continuously by Soviet sen-sors. All of these means would be subject toU.S. countermeasures. Since, as describedabove, even continuous retargeting of ICBMSon the basis of up-to-the-minute knowledge ofaircraft locations could be unprofitable if theaircraft speed were high, exploitation of a con-tinuous tracking capability would require thatthe ICBMS be able to be retargeted in flight.This brief section describes some of the meansto track aircraft and the possibilities for in-fl ight correction of ICBM trajectories. How-ever, even if in-flight correction were feasible,Soviet dependence on any such strategy for at-tacking air mobile MX would entail risk and besubject to U.S. countermeasures.

Probably the easiest means to identify andtrack aircraft would be to direction-find ontheir radio emissions. To counter this threat, anair mobile force could observe radio silencewhenever possible and stagger broadcasts sothat all planes could not be located simul-taneously. Above all, it could use communi-cations not susceptible to intercept.

Large over-the-horizon radars based in Cubacould probably maintain coverage of the en-tire United States but would not be able tolocalize aircraft well enough to support effec-tive retargeting. They would also be suscepti-ble to jamming. Space-based radars wouldhave to be relatively large in number, wouldhave di f f icul ty with ground-clutter back-ground, and could be jammed. It might be pos-sible to locate the aircraft by interceptingrefIected signals from the Federal Aviation Ad-ministration radar network. Receivers used forthis purpose might be jammable.

Space-based short-wave infrared sensorscould attempt to observe the hot exhaust gasesfrom aircraft engines, but the power levelswouId be exceedingly low, especialIy if the air-

Ch. 6—Air Mobile MX . 225

craft cruised at low altitudes. Means to cooland diffuse aircraft exhaust are also possible.Long-wave infrared sensors would seek to ob-serve the cool body of the aircraft against thewarm earth. Again, this technique would bedifficult in the best of circumstances andcouId be defeated by emissive body paints andheaters in the skins of the aircraft. All infrareddevices could be defeated by cloud cover. ifthe aircraft cruise altitudes were in the 10,000-to 15,000-ft range, average U.S. cloud covermight obscure about a third of the force at anygiven time.

Since jet aircraft could travel about 200miIes in a half hour, substantial trajectory cor-rections would be required if an RV were to beretargeted during flight to an impact point nearthe aircraft. A maneuverable reentry vehiclecould not make this large a correction usingaerodynamic maneuvers. Midcourse velocitycorrections of a few thousand feet-per-secondwould be needed for ballistic RVS. The linkfrom the sensor tracking the aircraft to the in-flight RV could be jammed. Significant pay-load penalties (at least 50 percent) would alsoresult from the need for receiving equipmentand active propulsion.

SLBM Attack On Dash-on-WarningAir Mobile

Attack on the alert airstrips from Soviet sub-marines deployed near U.S. coasts would bethe principal threat to a dash-on-warning airmobile fleet. Calculations indicate—given theusual uncertainties in such estimates— that theforce would be highly survivable even againsta rather advanced future Soviet SLBM deploy-ment consisting of large numbers (20 or more)of Soviet submarines stationed very near toU.S. coasts, provided high alert procedureswere adopted for the force.

The most important factors influencing thesurvivability of an air mobile force would bethe procedures adopted by the United Statesto ensure rapid takeoff in the event of attackand the size and deployment of a future SovietSLBM force. These factors establish the impor-

tant trends. The precise numerical results alsodepend on aircraft hardness to nuclear effects,the way the Soviet attack was structured (lay-down pattern, height of burst), the flyout pat-tern of the aircraft (range, altitude, and direc-tion from airstrip as a function of time), andthe distribution of escape airstrips with respectto distance from the coasts. The outcome ofany calculation should be viewed with thesesensitivities and uncertainties in mind.

Alert Procedures

It would be crucial to the survivability of airmobile that the time between Soviet SLBMlaunch and aircraft brake release be as short aspossible. This time would be the sum of thetimes to receive warning of Soviet attack, manthe aircraft, and bring engines up to speed. Asdiscussed more fully in the Support Systemssection and chapter 4, it should be technicallyfeasible to provide reliable warning sensorsthat would indicate SLBM launch within atleast 1 minute. It would be possible to stationcrews in the cockpits of alert aircraft at alltimes, though this type of duty might well beunattractive to the crews. A jet engine can bestarted and brought up to speed in somewhatmore than 1 minute.

Thus, a “breakwater to brake release” timedelay of between 2 and 3 minutes is feasible,though perhaps optimistic.

Such an extreme alert posture could result inan occasional false alarm dispersal of aircraft,carrying their potentially explosive (at least inthe nonnuclear sense) payloads. Public accept-ance of this possibility wouId be important inmaintaining this posture in the long term. Iftime-consuming procedures were instituted todouble-check the accuracy of the warningmessage before the aircraft took off, surviva-bility against surprise attack could be signifi-cantly reduced.

If the aircraft were able to launch their mis-siles only while airborne, such a false alarmdispersal could appear to the Soviets to bepreparation for a U.S. first strike.


Soviet SLBM Forces

Attack on air mobile would require largenumber s o f S LBMS

- deployed near to U.S.coasts. The effectiveness of an attack woulddepend on the number of SLBM miss i leslaunched but would be quite insensitive tohow the payloads were fractionated into RVSand to RV accuracy. Effectiveness would alsodepend on how close the submarines were ableto approach to U.S. shores and the types of tra-jectories they fIew.

In order to destroy an appreciable fractionof the air mobile force, the Soviets would haveto deploy a large number of submarines nearto U.S. coasts and launch their missi les onspecial fast trajectories. The present SovietSLBM force is incapable of such an attack.Soviet dedication of a future SLBM force to at-tacking a U.S. air mobile force could competewith other time-urgent missions involving bothU.S. and European targets. It is also unlikelythat the approach of large numbers of Sovietsubmarines to U.S. coastlines would go unde-tected. Short-term U.S. responses to such a“surge” could include diplomatic remon-strance, increased antisubmarine warfare ef-forts, and very high (perhaps even continuous-ly airborne) alert procedures.

I l lust rat ive Calculat ions

Figure 89 shows the result of a typical calcu-lation of air mobile survivability. The graphshows the fraction of the air mobile force sur-viving an attack plotted against “escapetime’ ’–the number of minutes the aircraft hadto fly away from their bases (measured frombrake release) before incoming SLBM RVS ar-rived to destroy them. The earlier the aircraftresponded to a warning signal, the longer theescape time would be; the shorter the SLBMflight time (depending on the range and thetype of trajectory), the shorter the escape time.

(The precise assumptions made in construct-ing figure 89 are: 747 flyout; simultaneoustakeoff of two aircraft per base in opposite dir-ections; about 8 equivalent megatonnage(EMT) targeted at each base; nominal aircrafthardness of 2 psi; inland basing.)

Figure 89.—Survivabilit y v. Escape Time(8 EMT on each airstrip, 2 psi aircraft)

t 1

80

80

40

20

0 1 1-0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Aircraft escape time before arrival of SLBM attack (minutes)SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

The curve in figure 89 begins at very low val-ues (most aircraft destroyed) and climbs rap-idly to rather high values (most aircraft sur-vive). Whether the aircraft survived an attackor not would clearly be a matter of a very fewminutes.

Where the outcome of a given attack fell onthe curve of figure 89 would depend on theSoviet SLBM deployment. The various possibil-ities–launch from offshore patrol areas (hun-dreds of miles from U.S. coasts) or from posi-tions at the coasts, on normal or special fasttrajectories—would result in the approximatevalues shown in figure 90 for the survivabilityof the air mobile force. Figure 91 shows theresuIt of delaying takeoff by 2 1\2 minutes,either because crews were not stationed in thecockpits or because confirmation of warningwas required before takeoff. Figure 92 showsthe effect of increasing the size of the attack(measured in EMT) on each alert airstrip.Figure 93 shows the combined effects of bothdelayed takeoff and increased attack size.Finally, in figure 94, takeoff is delayed and theattack size increased, but the aircraft hardnessis also increased from a nominal value of 2 to 5psi.

These figures support the following conclu-sions:

● The dash-on-warning force would be high-ly survivable against all attacks exceptthose involving fairly large numbers ofSLBMS launched on fast trajectories frompositions actually at the U.S. coastline.

Ch. 6—Air Mobile MX . 227

wc. -. -:3U)

Figure 90.—Aircraft Survivability y DuringBase Escape

8 EMT per airstrip2 psi aircraftPrompt takeoff

1001 1

I . . I

I I

1

Off coasts Off coasts At coastsnormal fast normaltrajectory trajectory trajectory

Soviet submarine deployment


At coastsfasttrajectory

Figure 91 .—Aircraft Survivability DuringBase Escape

8 EMT per airstrip2 psi aircraftTakeoff delayed 2.5 minutes

Off coasts Off coasts At coasts At coastsnormal fast normal fasttrajectory trajectory trajecto~ trajectory




14 EMT per airstrip2 psi aircraftPrompt takeoff

g loo~

.ka

‘5

Off coasts Off coasts At coasts At coastsnormal fast normal fasttrajectory trajectory trajectory trajectory




14 EMT per airstrip2 psi aircraftTakeoff delayed 2.5 minutes

75

50

25





c0. -Gmt

100

75

50

25

Figure 94.—Aircraft Survivability During ●

Base Escape

14 EMT per airstrip5 psi aircraft ●

Takeoff delayed 2.5 minutes

●

The effect even of this rather advancedthreat could be offset somewhat by highalert procedures.Significant aircraft hardening, if feasible,would restore high survivability even inthe face of an advanced threat.Further airfield construction, so that therewas one airstrip per aircraft (or even sev-eral, with the aircraft moving among themfrequently), would, by decreasing the EMTapplied to each, improve survivability inthe face of a large SLBM deployment.



SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment.

ENDURANCE

If the air mobile force survived the initial at-tack, it would only be effective for the first fewhours of the war unless provision were made toland and refuel the aircraft. The unrefueled en-durance of the aircraft would be 5 to 10 hours,depending on the type. This time could bemore than doubled with in-flight refueling, buta fleet of tankers with its own escape airstripswould have to be provided for this purpose. Ifairfields capable of at least minimal supportwere not available at the end of this period,the National Command Authorities would bein a position of “use it or lose it” with respectto the air mobile ICBM force. Attempting toensure endurance for an air mobile force couldtherefore be a critical problem and, if ad-dressed by constructing a large number ofrecovery airstrips, a major cost driver.

A first possibility for postattack reconstitu-tion would be use of the several hundred exist-

ing military and commercial airfields through-out the U.S. with runways long enough for thelarge MX missile carriers. Soviet ICBMS couldeasily destroy these airfields within the firsthalf hour of a war. Whether the Soviets wouldchoose to do so in all circumstances is anothermatter, since most of these airfields are nearlarge urban areas. Nonetheless, attack on allwould clearly be possible at relatively low costto the Soviet RV inventory.

It should be noted that whether additionalpostattack airfields were provided or not, theSoviets would have to attack the existing com-mercial airfields if they wished to deny en-durance to the U.S. force. Thus, constructionof additional airfields could not be justified onthe grounds that failing to do so would inviteattack on all the Nation’s airports: the very ex-istence of these airfields, sufficient by them-selves to support air mobile in the postattack


period, would make them targets no matterwhat else the United States built. Independentof whether extra recovery airstrips were built,air mobile deployment would face the Sovietswith the choice of attacking a large number ofurban/industrial targets (and forc ing theUnited States to a “lose it or use it” posture) orgranting endurance to the U.S. force.

A second approach to endurance would beto construct a large number of “austere” orminimalIy equipped recovery airstrips through-out the United States. These airstrips wouldhave to have at least an adequate runway andfuel supply. They would have to be spaced farenough apart so that fallout from attack onone would not make it impossible for aircraftcrews to remain at neighboring airstrips for thehours or days of postattack endurance soughtby building them. It would also be desirable, ifnot necessary, to equip each field with landingaids (beacons or radar reflectors) and perhapsalso crew shacks, floodlights, fences, snow-plows, and the like. Equipping each of thou-sands of airfields with such provisions wouldbe exceedingly expensive. Alternatives couldinclude providing road-mobile recovery teamsto meet the aircraft at the recovery sites or pro-viding a fleet of aircraft loaded with supplies,on alert like the missile fleet, to accompanythe aircraft.

A serious effort to build more austere recov-ery sites than the Soviets possessed RVS to de-stroy them would be enormously expensiveand completely impractical if the Soviet threatgrew large. There are about 2,300 airfields inthe United States with runways 2,500)-ft longand 40-ft wide, that are of medium hardness.Most of these fields are wholly inadequate tosupport aircraft the size of MX carriers andwould need substantial improvement. Con-struct ion of an addit ional 2,300 recoveryfields, to make a total of 4,600 (the number ofaimpoints in the baseline MPS system), wouldbe much more expensive still. If these recoveryfields were located 25 miles from one another,they would cover the entire 3 million mi2 of thecontinental United States. If the numbers weremade larger still, the packing couId be so close

that attack on one could make neighboringfields unusable.

It would thus be impossible to guaranteepostattack endurance for an air mobile MXforce against a large Soviet threat. As a prac-tical matter, it would only be possible to forceon the Soviets the choice of granting endur-ance to the U.S. force or attacking a largenumber of targets spread throughout the coun-try. How many airfields, if any, the UnitedStates constructed would thus seem to dependon what number, if any, would induce the Sovi-ets to give up targeting them. Alternatively, theUnited States could take the position that ifthe Soviets were willing to attack sites through-out the United States, the United States wouldbe willing to adopt a “use it or lose it” posture.In this case the number of recovery airfieldsbuilt would be decided according to theamount of damage the United States wouldtolerate before such a posture became accept-able to U.S. policy makers.

There could conceivably be some value inhaving more airfields suitable for air mobileoperation than the Soviets had SLBM RVS.These airfields could be useful if the U.S.doubted the reliabil ity of its SLBM warningsensors , wished to relax the force’s alertposture, or were somehow “spoofed” into dis-persing the air mobile fleet. If the number ofdispersal fields were larger than the SovietSLBM inventory, a force that in a crisis movedrandomly and frequently among them wouldhave a measure of survivability even in theabsence of warning of SLBM attack. ICBM RVSarriving in larger numbers a short time laterthan the SLBMS could stilI destroy the force, sothe dependence on warning would still not bewholly removed. Transit to a “hop and sit”posture would also allow some relaxation ofalert procedures, alleviating the fear thattakeoff in response to a false warning message

(there being no time for confirmation) could bemistaken by the Soviets for preparation for aU.S. first strike (since the missiles could onlybe launched while airborne). Last, the aircraftwould be vulnerable when they had to land fol-lowing a “spoof” or small attack designed to


cause them to take off. A large number of mal circumstances. It is possible that somelanding sites would make attacking the portion stretches of Midwestern highway could beof the fIeet grounded at any one time as costly used, but fuel caches and support equipmentas possible to the Soviets. would have to be prepositioned or brought to

Another possibility for recovery sites wouldthe landing sites by road mobile vehicles

be along stretches of the Nation’s highways.(themselves subject to attack).

Since M-X-sized missile carriers would need Endurance could clearly be a major problemlong and wide stretches of highway to land and for air mobile MX. The next section estimatestake off, it might not be practical to depend on the cost of providing large numbers of recov-this method. The traffic density on most U.S. ery airstrips.highways is prohibitively high, at least in nor-

COSTS

OTA has not performed detailed cost anal-yses for the three air mobile MX configurationsdiscussed in this chapter. What follows arerough estimates that seek to indicate overallorders of magnitude and to highlight the costdrivers. These estimates are based on air mo-bile MX analyses done by other Governmentagencies. However, since the outcomes arevery sensitive to assumptions concerning thenumber and cost of aircraft and airfields, etc.,these analyses could only provide a guide tothe costs of the systems described here. Thefinal results provided here probably reflect thetrue costs of the systems described to about 10to 20 percent. Costs quoted are nominally infiscal year 1980 dollars. These costs do not in-clude the systems described in the Support Sys-tems section nor the possible additional costsof hardening aircraft. Larger or smaller deploy-ments than those considered here could leadto substantial changes in system costs.

Continuously Airborne

This system would consist of 75 new largeturboprop aircraft (150 MX missiles) continu-ously airborne and operating out of four newcoastal main operating bases. Costs might be:

Aircraft: 75 patrol aircraft plus 50 for trainingand attrition, each costing $80 million (in-cluding development costs): $10 billion.

Missiles: missiles modified for air launch, in-cluding spares and test missiles: $12 billion,including development.

Bases: Four main operating bases: $4 billion.Operations, excluding fuel: $2 billion per year

for 13 years (average of 5 years of startupand 10 years of full deployment): $26 bil-lion.

Fuel: Round-the-clock flight of 75 aircraft at$1.17 per fuel gallon for 13 years: $39 bil-Iion.

Total: $91 billion.

Dash-on-Warning With “Endurance”

This concept consists of 150 AMST aircraft(carrying 150 MX) on continuous ground alertat 75 inland airfields. Also provided are 2,300to 4,600 recovery airfields. Three cases areconsidered:

●

●

●

Case A: Minimal upgrades to 2,300 exist-ing airfields, including hard gravel length-ening and fuel caches.Case B: Same fields as case A with addi-tion of landing aids, floodlights, securityfence, snowplow, crew shack, 2-man per-manent crew, and other supplies.Case C: Additional 2,300 airfields builtfrom scratch and equipped as in case B.

Aircraft: 85-percent reliability implies 180 alertaircraft plus another 50 for training and at-trition at $50 million each: $12 billion.

Missiles: As above, $12 billion.Alert bases: 75 Central U.S. airfields, including

some existing joint civilian/miIitary air-ports, with 6 main operating bases: $4 bil-lion.


Operations (1 3-year average):Case A: $18 billion.Case B: $24 billion.Case C: $28 billion.

Recovery airfields:Case A: $4 billion.Case B: $10 billion.Case C: $25 billion.

Total:Case A: $50 billion.Case B: $62 billion.Case C: $87 billon.

fields. No provision is made for postattack en-durance.

Aircraft: 85-percent reliability implies 90 alertaircraft plus another 40 for training and at-trition, at $60 miIlion each: $8 billion.

Missiles: As above, $12 billion.Alert bases: 38 Central U.S airfields, 4 main

operating bases: $3 billion.Operations: 13 years: $77 billion.Total: $40 billion.

Dash-on-Warning Without “Endurance”

This concept consists of 75 wide-bodied air-craft (150 MX) on ground alert at 38 inland air-

SUPPORT SYSTEMS

Warning Sensors

The survival of a dash-on-warning air mobileMX force would be critically dependent on re-ceipt of prompt, reliable warning of SovietSLBM launch. As discussed more fully in thecontext of launch under attack (ch. 4), it wouldbe technically feasible with cost and continuedeffort to provide a variety of tactical warningsystems which, taken together, wouId be ex-ceedingly difficult for the Soviets to disrupt.These warning sensors could include high-orbitshort-wave infrared satellites, ship-based andcoastal radars (the latter defended with a“threshold ABM” if desired), and airborne in-frared sensors and radars. It would also betechnically feasible, again with cost and effort,to secure the communications links from thesensors to command posts and from commandposts to the alert airfields.

Clearly, if the required money and effortwere not dedicated to providing such warningsensors, a force that depended for its survivalon a very few minutes of escape time would beendangered. No matter how much money andingenuity were devoted to designing safe-guards for the air mobile warning sensors, andeven if these safeguards were very robust in-deed, it would probably never be possible to

eradicate a l ingering fear that the Sovietsmight find some way to sidestep them.

Public acceptance of the possibility of falsealarm dispersal of the fleet wouId be essentialto preserving a high alert rate in the long term.If the aircraft could only launch their MX mis-siles when airborne, false alarm disposal couldbe mistaken by the Soviets for preparation fora first strike.


A C3 system capable of supporting the com-plex force management needs of an air mobileforce would entail relatively low risk but couldbe quite costly. After dispersal, the aircraftwould need to report their status [fuel remain-ing, missile readiness, etc. ) to a central air-borne command post and exchange informa-tion concerning the location and status of sur-viving recovery airfields. If a fraction of theforce had been destroyed, there could be aneed to exchange targeting information to en-sure adequate target coverage.

While airborne, line-of-sight communica-tions among aircraft via UHF would be possi-ble at ranges up to about 300 miles. A UHF


“relay” from all aircraft to the command postcould be established. Adaptive high frequencyand very low frequency/low frequency couldalso be used. If the aircraft were dispersed atmany recovery fields throughout the UnitedStates in the postattack period, some form ofsatel l i te communicat ions would be highlydesirable. High-orbit extremely high frequencysatellites such as described in other chapterswould provide survivable, high data-ratesatellite communications to small, trainabledish antennas.

Missile Guidance

Since the MX missile would be on a mobileplatform for up to several hours before launch,accuracy would degrade relative to stationarydeployment unless additional measures weretaken. These measures might take severalforms.

The most accurate would be external up-date, such as by the GPS or CBS that wouldprovide position and velocity update to themissile’s guidance system during cruise orduring boost. Accuracies could be made com-parable to land-based accuracies for update

during cruise and better for update duringboost. The main disadvantage of these meth-ods would be reliance on the survivability ofthe external aids. Secondly, in a nuclear en-vironment the update information might notbe transmitted through the ionosphere. Thisproblem could degrade accuracy by 25 to 50percent; however, the precise amount is un-certain.

A second method, that would be self-con-tained to the missile and aircraft, would be touse a detailed map of gravity disturbances anda high-class inertial measurement unit (IMU),such as the Advanced Inert ial ReferenceSphere in the missile. Such gravity mappingwould be compatible with mapping programsuti l iz ing SEASAT and GPS . Grad iometer smight be more applicable to this method intheir present state of development than to real-time navigation. Resulting accuracies might besome 70 percent degraded relative to land-based MX.

Finally, doppler radar and a high-class IMU,without external aids or gravity map compen-sation, might give the missile a circular errorprobable in the range 2,000 to 2,500 ft.

Chapter 7

SURFACE SHIP BASING OF MX

Chapter 7.— SURFACE SHIP BASING OF MX

Page

overview ......, . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...235

F a c t o r s C o m m o n t o A l l D e s i g n s 2 3 5

System Description . . 236

O p e r a t i o n a l C o n s i d e r a t i o n s . . . 2 3 8

Soviet Data Collecting Activities Relevantto the Vulnerability of MX-CarryingShips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..239

Threats to MX Surface Ships. . .240Continuous Trailing . . . . .240“Delousing” of Trailers at Port Egress. .244At Sea “De lous ing” o f T ra i le r s . . 244Reacqu i s i t ion o f T ra i led MX Sh ips 2 4 5Regions of Poor Visibi l i ty weather. 246Final Comments on Trailing 247

O t h e r S u r v e i l l a n c e T e c h n o l o g i e s . 2 4 7Over-the-Horizon Kaclars 247Satellite-f Borne Sensors . . . . .248

MX Requirements and Surface Ship Fleet, . 250

Accuracy of Surface-Ship-Based MX 251

Responsiveness of a Surface Ship Force 2 5 2

F l e x i b i l i t y . . . .

E n d u r a n c e 2 53

Cost and Schedule 253

T A B L E S

Table No. Page

30 Number and Displacement of Shipsin the World 239

31

3233

Operational Factors Affecting Fleet ofSov ie t T ra i l i ng Vesse l s . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241SL -7 Spec i f icat ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25410-Year L i fecyc le Cos t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254

95969798

99

100

101

102103104105

106

107

108

109

110

Topside Arrangements . . . . . .236Surface Ship Deployment Area. . . . .238Speeds of World’s Merchant Ships .. .239Displacements of World’s MerchantShips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.39Trailing Cycle Against MX-CarryingSurface Ships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......242Geometry of Barrier Outside a PortWith Unobstructed Access to the Sea .243Geometry of Barrier Outside a PortWith Obstructed Access to the Sea. .. 243Loss of Trail Probability Event Tree. . .246Regions Where Visibility is Often Poor 246Geometry of Over-the-Horizon Radar 247Radar Cross Sections of Two SimilarLooking Ships at Different Over-the-Hor i zon Radar F requenc ies . . . . 248Ground Track of SurveillanceSatellite in a 24-Hour Period . .......248Observation Swath of SurveillanceS a t e l l i t e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 9Single Satellite Repeat Coverage ofMid-North Atlantic in a 24-Hour Period 249Precession of Observation Swath onTwo Successive Orbits of aS u r v e i l l a n c e S a t e l l i t e . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 9Search Schedule of SurveillanceSatellites at Mid-Northern Latitudes .. 250

Chapter 7

SURFACE SHIP BASING OF MX

OVERVIEW

The object of basing the MX missile on sur-face ships would be to attain survivability byusing both deception and large areas of oceanto exhaust or overwhelm Soviet ability to trailor maintain surveillance over the force. Thefleet of MX-carrying ships would attempt todeceive Soviet trailers and sensors by lookingl ike typical merchant ships. By operat ingwithin the 6,000- nautical-mile (nmi) range ofSoviet targets, they could hide in between 50mill ion and 60 mill ion square miles (mi 2) ofocean. Since the ships would have to look likemerchant ships, they would not be fitted with alaunch pad. Instead, the ships would unloadmissiles directly into the water, and fire themfrom a floating position.

Surface ships appear attractive as a meansfor deploying the MX because they are easy tobuild. Therefore, if a policy decision were

made to deploy MX off land, it would be easierto build a fleet of surface ships than a fleet ofsubmarines.

The choice of whether MX should or shouldnot be deployed at sea is a matter of policy.Some of the views that argue for or against seabasing are presented in the discussion of smallsubmarines (ch. 5).

In the discussion that follows, the featuresof surface-ship basing that are common to theconcept are discussed first. Then a point de-s ign is presented and i ts surv ivabi l i ty dis-cussed. This section will be followed by a dis-cussion of the accuracy, responsiveness, flex-ibility, and endurance that could be possiblewith a system of MX-carrying surface ships. Inthe final section, the costschedule wilI be presented,

and deployment

FACTORS COMMON TO ALL DESIGNS

Surface ships are large floating objects. Con-sequently they can be observed at very greatdistances, under a wide variety of conditions,by a wide variety of sensors. The long dis-tances at which ships can be observed and theease of identification of ships create opportu-nities for very effective trailing operations aswell as for very effective wide area search.This circumstance is fundamentally differentfrom that of submarines.

In order to compensate for the fact thatships can be observed at great distances withmodern sensors, the ships would be disguisedto look like merchant ships and would patrol invery large areas of the ocean. They wouldsometimes mingle with other merchant ships inbusy shipping lanes and at other times theywould patrol in areas where Soviet surveil-lance is believed to be poor. The ships wouldhave a speed sufficient to outrun trailing trawl-ers and commercial ships, Iight defensive ar-

maments, and electronic jamming and spoof-ing equipment.

A large fleet of MX-carrying surface shipswould pose a considerable threat to the Soviethomeland and to Soviet strategic weapons sys-tems. It could therefore be expected that theSoviets would be unlikely to ignore such athreat, and in response, might commit substan-tial resources to trail ing and surveil lance.Since Soviet ships would have to make longtransits to and from home ports before at-tempting to trail MX-carrying surface ships,this deployment would result in a considerableexpenditure of Soviet resources. This tacticcould create resource problems for the Sovietsand force them to divert resources from othermiIitary commitments.

The counter problem, from the Americanpoint of view, is that confidence in the sur-vivability of the surface ships would be low.

235

`


There would be periods of time when theweather in the Northern Hemisphere wouldfavor surveillance, tracking, and trailing. Dur-ing these periods there would always be thepossibil ity that large fractions of the fleetwould be under surveiIlance or trail.

Under certain operational conditions, sur-v ivabi l i ty of the force could depend onmaneuvering duals between the trailers andthe trailed ships. As adversaries developedfamiliarity with each other’s operational pro-cedures and capabilities, the initiative couldconstantly shift from one force to the other.The constantly shift ing tactical momentum

between the different forces would have muchof the unpredictability of a classical “war atsea” as forces maneuvered about, attemptingto maintain an advantage. This situation couldresult in serious doubts in the minds of thepublic and decisionmakers about the surviva-bility of the force in times of crisis.

The result of this constantly shifting cir-cumstance would be that the vulnerability andthe survivability of the fleet would constantlyfluctuate. If the fleet were vulnerable during atime of crisis, a substantial incentive would ex-ist to preempt before the opportunity was lost.

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The fIeet of MX-carrying surface ships wouldbe made up of 30 fast merchant-like ships withmovable superstructures, false hatches, andmovable cranes and booms (see fig. 95). Thisequipment would allow them to change theirappearance and complicate the process of ra-dar satellite tagging of the ships. The shipswould, in addition, be rigged with multiple setsof navigation lights so they could be made tochange appearance to night observers. Theships would be constructed of lengths varying

Figure 95.—Topside Arrangements


between 550 and 650 ft and would have a dis-placement of between 15,000 and 20,000 tons.They would have an unrefueled-at-sea endur-ance of about 20,000 nmi assuming a patrolspeed of about 20 knots. The ships would alsohave high-speed gas turbines in order to reachthe 30 + knot speeds needed to break trail.

The ships are assumed to have an at-sea rateof about 80 percent (60 days at sea and 15 daysin port). Missile reliability, extended refits andoverhauls will result in a ship availability ofless than 80 percent. (See ch. 5 for and explana-tion of the effects of overhaul, extended refit,and missi le reliabil ity on the availabil ity ofships. ) If survivability fell below 50 percent, itwould require an increase in the number ofships if the fleet is to be able to maintain therequisite number of survivable missiles on sta-tion. As will be demonstrated in the section onsurvivability, an assessment aimed at optimiz-ing the at-sea rate and overhaul rate is notjustified in light of the very large uncertaintiesassociated with survivability.

Each ship would carry 8 to 10 MX missiles sothat 200 MX missiles would be at sea at alltimes. This total would be an adequate numberof MX missiles if the ships had a survivability .

rate of 50 percent. The conditions under whichsuch a survivability rate might be achieved arediscussed below in the section on surviva-bility).

Ch. 7—Surface Ship Basing of MX ● 237

The ship would be equipped with Trident-Iike navigation and communications suites.Antenna masts would be disguised to look likenormal merchant equipment or would be re-cessed so they could not be observed by air-craft, other ships or satellites. Jamming andelectronic countermeasure equipment wouldalso be available on the ship to aid in defenseand to help confuse potential trailers. In addi-tion to the Trident inertial navigation system,the ship’s navigation suite would be equippedwith a gravity gradiometer (assuming suchgradiometers are successfully deployable onsurface ships) and a system for interrogatingacoustic transponders.

The ships would also be equipped with asonar system that could be extended or with-drawn from recesses under the hull. This wouldgive the ship a modest active and passive sonarcapability against trailing submarines. It wouldalso be possible to mount a far more capablesonar array on the bottom of the hull but thiswould be observable to submarines or diversand could be used as a means of “sorting”ships while at sea or in port.

Since the ships would have to be indistin-guishable from merchant ships, their acousticoutputs would have to be comparable withthose of merchant ships. Since merchant shipsare considerably noisier than combat ships, itwould be considerably easier for a distant trail-ing submarine or surface ship to maintain con-tact with the aid of a passive sonar systemonce the MX ship has been taken in trail.

The ships would have an onboard securityforce to protect the missi les and nuclearweapons in the event of an incident at sea.This force would be armed with conventionalsmall arms and would also man the ships’defenses. Defenses might include heavy ma-chine guns, rockets, cruise missiles, and lightcannon. Perceived needs for heavier arma-ments would have to be balanced against theneed to maintain deception. Provision wouldalso be made for the destruction of the nuclear

weapons as a measure against the possibilityof a successful boarding.

A system of 150 acoustic transponder fieldswould be secretly emplaced in the 50 millionto 60 million mi2 of the surface-ship deploy-ment area. The transponder fields would makeit possible for the ships to obtain extremely ac-curate velocity and position information forthe missile guidance system prior to a launch.I n the event of a need to use these transponderfields, the ships could proceed at 30+ knots tothe nearest f ield. Fleet deployment to thefields could be affected within 11 to 12 hours.

The MX missile guidance system could bemodified in a number of ways in order toachieve high accuracy at sea. A minimal modi-fication would involve the development ofsoftware optimized for a purely inertial guidedsea-based MX. A more involved modificationof the guidance system would involve the useof a star tracker in conjunction with the MX in-ertial measurement unit. Still another modifi-cation of the guidance system would involvethe use of radio beacons in conjunction withthe MX inert ia l measurement uni t . Thesemethods of guidance, and their capabilities,are discussed in detail in the section on sub-marine basing of MX.

An additional activity aimed at achievingimproved accuracy with the surface-ship-based MX would involve the measurement anduse of gravimetric data for the deploymentareas in which the ships operate. These datawould then be used to correct for gravita-tionally induced missile guidance errors alongflight trajectories.

The ships would deploy from two bases onthe east and west coasts of the continentalUnited States. These bases would have specialshore facilities for assemblage, storage, andhandling of MX missiles. In addition, explosivehandling loading docks would be constructedso that damage from an accidental ignition orexplosion of rocket propellant would be lim-ited to the loading facility.


OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The fleet of surface ships would operate inan area as large as 50 million to 60 million mi2

(see fig. 96). There would be a goal of oper-ating in as large an area as possible to decreasethe likelihood of surveillance. This goal wouldbe constrained by the need to stay within mis-sile range of Soviet targets.

The ships would attempt to remain covertusing a variety of techniques. They would flythe flag of the country of registration anddisplay the hull identification markers of amerchant ship.

The pattern of deployment would takeadvantage of shipping lanes, bad weather,day/night cycles, and intelligence on Sovietpatrol activities. The ships would be in con-stant receipt of shore-to-ship very low fre-quency (VLF) signals. Since the ships would beon the ocean surface, they could also monitorshore-to-ship high frequency (H F) transmissionsand satell ite transmissions on a continuousbasis.

There would be an operational need to re-port back to National Command Authorities(NCA) on a regular schedule to prevent theSoviets from attritting a large part of the fleetwithout U.S. knowledge. In addition, there

Figure 96.—Surface Ship Deployment Area


couId be concern about the potential piracy ofthe nuclear weapons loads.

Report-back could be accomplished throughhigh-orbit millimeter wave satellites. A 5-inchdish antenna could be used to report back toNCA on a regular basis. Since the beam fromthe ship-borne antenna would be very narrow,there would be a very low probability of trans-missions being intercepted. The antenna wouIdnormally be recessed within a section of theship so it could not be observed from otherships, ai rcraft or h igh-resolut ion satelIitephotography.

The ships could constantly monitor theirposition using the Global Positioning System(GPS) anywhere in the deployment area. On acommand to launch, the missiles could be slidinto the water from ramps deployed to the rearof the ship and fired from a floating capsulecontainer.

Since sliding missiles into the water wouldbe visible to a trailing observer, such a pro-cedure would invite preemptive sinking of theship. An alternative method of launch wouldbe to carry the encapsulated missiles inside thehull and launch them through the bottom ofthe hull as the ship moves forward. The encap-sulated missile would then rise to the surfacebehind the advancing ship. Upon broachingthe surface of the water, its engines would beignited and it would fly out of the capsule. Inthis manner, it would be possible to launch themissiles without providing a trailer with tac-tical warning of a launch.

Another possible means of obtaining naviga-tional fixes would be to use the acoustict ransponder f ie lds that had been placedthroughout the deployment area. If the GPSwere attacked, these fields could be used whenthe the Ship’s Inert ia l Navigat ion System(SINS) has to be reset. Deployment to acoustictransponder fields would take 11 to 12 hours,well within the period of time needed betweenupdates (see ch. 5 for a more complete descrip-tion of the SINS capabilities).


SOVIET DATA COLLECTING ACTIVITIES RELEVANT TOTHE VULNERABILITY OF MX-CARRYING SHIPS

The MX-carrying surface ship would carry 8to 10 cannisterized MX missiles and would dis-place about 15,000 tons. The need to carry aheavy load of cannisterized missiles, to main-tain at-sea endurance, and to have a high-speed capability dictates the size class of theships.

Table 30 presents Department of Commercestatistics on the number and displacement ofships in the world. There are 5,094 ships withdisplacements greater than 10,000 tons and1,561 ships with displacements over 15,000tons. There are 130 ships with displacementsover 15,000 tons that fIy American flags.

Figure 97 is a plot of the number of merchantfreighters in the world versus speed. As can beseen from the plot, there are very few mer-chant ships in the world capable of being usedto trail an MX ship with a 30 + knot burstspeed. The bar graph in figure 98 shows thenumber of merchant freighters as a function ofdisplacement. The graph shows that there are1,400 to 1,500 merchant freighters in the worldwith displacement greater than 15,000 tonsand about 1,400 merchant freighters with dis-placements between 13,000 and 15,000 tons.Between 1,500 and 3,000 of the world’s 24,000ships would be in a class that couId potentiallybe mistaken for MX-carrying ships.

Figure 97.—Speeds of World’s Merchant Ships

2400 ‘ , .2100

1800

1500

1200

900

600

300

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Speed in knots

SOURCE: Department of Commerce

Figure 98.— Displacements of World’sMerchant Ships

3 0 0 0

QC

2000

10001 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1213 14 15

Displacement in thousands of tons

SOURCE: Department of Commerce

Table 30.—Number and Displacement of Ships in the World

World ships over 1,000 gross tons

Total number Passenger and Bulkof ships cargo Freighters carriers Tankers

24,511 487 14,410 4,651 5,233

Merchant-type freighters over 1,000 gross tons

U.S. flag GovernmentWorld total Foreign flag total Private owned

5,094 4,657 437 177

Merchant-type freighters over 15,000 gross tons

U.S. flag GovernmentWorld total Foreign flag total Private owned

1,561 1,431 130 125 5

SOURCE: Department of Commerce.


Any sensible Soviet reaction to the deploy-ment of MX-carrying surface ships would in-volve the cataloging of surface ships of theworld. Such a catalog would include all freeworld surface ships of length, width, and dis-placement similar to that of the MX surfaceships. The catalog would contain informationabout all relevant measurable characteristicsthat could aid in identification of the ships.Such data would include the following list ofinformation:

● length, width, and draft of the ship;● displacement;● propulsion (steam, gas-turbine, diesel);● side-view profiles;. radar signatures at different frequencies;. infrared signatures; and

● acoustic signatures.

Other ship features useful in “tagging” shipswould be such identifiable characteristics as

hull length-to-width ratios; hull shapes; wakecharacteristics; and the positions of hatches,booms, and lifeboats. Much of this data couldbe obtained from standard sources on com-mercial shipping and the rest could be ob-tained by making measurements while shipsleave and enter commercial ports. Data couldalso be collected by trawlers, surface com-batants, satellites, submarines, and airplanes.These data could be correlated with data col-lected by shore observers on the character-istics, numbers, departure times, and desti-nations of merchant ships in deepwater portsaround the world.

In the discussion that follows, it should bekept in mind that this background of data col-lecting would be an ongoing process, constant-ly being refined and updated, so that radar, in-frared, optical, and acoustic data would beavailable for purposes of “sorting” ships.

THREATS TO MX SURFACE SHIPS

The threats to a surface ship fleet fall intotwo broad categories:

1. continuous trailing of the MX ships so thata coordinated attack could be executed atwill, and

2. wide area tracking of the surface fleet sothat MX ships could be localized wellenough to attack at will.

Continuous trailing would most likely be at-tempted by picking up the ships as they egressfrom known operating ports. Ports from whichbal l i s t ic miss i le ships operate would havespecial facilities for loading MX missiles ontothe ships. Since the missiles are very large andthere are strict explosive handling safety re-quirements, these facil it ies would be easilyidentified by onshore agents or satelIite recon-naissance. Ships that are pulled up to thesedocks could either be photographed by satel-lite or observed by onshore agents. These datawould be added to the Soviet computer cata-log of ship characteristics.

Wide area, open ocean search could be at-tempted with aircraft, satellites, or over-the-horizon radar systems. Since the area in whichthe ships would operate would be enormous,search by aircraft would be very difficult andexpensive. Optimistically, a fleet of 600 to 800long-range surveillance aircraft and 100 to 200airborne refueling tankers would be requiredto localize enough ships in a short enough timeto be able to destroy a large fraction of theforce. Other wide area search techniques thatwould be more promising include infrared, op-tical, and radar search using satellite-bornesensors and over-the-horizon radar searchusing frequency scanning radars.

Continuous Trailing

A potential Soviet response to the deploy-ment of a fleet of MX-carrying surface shipscould be to deploy a fleet of surface ships tomaintain and establ i sh t ra i l on MX shipsoperating at sea. If a high percentage of MX

Ch. 7—Surface Ship Basing of MX . 241

ships could be brought under trail, a preemp-tive strike could result in the loss of a largepart of the MX fIeet.

Establishing and maintaining trail at sea isnot Iikely to be a simple matter. The success orfailure of such operations will depend on thecapabilities of the trailing ships, availability ofsupport forces to aid the MX ships, tactics, andenvironmental conditions. There are also polit-ical and legal factors that could affect the ac-tivities and tactical options of both the trailingand trailed ships. Such factors are difficult toanalyze in technical terms, since they basicallyinvolve violations or reinterpretations of inter-national law of the sea. Operations or tacticsthat would require routine violations of inter-national law are therefore not considered indetail in the technical assessment to follow.

In order to trail a fleet of MX-carrying sur-face ships, the Soviets might build a new typeof surface ship with the necessary speed andendurance to transit from home ports, trail theMX ship for 60 days, and transit back home forresupply and refit. The surface ships would beequipped with surface search radars, infraredand optical search systems, and facilities forhandling remotely piloted vehicles and/orhelicopters. They would also be equipped withsurface-to-surface cruise missiles, torpedoes,and possibly cannon. Poss ible ports f romwhich the ships would operate might be Cuba,or Murmansk, Petropavlosk, and Vladivostok.Table 31 shows transit distances to ports thatmight potentialIy handle the surface ships.

In order for Soviet ships to continuously trailMX ships, one or more of these ships wouldhave to be available to trail ships as theyegressed from port. Figure 99 shows a possiblescheduIe for keeping track of MX-carrying sur-face ships. The middle horizontal time lineshows the total cycle for a Soviet ship-trailingmission against MX-carrying surface ships. Theship first transits to the port from which theMX ship operates, waits outside the port untilthe MX ship leaves on a sea patrol, trails theMX ship for the sea-patrol period, transits backhome, and undergoes refit and resupply in itshome port. The top and bottom horizontaltime lines in figure 99 show the activities of

Table 31.–Operational Factors Affecting Fleet ofSoviet Trailing Vessels

Transit a Transitb Basec Requiredddistance time loss number

(nmi) (days) factor of ships

Murmanskto Norfolk . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,300 17.9 1.51 1.78

Murmanskto Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,600 19.2 1.53 1.80

Cuba toNorfolk ... , . . . . . . . . . . 870 3.6 1.23 1.45

Cuba toCharleston . . . . . . . . . . . 610 2.5 1.20 1.41

Petropavloskto Seattle . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,600 15.0 1.46 1.72

Petropavlosk toSan Diego . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,800 11.7 1.40 1.65

a on e . way t rans i t d is tance,b Tw o.way transit time assuming 20-knot average transit speed.cAssumes ships spend 5 days In ref!t and an average of 7 days on Port watch

waiting to pick up MX ships leaving port.dAss umes that 15 percent of the tra!ling ships are In overhaul at all times.


other trailing ships that are either transitingfrom home base to take up position outside ofport or transiting to home bases after havingcompleted an at-sea trailing mission. The num-ber of ships needed in order to keep one shipconstantly available for trailing at sea wouldthen be given by the expression:

B ,+ = 3 (total cycle time) – 2 (TOW + T,,J

(total cycle time)where:Blf = base loss factortotal cycle time = 2 T~,.n,lt + T~,W + Tt,<,ll + T,e~lt

T – time spent in port watchp w —

T trail = time spent trailing surface shipT tran~lt = time spent in transit to or from h o m e p o r t

‘ r e f t t = time spent in port for refit

The base loss factor Blf is simply the number ofships needed to keep a single ship on station atall times. Additionally, this factor must be ad-justed for the percentage of ships that wouldbe unavailable due to major overhaul activi-ties in shipyards. The required number of shipswould therefore be given by the expression:

Total number of shipsrequired for tra i i ing = (number of MX ships) (B,()

(1 - FO)where:F. = fraction of time ships in overhaul

Table 31 shows typical transit times to andfrom different Soviet ports to ports from which

242 ● MX Missile


MX missile ships might operate. The base lossfactors and number of ships necessary to con-tinuously cover different ports are also pre-sented. These factors were calculated assum-ing Soviet ships spend an average of 5 days inport changing crews and being resupplied andan average of 7 days on port watch waiting topick up a trailing ship. It would therefore benecessary for the Soviets to build a fleet of 45to 50 ships in order to have a ship continuouslyavailable at sea to pick up and trail surfaceships as they leave port.

Initiating trail as the ship leaves port couldbe a potentially complex operation. A line ofreconnaissance ships could be set up outsidethe port using relatively slow and inexpensivetrawlers to patrol sectors of l ine. Onshoreobservers could also be used to inform shipson the line of departure of a surface ship. Sur-face search radars could be used to detect theegressing surface ship and imaging radarscould be used as an aid to identification in fog.At night, infrared sensors and TV camerascould also be used. The ships on the reconnais-sance line could also be equipped with re-motely piloted helicopter vehicles and fixed-wing remotely piloted vehicles. These aircraftcould be launched in good or bad weather tohelp cover large areas of the ocean. Theywould also be of use if multiple ships egressed

from port and it was necessary to obtain ahigh-resolution look at several ships in order toidentify the MX-carrying ship. The number offast-trailing ships kept on station outside theport would always be greater than or equal tothe number of MX ships in port at any onetime. Multiple egresses and surging of MXships would be possible to complicate port-watch operations but this would have to bebalanced against a requirement to keep mis-siles on station. If the missile ships were surgedtoo often, it would result in periods where theUnited States would have more than the de-sired number of missiles on station and othertimes when the United States would have lessthan the desired number of missiles on station.

The number of ships required for the recon-naissance barrier can be estimated by consid-ering the geometry of a port egress, number ofMX-carrying ships in port, the range at whichan MX ship can be detected, the barrier ship’sability to identify a ship as an MX carrier, andthe rate at which multiple ships could exit theport. Figure 100 shows the geometry of a portegress for a range of exit tracks. The length ofthe barrier is:

barrier length = 2 L sin A1 + cos A

where:L is the territorialIit-nit


Figure 100.—Geometry of Barrier Outside a PortWith Unobstructed Access to the Sea


Assuming that the territorial limit is 12 milesand the ships can exit within a cone of 150the barrier length would have to be about 45miles long. This geometry could apply to portslike San Diego, Charleston, Seattle, and SanFrancisco. Ports l ike New York and Bostonhave considerably more constricted access tothe sea and would therefore require shorterbarriers (see fig. 101). The average number ofmerchant ships leaving three major Americanports are listed below:

Average number ofPort exits per dayB o s t o n . , 10 to 20N e w Y o r k 60 to 80S a n F r a n c i s c o 30 to 50

Two extreme cases are of interest: Ships ex-iting port at a uniform rate over a 24-hourperiod and ships exiting port at a maximumrate at one time. A maximum rate might beestimated by assuming that the ships wouldmaintain 1,000 yd between them and exit at 10knots. The maximum rate would therefore beone ship every 3 minutes. If the exits occurredduring conditions of poor visibility, the shipsmight instead maintain a 2,000- to 3,000-yddistance and exit at 5 knots. This exit processwould make the maximum rate one ship every12 to 18 minutes. If the displacements of theexiting ships reflected that of the world’socean going ships, 15 to 25 percent of the shipswould be 15,000 tons or over. Thus, assuming avery busy commercial port could be used fordeployment of nuclear armed MX ships, an exitrate as high as three to five ships an hour in the15,000-ton class could be leaving port during

Figure 101 .—Geometry of Barrier Outside a PortWith Obstructed Access to the Sea


peak periods of shipping. These ships couldpossibly be MX carriers and might have to beinspected at close range by the barrier patrolships.

In actuality, i t would probably not benecessary to inspect all these ships closely,since onshore observers could collect informa-tion on sailing schedules and send confirma-tion to the offshore ships on the sailing of theship. It would therefore be necessary only forthe barrier ships to leave their stations if it ap-peared that more ships of the right size werecrossing the barrier than expected.

Assuming that the barrier ships used surfaceradars with a range of 5 miIes, five ships wouldbe required to maintain a constant barrier pa-trol. This total might be an adequate numberfor average peak sailing periods. Since the bar-rier ships would more closely approximatetrawlers rather than the more expensive trail-ing ships, a prudent and determined adversarymight commit two or three times as manyships.

If the port was not a major commercial port,then peak exit rates could only occur if several


ballistic missile ships exited at the same time.Since scheduling of trail ing ships would beresponsive to such fluctuations, additionallong-range trailing vessels could be on station.

“Delousing” of Trailers at Port Egress

A number of options are available to shipsthat are attempting to “delouse” themselves asthey egress from port. The problem with suchmeasures is that they may involve tactics thatmay be uncharacteristic of merchant ships ormay result in serious delays before the patrol issuccessfully begun. More serious yet, the tac-tics may be fruitless against ships equippedwith modern sensors. These tactics might in-CI ude:

1. make repeated exit attempts until free,2. use alternate port exits when available,3. coast run to avoid the port watch barrier,4. take advantage of dark and bad weather,5. utilize military escorts to harass barrier

ships, and/or6. jam barrier ship sensors.

Tactics 1 through 4 would be very difficultto use successfully against ships equipped withmodern sensors. Tactic 5 could create a largenumber of incidents that could have interna-tional repercussions. Tactic 6 would be verydifficult to do if the ships were equipped withhigh-quality radars with good beam-formingand anti jam signal processing.

The success or failure of trailing operationswould depend in a sensitive way on many de-tails of ship operations, on the resolve of thetrailing and trailed ships, the quality of theequipment available to each side, and on theresourcefulness of the different ship com-manders. If the adversary is determined tocommit the resources to establish trail, thereappears to be little hope that the MX shipwould “delouse” itself during egress from port.Once at sea, there also appears to be littleopportunity for delousing. However, it couldbe argued that bad weather or tact icalmaneuvering could be used repetitively untiltrail is broken. This possibility is explored inthe next section.

At Sea “Delousing” of Trailers

It is of interest to determine how large afraction of the force might be free of trail if itis assumed that bad weather or some other op-portunity to break trail presents itself to theships.

Low-visibility conditions at sea could be ofuse in “delous ing” the surface ships. Thepercentage of maritime reports in which visi-bility is below 1 mile is about 5 percent.

If a low-visibility condition is assumed to ex-ist for 1 day, then on the average, the prob-ability of encountering such a weather condi-tion during a patrol of length n days would be:

P I= – (probability of clear weather)= 1 - (1 - 0 0 5 ) ”

orP = 0,95 for a 60-day patrol (i. e., n = 60)

The probability of encountering low visibilityweather on the ith day of the patrol wouldsimply be:

PI = (probability of i-1 days of good weather)x (probability of bad weather on the i!h day)

= (probability of one day’s good weather)’- I

X (probability of one days bad weather)

= (1 – 0,05) ’-1 x (0.05)

If the probability of breaking trail duringlow visibility is pb, the expected number ofdays free of trail for a patrol of n days will be:

Q (probability trail will be broken)X (average number of days before bad weather is

encountered)= P~ x (average number of days before bad weather

is encountered)

= P~ X ~ (n – i) PI

i =1The fraction of the fleet under trail at anygiven time would be:

[number of days number of days

F on patrol — free of trail= 1n - Q

[number of days on patrol]=

N

For 60 days at sea (n = 60 in the above summa-tion), the average number of days free of trailwould be about 12 days if the probability of


breaking trail during a day of bad weather isO .S. if the probability of breaking trail during abad day of weather is 0.25, then the averagenumber of days free of trail would be about 6.Thus, for the case where there is a 0.5 prob-ability of losing the trailer when the weather isbad, the fraction of the fleet under trail will be:

F = 6 0 – 12 s () 80

60

or 80 percent of the fleet would be under trail.

For the case in which the chance of losingthe ship during a bad day of weather was 0.25,the fraction of the fIeet under trail would be:

F = 60 – 6 = ()90

60

or 90 percent of the fIeet would be under trail.

If the ships could somehow choose weatherconditions so that it was five times more likelythat they would encounter weather with visi-bility of less than 1 mile, then the probabilityof encountering such weather on any givenday would go from 0.05 to 0.25. If again it isassumed that the ships would lose their trailerwith a probability of 0.5 on any day that suchweather is encountered, the mean number ofdays free of trailers would rise to 28 and thefraction of the force under constant trailwould be 50 percent. If the ships lost the trailerevery time bad weather was encountered, thefraction of the force under constant trailwouId be only 7 percent.

Reacquisition of Trailed MX Ships

The discussion above assumes that once theMX ship has been lost to the trailing vessel it isnot reacquired during the remainder of its pa-trol period. If a search is immediately initiatedonce the trailer has lost the MX ship, andremotely piloted helicopters or remotely pi-loted winged vehicles are used, it is possiblethat the MX ship could be reacquired. If theremotely piloted vehicle could fly at 100 knotsand had a modest radar with a range of 5 nmi,then the vehicle could search about 1,000m i2/hr. If the MX ship were to make a 30 +dash upon determining the trailer had lost con-tact (a questionable action if the visibility were

less than 1 mile and other ships were nearby),then it is conceivable that the ship could gen-erate a large enough area of uncertainty toevade the drone vehicles. If the drone vehiclewas not launched for half an hour after thetrail was lost, the ship could be anywhere in acircle of radius 15 nmi. The trailing ship wouldbe at the center of this circle of area 700 mi’when the drone is launched. If the drone fliesin widening circles around the trailing ship itwil I have searched the 700-m i 2 area withinabout 45 minutes. By that time the surface shipcould be within an area of radius of 36 to 37miles (an area of 4,300 mi’). The drone mighttherefore not acquire the surface ship in timeif it is not launched quickly from the deck ofthe ship. If, instead, the drone is launchedwithin 15 minutes after trail is lost, it could beexpected to reacquire the ship with a probabil-ity of 1.

Since the ability to reacquire the target shipis sensitive to the capability of the drone (i. e.,its radar might have a 10-mile range instead ofa 5-mile range) and to how quickly the crew re-sponds to the loss of trail, it is of interest to askwhat percentage of ships would be kept undertrail if the ships had some success reacquiringlost trails.

Figure 102 diagrams the possible events thatmight occur during a period of bad weather.The lower branch diagrams the situation inwhich trail is maintained during the period ofpoor visibility. The upper branch diagrams theevents that could occur after loss of trail.

After loss of trail one of two events canfollow: the ship reacquires the trail or it fails toreacquire trail. The lowermost diagram showsthe result of a situation in which the proba-bility of losing trail is very high (7s percent). Iftrail could not be reacquired and the shipswere able to seek out poor weather 25 percentof the time (i. e., five times more bad weatherthan would randomly be encountered) then 30percent of the fleet would be under trail. If in-stead there was a 50-percent chance the trailcould be reestablished, the percentage of theforce under trail would then be 37 percent.Therefore, the fraction of ships under trail


Figure 102.—Loss of Trail Probability Event Tree could change significantly if the trailing shipshad a modest ability to reacquire trail.

It should also be noted that if a ship is takingadvantage of bad weather to intermingle withother ships (so as to make it difficult for aradar operator to keep track of the MX-carry-ing ship) it is relatively easy to sort ships withthe aid of fixed wing or helicopter-like drones.If the MX-carrying ship makes a dash at 30+knots, its acoustic output would be enormousand it could be heard for many miles by thetrailing ship. The ship could then send a dronein the direction of the acoustic signal to deter-mine whether this was in fact the MX ship run-ning for freedom, or just a decoy ship acous-tically enhanced to sound like a fast runningsurface ship. In any case, the use of advancedpilotless drones with advanced sensors wouldmake the reestablishment of a temporari lybroken trail quite likely.

Regions of Poor Visibility Weather

The shaded region in figure 103 shows areasof the world that have poor visibility a highpercentage of the time. Due to proximity tothe Soviet Union, Soviet air and ocean surveil-lance could be expected to be quite good inthe northern regions near the Bering and Nor-wegian seas. Therefore, the regions of poor

Figure 103.—Regions Where Visibility isOften Poor

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment


visibility weather that could be used for at-tempting to break trail would be only theseveral hundred thousand square miles ofocean west of Greenland and north of Antarc-tica. These regions wil l have weather thatvaries significantly with changes in season. Itcould therefore be expected that if theseregions were used extensively, the fleet couldbe seriously unmasked during periods of clearweather. Another problem encountered inthese regions is ice. While it would normallynot be considered prudent to operate in poorvisibility weather without radar, it would besuicidal to do so in waters populated by ice-bergs. The radar emissions of the trailed shipcould therefore be used as an aid for the trail-ing vessel during periods of poor visibility. Theemissions would not exclude the trailer fromalso observing the trailed ship with its own ad-vanced radars as well.

Final Comments on Trailing

It should be clear from the above discussionthat the survivability of a fleet of MX-carryingships could be sensitive to operational details,capabilities of search radars and possiblyweather. Advanced sensors and remotely pi-loted vehicles would substantially enhance theability of a fleet of trailing ships to maintaintrail. If there is a 5-percent chance per day thattrail will be lost (either due to weather, at-seatactics or equipment failures) as much as 45 to50 percent of the fleet could be free of trailers.This circumstance, however, would be very un-likely with the variety, diversity and reliabilityof advanced sensing technologies that can beexpected to exist in the late 1980’s and early1 990’s.

OTHER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES

Although trailing would be the most techno-logically conservative means of keeping trackof the MX-carrying surface ships, there are anumber of other important technologies thatcould either supersede the trail ing threat or beused to aid the trailing vessels. These technol-ogies are over-the-horizon radars and satellite-borne sensors.

Over-the-Horizon Radars

signal off the ionosphere (see fig. 104). The re-flected signal from the target also bounces offthe ionosphere before it arrives back at theradar receiver.

Over-the-horizon radars are restricted to fre-quencies no higher than that in the HF bandsince higher frequencies are not substantiallyreflected from the ionosphere. A consequenceof such a low radar frequency is that the radarhas low resolution.

An over-the-horizon radar i l luminates tar- Figure 105 shows the scattered intensity atgets over the horizon by bouncing a radar different frequencies for two similar looking

Figure 104.—Geometry of Over-the-Horizon Radar


Intensity

Figure 105.— Radar Cross Sections ofTwo Similar Looking Ships at DifferentOver”the”Horizon Radar Frequencies

Partial ramp response

Shimokaze

Hayanami

Intensity A — B o w S t e r n

Partial ramp response

Frequency

SOURCE: E. K. Young and J. D. Walton, Surface Ship Target ClassificationUsing H. F. Radar, Office of Naval Research, Final Report 712352,May 1980.

ships as they might appear to an over-the-horizon radar reflecting off a perfectly smoothundisturbed ionosphere. Although the shipsare not resolved in a visual sense, the fre-quency dependent radar signal differs for eachship. An actual over-the-horizon radar wouldhave to track ships in the presence of travelingionospheric disturbances and sea clutter.

It is possible that over-the-horizon radarswould be able to track and identify ships onthe surface of the ocean almost continuously.This identification could be possible if the in-tensity of reflected radiation at different fre-quencies, can be measured accurately in thepresence of ionospheric disturbances and seaclutter.

If this promising technology is successfullydeveloped, the range of observation is likely tobe on the order of 2,000 miles. An over-the-horizon radar would be unlikely to threatenthe fleet of MX-carrying ships but could beused to open large areas of ocean to observa-tion from shore-based radars.

Satellite-Borne Sensors

Satellite-borne sensors could include micro-wave radiometers (to pick up electromagneticemissions from ships), infrared sensors, opticalsensors, and various types of radars. Figure 106shows the ground tracks of the Cosmos 749 sat-ellite that has an orbital period of about 95minutes and an orbit inclined at 740 from theEquator. As the Earth rotates to the east, theground track of the satellite precesses to thewest. Because of the chosen orbital period, thesatellite ground tracks repeat themselves every24 hours (or every 16 orbits).

Figure 107 shows the ground swath of thesatellite assuming that it has a sensor range of500 to 600 miles from its ground track. Thechanging shape of the ground swath is due tothe ground swath being drawn on a Mercatorproject ion, with a changing distance scale.Figure 108 shows the orbits for which it over-flies the Atlantic. This overflight occurs twiceduring a 24-hour period of 16 orbits. Figure 109shows ground swaths of two successive satel-lite orbits. If the satellite sensors have a rangeof 800 to 900 miles the satelIite swaths wouldoverlap even at the Equator and al I the over-

Figure 106. —Ground Track of Surveillance Satellitein a 24-Hour Period

SOURCE: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook


Figure 107.—Obsemation Swath ofSurveillance Satellite


Figure 108.—Single Satellite Repeat Coverage ofMid-North Atlantic in a 24-Hour Period


flown regions of the Earth’s surface could becovered by a single satell ite. If three suchsatellites were launched in orbits separated byan order of 700 to 800, the surface of theAtlantic would be observed on an average ofevery 3 to 4 hours (see fig. 110 for details of thesatellite overflight schedule). If the range ofthe sensors did not allow for overlapping ob-servations on successive orbits, more satelliteswould be needed. A sensor range of 450 nmi

Figure 109.— Precession of Observation Swath onTwo Successive Orbits of a Surveillance Satellite


would require 6 satellites and a sensor range of225 mi les would require 12 satel l i tes. Thisrange would allow the Soviets to observe allareas of the world’s oceans (with the exceptionof the region near the North and South Pole)every 3 to 4 hours.

If an extensive system of satellites was usedto observe (but not identify) large surface shipswhile at sea, an operational need might arisefor the MX ships to make false reports to shoreusing standard merchant HF channels. Sinceowners of merchant ships usually want to re-main informed about whether or not their shipis on schedule, merchant ships wil l usuallyreport their positions to shore based H F sta-tions once a day. If Soviet ships on regularpatrol routinely recorded HF messages and re-ported them back to a central facility, therewould be a very high probability that HF mes-sages would be intercepted. These data couldthen be combined with data collected frompublished merchant ship sailing schedules andsatellite reconnaissance data to help identifyships that might be MX carriers.

Satellites could not only be of use in observ-ing ships on the surface of the ocean but sig-nature data could be accumulated and corre-lated with observations from surface ships andaircraft. If some form of “fingerprinting” couldbe accomplished using either radar, infrared,

83-477 0 - 81 - 17


Figure 110.-Search Schedule of Surveillance Satellites at Mid= Northern Latitudes

Satellite 1

Satellite 2 i

Satellite 3

Satellite 1

Satellite 2 Search— - - - -

4 7 8 9 1011.11

‘1 . Search

6 7

Satellite 3 Search Search Search— . 0 - - - - -

Single coverage Double coverage Triple coverage


or passive microwave sensors the ships couldbe continuously tracked from space. “finger-printing” was not technically possible, thesatellites could be used by trailing ships tohelp reestablish contact with recently lost sur-

6 7

search- - - —

face ships. This use of the satell ites wouldgreatly reduce the need to trail at very closedistances and would also be an aid to pickingup ships after port egress.

MX REQUIREMENTS AND SURFACE SHIP FLEET

As has been demonstrated in the sectionsabove, major uncertainties would exist withregard to the survivability of a fleet of MX-carrying surface ships. These uncertaintiesderive from the fact that surface ships areobservable at very great distances. As sensingtechnologies advance, new and novel capabil-

ities for detecting and “fingerprinting” surfaceships at great distances can be expected tocontribute to surveillance capabilities. Once“fin gerprinted,” a surface ship would not haveto be resolved in the sense that is usually asso-ciated with “seeing” an object, if it is to be suc-cessfully tracked. While it can be expected


that tracking capabilities would change withthe weather, time of day, and ship operations,it cannot be expected that cover of night orbad weather will dramatically enhance the sur-vivability of such a fIeet.

Another aspect affecting the survivability ofa fleet of MX-carrying surface ships is theoperational circumstances of individual ships.These ci rcumstances would be constant lychanging with time. The survivability of someships may be due to circumstances independ-ent of those of other ships (i. e., some ships mayhave to transit between bad weather whileother ships do not) or may be due to circum-stances dependent on those of other ships (a

trailer confronted with two ships, might, for in-stance, have to choose which ship to trail). Thesurvivability of such a fleet of surface ships istherefore an unpredictably changing variable.

Since the surface ship fleet would have to besized to allow for ships destroyed in preemp-tive action, and the survivability is a con-stantly changing unpredictable variable, thereis no way to size the fleet for such a contin-gency. It is therefore important to note that itis unlikely that the requirement for 100 surviv-ing rnissi/es on station after any enemy actioncan be met on a continuous basis if MX weredeployed on surface ships.

ACCURACY OF SURFACE-SHIP-BASED MX

The guidance technology used by surface-ship-based MX would be largely the same asthat used for submarines. The accuracy figuresdiscussed below assume the same sets ofguidance technologies as those discussed inthe chapter on submarines.

Since surface ship survivability requires thatthe ships operate in as large an area of oceanas possible, many of the ships could be ex-pected to be at a full 6,000-mile range fromSoviet targets.

Figure 85 in chapter 5 shows the CEP multi-plier v. range for an inertially guided missileand a star-t racker-aided inert ia l ly guidedmissile. The CE P multiplier is a number definedas the CE P of the sea-based missile divided bythe CEP design requirements of the land-basedMX. Thus, an accuracy multiplier of 1.5 meansthat the CEP of the missile in question is 1.5times that of the CEP design requirements ofthe land-based MX.

As noted in chapter 5, it is expected that theland-based MX will exceed its CEP design re-quirements, so a CEP multiplier of 1.0 does notnecessarily mean accuracy equal to a land-based MX.

Figure 85 is a plot of CEP multiplier at a full6,000-nmi range for a sea-based MX guided

with purely inertial technology and with iner-tial technology aided by a star tracker. Forpure inertial guidance, at a range of 6,000 nmithe accuracy of the missile would be degradedrelative to the accuracy design requirementsof the land-based MX. If the advanced inertialmeasuring unit were aided with a star tracker,the CEP multiplier at 6,000 nmi could be ex-pected to be comparable to the design re-quirements set for the land-based missile.

If the surface ship fleet were forced todeploy at 6,000-nmi ranges from Soviet targetsand the sea-based MX has purely inertia Igu idance the s ing le - shot k i l l p robab i l i t yagainst hard targets would be degraded.However, if the hard targets were to be at-tacked with two warheads, the double-shot killprobability would still be high.

If a star tracker were added to the inertialguidance system of a sea-based MX, the accu-racy would degrade much more slowly withrange. I n this case, ships deployed at a 6,000-nmi range from targets could have CEPs com-parable to the design requirements set for theland-based MX. For this set of circumstancesthe single-shot kill probabilities would be verylarge and, correspondingly, the double-shotkill probability would also be very large.


A third system of guidance technologies thatmight be used would be to enhance the ac-curacy of the missile by updating the inertialguidance system of the missile with the aid ofa system of radio ground beacons or with theGPS. Using this system of guidance, MX ac-curacy would be achieved against Soviet tar-gets from any point in the deployment area ifthe GPS were used.

If the GPS was unavailable due to attacks onthe satellites, the ground beacons deployed onthe coast of the continental United States andthe coast of Alaska could be used instead. Inorder to use the ground beacons, it would benecessary for the ships to deploy to areaswithin which the missi les could “see” thebeacons after launch. These regions are shownin figures 86 and 87 in chapter 5.

RESPONSIVENESS OF A SURFACE SHIP FORCE

The operational complexity of a surface shipforce could make it very difficult for a fleet ofMX-carrying surface ships to be responsive toNCA.

A major operational problem that could af-fect the responsiveness of the force is the lowsurvivability of the ships to preemptive action.It would be necessary for a roll call to be takenin order to be sure that high-priority targetswere covered. If ships were still threatenedwith attack during the process of taking therolI call, high- priority targets would have to bereassigned to stilI other surviving ships. This re-assignment could make the timing of a largecoord inated s t r i ke ex t reme ly d i f f icu l t toexecute.

It is also possible that hostile forces wouldbe unable to attack the remaining ships. Thisinability could occur if the United States suc-cessfully destroyed Soviet surveillance sensorsand a s igni f icant port ion of Soviet Navalforces. Under these conditions, retargettingthe ships could be done with a multisyn-chronous satellite system, that would have theability to survive Soviet antisatellite attacks.Since the satellites would use extremely highfrequency (EHF) channels, the ships coulddirect transmissions into such a narrow beamthat the probability that the ships’ transmis-sions would be intercepted would be very low.The ships could then communicate two wayswith NCA at very high data rates and retargetthe surviving MX missiles.

A surface ship would have the abil ity tomaintain h igh accuracy for an indef in i te

period of time after antisatellite attacks onGPS if the missile guidance system were basedon star tracker enhanced inertial guidance andthe ships inertial navigation system utilized ad-vanced guidance technologies. Under theseconditions the ship could carry out launchorders against very hard targets without seri-ous delays.

If the missile guidance were purely inertial,missile accuracy wouId rapidly be degraded asa function of time (in a period of time of tensof hours rather than tens of days). This degrad-ation occurs because the star tracker can beused to help correct for navigational errorswhich accumulate over time in the ships’ navi-gational system. If the missile does not have astar tracker, errors in the ships navigationalsystem cannot be compensated for during theearly portion of the missile’s flight.

Without a star tracker update, the damageexpectancies against very hard targets wouldbe significantly degraded over time unless theships positioned themselves near acoustictransponder fields so they could update theirguidance systems. The ships would then haveto operate in a manner that could diminishtheir survivability.

If the missile guidance were based on radiobeacon updates of the missile’s guidance sys-tem, the ships would have to redeploy to theareas shown in figures 86 and 87 in chapter 5.In this case, redeployment activities coulddelay execution of the force for days and theresponsiveness of the system would be poor.


FLEXIBILITY

If attrition of the force was occurring on atime scale on the order of that required for at-tacks on targets, flexibility of targeting wouldbe nonexistent.

If the force was not being attritted and therewas confidence that ships ordered to carry outattacks would survive long enough to carry outorders, targeting flexibiIity of the MX-carryingsurface ships would be possible. This flexibilitywouId be accomplished using communicationschannels through the multi synchronous EHF

satel l i tes or s imply with VLF t ransmiss ionsfrom land-based VLF stations or survivable air-borne VLF radio relays. Emergency ActionMessages could be transmitted over VLF if pre-planned options or sub-options within pre-planned options are to be executed. Largeamounts of data required for ad hoc attackson targets designated by latitude, longitude,and height of burst would be transmitted overthe EHF channels through the multisynchro-nous satelIites.

ENDURANCE

The endurance of a fleet of surface ships would have to return to port for at least s ocould be very great provided the ships were days. At the end of 90 days, half of the surviv-not under constant attack from sea-based ing ships would have to return to port and bySoviet assets. The ships could have an at-sea the end of 120 days surviving ships wouldendurance in excess of 120 days. Assuming either have to be replenished at sea or returnthat the ships were at sea for an average of 30 to port.days at the beginning of hostilities, no ships

COST AND SCHEDULE

The surface ship considered for the costanalysis is the SL-7 type fast containership . Thespecifications of the SL-7 are shown in table32, It should be noted that this ship was chosenfor purposes of costing because it is an existingdesign of a merchant ship with a very highspeed (33 knots). It is unlikely that SL-7S wouldbe a good choice of surface ship because theratio of its hull length to width would be easilydistinguishable from space. It should be notedthat the SL-7 has insufficient fuel capacity tostay at sea for more than 26 to 27 days at a 20-knot patrol speed. The ship could be operatedat a lower average patrol speed but this wouldmake the endurance requirements on Soviett ra i le r s le s s severe and wou ld the re fo rediminish the stress on Soviet forces committedto tracking the ships, Therefore, at a minimum,the ships would have to be modified to carryan additional 5,000 to 6,000 tons of fuel orwouId have to be refueled at sea.

The Iifecycle cost estimate for a fleet ofSL-7-type surface ships is presented in table 33.

In i t ial operat ional capabi l i ty would besometime in 1987, assuming the success-ori-ented missile development effort is not seri-ously delayed by the need for guidance systemmodifications or redesign. This date is deter-mined by the long Ieadtime needed for the MXmissile, not by long Ieadtime required for theconstruction of ships. The time estimated forconstruction of the leadship is on the order of3 years. The time required for follow-on shipswould be on the order of 2 years.

If it turned out to be feasible to home basethe ships near the Atlantic strategic weaponsfacility (SWFLANT) and the Pacific strategicweapons facility (SW FPAC), some costs andconstruction could be avoided,


Table 32.—SL-7 Specifications

Length overallBeamDraft - design

operatingPropulsionShaftsBoilersShaft horsepower (total)Depth at main deck

(fwd of aft deck house)Depth at main deck

(aft deck house to fantail)Speed (light draft)Displacement - 30’ draft

34’ draftFuel capacityFuel consumption -33 kts

25 kts19 kts12 kts

Electrical capacity

946’ 1-1/2”105’ 6“30’34’

Geared steam turbines22

120,000

64’

68’ 6“33 + kts43,000 tons50,300 tons4,434 tons

614 tons/day240 tons/day159 tons/day34 tons/day

2 installed, 3,000 kWShips service turbogenerator

1 installed 1,500 kWShips service dieselgenerator

1 installed, 60 kWEmergency dieselgenerator

SOURCE J W Noah

It is also possible that ships could operatefrom other existing naval bases. The feasibilityof this approach would be determined by theavailability of waterfront area and land nearthese bases. There would be a need to con-struct additional waterfront facilities for theships. These facilities would have to be con-structed to satisfy “minimum” safe handlingd i s tances fo r exp los ive mater ia l s . La rgeamounts of additional real estate would alsobe required for a missile assembly area and aweapon storage area.

It should be noted that early deployment(i.e., 1987) of a few MX-carrying surface shipswould not necessarily result in surviving mis-siles at sea, as would be the case with sub-marines. Because surface ships achieve sur-vivability by dispersing in large areas of the

Table 33.—1 O-Year Lifecycle Cost(billions, fiscal year 1980 constant $)

Cost element Number cost

RDT&ESurface ship — $0.100Missile — 6.056SWS — 0.400Capsule — 0.282Nav. aids — 0.190

Total RDT&E $7.028

ProcurementSurface ship 30 $9.983Basing 2 4.830Missile 485 5.578SWS 2.190Capsule 5% 1.705Nav. aids 1 500/3000 1.400

Total procurement $25.686

Total acquisition $32.714

Operating & supportIOC to FOC $ 1.165’FOC + 10 8.879

Total operating & support $10.044

Total 10-year LCC $42.758

“Note: Ship availability and basing availability are not compatible, thereforeinterim support ship basing used.


ocean in an attempt to exhaust Soviet trailingand monitoring capabilities, the first surfaceship that goes to sea may face substantialSoviet trail ing assets. The survivability of afleet of surface ships will depend on the abilityto spread trailing forces thin enough that it isdifficult for a trailer to reacquire the ship if itis lost. A Soviet decision to commit substantialassets to trailing a fleet of surface ships couldresult in a substantial Soviet trailing capabilityby the time the first lead ship is deployed. Thesurvivability of the surface ships would onlyimprove as more ships came on Iine, taxing thecapacity of the Soviet trailing fleet and drivingthe size of the Soviet trailing commitment tosubstantial levels.

Chapter 8

LAND MOB LE MX BASING

Chapter 8.— LAND MOBILE MX BASING

Page

Barrage Attack on Mobile Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........258The’’Area Kill’’Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....258Attack On Mobile Basing Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........260

Land Mobile MX Mx BasingConcepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...261RoadMobileMX: Continuously Dispersed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261R o a d M o b i l e M X : D i s p e r s e - o n - W a r n i n g . . . . . . . . . ., 263Off-RoadMobileMX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264D a s h - t o - S h e l t e r s . 2 6 4R a i l M o b i l e M X . . . . . . . ’ ” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ’ . . 2 6 4

F I G U R E SPage

111, Lethal Radius of One-Megaton Weaponas Function of VehicleHardness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258

112. Lethal Radius as a Function of Weapon Yield for Various Values of VehicleHardness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

113, Barrage Patterns of One 8-M-l_ Weapon and Seven 430-kT Weapons 259114. Area Barraged byan ICBM Force of 3,000 EMT as a Function of Vehicle

Hardness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260115 Length Barraged by an ICBM Force of 3,000 e-Megaton Reentry

V e h i c l e s a s a F u n c t i o n o f V e h i c l e H a r d n e s s . 260

Chapter 8

LAND MOBILE MX BASING

Land mobile MX-basing systems would seekto create uncertainty for the Soviet targeter byconstantly changing missile location in an un-predictable way. If the locations of the missile-carrying vehicles were completely unknown tothe Soviets, then the only way to attack themwould be to barrage or pattern bomb the de-ployment area, spreading destructive effectsover as wide an area as possible. To guaranteesurvival of a fraction of a land mobile force,the deployment area would have to be largerthan the area that the Soviets could “sweepclean” with a barrage. If the Soviets were ableto observe the vehicles by remote means andtarget their attack at individual vehicles on thebasis of recent sightings, then the vehicleswould have to be fast enough to generate alarge uncertainty in their locations in the timeelapsed between the last preattack sightingand the arrival of RVS targeted on the basis ofthat last sighting.

In either case, the Soviets would have toblanket as much area as possible with nucleareffects lethal to the MX-carrying vehicles. The“area ki l l” mechanism — as opposed to theaimpoint or hard-target kill relevant for missilesilos or multiple protective shelters (MPS)—has the important feature of being insensitiveto Soviet fractionation. Roughly speaking, thearea (or length of road or rail) the Soviets couldbarrage with nuclear destruction of a givenseverity wouId depend on the number and sizeof Soviet missiles but not on whether the mis-siles carried a small number of high-yield reen-try vehicles (RVS) or a larger number of smalleryield RVS. The small warheads would be morenumerous, but each would barrage a smallerarea, and the total area covered by all the war-heads from a given missile would be roughlythe same no matter what the fractionation.Said another way, the vulnerability of a landmobile MX basing system would be sensitive tothe total throwweight in the Soviet arsenal butnot to how that throwweight was apportionedamong RVS.

Because it would be more difficult for theSoviets to increase their throwweight thantheir number of RVS, the “area kill” vulnerabil-ity of Land Mobile systems is attractive in prin-ciple. However, it is difficuIt to realize in prac-tice.

Road mobile MX could either have missile-carrying trucks continuously in motion on thehighways (Continuously Dispersed Road Mo-bile) or stationed at central bases and dis-persed onto the highways on warning of Sovietattack (Disperse-on-Warning Road Mobile).Off-Road Mobile could either have hardenedvehicles moving randomly throughout a largearea or dashing from central bases to dispersedhardened shelters . Rai l Mobi le MX wouldtravel the Nation’s raiIways.

None of the land mobile concepts turns outto be a particularly attractive option for MX-missile basing, but Continuously DispersedRoad Mobile could be highly survivable, andits survivability would be independent of warn-ing. Disperse-on-Warning systems would re-quire hours of warning time if they were to sur-vive attack, so they would always be vulner-able to surprise. Off-Road Mobile would re-quire a very large deployment area. Dash-to-Shelters would use a smaller amount of landthan Off-Road Mobile but would still dependon warning. I n fact, MPS basing with preserva-tion of location uncertainty (PLU) could beviewed as an evolution of Dash-to-Shelterswith dash reemphasized to achieve independ-ence from warning. Rail Mobile would sufferfrom the need for r ight-of-way on intercitylines.

In addition to problems with the fundamen-tal concepts, land vehicles capable of carryingthe 190,000-lb MX missile would be very large.A road vehicle would probably be much toolarge to fit under highway underpasses and tooheavy to cross highway bridges. Thus, RoadMobile MX is probably a practical impossibili-ty. Off-road vehicles of MX size could be verydestructive of their deployment areas.

257


BARRAGE ATTACK ON MOBILE SYSTEMS

This section discusses some basic features ofnuclear barrage attacks, the type of attacksrelevant to basing systems consisting of mobilemissile-carrying vehicles. In contrast to the sur-vivability of systems of fixed hard aimpointslike silos and MPS, which depends on the num-ber, yield, and accuracy of Soviet RVS, the sur-vivability of mobile systems depends on thetotal equivalent megatonnage (EMT) in theSoviet missile force. EMT in turn depends onthe size and number of Soviet offensive mis-si les but is insensitive to whether a givenmissile carries a small number of high-yieldwarheads or a larger number of smaller yieldwarheads. That is, the Soviets would obtain Iit-tle advantage by fractionating their ICBM mis-si les with large numbers of multiple inde-pendently targeted RVS if the United Stateswere to deploy a mobile basing system. RV ac-curacy would also be irrelevant, since for softtargets it would be sufficient for an RV todetonate a few miles away (rather than a frac-tion of a mile, as with silos and MPS) in orderto destroy the missile-carrying vehicle. Sincemobile basing would deprive the Soviets ofany substantial advantage from modernizingtheir ICBM force, the concept is very appeal-ing. Unfortunately, it is difficult to translatethis hypothetical concept into a survivablebasing system, principally because the Sovietsalready possess sufficient EMT in their ICBMarsenal to destroy mobile vehicles dispersedover even very large areas of the United States.

The “Area Kill” Mechanism

The distance from a nuclear detonation atwhich a mobile vehicle could survive dependson the vehicle’s “hardness,” or resilience tonuclear effects, and on the weapon yield.Hardness is typically quoted in pounds persquare inch (psi) of static overpressure. Thisconvention does not necessarily imply thatstatic overpressure is actually the effect thatdestroys the vehicle or renders it inoperable:gusting winds that follow the shock front (“dy -namic overpressures”), thermal radiation, orother effects might be responsible for vehicle

impairment. Rather, stating that a vehicle hasa hardness of so many pounds per square inchmeans that it can survive the effects of aweapon at distances from the detonation atwhich the shock front applies that many psioverpressure. Within the range at which thegiven overpressure occurs, the vehicle is as-sumed destroyed; beyond that range, it isassumed to survive. (In practice there is nodistance beyond which all vehicles would sur-vive with 100-percent certainty. Instead, thereis a “sure-safe” distance, a “sure-k i I l“ distance,and a certain probability of kill at distancesbetween. Also, if overpressure is not the killmechanism, the “hardness” will actually be afunction of yield.)

Figure 111 shows the range to which a givenoverpressure extends as a function of over-pressure for a l-MT weapon (ground rangesfrom ground zero for optimum burst height).This is the same as a plot of the “lethal radius”for a vehicle v. the vehicle’s hardness. For in-stance, a 5-psi hard vehicle would be destroyedat a range of 4 miles or closer, an 8-psi vehicleat a range of 3 miles or closer, and so on.

Figure 11 l.— Lethal Radius of One-Megaton Weaponas a Function of Vehicle Hardness -

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

Target hardness in psi


Ch. 8—Land Mobile MX Basing ● 259

For intermediate overpressures, the laws ofhydrodynamics prescribe a rough scaling lawsaying that, for a given hardness, the lethalradius increases as the one-third power of theyield. Figure 112 shows lethal radius as a func-tion of yield for various values of hardness.

if a vehicle is within a circle of radius equalto its lethal radius, it will be destroyed. Thearea of this circIe is “pi” (3.14) times the squareof the lethal radius. Since the lethal radiusvaries as the one-third power of the yield, thelethal area varies as the two-thirds power ofthe yield. Since the area that can be “bar-raged” with a given overpressure is propor-tional to (yield)zls, the area that can be bar-raged by a given force of nuclear weapons isproportional to the number of weapons timesthe two-thirds power of their yield. This quanti-ty is called the EMT of the force:

Barrage area proportional to EMT =(number of weapons) X (yield)l )

where the yield is measured in megatons. Thus,a force of 4,000 1-MT RVS has 4,000 EMT, anda force of 1,000 8-MT RVS also has 4,000 EMT.

Since mobile basing systems seek survivabil-ity by dispersing over wide areas, their sur-

Figure 112.—Lethal Radius as a Function of WeaponYield for Various Values of Vehicle Hardness

O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Yield in megatons

vivability depends on how much of the deploy-ment area can be barraged by the Soviets,which in turn depends on the total EMT in theSoviet ICBM force.

It so happens that the EMT that can be de-livered by a given ICBM depends (speakingroughly) only on its throwweight and not onhow this throwweight is apportioned amongRVS. The effectiveness of a given missile inbarraging an area is relatively insensitive topayload fractionation. The missile can carry asmall number of high-yield RVS or a largernumber of smaller yield RVS. The smaller RVSwould be more numerous, but each would bar-rage a smaller area. The total barrage areawould be about the same no matter what thefractionation.

Figure 113 shows the barrage patterns of asingle 8-MT RV (4 EMT) and of seven 430-kil -

Figure 113. —Barrage Patterns of One 8-MT Weapon(4 EMT) and Seven 430.kT Weapons (also 4 EMT)

8 MT 0.43 MT5 psi contour = 8.7 miles — 5 psi contour = 3.3 miles

One 8-MT weapon = 4 EMTSeven 0.43-MT weapons = 4 EMT

The area covered is about the same no matter how the EMTis apportioned among reentry vehicles

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment SOURCE. Office of Technology Assessment


oton RVS (also 4 EMT). The circles show theareas within which a 5-psi vehicle would be de-stroyed. The barrage area is~bout the same nomatter what the “fractionation. ”

In summary: In contrast to a system of hardpoint targets (silos or MPS), the survivability ofa mobile system which the Soviets had to bar-rage would depend on the EMT of the Sovietmissi le force but would be relatively insen-sitive to the fractionation of each missi le.Therefore, to substantially increase the threatto a U.S. basing system subject to area barrage,the Soviets would have to build more missiles.To increase the threat to silos or MPS, theywould need only to increase the number ofRVS carried by existing missiles. Furthermore,since the lethal radius is a few miles for theoverpressures relevant to mobile basing, dif-ferences in RV accuracy of a fraction of a mileare irrelevant to the area kill mechanism. Thus,for purposes of attack on a mobile basing sys-tem, Soviet accuracy improvements wouldgain them little.

Because their survivability would be insen-sitive to fractionation and accuracy, mobilebasing systems are attractive in principle.However, the area the present Soviet ICBMforce can barrage is already quite large. Figure114 shows the area that can be barraged by aforce of 3,000 EMT as a function of hardness.The figure shows that such an arsenal coulddestroy every 4-psi vehicle in an area the sizeof Texas and every 7-psi vehicle in an area thesize of Nevada. It is clear that survivablemobile MX-basing systems would require largedeployment areas.

Figure 115 shows the length of road or railthat could be barraged by 3,000 l-MT RVS. Bar-rage length, unlike barrage area, is not propor-tional to EMT, but the outcome of a barrageattack on a road or rail mobile basing systemwould also be relatively insensitive to frac-tionation. Such an arsenal could also destroyal vehicles on long stretches of road or rail.

Attack On Mobile Basing Systems

The outcome of an attack on a mobile bas-ing system would depend on whether the Sovi-

Figure 114.—Area Barraged by an ICBM Force of3,000 EMT as a Function of Vehicle Hardness

600

t ~

Alaska (600)

M C

r [

3,000 equivalent360 , ; ~ meaatons assumed

320 .

2 8 0

240 ~ “ = s. ,

2 0 0

160

1 -n : ‘

–=

‘Texas (270)

““~ , . - ~ “ ” v ’ d a ( ” o )

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

Hardness of targets in psi

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment.

Figure 115.—Length Barraged by an ICBM Force of3,000 One-Megaton Reentry Vehicles as

a Function of Vehicle Hardness

100

70

* 60 -a) 3,000 1-megatonc = reentry vehicles assumed-DEg % 50 -

Interstate highway

waterways (35)

O 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

Hardness of targets



ets knew where the individual vehicles were atthe time of attack in addition to depending onthe total EMT in the Soviet arsenal.

If the Soviets did not or could not track in-dividual vehicles as they moved about the de-ployment area, they would have to barrage aslarge a fraction of the deployment area aspossible. If the deployment area were twice aslarge as the area the Soviets could barrage,half of the MX force would survive; if the de-ployment area were three times as large as thebarrage area, two-thirds of the force would sur-vive; and so on.

If the vehicles were stationed at fixed basesand dispersed only when attack was imminent,the Soviets would only have to barrage the vi-cinity of the bases. For instance, if the vehiclesdispersed in all directions when warned ofSoviet ICBM launch, and if the vehicles werecapable of speeds of 50 mph, then in the half-hour flight time of Soviet ICBMS they would bedispersed within a circle of radius 25 milesfrom the base. Since this circle would have anarea of only 2,000 mi 2, it would be easily bar-raged. Therefore, because of the slow speedsof land vehicles, Disperse-on-Warning RoadMobile systems would be vulnerable to sur-prise attack.

Even a continuously dispersed system couldbe vulnerable if the Soviets were able to trackthe vehicles continuously and retarget theirmissiIes on the basis of up-to-the-minute in-

formation. Then they would only have to bar-rage the vicinity of each vehicle, not the wholedeployment area. The time it took the Sovietsto determine the location of each vehicle,transmit the locations to their missile fields,program their missiles, and launch them, plusthe half-hour ICBM flight time, is called the“intelligence cycle time” (l CT). ICT is thus thetime from last sighting to attack arrival. Theimportant quantity in this case is the distancethe vehicles could move during the ICT. For in-stance, if a hypothetical Soviet surveillancesystem and ICBM force were capable of a 2-hour ICT (and this example by no means in-tends to suggest that such an ICT is feasible forthe present Soviet force), then the vehicleswould have two hours to move away from thepoint where they were at the time they werelast sighted (this time would be chosen by theattacker and would be unknown to the U.S.force). If the vehicles patrolled in such a waythat they constantly changed direction, mov-ing away from their starting point with averagespeed of 40 mph, then when the Soviet attackarrived they could be anywhere within a circleof radius 80 miles. This circle would have anarea of 20,000 m i 2.

If the Soviet surveillance system were suchthat it could not locate the vehicles precisely,but only localize them within a circle of radius20 miles, then a 2-hour ICT and 40 mph aver-age speed would result in a “circle of uncer-tainty” of radius 100 miles and area 31,000 mi2.

LAND MOBILE MX BASING CONCEPTS

Road Mobile MX:Continuously Dispersed

A system of missile-carrying road vehicles incontinuous motion on the Nation’s highwayswould be survivable if the Soviets were unableto keep track of the location of each vehicle.This section first analyzes Road Mobile as aconcept and then describes the special prob-lems which arise when the concept is appliedto a very large missile like the MX.

Road Mobile Concept

Each missile-carrying vehicle would travel ina convoy of perhaps five vehicles with a totalcrew of 10 to 12 people. The other vehicleswould carry security equipment to defend thenuclear weapons against terrorism, sabotage,etc., and communications equipment to keepthem in continuous contact with commanders.One hundred convoys, each consisting of twomissile-carrying vehicles, two security vans,


and one communications van, might be re-quired for a deployment of 200 MX missiles.

The U.S. Interstate Highway System consistsof 42,500 miles of 4-lane highway, not all ofwhich is open to traffic. 1 n addition, there are81,000 miles of other 4-lane highway, of which28,000 miles are located near heavily popu-lated urban areas. About 80,000 miles of 4-lanehighway located away from populated areasmight be available for Road Mobile MX oper-at ions.

Survivability y

Little of a definite nature is known about theeffects of nuclear weapons on road vehicles,but there is agreement that a hardness ratingof 15 psi is probably an absolute upper limit,with a more reasonable hardness range being 5to 10 psi. The principal mechanism of destruc-tion might be overturning of the vehicle by thehigh winds that follow the shock wave from anuclear detonation, To alleviate this problem,one couId put stakes in the ground and lash thevehicle down shortly before attacking RVS ar-rived. Other problems for road vehicles mightbe thermal flash and radiation doses sufferedby the crews.

A l-MT weapon would destroy a lo-psi vehi-cle if it exploded closer than about 3 milesfrom the vehicle. One thousand l-MT weaponscou Id therefore destroy every 10-psi vehicle ona stretch of road 6,000 miles long. To “sweepclean” the entire 80,000 miles of available U.S.highway would therefore require 13,000 l-MTRVS, which is much more than the presentarsenal of Soviet ICBMS is capable of deliver-ing. If the vehicles were 5 psi hard, only 9,oOOMT would be required; if 15 psi hard, then18,000 MT would be required.

It is important to recall that what matters inthese barrage attacks is, roughly speaking, thenumber of attacking missiles, not the numberof RVS they carry. (Barrage length, not barragearea, is relevant here; barrage length does notcorrelate with EMT, but the results are sti l lrelatively insensitive to fractionation.) Thus,

‘U S Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics,

for example, a Soviet SS-18 can “sweep clean”about the same length of road whether it car-ries a few high-yield RVS or a larger number oflower y ield RVS. Thus, the survivabi l i ty ofRoad Mobile would be insensitive to Sovietfractionation.

A barrage attack on the entire U.S. highwaysystem could cause significant damage topopulation and industry even if the attack ex-cluded highways in the immediate vicinity oflarge cities. Road Mobile deployment couldtherefore conceivably deter the Soviets fromattacking U.S. missiles for fear of U.S. retalia-tion on Soviet population and industry. On theother hand, if a “counterforce” war did begin,the damage to the United States could be con-siderable.

A theoretical possibil ity for Soviet attackplanners would be to keep track continuouslyoff the locations of the Road Mobile convoysand retarget their missi les on an up-to-theminute basis. Since the average speed of a con-voy might be 40 mph, each convoy could trav-el no more than 20 miles in the minimum possi-ble ICT of a half hour. If the Soviets werecapable of this ideal ICT, they would only haveto barrage 2,000 miles of highway to destroyall 100 convoys. For this attack, 330 l-MT RVSwould suffice. If the ICT were 1 hour, 660 RVSwould suffice, and so on.

Cloud cover over the United States and U.S.countermeasures would make reliance onspace-based surveillance a risky course for theSoviets. Human agents capable of tracking theconvoys or attacking them directly would alsobe a possibility.

Advantages and Disadvantages

in summary, the principal advantages of theRoad Mobile concept are its high survivabilityin the absence of continuous tracking, the in-sensitivity of its survivability to Soviet frac-tionation, independence from warning, littleenvironmental impact, and — at least fromsome points of view on deterrence— an un-clear distinction between attack on U.S strate-gic forces and attack on U.S. value.


A principal disadvantage of Road Mobilewould be the exposure of nuclear weaponstraveling the Nation’s highways to accidents,public interference, sabotage, and terrorism.Though probably difficult to implement inpractice, and subject to U.S. countermeasures,a system for continuous tracking and targetingof Road Mobile convoys would allow the Sovi-ets to destroy a Road Mobile force. Finally, at-tack on Road Mobile could, depending on thehighways used, cause substantial collateraldamage to U.S. population and industry.

Minimizing accuracy degradation relative tothat planned for fixed land-based deploymentmight require pre-surveying of thousands oflaunch points along the nation’s highways orprovision of external navigation aids.

The Problem of Missile Size

The discussion so far has been confined tothe concept of Road Mobile missile basing.The problems of actually implementing thisconcept with the large MX missile would besevere. The vehicle needed to carry MX wouldexceed by large margins not only the legallypermitted loads on the Nation’s highways butquite probably the physical tolerances ofbridges and underpasses.

According to a rough rule of thumb for de-sign of heavy road vehicles, the gross weight ofa loaded vehicle is about twice the weight ofthe load. The MX missile and its support andlaunch equipment might weigh 250,000 to300,000 lb, meaning a 500,000- to 600,000-lbRoad Mobile vehicle. To distribute this weight,even with modern independent suspension,could require some 20 axles with 8 wheelseach, spaced 8ft apart for a total vehiclelength of some 160 ft. By contrast, the max-imum load permitted by any State, even with aspecial permit, is only 100,000 lb, and largetractor-trailers weigh half this amount. Thelargest load ever moved long distance over theNation’s highways weighed only 335,000 lb andtraveled only in good weather. z S ince theweight of an MX carrier would exceed by largemargins the loads for which highway over-

~ Transportation Engineer Magazine, February 1980

passes and bridges are designed, it cannot besaid with assurance that these structures couldsupport them.

Size of the vehicle would also be a problem.A large beam under the bed of the vehiclewould be needed to support the heavy load.Vertical clearance on Interstate Highway un-derpasses is nominally 16 ft, but many oldersegments of the system have only a 14-ft clear-ance. A Road Mobile MX vehicle would prob-ably be too tall to fit under these underpasses.

Thus, the large size of the MX missile makesRoad Mobile MX a practical impossibility.

Road Mobile MX: Disperse-on-Warning

An alternative to keeping missile-carryingvehicles in continuous motion would be tobase them at existing military installations andhave them disperse onto the highways whengiven warning of Soviet attack.

For an average vehicle escape speed of 40mph given tactical warning only, the vehiclescould be at most 20 miles from their baseswhen Soviet RVS arrived. The Soviets wouldtherefore only have to barrage the highwayswithin a 20-mile radius of each base to destroyall the vehicles. If the vehicles were 10 psihard, then a few tens of l-MT RVS would suf-fice for this barrage.

If the vehicles were given more warningtime, then they could disperse over more road.With about 6 hours of warning time, the vehi-cles could be dispersed over so much road thata Soviet barrage could not destroy al I of them.Disperse-on-Warning R o a d M o b i l e w o u l dtherefore require hours of warning time to sur-vive. If attack were to come with Iittle or noadvance warning, the force would be de-stroyed.

Even given ample advance or “strategic”warning of imminent Soviet attack, therecould be concern for the reaction of the U.S.public and the Soviet Union to dispersal of thevehicles from their bases. Thus, there might beinhibitions on the part of U.S. authorities todisperse the force until the evidence of immi-nent Soviet attack was absolutely convincing.


By then it could be too late to guarantee sur-vival of the force.

Traffic might also impede the escape of aDisperse-on-Warning force.

Last, the same problems of miss i le s izewould obtain as for Continuously DispersedRoad Mobile.

Off-Road Mobile MX

Off-Road Mobi le would be a system ofwheeled, tracked, or ground-effect vehiclescapable of travelling over relatively rugged ter-rain. By dispersing over a large area andfollowing random paths, such a sytem wouldforce the Soviets to barrage the entire deploy-ment area to destroy the missiles. The successof such a barrage attack would be insensitiveto Soviet fractionation.

Off-Road Mobi le would require a largeamount of land for deployment, and the ran-dom movement of the large, heavy vehicleswould make off-road operation destructive ofthe deployment area. If the vehicles were 15psi hard (a quite high value), then a single l-MTRV could destroy every vehicle in a 16-mi2 areaabout the detonation point. Three thousandRVS could destroy every vehicle in a 48,000-mi2

area. To guarantee 50-percent survival of anMX force against such an attack, a total de-ployment area of 96,000 mi2 would thereforebe required. If the vehicles were only 10 psihard, then 150,000 miz would be needed.

For comparison, the area of the State ofUtah is 85,000 mi2, of Texas 267,000 mi2, and ofAlaska 590,000 mi2. The total amount of landowned by the Departments of Defense and En-ergy in the Southwest (including Nellis Bomb-ing and Gunnery Range, Yuma ProvingGround, White Sands Missile Range, and FortBliss Military Reservation) is about 17,000 mi2.

An Off-Road system that did not occupy theentire dispersal area at all times, but flushedfrom central operating bases on warning,would be vulnerable to surprise attack in thesame manner as Disperse-on-Warning RoadMobile. The consequences of false alarm dis-persal could be serious if the dispersal area

were normally used for peaceful purposes,since the vehicles would be quite destructiveof the terrain.

As in the case of Road Mobile, design ofvehicles to carry the large MX missile safelyover rough terrain would be chalIenging.

Dash-to-Shelters

A large dispersal area would be required forOff-Road Mobile because the vehicles wouldbe relatively soft targets, of order 10 to 15 psi.The deployment area could be contracted byproviding many harder garages or sheltersthroughout the deployment area. The vehicleswouId take refuge in the shelters shortly beforeattacking warheads arrived. Such a systemwould in fact be a multiple aimpoint system,since the Soviets would target each shelterindividually rather than bombard the wholearea.

The Dash-to-Shelters concept can be seen asa precursor of the MPS system with PLU suchas presently under development by the AirForce. A Dash-to-Shelters system would forcethe Soviets to target all the shelters, since themissile transporter would not choose whichshelter to dash to until it received warning thata Soviet attack was underway. Success of thissystem would therefore depend upon reliablewarning. The same objective of forcing theSoviets to attack each shelter could be at-tained, and the dependence on warning re-moved, by emplacing the miss i les in theshelters before the attack but concealingwhich shelter actually received the missi le.This approach would of course be the MPSconcept with PLU.

Rail Mobile MX

Rail vehicles to carry the large MX missilecouId probably be built much more easily thanlarge wheeled vehicles. Like road vehicles, therail cars wouId be vulnerable to overturning bythe strong winds that follow a nuclear blastwave. The hardness of a rail vehicle wouldtherefore be in the region of 10 psi, thoughlashing down the vehicle might result in


greater hardness. A l-MT RV could therefore“sweep clean” some 6 miIes of rail.

There are about 200,000 miles of rail route inthe United States. The length of track is larger,since many routes consist of several paralleltracks. Many of these rail routes are in thevicinity of large population concentrations, so

a s m a l I e r l e n g t h o f r o u t e — p e r h a p s 1 0 0 , 0 0 0m i l e s — w o u l d b e a v a i l a b l e t o a R a i l M o b i l e

MX force. This is more track than could be bar-raged by any foreseeable Soviet arsenal.

The rail vehicles would have to have right-of-way on the tracks, since their survival would

depend on their ability to choose their itiner-aries randomly. Since most intercity rail routessuch as those that would be used for the mis-sile force consist of only one track, they arealready quite congested. Trains must be routedinto sidings to allow others to pass, and so on.Military commanders would therefore be de-pendent on civilian rail operators and workersfor the day-to-day operations of the force.

Rail Mobile missiles would also be subjectto accidents, sabotage, and terrorism.

83-477 10 - 81 - 18

Chapter 9

DEEP UNDERGROUND BASING

Chapter 9.— DEEP UNDERGROUND BASING

L

figure No.

stof figures

1 1 6 P o s t a t t a c k E g r e s s

117, Mesa/Tunnel Concept Section View11 T u n n e l B o r i n g M a c h i n e

119. Aerial View of Mesa-[ la<120 Mesa/Tunnel Concept P121. Transporter Lau

122 Missi le Launch123 [and Area Requirements

Base forcea n V i e w S c h e m a t i c

Requirments

Chapter 9

DEEP UNDERGROUND BASING

000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000One interesting concept for missile basing isthe deployment of the missile force in deepmountain in tunnels, buried thousands of feetunder the surface, thereby providing protec-tion for the missiles from a nuclear attack.Such a facility would be manned and wouldhave self-contained provisions for electricalpower, life-support, and missile maintenance.Upon the command to launch, tunnels wouldneed to be bored to the surface to give themissiIe outside access preparatory to beinglaunched.

The limitations of such a missile deploymentderive not from the technicaI feasibiIity of itsconstruction, but from the time constraints ofa reliable missiIe egress for Iaunch A sc he-m,] t i c for two types of missiIe egress is i1-Iustrated in figure 116A and B shows a numberof completed vertical exit passages that arepreconstructed. Missile egress through thesepassages could be rapid, but the exit portalscould be easily attacked with nuclear weap-

Figure 116A. —Postattack Egress

I I

116B1

l - - I

SOURCE” Office of Technology Assessment

ens, which would deny then the abil ity tolaunch the missile. Even “hardened” exit por-tals would be vulnerable with today’s missileaccuracies. Moreover, attempts at construct-ing hidden exits wouId rely totalIy on keepingtheir locations secret for the entire course ofdeployment – a considerable risk

These observations have led to designs fordeep underground basing without p r e c o n -structed exits (see fig. 116B). After the order tolaunch, large underground tunnel bor ingmachines would clear a path to the surfacefrom the partially completed tunnels. Thismethod of launch would not be rapid, due tothe lengthy excavation process, and couId takea period of days to perhaps weeks; in themeantime work continues on devising a fastermethod for missile egress.

Clearly, this mode would not be suitable as aquick-response force for t i me-urgent missionsa f te r the i n i t i a I a t ta c k — amajor sta ted require-ment for the MX missile. On the other hand, itcouId play a usefuI part in the overaI I strategicnuclear force as a secure reserve force. Post-attack endurance might be very good, perhapsa yea r or Ionger. Further more, i t couId have astabilizing effect and serve as a deterrent towar due to its high survivab i I it y to nucIearattack Unlike fixed missiIe siIos or muItipleprotective shelters, deep underground basingwouId be relatively insenitive to the increasedaccuracy of enemy misiiIes, or the f rac-t i o n a t i o n o f their pay load. Moreover,deceptive basing of the missi les would beunnecessary

Although studies of deep missile basing dateback many decades, it is still in a conceptualstage. Hardware specific to this type of missiIebasing has not been developed or tested,a I though m a n y of its components, such asdeep unclerground faciIities and tunnel boringmachines, have been constructed for otherpurposes. And, although a large data base onunderground nuclear explosions has been col-lected over several decades, there is still a

269


degree of uncertainty on the coupling of ex-plosive energy of a nuclear surface burst to theunderground. This knowledge would be im-portant in determining the minimum tunneldepth for sure survival of the missile against alarge nuclear attack.

One concept for deep basing is illustrated infigure 117. This approach would utilize basinginside of a mesa, which, due to its relativelysteep slope, has the advantage of providing ashort tunneling length to the mesa face formissile egress. System burial would be typical-ly several thousand feet. The exit route for themissile would be partially predug, with the re-mainder left to be dug by a tunnel boringreach i ne, after receiving the command tolaunch. In addition, a number of horizontalaccess tunnels would lead to the undergroundcomplex from the outside. These access tun-nels, which would be required during con-

struction, would also provide undergroundaccess during peacetime. Blast doors in thesetunnels would be needed for protection of theunderground complex during an attack. Stor-age cavities would be provided for crewquarters, a fuel cell powerplant and its re-actants, waste disposal, and tunnel boring ma-chines. (A typical tunnel boring machine isshown in fig, 118. It is constructed and sold fortunneling operations.) A reliable means ofassuring a survivable communications link be-tween the outside and the missile force has notyet been fully developed, although a numberof possible candidate concepts do exist. Onesuch concept involves the deployment of alarge number of erectable communications an-tennas, as illustrated in the diagram. Assuringcontinuity of this link through the mesa duringperiods of attack is still a matter to be fully re-solved, since resulting block movements insidethe mesa may break underground cable links.

Figure 11 7.—Mesa/Tunnel Concept Section View (not to scale)

Erectable communicationsantenna concepts


Ch. 9—Deep Underground Basing ● 271

Figure 118.—Tunnel Boring Machine

SOURCE: Robbins Co , Seattle, Wash.

An aerial view of the underground mesa-based force is shown in figure 119. The under-ground tunnels, shown as broken lines, form aclosed complex around the mesa. An enlarge-ment of a tunnel section is described in figure120. The missile would be part of a launcherand transporter vehicle, as shown in figure 121,that resembles the vehicle used for buriedtrench basing, as discussed in chapter 2. Formissile launch, after the tunnel boring machinecleared the way to the surface, the transporter-missiIe-launcher would move through the new-ly built tunnel to the surface, under its ownpower. This is illustrated in figure 122.

OTA has not analyzed either the environ-mental impacts or scheduIing considerationsfor deep basing. A preliminary review does notindicate the l ikel ihood of insurmountableproblems, however. Estimates for system cost

and construction time are highly tentative atthis time. Much work on the detailed concept(particularlyC 3), research and development,and validation of design would be needed.Moreover, delays in construct ion for th isbasing mode could be expected, as experiencein previous underground excavation projectsindicates unexpected geological conditionsthat hamper progress. On the other hand,much excavation experience is available frommany commercial and civil projects. Land arearequirements are likely to be relatively small.Shown in figure 123 is a map of the UnitedStates with deployment areas of the Minute-man missile fields, the proposed MX/MPS de-ployment area, and two candidate basingareas for deep underground basing, one in thearea of Grand Mesa, Colo., and an alternativesite in southern Utah.

.


Figure 119. —Aerial View of Mesa-Based Force


Figure 120.—Mesa/Tunnel Concept Plan View Schematic

Ch. 9—Deep Underground Basing ● 273

Figure 121.— Transporter Launcher

Length - 35m (115 ft)

Width - (11.5 ft)Height , (17.5 ft)Weight 135,000kg (300,000lbDrive motors (3) 350hp each


Figure 122.— Missile Launch

’

1,

i

Missile launch

Transporterlauncher

mesa face

tunnel (200/0upgrade)

Bed rock


\____

Chapter 10

COMMAND, CONTROL, ANDCOMMUNICATIONS (C3)

Chapter 10.– COMMAND, CONTROL,AND COMMUNICATIONS

Page

Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .277Technical Aspects of Strategic C3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .278

Communications Links. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .278Vulnerabilities of Communications Systems, . . . . . . . . . . . .281Command and Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......283

C Functions for MX Basing. . . . . . . . . .284Preattack Functions.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,......284Transattack and Postattack Functions. ., . . . . .285

C ) SystemsforMX Basing Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........285f3aselineMPS System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., ....286MPS 13 asing With LoADS ABM System. ......,. . . . . . . . . . . . . .......,289Launch UnderAttack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....290Small Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...290AirMobileMX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...293

Overviewof Radio Communications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...294RadioWavePropagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,..,. 294Disruption of Radio Communications Due to Nuclear Detonations ............296

T A B L ETable No.

34. Radio Communications Bands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......,.279

124125126127128129130,131132.133.134,135.136137

138139140

F I G U R E SFigure No

Communicat ions System for Basel ine MPS System (Transattack) . . . ,286Possible Additions to Baseline MPS Communications System (Transattack). 288Communicat ions System for Basel ine MPSSystem (Postattack) . . . . .288Possible Additions to Baseline MPS Communications System (Post attack). .289Preattack C) System for Small Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . ....291Transattack C’ System for Small Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......292PostattackC’ System for Smal l Submarines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .293T r a n s a t t a c k A i r M o b i l e M X C o m m u n i c a t i o n s S y s t e m . . 2 9 4Physical Paths of RadioWaves .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...295Electromagnetic Transmission Ranges at Different Frequencies . . . .295Over-the-Horizon Radio Transmission . . . . . . . . ..296Geometry of Aircraft Direct Path Communications.. . . . . . . . . .. ....296Geometry of Satellite Communications . . . ...297Electromagnetic Pulse Ground Coverage for High-AltitudeNuclear Explosion . . . . .................................................................................. . . . . . . ..297Origin of Electromagnetic Pulse From High-Altitude-Nuclear Explosion. . .298Atmospheric Radio Propagation at Different Frequencies. . . ........... 299Radio Propagation Paths Before and After High-Altitude-Nuclear Explosion 299

Chapter 10

COMMAND, CONTROL, ANDCOMMUNICATIONS (C’)

OVERVIEW

A missile force that physically survives an at-tack is of no use if the means to command theforce do not survive as well. Reliable com-mand, control, and communications (C3, pro-nounced “C-cubed”), impervious to Soviet at-tempts at disruption, are needed if command-ers are to assess the status of an MX force,retarget the missiles if desired, and transmitlaunch commands. There is a wide variety oftechnical possibilities for wartime communica-tions and just as wide a range of means to dis-rupt and impede them. The nature of the dis-ruption suffered by the U.S. C3 system in war-time would depend on the amount of damagedone to communications installations them-selves and on the extent of disturbance of theatmosphere due to nuclear explosions. Thoughsome disruption would inevitably result re-gardless of the nature of the Soviet attack, themost stressing circumstance would result froma deliberate Soviet attempt to deny U.S. com-manders the means to control and executetheir forces.

It will be apparent that no single communi-cations link can be made absolutely surviv-able, but disruption can be made difficult,time-consuming, provocative, and costly ofSoviet resources. Multiple links can also beprovided, subject to different failure modes,and provision can be made for reconstitutingsome links if the primary system is destroyed.

The actual functions that a C3 system sup-porting an MX force must fulfill depend tosome extent on doctrine for the force’s use. Ata minimum, the communications system mustbe consistent with the operations of the force(e.g., must not compromise missile location inmultiple protective shelter (MPS) basing orsubmarine location in submarine basing) andmust permit one-way communication of shortlaunch commands (Emergency Action Mes-sages— EAMs) from commanders to the mis-

siles to order execution of preplanned optionsof the Single Integrated operational Plan(SIOP). In addition, it could be desirable forthe C3 system to support prompt response tolaunch commands (“responsiveness”), flexibleor ad-hoc retargeting outside of the SIOP, andtwo-way communications so that the forcescould report their status to commanders andconfirm execution of orders. Last, if the forceexpected attrition in an attack, it could be de-sirable for the surviving missiles to be able toredistribute targets among themselves so thatthe highest priority targets were always cov-ered by surviving missiles. For a given basingmode, the hardware to carry out these func-tions, and the functions themselves, can differsubstantially from the preattack or peacetimeperiod to the transattack and postattackperiods.

OTA has sought to prescribe a technicallyfeasible C3 system that satisfies these criteriafor each of the principal basing modes. Inmany cases the system described differs sub-stantially from those that are available to U.Sforces today. Obviously, providing these sys-tems would involve some cost, but with the ex-ception of launch under attack, in no case is C3

a cost driver for the basing mode as a whole.Some elements of these C3 systems would fur-thermore support other strategic and conven-tional forces, so their costs should perhaps notbe assigned entirely to the MX basing mission.

There are distinct and important differencesfrom basing mode to basing mode regardingboth the technical means to support effectiveC 3 and potential vulnerabilities. In each case itappears that with adequate funding and effort,acceptable technical solutions are available,though it would be extremely difficult to pro-vide a C3 system survivable against any and allcontingencies. Direct comparisons are diffi-cult, but on balance OTA can see no clear rea-

277


son for preference among the basing modes on in concrete terms the functions desired from athe basis of C3. C 3 system supporting MX basing. The next sec-

tion describes the C3 systems for the basingThe next section discusses the technical as- modes and describes how they might function

pects of strategic C’ in general terms, including before and after attack. The last section con-available means of communication and their tains a technical overview of radio communi-vulnerabilities. The following section lays out cations.

TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF STRATEGIC C3

Communications Links

The communication of information betweentwo points requires an intervening communica-tions link. For instance, a telephone micro-phone converts acoustic signals (i.e., a humanvoice) into electrical signals, and the earphoneconverts the electrical signal back into sound.The lines over which the signal travels betweenthe phones is referred to as the communi-cations link. By bouncing radio waves off theionosphere, it is possible to communicate oververy great distances. in the case of this type ofcommunications, the path over which the ra-dio wave travels is the communications link.At very high radio frequencies, radio waves arenot reflected by the ionosphere. In order toachieve long-range communications in thiscase, it is necessary to transmit the signal to asatellite that then retransmits it back to Earth.The channel established through the satellite iscalled the communications link. This seeming-ly expensive and complex method of radiocommunications is valuable for two reasons:

1 . Sate l l i te commun icat ions l i nk s can

2

achieve high data rates relative to radiocommunications that require reflectionfrom the upper atmosphere.Satellite links, if they are not destroyed,are extremely reliable, since communica-tions capabilities do not change with thefIuctuating conditions in the upper atmos-phere.

The time it takes to transmit a message of agiven length over a communications link isdetermined by the data rate of the link. Anymessage, whether transmitted by voice, tele-type, or picture, can be expressed as a se-

quence of “on or off” signals called bits. Thedata rate is the number of bits per second thatcan be transmitted over a particular link. Tel-etype rates are typically a few hundred bits persecond. Since each sequence of five to sevenbits would be enough to represent a letter ofthe alphabet, and since on the average thereare five letters per word of the English lan-guage, a 300 bit-per-second teletype link couldcarry 8 to 12 words per second. Voice com-munications require data rates of several thou-sand bits per second. High-frequency satellitelinks can transmit data at hundreds of millionsof bits per second. These data rates could sup-port tens of thousands of separate voice chan-nels. A particularly important type of messagein the case of strategic C’ is the EAM. Thesemessages, ordering a strike by U.S. strategicforces, could be preformatted and might con-sist of a small number of bits, since even a for-mat with a small number of bits would lead toa large number of possible messages thatcould have the same format. For instance, ifEAMs consisted of 20 bits, then more than amillion different messages with the same for-mat could be created. EAMs can therefore bevery short messages and can be transmitted ina short time even by links with relatively lowdata rates. Much more information wouldhave to be transmitted to order a strike thatwas not among the preplanned options. A highdata-rate link would be required to transmitsuch long messages in a short time.

Land lines

Landlines consist either of wires that con-duct electricity or of glass fibers (i.e,. fiber-optic) through which light can be guided.

Ch. 10—Command, Control, and Communications (C3) . 279

Both types of Iandlines can be used for ex-tremely high data-rate communications andare therefore very useful for communicatingwith land-based strategic weapons systems,The communications Iinks and nodes associ-ated with Iandlines, however, are vulnerable tophysical destruction in war and are subject todisruption or destruction by electromagneticpulse (EMP) generated by high-altitude nuclearbursts. Landlines might therefore only be ofuse before an attack on a land-based strategicweapons system.

Radio Links

Radio communication bands are, by conven-tion, referred to by acronyms. Since theseacronyms are commonly used in discussions ofcommunications systems, they are summa-rized in table 34.

VLF/LF

Very low frequency (VLF) and low frequency(LF) radio signals are useful for reliable com-munication over very large distances. A power-ful VLF/LF station can be received over dis-tances of many thousands of miles, even ifthere are nuclear detonations in the upper at-mosphere. VLF/LF signals penetrate seawaterwell enough to make communications possiblewith submarines and, at a cost in data rate, canbe made resistant to jamming. VLF/LF radiohas two important drawbacks: the antennas re-quired for transmission and reception must bevery large and are therefore susceptible tophysical destruction, and the data rates that

are possible with VLF/LF are low. However, air-planes are able to trail large antennas in flightand transmit suff ic ient ly powerful VLF/LFradio waves to permit long-range communi-cations. Airplanes can communicate withground stations, other aircraft, and submergedsubmarines in this way.

M F

Medium frequency (MF) radio links are high-

er frequency than VLF/LF radio links and canbe used to transmit information at higher ratesthan is possible with VLF/LF. (The reason forthis and other features of radio propagation isdiscussed in the Overview of Radio Communi-cations section. ) MF radio is in the same bandof frequencies as AM radio broadcasting. LikeAM radio, MF signals do not, under normalconditions, propagate much further than thelength of a metropolitan area, though at nightskywave propagation can lead to longer range.MF is a reliable means for moderate data-ratetransmissions over short distances. Since theradio signals at these frequencies do not travelvery far, they are generally (but not always) dif-ficult to jam from great distances. Distancesover which communications at these frequen-cies can generally be affected are 40 to 50miles between ground stations and 100 to 150miles between an airplane and a ground sta-tion.

H F

H i g h f r e q u e n c y ( H F ) ( “ s h o r t w a v e ” ) r a d i os i g n a l s a r e e x t r e m e l y u s e f u l f o r l o n g - r a n g e

Table 34.—Radio Communications Bands

Name of Range Frequency Range* Wavelength Range

Extremely low frequency ELF .3-3 KHz 1,000-100 kmVery low frequency VLF 3-30 KHz 100-10 kmLow frequency LF 30-300 Kfiz 10-1 kmMedium frequency MF 300-3,000 KHz 1,000-100 mHigh frequency HF 3-30 MHz 100-10 mVery high frequency VHF 30-300 MHz 10-1 mUltra high frequency UHF 300-3,000 MHz 100-10 cmSuper high frequency SHF 3-30 GHz 10- 1 cmExtremely high frequency EHF 30-300 GHz 1 -.1 cm

“Hertz = cycle per second, KHz= KiloHertz = 1,000 cycles per second, MHz= MegaHertz = 1,000 KHz,GHz = GigaHertz = 1,000 MHz.

tm = meter= 328 feet, km= kilometer= 1,000 meters= .6212 miles, cm = 01 meters= 394 inches.

.


moderately high data-rate communications. Incontrast to VLF/LF radio systems, HF equip-ment and antenna systems are compact and donot require large amounts of power. A seriousproblem with HF band communications is thatthey are easily disrupted by nuclear detona-tions in the upper atmosphere, and can be“blacked out” over very large distances forperiods of hours. Another problem with HFcommunications is the possibil ity of usingdirection finders to determine the location ofthe transmitter well enough to attack it. Apossible further problem with HF is that thenumber of usable frequency bands is limited.Many users trying simultaneously to use HFcould jam one another.

In spite of these drawbacks, the upper at-mosphere would recover electrically severaltens of hours after nuclear detonations oc-curred and would then be able to support thelong-range transmission of HF. For this reason,HF would be useful for an indefinite periodafter a nuclear attack for high-data-rate com-munications even if other communicationslinks were destroyed.

Today’s fielded HF systems require manualtuning, introducing some unreliability even inday-to-day peacetime communications. Micro-processor-tuned HF systems resulting fromtechnology improvements would make HFhighly reliable except in periods of significantblackout.

VHF

Very high frequency (VHF) waves are notstrongly reflected from the upper atmosphereand do not travel far over ground. VHF is theband at which FM radio broadcasts occur, andit is familiar to radio Iisteners that FM stationshave shorter range than AM stations. Very highdata rates are possible with VHF, and antennasand equipment can be made compact.

Long-range communications are possibleusing VHF by reflecting radio signals off theionized trails of meteors. Since it is necessaryto have a reflecting meteor trail in the rightlocation of the upper atmosphere to permitcommunications between two points beyond

the radio horizon, delays of a few minutescould occur before it would be possible totransmit a message using VHF. One possibleadvantage of VHF is that it might be possibleto communicate effectively by bouncing radiosignals off the bottom of the ionized regionformed by a high-altitude burst. Thus, VHFcommunications might actually be improved ifthe Soviets blacked out HF or UHF.

UHF

Ultrahigh frequency (UHF) is extremely use-ful for line-of-sight communications betweenaircraft. The data rates are high and the equip-ment is quite compact and low power. UHFcan be used to communicate to ground instal-lations from an aircraft at a distance of about200 miles and can be used to communicatebetween aircraft at distances between 300 and450 miles. For this reason, UHF could be usedto communicate between airborne commandposts and to transmit launch commands toland-based missiles.

It is possible to use direction-finding tech-niques to locate UHF transmitters and it is alsopossible to jam receivers This problem is un-likely to be serious for l ine-of-sight aircraftcommunications but it could be a problem forUHF links through satellites.

Satellite Communications (SATCOM)

UHF SATCOM

UHF sate l l i te l i nk s a re use fu l not on lybecause data rates can be very high, but alsobecause UHF antennas are not extremely di-rectional, so users do not have to have meansfor pointing antennas at satellites. A drawbackof UHF SATCOM links is that it is possible tojam the uplinks to the satellites from smallmobile jammers (ship or ground mobile) lo-cated anywhere in the satellite’s hemisphere ofview. A problem associated with the multi-di rect ional nature of UHF s ignals i s thatenough signal can be “seen” from other direc-tions that it is in principle possible to locateground-based UHF transmitters from space.Nuclear detonations in the upper atmospherecan also result in “blacking out” of UHF

Ch. 10—Command, Contro/, and Communications (C3) 281

signals for a few hours over regions of theEarth’s surface. These regions of blackoutwould have radii of tens to hundreds of miles.The United States now uses UHF SATCOM reg-uIarly for worldwide mi1itary communications.

UHF satellites could be launched from silosinto low orbit in wartime to reconstitute dis-rupted I inks.

SHF/EHF SATCOM

Super high frequency (SHF) and extremelyhigh frequency (EHF) satell ite l inks are ex-tremely useful for very high data rate, reliablecommunications. Because of the large band-width, such links are, at least for EHF, unjam-mable. Because the wavelengths are so short(on the order of fractions of a centimeter), it ispossible to have very highly collimated radiobeams that can be trained on the satellite. Inaddition, SHF/EHF antennas are sufficientlysmall (about 5 inches in diameter) that theycan be conveniently mounted on ground vehi-cles, aircraft, surface ships, and submarinemasts.

Since the SHF/EHF beam is so tightly col-limated, it is nearly impossible for a receiverthat is not in the beam to “see” the signal. Theonly way that the presence and location of anSHF/EHF transmitter could be detected wouldbe if the search receiver was itself in the beam.Thus, SHF/EHF satellite uplinks from forces inthe field, surface ships, and submarines wouldnot pose the risk of revealing the location ofthe transmitters.

A potential problem with SHF/EHF is an at-mospheric phenomenon called scintillation.Electron density fluctuations in the ionosheredue to high-altitude nuclear bursts could causethe beam to be bent as it propagated throughthem. This bending would result in fluctua-tions in the quality of reception at the receiver.It is believed that with suitable signal modula-tion scintillation would not be a problem at all.For EHF, scinti l lation would not last, in anyevent, for more than a few minutes after ahigh-altitude burst. Another minor problem isthat water absorbs EHF signals. However, amajor rainstorm would be required to impede

communications. Mist and clouds would notbe a problem.

LASER SATCOM

The high frequencies and directional natureof laser communication allow for extremelyhigh-data-rate, low power consumption, un-jammable l inks between satell ites and be-tween satellites and aircraft flying above theclouds. Communications between ground sta-tions and satell ites would not be feasiblebecause of the possibility of cloud cover. Evenin clear weather, such communications wouldcreate a visible pencil of l ight in the sky,revealing the location of the user. For thisreason laser SATCOM might endanger the co-vertness of submarines, surface ships, andmobile ground units.

Vulnerabilities ofCommunications Systems

Physical Destruction

One obvious way to attempt to deny com-munications capability to U.S. strategic forceswould be to physically destroy as many sus-ceptible elements of the system as possible.This destruction would include landlines, land-line switching stations, radio transmitter sta-tions (i.e., VLF/LF/MF, etc.), satellite up-and-down-link stations, and fixed command cen-ters

After an in i t ia l attack, i t could not beguaranteed that landline communicationswould exist with land-based forces or thatfixed VLF stations would be broadcasting tothe submarine forces. Only communicationslinks made possible with aircraft and satelliteswould necessarily still be intact.

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)

An effect of the detonation of nuclearweapons, both inside and outside the at-mosphere, that is less appreciated but still veryimportant is EMP. The case of a detonationoutside of the atmosphere is, however, themost relevant as a general problem for com-munications systems.

83-477 0 - 81 - 19


As explained in the Overview of Radio Com-munications section, a high-altitude nucleardetonation could generate a sudden electricfield over large regions of the United States ofup to 50,000 volts/meter. This intense electricfield could destroy or disrupt communicationsand electrical equipment of all types. Highquality assurance and testing are required toensure that components are properly sealedand protected if they are to survive the effectsof the EMP from high-altitude detonations.

Ionospher ic Disrupt ion

Another effect of h igh-al t i tude nucleardetonations i s ionospher ic dis rupt ion. Theelectron densities in the ionosphere would bechanged suddenly by the ionizing effects ofprompt gamma rays from the nuclear detona-tion and/or beta rays from fission decay prod-ucts. These effects could cause significantdegradations at those radio frequencies thatare reflected from (HF) or pass through (UHFSATCOM) the ionosphere.

Jamming

Jamming refers to the ability of a hostiletransmitter to drown out the signal being re-ceived. The susceptibility of a radio link tojamming depends on power, bandwidth, modu-lation technique, and antenna directivity. Ingeneral, jamming becomes more difficult asthe frequency of the transmission increases. Ifthe nature of potential wartime jamming canbe foreseen, it can be compensated by changesin modulation technique and increases inpower.

Ant i satellite (ASAT) Threats

There is considerable concern that the heavydependence of the U.S military on SATCOMwill make satellites the targets of attack. Themeans of attack could be direct-ascent in-terception, space mines, land-based lasers, oreven space-based lasers.

Several of the basing modes discussed in thisreport could make effective use of SATCOM.A highly reliable SATCOM system based ondeep-space millimeter-wave (E H F) communica-

tions has been proposed for military use andwould be very useful to support MX basing.The following discussion explains why there isconsiderable interest in such satelIites.

Though geosynchronous orbit would bemost convenient for such satellites operatingat EHF frequencies, it would perhaps be ad-visable to deploy them in h igher orbits .Geosynchronous orbit is that unique orbit22,300 miles from the Earth at which the or-bital period of satellites is equal to the rotationperiod of the Earth. Thus, satellites in geosyn-chronous orbits remain over the same point onthe Earth’s surface as both they and the Earthgo around. Because its position relative to theEarth’s surface would remain the same, userswould have a fixed point upon which to focustheir directional antennas. Because of its con-venience, however, geosynchronous orbit isquite crowded. It would therefore be possiblefor the Soviets to station a “space mine” near aU.S. communications satellite and answer inresponse to U.S protests that the mine was infact some other sort of satellite that it was con-venient to position in geosynchronous orbit.The United States would then not be in a posi-tion to assert that the Soviets had no businessthere, because it would be quite plausible thatthey did have legitimate purposes for position-ing a satellite in this unique, convenient orbit.

If on the other hand the U.S. satellites werein an orbit chosen more or less randomly fromamong the infinite number of possible alti-tudes, the United States would be in a betterposition to assert that the only possible pur-pose for a nearby Soviet satellite must be to in-terfere with that of the United States. TheUnited States might then just i fy on thesegrounds measures against such interference.

Satellites could also be threatened by directattack from a missile launched from the SovietUnion. However, the U.S. satellites could bepositioned high enough that it would takemany hours (18 or so) for an attacking vehicleto reach them. Furthermore, since the intercep-tor missiles required to reach high orbits wouldbe quite large, the Soviets would probably onlylaunch them from the Soviet Union. Most of

Ch. 10—Command, Control, and Communications . 283

the U.S. satellites would be on the other side ofthe Earth when the f i r s t interceptor waslaunched, and launch of other interceptorswould have to be staggered to intercept therest of the satellites as they “came around. ”Direct-ascent antisatellite attacks on high or-bits would therefore present a timing problemto the Soviets. The United States would cer-tainly be aware that the satellites were underattack hours before they were destroyed.

Last, land-based lasers could not deliver suf-ficient power to the orbits of interest (fivetimes geosynchronous or so, or half way to theMoon) to destroy the satellites.

A number of measures could be taken to en-sure the survival of these satell ites. For in-stance, they could be provided with sensors toallow them to determine when they were underattack, and they could maneuver to avoidhoming interceptors and deploy decoys orchaff to confuse homing sensors. Backupsatell ites at such distances from the Earthmight also be able to be hidden entirely by giv-ing them small optical, infrared, and radarsignatures. Dormant backup satellites mightbe hidden among a swarm of decoys andturned on when the primary satell ites en-countered interference. Last, backup satellites(probably using UHF instead of higher frequen-cies) couId be deployed on missiles in silos andlaunched into low orbits to replace the pri-maries. These reconstituted satell ites couldalso be attacked, but it would take time for theSoviets to acquire data on their orbits, evenassuming the United States allowed them un-hindered operation of the means to acquirethis data. Some of these techniques for satel-lite security are more effective than others.

Command and Control

This chapter deals for the most part with thecommunications aspect of C3. The commandand control functions for U.S. strategic forcesare outside the scope of this discussion, but itis necessary to specify how the commandstructure is linked to the communications sys-tem and thus to the forces.

Decisions regarding the use of U.S. strategicforces are in the hands of the National Com-mand Authorities (NCA), i.e., the President andSecretary of Defense or their successors. Themilitary provides a National Military Com-mand System to support NCA. This system con-sists of fixed command centers and survivablemobile command posts. The fixed ground cen-ters include the National Military CommandCenter in the Pentagon, an Alternate NationalMilitary Command Center at a rural site out-side Washington, D. C., the underground com-mand center at Strategic Air Command (SAC)headquarters at Of futt Air Force Base inOmaha, Nebr., and North American AerospaceDefense Command headquarters in CheyenneMountain, Colo.

Since the fixed ground centers could be de-stroyed early in a nuclear war, a fleet of sur-vivable Airborne National Command Posts isprovided for postattack command and control.The most important aircraft in this fleet is theE-4B (modified Boeing 747) National Emer-gency Airborne Command Post (NEACP, pro-nounced “kneecap”) available for Presidentialuse. In addition, there is a fleet of strip-alertaircraft at military bases throughout the coun-try, including command posts of the nuclearcommanders and the Post-Attack Commandand Control System (PACCS) fleet. This fleetcould establish a network of line-of-sight UHFcommunications from the Eastern to CentralUnited States within a short time after an at-tack. Finally, SAC maintains an EC-135 (modi-fied Boeing 707) command aircraft, called“Looking Glass,” on continuous ai rbornepatrol over the United States.

Ground-mobile command posts–disguisedas vans traveling the Nation’s highways toavoid being targeted — are also a possibility forsurvivable command posts.

In the descriptions that follow of possible C3

systems for each of the basing modes, it will beassumed that all force management functionsand launch commands originate with, or passthrough, the airborne or grounded NEACP, andthat NEACP is provided with the necessarycommunications systems to link them with theMX force.


C’ FUNCTIONS FOR MX BASING

This section outlines the functions desiredof an MX C3 system to support the variousaspects of U.S. Nuclear Weapons EmploymentPolicy. These policy aspects are associatedwith such terms as Basic Employment Policy,Flexible Response, Quick Reaction Hard-Tar-get Counterforce, Secure Reserve Force, andthe like, as derived from the public statementsof senior defense officials. This section trans-lates these notions into concrete functions re-quired of a C3 system for MX. The next sectionwill prescribe hardware capable of performingthese functions for each basing mode.

These functions, and most certainly themeans to accomplish them, differ among thepreattack, transattack, and postattack periods.For the purposes of this chapter, the trans-attack period is defined as the period of air-borne operation of certain C3 aircraft (N EACP,Ai rborne Launch Control Center (ALCC),TACAMO, etc.). The distinction between trans-attack and postattack as used here thereforeconcerns the hardware avai lable to ac-complish the C3 functions and not the func-tions themselves. Transattack and postattackfunctions will therefore be treated together.

Preattack Functions

Peacetime Operations

Peacetime communications are required forcommanders to assess continuously the statusand readiness of the MX force. Continuousone-way communications from commandersto the forces is an obvious requirement. Two-way communications — including from the mis-sile forces to commanders— is clearly impor-tant, though intermittent report-back (relevantfor the case of submarine basing) might beadequate.

Since the communications links have suf-fered no damage, the only impediment tomaintaining adequate peacetime communica-tions would be the requirement that the meansof communications should be consistent withthe operations of the force. Thus, the peace-time communications should not be of such a

nature as to compromise missile locations inthe case of MPS basing or defense unit loca-tions in the case of the MPS/LoADS (low alti-tude defense system) combination, nor betraythe locations of patrolling subs in small sub-marine basing.

Responsiveness

In the event that NCA ordered the launch ofthe MX missiles according to one of the pre-planned options of the SIOP before the forcehad suffered attack, all that would be requiredof the C3 system would be the capability totransmit a short, preformatted, encryptedmessage to the MX force. Since the messagewould be short, low-data-rate communicationswould suffice.

There could be a requirement that missilelaunch be accomplished rapidly after the deci-sion to launch was made. This could be thecase if a Soviet attack were believed imminentand it was thought desirable to strike Sovietforces before they could attack the UnitedStates or disperse from their home bases. Thisrequirement of responsiveness would seek tomake the time interval between disseminationof the EAM ordering launch and actual missilelaunch as short as possible. A portion, thoughnot necessari ly most, of this time intervalwould be comprised of the time it took for therelevant communications links to transmit theshort EAM to the MX force with low probabili-ty of error.

in order to strike certain hardened targetssuch as missile silos, it would also be desirableto be able to control the arrival times of RVS sothat detonation of one would not compromisethe effectiveness of others (“fratricide”). Suchtime-on-target control could be accomplishedby including in the EAM a reference time, rela-tive to which each missile would determine thearrival time required of its RVS in order to coor-dinate arrival with RVS from other missi les.The precise timing would be achieved by coor-dinating launch time, maneuvers of the mis-sile, and reentry angle.

Ch. 10—Command, Control, and Communications (C3) ● 285

In addition to short response time, it couldbe desirable for the MX force to be able tocommunicate back to the commanders in ashort time to confirm successful launch.

Ad-Hoc Retargeting Before Launch

Ad-hoc retargeting refers to the ability toconstruct attacks that are not among the pre-planned options of the SIOP. Such retargetingflexibil ity could involve either rearrangingtargets from the extensive target sets alreadystored in the MX missile launcher’s memory orreprogramming the missile with entirely newtarget sets. Both s i tuat ions would requiretransmission of larger amounts of data thancontained in the short EAM. In the latter case,the information would include target latitudesand longitudes (calculated in the proper coor-dinate system), reentry angle, timing, andfuzing.

Since large attack options would likely beincluded among the S IOP options, extensivead-hoc retargeting might be confined to a rela-tively small portion of the force, in which caseonly that portion need be in a position toreceive such high-data-rate communications.

The portion of the force retargeted wouldpresumably be required to report back receiptof the new targets, confirm them, and reportsuccessful launch.

Transattack and Postattack Functions

Prelaunch Damage Assessment andReoptimization Within the SIOP

In the event that the MX force suffered attri-tion in the attack, it might be desirable for thesurviving missiles to reallocate targets in sucha way that the highest priority targets con-tinued to be covered even if the missiles thatoriginally covered these targets were de-stroyed in the initial attack.

Commanders would presumably also wish toknow the extent of attrition and remainingtarget coverage.

Order for Launch of Preplanned Options

Dissemination of the EAM after an attackwould require that the surviving portion of theC 3 system support at least one-way low-data-rate messages. Report-back confirming suc-cessful launch would require two-way com-munications. It is not clear that the need forrapid response would always be as great in thepostattack period as in the preattack period.

Ad-Hoc Retargeting

Assignment of entirely new targets to the MXmissiles and confirmation of receipt would re-quire teletype data-rate two-way communica-tions.

C’ SYSTEMS FOR MX BASING MODES

In this section, the problems of providing ef-fect ive C3 for each of the principal basingmodes are discussed and technically feasiblesolutions identified. In many instances, the C3

system described for hypothetical future MXbasing modes differs substantially from C3 sys-tems supporting present strategic forces. Thesesystems would have to be acquired at somecost, though in no case (excluding launch un-der attack) is the C3 system a major cost driverfor the system as a whole. Moreover, some ofthe communications systems described wouldbe useful for other military missions in addi-tion to MX basing. OTA has only identified

feasible C3 systems and has not attempted tofind a “best” solution. Also, the systems havenot been subjected to the cost tradeoffs thatcould occur if a decision were made to deployone of them.

The baseline MPS system is in full-scaleengineering development and subject to cer-tain budgetary constraints. it is thereforenatural that the baseline system could be im-proved on (e.g., with regard to two-way Iong-haul communications) with additional funding.Since for the other basing modes similar fund-ing constraints have not been applied to the C3


-—

systems described here, feasible improvementsto the baseline MPS system—available atsome additional cost — are identified.

Baseline MPS System

Preattack

Peacetime MPS C3 operations would be ac-complished principally through the fiber-opticnetwork linking each shelter with the Opera-tional Control Center (OCC) and with othershelters. Each fiber cable would contain threelines (one for communications in each direc-tion and one spare) capable of 48 kilobit/sec-ond data rates. With such high data rates,launch orders and retargeting informationcould be transmitted in a very short time.Response time to an EAM would be driven byoperational procedures and by the severalminutes it would take the missile to emergefrom the shelter and erect.

PLU would be maintained by having the mis-siles and simulators transmit encrypted statusmessages with identical formats according touniform message protocols.

Transattack

The transattack period is defined in thischapter to comprise the period of airborneoperation of the ALCC and NEACP. One ALCCwould always be airborne in peacetime, withanother on strip alert. The in-flight enduranceof the ALCC would be about 14 hours, afterwhich communications would have to be ac-complished from the grounded aircraft to theMPS shelters.

The transattack C3 system for the baselineMPS system is shown in figure 124.

Communications between the ALCC andNEACP are relatively secure. Immediatelyafter the attack, however, the HF and UHFSATCOM could be disrupted, and it wouldtake some time to set up the UHF line-of-sightPACCS net.

Of the links from the ALCC to the shelter, HF( l ine-of-s ight) could be dis rupted by thenuclear environment, and MF represents acompromise between the better propagationof low frequencies through an ionized at-

Figure 124.–Communications System for Baseline MPS System (transattack)


Ch. 10—Command, Control, and Communications (C’) “ 287

mosphere and the higher data rates of high fre-quencies.

MF, which has short range, would be theonly means in the present baseline systemdesign by which the shelters could communi-cate with the ALCC to report their status.Transmission would be through the buried MFdipole antenna at each shelter. Taking into ac-count soil propagation losses, the effectiveradiated power from each shelter would beonly about 2 watts. The low power of the trans-mitter at each shelter would be multiplied bythe “simulcast” technique where each surviv-ing shelter that contained an MX rnissile wouldtransmit its status via MF. Other surviving shel-ters receiving this message would repeat thetransmission simultaneously with rebroadcastsby the original shelter. In this way, after manyrepetitions, all of the surviving shelters wouldbe t ransmitt ing, in sequence, the statusmessage of each individual shelter, with a totaleffective transmitting power of all the shelterstaken together.

Since only the shelters containing MX mis-siles would be transmitting in this period, theseemissions might reveal the locations of the sur-viving missi les if the Soviets could detectthem. However, the short range of ground-wave MF would preclude direction-finding byremote ground stations or ships, and iono-spheric absorption and refraction would pre-vent satellites from detecting and locating theemissions. Thus, this hypothetical threat toPLU may be impossible for the Soviets to capi-talize on. This security from detection is one ofthe reasons why MF communicat ion waschosen.

The simulcast would also be used to enablethe surviving missi les to redistribute targetsamong themselves in order to maintain cover-age of the highest priority targets. The missileswould be numbered I through 200, and foreach SIOP option there would be 200 targetsets, numbered 1 through 200 in priority order.Before the attack, missile #l would have targetset #l, missile #2 target set #2, and so on. Afterthe attack, missile #200 would listen on the MFsimulcast for a status message from missile ##1.

If missile #I did not report or reported that itwas unable to fire, missile #200 (if it survived)would assume target set M. If missile #2 hadnot survived, its target set would be assumedby missile #199 (if it survived), and so on.

Transattack two-way communications be-tween the ALCC and the missile force wouldrely exclusively upon the single MF I ink, SinceMF is short-range, the ALCC would have to ap-proach within 50 to 100 miles of the missilefield in order to receive the MF simulcast andassess the status of the force. There could beconcern for the effects upon the ALCC of dustand radiation lofted into the atmosphere bythe attack.

Th i svialingand/orshownW O U I d

situation could be improved by pro-HF transmitters (as well as receivers)SATCOM terminals at the shelters, asin figure 125. A UHF SATCOM terminalcost about $100,000, so SATCOM at

each shelter would cost about $500 miIIion.

Postattack

The postattack period, as defined for thepurpose of this discussion, would begin whenthe ai rborne command posts (ALCC andNEACP) were forced to land, either to refuel orfor extended grounded operations. The base-line C3 system for this period is shown in figure126. HF and MF skywave communicationscould be disrupted for hours or days after at-tack. The ground-wave communications wouldin any case be short range. The ALCC wouldhave to be within 50 to 100 miles of the shel-ters or it would be out of MF range. The Sovietswould not necessarily spare airfields this closeto the deployment area. There would thereforebe a need for long-haul two-way communica-tions from the grounded aircraft to the sheltersin the postattack period. This communicationwould be needed especially if the ALCC wereinoperable, and the grounded NEACP had tocommunicate with the MX force over thou-sands of miles.

Means to provide these two-way long-haulcommunications that are not part of the pres-ent baseline design are shown in figure 127.


Figure 125.—Possible Additions to Baseline MPS Communications System(transattack)

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment,

Figure 126.–Communications System for Baseline MPS System (postattack)

Shelter


Ch. 10—Command, Contro/, and Communications (C’) ● 289

Figure 127.—Possible Additions to Baseline MPS Communications System(postattack)

(ReconstitutableUHF SATCOM)

antenna

HF, MF ground network

SOURCE. Off Ice of Technology Assessment.

They include adaptive HF, ground-based HF orMF relays prol i ferated across the UnitedStates, satellite communications, and erect-able LF antennas.

MPS Basing with LoADS ABM System

The two principal C3 functions required ifLoADS were added to MPS basing would be:1 ) tactical warning of Soviet attack so that theLoADS defense units (DUS) could break out oftheir shelters and prepare to defend; and 2)communications to transmit a breakout orderand authorization to activate the nuclear-armed interceptors (“nuclear release”).

If the design goal providing for awakeningdormant electrical equipment in the DU andbreaking the radar and interceptor cannis-ter through the shelter roof within a very shortperiod of time could be achieved, warning of

Soviet attack would not be required until latein the flight of the Soviet ICBM reentry vehi-cles (RVS). Means to provide such late warning(within 15 minutes of impact) could includerocket-launched sensor probes, sensor aircraft,and ground-based radars, in addition to sat-ellites. Such warning sensors are discussed ex-tensively in chapter 4. Radars similar to theLoADS radars themselves could be positionedat the northern edges of the deployment area.The sensors could provide attack assessment ifsuch information were required to attempt tolimit degradation of defense effectiveness inthe face of a potential Soviet Shoot-Look-Shoot capability (see ch, 3). Without adequatewarning for breakout, the LoADS defensewould clearly be useless. If breakout occurredin peacetime as a result of error, the shel-ters containing the LoADS DUS would bedestroyed.

83-477 0 - 81 - 20


Though it might be feasible physically toactivate the defense in a short time, the proce-dures whereby commanders assessed the warn-ing information and ordered breakout and nu-clear release could in practice lengthen the re-ponse time considerably. In the present LoADScommand concept, breakout and nuclearrelease are effected by two distinct com-mands. The communications needed to sup-port timely activation of the defense would de-pend on who was authorized to order nuclearrelease. Offensive nuclear release must beordered by NCA. Whether authority for defen-sive nuclear release could be delegated to mil-itary commanders is unclear.

At the time the breakout and release orderswere given, detonations of Soviet SLBM RVScould already have occurred in the deploy-ment area and at other centers of the NationalMilitary Command System. MF injection fromthe ALCC might therefore be the only means totransmit the defense commands. If the ALCCoperating area were expanded by using longerrange communications (H F or VLF/LF) betweenthe ALCC and the shelters, the lower data ratescould lengthen the time it would take to trans-mit commands to the defense.

At present, uncertainties in the LoADS sys-tem architecture and unresolved operationalprocedures do not permit judgment on the fea-sibility of supporting the defense’s warningand breakout needs.

If a LoADS defense were added to a vertical-shelter MPS system, the radar and interceptorcannister would have to be emplaced in sepa-rate shelters. In this case it would probably benecessary to deploy a separate communica-tions network to support the rapid transfer ofdata from the radar to the interceptors in anengagement.

Launch Under Attack

Warning and communications systems tosupport reliance upon launch under attack arediscussed extensively in chapter 4. Since thesesystems would be the only “basing mode” tospeak of, considerable time, effort, and money

would presumably be spent assuring their relia-bility in the face of determined Soviet effortsat disruption. As discussed in chapter 4, itwouId be technically feasible to deploy a widevariety of warning sensors and communica-tions links to airborne command posts that,taken together, would be exceedingly difficultfor the Soviets to disrupt. Such disruptioncould furthermore be made time-consumingand provocative.

What cannot be determined on the basis oftechnology alone is whether information pro-vided by remote sensors would be adequate tosupport a decision of such weight as thelaunch of U.S. offensive weapons, whetherprocedures could be devised to guaranteetimely decisions by NCA, and whether (giventhe complex interaction of human beings andmachines operating against a short timeline) abound could be set and enforced upon theprobability of error resulting in catastrophe.

Small Submarines

Since seawater absorbs radio waves of allbut the lowest frequencies of the radio spec-trum, completely submerged submarines areconfined to low data-rate receive-only LF, VLF,and ELF communications. Two-way communi-cations and high data rates require puttingeither a mast antenna or a trailing buoy anten-na above the surface. While the buoy or mastantenna itself poses essentially no threat tosubmarine covertness, broadcasts at moderatefrequencies could reveal the locations of thesubmarines. E H F communications to surviv-able deep-space satellites such as have beenproposed for a wide variety of military com-munications missions would permit high data-rate communications from submarines to com-manders with essentially no risk to submarinecovertness. Present U.S. fleet ballistic missilesubmarines use a variety of classified meansfor report-back.

This section describes a technically feasibleC 3 system to support small submarine basingof MX. The system described differs somewhatfrom the C’ system that supports present sub-


marine forces and intends to provide the smallsubmarine force with some of the attributes ofa land-based missile force.

Preattack

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The preattack C ] system is shown128.

The land-based VLF transmitters

in figure

exist atpresent. The network provides worldwide cov-erage and would be more than adequate forthe small submarine deployment area. Thetransmitters have high power, adequate anti-jam capability, and can transmit an EAM tosubmerged submarines in an extremely shorttime. There is also a worldwide LF network.

The EHF satellites do not exist at present,but a similar satell ite (LES 8/9) has beendeployed with great success. EHF frequenciesare chosen because jamming them is virtuallyimpossible, submarines can communicate withvirtualIy no chance of betraying their loca-tions, data rates are high, and small (5 inch)mast antennas can be used. Such satellites indeep-space orbits could be made exceedingly

difficult for the Soviets to disrupt (see thediscussion of ASAT in the Technical Aspects ofStrategic C3 section).

PREATTACK FUNCTIONS

peacetime covert operations could be ac-complished in the same way as with the pres-ent submarine force copying VLF. The VLF net-work would also permit transmission of anEAM in an extremely short time. The SIOPwould contain a timing plan, keyed to a refer-ence time in the EAM, to allow the missiles tocoordinate their time-on-target. Depending onwhere it was in the deployment area, eachmissile would calculate a launch time, reentryangles, missile maneuvers, and bus deploy-ment to provide the required time-on-targetcoordination. Coverage and footprinting couldbe arranged by advance operational planning.

Ad-hoc targeting instructions for l imitednuclear options could be assigned to 10 to 12percent of the force that would be snorkelingat any given time. These submarines could becopying high data-rate SATCOM via their mastantennas. If a larger portion of the force wererequired for ad-hoc retargeting, the VLF net-

Figure 128.—Preattack C3 System for Small Submarines



work could direct more submarines to erecttheir masts or deploy awash buoys to copyother communications.

Report-back could be arranged, at no addi-tional risk to the submarines, by having themtransmit status messages via EHF SATCOMwhenever they snorkeled. Classified means areused today for submarine report-back.

Transattack

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The transattack period is defined for the pur-poses of this chapter as the period whenNEACP and TACAMO are airborne. This periodwould normally be the first 12 to 14 hours afterattack plus additional periods if provisionwere made for extended operations. The trans-attack CJ system is shown in figure 129.

The land-based VLF antennas are assumeddestroyed in the attack, though this might notbe true of the antennas on the soil of other na-tions. The EHF satellites are assumed intact.

There are at present several TACAMO air-craft in the Atlantic and a few in the Pacific.

More Pacific TACAMOS are expected to sup-port Trident operations. These TACAMO air-craft will be EM P-hardened.

Both TACAMO and the E-4B NEACP wouldbe capable of transmitting an EAM directly tosubmerged submarines from their VLF trailingantennas <

TRANSATTACK FUNCTIONS

Prelaunch damage assessment and targetingreoptimization would be unnecessary for thesmall submarine force, since it would be ex-pected to be almost completely survivable.

EAM transmission could occur via VLF fromTACAMO or NEACP. When the submarineslost communications with the land-based VLFtransmitters, they would tune to TACAMO.

Ad-hoc retargeting would require high datarates and two-way communications, so VLFwould not be appropriate. A short-coded mes-sage via VLF ordering certain submarines tocome to depth and copy targeting instructionsvia E H F SATCOM would be a means to accom-plish ad-hoc retargeting the transattack period.

Figure 129.-Transattack C3 System for Small Submarines


Ch. 10—Command, Contro/, and Communications (C3) “ 293

Postattack

Two-way communications via EHF SATCOMcould be available in the postattack period,and HF and UHF SATCOM could be reconsti-tuted in this period as well. The postattack C3

system is shown in figure 130.

A i r Mob i le MX

Preattack

The principal preattack C3 requirements foran air mobile fleet would concern receipt oftimely warning messages to support the fleet’shigh alert posture. A wide variety of reliablewarning sensors, available at some cost, isdiscussed in chapters 4 and 6. The communi-cations I inks from these sensors to com-manders authorized to order dispersal of thefleet and from commanders to the alert air-bases would presumably be used before thecommunications system had suffered exten-sive damage.

The responsiveness of an air mobile force toa launch order wouId be limited to the time—perhaps 10 minutes or so– it would take the

aircraft to take off and cl imb to launchaltitude.

Transattack and Postattack

The C3 system to support the complex forcemanagement needs of the dispersed MX fleetwould require at least teletype data-rate com-munications between each missiIe-carrying air-craft and command aircraft. The aircraftwould be required to report their status, in-cluding remaining fuel supplies, and receivelaunch instructions. Targeting reoptimizationwould not be required if a substantial portionof the fleet survived the initial attack. The air-borne fleet could make use of a wide variety ofcommunications including UHF l ine-of-sight(including the PACCS fleet), adaptive HF,VLF/LF, and SATCOM, as shown in figure 131.The communications system itself would below risk, the principal C3 problems being asso-ciated with the need to manage the dispersedforce, assess its status, and ready it for launch.

The problems of making provision for endur-ance beyond the few hours of unrefueled flighttime are discussed extensively in chapter 6. If

Figure 130.—Postattack C3 System for Small Submarines



Figure 131 .—Transattack Air Mobile MX Communications System

PACCS


air f ie lds surv ived for reconst i tut ion, theywould have to be located, their status assessed(including local fallout levels), and landingaids provided in advance.

Last, providing for missile accuracy com-parable to land-based MX would require com-munications from Global Positioning Satellites(GPS) or a Ground Beacon System (GBS).

OVERVIEW OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

Radio Wave Propagation

This section discusses some of the character-istics of radio waves that are relevant to strate-gic communications systems.

Radio waves are electromagnetic disturb-ances that propagate with the speed of lightand, under certain conditions, can be bent, re-flected, and absorbed within different regionsof the upper atmosphere. The propagationcharacteristics of radio waves in the upper at-mosphere differ markedly for waves of differ-ent frequencies. Propagation can also changewith time of day, time of year, and sunspot ac-tivity. In addition high-altitude nuclear explo-sions can dramatically alter the propagationcharacteristics of radio waves within the at-mosphere. This circumstance has obvious andimportant implications for communicationssystems that may have to function reliably in anuclear environment.

Radio communications bands are, by con-vention, referred to by different names. Sincethe names of these bands are commonly usedin discussions of communications systems,they are summarized in table 34.

The rate at which a radio wave is able totransmit information is determined by its fre-quency (assuming there is no significant noise,fading, or other fluctuation effects mixed inthe signal). This rate can be thought of as thenumber of times per second (the unit of fre-quency is the Hertz; one Hertz is the same asone cycle per second) the signal can be turned“on” or “off” in order to create the sound of avoice or to t ransmit informat ion in otherforms. This “on-off” rate can never be greaterthan the frequency of the wave since the fre-quency of the wave is in fact the number oftimes per second that the wave itself is turned“on and of f.” A rough rule of thumb is that a

Ch. 10—Cornmand, Contro/, and Communications (C’) ● 295

radio signal can carry information at about 10percent the rate of its frequency. Thus, if low-fidelity voice communication requires thetransmission of a voice signal that has primaryfrequency components in the 1,000 to 2,000cycle per second range, then the radio wavemust have a frequency of at least 10,000 to2 0 , 0 0 0 Hertz . Th is means that the lowestusable frequencies for voice communicationslies in the upper end of the LF band. High-quality voice transmission would require thetransmission of voice components at frequen-cies of order 10,000 to 15,000 Hertz, thus re-quiring frequencies on the order of severalhundreds of kiloHertz. These frequencies lie inthe lower end of the MF band or broadcastband, where commercial AM radio stations arelicensed to operate. For situations that requireparticularly reliable signal reception and goodrejection of noise, much higher frequencies arepreferable, as is the case with high fidelitymusic transmissions that are transmitted in theVHF (FM radio) band. Still higher data ratesmay be required for transmitting enough in-formation to construct pictures rapidly in time,as is the case in television broadcasting. Televi-sion information rate requirements dictateradio f requencies in the VHF and UHF radiobands.

R a d i o w a v e s c a n b e r e c e i v e d b e t w e e nground stations over several different physical

paths If the stations are close enough togetherto have line-of-sight contact, they can receive“direct-wave” transmissions (see fig. 132). It is

also possible to use different layers of the up-per atmosphere to bend or reflect radio waves

back toward the surface of the Earth for over-the-hor izon recept ion (or for over- the-hor izonradars). Signals received over such paths are

called skywaves. Radio waves can also be re-flected from the surface of the Earth, to theionosphere, and back again toward the Earth.This phenomenon, which occurs mostly at low-er radio frequencies, can result in the radiowave being “guided” along the Earth’s surfacefor great distances. The radio waves are, in ef-fect, trapped by the boundaries of the iono-sphere and the Earth’s surface.

F igu re 133 shows a g raph o f t yp ica ldistances over which communications can be

Figure 132.—Physical Paths of Radio Waves


Figure 133.—Electromagnetic Transmission Rangesat Different Frequencies

Nightime skywave

2,000 -

10-4 10-’ 1 10’ 10’ 10’ 105 1 0

Frequency in megaHertz

SOURCE. Office of Technology Assessment

achieved between ground stations using com-monly available radio equipment. VLF signals(designated by an arrow at 10 KHz on thegraph) can be reliably received at distances ofmany thousands of miles because they are

296 ● MA Missile Basing

guided along the Earth’s surface by the bound-aries on the ionosphere and the ground (fig.134 shows the geometry of VLF over-the-horizon radio propagation). At higher frequen-cies encountered in the LF band, radio wavesbegin to suffer attenuation at the greaterdistances due to absorption. As a result ofthese effects, LF reception tends to be ofshorter range than that of VLF waves. At stillhigher frequencies, less and less of the radiowaves get redirected back to the Earth’s sur-face by the ionosphere and the range at whichradio transmissions can be received drops tothe line-of-sight distance. (For radio transmis-sions, line-of-sight distances are approximately40 miles. This distance is somewhat larger thanvisual Iine-of-sight distances. ]

Many communications applications requirehigh data rates in addition to long range andhigh reliability. High data-rate communicationmandates the use of high radio frequencies.Since high frequencies are either not reflectedor poorly reflected from the ionosphere, it isnecessary that the transmitter and receiverhave line of sight geometry if reliable com-munications are to be affected. One way of in-creasing the range of line-of-sight radio com-munications is to use airplanes.

Figure 135 illustrates schematically the ge-ometry for line-of-sight communications be-

Figure 134.— Over-the. Horizon Radio Transmission

❑

T r a n s m i t t e r Receiversite site


Figure 135.—Geometry of Aircraft DirectPath Communications


tween aircraft. As an airborne relay, line-of-sight transmission between aircraft can be af-fected over distances of approximately 400miles using the HF and UHF bands. The aircraftcan also communicate with ground installa-tions over distances of approximately 200miles at those same frequencies.

Another feature of aircraft communicationslinks is that they are constantly in motion andare therefore difficult to target from great dis-tances. For this reason, aircraft are particularlyuseful as survivable command posts, launchcontrol centers, and communications relays.

For still greater distances and high data-ratecommunications, satellites can be used as or-biting relays. The geometry of an orbitingsatellite relay is shown in figure 136. A par-ticularly convenient orbit used for long-range,high data-rate satellite communications is at adistance of 22,300 miles from the Earth. Satel-l ites in orbits that l ie in the plane of theEquator at that distance will always remainover the same point on the Earth’s surface. Forthis reason, many communications satellitesare put in such “geosynchronous” orbits.

Disruption of Radio CommunicationsDue to Nuclear Detonations

Electromagnetic Pulse

When a nuclear detonation occurs, a largenumber of gamma rays is emmitted by nucleiin fission and fusion reactions, resulting in aninitial “gamma flash” of extremely high inten-sity. If the nuclear weapon is detonated at analtitude above the sensible atmosphere, thegamma rays from the weapon can induce ex-tremely intense electromagnetic fields in thelayer of air between 15 and 25 miles altitude.

Ch. 10—Command, Control, and Communications (C3) . 297

Figure 136.—Geometry of Satellite Communications

Satellite


These electromagnetic fields will then prop-agate towards the surface of the Earth.

Nuclear-explosion-generated electromag-netic phenomena of this type are known asEMP effects. EMP fields are of great interestsince they are sufficiently intense to representa potential threat to the survivability of almostal I electronic equipment.

Figure 137 shows the area over which an in-tense electric field of 25,000 volts per meter ormore would be generated by a nuclear explo-sion of several hundreds of kilotons yield at analtitude of 190 miles. The area affected essen-tially covers the entire United States and partsof Canada and Mexico.

The size of the area that could be affectedby EMP is primarily determined by the heightof burst and is only very weakly dependent onthe yield. For example, the size of the affectedarea shown in figure 137 could be increased by60 percent if the detonation height were in-creased to an altitude of 300 miles. Thus,severe EMP effects are possible over very largeareas without the use of high-yield weapons.

Figure 137.-Electromagnetic Pulse GroundCoverage for High-Altitude-Nuclear Explosion

Peak electric field25,000 volts/meter or greater

Height of burst = 190 miles


The physical reason for the altitude depend-ence of EMP phenomena can be seen fromfigure 138. The tangent to the Earth from theburst point determines the maximum range atwhich the gamma rays can induce intense elec-tromagnetic fields. The gamma rays initiallygenerated by the exploding weapon deposittheir energy in a band of the atmosphere be-tween 15 and 25 miles altitude. The electro-magnetic field that reaches the surface of theEarth is generated within this band of at-mosphere. If the weapon is detonated at agreater height, the tangent will occur at agreater ground range from the surface zeropoint, and the extent of the gamma ray-in-duced band will also be greater.

During the initial period of a nuclear attack,intense electr ic f ie lds f rom high-alt i tude-nuclear detonations could cause severe dam-age to electronic equipment. PowerIines, radioantennas, metal conduits, and other conduct-ing surfaces would collect EMP energy likeantennas and destroy or disrupt the electricalequipment to which they were connected.Even equipment that had been carefully de-signed to survive the effects of EMP could betemporarily disrupted for a period after a high-


Figure 138.—Origin of Electromagnetic Pulse From High-Altitude-Nuclear Explosion


altitude nuclear detonation (for instance EMP-protected computers could be disrupted byloss of sections of memory or computation).

Ionospheric Disruption

Since the gamma rays from a high-altitudenuclear detonation can change the electrondensities in very large regions of the iono-sphere, the propagation characteristics ofradio waves may change dramatically. A resultof this change could be a “blackout” of radiocommunications.

Figure 139 shows the skywave paths of radiowaves of different frequencies. The D layer ofthe ionosphere is responsible for ref Iecting VLFand LF radio signals. Nuclear explosions in orabove the D layer would change ionizationlevels in the D layer. The effect of this changewould be to lower the altitude at which VLFand LF signals would be reflected from theionosphere. This effect could disrupt com-munications over long ranges, but it would beunlikely that VLF and LF communicat ionswould be blacked out by nuclear detonations.

MF radio propagation is normally limited togroundwaves because the MF radio waves getabsorbed in the D layer before they can reachthe upper layers and be reflected back to theEarth’s surface. At night, when the lack ofsunlight results in a drop in the ionization ofthe D layer, MF radio may propagate to fairlygreat distances (see the curve marked night-

time skywave transmission in fig. 133). For thisreason it is sometimes possible at night to pickup AM broadcasts from remote transmitters.Nuclear explosions in or above the D layercould blackout MF skywave communicationsfor hours near the point of detonation.

The HF band is used extensively for long-range communications. If conditions in theionosphere are such that H F waves are not ab-sorbed, HF waves will be bent back to Earthwhen they reach the E and F layers of the iono-sphere (see fig. 139). HF is particularly usefulfor long-range communications because its f re-quency is high enough that large amounts ofinformation can be transmitted and yet it islow enough that the ionosphere will bend itback to the surface of the Earth.

Nuclear detonations in or above the D layercould change ionization levels sufficiently tocause absorption of HF waves in the D layer.The changed ionization levels could also lowerthe altitude at which HF waves were reflectedfrom the ionosphere (see fig. 140). This changecould result in severely degraded HF communi-cations for periods of minutes to hours.

A nuclear burst at an altitude of approxi-mately zoo mi Ies wou Id be expected to disruptHF communications over the same area inwhich severe EMP would be experienced. Theblackout from such a detonation could last forhours.

—


I n bands above H F, most radio transmissions satellites were not attacked, communicationswould suffer varying degrees of degradation at these frequencies would probably not sufferthrough the ionosphere. However, provided severe degradation.

Figure 139.—Atmospheric Radio Propagation at Different Frequencies

... -n 1

I .[ ——. d . . -----*--*-——u) 240Pa>

-&..-”-–------ OD.- - - - J\=-

. -. .- -. -. . . . .

200 400 600 800 1000 1200

Approximate ground range in milesSOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

Figure 140.— Radio Propagation Paths Before and After High-Altitude-Nuclear Explosion

Explosion induced Skywavebeforeionospheric absorptionnvnlncinn

Explosion induced 7 ‘,’ionospheric reflection ~,z _

//4

N ‘ 4’

/

\

\

\\

explosion

\

.


Chapter 11

DIVERSITY OF U.S. STRATEGICFORCES

Chapter ll.— DIVERSITY OF U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES

Page

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........303

Diversity and Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............304

Diversity and Weapon System Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........305

Diversity and Deterrence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................307

Chapter 11

DIVERSITY OF U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES

OVERVIEW

Among the many considerations that arise inthe selection of a basing mode for the MX mis-sile is the perceived need to maintain diverseU.S. strategic offensive forces. For the past 20years , the United States has deployed a“Triad” of strategic offensive forces— inter-continental ball istic missi les (I CBMS), sub-marine launched ballistic missi les (S LBMS),and manned bombers—with each “leg” ofroughly equal importance. Whi le the de-velopment of these strategic offensive forcesdid not occur as a result of a conscious policyfor the procurement and use of strategic nu-clear weapons, the diverse operational char-acteristics of U.S. strategic forces describedbriefly below have stimulated the formulationof American nuclear strategies and tactics thatseek to optimize the differing capabilities andvulnerabilities of each leg of the Triad.

The following discussion assumes that nomatter what basing mode is selected for theMX missile, the United States will also deployfuture strategic offensive forces composed ofMinuteman ICBMS, manned bombers, andSLBMS on both Poseidon and Trident fleet bal-listic missile submarines (SSBNS). For purposesof OTA’S analysis, the MX missile is regardedas an additional strategic nuclear weaponsdelivery vehicle, rather than a substitute forany existing U.S. strategic offensive nuclearweapon. This assumption is consistent with ex-isting or proposed Defense Department plans.

MX deployed on land in such modes asmultiple protective shelters (MPS), defendedMPS, defended silos, and in silos relying onlaunch under attack would continue to pro-vide the United States with hedges againstchanges in the technological environment ofstrategic forces. Any of these modes wouldl imit the effects of fai lures of American

technology encountered in the modernizationof the bomber and SLBM legs of the existingTriad. These land-based MX basing modeswould continue to provide a hedge againstSoviet defenses, and would retain the presentcharacter is t ics of U.S. st rategic offens iveforces that make it impossible for the Sovietsto pIan and execute a preemptive attackagainst them with high confidence. The land-based MX basing modes would also retainthose attributes of strategic offensive forcescommonly thought to be the strong points ofexisting ICBM forces.

Small submarine basing for the MX missilewould guard against some changes in the tech-nological environment but not against others.If the Soviet Union were to suddenly developand deploy an unexpected antisubmarine war-fare capability, it might be effective againstPoseidon and Trident submarines as well assmall submarines carrying MX missiles; there isalso a risk that problems with other U.S. sub-marine construction programs might apply to,or be exacerbated by, small submarine con-struction. Small submarines could acquiremilitary capabilities quite comparable to land-based MX deployment options. While land-based systems would be somewhat more ac-curate, OTA’S analyses do not clearly indicatethat the differences in accuracy would havemilitarily significant practical implications.

There is a controversy over whether increas-ing the importance of sea-based as opposed toland-based strategic forces would strengthenor weaken deterrence.

Air mobile MX would share a common fail-ure mode with the bomber force, but it wouldnot be targetable by Soviet ICBMS.

303


DIVERSITY AND VULNERABILITY

Maintaining three completely di f ferenttypes of strategic weapons delivery systemsover the past 20 years has provided the UnitedStates with an insurance policy of sorts againstsudden and unforeseen technological develop-ments. Diversity complicates Soviet efforts toplan and execute a preemptive attack onU.S. strategic forces with high confidence ofsuccess.

Diverse U.S. strategic forces complicateSoviet use of air defense, antiballistic missiledefense or antisubmarine warfare to preventdestruction of their homeland in the event ofan attack by the United States. Diversity inU.S. strategic forces necessitates the divisionof Soviet offensive and defensive capabilitiesamong several dist inct miss ions, therebydiluting the resources that can be applied toany one mission. The possibility of a suddenand unanticipated technological Soviet de-velopment rendering any leg of the U.S. Triadof strategic offensive forces is therefore re-duced. Even if the Soviets developed an abilityto defend themselves against one leg of theU.S. Triad, other legs could still carry out theirstrategic missions.

Hence, one criterion that might be used incomparing and contrasting various MX basingmodes is the degree to which each basingmode would provide a hedge against vulner-ability as a result of the technological change.

MX deployed in an MPS basing mode with orwithout a low altitude defense system satisfiesthis criterion, assuming that preservation oflocation uncertainty (PLU) is maintained andthe MX/MPS is deployed on such a large scalethat the Soviets lack the number of reentryvehicles (RVS) necessary to confidently attackeach MPS. Under these conditions, MX/MPSwould provide a hedge against technical prob-lems that might be experienced during themodernization of the manned aircraft and sub-marine legs of the Triad. The proliferation oftargets in the United States would make it sig-

Wllliam J Perry, The F/sea/ Year 1981 Department of DefenseProgram for Research, Development, and Acquisition (Wash-ington, D C Department of Defense, 1980), p VI-1

nificantly more difficult for the Soviets to planand execute a preemptive attack against U.S.strategic offensive forces. Timing and coor-dinating an attack against 4,600 MX shelters,approx imate ly 1 ,000 ICBM s i lo s , bomberbases, and the submarine force with high con-fidence of success would be a virtually im-possible task.

MX/MPS might share a vulnerabi l i ty toSoviet ABM systems with other U.S. ICBMS orSLBMS. However, the deployment of a largeMX/MPS system would stress Soviet defense re-sources in at least two different ways. First, theSoviets would have to invest heavily in thefractionation of their own RVS in order to ac-quire the number needed to destroy eachshelter with high confidence. Second, theSoviets would have to invest in remote sensing,clandestine sensors, and espionage if theywere to attempt to compromise PLU. The mag-nitude of these investments might make it dif-ficult for the Soviets to pursue other strategicprograms with the same vigor and commit-ment of resources possible in the absence ofMX/MPS.

Deployment of MX missiles on small sub-marines provides a hedge against some kindsof technological change. If a sudden and unan-ticipated technological development in thefield of antisubmarine warfare were to occur,and if this development were to simultaneous-ly threaten the Poseidon/Trident force as wellas the small submarine/MX force, considerablediversity in U.S. strategic forces would be lost.However, the small submarine basing mode ex-amined by OTA would add considerable di-versity to the U.S. strategic missile submarineforce. Since the nature of a sudden and unfore-seen hypothetical breakthrough in Soviet an-tisubmarine warfare capabilities cannot bepredicted, it is impossible to judge the extentto which diverse submarine types wouldcomplicate or frustrate Soviet antisubmarinewarfare.

Moreover, deployment of MX missi les onsmall submarines might not provide an ade-quate hedge against problems encountered in

Ch. n-Diversity of U.S. Strategic Forces “ 305

future U.S. submarine construction programs.Present submarine construction facil it ies inthe United States are backlogged and plaguedby management problems. ’ If these problemscannot be solved, small submarine deploy-ment of MX missiles might not be an accept-able hedge against technical problems or de-lays in the deployment of Trident submarinesin the late 1980’s. The importation of modern,proven diesel-electric submarine technologyfrom our North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) allies might provide a hedge againstcontinued problems in U.S. submarine con-struction programs.

Air mobile MX could be subjected to attackon the ground just as the manned bomber

“ ’S ta tement o f Adm Ear l Fowler , ” U S Congress , House Com-

mittee on Armed Services, Mar 12, 1981

force might be. In the absence of adequatewarning, both the bomber and air mobile MXforce could be destroyed. Air mobile MXwould hedge to some degree against improve-ments in Soviet air defenses that might jeop-ardize the effectiveness of air-launched cruisemissiles or a new penetrating bomber. It wouldstress the ability of the Soviet Union to deploya large number of SLBMS close to the con-tinental United States, a capability they do nothave today. It would not be targetable byICBMS.

Deployment of MX in silos and reliance on adoctrine of launch under attack (LUA) com-pletely fails to meet this criterion. MX/LUAwould share a common mode of failure withthe present Minuteman force that is thought tobe vulnerable to a Soviet preemptive attackshould there be a failure in warning or com-munications systems.

DIVERSITY AND WEAPONS SYSTEM CAPABILITIES

Present U.S. strategic doctrine emphasizesthe cont inuin g need for strategic offensiveforces that contribute to the deterrence of warby virtue of their diverse military capabilities.As Gen. David Jones, Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff noted in his report to the Con-gress for fiscal year 1982:

The primary purpose of U.S. strategicnuclear forces is deterrence. To insure deter-rence, these forces must be capable of ex-ecuting national strategy under all con-ditions — no matter what the challenge, nomatter what tactics an opposing force maychoose. While a force composed of a singledelivery system could be optimum in certainsituations, the United States faces an interna-tional environment of diverse threats to na-tional security. To deal effectively with thiswide range of strategic uncertainties, U.S.strategic nuclear forces are structured aroundan array of independent capabilities which canconfront any level of nuclear threat. 3

‘Cen David Jones, United States M//ltary Posture for FiscalYear 1982 (Washington, D C D e p a r t m e n t o f D e f e n s e , 1 9 8 1 ,

P 69

There is a wide range of military capabilitiesbelieved to be needed for effective deterrence.The ICBM leg of the Triad has been consideredsuperior to other legs of the Triad in several ofthese military capabilities in the past.4 Thesemilitary capabilities include the following:

●

●

●

●

●

accurate delivery of nuclear weapons (ac-curacy);the ability to carefully control the time atwhich a nuclear weapon arrives on its tar-get (time-on-target control);the ability to change targets assigned tospecific strategic nuclear weapon deliveryvehicles rapidly (rapid retargeting);the ability of strategic forces to respondquickly to attack orders (rapid response);andthe ability to use a small number of stra-tegic nuclear weapon delivery systems in aflexible, limited manner (flexible use).

“Wllllam ) Perry, The f/sea/ Year /982 Department of DefenseP r o g r a m f o r R e s e a r c h , D e v e l o p m e n t , a n d A c q u i s i t i o n ( W a s h -

ington, D C Depar tment o f Defense, 1981, p V i - l

8 3 - 4 7 7 0 - 81 - 21


Accuracy is necessary to attack targets thathave been especially designed to withstand theeffects of nuclear weapons. Such targets mightinclude missile si los, communications facil-ities, special ized industr ia l faci l i t ies, andhardened military facilities.

Time-on-target control is required to preventthe earliest arriving nuclear weapons from de-stroying subsequent weapons in a multipleweapon attack against a specific target. Time-on-target control may also be required in cer-tain attack tactics in which the destructive ef-fects of nuclear weapons are compoundedthrough use of multiple, closely spaced weap-ons against adjacent targets.

Retargeting of nuclear weapon delivery sys-tems is desired in those cases where the Presi-dent chooses an attack option from a menu ofpreplanned attack options or alternativelydecides to attack a specific target that mightnot be included in a particular attack option.The abil ity to retarget a strategic nuclearweapon delivery vehicle may also be requiredin the event that some portion of the force isdestroyed and a retaliatory attack against im-portant targets is ordered. Retargeting of sur-viving forces would be necessary to ensurethat high-priority targets would be attacked bysurviving forces.

Rapid retargeting is desired to give the Presi-dent more options as new information is pro-vided about the scope, magnitude, and appar-ent political objectives of an attack, or al-ternatively, to permit maximum flexibility inthe use of a force as it suffers attrition duringthe course of an attack against it.

Rapid response to launch orders, referred toas Emergency Action Messages, may be de-sired in order to take advantage of currentintell igence about the disposition of high-value targets. Rapid response may also bedesired in the event that an attack against U.S.forces is detected, thereby permitting thelaunch of forces prior to their destruction.

Flexibility for limited attacks may be desiredso that political decision makers can attemptto control the pace of escalation, trying to

limit the scope and magnitude of a nuclear warto a level less than all-out or cataclysmic war.

Comparison of various MX basing modesagainst these desired weapon system capa-bilities leads to the following observations.

MX deployed in an MPS mode with or with-out defense, in defended silos, or in silos rely-ing on launch under attack would retain andincrease the military capabilities of the pres-ently deployed ICBM leg of the Triad of U.S.strategic offensive forces in terms of accuracy,time-on-target control, rapid retargeting, rapidresponse, and fIexibility for Iimited attack.

Small submarine-based MX would also ex-pand the military capabilities of U.S. strategicforces and could come quite close to the land-based MX basing options. While small sub-marine based MX would not have accuracyquite as high as land-based MX, the differencebetween the two could be so small as to be oflittle practical consequence unless time-urgenthardened targets of interest in the SovietUnion were significantly more resistant to nu-clear weapon effects than currently believed.

Time-on-target control for small submarinebased MX missiles could be comparable toland-based missiles if the command and con-trol system deployed to support small sub-marine-based MX permitted communication ofinformation needed to plan and execute suchattacks.

Rapid retargeting of small submarine-basedMX missiles could be comparable to land-based missiles. Retargeting of MX missiles de-ployed on small submarines to take attrition ofthe small submarine force into account couldbe more difficult than would retargeting ofland-based MX missiles; however, attrition ofsmall submarines appears far less likely thanattrition of the land-based MX force.

Small submarine-based MX missiles couldhave response times comparable to land-basedMX if the communications systems supportingthem were properly designed and imple-mented. They would have very great flexibilityfor use in limited nuclear exchanges. Unlike

Ch. 1 l—Diversity of U.S. Strategic Forces ● 307

larger Poseidon or Trident submarines, use ofan MX missile from a small submarine wouldcompromise the location of only a small frac-tion of the MX force on station at any giventime. Were one MX used, only three additionalMX missiles would be placed in jeopardy, ascompared with 15 Poseidon missiles or 23 Tri-dent missiles in the event that one missile wereto be launched from the larger submarines. Onthe other hand, the launch of one land-basedMX missile exposes no additional missiles topossible immediate counterattack.

Air mobile and surface ship mobile MXmight not be quite as accurate as either land-based MX or small submarine-based MX mis-

DIVERSITY AND

There is a wide range of views on the dif-ferences among various basing modes for theMX missile in terms of continued maintenanceof strategic nuclear deterrence. The foIlowingdiscussion summarizes the major points ofview.

One view holds that the United States mustretain a substantial portion of its most militari-Iy capable strategic forces on the continentalUnited States in order to effectively deter theSoviet Union from initiating attacks on eitherthe United States or our al l ies . Russel l E .Dougherty, retired Commander in Chief of theStrategic Air Command, summarized this view:

attacking the MX or any other land-basedICBM located in the American heartlandforces an aggressor into the open. There canbe no ambiguity about an attack of the mag-nitude required to blunt even a small portionof the U.S. ICBM force. Such an attack wouldinvolve a very large number of ICBM warheadswith a flight time of about 30 minutes fromSoviet launch sites to U.S. targets. The at-tacker knows that the intended victim knowswith certainty and in some detail that a strikehas been launched. The attacker also is awarethat the victim has enough time to react to thisunambiguous act, and probably will. 5

‘Ru$sell E D o u g h e r t y , “ T h e M X Ml$slle system – Keystone of

a Moclern Strategic Nuclear Force, ” A E / Foreign POIICY and De-fen$e Re~ww, VOI 2, No 6, December 1980, p 7

siles. In addition, the need for aircraft carryingMX missiles to take off and reach altitude todrop missiles or surface ship carrying MX mis-siles to deploy to areas within range of land-based miss i le navigat ion aids would sub-stantially reduce their ability to exercise time-on-target control and responsiveness. Further-more, these operational requirements mightprovide the Soviets with strategic warning of apending American attack.

Surface ship mobile would provide con-siderably less flexibility for limited use, giventhat the use of one MX missile would com-promise the location of large number of un-used missiles carried aboard the surface ship.

DETERRENCE

Hence, deployment of the MX missile on landdrives up the threshold of attacks on theUnited States, r i sk ing perhaps mi l l ions ofAmerican civilian casualties, and, at least inthis view, assuring American retaliation. De-ployment of air mobile MX would have similarconsequences were the Soviets to attempt toattack this mode.

Another view holds that deployment of theMX on the continental United States is polit-ically important in the context of broader U.S.efforts to win support for NATO theater nu-clear forces modernization and promotion ofmeaningful negotiations for Mutual and Bal-anced Force Reductions in Europe.

Adherents to these views tend, therefore, tolook with disfavor on the deployment of MXmissiles on either small submarines or surfaceships arguing that retention of the currentbalance of capability among land-, sea-, andair-based legs of the Triad is essential to themaintenance of deterrence.

Others believe that the United States neednot create additional targets on the continen-tal United States with the selection of a basingmode for the MX missile. Retention of Minute-man ICBMS, bomber bases, submarine bases,and the addition of shore support facilities foreither small submarine basing of MX missiles


or surface ship mobile MX would still force the of radioactive fallout from an attack on MX/Soviets to expend a sufficiently large fraction MPS, MX/defended MPS, air mobile MX, orof its strategic forces to make clear its intent. silo-based MX. As a result deterrence could be

strengthened because the United States wouldDeployment of MX missi les at sea, it is be better able to exercise escalation control

argued, reduces the amount of damage that with less of its population at risk as a result ofmight be done to the United States as a result the MX basing at sea.

Chapter 12

ARMS CONTROL CONSIDERATIONSAND MX BASING OPTIONS

.

Chapter 12.—ARMS CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS ANDMX BASING OPTIONS

Page

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .311Basing Modes Inconsistent With Arms Control Agreements in Force . .......312

ABMTreaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .312OuterSpaceTreaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312SeabedTreaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312

OtherArms Control Agreements in Force Affecting MX Basing Decisions .. ...313Limited NuclearTest Ban Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . 313SALT I Agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 3

lmpactofSALTllonMX Basing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315O t h e r P e n d i n g A r m s C o n t r o l A g r e e m e n t s A f f e c t i n g M X B a s i n g . 3 1 8Future ArmsControl Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . .,319ArmsControl and Stability . . . . )22

Chapter 12

ARMS CONTROL CONSIDERATIONSAND MX BASING OPTIONS

OVERVIEW

This chapter discusses several ways in whicharms control considerations bear on the choiceof a basing mode for the MX missile. Theseinclude the impact of arms control agreementsin force, the impact of agreements signed butnot yet ratified, and the possible impact ofvarious MX basing modes on future arms con-trol negotiations. *

The 1972 ABM Limitation Treaty would pro-hibit the deployment of MX missiles in anymode defended by an antiball istic missi le(ABM) system unless such deployments oc-curred with in the Grand Forks , N. Dak. ,Minuteman field. The Treaty would also pro-hibit the deployment of ABM systems thatwere not of a type explicitly permitted by Arti-cle I II.

The Seabed Arms Control Treaty wouldprohibit deployment of MX missiles in fixedshelters on the seabed floor or on any seabed-mobile platform. The Outer Space Treatypresently in force and the proposed SALT IITreaty would prohibit deployment of MX mis-siles in any mode which launched nuclearweapons into Earth orbit. None of these basingmodes appears attractive at this time.

Other arms control agreements either inforce or still awaiting ratification would permitmost MX basing modes. The proposed SALT IITreaty would prohibit deployment of surfaceship mobile based MX as well as inland water-way variants of surface ships, submarines, ordeployment on the bottom of lakes, rivers,canals, or other inland waterways. The SALT I

‘This dl~cusslon IS restricted to an assessment of the arms con-trol Impllcat}ons of basing mode options only For a detailedanalysts of the arms control Impllcatlons of the MX mlsslle Itself,see “ ICBM Programs, ” In U S Congress, House Committee onF o r e i g n Affairs and Senate C o m m i t t e e o n F o r e i g n Relatlons,

FIJca/ Year /982 Amr$ Control Impact Statements (Washington,D C U S Government Prlntlng Off Ice, 1981), pp 26-71, passlm

Treaty would not prohibit other basing modesassessed in this study if deployments could bemade in a manner that would permit verifica-tion, through use of national technical means,of U.S. compliance with the terms of the Trea-ty were it in effect.

Minuteman III rebasing in a multiple pro-tective shelter (MPS) mode could be under-taken if the SALT II Treaty limits were still ineffect after 1985; however, the Iimits on thetotal number of MlRVed bal l i s t ic miss i leswould, if sti l l in effect, prevent the UnitedStates from deploying an economical mix ofmissiles and shelters for Minuteman IIl/MPS tokeep pace with plausible Soviet theats unlessthe number o f U . S . submar ine- launchedballistic missiles (SLBMS) armed with multipleindependently targetable reentry vehicles(Ml RVS) deployed were decreased.

The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty that ispresently in force, and the 1974 ThresholdNuclear Test Ban and the 1976 Peaceful Nu-clear Explosions Treaties that are signed butstill awaiting U.S. ratification, contain provi-sions that limit the ability of the United Statesand the Soviet Union to conduct nuclearweapons explosions useful in generating em-pirical data that would be helpful in designingboth basing modes and attack strategiesagainst them.

Most basing modes for the MX missile poserelatively few future arms control negotiatingproblems. MPS basing for MX and MinutemanIII raises serious negotiating problems becausea very high premium is placed on limiting thenumber of RVS the Soviets can deploy onintercontinental balI istic miss i les ( ICBMS).MPS also would compel arms control nego-tiators to specify procedures for verification ata level of detail not successfully negotiated inearl ier arms control negotiations.

311


BASING MODES INCONSISTENT WITHARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IN FORCE

Most basing modes considered for the MXmissi le are not prohibited by arms controlagreements currently in force. However, threetreaties contain specific provisions that wouldbe contravened by some basing modes for theMX missile.

ABM Treaty

As noted in chapter 3 the 1972 ABM Limita-tion Treaty prohibits widespread ABM deploy-ment to defend MX missi les in any basingmode. In addition, it also constrains deploy-ment of a limited ABM system in numbers ofradars, ABM launchers, and ABM interceptormissiles and restricts such deployment to thevicinity of the Grand Forks, N. Dak., Air ForceBase.

Outer Space Treaty

Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treatyprovides:

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not toplace in orbit around the Earth any objectscarrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds ofweapons of mass destruction, install suchweapons on celestial bodies, or station suchweapons in outer space in any manner.

This prohibition would be a legal barrier to anydeployment of MX missiles that were used tolaunch nuclear weapons into Earth orbit underany circumstances. *

There are major technical obstacles to thedeployment of mil itari ly effective nuclearweapons aboard Earth-orbiting platforms.These obstacles include accurate delivery of anuclear weapon to a fixed point on the Earthand maintenance of adequate command andcontrol over an orbiting platform during a nu-

“’Outer Space Treaty, ” in U.S Arms Control and Disarma-ment Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, 1980Edition (Washington, D C U S. Government Printing Office,1980), p 52 Cited below as Arms Contro/ Agreements.

*A similar obligation IS found in the proposed SALT I I Treaty.

clear conflict. Launching nuclear weapons intoorbit cannot now be regarded as a technicallyattractive basing mode for the MX missile.

Seabed Treaty

A third arms control treaty containing pro-visions that would rule out a basing mode thatis technically feasible is the 1971 Seabed ArmsControl Treaty. Article 1 provides:

1. The States Parties to this Treatyundertake not to emplant or emplace on theseabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoilthereof beyond the outer limit of a seabedzone, as defined in Article 11, any nuclearweapons or any other types of weapons ofmass destruction as well as structures,launching installations or any other facilitiesdesigned for storing, testing or using suchweapons. 2

This provision would prohibit the deploymentof MX miss i les on var ious platforms thatcrawled along the seabed floor, in silos dugin to the ocean f loo r , o r i n o the r f i xedstructures attached to the ocean floor.

Mobile platforms that crawled along theseabed floor would be detectable with variousunderwater remote-sensing equipment. Likeother large land-mobile systems, seabed crawl-ing platforms would not be fast enough toescape a determined effort to barrage attacktheir last known positions. While the oceanwould provide some degree of protection fromsome nuclear weapon effects, seabed crawlerscarrying MX missiles would nevertheless bevulnerable to nuclear weapons attack. Fixedshelters or si los dug into the seabed floorwouId have similar vulnerabiIities.

Moreover, there would be many compli-cated, expensive, and technically challengingoperational problems to be met before such asystem could be deemed a technically feasible

“’Seabed Arms Control Treaty, ” In Arm\ Contro/ A~reempnt$

p 102

Ch. 12—Arms Control Considerations and MX Basing Options ● 313

basing mode for the MX missile. Hence, it does Treaty prohibits the deployment of the MXnot appear that the Seabed Arms Control missile in any attractive basing mode.

OTHER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IN FORCEAFFECTING MX BASING DECISIONS

Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

The 1962 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treatyprohibits the detonation of nuclear explosivedevices in the atmosphere, under water, and inouterspace. 3 These l imitat ions on nuclearweapons testing prevent the United States orthe Soviet Union from conducting nuclearexplosions that could generate empirical dataabout nuclear weapons effects that might beneeded to resolve major technical un-certainties in areas such as the following: thehardness of vertical and horizontal protectiveshelters; nuclear weapon effects on aircraft,surface ships, and submarines, or other vehi-cles used to carry MX missiles; the effects ofnearby nuclear detonations on ABM systemsand components; nuclear weapons effects oncommunications during and immediately afteran attack; the effects of multiple nuclearweapon detonations in close proximity to asmall number of protective shelters; and thedevelopment of strategies and tactics toattack or to defeat an attack on M X / M P Sdeployments. However, the amount of tech-nical risk for each basing mode introduced bythe lack of atmospheric nuclear weapons testdata is relatively minor in comparison withtechnical risk created by other factors.

SALT I Agreements

The SALT I Agreements of 1972 contain sev-eral provisions that might affect MX basingdecisions. The SALT I Agreements consist oftwo separate agreements: The 1972 ABMLimitation Treaty previously discussed, andthe Interim Agreement on Strategic OffensiveForces. ’ The Interim Agreement on Strategic

‘“L Imited Test Ban Treaty, ” art I In Ibid , p 424 “ I nterlm Agrtwrnent on Strategic Of fen\lve Arms, ” In Iblcj ,

p p 1 5 0 1 5 7

Offensive Forces, however, was an ExecutiveAgreement and was affirmatively endorsed bythe House of Representatives and the Senatepursuant to section 33 of the Arms Control andDisarmament Act of 1961. It set limits on thenumbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers that theUnited States and the Soviet Union could de-ploy for the period May 1972 through October1977, When it expired, both the U.S. and theSoviet Governments indicated that pendingthe completion of negotiations for a SALT IITreaty, they would continue to abide by theterms of the Interim Agreement unless or untilthe other party to that agreement undertookan action that was inconsistent with the termsof that agreement. 5b

Article I of the Interim Agreement prohibitsthe construction of additional fixed land-basedICBM launchers after July 1, 1972.7 Hence ifthe Interim Agreement were still de facto ineffect when the MX was to be deployed, MXbasing in silos would be limited to modifiedMinuteman silos rather than new ones.

5“Statement by Secretary of State Vance United States IntentRegarding the SALT I Interim Agreement, September 23, 1977, ”In U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents onDisarmament, 1977 (Washington, D C U S Government PrintingOff Ice, 1979), pp 577-578

Secretary of State Vance Issued the following statementI n order to m a Int aln the status quo w h I Ie SA I T I I negot I at Ions are

being completed, the United States de{ Iares lt~ Intent Ion not to takeany action Inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreementon certain measures with re~pect to the I Imltatlon of ~trateglc of fen-SIVe arms which expire~ 0[ tober 3, 1977, and with the goals of theseongoing negotlatlon~ provided the Soviet Un Ion exercises similarrestraint

“’Statement by the Soviet Union Intent Regarding the SALTInterim Agreement, Sept 24, 1977, ” Ibid , p 578

I n ac( ordance with the reacflness expressed by both $Icfes to com-plete a new agreement Ilmltlng ~trateglc offensl~ e arms and In the in-terests of malntatnlng the status quo whl Ie the talks on the newagreement are being cone Iuded, the Soviet Unton expresses Its lnten-tton to keep from anv a( tlons [compat ib le wtth the prov is ions ofthe Interim agreement on some measures pertaining to the Ilmltat Ionot >trateglc offensive arms which expires on October 3, 1977, andw It h the goa Is ot the ta Iks that are being conducted, provided thatthe U nlted States of America show~ the same restraint

7 “ Interim Agreement, ” In Arms Contro/ Agreements, p 150


Modernization of SLBM platforms is specifi-cally permitted under article IV of the InterimAgreement, so deployment of both the Tridentsubmarine and small submarines armed withMX missiles would be allowed were the termsof the Interim Agreement still being observedat the time MX deployment was made.8

During the final hours of the SALT I nego-tiations, Department of Defense (DOD) Repre-sentat i ve Pau l N i t ze spoke fo r the U .S .Government on the question of land-mobileICBMS. Nitze said:

In connection with the important subject ofland-mobile ICBM launchers, in the interest ofconcluding the Interim Agreement the U.S.Delegation now withdraws its proposal thatArticle I or an agreed statement explicitlyprohibit the deployment of mobile land-basedICBM launchers. I have been instructed toinform you that while agreeing to defer thequestion of limitation of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers to the subsequentnegotiations on more complete I imitations onstrategic offensive arms, the U.S. wouldconsider the deployment of operational landmobile ICBM launchers during the period ofthe Interim Agreement as inconsistent with theobjectives of that Agreement.9

The purpose of this statement was to warn theSoviet union that the united States would con-sider the deployment of the SS-16 in its mobilemode to be legitimate grounds for terminatingthe Interim Agreement. It was not intended topreclude U.S. deployment of a mobile ICBM atsome future point in time if agreement onmeasures to ensure adequate verification of aSALT treaty limiting offensive forces could benegotiated.

The Protocol to the Interim Agreement lim-its to 710 the number of SLBM launchers per-mitted for the United States. The Protocol fur-ther provided that both the United States andthe Soviet Union could exchange retir ing

‘Ibid , p 151“’Unitateral Statement [B]: Land-Mobile ICBM Launchers, ”

Ibid , p 156

ICBMS dep loyed pr io r to 1964 fo r newSLBMs. ’O However, President Nixon informedthe Soviet Government that the United Stateswould not exercise its right under the provi-sions of Article 11 I of the Protocol to convertolder ICBMs into newer SLBM launchers.

The number of SLBM launchers deployed bythe United States would exceed 710 if de-ployment of MX missiles on small submarineswere to take place, the 31 SSBNS built in the1960’s armed with Poseidon and Tr identmissiles were retained in the fleet, and morethan nine Trident submarines were to bedeployed simultaneously. A judgment on thestrategic uti l ity of continuing into the late1980’s and 1990’s to adhere to the terms of the1972 Interim Agreement on Strategic Offen-sive Forces would require considerable tech-nical and political analysis as the number ofdeployed MX missiles on small submarines, Tri-dent submarines, and remaining Poseidon sub-marines approached the limit of the InterimAgreement.

The second component of the SALT I Agree-ments relating to MX basing is the 1972 ABMLimitation Treaty discussed in chapter 3. TheABM Limitation Treaty prohibits the deploy-ment of the LoADS ABM system or the presentconcept of an Overlay ABM to defend MX mis-siles deployed either in MPS or in silos. It alsoprohibits the deployment of Soviet defensesthat in turn might substantially increase theneed for larger numbers of U.S. strategicweapons carried aboard both ICBMS andSLBMS. The value of deploying MX in anymode protected by any ABM system must beweighed against the uncertainties in U.S. stra-tegic planning and increases in strategic forcesrequirements that might be introduced withthe deployment of a Soviet ABM system.

‘“’’ Protocol to the Interim Agreement, ” in ibid , p. 154‘ ‘The evolution of the limits on the number of modern sub-

marine launched ballistic missile launchers in the SALT I in-terim Agreement Protocol are discussed In great detail In GerardC Smith’s book, Doubletalk: The Story of SALT (Garden City,N Y Doubleday, 1980) See especially pp 393-397 and p 428


IMPACT OF SALT II ON MX BASING

The SALT II Treaty, signed June 18, 1979, inVienna, Austria, would substantially affect MXbasing options were the Treaty to be ratifiedand were its terms to remain in effect beyondDecember 31, 1985. The Treaty was intendedto limit equally the total number of strategicnuclear weapons delivery vehicles in thearsenals of the United States and the SovietUnion, to place an upper limit on the totalnumber of nuclear weapons carried by ICBMS,SLBMS, and long-range bombers equipped withcruise mi s s i le s , o r air-to-surf ace ballisticmissiles, and to inhibit the development ofnew types of ICBMS. It was also intended tobuild confidence in the ability of the two na-tions to coexist without fear of an unremittingstrategic arms race by providing for an ex-change of data on strategic nuclear weapons,establishing rules for the monitoring of eachother’s compliance with the terms of the trea-ty, exchanging information on certain ac-tivities that might be ambiguous, and continu-ing the negotiating process leading to one ormore subsequent Strategic Arms LimitationAgreements. 2

The Treaty was submitted to the Senate onJune 22, 1979, where extensive hearings wereheld by both the Committee on Foreign Rela-tions and the Committee on Armed Services.Before the Senate could take up the report ofthe Foreign Relations Committee on the pro-posed ratification of the Treaty, the SovietUnion invaded Afghanistan and President Car-ter formally requested the Senate on January3, 1980, to defer further action on the Treaty.The President said in his letter to SenatorRobert Byrd:

In light of the Soviet invasion of Afghan-istan, I request that you delay consideration ofthe SALT I I Treaty on the Senate floor.

The purpose of this request is not to with-draw the Treaty from consideration, but to de-

fer debate so that Congress and I as Presidentcan assess Soviet actions and intentions, anddevote our primary attention to the legislativeand other measures required to respond to thiscrisis.

The United States has signed the Treaty, ashas the Soviet Union; however, the SovietUnion has not ratif ied the Treaty, and hasstated that it will not do so until the UnitedStates indicates whether or not it will completethe ratification process as is required by theU.S. Constitution. The United States has notcompleted ratif ication of the Treaty, sincetwo-thirds of the Senate has not given its ad-vice and consent to do so.

During this period between signature of theTreaty and either its ratification or rejection,common understanding of international lawrequires the United States to take no action in-tended to defeat the purposes for which theSALT II Treaty was negotiated.14 The Reaganadministration has publicly taken the positionthat it does not believe itself bound by thelimits of the agreement pending completion ofa careful review of the Treaty. 15 Nevertheless,the United States has observed those provi-sions of the Treaty imposing quantitative andqualitative limitations on American strategicnuclear forces.


There are several provisions of the proposedSALT II Treaty that would affect the deploy-ment of the MX were the terms of the Treaty inforce in 1986 or beyond. Some of the Treatyprovisions affect basing modes directly; otherprovisions of the Treaty might affect thetesting, operation, or cost of MX deployment,or might require design changes in variousbasing modes to facil itate monitoring thedeployment of mobile ICBMS for compliancewith the terms of the Treaty.

Four basing modes would be explicitly pro-hibited under terms of the SALT I I Treaty werethe Treaty in force when the MX would bedeployed:

.

2.

3.

4.

Deployment of MX missiles in new, fixedICBM silos would be prohibited underprovisions of article IV. Surface ship mobile deployment of MXmissiles would be prohibited under provi-sions of article IX. 7

Deployment of MX miss i les on in landwaterways, lakes, or the bottoms thereofwould be prohibited under provisions ofarticle IX. Deployment of MX missiles in any basingmode to launch nuclear weapons intoEarth orbit would be prohibited underprovisions of article IX.

Article II of the Treaty defines ICBM launch-ers countable under the Treaty. MX research,development, and test launchers must beunique to the MX missiles unless the UnitedStates would be willing to have less capablemissiles and their launchers counted under theSALT I I l im i t s . ’ ” Fo r example , mob i le in -termediate range ballistic missiles would becountable under the SALT I I Treaty limits ifthey were tested from MX development fa-cilities or MX deployment sites.

Deployment of MX missiles by backfittingthem into existing Minuteman silos would bepermitted under terms of the SALT II Treaty,

1“’SALT I I Treaty, ” art IV, In Arms Control Agreements, p 215.“Art IX, clause l(a), ibid , p 225“Art IX, clause l(b), Ibid‘9Art IX, clause l(c), ibid‘“Art 11, Ibid , pp 208-214

even i f ex is t ing Minuteman s i los requi redmodification to support the larger MX mis-sile. 2’ Deployment of MX missiles to Minute-man II silos would, however, by definition in-crease the number of Ml RV-countable launch-ers, thereby bringing the United States closerto or even exceeding the allowed number ofMIRVed ballistic missiles under provisions ofthe Treaty. 22

While the SALT I I Treaty permits moderniza-tion and improvements of ICBMS and theirlaunchers, there is disagreement between theUnited States and the Soviet Union as towhether or not multiple protective sheltersconstitute fixed ICBM launchers within thecontext of article IV.

The Soviet position is that multiple protec-tive shelters are but one form of fixed ICBMlaunchers. ”

The U.S. position is that so long as the multi-ple protective shelter cannot launch an MXmiss i le without the aid of an associatedlauncher that contains launch support equip-ment including power supplies, environmentalcontrol equipment, communications equip-ment, and other missile support equipment,the shelters would not meet the definition of afixed ICBM launcher found in article 11 of theTreaty. MPS basing for MX would therefore bepermitted were the SALT I I Treaty in forcewhen the MX was deployed. 24

Article XV of the Treaty requires that anydeployment of the MX missile be made in amanner that would permit the unimpeded useof technical means of verification to monitorU.S. compliance with the provisions of the

“Art IV, ibid , pp 214-215“Art V, Ibid , pp 220-221“The Soviet position on MPS deployment for the MX or Min-

uteman missiles IS described by Strobe Talbott, in “Keeping theOptions Open, ” Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT // (New YorkHarper & Row, 1979, 1980), p 162-173, on the basis of Interviewswith senior U S officials Authoritative unclassified discussion ofthe Soviet position on this issue is presented in, U.S CongressSenate Committee on Foreign Relations, SALT // Treaty (Wash-ington, D C U S Government Prlntlng Office, 1979), Part 4, pp433-437 and Part 5, pp 278-280, 291, 301-302

*“lbld , see also, “Statement of Ambassador Ralph Earle, ” inU.S Congress, Senate Foreign Relatlons Committee, Ibid , pt 4,pp 436


ployment sometime in the future may m a k ethe distinction between horizontal and verticalshelters significant.

Rebasing Minuteman Ill missiles in an MPSmode would be constrained were the terms ofthe SALT Ii Treaty in force in 1986 when suchdeployments could begin. The number of Min-uteman I I I missiles that could be deployedwould be limited under terms of article V suchthat the total number of ICBMS and SLBMSequipped with MIRVS could not exceed 1,200,and the total number of bombers equippedwith air-launched cruise missiIes, MIRVedICBMS, and MIRVed SLBMS could not exceed1,320.26 DOD has proposed to deploy up to 172B-52 aircraft equipped with air-launched cruisemissiIes,27 and as many as 760 MIRVed SLBMSin the late 1980’s,28 leaving room for only 388MIRVed ICBMS under the proposed ceiling onaggregate number of MIRVed strategic nucleardelivery vehicles in the SALT II Treaty.

Rebasing of Minuteman Il l missi les couldtherefore disrupt current plans to deploy afleet of MIRVed Poseidon and Trident SLBMS,B-52 bombers equipped with air-launchedcruise missiles, and retention of the presentMinuteman Ill force. Furthermore, the smallnumber of missiles that could be deployedwithin the SALT 1I Treaty limits were they inforce beyond 1985 would constrain a Minute-man I I l/MPS system to a MX of Minuteman IIImissi les and shelters that would cost con-siderably more than the optimal mix.

Quest ions on status of vert ical sheltersnoted above in connection with MX/MPSwould also require resolution for rebasing ofMinuteman I I I miss i les . Ver i f icat ion i ssuesarising in connection with MX/MPS would alsoarise in the case of rebasing of the MinutemanIII missiles in an MPS mode.

Other basing modes for the MX not explicit-ly prohibited by the SALT II Treaty do not ap-pear to be as stressful to the monitoringcapabilities of either the United States or the

—


Soviet Union as MX or Minuteman Ill deployedin an MPS mode. Silo basing, with or withoutdefense, can be monitored readily by nationaltechnical means in the same manner that cur-rent deployments of MIRVed ICBMS are moni-tored. Air-mobile basing of MX could be moni-tored through national technical means just aspresent bomber deployments are monitored.In addition, air-mobile deployment of MX ifundertaken within the terms of the SALT I ITreaty would require the use of aircraft withFunctionally Related Observable Differences(FRODS). Such measures might include the useof specifically designed aircraft unique to theair-mobile MX mission or the structural modi-fication of other aircraft of similar types to aidin their identification as MX missile launchingplatforms through use of national technicalmeans of verification. These measures wouldfacilitate counting the MX-carrying aircraftand missiles under the aggregate Iimits on stra-tegic nuclear delivery vehicles and the MI RV-ed ICBM sublimits.

OTHER PENDING ARMSAFFECTING

Like the 1962 Partial Test Ban Treaty, the1976 Threshold Nuclear Test Ban Treaty andthe 1978 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treatydo not directly limit any MX basing decision.These two treaties, still awaiting U.S. ratifica-tion, nevertheless impose limits on certain U.S.Government activities that in turn affect re-search and development activities related toMX basing issues.

The Threshold Nuclear Test Ban Treatylimits the yield of underground nuclear explo-sions to not more than 150 kilotons. 29 I n so do-ing, it limits the ability of the United States toconduct reseach and development on thestructural hardness and resistance to nucleareffects of MPS horizontal and vertical struc-tures, command and control systems, com-mand post structures, and vehicles. The Peace-

-“’’’Threshold Test Ban Treaty, ” In Arms CorJtrO/ Agreements,pp 167-170

Small submarine basing for the MX missilecould be verified relying on the techniques andtechnologies presently used to count deployedSLBMS.

The SALT II Treaty, were it ratified, wouldhave some effect on the MX basing mode deci-sion, ruling out new ICBM silo basing, surfaceship mobile basing, inland waterway basing,and orbital bombardment systems on legalgrounds. Other basing modes for the MX mis-sile would be permitted, and with the excep-tion of MPS basing for MX or Minuteman Illappear to present few technical challenges tothe capabilities of either the United States orthe Soviet Union to adequately verify eachother’s compliance with terms of the proposedSALT I I Treaty were the Treaty still in force inthe per iod 1986 through the 1990’s andbeyond.

CONTROL AGREEMENTSMX BASING

ful Nuclear Explosions Treaty limits nuclear ex-plosions for peaceful purposes to a yield of150 kilotons. It also imposes certain additionallimitations on the instrumentation of such ex-plosions intended to reduce the likelihood thata peaceful nuclear explosion might be used tohide either nuclear weapons development ac-tivities or tests for various nuclear weapon ef-fects. 30 Hence, these two treaties, like the Par-tial Test Ban Treaty, iimit to some degree theability of the United States to test the hardnessof various MX basing modes to the nuclear ef-fects environment in which they might be re-quired to operate.

It is important to note, however, that theunderground nuclear testing program con-ducted by the U.S. Government in recentyears, chemical explosion simulation tests,other dynamic stress tests, nondestructive

“’’’Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, ” Ibid , pp 173-189

Ch. 12—Arms Control Considerations and MX Basing Options 319

tests, and simulations have provided a wealth MX development, there is widespread confi-of data necessary to design the MX missile and dence in the ability of the missile to be builtvarious possible basing modes for it. As a and operated within the design specifications.resu

It

t of “this vigorous test program related to

FUTURE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

IS very difficult to predict confidently thefuture course of international arms controlnegotiations. T h e r e c e n t h i s t o r y o f t h eStrategic Arms Limitation Talks between theUnited States and the Soviet Union serves to il-lustrate the multiple technical and politicalproblems confronting would-be arms controlnegotiators. ‘

However, both the United States and theSoviet Union, despite obvious difficulties inbringing the SALT I I Treaty into force, havestated their continuing hope for eventualresumption of arms control negotiations. Dur-ing ceremonies welcoming Chancellor HelmutSchmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany,President Reagan reaffirmed the commitmentof the United States to negotiations leading tothe reduction of arms in Europe within theSALT f ramework. The Pres ident promised“meaningful negotiations as to Iimit those veryweapon s.”

The Soviets too have expressed their con-tinuing desire for a resumption of arms controlnegotiations. For example, Leon id Brezhnev,General Secretary of the Communist Party of

“See tor example, te~tlmony of various publlc officials andprivate witnesses on the pro; and cons of the ratlflcatlon of theSAL T II Treaty In U S Congress, Senate Committee on ForeignRelatlons, ‘5AL T II Treaty, Volumes f Through 5 (Washington,D C U S Government Prlntlng Off Ice, 1979), U S Congress, Sen-ate Comm Ittee on Armed Services, M1/ltary /mp/icatlons of theSAL T // [reaty, Vo/umes I Through 6 (Washington, D C U SGovernment Prlntlng Off Ice, 1979) See also Strobe Talbott, opclt , Robert P La brie, SALT HandbooL’ Key Documents and/$51)e$, 1971- /979 (Washington, D C American Enterprise ln-stltute, 1979) For an Intere\tlng account of Soviet views on theproblems of negotiating SALT, see Samual B Payne, Jr , The$o~ let Union and SALT (Cambridge, Mass MIT Press, 1980)

““Vlslt of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republlcof Germany, ” w eehly Cornp//at/on of Prestdentla/ Documents,VOI 17, No 21 (May 25, 1981), p 547 The commitment of theUnited State~ to renew arms control efforts was made by Sec-retary Halg to the NATO Foreign Mlnlsters during hls speech ofMay 4, 1981 See John M Coshko, “ Halg Tells NATO of NewPlan for Talk$ With Soviets, ” Lt a$hlngton Post, May 5, 1981

the Soviet Union, in speaking to the 26th Con-gress of the Party, said:

We once more issue an urgent appeal for re-straint in the sphere of strategic armaments.The peoples of the world must not be allowedto live under the threat of a nuclear war beingunleashed. The I imitation of strategic armsand their reduction is an extraordinary prob-lem. On our part, we are ready to continuewithout delay appropriate talks with theUnited States of America while preservingeverything positive that has been achieved upto now in this sphere.

The interest of both the United States andthe Soviet Union in continuing their bilateraldialog on arms control suggests a need tounderstand better the impact of the MX basingdecision on some of the problems arms controlnegotiators may face in the future.

MX missiles deployed in silos, on small sub-marines, or in an air mobile mode present fewnew arms control negotiating problems. Thesebasing modes are either extensions of existingbasing modes for strategic nuclear weaponsdelivery vehicles (SNDVS) or have been previ-ously considered during the Strategic ArmsLimitation Talks. * As a result there appear tobe few new or unique arms control negotiatingor verification problems associated with thesebasing modes. Extension of past arms controlnegotiating and verification practices wouldenable both the United States and the SovietUnion to conclude an arms control agreement

) “’Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress, Volume 1 Brezh-nev Report, ” [n Foreign Broadca$t Publication Ser;ice, Dal/yReport Soviet Union, VOI I I 1, No 36, Supplement 1, Feb 24,1981, p 20

‘Air-to-surface balllstlc mls$iles and the atrcraft carrying themwould be a permitted MX basing mode were SALT I I In effect Inthe late 1980’s provided the mlsslles were not tested before theexpiration of the Protocol to the SALT I I Treaty on Dec 31, 1981,and that the aircraft carrying the mlsslles were equipped withFRODS to fac II It ate verlf Icatlon


permitting deployment of the MX missile inone or more of these modes which would stillbe verifiable using national technical means.

Surface ship mobile deployment of the MXmissile, as noted earlier, is prohibited by theterms of the SALT I I Treaty because no for-mula could be negotiated to permit adequateverification without reducing surface shipmobile ICBM survivability to an unacceptablelevel. The principal arms control negotiatingproblem is the development of a formula per-mitting deployment of surface ship mobile MXin a relatively survivable manner on the onehand, and adequate verification of the numberof missiles so deployed on the other. U.S. de-ployment of a surface ship mobile MX wouldestablish a precedent for Soviet deployment ofa comparable system. However, the UnitedStates would want to be certain that the abilityto count the number of Soviet surface shipmobile ICBMS would not be unduly hinderedshould the Soviets opt for a mobile ICBMdeployed in that mode at some time in thefuture. The problem from a weapon systemsurvivabil ity perspective is that steps thatmight be taken to faciIitate arms control agree-ment verification rapidly reduce the surviva-bility of surface ship mobile based ICBMS (seech. 7 of this report).

Deployment of MX missiles on surface shipplatforms equipped with FRODS to aid veri-fication of an arms control agreement wouldfacilitate detection, identification, and main-tenance of trail at sea, thereby reducing sur-vivability to a very low rate. Limiting areas ofsurface ship mobile operation would facilitatecounting the vessels, but would also permit theSoviets to concentrate their antisurface war-fare-monitoring assets on the general areas ofdeployment, thereby reducing the long-termsurvivability of the surface ship platforms.

MX missiles deployed in an MPS mode withor without defense would radically alter thearms control negotiating environment.

The number of ICBMS deployed in fixedsilos cannot be readily augmented withoutconsiderable testing of alternative means for

launching missiles. The time consumed andthe highly visible activities involved in the con-struction of ICBM silos make it highly unlikelythat such silos could be deployed in largenumbers without being detected by nationaltechnical means of arms control agreementverification. Other techniques for launchingICBMS might be developed that would go un-not iced, but such techn iques cou ld bedetected when and if extensive testing were tooccur.

Uncertainty about the possibility of detect-ing a clandestine deployment of ICBMS makesit difficult for either the United States or theSoviet Union to justify the risks of clandestineICBM deployment unless such a deploymentcould be large enough to make a significantdifference in the strategic balance. While judg-ments as to the number of clandestinely de-ployed ICBms or RVS will vary among analysts,t h e t h r e s h o l d f o r strategic significancediminishes quickly as the number of ICBMSand/or RVS permitted decreases.

MPS deployment by the Soviets for a futureland-mobile ICBM might create a situation inwhich they would find it relatively easy toeither openly abrogate or clandestinely violateon arms control treaty limiting the number ofland-mobile ICBMS deployed. An MPS systemwould deploy an entire infrastructure of mis-sile shelters, command and control systems,transportation systems maintenance facilities,personnel, and other resources needed to sup-port any mobi le ICBM. Rapid, overt de-ployment of stockpiled missiles (“breakout”)in excess of future treaty limitations in a sud-den, open act of treaty abrogation might there-fore be an attractive, relatively low cost optionfor increasing Soviet strategic forces.

The existence of the MPS infrastructuremight also encourage clandestine attempts todeploy excess land-mobile ICBMS. Such de-ployments could be especially difficult to de-tect after they had occurred, and MPS deploy-ment of land mobile ICBMS might lead to asituation in which it would not be possible toadequately verify violation of an arms controlagreement.

Ch 12—Arms Control Consideration and MX Basing Options ● 321

MX/MPS creates an unprecedented need forfuture arms control agreements to specifycooperative measures for verifying the numberof mobile ICBMS deployed by either side. Thissubject raises serious negotiating problems, aseach procedure related to the verification ofthe number of MX missiles deployed by theUnited States must be designed with a hypo-thetical Soviet mobile ICBM in mind as well.Furthermore, a series of procedures, useful forverification purposes but perhaps not essen-tial, would have to be included in order to en-sure that those procedures essential for pur-poses of counting the number of large, landmobile IC BMs deployed by either side emergefrom the negotiating process.

MX deployed in an MPS mode would furthercomplicate the process of strategic arms con-trol negotiation limitation by placing a veryhigh value on Soviet agreement to an RV limi-tat ion Previous SALT negotiations have at-tempted to balance specific United States andSoviet advantages in various areas of strategicweapons and Strategic nucIear weapon de-Iivery systems in order to conclude an agree-ment that was baIanced need WhiIe views differ onthe degree of success U S and Soviet nego-tiators have had in attempting to reach a bal -anced agreement, M X M P S would further com -plicate the negotiating process The great sen-sitivity of the MX,’MPS survivabiIity to the

numbers of Soviet RVS and the potentiaIgrowth in the Soviet RV inventory coupledwith the great cost of the United States MPSsystem wouId put Soviet arms control nego-tiators in a very strong negotiating position Anagreement Iimiting the number of Soviet RVSnow or in the future would enable the UnitedStates to plan and budget for MX/MPS; theSoviets could therefore use their willingness toagree to RVI i m i tat ions as a ‘‘bargaining chip’to persuade the United States to agree to otherIimitations on strategic weapons of keen in-terest to the Soviets

MX, MPS also complicates arms controlnegotiations by making it much more difficultto accept any agreement that would freezestrategic force modernization efforts unlesssuch a freeze were absolute. The sensitivity ofMX/MPS survivability to the number of RVS de-

83-477 0 - 81 - 22

ployed by the Soviets would require the UnitedStates to take a position that in essence re-quired the Soviets to stop all construction anddeployment of systems not operational as of acertain date even though MPS constructionwould have to continue until the number ofshelters built exceeded the number of threat-ening Soviet RVS. Failure to obtain this kind ofcutoff of new deployments wouId jeopardizethe survivability of MX missiles deployed in anMPS mode.

Minuteman I I I rebased in a n M P s m o d ewouId simiIarly complicate future arms con-trol negotiations. Rebasing of Minuteman I I Iwould be as sensitive to the number of SovietRVS deployed as would be MX/MPS deploy-ment; the relative bargaining leverage gainedby the Soviets for MX/MPS would also begained with Minuteman I I l/MPS. Cooperativemeasures for verifying U.S. compliance with alimitation on the number of mobile, relativelysmall ICBMS would also have to be negotiated,again on the premise that U.S. deployment of amobile ICBM would at some point be matchedby a similar but not necessarily identicalSoviet mobile ICBM deployment.

As a result, MX/MPS and Minuteman III/MPSwould create a need for arms control negotia-tions to become ever more deeply and inti-mately involved in the specification of detail-ed procedures of weapon system deploymentand peacetime operation.

Defended MX/MPS would add the greatuncertainties associated with the reopening ofdiscussions on ABM system limitations to theother negot iat ing problems noted above.While the present ABM Treaty seriously in-hibits development, testing, and deploymentof the LoADS ABM system, it equally inhibitsdevelopment and deployment of Soviet ABMsystems. Were the Soviets to be ret ieved of thislegal inhibition, they might well deploy anABM system that would affect the ability ofU.S. ICBM and SLBM RVS to successfully at-tack Soviet targets, generating requirementsfor signif icant ly largerstrategic forces. The greatduced in calculating thedeveloping requirements

n u m b e r s o f U . S .uncertainties intro-strategic balance,

for U.S. strategic


forces, and procuring the necessary forces tional increment of survivability that a LoADSwould have to be weighed against the addi- ABM might provide the MX.

ARMS CONTROL AND STABILITY

Arms control seeks as a general goal toreduce the likelihood of war. Efforts to main-tain international stabil ity and control theescalation of severe international crises aretherefore often considered an integral compo-nent of arms control. The procurement and de-ployment of strategic forces in a manner thatreduces the incentives to continue moderniza-tion or procure additional numbers of forcesare also thought to be consistent with armscontrol efforts. The selection of a basing modefor the MX missile may therefore have broaderimplications for arms control beyond thenegotiation of new international agreements.

The deployment of the MX missile in a sur-vivable basing mode is generally thought to bean important adjunct to the management ofsevere international crises. High confidence byAmerican and Soviet decisionmakers in thesurvivability of the MX force would minimizeincentives for either side to strike first. Sur-vivable basing wouId allow American decision-makers to wait out a crisis without resorting tothe use of force out of concern that if the MXmissiles were not used, they might be preempt-ed and unavailable later during a crisis. Sur-vivable basing for the MX missile would reduceincentives of the Soviet leadership to attemptpreemption because they could not be confi-dent of destroying a sufficiently large fractionof the force to effectively limit the ability ofthe United States to retal iate. Surv ivablebasing would also reduce Soviet incentives toinitiate an attack out of fear that the UnitedStates would strike first to forestall Sovietpreemption.

As noted throughout the earlier chapters ofthis study, most basing modes for the MX mis-si le would provide survivability when fullydeployed; several including small submarineor air mobile MX basing would provide sub-

stantial survivability concurrent with or shortlyafter initial operating capability. However, insome operational concepts, air mobile basingmight create a situation during a crisis in whichthe Soviets might mistake a widespread, simul-taneous launch of MX-carrying aircraft under-taken to enhance survivability as strategic war-ning of an impending American attack. Such aperception would add instability to a crisis.While there are many other operational con-cepts for an air mobile force which might over-come this concern, the possibility that theSoviets might perceive the airborne operationof a large fraction of the air mobile MX forceas a provocative action during a severe crisiscannot be completely discounted.

As noted above, the selection of a basingmode for the MX missile that added incentivesto increase the size of strategic nuclear forceswould be inconsistent with the general goals ofarms control. Most basing modes for the MXmiss i le assessed in th is s tudy sat is fy th iscriterion; MPS with or without the LoADS de-fense, however, would provide a strong incen-tive for the Soviets to add to their inventory ofRVS. Finally, MX/MPS would make terminatinga buildup of U.S. and Soviet strategic forcesmore difficult than other MX basing modesbecause the United States could not stop con-structing MPS until the number of shelters ex-ceeded the number of RVS in the Soviet inven-tory that might pose a threat to MX/MPS sur-vivabil ity. The Soviets, on the other hand,might find it difficult to stop adding RVS totheir inventory unless they had clear evidencethat the United States had halted its MPS con-struction program. Thus, MPS with or withoutthe LoADS ABM defense would pose the mostsevere challenges to the long-term ability ofthe United States to achieve some of its statedarms control objectives.

APPENDIXES

Appendix A

LETTER OF REQUEST

T E C H N O L O G Y A S S E S S M E N T B O A R O Congress of the United States J O H N H . G I B B O N S

MORRIS K . UDALL . ARIZ.. CHAIRM A N D i r e c t o r

TED STEVENS. ALASKA, VICE CHAIRMAN O F F I C E O F T E C H N O L O G Y A S S E S S M E N T DANIEL DESIMONe

EdWARD M. KENNEDY. MASS. GEoRGE E. B rownJr.n.. CALIF.Deputy Director

E R N E s T F . H o u l l i n g s S . C . J O H N O D I NG E L L M I C H . W A S H I N G T O N , D . C . 2 0 5 1 0A D L A E . S T E V E N S O N , - LARRY WINN, JR , KANs.O R R I N a . HA T C H, U T A H C L A R E N C E E . M I L L E R . O H I OC H A r l e s M C C . M A T H I A S. Jr, M D . JOHN W. WYOLER, N.Y.

JOHN H. GIBBONS

M a y 8 , 1 9 8 0

Dr. John H. GibbonsDirectorOff ice of Technology AssessmentWashington, D. C. 20510

Dear Jack :

The Administration has proposed that the UnitedStates build and deploy the new MX missile in Utah and Nevada.Although the case for a new strategic missile is understood,the missile basing system remains controversial, and thetrade-offs involved remain unclear. In view of the criticalimportance of MX to the future military security of the UnitedStates, the enormous size of the proposed budget, and thetremendous impact which MX deployment may have on the regionswhere such deployment takes place, Congress as a whole oughtto have the best obtainable information and analysis aboutMX basing. There would be particular value in an assessmentwhich, while drawinq upon whatever military and intelligenceinformation is pertinent, would be independent of the DefenseDepartment and the Administration.

We therefore request that OTA prepare and submitto the Board as soon as possible a plan for an assessmentof how the MX missile might be based. If this plan indicatesthat the time and money required for a study are not excessive,we expect to reuuest that the Board approve the initiation ofsuch an assessment.

The study would describe and evaluate the Adminis-tration proposal, selected alternatives which the DefenseDepartment has studied, and additional possible basing modeswhich seem worthy of consideration. Various types of multipleprotective structure (MPS) systems, alternatives to MPS, andalternatives to land-basing should be addressed.

Specifically, OTA’S evaluation should address thesuitability of each basing concept in terms of such issues astechnical risk, survivability (includinq detectability andhardness) , reliability, the time required for deployment, etc.To the extent necessary to evaluate basing systems, the studyshould also address the projected Soviet threat, and possibleSoviet responses to an MX system.

325

326 “ MX Missile Basing

Dr. John H. GibbonsMay 8, 1980Page Two

In order to clarify the trade-offs that must bemade in choosing a basing system, the study should addressbasing proposals in the following contexts:

(1) the peacetime strategic balance, in which U.S.strateqic forces should preserve and enhance stability andsecurity; (2) likely future efforts to negotiate arm= controltreaties, in which U.S. strategic forces should make such ne-gotiations easier rather than more difficult; (3) a severecrisis or limited war, in which U.S. strategic forces shouldenhance our ability to manage the crisis and to terminate iton acceptable terms; and (4) a major war, in which U.S.strategic forces should make an enemy regret that he hadrefused to be deterred.

To the extent necessary for a comparison of basingsystems, the study should evaluate the environmental impactof construction and peacetime operation of the various al-ternatives. The effect which the choice of basing systemmight have on the effects of war on the civilian populationand economy should also be addressed.

The final topic of the study should be an estimateof the cost of the Administration proposal and of any alter-natives that appear worthy of serious consideration. We re-quest that you explore the possibility of a cooperative effortbetween OTA and the Congressional Budget Office, in which CBOwould apply their expertise concerning the budgetary impact ofchoices Congress might make. If such CBO cooperation appearsto be likely, it should be reflected in the assessment plansubmitted to the Board.

We do not expect or desire that OTA attempt to reachconclusions about whether the Administration proposals, or par-ticular alternatives, should be adopted. The completed assess-ment should present a clear analysis of the options availableto Congress regarding the MX basing, an explanation of why theseparticular options are worthy of consideration, and a state-ment of the major advantages and disadvantages of each option.

While OTA should draw upon appropriate classifieddata regarding both U.S. capabilities and the Soviet threat,the report should contain at least a summary that is unclassified.

App. A—Letter of Request . 327

Dr. John H. GibbonsMay 8, 1980Page Three

We recognize that an assessment of this sortcannot be carried out overnight. Nevertheless, timelycompletion of the assessment is essential. The timetableshould allow for OTA staff to brief Members of Congress andtheir staff on the study's preliminary results after theAugust, 1980 break, and a final report should be readyprior to the convening of the 97th Congress.

With best wishes,

Cordially,

\ k & Y ~

1 /

1 /1

,t. f“ ~.0.L/!!ORRIS UD= D’ ?5!lV3’VElfS

CHAIRMAN ) VICE CHAIRMAN

Appendix B

MX MISSILE

The MX missile is a four stage intercontinentalballistic missile (ICBM) presently in full-scaleengineering development. Like its predecessor, theMinuteman Ill, the first three rocket stages aresol id propellant, with a Iiquid-fueled fourth stage/post-boost vehicle. Weighing about 192,000 lb, themissile will be 70 ft long, with a 92 inch diameter.The MX is a MIRVed (multiple independently tar-getable reentry vehicle) missile, and will carry 10MK 12A warheads. The Minuteman I I I carries threeMK 12As. A comparison between the MX and theMinuteman is given in figure B-1.

Figure B-1 .—Missile Comparison

. %’

- 1 9 2 , 0 0 0 l b

7(

A drawing of the MX fourth stage postboost vehi-cle (PBV) is shown in figure B-2. We see that it isdesigned to be able to carry 12 MK 12A warheads,or alternatively, 11 advanced ballistic reentryvehicles [A BRV). SALT I I would limit the number ofreentry vehicles (RVS) to 10. The inertial measuringunit (I MIJ) of the MX’S guidance and control systemis a significant advance in guidance technologyover Minuteman, and is designed to give the MXmuch greater accuracy on target.

Also unlike Minuteman, the MX missile will be“cannisterized,” to facilitate handling and move-ment of the missile, and to provide for the missile’senvironment control. The MX is also designed to be“cold launched” from the cannister. This meansthat for launch, the missile is first gas-expelled fromthe cannister, at which point it fires its first stage.

The MX missile is scheduled to begin flight test-ing in January 1983, for a total of 20 tests beforesystem is in initial operating capability. The lastflight test is scheduled for April 1986. These testswill check for a wide variety of missile functionsand of associated equipment, including rocketstage performance, guidance and control, reentrysystem performance, range and payload capability,retargetting, and many others.

SOURCE: U.S. Air Force.

328

App. B—MX Missile . 329

Figure B.2.—MX Post Boost Vehicle

MK 12A ABRV

Warheads

Battery -

Oxidizer

Cold gaspressurization

Fuel

Guidance & control

SOURCE: U.S. Alr Force.

Guidance & control

Appendix C

ACRONYMS ANDGLOSSARY

List of Acronyms

A&CO — assembly and checkoutABM – antiballistic missileABNCP — Airborne National Command PostAFY – acre-feet per yearAIRS — Advanced Inertial Reference

SphereALCC — Airborne Launch Control CenterALCM — Air-Launched Cruise MissileAMST – Advanced medium short takeoff

and landing aircraftANMCC – Alternate National Military

Command Center (Ft. Richie, Va.)A SAT — antisatelliteASW – antisubmarine warfareBMD – ballistic missile defenseB M D S C O M – Ballistic Missile Defense Systems

c’

CBOCEPDE IS

DODDUEAMEHFEISEMPEMTFOCFROD

GBSGPSHFICBMICTIGPSI MUI o ckTLF

Command (U.S. Army)— command, control, and

commun i cat ions– Congressional Budget Office— circular error probable– draft environmental impact

statement– Department of Defense– defense unit (LoADS)– Emergency Action Message— extremely high frequency— environmental impact statement— electromagnetic pulse— equivalent megatonnage– full operational capability– functionally related observable

difference– Ground Beacon System– Global Positioning System– high frequency— intercontinental ballistic missile— intelligence cycle time– Inverted Global Positioning System— inertial measuring unit— initial operating capability– kiloton– low frequency

LoADSLUAMAPMaRVMF

“1

;’I RV

MPSMTMWeNCANEACP

NMCC

nm iNORAD

NTSO c cORVPLU

psiRDT&E

RVSAC

SALTSATCOMSccSHFSIOPSLBM

SWFLANT

SWFPAC

TELUHFUSAFUSNVLF

– low altitude defense system– launch under attack— multiple aim point— maneuverable reentry vehicle— medium frequency— square miles— multiple independently targetable

reentry vehicle— multiple protective shelters— megaton— megawatts of electricity— National Command Authorities— National Emergency Airborne

Command Post– National Military Command Center

(Pentagon, Washington, D. C.)— nautical mile– North American Aerospace

Defense Command– Nevada Test Site– Operational Control Center– Off-Road Vehicle— preservation of location

uncertain y– pounds per square inch— research, development, test, and

evaluation— reentry vehicle– Strategic Air Command (U.S. Air

Force)– Strategic Arms Limitation Talks– Satellite communications– Standing Consultative Commission— super high frequency– Single Integrated Operational Plan— submarine-launched ballistic

miss ile– Strategic Weapons Facility,

Atlantic, U.S. Navy– Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific,

U.S. Navy— transporter-e rector-1 auncher— ultrahigh frequency– U.S. Air Force– U.S. Navy— very low frequency

330

App. C—Acronyms and Glossary | 331

Glossary

ABM Treaty: Formally entitled the “Treaty betweenthe United States of America and the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics on the limitation ofantiballistic missile system s,” this Treaty limitsthe deployment of antiballistic missile systemsby the United States and the Soviet Union tospecific sites and to specific technical char-acteristics. The Treaty is of unlimited duration,subject to review every 5 years. The Treaty wasamended in 1974 Iimiting the deployment of an-tiballistic missile systems to one site containingno more than 100 interceptor launchers andmissiles.

Acoustic Transponders: Navigation aids attached tothe ocean floor which when queried respond byemitting a signal permitting a submarine or sur-face ship to determine its location with greatprecision.

Acquisition Costs: The amount of money invested inresearch, development, test, production, andprocurement of a weapon system but not cover-ing costs of operating and maintaining theweapon system once it has reached operationalcapability and is deployed with military forces.

Adaptive Preferential Defense: A tactic for multiply-ing the effectiveness of an antiballistic missiledefense system by defending only a smallproportion of the total number of targets underattack.

Ad Hoc Retargeting: The ability to constructstrategic nuclear attacks which have not beenpreviously included in the wide range of pre-planned attack options comprising the U.S.Single Integrated Operational Plan.

Advanced Inertial Reference Sphere (AIRS): An ad-vanced guidance system presently being de-veloped for the MX missile.

Airborne Launch Control Center (ALCC): Aircraftused to launch MX missiles deployed in a multi-ple protective shelter basing mode.

Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM): Small un-manned airplane-like vehicles armed with nu-c I ear weapons.

Alert Rate: The number of U.S. strategic nucleardelivery vehicles armed, manned, or deployedon combat patrol during peacetime conditions.

Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW): Methods of warfareutilizing specialized sensors, data processingtechniques, weapons platforms, and weaponsintended to search for, identify, and destroysubmarines.

Area Kill: See Barrage Attack.

Arms Control Agreement Verification: The process ofcollecting and analyzing information to deter-mine whether or not parties to an internationalarms control agreement are complying with itsterms.

B-52: A heavy intercontinental range strategicbomber deployed by the United States. B-52bombers can be equipped with gravity bombs,short-range attack missiles, or air-launchedcruise missiles.

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD): Systems for defenseagainst missiles which follow trajectories re-sulting from gravity and aerodynamic drag fol-lowing termination of powered flight. This termis used interchangeably with ABM systems.

Barrage Attack: An attack using nuclear weapons tocover a large area with a given severity of blastand/or thermal nuclear effects.

Baseline Design: As used in this study, the term“baseline design” refers to the Air Force MXbasing design, May 1981. This design includesboth the design of the MX missile as well as themu Itiple protective shelter basing mode.

Blackout: A condition in which the heat and radia-tion from an atmospheric nuclear explosionionize the surrounding volume of air causingradar signals passing through the affectedregion to be absorbed or reflected.

Breakout: As used in connection with discussion ofthe LoADS ABM system, breakout refers to therapid deployment of the LoADS defense unit byuse of explosive charges to break through thetop of the protective shelter permitting thedefense unit to activate its radar and launch itsinterceptor missiles.

Circular Error Probable (CEP): A measure of the ac-curacy with which a weapon can be delivered.It is the radius of a circle around a target ofsuch size that a weapon aimed at the target hasa 50-percent probabiIity of falIing within the cir-cle.

Cold launch: The use of a gas generator to build upsteam pressure inside a cannister housing aballistic missile which forces the missile out ofthe cannister prior to the ignition of the firststage rocket motor. The temperature of thesteam used to eject the missile from the can-nister is quite hot; however it is substantiallyless than the many thousand degrees Fahrenheitof the rocket motor exhaust, and hence theterm “cold launch. ”

Command, Control, and Communications (C3): Thesystems and procedures used to ensure that thePresident, senior civilian and military officials,and U.S. strategic nuclear forces remain in com-


munication with each other, able to plan for theuse of nuclear weapons, to choose among op-tions, to deliver orders to the forces in the field,and to receive word that the forces have ex-ecuted or attempted to execute their ordersduring the course of peacetime or wartimeoperations.

Damage Expectancy: The probability that a nuclearweapon wilI arrive at and destroy its target.

“Dash-on= Warning”: A concept in which MX missileson vehicles are dispersed rapidly upon receiptof warning that an attack appears underway toa nearby shelter where the MX missile is quicklyinserted.

Desertification: The significant reduction of biologicactivity and accelerated deterioration of soils inarid land ecosystems.

Dynamic Pressure: A measure of the gusting windsfolIowing the shock front produced by a nu-clear detonation.

Emergency Action Message (EAM): Orders to U.S.strategic offensive forces for the initiation ortermination of a strategic nuclear attack.

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP): A sharp pulse ofelectromagnetic energy produced by a nuclearexplosion capable of damaging unprotectedelectrical and electronic equipment at greatdistances.

Endoatmospheric Defense: ABM systems whichoperate in the sensible portion of the Earth’s at-mosphere, typically at altitudes from theground to 100,000 ft.

Environmental Impact Statement (EIS): A descriptionof the possible range of impacts on the socio-economic and physical environments preparedby the Air Force pursuant to the requirementsof the National Environmental Policy Act.

Endurance: The ability of a strategic weaponsforce– including both strategic nuclearweapon delivery vehicles and associated com-mand, control and communications systems —to survive and function for weeks or monthsfollowing a nuclear exchange.

Equivalent Megatonnage: The yield of a nuclearweapon in megatons, to the two-thirds power. Ameasure of the area that can be barraged to agiven overpressure.

Exchange Ratio: The number of nuclear weaponsthat must be used by an attacker to destroy onenuclear weapon belonging to an adversary.

Exoatmospheric Defense: ABM systems that operateoutside the atmosphere.

External Navigation Aid: Devices external to a missileor platform used to provide information to the

missile or missile platform on its position andvelocity.

Flush: A launch of manned aircraft or a rapid de-ployment of submarines or surface ships in re-sponse to either tactical or strategic warning topreserve as much of the force as possible in theevent of a nuclear attack.

Fractionation: The division of the payload of a mis-sile into a larger number of warheads withsmaller individual yields.

Fugitive Dust: Dust generated by construction ac-tivities and vehicular traffic on and off roadswhich migrates from the area immediately sur-rounding such activities to distant locales.

Full Operational Capability (FOC): The date on whichthe planned number of weapon systems hasbeen deployed and control of the forces givento the operational military command for the en-tire force.

Functionally Related Observable Differences (FRODS):Structures added to similar airframes or navalvessels to differentiate among them thereby fa-cilitating direct observation by national tech-nical surveillance systems permitting verifica-tion of each party’s compliance with the termsof an arms control agreement.

Global Positioning System (GPS): A system of ar-tificial satellites currently being deployed bythe United States in the 197o’s and 1980’s in-tended to provide accurate position and veloci-ty data to facilitate improved navigation andmissile accuracy.

Hardness: A measure of the resistance of an objectto the effects of nuclear detonations.

Hard Targets: Targets that have been specificallydesigned to withstand the blast, thermal radia-tion, and other effects of nuclear weapondetonations nearby.

Horizontal Shelters: Protective shelters for the MXmissile constructed such that the missile and itslaunch support equipment are inserted into thestructure and stored in a horizontal position.

Inertial Guidance: A guidance system for missiles,aircraft, and ships which relies solely on a self-contained set of instruments carried aboard theplatform to determine changes of velocity andposition from a known initial point.

Inertial Measuring Unit (IMU): A device installed inthe uppermost stage of a ballistic missile usedto derive missile accelerations throughoutflight, and to obtain velocity and position datawhich is used to navigate the missile.

Initial Operating Capability (IOC): The date on whicha small number of weapon systems is turned

App. C—Acronyms and Glossary ● 333

over to the commander of a military force forincorporation into the operational forces of theUnited States.

Intelligence Cycle Time (lCT): The period of timefrom the s ight ing of a target to the t imeweapons can be delivered against it.

Inverted Global Positioning System (IGPS): A conceptfor a system of ground-based radio beacons tobe used to provide navigational information formobiIe MX missiIes and various platforms carry-ing such missiles.

Kill Vehicles: Independently guided nonnuclearweapons that are used in the exoatmosphericantiballistic missile systems to destroy incom-ing nucIear weapons.

Kilofeet: 1,000 f t.Knot: 1 nautical mile per hour.Kilotons (kT): Equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT.Launch Under Attack (LUA): A doctrine for strategic

forces requiring their launch upon receipt ofwarn ing of an attack on the United States.

Layered Defense: An antiballistic missile systemconsisting of both an exoatmospheric defenseand an endoatmospheric defense.

Lifecycle Costs: Costs of research, development,test, procurement, operation, maintenance,modification, and dismantling of a weaponsystem over the period from initial research anddevelopment to retirement or dismantling ofthe last weapon system.

Low Altitude Defense System (LoADS): A system pro-posed by the Army as an endoatmospheric anti-ballistic missile defense.

LoADS Defense Unit (DU): This consists of a radar, in-terceptor launchers, and interceptors mountedon a mobile unit and deceptively deployed inconjunction with MX missile deployments.

Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MaRV): An independ-ently targetable reentry vehicle which canmaneuver to evade balIistic missile defense orto obtain better accuracy.

Microwave Radiometers: Instruments that candetect electromagnetic emissions such as radiotransmissions or radar signals used to detectand identify the transmitting platform.

Minuteman: An ICBM deployed by the UnitedStates in two models. Minuteman II is a threestage, solid fueled missile armed with a singlenuclear weapon; Minuteman I I I is armed withthree independently targetable nuclear weap-ons.

Multiple Aim Point: A term for basing a force ofICBMS among a larger number of protectivemissile shelters. See Mu/tip/e Protective Shelter.

Multiple Protective Shelter (MPS): A term describing abasing mode for land-based missiles in whichmissiles are deployed among a large number ofhardened structures. These are designed anddistributed to provide protection against near-by nuclear weapon detonations.

MX Missile: Missile X or missile experimental; theproposed U.S. Air Force advanced ICBM.

Northern Minuteman Wings: Minuteman missiles

deployed at Malstrom Air Force Base, Mont.;Grand Forks, N. Dak.; Warren Air Force Base,Wyo.; and Ellsworth Air Force Base, S.Dak.

National Technical Means of Verification (NTM):Technical intelligence information collectionsystems which are under national control formonitoring compliance with the provisions ofan arms control agreement. NTM includephotographic reconnaissance satellites, aircraftbased systems such as radars and opticalsystems, as well as sea- and ground-basedsystems such as radars, antennas for collectingtelemetry, and seismic recorders,

National Command Authorities (NCA): The President,the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefsof Staff and their designated successorsauthorized to initiate an order for the use ofnuclear weapons.

National Emergency Airborne Command Post(NEACP): A modified Boeing 747 transport air-craft equipped with a wide array of com-munications equipment for use by the Presidentand other members of the National CommandAuthorities in the event of a nuclear war.

Nevada Test Site (NTS): A facility where the UnitedStates detonates nuclear explosive devicesunderground.

North American Aerospace Defense Command(NORAD): A joint U.S.-Canadian military com-mand responsible for outer space, air spacesurveillance and air defense of the NorthAmerican Continent.

Ocean Mobile Systems: Basing of the MX missile bydeployin g the missile aboard small submarinesor surface ships.

Operational Control Center (OCC): Peacetimeoperating base for logistic support and physicalsecurity for the MX missiIe force.

Overlay: concept for exoatmospheric antiballisticmissile defense.

Overpressure: The transient pressure, usually ex-pressed in pounds per square inch, exceedingthe ambient atmospheric pressure, due to theshock wave generated by an explosion.


Permeable Metal: A metal with a strong magneticresponse.

Point Kill: The destruction of a hardened target at afixed location.

Postattack: The period of time following a nuclearexchange between the United States and theSoviet Union.

Preattack: The period of time preceding a nuclearexchange between the United States and theSoviet Union.

Preservation of Location Uncertainty (PLU): Theengineering of the MX missile, its transporter-Iauncher vehicle, the protective shelter, to pre-vent an outside observer from determining theprecise location of the MX missile among themany available shelters which could house it.

Rad: A unit of absorbed dose of radiation.Reentry Vehicle: That portion of a ballistic missile

which carries the nuclear weapon and reentersthe Earth’s atmosphere to reach it target.

Refit: The resupply of naval vessels with fresh food,fresh water, fuel, other consumables, installa-tion of new equipment, repair of equipment onboard, and the embarkation of a new crew.

Reliability: The ability of a missile system to carryout an order from its receipt to the detonationof a weapon against its target.

Responsiveness: A measure of the length of time re-quired for U.S. strategic forces to receive,authenticate, and implement an order from theNational Command Authorities for the use ofnuclear weapons.

Retargeting: The process of assigning new targetsfor a strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicle.

Readable TEL: A missile-carrying vehicle chosen fora previous U.S. Air Force MPS design, thatcould transport, erect to a vertical position, andlaunch the MX missile.

Reentry Vehicles (RV): As used in this report, reentryvehicles contain nuclear weapons.

SAFEGUARD: An antiballistic missile systemdeployed by the United States in the early1970’s containing both large and small phasedarray ABM radars and exoatmospheric and en-doatmospheric interceptors.

SALT: An acronym for the bilateral negotiations be-tween the United States and Soviet Union onthe subject of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.SALT I refers to the agreements concluded inMay 1972 including the ABM Treaty and the in-terim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Nu-clear Weapons.

SCC: The joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Standing ConsultativeCommission, a deliberative and negotiatingbody established by the ABM Limitation Treaty

which meets semiannually to review implemen-tation of the ABM Limitation Treaty and otherStrategic Arms Limitation Agreements in force.

Shock Front: The leading edge of a wave of airpressure created by an explosion.

Shoot-Look-Shoot: A tactic for attacking MXdeployed in an MPS or defended MPS mode inwhich the attacker fires a salvo of reentryvehicles, observes the effects of such an attack,and then attacks shelters left undamaged by thefirst attack.

Silo: A fixed, vertical structure housing an ICBMand its launch support equipment includingpower supply, communications equipment, andenvironmental control equipment which hasbeen constructed to withstand the effects ofnearby nuclear explosions.

Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP): Thepreplanned nuclear attack options prepared forthe consideration of the President by theDepartment of Defense.

Site Activation Task Force: A Joint U.S. Air Force andU.S. Army team which will check out and ac-cept individual MPS shelters when the construc-tion contractor believes construction has beencompleted.

Small Submarine Basing: A basing concept utilizingsubmarines displacing 2,500 to 2,800 tons onwhich MX missiles are deployed and operatedin deep ocean waters within 1,000 to 1,500 milesfrom the continental United States in the NorthAtlantic or Gulf of Alaska. The concept as usedby OTA differs in several respects to the“small sub underwater mobile” (SUM) basingconcept advanced by Sidney Drell and RichardGarwin.

Smallsub Underwater Mobile (SUM) Basing: A conceptfor the deployment of MX missiles on small sub-marines proposed by Sidney Drell and RichardGarwin.

Split Basing: As used in this report, split basing refersto the construction of multiple protectiveshelters for the MX missile in two regions ofdeployment. One half of the MX force would bedeployed in portions of Texas and New Mexicoand the other half of the force would bedeployed in Nevada and Utah.

Sprint: A very high acceleration, nuclear-armedendoatmospheric ABM interceptor missile de-ployed by the United States in the early 1970’sas part of the SAFEGUARD ABM system.

SSBN: Designator of nuclear-powered, fleetballistic, missile-carrying submarines deployedby the United States, the Soviet Union, France,and the United Kingdom.

App. C—Acronyms and Glossary ● 335

Star Tracker: A device carried aboard a ballisticmissile used to obtain information on the posi-tion and orientation of the missile in relation-ship to a known star for purposes of improvingin-flight guidance and the accuracy with whicha reentry vehicle could be delivered against atarget.

Strategic Triad: The three different types of plat-forms used by the United States to deliverstrategic nuclear weapons: ICBMS, submarinescarrying SLBMS, and bombers carrying gravitybombs, short-range attack missiles, and long-range air-launched cruise miss iles.

Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM): A bal-listic missile carried in or attached to andlaunched from a submarine.

SUM: An acronym for Smallsub Underwater Mobilebasing for MX proposed by Sidney Drell andRichard Garwin,

Transporter-Erector-launcher (TEL): A vehicle de-signed for an earlier version of MPS basingwhich would have been used to transport theMX missile, erect it to a vertical position, andthen launch it.

Time-on-Target Control: The ability to control thetime at which several nuclear weapons arrive ata particular target.

Transattack: The period of time in which the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union are actively engag-ed in the exchange of nuclear weapons. Thiscan be a period of minutes or can extend forhours or even days,

Transporte~ A vehicle designed to transport the MXmissile or a mass simulator, and to perform anexchange of either missiIe or the mass simuIatorand a protective shelter.

Trident Missile: A modern submarine launchedballistic missile deployed by the United States.The Trident I missile is currently being pro-duced and deployed; the Trident I I would be alarger and more accurate missile proposed forinitial deployment in the late 1980’s.

Trident Submarine: A very large nuclear-powered,ballistic missile-carrying submarine beingdeployed by the United States.

Valley Cluster Basing: A variant of MPS basing forthe MX missile in which missiles may be movedfreely among the protective shelters in an entirevalIey as opposed to onIy within a cluster.

Vertical Shelters: Protective shelters for the MX orMinuteman missile resembling ICBM silos,housing the missile and its mobile launch sup-port equipment in a vertical position.

Warning Systems: Satellites, ground-based radars,and other mobile sensors used to provide theUnited States warning of an impending ICBM,SLBM, or bomber attack.

Yield: The energy released in an explosion. Theenergy released in the detonation of a nuclearweapon is generally measured in terms of thekilotons or megatons of TNT required to pro-duce the same energy release.

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