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A Government Employee Confronts the Anti-Communist Crusade

C H A P T E R 27Chills and Fever During the Cold War, 1945–1960

902

Val Lorwin was in France in November 1950 when he learned of the charges againsthim.A State Department employee on leave of absence after 16 years of governmentservice, he was in Paris working on a book. Now he had to return to the United Statesto defend himself against the accusation that he was a member of the Communist party

American Stories

The Cold War was closely connected to the nuclear arms race. The spectacular mushroomcloud, like the one created by this hydrogen blast at Eniwetok in the Pacific in 1952, was beauti-ful but frightening at the same time. (National Archives)

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and thus a loyalty and security risk. It seemed to him a tasteless joke.Yet communismwas no laughing matter in the United States. Suspicions of the Soviet Union had esca-lated after 1945, and a wave of paranoia swept through the United States.

Lorwin was an unlikely candidate to be caught up in the fallout of the Cold War. Hehad begun to work for the government in 1935, serving in a number of New Deal agen-cies, then in the Labor Department and on the War Production Board before he wasdrafted during World War II.While in the army, he was assigned to the Office of Strate-gic Services, an early intelligence agency, and he was frequently granted security clear-ances in the United States and abroad.

Lorwin, however, did have a left-wing past as an active socialist in the 1930s. His so-cial life then had revolved around Socialist party causes, particularly the unionization ofsouthern tenant farmers and the provision of aid to the unemployed. He and his wife,Madge, drafted statements and stuffed envelopes to support their goals. But that activitywas wholly open and legal, and Lorwin had from the start been aggressively anti-Com-munist in political affairs.

Suddenly, Lorwin, like others in the period, faced a nightmare. Despite his spotlessrecord, Lorwin was told that an unnamed accuser had identified him as a Communist.The burden of proof was entirely on him, and the chance of clearing his name was slim.He was entitled to a hearing if he chose, or he could resign.

Lorwin requested a hearing, and one was held late in 1950. Still struck by the absurdityof the situation, he refuted all accusations but made little effort to cite his own positiveachievements. At the conclusion,he was informed that the government no longer doubtedhis loyalty but considered him a security risk, likewise grounds for dismissal from his job.

When he appealed the judgment, Lorwin was again denied access to the identity ofhis accuser.This time, however, he thoroughly prepared his defense.At the hearing, 97witnesses either spoke under oath on Lorwin’s behalf or left sworn written depositionstestifying to his good character and meritorious service.

The issues in the hearings might have been considered comic in view of Lorwin’srecord, had not a man’s reputation been at stake.The accuser had once lived with theLorwins in Washington, D.C. Fifteen years later, he claimed that in 1935 Lorwin had re-vealed that he was holding a Communist party meeting in his home and had evenshown him a party card.

Lorwin proved all the charges groundless. He also showed that in 1935 the Socialistparty card was red, the color the accuser reported seeing, while the Communist partycard was black. In March 1952, Lorwin was finally cleared for both loyalty and security.

Lorwin’s troubles were not yet over. His name appeared on one of the lists pro-duced by Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, the most aggressive anti-Commu-nist of the era, and Lorwin was again victimized. The next year, he was indicted formaking false statements to the State Department Loyalty-Security Board.The chargesthis time proved as specious as before. Finally, in May 1954, admitting that its specialprosecutor had deliberately lied to the grand jury and had no legitimate case, the Jus-tice Department asked for dismissal of the indictment. Cleared at last, Lorwin wenton to become a distinguished labor historian.

Val Lorwin was more fortunate than some victims of the anti-Communist

crusade. Caught up in a global conflict that engulfed most of the world, he

managed to weather a catastrophe that threatened to shatter his life. People

rallied around him and gave him valuable support. Despite considerable

emotional cost, he survived the witch hunt of the early 1950s, but his case still

reflected vividly the ugly domestic consequences of the breakdown in relations

between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Cold War, which unfolded soon after the end of World War II and lasted

for nearly 50 years, powerfully affected all aspects of American life. Rejecting

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Origins of the Cold WarThe American StanceSoviet AimsEarly Cold War LeadershipDisillusionment with the USSRThe Troublesome Polish QuestionEconomic Pressure on the USSRDeclaring the Cold War

Containing the Soviet UnionContainment DefinedThe First Step:The Truman

DoctrineThe Next Steps:The Marshall Plan,

NATO, and NSC-68Containment in the 1950s

Containment in Asia, theMiddle East, and LatinAmericaThe Shock of the Chinese

RevolutionStalemate in the Korean WarVietnam:The Roots of ConflictThe Creation of Israel and Its

Impact on the Middle EastRestricting Revolt in Latin America

Atomic Weapons and theCold WarSharing the Secret of the BombNuclear ProliferationThe Nuclear West“Massive Retaliation”Atomic Protest

The Cold War at HomeTruman’s Loyalty ProgramThe Congressional Loyalty

ProgramSenator Joe McCarthyThe Casualties of Fear

Conclusion:The Cold War inPerspective

903



904 PART 6 A Resilient People, 1945–2005

for good the isolationist impulse that had governed

foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s, the United

States began to play a major role in the world in the

postwar years. Doubts about intervention in other

lands faded as the nation acknowledged its dominant

international position and resolved to do whatever

was necessary to maintain it. The same sense of mis-

sion that had infused the United States in the Span-

ish-American War, World War I, and World War II now

appeared in a revived evangelical faith and commit-

ted most Americans to the struggle against commu-

nism at home and abroad.

This chapter explores that continuing sense of

mission and its consequences. It examines the roots

of the Cold War both in the idealistic aim to keep the

world safe for democracy and in the pursuit of eco-

nomic self-interest that had long fueled American

capitalism. It records how the determination to pre-

vent the spread of communism led American policy-

makers to consider vast parts of the world as pivotal

to American security and to act accordingly, particu-

larly in Korea and Vietnam. It notes the impact on

economic development, particularly in the West,

where the mighty defense industry flourished. And it

considers the tragic consequences of the effort to

promote ideological unity in a rigid and doctrinaire

version of the American dream that led to excesses

threatening the principles of democracy itself.




Conflicting Aims During the Cold War

United States Soviet Union

ORIGINS OF THE COLD WARThe Cold War developed by degrees. It stemmedfrom divergent views about the shape of thepost–World War II world as the colonial empires inAsia, Africa, and the Middle East began to crumble.The United States, strong and secure, was intent onspreading its vision of freedom and free trade aroundthe world to maintain its economic hegemony. TheSoviet Union, concerned about security after a dev-astating war, demanded politically sympatheticneighbors on its borders to preserve its own auton-omy. Suppressed during World War II, these differ-ences now surfaced in a Soviet–American confronta-tion. As tensions rose, the two nations behaved,according to Senator J. William Fulbright, “like twobig dogs, chewing on a bone.”

The American StanceThe United States emerged from World War II morepowerful than any nation ever before, and it soughtto use that might to achieve a world order that could

sustain American aims. American policymakers, fol-lowing in Woodrow Wilson’s footsteps, hoped tospread the values—liberty, equality, and democ-racy—underpinning the American dream. They as-sumed that they could furnish the stability thatpostwar reconstruction required. They did not al-ways recognize that what they considered universaltruths were rooted in specific historical circum-stances in their own country and might not flourishelsewhere.

At the same time, American leaders sought aworld where economic enterprise could thrive. Rec-ollections of the Great Depression haunted leaders.With the American economy operating at full speedas a result of the war, world markets were neededonce the fighting stopped. Government officialswanted to eliminate trade barriers—imposed by theSoviet Union and other nations—to provide outletsfor industrial products and for surplus farm com-modities such as wheat, cotton, and tobacco. As thelargest source of goods for world markets, with ex-ports totaling $14 billion in 1947, the United Statesrequired open channels for growth to continue.

Spread ideological values of liberty, equality, anddemocracy

Extend the tradition of representative governmentMaintain stability around the worldFill vacuum created by the end of imperialism with regimes

sympathetic to Western idealsMaintain a world free for economic enterprise by eliminating

trade barriers and providing markets for Americanexports

Spread ideological values of class struggle, triumph of theproletariat

Extend the tradition of strong centralized governmentSupport revolutionary movements around the worldSupport regimes sympathetic to the Soviet Union,

particularly to avoid attack on its western flankRebuild the devastated Soviet economy by creating

preferential trading arrangements in the region of Sovietdominance



CHAPTER 27 Chills and Fever During the Cold War, 1945–1960 905

Americans assumed that their prosperity wouldbenefit the rest of the world, even when other na-tions disagreed.

Soviet AimsThe Soviet Union formulated its own goals afterWorld War II. Russia had usually been governed inthe past by a strongly centralized, sometimes auto-cratic, government, and that tradition—as much asCommunist ideology, with its stress on class strug-gle and the inevitable triumph of a proletarianstate—guided Soviet policy.

During the war, the Russians had played downtalk of world revolution, which they knew their alliesfound threatening, and had mobilized domesticsupport with nationalistic appeals. As the struggledrew to a close, the Soviets still said little aboutworld conquest, emphasizing socialism within thenation itself.

Rebuilding was the first priority. Devastated bythe war, Soviet agriculture and industry lay in sham-bles. But revival required internal security. At thesame time, the Russians felt vulnerable along theirwestern flank. Such anxieties had a historical basis,for in the early nineteenth century, Napoleon hadreached the gates of Moscow. Twice in the twentiethcentury, invasions had come from the west, most re-cently when Hitler had attacked in 1941. Hauntedby fears of a quick German recovery, the Soviets de-manded defensible borders and neighboringregimes sympathetic to Russian aims. They insisted

on military and political stability in the regions clos-est to them.

Early Cold War LeadershipBoth the United States and the Soviet Union hadstrong leadership in the early years of the Cold War.On the American side, presidents Harry Truman andDwight Eisenhower accepted the centralization ofauthority Franklin Roosevelt had begun, as the ex-ecutive branch became increasingly powerful inguiding foreign policy. In the Soviet Union, firstJoseph Stalin, then Nikita Khrushchev providedequally forceful direction.

Truman and Eisenhower paid close attention tothe Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. Thoughtheir personal styles differed, both subscribed totraditional American attitudes about self-determi-nation and the superiority of American political in-stitutions and values. Both were determined tostand firm in the face of the Soviet threat. If accom-modation was not possible, they were willing to takewhatever steps were necessary to achieve Americandiplomatic aims.

As World War II drew to an end, Truman grew in-creasingly hostile to Soviet actions. Viewing collab-oration as a wartime necessity, he was uncomfort-able with what he felt were Soviet designs inEastern Europe and Asia as the struggle wounddown. It was now time, he said, “to stand up to theRussians” before they solidified positions in vari-ous parts of the world.

Soviet PropagandaJoseph Stalin’s autocraticapproach to foreign and do-mestic affairs affrontedAmerican sensibilities. TheRussian caption on this So-viet propaganda posterreads: “Under the Leader-ship of the Great Stalin—Forward to Communism!”What image does Stalinconvey in this image?(Hoover Institution Archives,Stanford, CA Russian & SovietPoster Collection)




Like Truman, Eisenhowersaw communism as a mono-

lithic force strug-gling for world su-premacy and agreedthat the Kremlin inMoscow was or-chestrating subver-sive activity aroundthe globe. Yet Eisen-

hower was more willing thanTruman to practice accommo-dation when it served his ends.

Joseph Stalin, the Sovietleader at war’s end, possessedalmost absolute powers. Helooked, in the words of oneAmerican diplomat, like “anold battle-scarred tiger.”Though quiet and unassumingin appearance, he had presidedover ruthless purges against hisopponents in the 1930s. Nowhe was determined to do what-ever was necessary to rebuild Soviet society, if possi-ble with Western assistance, and to keep Eastern Eu-rope within the Russian sphere of influence.

Stalin’s death in March 1953 left a power vacuumin Soviet political affairs that was eventually filled byNikita Khrushchev, who by 1958 held the offices ofboth prime minister and party secretary. A crudeman, Khrushchev once used his shoe to pound atable at the United Nations while the British primeminister was speaking. During Khrushchev’sregime, the Cold War continued, but for brief peri-ods of time Soviet–American relations became lesshostile.

Disillusionment with the USSRAmerican support for the Soviet Union fadedquickly after the war. In September 1945, 54 percentof a national sample trusted the Russians to cooper-ate with the Americans in the postwar years. Twomonths later, the figure dropped to 44 percent, andby February 1946, to 35 percent.

As Americans soured on Russia, they began toequate the Nazi and Soviet systems. Just as theyhad in the 1930s, authors, journalists, and publicofficials pointed to similarities, some of them legit-imate, between the regimes. Both states, they con-tended, maintained total control over communica-tions and could eliminate political oppositionwhenever they chose. Both states used terror to si-lence dissidents, and Stalin’s labor camps in

Siberia could be compared with Hitler’s concentra-tion camps. After the U.S. publication in 1949 ofGeorge Orwell’s frightening novel 1984, Life maga-zine noted in an editorial that the ominous figureBig Brother was but a “mating” of Hitler and Stalin.Truman spoke for many Americans when he saidin 1950 that “there isn’t any difference between thetotalitarian Russian government and the Hitlergovernment. . . . They are all alike. They are . . . po-lice state governments.”

The lingering sense that the nation had not beenquick enough to resist totalitarian aggression in the1930s heightened American fears. Many believedthat the free world had not responded promptlywhen the Germans, Italians, and Japanese firstcaused international trouble and were determinednever to repeat the same mistake.

The Troublesome Polish QuestionThe first clash between East and West came, evenbefore the war ended, over Poland. Soviet demandsfor a government willing to accept Russian influ-ence clashed with American hopes for a more repre-sentative structure patterned after the Westernmodel. The Yalta Conference of February 1945 at-tempted to resolve the issue (see Chapter 25), yetwhen Truman assumed office, the Polish situationremained unresolved.

Truman’s unbending stance on Poland was madeclear in an April 1945 meeting with Soviet foreign

A New Soviet Leader Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was an aggressive leader whosometimes spoke out belligerently in defense of his country’s interests. Here he appears on thepodium at the United Nations delivering a speech. What do you think Khrushchev hoped to ac-complish by his often abrasive approach? (Getty Images)

HowCommunismWorks, 1938



nashsp_pdfDivert.html?27_0_lge


minister Vyacheslav Molotov. Concerned that theRussians were breaking the Yalta agreements, im-precise as they were, the American leader de-manded a new democratic government there.Though Molotov appeared conciliatory, Truman in-sisted on Russian acquiescence. Truman later re-called that when Molotov protested, “I have neverbeen talked to like that in my life,” he himself re-torted bluntly, “Carry out your agreements and youwon’t get talked to like that.” Such bluntness con-tributed to the deterioration of Soviet–American re-lations.

Truman and Stalin met face-to-face for the first(and last) time at the Potsdam Conference in July1945, the final wartime meeting of the UnitedStates, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. There,outside devastated Berlin, the U.S. and Soviet lead-ers sized each other up as they considered the Russ-ian–Polish boundary, the fate of Germany, and theAmerican desire to obtain an unconditional surren-der from Japan. It was Truman’s first exposure to in-ternational diplomacy at the highest level, and it lefthim confident of his abilities. When he learned dur-ing the meeting of the first successful atomic bombtest in New Mexico, he became even more deter-mined to insist that the Soviets behave in the wayshe wished.

Economic Pressure on the USSROne major source of controversy in the last stages ofWorld War II was the question of U.S. aid to its allies.Responding to congressional pressure at home tolimit foreign assistance as hostilities ended, Trumanacted impulsively. Six days after V-E Day signaledthe end of the European war in May 1945, he issuedan executive order cutting off lend-lease supplies tothe Allies. Ships heading for allied ports had to turnback in the middle of the ocean. Though the policyaffected all nations receiving aid, it hurt the SovietUnion most of all and caused serious resentment.

The United States intended to use economic pres-sure in other ways as well. The USSR desperatelyneeded financial assistance to rebuild after the warand, in January 1945, had requested a $6 billion loan.Roosevelt hedged, hoping to win concessions in re-turn. In August, four months after FDR’s death, theRussians renewed their application, but this time foronly $1 billion. Truman, like his predecessor, draggedhis heels, seeking to use the loan as a lever to gain ac-cess to markets in areas traditionally dominated bythe Soviet Union. The United States first claimed tohave lost the Soviet request, then in March 1946 indi-cated a willingness to consider the matter—but onlyif Russia pledged “nondiscrimination in world

commerce.” Stalin refused the offer and launched hisown five-year plan instead.

Declaring the Cold WarAs Soviet–American relations deteriorated, bothsides stepped up their rhetorical attacks. In 1946,Stalin spoke out first, arguing that capitalism andcommunism were on a collision course, that a seriesof cataclysmic disturbances would tear the capital-ist world apart, and that the Soviet system would in-evitably triumph. “The Soviet social system has suc-cessfully stood the test in the fire of war,” hedeclared, and would win the struggle ahead. Stalin’sspeech was a stark and ominous statement thatworried the West. Supreme Court justice William O.Douglas called it the “declaration of World War III.”

The response to Stalin’s speech came not from anAmerican but from England’s formerprime minister, Winston Churchill, longsuspicious of the Soviet state. Speaking inFulton, Missouri, in 1946, with Trumanon the platform during the address,Churchill declared that “from Stettin inthe Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, aniron curtain has descended across theContinent.” To counter the threat, heurged that a vigilant association of Eng-lish-speaking peoples work to contain Soviet de-signs. Such a coalition was the only way the SovietUnion could be stopped.

WinstonChurchill, “Iron

CurtainSpeech”(March 5,

1946)


CONTAINING THE SOVIET UNIONContainment formed the basis of postwar Americanpolicy. While the fledgling United Nations, estab-lished in 1945, might have provided a forum to easetensions, both the United States and the SovietUnion acted unilaterally, and with the aid of allies,in pursuit of their own ends. Within the UnitedStates, both Democrats and Republicans were de-termined to check Soviet expansion whereverthreats appeared. The Soviet Union responded in anequally uncompromising way.

Containment DefinedGeorge F. Kennan, chargé d’affaires at the Americanembassy in the Soviet Union and an expert on Sovietmatters, was primarily responsible for defining thenew policy of containment. After Stalin’s speech inFebruary 1946, Kennan sent an 8,000-word telegramto the State Department. In it he argued that Soviet




hostility stemmed from the “Kremlin’sneurotic view of world affairs,” which inturn came from the “traditional and in-stinctive Russian sense of insecurity.” Thestiff Soviet stance was not so much a re-sponse to American actions as a reflec-tion of the Russian leaders’ own efforts to

maintain their autocratic rule. Russian fanaticismwould not soften, regardless of how accommodat-ing American policy became. Therefore, it had to beopposed at every turn.

Kennan’s “long telegram” struck a resonant chordin Washington. Soon he published an extendedanalysis, under the pseudonym “Mr. X,” in theprominent journal Foreign Affairs. “The whole So-viet governmental machine, including the mecha-nism of diplomacy,” he wrote, “moves inexorablyalong the prescribed path, like a persistent toy auto-mobile wound up and headed in a given direction,stopping only when it meets with some unanswer-able force.” Many Americans agreed with Kennanthat Soviet pressure had to “be contained by theadroit and vigilant application of counter-force at aseries of constantly shifting geographical and politi-cal points.”

The concept of containment provided the philo-sophical justification for the hard-line stance thatAmericans, both in and out of government,adopted. Containment created the framework formilitary and economic assistance to countries thatseemed threatened by the perceived Communistmenace around the globe.

The First Step: The Truman DoctrineThe Truman Doctrine represented the first majorapplication of containment policy. The SovietUnion was pressuring Turkey for joint control ofthe Dardanelles, the passage between the BlackSea and the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, a civil warin Greece pitted Communist elements against theruling English-aided right-wing monarchy. Revolu-tionary pressures threatened to topple the Greekgovernment.

In February 1947, Britain, still reeling from thewar, informed the State Department that it could nolonger give Greece and Turkey economic and mili-tary aid. Truman administration officials, who werewilling to move into the void, knew they needed bi-partisan support to accomplish such a major policyshift. A conservative Congress wanted smaller bud-gets and lower taxes rather than massive and expen-sive aid programs. Senator Arthur Vandenberg ofMichigan, a key Republican, aware of the need forbipartisanship, told top policymakers that they had

to begin “scaring hell out of the country” if theywanted support for a bold new containment policy.

Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson took thelead. Meeting with congressional leaders, he de-clared that “like apples in a barrel infected by onerotten one, the corruption of Greece would infectIran and all to the east.” He warned ominously thata Communist victory would “open three conti-nents to Soviet penetration.” The major powerswere now “met at Armageddon,” as the SovietUnion pressed forward. Only the United States hadthe power to resist.

Truman likewise played on the Soviet threat. OnMarch 12, 1947, he told Congress, in a statementthat came to be known as the TrumanDoctrine, “I believe that it must be thepolicy of the United States to support freepeoples who are resisting subjugation byarmed minorities or by outside pres-sures.” Unless the United States acted,the free world might not survive. “If wefalter in our leadership,” Truman said,“we may endanger the peace of theworld—and we shall surely endanger the welfare ofour own nation.” To avert that calamity, he urgedCongress to appropriate $400 million for militaryand economic aid to Turkey and Greece.

The Authors of the Containment Policy Harry Truman relied heavily on Dean Acheson, pictured here on the right,who served first as undersecretary of state and from 1949 on as sec-retary of state. Together Truman and Acheson helped develop theoutlines of the containment policy that sought to limit the advances ofthe Soviet Union. What were the contours of that approach? (Harry S.Truman Library)

George F.Kennan, The

Long Telegram(1946)

PresidentTruman andthe Threat ofCommunism






Not everyone approved of Truman’s request. Au-tocratic regimes controlled Greece and Turkey,some observers pointed out. And where was theproof that Stalin had a hand in the Greek conflict?Others warned that the United States could not byitself stop communist encroachment in all parts ofthe world. Nonetheless, Congress passed Truman’sforeign aid bill.

In assuming that Americans could police theglobe, the Truman Doctrine was a major step in theadvent of the Cold War. Journalist Walter Lippmannominously termed the new containment policy a“strategic monstrosity” that could embroil the UnitedStates in disputes around the world. Events of thetwo succeeding decades proved Lippmann correct.

The Next Steps: The Marshall Plan,NATO, and NSC-68The next step for American policymakers involvedsending extensive economic aid for postwar recoveryin Western Europe. At the war’s end, most of Europewas economically and politically unstable, thereby of-fering inviting opportunities for communism to takehold. In France and Italy, large Communist partiesgrew stronger and refused to cooperate with estab-lished governments. In such circumstances, U.S. offi-cials believed, the Soviet Union might easily inter-vene. Decisive action was needed, for as the newsecretary of state, George Marshall, declared, “The pa-tient is sinking while the doctors deliberate.” Bolster-ing the European economy to provide markets forAmerican goods provided another motive for action.Excellent customers earlier, Western Europeans in the

aftermath of the war were able to purchase less at atime when the United States was producing more.

Marshall revealed the administration’s willing-ness to assist European recovery in a Harvard Uni-versity commencement address in June 1947. Heasked all troubled European nations to draw up anaid program that the United States couldsupport, a program “directed not againstany country or doctrine but againsthunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.”Soviet-bloc countries were welcome toparticipate, Marshall announced, awarethat their involvement was unlikely sincethey would have to disclose economicrecords to join, and Communist nations maintainedrigorous secrecy about their internal affairs.

The proposed program would assist the ravagednations, provide the United States with needed mar-kets, and advance the nation’s ideological aims.American aid, Marshall pointed out, would permitthe “emergence of political and social conditions inwhich free institutions can exist.” The Marshall Planand the Truman Doctrine, Truman noted, were “twohalves of the same walnut.”

Responding quickly to Marshall’s invitation, theWestern European nations worked out the details ofmassive requests. In early 1948, Congress commit-ted $13 billion over a period of four years to 16 co-operating nations. But not all Americans supportedthe Marshall Plan. Henry A. Wallace, former vicepresident and secretary of agriculture, called thescheme the “Martial Plan” and argued that it wasanother step toward war. Some members of Con-gress feared spreading American resources too thin.

The Contagion of Communism Americans in the early postwar years were afraid that commu-nism was a contagious disease spreading around the globe. In this picture from the spring of 1946, Time maga-zine pictured the relentless spread of an infection that would need to be contained. Why would such a mapseem frightening to people who looked at it? (© 1946 Time, Inc. Reprinted by permission.)

GeorgeMarshall, TheMarshall Plan

(1947)




910

But most legislators approved, and the containmentpolicy moved forward another step.

Closely related to the Marshall Plan was a con-certed Western effort to integrate a rebuilt Germanyinto a reviving Europe. At the war’s end, Allied lead-ers had agreed to divide the defeated Nazi nationand its capital, Berlin, into four occupation zones(Soviet, American, British, and French). Allied lead-ers intended the division of both Germany andBerlin to be temporary, until a permanent peacetreaty could be signed, but the lines of demarcationbecame rigid. With the onset of the Cold War andthe growing Soviet domination of Eastern Europe,the West became worried and moved to fill the vac-uum in Central Europe to counter the Russianthreat. In late 1946, the Americans and Britishmerged their zones for economic purposes and be-gan assigning administrative duties to Germans. Bymid-1947, the process of rebuilding German indus-try in the combined Western sector was underway.

Meanwhile, increasingly rigid separation dividedBerlin into two separate cities.

Despite French fears, the United States sought tomake Germany strong enough to anchor Europe.Secretary Marshall cautiously laid out the connec-tions for Congress:

The restoration of Europe involves the restoration ofGermany. Without a revival of German productionthere can be no revival of Europe’s economy. But wemust be very careful to see that a revived Germanycannot again threaten the European community.

The Soviet Union was furious at what it regardedas a violation of the wartime agreement to act to-gether. In mid-1948, the Soviets became irritated atan effort to introduce a new currency for the com-bined Western zones, a first step toward the cre-ation of a separate West German nation, thatwould include the western part of divided Berlin,located within the Soviet-controlled eastern part of

HOW OTHERS SEE USA West German Poster on the Marshall Plan

European nations welcomed the assistance provided bythe Marshall Plan that could help them maintain theirindependence and avoid communism.This poster from WestGermany hails freedom, which it calls the “free way” (freiebahn), in a play on the German word for “highway”—autobahn.

■ Why was communism a threat in postwar Europe?

■ How could the Marshall Plan help European nationsremain free?

■ How effectively does this poster underscore the idea offreedom?

(The Art Archive)




Germany. A crisis erupted when the Soviets at-tempted to force the Western powers out of Berlinby refusing to allow them land access to their partof the city and banning all shipments through east-ern Germany. In what became known as the Berlinairlift, the United States and the British Royal AirForce flew supplies to the beleaguered Berliners.Over the next year, more than 200,000 flights pro-vided 13,000 tons daily of food, fuel, and other nec-essary materials. The airlift proved to be a publicrelations disaster for the Soviet Union and a tri-umph for the West. The Soviets finally ended theblockade, but Berlin remained a focal point of con-flict, and there were now two separate Germanstates: the Federal Republic of Germany, or WestGermany, and the German Democratic Republic,or East Germany. The episode also highlighted forthe Western powers the need for a more cohesiveway of working together to meet the Soviet threat.

The next major link in the containment strategywas the creation of a military alliance in Europe in1949 to complement the economic program. Afterthe Soviets tightened their control of Hungary andCzechoslovakia, the United States took the lead inestablishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO). Twelve nations formed the alliance, vowingthat an attack against any one member would beconsidered an attack against all, to be met by appro-priate armed force.

The Senate, long opposed to such military pacts,approved this time. In his presidential farewell ad-dress in 1796, George Washington had warnedagainst “entangling alliances,” and the United Stateshad long heeded his warning. Now the nation estab-lished its first military treaty ties with Europe sincethe American Revolution. Congress also voted mili-tary aid for its NATO allies. The Cold War had soft-ened long-standing American reluctance to becomeclosely involved in European affairs.

Two dramatic events in 1949—the Communistvictory in the Chinese civil war and the Russian det-onation of an atomic device—shocked the UnitedStates. The Communist victory in China was fright-ening enough, but the erosion of the Americanatomic monopoly was horrifying. Although Ameri-can scientists had understood that, once the secretof the atom had been unlocked, the Soviets wouldbe able to create a bomb of their own in severalyears, many top policymakers believed it would takethe less technologically advanced Russians at least adecade and a half to do so. President Trumanthought they might never be able to accomplishsuch a feat at all. In September 1949, an air force re-connaissance plane picked up air samples with a ra-dioactivity content that revealed the Soviets hadtested their own bomb, just four years after theUnited States had ushered in the atomic age. Now anuclear arms race beckoned. Physical chemist

The Berlin Airlift AnAmerican and British airlift in 1948brought badly needed supplies toWest Berliners isolated by a Sovietblockade of the city. By refusing toallow the Western powers toreach the city, located within theSoviet zone, the Russians hoped todrive them from Berlin, but the air-lift broke the blockade. Why wasan airplane more effective than atruck in providing supplies to WestBerlin? (Bettmann/CORBIS)




Harold Urey observed on hearing the news: “Thereis only one thing worse than one nation having theatomic bomb—that’s two nations having it.”

The Chinese Communist victory andthe Soviet bomb led the United States todefine its aims still more specifically. Re-sponding to Truman’s request for a full-fledged review of U.S. foreign and de-fense policy, the National Security

Council, organized in 1947 to provide policy coordi-nation, produced a document called NSC-68, whichshaped U.S. policy for the next 20 years.

NSC-68 built on the Cold War rhetoric of the Tru-man Doctrine, describing challenges facing theUnited States in cataclysmic terms. “The issues thatface us are momentous,” the paper said, “involvingthe fulfillment or destruction not only of this Repub-lic but of civilization itself.” Conflict between East

NorthSea

BalticSea

BlackSea

Sicily(Italy)

Crete

Corsica(France)

Sardinia(Italy)

Mediterranean Sea

ATLANTICOCEAN

Berlin

Paris

London

SOVIET UNION

FINLAND

SWEDEN

NORWAY

POLAND

ROMANIA

YUGOSLAVIA

ITALY

FRANCE

SPAINPORTUGAL

GREATBRITAINIRELAND

ICELAND

BULGARIA

GREECE

TURKEY

GERMANFEDERALREPUBLIC

DENMARK

NETHERLANDS

BELGIUMLUX.

GERMANDEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC

HUNGARYAUSTRIA

SWITZERLAND

ALBANIA

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

WestBerlin

EastBerlin

NATO bloc

Communist bloc

Neutral countries

Occupied by bothEast and West

Cold War Europe in 1950

This map shows the rigid demarcation between East and West during the Cold War. Although there were a number of neutralcountries in Europe, the other nations found themselves in a standoff, as each side tried to contain the possible advances of theother. The small insert map in the upper right-hand corner shows the division of Berlin that paralleled the division of Germanyitself after World War II. Reflecting on the Past How widespread was the policy of neutrality in Cold War Europe? How pow-erful was the NATO bloc? How easily could one side move against the other in divided Europe?

NSC-68(1950)





and West, the document assumed, was unavoidable,for amoral Soviet objectives ran totally counter toU.S. aims. Negotiation was useless, for the Sovietscould never be trusted to bargain in good faith.

NSC-68 then argued that if the United Stateshoped to meet the Soviet challenge, it must increasedefense spending from the $13 billion set for 1950 toas much as $50 billion per year and increase thepercentage of its budget allotted to defense from 5percent to 20 percent. The costs were huge but nec-essary if the free world was to survive. “In sum-mary,” the document declared, “we must . . . wrestthe initiative from the Soviet Union, [and] confrontit with convincing evidence of the determinationand ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlindesign of a world dominated by its will.”

Containment in the 1950sContainment, the keystone of American policythroughout the Truman years, was the rationale forthe Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, andNSC-68. Because this policy required detailed andup-to-date information about Communist moves,the government relied increasingly on the CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA). Established by the Na-tional Security Act of 1947, the CIA conducted espi-onage in foreign lands, some of it visible, an increas-ing amount of it secret. With President Eisenhower’sapproval, by 1957, 80 percent of the CIA’s budgetwent toward covert activities. More and more,Eisenhower relied on clandestine CIA actions to un-dermine foreign governments, subsidize friendlynewspapers in distant lands, and assist those whosupported the U.S. stance in the Cold War.

The civil rights movement that was gaining mo-mentum in the 1950s also affected Cold War policy.American policymakers were aware of the impact ofstories about racial discrimination in other nations,particularly nations moving toward independencein sub-Saharan Africa. In propaganda aimedabroad, U.S. leaders sought to portray the domesticcivil rights movement in the best possible light.

At the same time, the administration reassessedthe impact of the containment policy itself, espe-cially in light of criticism that it was too cautious tocounter the threat of communism. For most ofEisenhower’s two terms, John Foster Dulles was sec-retary of state. A devout Presbyterian, he sought tomove beyond containment and to counter the“Godless terrorism” of communism with a holy cru-sade to promote democracy and to free the coun-tries under Soviet domination. Instead of advocat-ing containment, the United States should make it“publicly known that it wants and expects liberation

to occur.” Dulles favored immediate retaliation inthe face of hostile Soviet ventures: “There is one so-lution and only one: that is for the free world to de-velop the will and organize the means to retaliateinstantly against open aggression by Red armies, sothat, if it occurred anywhere, we could and wouldstrike back where it hurts, by means of our ownchoosing.”

Eisenhower’s own rhetoric was equally strong. Inhis 1953 inaugural address, he declared, “Forces ofgood and evil are massed and armed and opposedas rarely before in history. Freedom is pitted againstslavery, lightness against the dark.” Yet he was moreconciliatory than Dulles and recognized the impos-sibility of changing the governments of the USSR’ssatellites. In mid-1953, when East Germansmounted anti-Soviet demonstrations, in a challengethat foreshadowed the revolt against communismthree and a half decades later, the United Statesmaintained its distance. In 1956, when Hungarian“freedom fighters” rose up against Russian domina-tion, the United States again stood back as Sovietforces smashed the rebels and kept control of their

An Anti-Communist Crusader Secretary of State JohnFoster Dulles viewed the Cold War as a moral struggle betweengood and evil. Opposed to “godless communism,” he often appearedas a religious crusader for measures he believed were necessary forthe survival of the free world. How does this picture capture Dulles’sstern approach? (Bettmann/CORBIS)



In recent years, historians have used a new source ofevidence: the public opinion poll. People have alwaysbeen concerned with what others think, and leadershave often sought to frame their behavior according tothe preferences of the populace. As techniques of as-sessing the mind of the public have become more so-phisticated, the poll has emerged as an integral part ofthe analysis of social and political life. Polls now mea-sure opinion on many questions—social, cultural, intel-lectual, political, and diplomatic. Because of polls’ in-creasing importance, it is useful to know how to usethem in an effort to understand and recover the past.

The principle of polling is not new. In 1824, theHarrisburg Pennsylvanian sought to predict the winnerof that year’s presidential race, and in the 1880s, theBoston Globe sent reporters to selected precincts onelection night to forecast final returns. In 1916,Literary Digest began conducting postcard polls to pre-dict political results. By the 1930s, Elmo Roper andGeorge Gallup had further developed the field ofmarket research and public opinion polling. Notwith-standing an embarrassing mistake by Literary Digest inpredicting a Landon victory over FDR in 1936, pollinghad become a scientific enterprise by World War II.

According to Gallup, a poll is not magic but “merelyan instrument for gauging public opinion,” especiallythe views of those often unheard.As Elmo Roper said,the poll is “one of the few ways through which the so-called common man can be articulate.” Polling, there-fore, is a valuable way to recover the attitudes, beliefs,and voices of ordinary people.

Yet certain cautions should be observed. Like all in-struments of human activity, polls are imperfect andmay even be dangerous. Historians using informationfrom polls need to be aware of how large the sampleswere, when the interviewing was done, and how opin-ions might have been molded by the form of the pollitself. Questions can be poorly phrased. Some hint atthe desirable answer or plant ideas in the minds ofthose interviewed. Polls sometimes provide ambigu-ous responses that can be interpreted many ways.

More seriously, some critics worry that human free-dom itself is threatened by the pollsters’ manipulativeand increasingly accurate predictive techniques.

Despite these limitations, polls have become anever-present part of American life. In the late 1940sand early 1950s, Americans were polled frequentlyabout topics ranging from foreign aid, the United Na-tions, and the occupation of Germany and Japan to la-bor legislation, child punishment, and whether womenshould wear slacks in public (39 percent of men saidno, as did 49 percent of women). Such topics as thefirst use of nuclear arms, presidential popularity, na-tional defense, and U.S. troop intervention in a trou-bled area of the world remain as pertinent today asthey were then.

REFLECTING ON THE PAST A number of the polls in-cluded here deal with foreign policy during the ColdWar in the early 1950s. How did people respond toSoviet nuclear capability? How did they regard Russ-ian intentions and the appropriate American re-sponse? How do you analyze the results of thesepolls? What do you think is the significance of ratingresponses by levels of education? In what ways arethe questions “loaded”? How might the results ofthese polls influence American foreign policy? Whatdo you think is significant about the Indochina poll?These polls show the challenge-and-response natureof the Cold War. How do you think Americans wouldrespond today to these questions?

Polls also shed light on domestic issues. Considerthe poll on professions for young men and womentaken in 1950.What does it tell us about the attitudesof the pollster on appropriate careers for men andwomen? Why do you think both men and women hadnearly identical views on this subject? How do youthink people today would answer these questions?Would they be presented in the same way? Also ob-serve the poll on women in politics. To what extenthave attitudes on this issue changed in the interveningyears?

RECOVERING THE PAST

Public Opinion Polls

914



915

December 2, 1949—Atom BombNow that Russia has the atom bomb, doyou think another war is more likely orless likely?More likely 45%Less likely 28%Will make no difference 17%No opinion 10%

BY EDUCATIONCollege

More likely 36% Will make no difference 23%Less likely 35% No opinion 6%

High SchoolMore likely 44% Will make no difference 19%Less likely 28% No opinion 9%

Grade SchoolMore likely 50% Will make no difference 12%Less likely 26% No opinion 12%

May 1, 1950—National DefenseDo you think United States Governmentspending on national defense should beincreased, decreased, or remain aboutthe same?Increased 63%Same 24%Decreased 7%No opinion 6%

September 18, 1953—IndochinaThe United States is now sending warmaterials to help the French fight theCommunists in Indochina. Would youapprove or disapprove of sending UnitedStates soldiers to take part in the fightingthere?Approve 8%Disapprove 85%No opinion 7%

January 11, 1950—RussiaAs you hear and read about Russia thesedays, do you believe Russia is trying tobuild herself up to be the ruling power ofthe world—or is Russia just building upprotection against being attacked inanother war?Rule the world 70%Protect herself 18%No opinion 12%

BY EDUCATIONCollege

Rule the world 73%Protect herself 21%No opinion 6%

High SchoolRule the world 72%Protect herself 18%No opinion 10%

Grade SchoolRule the world 67%Protect herself 17%No opinion 16%

February 12, 1951—Atomic WarfareIf the United States gets into an all-outwar with Russia, do you think we shoulddrop atom bombs on Russia first—or doyou think we should use the atom bombonly if it is used on us?Drop A-bomb first 66%Only if used on us 19%No opinion 15%

The greatest difference was betweenmen and women—72% of the menquestioned favored our dropping thebomb first, compared to 61% of thewomen.

Foreign Policy Polls

October 29, 1949—Women in PoliticsIf the party whose candidate you mostoften support nominated a woman forPresident of the United States, would youvote for her if she seemed qualified for thejob?Yes 48%No 48%No opinion 4%

BY SEXMen

Yes 45%No 50%No opinion 5%

WomenYes 51%No 46%No opinion 3%

BY POLITICAL AFFILIATIONDemocrats

Yes 50%No 48%No opinion 2%

RepublicansYes 46%No 50%No opinion 4%

Would you vote for a woman for VicePresident of the United States if sheseemed qualified for the job?Yes 53%No 43%No opinion 4%

May 5, 1950—Most ImportantProblem

What do you think is the most importantproblem facing the entire country today?War, threat of war 40%Atomic bomb control 6%Economic problems, living costs,

inflation, taxes 15%Strikes and labor troubles 4%Corruption in government 3%Unemployment 10%Housing 3%Communism 8%Others 11%

July 12, 1950—ProfessionsSuppose a young man came to you andasked your advice about taking up a pro-fession. Assuming that he was qualifiedto enter any of these professions, whichone of them would you first recommendto him?Doctor of medicine 29%Government worker 6%Engineer, builder 16%Professor, teacher 5%Business executive 8%Banker 4%Clergyman 8%Dentist 4%Lawyer 8%Veterinarian 3%None, don’t know 9%

July 15, 1950—ProfessionsSuppose a young girl came to you andasked your advice about taking up a pro-fession. Assuming that she was qualifiedto enter any of these professions, whichone of them would you first recommend?

CHOICE OF WOMENNurse 33%

Teacher 15%

Secretary 8%

Social service worker 8%

Dietitian 7%

Dressmaker 4%

Beautician 4%

Airline stewardess 3%

Actress 3%

Journalist 2%

Musician 2%

Model 2%

Librarian 2%

Medical, dental technician 1%

Others 2%

Don’t know 4%

The views of men on this subjectwere nearly identical with those ofwomen.

Domestic Policy Polls

NASH.7654.CP27.p902-935.vpdf 9/29/05 2:34 PM Page 915



satellite. Because Western action could have precip-itated a more general conflict, Eisenhower refusedto translate rhetoric into action. Throughout the1950s, the policy of containment, largely as it hadbeen defined earlier, remained in effect.




CONTAINMENT IN ASIA,THE MIDDLE EAST, ANDLATIN AMERICAIn a dramatic departure from its history of nonin-volvement, the United States extended the policy ofcontainment to meet challenges around the globe.Colonial empires were disintegrating, and countriesseeking and attaining their independence now foundthemselves caught in the midst of the superpowerstruggle. In Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America,the United States discovered the tremendous appealof communism as a social and political system inemerging nations and found that ever-greater effortswere required to advance American aims.

The Shock of the Chinese RevolutionThe Communist victory in the Chinese civil war in1949 strengthened U.S. commitment to global con-tainment. An ally during World War II, China hadstruggled against the Japanese, while simultane-ously fighting a bitter civil war deeply rooted in theChinese past—in widespread poverty, disease, op-pression by the landlord class, and national humili-ation at the hands of foreign powers. Mao Zedong(Mao Tse-tung)*, founder of a branch of the Com-munist party, gathered followers who wished to re-shape China in a distinctive Marxist mold. Oppos-ing the Communists were the Nationalists, led byJiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) who wanted to pre-serve their power and governmental leadership. Bythe early 1940s, the corrupt and inefficient Nation-alist regime was exhausted. The Communist move-ment, meanwhile, grew stronger during the SecondWorld War as Mao opposed the Japanese invadersand won the loyalty of Chinese peasants. Mao fi-nally prevailed, as Jiang fled in 1949 to the island ofTaiwan (Formosa), where he nursed the improbablebelief that he was still the rightful ruler of all Chinaand would one day return.

The United States failed to understand issuesthat were part of the long internal conflict in Chinaor the immense popular support Mao had garnered.

As the Communist army moved toward victory, theNew York Times termed Mao’s party a “nauseousforce,” a “compact little oligarchy dominated byMoscow’s nominees.” Mao’s proclamation of thePeople’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949,fanned fears of Russian domination, for he had al-ready announced his regime’s support for the SovietUnion against the “imperialist” United States.

Events in China caused near hysteria in America.Even before Mao’s victory, the State Department is-sued a 1,000-page document entitled TheChina White Paper, which outlined thebackground of the struggle and arguedthat the United States was powerless toalter the results. “The unfortunate but in-escapable fact is that the ominous resultof the civil war in China was beyond thecontrol of the government of the UnitedStates,” the White Paper declared. Staunch anti-Communists argued that Truman and the UnitedStates were to blame for the Nationalist defeat be-cause they failed to provide Jiang with sufficientsupport. Four senators called the White Paper a

A New Chinese Leader Mao Zedong, chairman of the Chi-nese Communist party, was a powerful and popular leader who droveJiang Jieshi from power in 1949 and established a stronghold over thePeople’s Republic of China he created at that time. How was Maoable to defeat his opponents and win the revolutionary war?(Bettmann/CORBIS)

Chairman MaoCasts His Vote,

1953

*Chinese names are rendered in their modern pinyin spelling. At first occur-rence, the older but perhaps more familiar spelling (usually Wade-Giles) isgiven in parentheses.





“whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy whichhas succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of So-viet conquest with its ultimate threat to the peace ofthe world and our own national security.” Secretaryof State Dean Acheson briefly considered grantingdiplomatic recognition to the new Chinese govern-ment but backed off after the Communists seizedAmerican property, harassed American citizens,and openly allied China with the USSR. Like otherAmericans, Acheson mistakenly viewed the Chineseas Soviet puppets.

Tension with China increased during the KoreanWar (1950–1953) and again in 1954 when Mao’s gov-ernment began shelling Nationalist positions on theoffshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Eisenhower,elected U.S. president in 1952, was committed todefending the Nationalists on Taiwan from a Com-munist attack, but he was unwilling to risk war overthe islands. Again he showed an understanding ofthe need to proceed with caution.

Stalemate in the Korean WarThe Korean War highlighted growing U.S. interven-tion in Asia. Concern about China and determina-tion to contain communism led the United Statesinto a bloody foreign struggle. But American objec-tives were not always clear and after three years ofwar remained largely unrealized.

The conflict in Korea stemmed from tensionslingering after World War II. Korea, long underJapanese control, hoped for independence afterJapan’s defeat. But after the atomic bombs droppedon Japan, the Allies, seeking to bring a rapid end tothe Pacific struggle and expedite the transition topeace, temporarily divided Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel. The arrangement allowed Soviettroops to accept Japanese surrender in the northwhile American forces did the same in the south.The Soviet–American line, initially intended as amatter of military convenience, hardened after1945, just as a similar division became rigid in Ger-many. In time, the Soviets set up a Korean govern-ment in the north and the Americans a second Ko-rean government in the south. Though the major

powers left Korea by the end of thedecade, they continued to support theregimes they had created. Each Koreangovernment hoped to reunify the countryon its own terms.

North Korea moved first. On June 25,1950, North Korean forces crossed thethirty-eighth parallel and invaded South

Korea. While the North Koreans used Soviet-builttanks, they operated on their own initiative. Kim Il

Sung, the North Korean leader, had visited Moscowearlier and gained Soviet acquiescence for an attack,but both the planning and the implementation oc-curred in Korea.

Taken by surprise and certain that Russia hadmasterminded the North Korean offensive to testthe U.S. containment policy, Truman told the Amer-ican public that “the attack upon Korea makes itplain beyond all doubt that communism has passedbeyond the use of subversion to conquer indepen-dent nations and will now use armed invasion andwar.” He later reflected in his memoirs: “If this wasallowed to go unchallenged it would mean a thirdworld war, just as similar incidents had brought onthe second world war.”

Truman readied American naval and air forcesand directed General Douglas MacArthur, head ofthe American occupation forces in Japan, to supplySouth Korea. The United States also went to the UNSecurity Council. With the Soviet Union absent in

General MacArthur General Douglas MacArthur was a su-perb tactician but a supremely egotistical commander of UN forces inKorea, where this picture was taken in the first year of the KoreanWar. Eventually his arrogance led him to challenge Truman’s policy,whereupon the president relieved him of his command. How doesthis image convey MacArthur’s strong-willed approach? (Time Life Pic-tures/Getty Images)

The KoreanWar,

1950–1953




918

protest of the UN’s refusal to admit the People’s Re-public of China, despite its victory in the Chinesecivil war, the United States secured a unanimousresolution branding North Korea an aggressor, thenanother resolution calling on members of the orga-nization to assist South Korea in repelling aggres-sion and restoring peace. MacArthur became leaderof all UN forces in this largest UN operation to date.The United States and South Korea provided morethan 90 percent of the personnel, but 15 other na-tions participated in the UN effort.

Air and naval forces, then ground forces, wentinto battle south of the thirty-eighth parallel. Fol-lowing a daring amphibious invasion that pushed

the North Koreans back to the formerboundary line, UN troops crossed thethirty-eighth parallel, hoping to reunifyKorea under an American-backed gov-ernment. Despite Chinese signals thatthis movement toward their borderthreatened their security, the UN troops

pressed on. In October, Chinese troops appearedbriefly in battle, then disappeared. The next month,the Chinese mounted a full-fledged counterattack,which pushed the UN forces back below the divid-ing line.

The resulting stalemate provoked a bitter strug-gle between MacArthur and Truman. The brilliant

but arrogant general called for retaliatory airstrikes against China. He faced opposition fromGeneral Omar Bradley, chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, who declared, “Frankly, in the opin-ion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy wouldinvolve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, atthe wrong time, with the wrong enemy,” and fromPresident Truman, who remained committed toconducting a limited war. MacArthur finally wenttoo far. In April 1951, he argued that the Americanapproach in Korea was wrong and asserted pub-licly that “there is no substitute for victory.” Tru-man had no choice but to relieve the general for in-subordination. The decision outraged manyAmericans. After the stunning victories of WorldWar II, limited war was frustrating and difficult tounderstand.

The Korean War dragged on into Eisenhower’spresidency. Campaigning in 1952, Ike promised togo to Korea, and three weeks after his election, hedid so. When UN truce talks bogged down in May1953, the fighting intensified and the newadministration privately threatened theChinese with the use of atomic weapons.This threat prompted the renewal of ne-gotiations, and on July 27, 1953, anarmistice was signed. After three longyears, the unpopular war ended.

AMERICAN VOICESSpeech to Troops by Colonel Lewis “Chesty” Puller, CommandingOfficer of the 1st Regiment of the Marine Corps in Korea in 1950

On November 10, 1950, the Marine Corps celebrated theanniversary of its founding.Colonel Puller sliced a 100-poundcake, decorated with radishes and jelly since candles were notavailable, with a captured North Korean sword.Then, afteroffering a tribute to the Marine Corps, he gave a brief speechto his troops in which he talked about the need to fight hardand complained about the lack of awareness of the nature ofthe conflict back home in the United States.

Now that’s complied with, and I want to tell yousomething straight. Just do one thing for me—writeyour people back home and tell ’em there’s one hellof a damned war on out here, and that the raggedy-tailed North Koreans have been shipping a lot ofso-called good American troops, and may do itagain. Tell ’em there’s no secret weapon for ourcountry but to get hard, to get in there and fight.

I want you to make ’em understand: Our coun-try won’t go on forever, if we stay as soft as we arenow. There won’t be an America—because someforeign soldiery will invade us and take our womenand breed a hardier race.

■ What did Colonel Puller want Americans at home tounderstand?

■ What was Colonel Puller’s overriding fear about what washappening in the war?

■ How does he characterize the North Koreans?

■ Why were Americans at home ambivalent about the con-flict going on in Korea?

U.S. Marines—1950

The KoreanWar Armistice






American involvement carried a heavy price:more than 33,000 Americans killed in action andmore than 142,000 American casualties in all. Theother 15 UN nations involved in the struggle ac-counted for another 17,000 casualties. But those fig-ures paled in comparison to Korean casualties: asmany as 2 million Koreans dead and countless oth-ers wounded and maimed.

The war significantly changed American attitudesand institutions. For the first time, American forcesfought in racially integrated units. As commander inchief, Truman had ordered the integration of the

armed forces in 1948, over the opposition of manygenerals, and African Americans became part of allmilitary units. Their successful performance led toacceptance of military integration.

During the Korean War military expendituressoared from $13 billion in 1950 to about $47 billionthree years later, as defense spending followed theguidelines proposed in NSC-68. In the process, theUnited States accepted the demands of permanentmobilization. Whereas the military absorbed lessthan one-third of the federal budget in 1950, adecade later, it took half. More than a million military

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Farthest UN advanceNov. 1950

Truce line1953

Farthest North KoreanadvanceSept. 1950

Internationalboundary, 1950

38°

Yellow Sea

Sea of Japan

Seoul

Panmunjom

PusanAug.–Sept. 1950

InchonSept. 1950

PyongyangSept. 1950

CHINA

JAPAN

NORTHKOREA

SOUTHKOREA

Battles

North Korean invasion

UN offensive

Chinese Communist offensive

The Korean War

This map shows the ebb and flow of the Korean War. North Korea crossed the thirty-eighth parallel first, then the UN offensive drove the North Koreans close to the Chineseborder, and finally the Chinese Communists entered the war and drove the UN forcesback below the thirty-eighth parallel. The armistice signed at Panmunjom in 1953 pro-vided a dividing line very close to the prewar line. Reflecting on the Past How far didboth North Korea and South Korea penetrate into the territory of the other nation?What role did China play in the Korean War?




personnel were stationed around the world. At home,an increasingly powerful military establishment be-came closely tied to corporate and scientific commu-nities and created a military–industrial complex thatemployed 3.5 million Americans by 1960.

The Korean War had significant political effects aswell. In September 1951, the United States signed apeace treaty with Japan and came to rely on theJapanese to maintain the balance of power in the Pa-cific. At the same time, the struggle poisoned rela-tions with the People’s Republic of China, which re-mained unrecognized by the United States, andensured a diplomatic standoff that lasted more than20 years.

Vietnam: The Roots of ConflictThe commitment to stopping the spread of commu-nism led to the massive U.S. involvement in Vietnam.That struggle tore the United States apart, wroughtenormous damage in Southeast Asia, and finallyforced a re-evaluation of U.S. Cold War policies.

The roots of the war extended far back in thepast. Indochina—the part of Southeast Asia that in-cluded Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia—had been aFrench colony since the mid-nineteenth century.

During World War II, Japan occupied the region butallowed French collaborators to administer internalaffairs. An independence movement, led by theCommunist organizer and revolutionary Ho ChiMinh, sought to expel the Japanese conquerorsfrom Vietnam. In 1945, the Allied powers faced thedecision of how to deal with Ho and his nationalistmovement.

Franklin Roosevelt, like Woodrow Wilson, be-lieved in self-determination and wanted to endcolonialism. But France was determinedto regain its colony as a way of preservingits status as a great power, and by the timeof his death, Roosevelt had backed down.Meanwhile, Ho Chi Minh established theDemocratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945.The new government’s declaration of in-dependence echoed its American coun-terpart, declaring: “All men are createdequal. They are endowed by their Creatorwith certain inalienable rights, amongthese are Life, Liberty and the pursuit ofHappiness.” Although the new government enjoyedwidespread popular support, the United States re-fused to recognize it.

A long, bitter struggle broke out between Frenchand Vietnamese forces, which became entangledwith the larger Cold War. President Truman was lessconcerned about ending colonialismthan with checking Soviet power. Heneeded France to balance the Soviets inEurope, where he wanted French supportfor America’s policy in Germany and as amember of NATO, and that meant coop-erating with France in Vietnam.

Although Ho did not have close ties tothe Soviet Union and was committed tohis independent nationalist crusade, Tru-man and his advisers, who saw communism as amonolithic force, assumed wrongly that Ho took or-ders from Moscow. Hence, in 1950, the UnitedStates formally recognized the French puppet gov-ernment in Vietnam, and by 1954, the United Stateswas paying more than three-quarters of the cost ofFrance’s Indochina war.

After Eisenhower took office, France’s position inSoutheast Asia deteriorated. Secretary of StateDulles was eager to assist the French, and the chair-man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff even contemplatedusing nuclear weapons, but Eisenhower refused tointervene directly. He understood the lack of Ameri-can support for intervention in that far-off land.Senator John F. Kennedy spoke for many of his con-gressional colleagues when he declared in 1954: “Iam frankly of the belief that no amount of American

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1975

do

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90

70

50

30

10

1945 1950 1955 1960Year

World War ll ends

Korean WarCold War

Defense Expenditures, 1945–1960

Defense spending plummeted after World War II, only toquadruple with the onset of the Korean War.After thatincrease, spending levels never dropped dramatically,even after the end of the war.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Ho Chi Minh,Declaration ofIndependence

for theDemocraticRepublic of

Vietnam(1945)

AmericanObjectives in

Southeast Asia(June 25,

1952)






military assistance in Indochina can conquer an en-emy which is everywhere and at the same time

nowhere, ‘an enemy of the people’ whichhas the sympathy and covert support ofthe people.” As a French fortress at DienBien Phu in the north of Vietnam finallyfell to Ho’s forces, an international confer-ence in Geneva sought to prevent Ho ChiMinh from gaining control of the entirecountry. The final declaration of the con-ference divided Vietnam along the seven-

teenth parallel, with elections promised in 1956 tounify the country and determine its political fate.

Two separate Vietnamese states emerged. Ho ChiMinh held power in the north, while in the south,Ngo Dinh Diem, a fierce anti-Communist who hadbeen in exile in the United States, returned to form agovernment. Diem, a Vietnamese nationalist whohad served in the colonial bureaucracy earlier, hadproclaimed his support for Vietnamese indepen-dence while in America. Now he enjoyed the fullsupport of the United States, which saw him as a

way of securing stability in Southeast Asia andavoiding further communist incursions. When hedecided not to hold the elections mandated in theGeneva accord, the United States backed him inthat decision. In the next few years, American aidincreased and military advisers—675 by the timeEisenhower left office—began to assist the SouthVietnamese. The United States had taken its firststeps toward direct involvement in a ruinous warhalfway around the world that would escalate out ofcontrol.

The Creation of Israel and Its Impacton the Middle EastThe creation of the state of Israel became inter-twined with larger Cold War issues. Jews had longedfor a homeland for years, and the Zionist movementhad sought a place in Palestine, in the Middle East,since the latter part of the nineteenth century. Jew-ish settlers who began to gravitate to Palestine werenot welcomed by the Turks, who dominated the re-gion, or by the British, who exercised control afterWorld War I.

Then the Holocaust—and the slaughter of 6 mil-lion Jews—during World War II created new pressurefor a Jewish state. The unwillingness—and inability—of the Western powers to intervene in time to stop theNazi genocide created a groundswell of support, par-ticularly among American Jews, for a Jewish home-land in the Arab-dominated Middle East.

In 1948, the United Nations attempted to parti-tion Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state.Truman officially recognized the new state of Israel15 minutes after it was proclaimed. But Americanrecognition could not end bitter animosities be-tween Arabs, who believed they had been robbed oftheir territory, and Jews, who felt they had finally re-gained a homeland after the horrors of the Holo-caust. As Americans looked on, Arab forces fromEgypt, Trans-Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq in-vaded Israel, in the first of a continuing series ofconflicts that continues to dominate the MiddleEast to the present day. The Israelis, fighting for thesurvival of their new nation, won the war and addedterritory to what the UN had given them. But strug-gles erupted in 1967 and again in 1973 with adver-saries who did not recognize Israel’s right to exist.

While sympathetic to Israel, the United States triedat the same time to maintain stability in the rest of theregion. The Middle East had tremendous strategic im-portance as the supplier of oil for industrialized na-tions. In 1953, the CIA helped the Iranian army over-throw the government of Mohammed Mossadegh,which had nationalized oil wells formerly under

Father Ho Ho Chi Minh waged a long struggle first againstFrance, then Japan, and finally the United States for the independenceof Vietnam. The Vietnamese people viewed him as the father of thecountry. How does this picture of him with children contribute tothat impression? (Library of Congress [LC-USZ62-126864])

Eisenhower,Decision Not to

Intervene atDien Bien Phu

(1954)





British control, and placed the shah of Iran securelyon the throne. After the coup, British and Americancompanies regained command of the wells, andthereafter the U.S. government provided military as-sistance to the shah.

As it cultivated close ties with Israel, the UnitedStates also tried to maintain the friendship of oil-rich Arab states or, at the very least, to prevent themfrom falling into the Soviet orbit of influence. InEgypt, the policy ran into trouble when Arab nation-alist General Gamal Abdel Nasser planned a hugedam on the Nile River to produce electric power.Nasser hoped to follow a middle course by pro-claiming his country’s neutrality in the Cold War. Al-though Secretary of State Dulles offered U.S. finan-

cial support for the Aswan Dam project, Nasser alsobegan discussions with the Soviet Union. An irateDulles, who believed that neutralism was immoral,withdrew the American offer. Left without funds forthe dam, in July 1956, Nasser seized and national-ized the British-controlled Suez Canaland closed it to Israeli ships. Now GreatBritain was enraged. All of Europe fearedthat Nasser would disrupt the flow of oilfrom the Middle East.

In the fall, Israeli, British, and Frenchmilitary forces invaded Egypt. Eisen-hower, who had not been consulted, wasfurious. When told that paratroopers wereabout to land near the canal, he said, “I

Suez Canal

PersianGulf

CaspianSea

Black Sea

Mediterranean Sea

Red Sea

ROMANIA

TURKEY

EGYPT

SAUDI ARABIA

MUSCAT &OMAN

SYRIA

IRAQ

IRAN

SOVIET UNION

BULGARIA

GREECE

YUGOSLAVIA

HUNGARY

ALBANIA

TRANS-JORDAN

KUWAIT

QATAR

Neutral Zone

VariousSheikdoms

ISRAEL

LEBANON

JordanRiver

MediterraneanSea

Sea ofGalilee

DeadSea

Gulf ofAqaba

Gaza

Aqaba

Tel Aviv

Haifa

Amman

Jerusalem

EGYPT

TRANS-JORDAN

SYRIA

WestBank

NeutralZone

NEGEV

Jewish state according topartition in 1948

Jewish state after PalestineWar of 1948–1949

Oil fields

The Middle East in 1949

This map shows the extensive oil reserves that made the Middle East such an important region; it also shows the shifting bound-aries of Israel as a result of the war following its independence in 1948. Notice how Israel’s size increased after its victory in thefirst of a series of Middle Eastern conflicts. Reflecting on the Past Why was Middle Eastern oil such an important commodityto the rest of the world? How secure was Israel as it confronted the other Middle Eastern nations? How much territory did Is-rael gain in the conflict after the partition in 1948?

Eisenhower,Special

Message toCongress onthe MiddleEast, 1957





think it’s the biggest error of our time, outside of los-ing China.” Realizing that the attack might pushNasser into Moscow’s arms, the United States spon-sored a UN resolution condemning the attack andDulles persuaded other nations not to send petro-leum to England and France as long as they re-mained in Egypt. These actions persuaded the in-vaders to withdraw.

Before long, the United States again intervenedin the Middle East. Concerned about the region’sstability, the president declared in 1957, in whatcame to be called the Eisenhower Doctrine, that“the existing vacuum in the Middle East must befilled by the United States before it is filled by Rus-sia.” A year later, he authorized the landing of 14,000soldiers in Lebanon to prop up a right-wing govern-ment challenged from within.

Restricting Revolt in Latin AmericaThe Cold War also led to intervention in Latin Amer-ica. In 1954, Dulles sniffed Communist activity inGuatemala, and Eisenhower ordered CIA support

for a coup aimed at ousting the electedgovernment of reform-minded ColonelJacobo Arbenz Guzmán. It trained andequipped Guatemalans to overthrow thelegitimate regime, which had appropri-ated property of the American-ownedUnited Fruit Company. The right-wingtakeover succeeded, established a mili-tary dictatorship that responded to U.S.wishes, and restored the property of the

United Fruit Company. These actions demonstratedagain the shortsighted American commitment tostability and private investment, whatever the inter-nal effect or ultimate cost. The interference inGuatemala fed anti-American sentiment through-out Latin America.

In 1959, when Fidel Castro overthrew the dicta-torship of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, the shortsight-edness of American policy became even clearer. Na-tionalism and the thrust for social reform werepowerful forces in Latin America, as in the rest ofthe third world formerly dominated by Europeanpowers. As Milton Eisenhower, Ike’s brother and ad-viser, pointed out: “Revolution is inevitable in LatinAmerica. The people are angry. They are shackled tothe past with bonds of ignorance, injustice, andpoverty. And they no longer accept as universal orinevitable the oppressive prevailing order.” Butwhen Castro confiscated American property inCuba, the Eisenhower administration cut off ex-ports and severed diplomatic ties. In response, Cubaturned to the Soviet Union for support.

A Case Historyof CommunistPenetration inGuatemala,

1957


ATOMIC WEAPONS AND THE COLD WARThroughout the Cold War, the atomic bomb cast anominous cloud over all diplomatic discussions andmilitary initiatives. Atomic weapons were destruc-tive enough, but the development of hydrogenbombs in both the United States and the SovietUnion ushered in an age of overkill.

Sharing the Secret of the BombThe United States, with British aid, had built thefirst atomic bomb and attempted to conceal theproject from its wartime ally, the Soviet Union. So-viet spies, however, discovered that the Americanswere working on the bomb, and, even before thewar was over, the Soviets had initiated a program tocreate a bomb of their own.

The idea of sharing the atomic secret was consid-ered in the immediate postwar years. Just before heretired, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson favoredcooperating with the Soviet Union rather than act-ing unilaterally. Recognizing the futility of trying tocajole the Russians while “having this weapon os-tentatiously on our hip,” he warned that “their sus-picions and their distrust of our purposes and mo-tives will increase.” Only mutual accommodationcould bring international cooperation.

For a time, the administration contemplated asystem of international arms control. Realizing byearly 1946 that mere possession of the bomb by theUnited States did not make the Russians more co-operative, Truman proposed to the United Nationsthe creation of an international agency to controlatomic energy. When the Russians balked at a pro-posal that they argued favored the United States, theplan fizzled.

The United States gave up on the idea of sharingatomic secrets. Intent on retaining the technologicaladvantage until the creation of a “foolproof methodof control,” Truman endorsed the Atomic EnergyAct, passed by Congress in 1946. It established theAtomic Energy Commission (AEC) to supervise allatomic energy development in the United Statesand, under the tightest security, to authorize all nu-clear activity in the nation at large. It also openedthe way to a nuclear arms race once Russia devel-oped its own bomb.

Nuclear ProliferationAs the atomic bomb found its way into popular cul-ture, Americans at first showed more excitementthan fear. In Los Angeles, the “Atombomb Dancers”




wiggled at the Burbank Burlesque Theater. In 1946,the Buchanan Brothers released a record called

“Atomic Power,” noting the brimstone firefrom heaven that was “given by themighty hand of God.” David E. Lilienthal,first chairman of the AEC, recalled thatthe atom “had us be-witched. It was so gigantic,so terrible, so beyond the

power of the imagination to embrace,that it seemed to be the ultimate fact.It would either destroy us all or itwould bring about the millennium.”

Anxiety lurked beneath the exuber-ance, though it did not surface dra-matically as long as the United Statesheld a nuclear monopoly. Then, inSeptember 1949, when Americanslearned that the Soviet Union hadtested its own bomb, the Americanpublic was shocked. Suddenly the se-curity of being the world’s only atomicpower had vanished. People wonderedwhether the Soviet test foreshadoweda nuclear attack and speculated whenit might come. At the Capitol in Wash-ington, D.C., members of the JointCommittee on Atomic Energy strug-gled over what to do about the an-nouncement of the Soviet bomb.

When a thunderclap startled them, someone in theroom said, “My God, that must be Number Two!”The editors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,the nation’s foremost publication dealing with nu-clear affairs, moved the minute hand of the “dooms-day clock,” on the journal’s cover from seven min-utes before midnight to three minutes beforemidnight. The clock, which was meant to indicatethe global level of nuclear danger and the state of in-ternational security, reflected the editors’ fear of pro-liferation.

In early 1950, Truman authorized the develop-ment of a new hydrogen superbomb, and by 1953,both the United States and the Soviet Union had un-locked the secret of the hydrogen bomb.This new fearsome weapon raised thestakes of the arms race ever higher. Thegovernment remained quiet about MIKE,the first test of a hydrogen device in thePacific Ocean in 1952, but rumors circu-lated that it had created a hole in theocean floor 175 feet deep and a mile wide.Later, after the 1954 BRAVO test, AECchairman Lewis Strauss admitted that “anH-bomb can be made . . . large enough to take out acity,” even New York. Then, in 1957, shortly after thenews that the Soviets had successfully tested theirfirst intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Ameri-cans learned that the Soviets had launched into outerspace Sputnik, the first artificial satellite—with arocket that could also deliver a hydrogen bomb.

A New Plaything The atom was a source of both hopes andfears for people around the world. Scientists and others realized thatthey faced serious choices as they struggled to deal with the conse-quences of atomic energy. British cartoonist David Low capturedtheir concerns as they weighed their options. What were theirhopes? What were their fears? (Solo Syndication/Associated Newspapers)

Duck andCover

Sputnik The Cold War moved into space when the Soviet Union launched the firstartificial satellite, known as Sputnik (“fellow traveler”). Shown here is a model of thesatellite, which weighed 184 pounds and traveled in an elliptical orbit, ranging fromabout 140 to 560 miles above the earth. Americans, who prided themselves on theirtechnological expertise, were stunned. Why do you think they were frightened as wellas shocked? (Bettmann/CORBIS)

U.S. HydrogenBomb Test inthe Pacific,

1952






The discovery of radioactive fallout added an-other dimension to the nuclear dilemma. Falloutbecame publicly known after the BRAVO blast in1954 showered Japanese fishermen on a ship calledthe Lucky Dragon 85 miles away with radioactivedust. They became ill with radiation sickness, andseveral months later, one of the seamen died. TheJapanese, who had been the first to experience theeffects of atomic weapons, were outraged andalarmed to be the first victims of the hydrogenbomb. Despite the contention of AEC ChairmanStrauss that the Lucky Dragon was not a fishing boatbut a “Red spy outfit” monitoring the test, the Amer-ican ambassador to Japan apologized to the Japan-ese and the United States eventually provided finan-cial compensation. But the damage was done.Everywhere people began to realize the terrible con-sequences of nuclear proliferation. Fallout had be-come a serious international problem—in thewords of physicist Ralph Lapp, “a peril to humanity.”

Both the scientific and the popular press focusedattention on radioactive fallout. Radiation, Lapp ob-served, “cannot be felt and possesses all the terror ofthe unknown. It is something which evokes revul-sion and helplessness—like a bubonic plague.”Nevil Shute’s best-selling 1957 novel On the Beach,and the film that followed, also sparked publicawareness and fear. The story described a war thatreleased so much radioactive waste that all life inthe Northern Hemisphere disappeared, while theSouthern Hemisphere awaited the same deadly fate.

In 1959, when Consumer Reports, the popular mag-azine that tested and compared various products,warned of the contamination of milk with the ra-dioactive isotope strontium-90, the public greweven more alarmed.

The discovery of fallout provoked a shelter craze.Bob Russell, a Michigan sheriff, declared that “tobuild a new home in this day and age without includ-ing such an obvious necessity as a fallout shelterwould be like leaving out the bathroom 20 years ago.”Good Housekeeping magazine carried a full-page edi-torial in November 1958 urging the construction offamily shelters. More and more companies adver-tised ready-made shelters. A firm in Miami reportednumerous inquiries about shelters costing between$1,795 and $3,895, depending on capacity, andplanned 900 franchises. Life magazine in 1955 fea-tured an “H-Bomb Hideaway” for $3,000. By late1960, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization es-timated that a million family shelters had been built.

The Nuclear WestThe new nuclear weapons sparked an enormous in-crease in defense spending and created a huge nu-clear industry, located primarily in the West. Con-tractors liked the region because of its anti-unionattitudes; labor stability, they argued, would make iteasier to meet government deadlines.

During World War II, a number of the ManhattanProject’s major centers were located in the West. The

plant at Hanford, Washington,was one of the most importantproducers of fissionable mate-rial, and the first atomicweapon had been produced atLos Alamos, New Mexico. De-velopment in this area ex-panded after the war. Hanfordcontinued to produce pluto-nium, a facility outside Denvermade plutonium triggers forthermonuclear bombs, the newSandia National Laboratory inAlbuquerque provided the pro-duction engineering of nuclearbombs, and the Los Alamoslaboratory remained a majoratomic research center. In 1951,the United States opened theNevada Test Site, 65 miles northof Las Vegas, to try out nuclearweapons. The 1,350-square-mile tract of uninhabitedland—an area largerer than the

Seeking Safety Americans sought protection from fallout in shelters that civil defense au-thorities told them would be just like home. Here a typical family in 1955 practices in the KiddieKokoon, which had beds and supplies of food and water to last for several weeks. Do you thinkfamily members would appear as happy as they seem here after a few days? (Walter P. Reuther Li-brary, Wayne State University)




state of Rhode Island—was the site of approximately100 aboveground tests. The Las Vegas Chamber ofCommerce offered schedules of test shots, and themushroom cloud became the logo for the SouthernNevada telephone directory. Utah residents often roseearly to watch atomic flashes and years later recalled“the beautiful mushroom as it’d come up, [and]change colors.” Californians could sometimes see thelight.

Satirist and songwriter Tom Lehrer highlightedthe West in the song “The Wild West Is Where I Wantto Be” in his first album in 1953. The first verse went:

Along the trail you’ll find me lopin’Where the spaces are wide open,In the land of the old A.E.C.Where the scenery’s attractive,And the air is radioactive,Oh, the wild west is where I want to be.

Defense spending promoted other developmentas well. Naval commands had headquarters in Seat-tle, San Francisco, San Diego, and Honolulu. Radarsites, aimed at tracking incoming missiles, stretchedall the way up to Alaska. The Boeing Company, lo-cated in Seattle, stimulated tremendous develop-ment in that city as it produced B-47 and B-52 air-planes that were the U.S. Air Force’s main deliveryvehicles for nuclear bombs.

“Massive Retaliation”As Americans grappled with the implications of nu-clear weapons, government policy came to dependincreasingly on an atomic shield. The Soviet Union’ssuccess in building its own bomb encouraged theconviction that the United States had to increase itsatomic forces. Truman authorized the developmentof a nuclear arsenal but also stressed conventionalforms of defense. Eisenhower, however, found theeffort fragmented and wasteful. Concerned withcontrolling the budget and cutting taxes, his admin-istration decided to rely on atomic weapons ratherthan combat forces as the key to American defense.

Secretary of State Dulles developed the policy ofthreatening “massive retaliation.” The United States,he declared, was willing and ready to use nuclearweapons against Communist aggression on what-ever targets it chose. The policy allowed troop cut-backs and promised to be cost-effective by giving“more bang for the buck.”

Massive retaliation provided for an all-or-nothingresponse, leaving no middle course, no alternativesbetween nuclear war and retreat. Still, it reflectedDulles’s willingness to threaten direct retaliation todeter Soviet challenges around the world. “The ability

to get to the verge without getting into war is the nec-essary art,” he said. “If you cannot master it you in-evitably get into war.” Critics called the policy“brinkmanship” and wondered what would happen ifthe line was crossed in the new atomic age. Eisen-hower himself was horrified when he saw reports in-dicating that a coordinated atomic attack could leavea nation “a smoking, radiating ruin at the end of twohours.” With characteristic caution, he did his best toensure that the rhetoric of massive retaliation did notlead to war.

Atomic ProtestAs the arms race spiraled, critics demanded that itend. In 1956, Democratic presidential candidate Ad-lai Stevenson pointed to “the danger of poisoningthe atmosphere” and called for a halt to nucleartests. Eisenhower did not respond, but Vice Presi-dent Richard Nixon called Stevenson’s suggestion

Worrying About the Future SANE tried to get theUnited States, and the rest of the world, to stop testing nuclearweapons and dumping huge amounts of fallout in the atmosphere.This newspaper advertisement, which appeared in 1962, was part ofthe larger effort to make the world a safer place. How does this pic-ture of noted pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock underscore a sense offear? (Records of SANE, Inc., Swarthmore College Peace Collection)




“catastrophic nonsense,” while Dulles minimizedthe hazards of radiation by arguing, “From a healthstandpoint, there is greater danger from wearing awrist watch with a luminous dial.”

In 1957, activists organized SANE, the NationalCommittee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. One of itsmost effective advertisements featured internation-ally known pediatrician Benjamin Spock, lookingdown at a little girl with a frown on his face. “Dr.Spock is worried,” the caption read, and the text be-low amplified on his concern. “I am worried,” hesaid, “not so much about the effect of past tests butat the prospect of endless future ones. As the testsmultiply, so will the damage to children—here andaround the world.”

Several years later, women who had worked withSANE took the protest movement a step further. Tochallenge continued testing, which dropped lethalradiation on all inhabitants of the globe, the pro-testers called on women throughout the country tosuspend normal activities for a day and strike forpeace. An estimated 50,000 women marched in 60communities around the nation. Their slogans pro-claimed “Let the Children Grow” and “End the ArmsRace—Not the Human Race.”

Pressure from many groups produced a politicalbreakthrough and sustained it for a time. The super-powers began a voluntary moratorium on testing inthe fall of 1958. It lasted until the Soviet Union re-sumed testing in September 1961 and the UnitedStates began again the following March.




THE COLD WAR AT HOMEThe Cold War’s effects on domestic affairs led to thecreation of an internal loyalty program that seri-ously violated civil liberties. Maps (such as the oneon p. 909) showed half the world colored red to dra-matize the spread of communism. As Americans be-gan to suspect Communist infiltration at home,some determined to root out all traces of commu-nism inside the United States.

Truman’s Loyalty ProgramThe Truman administration used increasingly shrillrhetoric in its drive to mobilize support for its con-tainment program in the immediate postwar years.Spokespeople contrasted American virtues with di-abolical Russian designs. For Truman, the issue con-fronting the world was one of “tyranny or freedom.”Attorney general J. Howard McGrath spoke of “manyCommunists in America,” each bearing the “germ ofdeath for society.”

When administration officials perceived an inter-nal threat to security after the discovery of classifieddocuments in the offices of the allegedly pro-Com-munist Amerasia magazine, Truman appointed aTemporary Commission on Employee Loyalty. Re-publican gains in the midterm elections of 1946 ledhim to try to head off a congressional loyalty probethat could be used for partisan ends, especiallysince Republicans had accused the Democrats ofbeing “soft on communism.”

On the basis of the report from his temporarycommission, Truman in 1947 issued an executivedecree establishing a new Federal Employee Loy-alty Program. In the same week that he announcedhis containment policy, Truman ordered the FBI tocheck its files for evidence of subversive activityand to bring suspects before a new Civil ServiceCommission Loyalty Review Board. Initially, theprogram included safeguards and assumed that achallenged employee was innocent until provenguilty. But as the Loyalty Review Board assumedmore power, it ignored individual rights. Employ-ees about whom there was any doubt, regardless ofproof, found themselves under attack, with littlechance to fight back. Val Lorwin, whose story wastold at the start of the chapter, was just one ofmany victims.

The Truman loyalty program examined severalmillion employees but found grounds for dismiss-ing only several hundred. Nonetheless, it bred theunwarranted fear of subversion, led to the assump-tion that absolute loyalty could be achieved, and le-gitimized investigative tactics that were used irre-sponsibly to harm innocent individuals.

The Congressional Loyalty ProgramWhile Truman’s loyalty probe investigated govern-ment employees, Congress launched its own pro-gram. In the early years of the Cold War, the law be-came increasingly explicit about what was illegal inthe United States. The Smith Act of 1940 made it acrime to advocate or teach the forcible overthrow ofthe U.S. government. The McCarran Internal Secu-rity Act of 1950, passed over Truman’s veto, furthercircumscribed Communist activity by declaring thatit was illegal to conspire to act in a way that would“substantially contribute” to establishing a totalitar-ian dictatorship in America and by requiring mem-bers of Communist organizations to register withthe attorney general. The American Communistparty, which had never been large, even in the De-pression, declined still further. Membership, num-bering about 80,000 in 1947, fell to 55,000 in 1950and to 25,000 in 1954.



928

AMERICAN VOICESInterrogation of Writer Ring Lardner, Jr., by the House Un-AmericanActivities Committee (HUAC) in 1947

In 1947,HUAC began an investigation of the motion pictureindustry, on the grounds that the left-wing sympathies ofwriters, actors, and directors compromised their work andcould corrupt the American public. Well-publicized hearingsbecame contentious, and the nation became familiar withthe refrain:“Are you now or have you ever been a memberof the Communist Party?” In the following selection, com-mittee chairman J. Parnell Thomas and chief investigatorRobert E. Stripling question Lardner and seek to find outabout his involvement with the Screen Writers Guild, whichHUAC considered subversive.

MR. LARDNER. Mr. Chairman, I have a short state-ment I would like to make. . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lardner, the committee isunanimous in the fact that after you testify you mayread your statement.

MR. LARDNER. Thank you. . . .MR. STRIPLING. Mr. Lardner, are you a member of

the Screen Writers Guild?MR. LARDNER. Mr. Stripling, I want to be coopera-

tive about this, but there are certain limits to mycooperation. I don’t want to help you divide orsmash this particular guild, or to infiltrate themotion-picture business in any way for the purposewhich seems to me to be to try to control that busi-ness, to control what the American people can seeand hear in their motion-picture theaters.

THE CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Lardner, don’t do likethe others, if I were you, or you will never read yourstatement. I would suggest _____

MR. LARDNER. Mr. Chairman, let me _____

THE CHAIRMAN. You be responsive to the question.MR. LARDNER: I am _____

THE CHAIRMAN. The question is:Are you amember of the Screen Writers Guild?

MR. LARDNER. But I understood you to say that Iwould be permitted to read the statement, Mr.Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. Yes; after you are finished withthe questions and answers _____

MR. LARDNER. Yes. . . .THE CHAIRMAN. All right, then, a congressional

committee is asking you:Are you a member of the

Screen Writers Guild? Now you answer it “yes” or“no.”

MR. LARDNER. Well, I am saying that in order toanswer that _____

THE CHAIRMAN. All right, put the next question.Go to the $64 question.

THE WITNESS. I haven’t _____

THE CHAIRMAN. Go to the next question.MR. STRIPLING. Mr. Lardner, are you now or have

you ever been a member of the Communist Party?MR. LARDNER. Well, I would like to answer that

question, too.MR. STRIPLING. Mr. Lardner, the charge has been

made before this committee that the Screen WritersGuild, which, according to the record, you are amember of, whether you admit it or not, has anumber of individuals in it who are members of theCommunist Party.The committee is seeking todetermine the extent of Communist infiltration inthe Screen Writers Guild and in other guilds withinthe motion-picture industry.

MR. LARDNER. Yes.MR. STRIPLING. And certainly the question of

whether or not you are a member of theCommunist Party is very pertinent. Now, are you amember or have you ever been a member of theCommunist Party?

MR.LARDNER. It seems to me you are trying to dis-credit the Screen Writers Guild through me and themotion-picture industry through the Screen WritersGuild and our whole practice of freedom of expression.

MR. STRIPLING. If you and others are members ofthe Communist Party you are the ones who are dis-crediting the Screen Writers Guild.

■ Why do you think the interchange between Stripling andLardner was so contentious?

■ What was Stripling trying to find out?

■ Why was Lardner reluctant to answer?

Source: House Committee on Un-American Activities, Hearings Regardingthe Communist Infiltration of the Motion Picture Industry, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,October 27, 1947, pp. 479–482.




The investigations of the House Un-American Ac-tivities Committee (HUAC) contributed to that de-cline. Intent on rooting out subversion, HUACprobed the motion picture industry in 1947, claiming

that left-wing sympathies of writers, ac-tors, directors, and producers were cor-rupting the American public. A frequentrefrain in congressional hearings was “Areyou now or have you ever been a memberof the Communist party?” Altogether,HUAC called 19 Hollywood figures to tes-tify. When 10 of them—including notedwriters Ring Lardner, Jr., and Dalton

Trumbo—refused to answer such accusatory ques-tions by invoking their constitutional right to remainsilent, Congress issued contempt citations. Membersof the “Hollywood Ten” served prison sentencesranging from six months to one year and were black-listed for years afterward. The movie industry knuck-led under to HUAC and blacklisted anyone with evena marginally questionable past. Hollywood execu-tives issued a statement that declared: “We will notknowingly employ a Communist nor a member ofany party or groups which advocates the overthrowGovernment of the United States by force or by illegalor unconstitutional means.”

Congress made a greater splash with the Hiss–Chambers case. Whittaker Chambers, a former

Communist who had broken with the party in 1938and had become a successful editor of Time maga-zine, charged that Alger Hiss had been a Commu-nist in the 1930s. Hiss was a distinguished NewDealer who had served in the Agriculture Depart-ment before becoming assistant secretary of state.Now out of the government, he was president of theCarnegie Endowment for International Peace. Hedenied Chambers’s charge, and the matter mighthave died there had not freshman congressmanRichard Nixon taken up the case. Nixon finally ex-tracted from Hiss an admission that he had onceknown Chambers, though by a different name. Hissthen sued Chambers for libel, whereupon Cham-bers charged that Hiss was a Soviet spy and duringthe 1930s had given Chambers military secrets to bepassed on to the Soviets. Dramatically, Chambersproduced rolls of microfilm that had been hidden ina hollowed-out pumpkin on his farm. The microfilmcontained several State Department documentsthat had been typed on a typewriter Hiss had onceowned.

Hiss was indicted for perjury for lying under oathabout his former relationship with Chambers, thestatute of limitations on prosecution for espionagehaving expired. The case made front-page newsaround the nation. Millions of Americans readabout the case at around the same time they

An Anti-CommunistMessage from Holly-wood As Hollywood im-plemented its blacklist of any-one deemed sympathetic tocommunism, filmmakers alsobegan to make a number ofanti-Communist films, such asThe Red Menace in 1949, toshow their own loyalty. Howdoes this poster highlight theproblems facing the UnitedStates? (Michael Barson Collec-tion)

RonaldReagan,

TestimonyBefore HUAC

(1947)





Seeking the Truth in the Alger Hiss Case As Whit-taker Chambers (sitting on the left) confronted Alger Hiss, membersof Congress as well as other Americans wondered which one of themwas lying and which one was telling the truth. Newspaper headlinesdramatized the confrontation, as the public followed the case withrapt attention. Why was this case so controversial? (Library of Con-gress [LC-USZ62-126777])

learned of Russia’s first atomic explosion and the fi-nal victory of the Communist revolution in China.Chambers changed his story several times, but Hiss,too, seemed contradictory in his testimony andnever adequately explained how he had such closeties with members of the Communist party or howsome copies of stolen State Department documentshad been typed on his typewriter. The first trialended in a hung jury; in a second trial in January1950 Hiss was convicted, sentenced to a five-yearprison term, and fined $10,000.

For years, Americans debated whether Hiss wasguilty as charged. He continued to assert his inno-cence for the remainder of his life, although evi-dence made available much later tends to substan-tiate Chambers’s charges.

For many Americans, the Hiss case proved that aCommunist threat indeed existed in the UnitedStates. It “forcibly demonstrated to the Americanpeople that domestic Communism was a real andpresent danger to the security of the nation,”Richard Nixon declared after using the case to win aSenate seat from California and then the Republi-can vice presidential nomination in 1952. The casealso led people to question the Democratic ap-proach to the problem. Critics attacked Secretary ofState Dean Acheson for supporting Hiss, who washis friend. They likewise questioned Truman’s own

commitment to protect the nation from internalsubversion. The dramatic Hiss case helped justifythe even worse witch hunts that followed.

Congress also charged that homosexuals posed asecurity risk. The issue surfaced in February 1950,when Undersecretary of State John Peurifoy men-tioned in testimony before the Senate Appropria-tions Committee that most of the 91 employees theState Department had dismissed for reasons of“moral turpitude” were homosexuals. This led to apress campaign against “sexual perverts.” Then, inDecember, the Senate released a report that painteda threatening picture of the problems of homosexu-als in the civil service. They lacked moral and emo-tional stability, the report suggested, and weretherefore likely candidates for blackmail, whichthreatened national security. No one was safe fromthe intrusions of the Cold War crusade.

Senator Joe McCarthyThe key anti-Communist warrior in the 1950s wasJoseph R. McCarthy, Republican senator from Wis-consin. He capitalized on the fear sparked by con-gressional and executive investigations and madethe entire country cognizant of the Communistthreat.

McCarthy came to the Communist issue almostaccidentally. Elected to the U.S. Senate in 1946, Mc-Carthy had an undistinguished career for much ofhis first term. As he began to contemplatere-election two years later, he was wor-ried, for Truman had carried Wisconsin in1948. McCarthy saw in the Communistquestion a way of mobilizing Republicansupport. He first gained national atten-tion with a speech before the Wheeling,West Virginia, Women’s Club in February1950, not long after the conviction of Al-ger Hiss. In that address, McCarthy bran-dished in his hand what he said was a list of 205known Communists in the State Department.Pressed for details, McCarthy first said that hewould release his list only to the president, then re-duced the number of names to 57.

Early reactions to McCarthy were mixed. A sub-committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-tee, after investigating, called his charge a “fraud anda hoax.” Even other Republicans, including RobertTaft and Richard Nixon, questioned his effectiveness.As his support grew, however, Republicans realizedhis partisan value and egged him on. Senator JohnBricker of Ohio allegedly told him, “Joe, you’re a dirtys.o.b., but there are times when you’ve got to have ans.o.b. around, and this is one of them.”

Sen. Joseph P.McCarthy,Speech to

Women’s Clubof Wheeling,WV (1950)





McCarthy selected assorted targets in his crusadeto wipe out communism. In the elections of 1950,he attacked Millard Tydings, the Democrat from

Maryland who had chaired the subcom-mittee that dismissed McCarthy’s first ac-cusations. A doctored photograph show-ing Tydings with deposed AmericanCommunist party head Earl Browderhelped bring about Tydings’s defeat. Mc-Carthy blasted Dean Acheson as the “RedDean of the State Department” and slan-dered George C. Marshall, the architect of

victory in World War II and the Marshall Plan for Eu-ropean recovery, as a “man steeped in falsehood . . .who has recourse to the lie whenever it suits hisconvenience.”

A demagogue throughout his career, McCarthygained visibility through extensive press and televi-sion coverage. He knew how to issue press releasesjust before newspaper deadlines and to provide re-porters with leaks that became the basis for stories.Playing on his tough reputation, he did not mindappearing disheveled, unshaven, and half sober. Heused obscenity and vulgarity freely as he lashed outagainst his “vile and scurrilous” enemies as part ofhis effort to appeal for popular support by appear-ing as an ordinary man of the people.

McCarthy’s tactics worked because of publicalarm about the Communist threat. The Korean Warrevealed the aggressiveness of Communists in Asia.The arrest in 1950 of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg fedfears of internal subversion. The Rosenbergs, a seem-ingly ordinary American couple with two small chil-dren, were charged with stealing and transmittingatomic secrets to the Russians. To many Americans, it

was inconceivable that the Soviets could have devel-oped the bomb on their own. Treachery helped ex-plain the Soviet explosion of an atomic device.

The next year, the Rosenbergs were found guiltyof espionage. Judge Irving Kaufman expressed therage of an insecure nation as he sentenced them todeath. “I consider your crime worse than murder,”he said. “Your conduct in putting into the hands ofthe Russians the A-bomb years before our best sci-entists predicted Russia would perfect the bombhas already caused, in my opinion, the Communistaggression in Korea, . . . and who knows but thatmillions more of innocent people may pay the priceof your treason.” Their execution in the electricchair after numerous appeals were turned down re-flected a national commitment to respond to theCommunist threat. For years, supporters of theRosenbergs claimed that they were innocent victimsof the anti-Communist crusade. More recent evi-dence indicates that Julius was guilty. Ethel, cog-nizant of his activities but not involved herself, wasarrested, convicted, and executed in a futile govern-ment attempt to make Julius talk. Their deaths un-derscored the intensity of anti-Communist feelingin the United States.

When the Republicans won control of the Senatein 1952, McCarthy’s power grew. He became chair-man of the Government Operations Committee andhead of the Senate Permanent Investiga-tions Subcommittee. He now had astronger base and two dedicated assis-tants, Roy Cohn and G. David Schine, whohelped keep attention focused on the os-tensible Communist threat. They assistedhim in his domestic investigations and

McCarthy’s Anti-CommunistCampaign Senator Joseph McCarthy’sspurious charges inflamed anti-Communist sen-timent in the 1950s. Here he uses a chart ofCommunist party organization in the UnitedStates to suggest that the nation would be atrisk unless subversives were rooted out. Howdoes the chart contribute to the impressionMcCarthy wanted to convey?(Bettmann/CORBIS)

McCarthyTelegram andTruman Draft

Response(1950)

Joseph P.McCarthySpeech






The Rosenbergs Convicted of Espionage Julius andEthel Rosenberg proclaimed their innocence when charged with passingon secrets about the atomic bomb, but were found guilty and executed.Here they are going back to prison in a patrol car after hearing the ver-dict. Why did this case arouse such an uproar? (Bettmann/CORBIS)

even traveled abroad, ripping books off the shelvesof American embassy libraries that they deemedsubversive. The lists of suspects, including Val Lor-win (introduced at the start of this chapter), grewever larger.

As McCarthy’s anti-Communist witch hunt con-tinued, Eisenhower became uneasy. He disliked the

senator but, recognizing his popularity, was reluc-tant to challenge him. At the height of his influence,polls showed that McCarthy had half the public be-hind him. With the country so inclined, Eisenhowercompromised by voicing his disapproval quietlyand privately.

Some allies of the United States were likewiseconcerned. The British, for example, had faced theirown spy scandals in recent years but had dealt withdisclosures of espionage more quietly and grace-fully. They were uncomfortable with the hystericalAmerican anti-Communist crusade.

With the help of Cohn and Schine, McCarthypushed on, but finally he pushed too hard. In 1953,the army drafted Schine and then refused to allowthe preferential treatment that Cohn insisted hiscolleague deserved. Angered, McCarthy began to in-vestigate army security and even top-level armyleaders. When the army charged that McCarthy wasgoing too far, the Senate investigated the complaint.

The Army–McCarthy hearings began in April1954 and lasted 36 days. Beamed to a captivated na-tionwide audience, they demonstrated the power oftelevision to shape people’s opinions. Americanssaw McCarthy’s savage tactics on screen. He cameacross to viewers as irresponsible and destructive,particularly in contrast to Boston lawyer JosephWelch, who argued the army’s case with quiet elo-quence and showed McCarthy as the demagogue hewas. At one point in the hearings, when McCarthy

Major Events of the Cold War

Year Event Effect

1946 Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech First Western “declaration” of the Cold WarGeorge F. Kennan’s long telegram Spoke of Soviet insecurity and the need for containment

1947 George F. Kennan’s article signed “Mr. X” Elaborated on arguments in the telegramTruman Doctrine Provided economic and military aid to Greece and TurkeyFederal Employee Loyalty Program Sought to root out subversion in the U.S. governmentHUAC investigation of the motion Sought to expose Communist influences in the movies

picture industry1948 Marshall Plan Provided massive American economic aid in rebuilding postwar Europe

Berlin airlift Brought in supplies when USSR closed off land access to the divided city1949 NATO Created a military alliance to withstand a possible Soviet attack

First Soviet atomic bomb Ended the American nuclear monopolyCommunist victory in China Made Americans fear the worldwide spread of communism

1950 Conviction of Alger Hiss Seemed to bear out Communist danger at homeJoseph McCarthy’s first charges Launched aggressive anti-Communist campaign in the United StatesNSC-68 Called for vigilance and increased military spending to counter the

Communist threatOutbreak of the Korean War North Korean invasion of South Korea viewed as part of Soviet

conspiracy1953 Armistice in Korea Brought little change after years of bitter fighting1954 Vietnamese victory over French at Early triumph for nationalism in Southeast Asia

Dien Bien PhuArmy–McCarthy hearings Brought downfall of Joseph McCarthy




accused a member of Welch’s staff of being involvedwith an organization sympathetic to the Commu-nist party, despite an earlier agreement not to raisethe issue, Welch exploded. “Little did I dream youcould be so reckless and so cruel as to do an injuryto that lad,” he said with a carefully controlled fury.“Have you no sense of decency, sir, at long last?Have you left no sense of decency?”

The hearings shattered McCarthy’s mystical ap-peal. His ruthless tactics, patently visible to the na-tional television audience, offended millions. TheSenate, which had earlier backed off confrontingMcCarthy, finally censured him for his conduct.Even conservatives turned against McCarthy be-cause he was no longer limiting his venom to De-mocrats and liberals. Although McCarthy remainedin office, his influence disappeared. Three yearslater, at age 48, he died a broken man.

Yet for a time he had exerted a powerful hold inthe United States. “To many Americans,” radio com-mentator Fulton Lewis, Jr., said, “McCarthyism isAmericanism.” Seizing on the frustrations and anxi-eties of the Cold War, McCarthy struck a resonantchord. As his appeal grew, he put together a follow-ing that included both lower-class ethnic groups,who responded to the charges against established

elites, and conservative midwestern Republicans.But his real power base was the Senate, where, par-ticularly after 1952, conservative Republicans sawMcCarthy as a means of reasserting their own au-thority. Their support encouraged the vicious cru-sade.

The Casualties of FearThe anti-Communist campaign kindled pervasivesuspicion in American society. In the late 1940s andearly 1950s, dissent no longer seemed safe. Civil ser-vants, government workers, academics, and actorsall came under attack and found that the right ofdue process often evaporated amid the Cold WarRed Scare. Seasoned China experts lost their posi-tions in the diplomatic service, and social justicelegislation faltered.

This paranoia affected American life in countlessways. In New York, subway workers were fired whenthey refused to answer questions about their own po-litical activities and beliefs. In Seattle, a fire depart-ment officer who denied current membership in theCommunist party but refused to speak of his past wasdismissed just 40 days before he reached the 25 yearsof service that would have qualified him for

NSC-68McCarran Internal Security Act

1950–1953 Korean War

1951 Japanese–American treaty

1952 Dwight D. Eisenhower elected presidentMcCarthy heads Senate Permanent Investigations

Subcommittee

1953 Stalin dies; Khrushchev consolidates powerEast Germans stage anti-Soviet demonstrationsShah of Iran returns to power in CIA-supported

coup

1954 Fall of Dien Bien Phu ends French control ofIndochina

Geneva Conference on VietnamGuatemalan government overthrown with CIA

helpMao’s forces shell Quemoy and MatsuArmy–McCarthy hearings

1956 Suez incidentHungarian “freedom fighters” suppressedEisenhower reelected

1957 Russians launch Sputnik satellite

1958 U.S. troops sent to support Lebanese government

1959 Castro deposes Batista in Cuba

T I M E L I N E

1945 Yalta ConferenceRoosevelt dies; Harry Truman becomes presidentPotsdam Conference

1946 American plan for control of atomic energy failsAtomic Energy ActIran crisis in which U.S. forces USSR to leaveChurchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech

1947 Truman DoctrineFederal Employee Loyalty ProgramHouse Un-American Activities Committee

(HUAC) investigates the movie industry

1948 Marshall Plan launchedBerlin airliftIsrael created by the United NationsHiss–Chambers caseTruman elected president

1949 Soviet Union tests atomic bombNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

establishedGeorge Orwell, 1984Mao Zedong’s forces win Chinese civil war; Jiang

Jieshi flees to Taiwan

1950 Truman authorizes development of the hydrogenbomb

Alger Hiss convictedJoseph McCarthy’s Wheeling (W. Va.) speech on

subversion




retirement benefits. Navajo in Arizona and New Mex-ico, facing starvation in the bitter winter of1947–1948, were denied government relief because ofcharges that their communal way of life was commu-nistic and therefore un-American. Racism becameintertwined with the anti-Communist crusade whenAfrican American actor Paul Robeson was accused ofCommunist leanings for criticizing American foreignpolicy and denied opportunities to perform. Subse-quently the State Department revoked his passport.Black author W. E. B. Du Bois, who actually joined the

Communist party, faced even more virulent attacksand likewise lost his passport. Hispanic laborersfaced deportation for membership in unions withleft-wing sympathies. In 1949, the Congress of Indus-trial Organizations (CIO) expelled 11 unions with atotal membership of more than 1 million for allegeddomination by Communists. Val Lorwin weatheredthe storm of malicious accusations and was finallyvindicated, but others were less lucky. They were theunfortunate victims as the United States becameconsumed by the passions of the Cold War.

Conclusion

The Cold War in Perspective

The Cold War dominated international relations inthe post–World War II years. Tensions grew after1945 as the United States and the Soviet Unionfound themselves engaged in a bitter standoff thataffected all diplomatic exchanges, encouraged anexpensive arms race, and limited the resourcesavailable for reform at home. For the United States,it was a first experience with the fiercely competi-tive international relations that had long plaguedthe nations of Europe. And while there was seldomactual shooting, the struggle required warlike mea-sures and imposed costs on all countries involved.

What caused the Cold War? Historians havelong argued over the question of where responsi-bility should be placed. In the early years after theSecond World War, policymakers and commenta-tors who supported their actions justified theAmerican stance as a bold and courageous effortto meet the Communist threat. Later, particularlyin the 1960s, as the war in Vietnam eroded confi-dence in American foreign policy, revisionist his-torians began to argue that American actions weremisguided, insensitive to Soviet needs, and at leastpartially responsible for escalating friction. As

with most historical questions, there are no easyanswers, but both sides must be weighed.

The Cold War stemmed from a competition forinternational influence between the two great worldpowers. After World War II, the U.S. goal was to exer-cise economic and political leadership in the worldand thus to establish capitalist economies and de-mocratic political institutions throughout Europeand in nations emerging from colonial rule. Butthese goals put the United States on a collisioncourse with nations such as the Soviet Union thathad a different vision of what the postwar worldshould be like and with anticolonial movements inemerging countries around the globe. Perceivingthreats from the Soviet Union, China, and otherCommunist countries, the United States clung to itsdeep-rooted sense of mission and embarked on anincreasingly aggressive effort at containment, basedon its reading of the lessons of the past. Americanefforts culminated in the ill-fated war in Vietnam asthe Communist nations of the world defended theirown interests with equal force. The Cold War, withits profound effects at home and abroad, was theunfortunate result.

1. What were the roots of the conflict that turned intothe Cold War?

2. Why did the United States and Soviet Union find it sodifficult to get along in the years after World War II?

3. How did Cold War policy change in the 1950s fromwhat it had been in the late 1940s?

Questions for Review and Reflection

4. What impact did the Cold War have on American so-ciety at home?

5. Could the Cold War have been avoided?




Recommended ReadingRecommended Readings are posted on the Web site for this textbook. Visit www.ablongman.com/nash

Fiction and Film

Fail-Safe by Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler(1962) is a novel about an accidental nuclear war.The Bridges at Toko-Ri (1953) by James A. Micheneris a novel about the frustrations of fighting the Ko-rean War when people at home do not seem to care.Walter M. Miller, Jr.’s A Canticle for Leibowitz (1959)is about the devastation following a nuclear warthat reduces civilization to a primitive state. NevilShute’s On the Beach (1957) is a novel about a nu-clear war that wiped out most life and created a ra-dioactive cloud that is killing the rest.

Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worryingand Love the Bomb (1964) is a movie made by StanleyKubrick about the absurdity of nuclear war. Fail-Safe(1964) is the film from the novel of the same nameabout an accidental nuclear war that destroyed bothMoscow and New York. High Noon (1952) is a Westerndramatizing the need to stand up to outlaws and re-flecting the need to resist the excesses of the anti-Communist crusade. On the Beach (1959) is the filmfrom the novel of the same name about a nuclear warthat ended all life on earth.

Discovering U.S. History Online

Cold Warwww.learningcurve.gov.uk/coldwar/default.htmwww.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.warThe first URL is the address for a British site that usesprimary sources from the United States and Europe toexamine such questions as “Did the Cold War really startin 1919–39?” “Who caused the Cold War?” and “How didthe Cold War work?” The second URL is the address forthe companion site to the CNN series on the Cold War. Itcontains a good deal of information about a wide varietyof issues.

The Marshall Planwww.lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/marshallThis site examines the Marshall Plan speech, reactionsto the speech, and implementation of the European Re-covery Program during the next 50 years. The site in-cludes a photo exhibit of reconstruction projects at mid-point.

NATOwww.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/nato/This site from CNN has an excellent timeline and imagestelling the history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-tion.

The Truman Doctrinewww.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/doctrine.htmPart of the Truman presidential library Web site, this siteoffers images of primary sources dealing with what cameto be known as the Truman Doctrine.

Korean Warwww.trumanlibrary.org/korea/index.htmlwww.koreanwar.orgA joint project of two presidential libraries, the first sitelisted presents many of the archival resources (docu-ments and photographs) from the two administrationsinvolved in the Korean War. The second site has infor-mation about the Korean War and is a guide to resourceson the struggle.

Vietnam Warhttp://vietnam.vassar.eduwww.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/vietnam/The overview section of the first site gives a good back-ground to the Vietnam War and the origins of Americaninvolvement under Eisenhower. The second site containsa detailed, interactive timeline of the war, interpretive es-says, and autobiographical reflections.

Atomic Weaponswww.atomicarchive.com/index.shtmlA companion to a CD-ROM of the same name, this site of-fers biographies, documents, treaties, an atomic timeline,and more.

Nuclear Age Peace Foundationwww.nuclearfiles.orgThe stated aim of this site is to create an “informed citi-zenry” regarding nuclear power and weapons. To achievethis goal, the site presents an interactive timeline, an im-age and audio archive, a database of nuclear treaties, vari-ous other primary documents, and a collection of essays.

Oak Ridge National Laboratorywww.ornl.gov/timeline/index.htmlAn interactive and illustrated timeline explains the pro-jects of this governmental laboratory, from the first nu-clear reactor (1940) to electron microscope images of thesilicon crystal (1999).

Alger Hisshttp://homepages.nyu.edu/~th15/Funded by grants from The Alger Hiss Research and Publi-cation Project of the Nation Institute and from a DonorAdvised Fund at the Community Foundation for SouthernArizona, this site seeks vindication for Hiss and also pro-vides an array of information and sources on this keyepisode in the Cold War on the home front.

Senator Joe McCarthywww.webcorp.com/mccarthy/mccarthypage.htmThis site includes audio and visual clips of McCarthy’sspeeches.



Documents

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