MINISTERIODE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES, UNIÓN EUROPEAY COOPERACIÓN

GOBIERNODE ESPAÑA

National Report

CITIZENS’ DIALOGUES ON THE FUTURE

OF EUROPE. SPAIN 2018

I. A PANORAMIC VIEW: DO CITIZENS WANT MORE EUROPE? ....................................................................... 5 I.1. Citizens across the EU .......................................................................................................................................6 I.2. Citizens of Spain .................................................................................................................................................7

II. METHODOLOGY AND CALENDAR ........................................................................................................................9 II.1. The organisers .................................................................................................................................................10 1.a. Creation of a steering group ............................................................................................................... 11 i) Transparency and publicity ....................................................................................................12 ii) Pluralism .....................................................................................................................................12 iii) Regional Administration responsible .................................................................................13 1.b. Group of European institutions in Spain .........................................................................................13 i) Offices of the European Parliament and Representations of the European Commis sion in Spain ...........................................................................................13 ii) Citizens panel and online consultation .............................................................................14 1.c. Volunteer group .....................................................................................................................................14 II.2. Characteristics of citizens’ consultations in Spain .................................................................................14 2.a. How many consultations? ..................................................................................................................14 2.b. When and where? .................................................................................................................................15 2.c. How many participants, and who? ...................................................................................................16 2.d. What were the consultations like? ................................................................................................... 17

III. EUROPEAN DIALOGUES: QUESTIONS POSED BY THE CITIZENS ...............................................................21

IV. FOCUS GROUPS: ISSUES DISCUSSED (AND RAISED) BY THE CITIZENS ................................................. 24 IV.1. The challenge of talking about Europe .................................................................................................... 25 1.a. Are we ready to talk about the European Union? ........................................................................ 25 1.b. Discursive positions on the EU: blocs, fractions and nuclei .......................................................27 IV.2. Issues that arose spontaneously ...............................................................................................................27 2.a. Immigration: perplexity, lack of criteria and confusion ...............................................................27 2.b. The demographic question ................................................................................................................ 29 2.c. Current principal EU conflicts ........................................................................................................... 30 IV.3. Suggested topics (not spontaneous) .......................................................................................................31 3.a. The different Europes that we perceive ..........................................................................................31 3.b. The economic and financial future of the European Union ....................................................... 32 3.c. Cultural diversity .................................................................................................................................. 34 3.d. Religious diversity ................................................................................................................................ 34 3.e. The European Union as an international power .......................................................................... 35 3.f. Terrorism ................................................................................................................................................. 35 IV.4. Consensus subjects...................................................................................................................................... 36 4.a. Unanimous successes ......................................................................................................................... 36 4.b. Improvable achievements .................................................................................................................. 38 4.c. Failures and weaknesses .....................................................................................................................41

V. LET’S TALK ABOUT EUROPE: CITIZENS’ PROPOSALS ................................................................................. 43

VI. OTHER (FURTHER COMMENTS ON AND/OR EVALUATION OF THE EXPERIENCE) ............................. 52 ANNEX I. COMPLETE SCHEDULE..................................................................................................................... 52 ANNEX II. LIST OF SPEAKERS ............................................................................................................................ 55 ANNEX III. DECALOGUE OF BEST PRACTICES ................................................................................................ 59 ANNEX IV. COMPOSITION OF THE FOCUS GROUPS......................................................................................61

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A panoramic view: do citizens want more Europe?

I

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I.1. Citizens across the EUIf we analyse the results of a recent study by the European Parliament (Eurobarometer Survey 89.2) the most striking conclusion is that in 2016 the majority of European citizens wanted the EU to play a more important role, and this opinion held steady in 2018. At least half of EU citizens favour greater influence in nearly every area men-tioned on the questionnaire, and in many areas this proportion topped 70%. Compared with 2016, this support receded on only a single issue, but it was significant one: combating terrorism.

A more detailed reading of the survey results brings us to a second conclusion: the percenta-ge of Europeans who want the EU to play a less important role has doubled in most areas since 2016. Just 2 years ago, only a minority of Euro-peans did not want Europe to play a more impor-tant role; however, today, in 2018, we could consi-der this a significant minority (figure 1).

Therefore, although the immense majority conti-nues to ask for more Europe, a growing minority is asking for less. The explanation for this appa-rent paradox can be found in an increased po-larization with regard to European issues. Both the increase in the percentage of Europeans who want more Europe, and (above all) of those who

want less, is due to the drop in the number of tho-se who, in 2016, believed that no changes were necessary. In other words, the majority of those Europeans who, 2 years ago, were not asking Eu-rope to change direction, and who now are asking for this, are inclined towards “less Europe” rather than more.

The shift of people from the conformist group to the Eurosceptic group, although not alarming in terms of size for the short term, does indicate the beginning of a trend. This shift, although tentati-ve, can be seen in 10 of the 15 areas included in the European Parliament’s Eurobarometer survey: These include combating unemployment, border protection, immigration, terrorism, and comba-ting tax fraud. For example, as regards external border protection, in 2016, 16% of EU citizens did not think that it was necessary to make any changes, falling to 10% in 2018. At the same time that the percentage of Europeans who believe that the EU should play a less important role has risen 6 points (from 7% in 2016 to 13% in 2018), those who want it to play a more important role remains almost the same (with a slight dip of 2 points compared to 2016).

In other areas, this shift in opinion is more divided between Europeanists and Eurosceptics, althou-gh the greater part have moved towards the lat-

Figure 1. Europeans’ expectations for future EU action: evolution from 2016 to 2018

Source: Eurobarometer 85.1. (‘Europeans in 2016’, June 2016) and Eurobarometer 89.2. (‘One Year before the European Elections’, April 2018).

DELIVERING ON EUROPE: CITIZENS’ VIEWS ON CURRENT AND FUTURE EU ACTION10

This chapter shall illustrate the combined analysis of ‘delivery assessment’ and future expectations on the

top items most cited by respondents. The fight against terrorism, the fight against unemployment and the

protection of the environment are the three policy areas where, on EU average, more than three-quarters

of respondents call for more EU intervention in the future. Compared to 2016 no significant change in

expectations can be registered, with the slight exception of the fight against terrorism (-3 percentage

points since 2016), making these the citizens’ top priorities for the years to come.

The important change, however, comes into play when looking at the respondents’ evaluation of current

EU action in these areas. 32% of respondents, a significant increase of 9 percentage points compared

to 2016, see the EU’s fight against terrorism as adequate. 29% of respondents say the same about the

fight against unemployment, an equally significant increase of 6 percentage points. At the same time, the

number of respondents assessing the EU’s fight against terrorism as insufficient went down to 57% by 12

percentage points. For the fight against unemployment, a decrease of 10 percentage points from 69% to

59% in 2018 registers.

Q Expectations for future intervention of EU action: Evolution from 2016 to 2018

Source: Eurobarometer 85.1 (‘Europeans in 2016’, June 2016) and Eurobarometer 89.2 (‘One Year before the European Elections’, April 2018)

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ter. First of all, there is a striking drop, compared to 2016, in the group of conformists in areas such as industrial policy (-13 points); agricultural poli-cy (-13); foreign policy (-14); economic policy (-12) and security and defence (-8). This decline in the number of conformists resulted both in an increa-se in the Europeanist group and in the Eurosceptic group, with slightly more moving into the latter.

The transfer from the conformist group to the Europeanist group has a more positive slant in two areas: environmental protection and energy supply. In fact, as we will see below, during the citizens’ consultations, environmental protection was one of the EU achievements most easily iden-tifiable among the participants.

Lastly, there seemed to be no difference in the di-rection of desired change in the following areas: equality between men and women, promoting democratic values, and health and social security.

I.2. Citizens of Spain

If we focus on data regarding Spain, the general outlook is more positive for the EU. Over the past 2 years, Spanish citizens’ demands for more Euro-pe have grown in nearly every area. Indeed, as we can see in table 1, comparing Spaniards’ opinions in

2016 and in 2018, we can see how the percentage of Spaniards calling for more Europe is much more pronounced than in the EU as a whole:

• The areas that saw the largest increase in de-mand for Europe to play a greater role, compared to 2016 (columns 7-9, table 1) are: energy supply (+14); equality between men and women (+13); industrial policy (+13); agricultural policy (+11); foreign policy (+11) and health and social policy (+10).

• With less intensity, other noteworthy areas of demand for a stronger EU role are (columns 7-9, table 1): environment (+8); border protection (+7); security and defence (+7); economic policy (+7); immigration (+6); promoting democracy and peace (+6), and combating terrorism (+3).

• Lastly, amongst all of the areas in which Spa-niards considered the EU to be playing an insuffi-cient role (columns 4-6, table 1), two stand out: combating unemployment and tax fraud. Com-paratively speaking, Spain ranks second among Member States (after Portugal) with 75% of Spa-niards believing that the EU is playing an insuffi-cient role in combating tax fraud. As to combating unemployment, Spain ranks fourth (after Greece, Portugal, and Cyprus), with 80% of Spaniards be-lieving that the EU is playing an insufficient role in this area.

Table 1. Spanish citizens’ expectations for future EU action: evolution from 2016 to 2018

Source: Eurobarometer 85.1. (‘Europeans in 2016’, June 2016) and Eurobarometer 89.2. (‘One Year before the European Elections’, April 2018).

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DELIVERING ON EUROPE: CITIZENS’ VIEWS ON CURRENT AND FUTURE EU ACTION16

Q The fight against unemployment: Citizens’ perception as adequate vs. insufficient

Source: Eurobarometer 89.2 (‘One Year before the European Elections’, April 2018)

DELIVERING ON EUROPE: CITIZENS’ VIEWS ON CURRENT AND FUTURE EU ACTION 17

Q The fight against tax fraud: Citizens’ perception as adequate vs. insufficient

Source: Eurobarometer 89.2 (‘One Year before the European Elections’, April 2018)

Figure 2. Opinion that EU action in the fight against unemployment is insufficient

Figure 3. Opinion that EU action in the fight against tax fraud is insufficient

Source: Eurobarometer 89.2. (‘One Year before the European Elections’, April 2018).

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Methology and schedule

II

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In December 2017, the European Council set, as one of its priorities for 2018, getting an in-depth look at the opinion of European citizens with an eye to defining the major challenges facing the EU in the next few years. At the initiative of the Pre-sident of France, Emmanuel Macron, the Member States of the EU—with the exception of the United Kingdom—accepted the invitation to conduct a join citizens’ consultation process on the future of Europe. Spain’s State Secretariat for the European Union (SEUE), part of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Union and Cooperation (MAEUC), was designated as responsible for promoting citi-zens’ consultations in Spain from May to October 2018.

The SEUE decided to give civil society pride of pla-ce in conducting the different consultations. To this end, a public call was made offering grants to carrying out processes aimed at learning Spanish citizens’ opinions on EU-related issues. Then, the principal EU representations in Spain were contac-ted for their collaboration. Lastly, Spain’s regional and local administrations were invited, along with different institutions and associations, to carry out citizens’ consultations, always leaving the door open to any interested stakeholders to participate. These three channels for selecting the organisers of the consultations led to the informal creation of three groups: a steering group (comprising beneficiaries of the grants), a group comprising European institutions in Spain, and a group of vo-lunteers. The following pages will provide details on the characteristics and composition of each of these groups.

This process resulted in 100 citizens’ consultations being carried out, and another hundred proposals were received. The consultations, as mentioned above, were characterised by providing their or-ganisers with autonomy, whilst also guaranteeing minimal common operational standards. From the beginning, we were aware of the challenges invol-ved in decentralising the organization of the citi-zens’ consultations, with more than 30 different collectives and institutions; in using different for-mats for participation; in opening up many com-munication channels; and in including groups with opposing interests, goals, and motivations—as well as trying to systematically collate all of this data from different sources.

Lastly, with a view to drafting this report, the structure agreed amongst the different Member States has been carefully followed at all times—even though prioritising the possibility of compa-rability with other countries meant, to a certain

extent, not reflecting particular aspects of the citi-zens’ consultations conducted in Spain. In order to obtain more in-depth information on the principal aspects agreed—questions, debates, and propo-sals on the EU—we have divided into three major blocs the different kinds of consultations conduc-ted, according to their capacity to cover each of these three aspects:

• To learn about major questions and concer-ns regarding the European Union, we analysed the citizens’ consultations conducted by the Eu-ropean institutions in Spain, especially the Cafés sobre Europa (Café Talks on Europe) and the Diá-logos Ciudadanos (Citizens’ Dialogues) organised by the Representation of the European Commis-sion in Spain. These events’ main purpose was to systematically collate those issues about which citizens demanded more information, or had the most doubts. Moreover, the people who usually attended these events belonged to a wide range of groups within the general public: young people and secondary school students; pensioners and members of local community groups. These Ca-fés and Diálogos were generally held in small and mid-sized towns, making them very useful to rea-ching a part of the general public that does not ne-cessarily have ties to European affairs, and which it is more difficult to access.

• To identify not only what were their principal issues of interest, but also what debates arose from them, we analysed a series of focus groups, putting the spotlight on different positions and major themes. Specifically, in July a total of 15 fo-cus groups were organised in nine Spanish cities by two think tanks in the steering group: the El-cano Royal Institute and FAES. These institutions had expert external advice from consulting servi-ces and sociologists specialised in conducting this kind of research.

• Lastly, to specify a list of proposals, the main source of information was the greater part of the citizens’ consultations carried out by the other steering group members, which are described in more detail below.

II.1. The organisers

Throughout this process, we have enjoyed the inestimable collaboration of 35 organizations and collectives. Overall, the stakeholders who partici-pated in the citizens’ consultations can be divided into three major groups: a steering group (22), a

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In December 2017, the European Council set forth the need to launch a dialogue process with its citizens on the future of Europe.

Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs participated in an event on 7 May in the Senate, launching the citizens’ consultations.

The Member States deliver a standardised final report with the results of the consultations in their respective countries.

Drafting of a comprehensive final report and preparation for deba-ting it at the last European Council of 2018.

The European Council of December of 2018 debates the conclusions of these citizens’ consultations

In January 2018, the President of France sent a letter to the Pre-sident of the Government of Spain informing him of the proposed initiative for citizens’ consultations, and the Government of Spain responded that it was committed to participating.

Steering group Europeaninstitutions in Spain

Volunteers’ group

The Council of Ministers of 13 April 2018 approved Spain’s participa-tion in the citizens’ consultations on the future of Europe.

Citizens’ panel and online consultation

The SEUE, on 23 April 2018, published the recipients of grants for conducting the citizens’ consultations.

Presentation of results

BACKGROUND

METHODOLOGY USED IN SPAIN

RESULTS AND COORDINATION

AMONG MEMBER STATES

group comprising the principal Representations of European institutions in Spain (4), and a group of volunteers (9). These are described below.

1.a. Creation of a steering group

The steering group led the launch of these citi-zens’ consultations, under the aegis of the Habla-mos de Europa (Talking About Europe) project.

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By steering group, we mean those stakeholders who received a grant from the SEUE to conduct citizens’ consultations. The steering group was, therefore, in charge of directly reaching out to interest groups. However, the steering group has not spoken with a single voice; rather, each of its component organizations has had the possibi-lity of coordinating with other organizations, or to work individually. The process of creating this steering group was based on the following prin-ciples: transparency and publicity, pluralism, and accountable autonomy.

i) Transparency and publicity

On 9 February 2018, the SEUE announced a grants call to promote, as part of the Hablamos de Europa initiative, citizens’ debates aimed at identifying their priorities, concerns, and pro-posals within the European Union. The call was open to all individuals or legal persons who were not part of the public sector, and were not-for-profit. The grants were awarded on the basis of competitive tendering, a process in which the applications submitted were compared. The crite-ria for evaluating the projects, as set forth in the call, were as follows:

• Clear and precise formulation of goals.

• Quality and innovativeness of the project or ac-tivity.

• Impact and repercussion of the activity to be carried out: Approximate number of attendees and their social, cultural and geographic origins; renown of the planned speakers or participants; duration of the activity and resources utilised to disseminate the activity and its outcomes.

• Persons responsible for organising the activi-ty and their dedication (activities carried out in the past 3 years in the sphere of the European Union).

A total of 123 projects were submitted to the call, of which 25 were ultimately selected. The selec-ted projects envisaged different goals, and the budget was distributed accordingly, and in line with the impact foreseen. The total initial bud-get allocation was €279,540: 30% of said budget was distributed among 16 minor projects (from €1,000 to €11,000), another 30% was allocated to four intermediate projects (from €14,000 to €26,000), and the remaining 40% was assigned to two projects with ambitious and wide-ranging goals (€52,000 and €64,000, respectively). The

grant award process complied with the principles of transparency and publicity.

ii) Pluralism

The 25 projects belonged to 22 diverse groups, but all of them included in the category of professio-nal stakeholders: associations (10), foundations (8), universities (2), NGOs (1), and trade unions (1). The areas of activity and interests of the different groups could be divided into: building Europe and European integration (9); analysis and study of so-cial reality (6); higher education and training (4); information and communication (2), and, lastly, labour relations and working conditions (1). The final combination sought to represent a diversity of positions and interests:

- Groups whose interests are oriented towards building Europe and European integration repre-sent different branches: the European Movement (represented by Spain’s federal council and three regional councils); the European League for Eco-nomic Cooperation; the Young European Federa-lists; and, lastly, Helsinki España, an NGO aimed at promoting the principles of the Human Dimension of the OSCE’s Helsinki Final Act.

- The groups dedicated to the analysis and study of social reality include foundations and associa-tions that represent different currents of political thought: liberal-conservative (FAES), progressive (Alternativas Foundation), left-wing (FEC), hu-manist (Carlos de Amberes Foundation), and two independent groups (Royal Elcano Institute Foun-dation, and Politikon).

Groups focusing on higher education and training consisted of two university centres with a specific interest in European studies (IE University, and the University Institute for European Studies of the CEU San Pablo University), and two foundations aiming to develop training programmes in non-hi-gher education (EDE Foundation, and San Patricio Foundation).

- In the field of communication and information, we have two expert groups on international rela-tions and foreign policy: Europa en Suma, and Es-global.

- Trade unions are represented by UGT (General Workers’ Union), and, especially, its youth branch RUGE (UGT Revolution). Other trade unions atten-ded as participants in many other meetings.

The stakeholders in the steering group have a pro-

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file that is known in participation and public de-liberation literature as professional and lay stake-holders. Following the classification by Archon Fung (2006), the steering group would be made up of this type of stakeholders. Most of the members of the steering group would choose the form of mini-publics, in the broad definition given by Fung (2006), as the principal participatory format1. Each of those mini-publics would be made up of a di-versity of actors (ranging from political representa-tives and senior officials in the public administra-tion to individual citizens and civil society groups), selected in different ways (e.g. in an open call or through more selective recruitment).

iii) Accountable autonomy

It was decided that the members of the steering group would be autonomous to decide the de-sign of citizens’ consultations, as long as certain requirements were met. Firstly, each group was responsible for drafting a document detailing the characteristics of the consultation, as well as its outcomes. Secondly, they were given a code of best practices when organising a consultation (see Annex III). Ultimately, the aim of accounta-ble autonomy (Fung, 20012) is to decentralize the citizens’ consultation process and guarantee the steering group’s autonomy by providing it with the necessary resources, while at the same time each member of the steering group undertakes to draft a report describing the evolution and outco-mes of the citizens’ consultations.

1 Archon Fung uses the term mini-publics in its broadest sense, including within it mechanisms that envisage a randomization sys-tem when selecting participants, as well as those open to the entire population, or the group formed by professional stakeholders and lay stakeholders”. See Fung, A. (2006). Varieties of participation in complex governance. Public Administration Review, 66, 66-75.

2 Fung, A. (2001). Accountable autonomy: Toward empowered deliberation in Chicago schools and policing. Politics & Society, 29 (1), 73-103.

II.1.b. Group of European institutions in Spain

At the beginning of the process, the different representations of the European institutions in Spain were contacted so as to build bridges be-tween the different projects aimed at recording Spaniards’ opinions about the European Union’s priority issues. Specifically, we have collaborated with the Madrid and Barcelona headquarters of the Office of the European Parliament and the Eu-ropean Commission Delegation.

i) Offices of the European Parliament and Representations of the European Commission in Spain

The Office of the European Parliament in Spain has been conducting, inter alia, two participative processes known as Terraza de Europa [Europe’s Terrace] and Europa en mi ciudad [Europe in my city]. For its part, its Barcelona headquarters ca-rries out different debate cycles on current Euro-pean affairs. The Representation of the European Commission in Spain conducts sessions known as Café con Europa [Coffee with Europe], which have been especially useful to identify the prin-cipal EU-related issues about which citizens are requesting more information. Likewise, its Barce-lona headquarters is carrying out a cycle of parti-cipatory processes in different towns in Catalonia and the Balearic Islands, with a comprehensive approach, called Diálogos ciudadanos sobre el fu-turo de Europa [Citizens’ dialogues on the future of Europe].

ii) Citizens’ panel and online consultation

The European Commission has carried out an on-line consultation open to all citizens. The ques-tionnaire was drafted in a participatory manner through a novel methodology consisting of the creation of a panel of 100 citizens, selected ran-domly in order to reflect the socio-economic di-versity of each of the 27 countries. The SEUE pla-yed an active role in disseminating this survey. As a result, Spain is the fourth country in terms

Figure 4. Participant Selection Methods (Fung, 2006:68)

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of absolute number of responses, with a total of 4,827; i.e., 7.4% of the European total. And Spain is the ninth country, together with Portugal, if we consider the number of responses per 1 million inhabitants3.

1.c. Volunteers’ group

In addition to the steering group and the group made up of European institutions in Spain, there is a third group, called the volunteers’ group. This group was created with the aim of offering anyo-ne who wished to organize a citizens’ consultation the possibility to do so. The main reason for this was that participation should be open to everyo-ne, without budgetary restrictions preventing the participation of those who wished to do so. Even though incentives for participation are greater when there are financial resources, a lack of such resources should not be an excuse for being de-nied the opportunity to participate.

To publicize the citizens’ consultation process, the SEUE has carried out several dissemination cam-paigns through press releases and letters to mu-nicipal councils, the Federation of Municipalities and Provinces, the regional administrations, and the Conference of Rectors of Spanish Universities, among others. To date, the volunteers’ group has included:

• Menéndez Pelayo International University

• Complutense University of Madrid

• Rey Juan Carlos University

• The European Documentation Centre of the Uni-versity of Cordoba

• The European Information Network of Andalusia (Secretariat-General for External Action of the re-gional Government of Andalusia)

• The Con Copia a Europa Association

• Casa del Mediterráneo

• Spanish Confederation of Employers’ Organiza-tions (CEOE)

• The regional Government of Valencia

II.2. Characteristics of citizen’s consultations in Spain2.a. How many consultations?

In total, we have recorded approximately 100 ci-tizens’ consultations as part of the Hablamos de Europa project. This number, while being very clo-se to reality, must be considered as the minimum number of consultations carried out, because other consultations may have been carried out unbeknownst to us. In any event, the number is a good indicator of the diversity of all of the citi-zens’ consultations about the EU that may have taken place from May to October 2018. Figure 5 shows the distribution of the number of consul-tations made by the three groups of organisers.

3 Figures updated on 9 November 2018.4 Note: The total number of citizens’ consultations varies throughout the document because we do not have the same degree of detail of information for all of them.

Figure 5. Distribution of citizens’ consulta-tions, by organising group

8%

48%Steering Group

EU Group

Volunteer Group

44%

Figure 5. Distribution of citizens’ consultations, by organising group4

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35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

2.b. When and where?

As for the calendar distribution, as can be seen in figure 6, in the months of May to July and Oc-tober an average of 15 consultations per month were recorded. September was the month with the greatest intensity, with 30 recorded consul-tations. As planned, the steering group’s activity concluded in December. The group comprising the European institutions continued to carry out consultations in the following months. The exact dates of each consultation, as well as its title and the city in which it took place, can be found in Annex I.

Another important factor when conducting citi-zens’ consultations has been the aim to reach as many locations as possible. To this end, particu-lar efforts have been made not to only focus on major cities. Even though Madrid and Barcelona have hosted the most consultations, as can be seen in Table 2, consultations have been held in most of Spain’s Autonomous Communities, and in 25 towns with a population of under 60,000.

Figure 6. Distribution of the consultations, from May to November

Steering Group EU Group Volunteer Group

Nota: Número total de consultas ciudadanas = 100

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ANDALUSIA 8Baena (Jaén) 1Cádiz 1Jerez de la Frontera (Cádiz) 1Sevilla 4Córdoba 1ARAGON 10Alcañiz (Teruel) 2Calatayud (Zaragoza) 2Jaca (Huesca) 2Zaragoza 4CANARY ISLANDS 2Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1Las Palmas de Gran Canaria 1CANTABRIA 3Santander 3CASTILLA Y LEÓN 6Aranda de Duero (Burgos) 2Valladolid 1Arévalo (Ávila) 1Zamora 1Cuéllar (Segovia) 1CATALONIA 16Gavà (Barcelona) 1Barcelona 9Campdevánol (Girona) 1Gironella (Barcelona) 1Hospitalet de Llobregat (Barcelona) 1L’Ampolla (Tarragona) 1Olesa de Montserrat (Barcelona) 1Santa Coloma de Gramanet (Barcelona) 1

AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITY OF MADRID 27Alcalá de Henares (Madrid) 1Getafe (Madrid) 1Madrid 25VALENCIAN COMMUNITY 6Valencia 3Alicante 1Castellón 1Quart de Poblet (Valencia) 1EXTREMADURA 1Plasencia (Cáceres) 1GALICIA 6Monforte de Lemos (Lugo) 2Pontearas (Pontevedra) 2Riveira (A Coruña) 2BALEARIC ISLANDS 5Calvià (Mallorca) 1Formentera (Baleares) 1Mahón (Menorca) 1Palma de Mallorca 1Sant Eulari des Riu (Ibiza) 1LA RIOJA 1Haro (La Rioja) 1BASQUE COUNTRY 6Bilbao 6PRINCIPALITY OF ASTURIAS 6Avilés 1Langreo 1Oviedo 2Villaviciosa 1Boal 1

Table 2. Cities in which citizens’ consultations were conducted

2.c. How many and who?

Approximately 6,000 people attended. Figure 7 shows the distribution of events by number of participants. In approximately two out of every three consultations held, the number of partici-pants has varied from 15 to 60, with approxima-tely 35 being the most usual number. Moreover, some consultations have been much more widely attended, with up to approximately 350 people.

As to which main interest groups were covered, the most prominent were, in the following order:

• Members of the academic community (stu-dents, teachers, and researchers);

• Europeanist civil society organizations;

• Opinion leaders, such as journalists and politi-cal commentators;

• Diplomats, representatives and civil servants of European institutions;

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18

16

14

10

8

6

4

2

0

• Secondary school students;

• Trade unions and employers’ organizations;

• Representatives of political parties and of local and regional governments;

• Representatives of associations and NGOs;

• Representatives of the justice system and state security forces;

• Farmers and rural entrepreneurs;

• Representatives from the world of culture.

Many individuals have also collaborated with the process, sharing their knowledge on the EU’s cu-rrent situation and its future. According to the data collected, active participants from universi-ties, political institutions and civil society totalled approximately 150 people. A list of those who par-ticipated actively in the citizens’ consultations in Spain can be found in Annex II. Figure 8 shows the distribution of consultations by the number of people who participated in them as speakers. Two aspects stand out: firstly, some speakers were involved in a number of consultations; and secondly, approximately 35% were women.

2.d. What were the consultations like?

The formats of the citizens’ consultations varied a great deal. We have classified the different for-mats into four major groups, taking into account, mainly, how the debates were conducted. Never-theless, each group has a wide variety of mem-bers.

In the format used most extensively, first, one or more experts in EU issues made a more or less brief presentation, followed by a question-and-answer session. Within this category, we find consultations that opted for a more conventional model, being held in such spaces as auditoriums. However, within this group we also find a large number of consultations which, although main-taining the format of presentations followed by question-and-answer session, opted for more in-formal venues, such as cafés.

Another format for consultations was a more ho-rizontal dialogue, in which the presence of the ex-perts, although obvious, was not the focal point. The main characteristic of these consultations was a fluid debate in which the audience inter-vened throughout the consultation, not just after the experts had their turn to speak. Together with

Figure 7. Distribution of the consultations by number of participants

15-30 31-45 45-60 61-75 76-100 101-200 >200

Total number of citizens’ consultations = 67. Approximate number of participants = 6,000

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25

20

15

10

5

0

this group, other noteworthy formats were those in which the debate was also horizontal, but had an experienced moderator (e.g. design thinking workshops, idea labs, mock European Parliament, online platforms).5

Lastly, as mentioned above, 15 focus groups were conducted by two members of the steering group. This research technique has been especially use-ful because, although it did not seek the probabi-listic representativeness of a formal survey, it did make it possible to achieve a degree of structural representativeness. The focus groups conducted are a cornerstone of the Citizens’ consultations on the future of Europe carried out in Spain. This research technique offers us the possibility explo-ring more in depth—from a structural perspecti-ve—the major issues concerning Spanish citizens about the future of Europe. In Annex IV we pro-vide details on the composition of the 15 focus groups, focusing on gender, age, education, em-ployment situation, and city of residence.

One data point that enables us to image how the citizens’ consultations were conducted is their duration. As shown in Figure 10, duration was consistent with the type of debate format used. Most of the consultations lasted from 1.5 to 2 hours. Having said this, it can be clearly seen that many of the consultations were quite long. A high number of the consultations last lasted from 2 to 6 hours were conducted using different

day-long formats divided between a morning and an afternoon session, giving participants more opportunities to socialize and enabling a more fluid dialogue. Lastly, according to the design of day-long sessions just described, there have also been several consultations held over two days.

Figure 8. Distribution of the consultations, by number of speakers

1 2 3 4 5 a 10 11 a 20 >20

Total number of citizens’ consultations = 67. Approximately number of speakers =142

Figure 9. Distribution of events, by format used

Number of citizens’ consultations = 88

Presentation +Questions time

Workshops,participatory

techniques, etcFocusGroups

Presentation & Horizontal Dialogue

55%

17%17%

11%

5 www.masdemocraciaeneuropa.org

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Figure 10. Duration of the events

Total number of citizens’ consultations = 63 (not including the 15 focus groups)

46%

11%

10%

8%

25%

< 2 hours

2-3 hours

3-4 hours

4-6 hours

> 6 hours

33

31

29

27

25

23

21

19

17

15

13

11

7

5

3

1

Figure 11. Percentage of time devoted to information and to debate, by consultation (n=33)

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Total number of citizens’ consultations = 33 (not including the 15 focus groups)

% presentation % debate

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Another factor we considered important when evaluating the citizens’ consultations was the time devoted to the informative and/or dissemi-nation phase involving expert presentations, and the time devoted the discussion and/or question-and-answer phase (Figure 10). Taking as our star-ting point the number of consultations regarding which this information was available (n=33), the results are quite positive. This is mainly due to the fact that a format based on a presentation followed by a question-and-answer session (the most common, as we have seen) is not at odds with devoting more time to the latter. In fact, many of the consultations, despite not achieving a horizontal, multilateral debate, did indeed place more emphasis on question-and-answer phase.

Fundación Ramón Areces

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European dialogues: questions posed by the citizens

III

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Which questions concern Spanish citizens regar-ding the future of the EU? About which issues did they ask for more information? One of the many possible ways of learning about citizens’ real con-cerns is to reach those areas that are usually left outside the political spotlight. This has been the main purpose of the different consultations ca-rried out in 2018 by the different Representations of the European Commission and the Offices of the Parliament in Spain. These bodies are carr-ying out many initiatives to take the pulse of the citizenry, such as the Cafés con Europa (Coffee with Europe), the Diálogos Ciudadanos (Citizens’ Dialogues), Terraza de Europa (European Café), Conecta con Europa (Connect with Europe), and Europa en mi Ciudad (Europe in My City).

Thanks to these consultations the European ins-titutions have been able to reach places that are often forgotten by supra-local institutions. The result has been the organization of more than 40 debates, between May and October, with re-sidents of townshaving less than 10,000 people, including Campdevánol, L’Ampolla, Gironella, Aré-valo, and Cuellar; between 10,000 and 25,000, such as Jaca, Monforte de Lemos, Calatayud, Olesa de Mostserrat, Pontearas, and Quart de Po-blet; and between 25,000 and 65,000, including Riveira, Mahón, Aranda de Duero, Sant Eulari des Riu, Plasencia, Gavá, Calvià, and Zamora. In all of these places, citizens presented their concerns, as well as asking for more information about is-sues regarding the EU. We believe that it is a good starting point to examine what questions citizens asked in these towns, in order to correct the over-representation that big cities tend to have in setting the political agenda. Below is a summary of the questions principally asked by citizens du-ring the events and debates held in their towns.

At first glance, we might think that citizens living in small towns and rural areas are only concer-ned with those EU issues that directly affect their area, of an exclusively local nature. However, in all of the consultations we have seen a high level of interest and concern regarding aspects of econo-mic and international policy which, although the-se people might initially seem far removed from them, actually incite interest due to recognition of the real impact they can have on citizens’ daily lives, and on their pocketbooks:

• How will Brexit affect the European budget for the Common Agricultural Policy? And Spain’s tra-de balance?

• What is the EU’s plan regarding the trade res-trictions announced by President Trump?

• How does the EU defend the different designa-tions of origin in free trade agreements?

• How is the EU dealing with the interests of transnational companies?

• What progress has been made on the Fiscal Union?

Nor are they unaware of the political instability that seems to have been taking root in the EU in recent years. Most of their questions revolved around the wave of Euroscepticism and factions break with EU rules and principles:

• Why are we seeing a wave of far-right and popu-list movements?

• What is the EU’s analysis of this rise in Euros-ceptic movements and parties?

• How can Members States be forced to comply with European directives?

• How to generate a political alternative within the EU to strengthen the Union?

The visible disagreement on migration and asylum issues are also among the main concerns behind some of the questions asked, in these terms:

• What are the EU’s priorities regarding migration policy?

• Is the European migration policy endangered by the Lega and M5S government in Italy?

• Why are some Member States not meeting their quota for accepting refugees?

Environmental protection was also a subject of many questions over the course of the citizens’ consultations; the frequently asked were:

• What is the EU doing to combat depopulation?

• How is the EU promoting renewable energy?

• What is the EU doing to protect the environ-ment from plastic pollution?

The main questions regarding education revolved around mobility and vocational training program-mes, as well as first-time job seekers:

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• What opportunities does the EU offer young people?

• What support programmes for entrepreneurs does the EU have?

• How does the Erasmus programme work?

• What is the role of vocational training in the EU?

• Is it compatible to demand impartiality in edu-cational contents while also designing campaigns to improve the EU’s image?

A last set of questions, although not as frequent as the others, revolved around European policies aimed at overcoming different kinds of inequali-ties and obstacles:

• What is the EU doing to integrate people with functional diversity?

• What is the EU doing to integrate ethnic minori-ties, such as the Roma population?

• What measures have been taken to close the digital divide?

These were the questions most often repeated during the different consultations organised by

the Representations of the principal European institutions in Spain as part of their attempt to reach the general public. The following sections examine how the citizens themselves, as well as civil society, have their own answers and opinions regarding these and many other questions.

Real Instituto Elcano / ESGLOBAL / Fundación Carlos de Amberes

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Focus group issues discussed (and raised) by the citizens

IV

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To identify the principal issues that are of concern to Spaniards, and what their positions are, we analysed the 15 focus groups described earlier in the section on methodology. This qualitative so-cial research technique made it possible, on the one hand, to analyse citizens’ reactions when pre-sented with the challenge of talking about the fu-ture of Europe, and, on the other, to identify their main positions regarding topics that at times arose spontaneously, and at others were brought up directly by the organisers of the consultations. Details about the members of the focus groups can be found in Annex IV. It is important to bear in mind that the participants’ statements and opi-nions included in this section do not aim to repre-sent Spanish society as a whole.

IV.1. The Callenge of talking about Europe

1.a. Are we, as Spaniards, ready to talk about the Euro-pean Union?

One of the first reactions when we are asked to discuss aspects regarding the European Union is to question our capacity to talk about it, and to make clear that it is a subject that surpasses our usual range of knowledge. Faced with such an open subject, a pattern often seen in focus groups was to get off track, talking about issues as they arose spontaneously, linking one to another, and getting farther away from the initial issue.

In the case of the focus groups analysed in this section, such a pattern of getting off track has rarely occurred. In the beginning, participants seemed to have been reticent to speak when con-fronted with the apparent challenge of talking about the European Union in general terms. La-ter, thanks to the role of the moderator, who su-ggested specific topics, participants began to ex-press their opinions on most of these. They made it obvious that they did indeed have opinions, more or less solidly evidence-based, on the major problems affecting the European Union.

Having said this, it is important to note the fo-llowing: Talking about, and expressing opinions about, European Union was not, at first, an easy task for Spaniards. However, when we facilitated discussion through asking specific questions that were interesting to them, we found that Spani-

sh citizens had a great deal to say regarding the Europe they want to see in coming decades. In future citizens’ consultations, discussion topics should be defined in advance as much as possi-ble. If not, the picture obtained will be one of citi-zens who see themselves as incapable of talking about, and expressing opinions about, Europe.

Lastly, and irrespective of how secure they feel talking about Europe, all of the groups expres-sed feeling uncertain about their information, in the sense of lacking media sources offering relia-ble reporting. This uncertainty can be seen both in the lack of clarity when trying to identify the EU’s common problems and when assessing the impact of the political situation of other States on the EU as a whole. A clear example is the fo-llowing quote about Brexit:

-But wait, I’m getting really confused, here. Is it true that the English are going to leave the European Union?-I don’t believe it. I mean, if they have such an important market here, and by “here” I mean the continent of Europe, where are they going to go...?-It’s true, they’ve left the EU.-Well, I’m telling you they haven’t. (Group 3. Middle class, Balearic Islands)

How is this feeling of incapability in talking about the EU mainly expressed? The difficulty in unders-tand what the EU is and how it works appears to be the main source of this feeling of incapability. It often leads to mistrust and scepticism towards European institutions and their representatives. In other words, not knowing how the EU works favours negative attitudes and opinions about it, weakening the ties between these institutions and the citizens.

-As for me, I don’t understand anything about the European Union, not a single thing... I don’t know how it works, how many people work there, what they do... I have no idea, least of all how much money they make and why... no idea.(Group 6. Madrid)

-The truth is, nobody understands how this European Union stuff works, who obeys who, what’s the point of people voting or not... Who are these people to tell us what we can and cannot do? -Okay, I agree with you, I don’t know how it works, but we’re there because they help us

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with a lot of things.(Group 5. Barcelona)

The lack of knowledge regarding the EU’s institu-tional architecture prevents linking mechanisms from being promoted, and particularly prevents feelings of belonging from being promoted. The main aspects in those who identify a lack of knowledge are: the total composition of Member States, the variety of existing bodies, and lastly, how the states and bodies relate to each other.

- Now, if you asked me to list each of the 27, the truth is I’d get lost, I don’t think I could name them all. - I don’t think I could either, but, well… I do know that there are countries that I didn’t even know were countries, I thought they were regions of other countries. (Group 3. Palma de Mallorca)

Of all of the institutions, the European Parliament was the most easily recognised. However, parti-cipants stated that they did not know whether there are mechanisms for citizens to monitor and control the parliament’s actions. They perceive the vertical and horizontal accountability systems between the different bodies and roles as com-pletely opaque. Participants do not clearly see a hierarchal pyramid that helps them to identify the position or body that is responsible for each matter:

- The idea they give you in the master’s degree is that it is all important and that each body is good, really good for each thing, even if it isn’t for another. Okay. But I want to know who’s in charge, who makes the final decision. (Group 4. Bilbao)

In short, there is a marked perception of a lack of information about the EU, resulting in a feeling of being unable to talk about the Union, strengthe-ning the perception of a lack of knowledge, and consequentially weakening citizens’ links with the Europe and specifically their feeling of belon-ging.

The perception described above is known as in-ternal political effectiveness, and consists of the perception that we have of ourselves in relation to our capacity to understand politics. The discus-sion groups that were analysed show that Spa-nish citizens initially considered themselves una-

ble to discuss the European Union. However, in practice this is not entirely true, as we will see in this section. Before moving forward, we will brie-fly describe the main causes of this feeling of not being equipped to talk about Europe.

One of the main reasons that citizens perceive themselves as unprepared to discuss Europe rela-tes to individual socioeconomic factors. In analy-sis of the discussion groups we can see how some sectors of the population tend to take refuge in a lack of information to avoid participation in the discussions. Specifically, the most socioeconomi-cally vulnerable sector tend to cultivate a narrati-ve in which they blame their lack of information on the media, the institutions and the govern-ments. In their version of events, there is an ins-titutional framework focused on creating an ove-rall situation of a lack of information, in order to evade accountability and to water down political responsibility for any decisions made.

- You can’t say you know, because the media lies systematically and always has lied to us, and the people in Europe, the Parliament and all of them, they’re all layabouts… that’s what I think of Europe… we don’t know and they don’t want us to. (Group 5. Employees, Barcelona)

-Well, I don’t think we’re uninformed just be-cause… we’re uninformed because it isn’t in the politicians’ interest for us to understand anything’. (Group 10. Older people, Valladolid)

-You’re right, I agree with her, if we don’t know it’s because there’s a lot of interest in us not knowing. (Group 3. Workers, Palma de Mallorca)

In contrast, the sectors of society that are best positioned in the social structure associate their lack of information with individual factors—pri-marily a lack of time—but also with greater trust in European institutions and their representati-ves.

-Well, my ignorance about everything that might be discussed here tonight is almost to-tal, let’s make that clear, but since I’m all for representative democracy, I think the people who do need to know are all the men and wo-men in Brussels who are there to represent us all. (Group 8. Older people, upper class, Seville)

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Differences are also observed in the way that Eu-rope is discussed according to gender, age and job security:

• Women, despite apparently having the same level of information on the European Union as men, tend to be more reserved about expres-sing a position on a variety of European affairs. Meanwhile, men seem to feel obliged to appear convincing.

• Younger people appear more insecure about their opinions, without any observed lower level of information on Europe than older sectors. Ol-der people, in contrast, are among those who are most enthusiastic and defend the importance of the EU most strongly. This segment is predispo-sed to involvement in initiatives that promote the European project of integration and the defence of their values.

• The segments with the greatest job security and integration offer sounder, more credible narrati-ves and arguments. They have knowledge of the European legislation that affects them most sig-nificantly, resulting in less emotional narratives.

1.b. Discursive positions on the EU: blocs, fractions and nuclei

Majority bloc: There is a clearly larger bloc that expresses fear towards the vision of a divided world that offers no certainty because of the es-tablishment of the idea of a lack of truth. This bloc feels very uncertain about the issues that most concern them. Their concerns reflect a significant underlying insecurity, which is often non-specific, which they feel is overwhelming.

Intermediate fractions: There are two fractions, which are smaller than the above bloc, but which have a considerable capacity for argumentation. We have called them the “belligerent” fraction and the “alarmist” fraction. The issues that are of most concern to these fractions do not differ greatly from those that concern the majority bloc, but they have the gift of eloquence. A trend is thus generated whereby the narratives of the more radical fractions (which are smaller in size) assert themselves over the majority bloc. The be-lligerent fraction (a minority and homogeneous) defends its “Spanishness” and its European iden-tity against those it considers enemies: Spanish separatists and immigrants. This is a very militant

group, with a more concrete and identifiable dis-course than the majority bloc. The alarmist frac-tion tends towards a sort of depressive fatalism as regards the same issues, but, far from opting for belligerence, falls into a form of alarmism and apocalyptic attitude whenever they feel threate-ned from outside of Spain, or from within by sepa-ratists or secessionists.

Small nuclei: There are two nuclei of resistan-ce: pro-openness and authoritarian. The former group promotes positions characterised by clearly progressive ethical and civic principles. The latter group, at the opposite pole, prefers authoritarian figures at the national level who will restore or-der, faced with what they consider to be a current chaotic situation. However, in many cases these people were loose cannons—at both extremes—who did not receive widespread support from the rest.

IV.2. Issues that arose spontaneously

Below are the key results of the debates on the issues that arose spontaneously in the discus-sion groups. Most of the issues are current, and therefore dominate the participants’ short-term memory.

2.a. Immigration: perplexity, lack of criteria and confusion

Immigration was the subject that was debated spontaneously most frequently. With the excep-tion of highly-educated adults, and young peo-ple who belong to different youth associations or NGOs, the underlying feeling in most citizens is deep-seated confusion as to the difference be-tween migrants and refugees, both of which are most frequently amalgamated into the term “im-migrants”. A similar thing occurs with the EU’s re-ception policies. The idea tends to prevail that the arrival of migrants is a “conflict” that the countries of Southern Europe (Spain, Italy and Greece) are facing without the support of other Member Sta-tes or of the EU.

- I think the European Union is there when it suits it, and if it doesn’t it just turns a blind eye… because you can’t say it can’t do

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anything… same as they sent people to Yu-goslavia years ago during the war, they ou-ght to send people to defend us, and I don’t mean just us Spaniards, also the Greeks and the Italians. - Since we’re here, right next to the border, we have to deal with the whole mess oursel-ves. - It can’t go on… I don’t know how many hundreds of thousands there are here, not to mention those who are on the way.Group 6. Madrid

With the exception of a few particular sectors, the majority are unaware of the figures for migrants and asylum seekers, and downplay the effect on other European countries or exaggerating them in the case of Spain. Normally, the sectors that have experienced the situation in other EU coun-tries directly, or that have personal links with peo-ple from other countries acknowledge that it is a problem throughout the EU, and one on which EU institutions have been working for some time, attempting to promote solidarity and viability in decision-making and resolutions.

- I don’t know how many thousands and thousands of refugees there are in Spain, because it isn’t just the government, the re-gions given refuge to a lot of people… here in Valencia, it’s madness, I don’t know how many people have been given residence…but definitely thousands. - And in all of Spain, millions. (Group 1. Valencia)

Broadly speaking, there appear to be three main positions on flows of migrants and refugees: hu-manitarian emergency, conflict of interest and social fear.

1) One position apparently represents the sectors that are most receptive to receiving migrants and refugees, but who are opposed to accepting the complexity of the phenomenon. They refer to the immigrant crisis by placing emphasis on the hu-manitarian emergency.

-Sorry, but you and I, even if it’s a job… for three months, at least I, I have a bed to sleep in, a shower and food on the table, but those people have nothing, nothing at all… and if we are human beings, we have to behave like them. (Group 3. Valencia)

2) Another position seemingly mirrors the sectors for whom the migration phenomenon represents a conflict of interest, representing the complexi-ty of the demand from refugees and migrants in societies that are attempting to recover from a decade-long economic crisis.

- It’s a full-blown conflict, because of course, if you have to leave Syria, well, obviously, in the middle of a war like the one we had here, you leave because you have no other op-tion, but I imagine you also think that you’re coming to a top-notch continent, which is swimming in riches where people are good and charitable…- Lots of people are good and charitable- I’m not saying they aren’t, what I mean is that it doesn’t depend on people, it depends on other things like the economy, like the politics of each country, no matter what the European Union says. You know? It’s a con-flict because you can’t make something out of nothing- And also because it’s all about political ex-tremism and uncertainty nowadays- Of course, you see it from both points of view, and I think that what is happening to the immigrants is a priority. (Group 4. Bilbao)

3) A third position illustrates social fear, caused by the enduring crisis for many segments of so-ciety, deregulation of integration into the labour market, various international divisions and a long list of other factors, whereby the migration phe-nomenon becomes a threat.

- What are we going to do with so many refu-gees, immigrants or whatever they’re called, if there’s no work here for us, what are we going to give them?…- No, what will happen is that the idiots, who are actually sharp as a tack, and sharper than all of us, will choose them because they can pay them peanuts and have them sleep on a mattress outside the plant, not even inside. - And the businessmen delighted with it all.- Until they start to burgle their houses, rape their daughters…(Group 1. Valencia)

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2.b. The demographic question

One issue that is closely linked to immigration is the demographic characteristics of European so-ciety. Unlike other issues, such as financial policy, or the future of the single currency, when consi-dered the demographic question Spanish citizens have more marked positions and share the same conclusions:

1) European societies are seen as peoples in de-cline (falling birth rates), with very worrying age-ing, and ones that are undergoing a transition towards an older population structure. The si-tuation is considered particularly alarming in the case of Spain.

2) In most of the discussion groups, a link was formed between demographics and economic growth. In fact, among the proposals the need for stable jobs and improved work-life balance stood out. Access to housing—not necessarily involving a purchase—is considered another of the key cau-ses of the fall in the birth rate, at least in Spain.

- The crisis of the past few years has also been a blow to young people deciding to have children. - How are they going to have children, if they can’t find work, a home, or even make plans? - Well, when we had our children it wasn’t… much better, we complained, of course, be-cause you have to, but we were able to make plans. (Group 9. Barcelona)

3) Rural depopulation appears to be the most dramatic facet of demographic alarm. A special section has been dedicated to this question, in view of the extremely serious situation in some regions of Spain.

Although there is widespread consensus on the conclusions, the main disagreements arise when considering the migration flows into Europe as a possible means to resolving the demographic pro-blem. The fraction that favours receiving migrants and asylum seekers, and the fraction that does not, agree in underscoring the complexity of the conflict, which highlights the paradox of the need for population growth and the simultaneous fear of “others”.

- Well, if you listen to each other, if we listen to the whole problem we’re describing, I don’t

understand why we don’t ask for it to be ea-sier for people to come from other countries, from Africa, even the Syrians… I don’t know, all over. - It isn’t going to be fixed like this.- And it won’t be fixed if we do nothing, I don’t understand it: we complain about the ageing of Spain, of Europe… and there are people who have to leave their homes becau-se they’ve got nothing to eat, or even worse, they’re in the middle of never-ending wars, and we don’t want to let them in. What’s that about?(Group 3. Balearic Islands)

For every argument that proposes a well-meant solution to the migration phenomenon, often connected to the demographic question, a coun-ter-argument is then put forward by another frac-tion, which ends up dominating:

1) For the proposal to implement more develop-ment and cooperation policies in the migrants’ countries of origin, the following counter-argu-ments arise:

• Most of the countries of origin have unreliable and unstable governments.

• High levels of corruption in the countries recei-ving investment.

• Competing interests within the EU when deci-ding where to invest.

- Invest in those countries? That’s just throwing money way, all that happens is that three guys from the ministry of whatever line their pockets and nothing is done; the people still don’t have any jobs, any hospitals, no-thing… that’s been done more than once and it’s come to nothing…- Careful! On top of that more than likely they’ll call you a colonialist… it’s not the time for…- That’s it… look what happened to the ener-gy companies in Latin America, they’ve had their fair share of problems.(Group 9. Bilbao)

2) For the proposal to enhance border controls to promote controlled and orderly migration, the counter-arguments put forward are:

- The perception that border controls are ineffec-

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tive, given the repeated failures that form part of the collective imagination of much of the popula-tion on this matter (climbing the fences, arrivals from the sea, etc.).

- The existence of mafias that profit from the dis-tress of migrants and refugees.

- The southern border of Europe has been forgo-tten.

3) For the proposal to develop integration and inclusion policies in the host countries to prevent cultural conflicts, the main counter-arguments are:

- The effects of the economic crisis make it im-possible to be altruistic towards the conflicts of people from other countries.

- Disbelief that the rest of the Member States would also opt for inclusion and integration.

- The so-called pull effect.

- The social conflicts that the processes of inser-ting and integrating migrant segments entail

Although the economic arguments to defend po-sitions in favour of receiving migrants and refu-gees (ageing population, weakening pension and social security system, etc.) prove effective when rationally refuting xenophobic visions, such argu-ments are weakened by the counter-arguments, based primarily on political mistrust and dispara-gement of institutions.

2.c. Current principal EU conflicts

This second bloc of subjects on which Spaniards spontaneously expressed concerned includes issues that are the focus of the media. Notably, of the 11 subjects or news items, only one was viewed in a positive light. This does not mean that the participants believe that the UE is responsible for the barrage of bad news, but in recent years in the EU citizens have been referring to negative news more frequently when they discuss Europe.

i) Uncertainty over the outcome of Brexit

All of the groups expressed confusion over the consequences of Brexit, for the Union as a whole, and for Spain. They considered it a symbolic blow that could open the way for more withdrawals. In short, the break-up of the EU, which seemed unthinkable until the Brexit experience, does not seem as unlikely now.

ii) Fear in response to the current Italian government’s threats of leaving the EU.

There was a fear that the positions of the new Italian government could favour a feeling of vul-nerability in an institution such as the European Union, which until now seemed unquestionably robust, and above all irreversible. In addition, the image of Italy among Spaniards may be un-dergoing a change as a result of the Italian go-vernment’s refusal to accept the Aquarius. Some participants began to include that country in a political space similar to those of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe with populist ri-ght-wing governments.

iii) Aquarius

One of the main news items mentioned was the Italian government’s refusal to accept the Aqua-rius vessel, carrying immigrants from Libya. From more clearly pro-European positions there was criticism of the EU allowing Italy to accept the boat, without any consequences. This tended to be the “anecdote” that gave rise to a preventive discourse as regards immigration and the limits of European human rights policies.

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iv) Image of the crisis and difficulties in forming a government in Germany

Participants gave Germany a prominence all of its own, as there are no other countries that approach its capacity for leadership. Although no names other than those of Chancellor Angela Merkel stood out or were identified, the groups were aware of the difficulties and that complex negotiations had to take place to achieve a con-sensus to form governments —and that they had fallen through various times.

v) Misinformation about the governments of Poland and Hungary

The countries that belong to the bloc known as the Visegrád Group were seen as another factor desta-bilising the European Union, although none of the discussion groups were able to identify or name the current conflicts. Unfamiliarity with these countries and a lack of information resulted in odd arguments based on prejudices and stereotypes of Poland and Hungary and very muddled impres-sions of the recent history of these countries.

vi) Lack of leadership

The lack of leaders they can identify with is ano-ther factor that the groups identify as a hurdle to forming emotional links with the EU. Following years of symbolic dominance by leaders (e.g., Fe-lipe González, François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl), the current period appears to lack figures with the capacity to lead—and above all, the ca-pacity to organise points of view that allow posi-tions to be adopted, either through acceptance or rejection.

vii) Separatist nationalism

Most of the groups referred to the pro-indepen-dence movement in Catalonia and understood that it was an inauspicious issue for the European Union. In contrast, some groups denied that it was a European dispute. However, the European Union appeared to have transmitted an image of strength and control in response to the plans for independence in various countries. Only some pro-independence sectors, in the case of Catalo-nia, considered the European Union’s actions in a negative light.

viii) The rise of Eurosceptic parties

Passing references were made over the course of the debates to different parties spearheading

severe criticism of the EU and even calling for it to be broken up. There appear to be two types: a) xenophobic parties linked to certain countries of Central and Eastern Europe; b) parties linked to economic matters, such as some Greek parties. These parties were included in the same area of tension as Brexit, painting a panorama for Europe of a fight for individual interests, with no collec-tive spirit.

ix) Russian electoral interventionism

Another subject that arose spontaneously, but more tangentially, concerns the information that has appeared regarding alleged Russian interfe-rence in the elections of other countries through social networks. This news item, even when pre-sented as an unsubstantiated rumour, leaves a certain trace of uncertainty and reinforces the feeling of a conflictive and unstable international situation.

x) Guarantee of net neutrality

The vote in which Brussels guaranteed net neu-trality in Europe, as opposed to the elimination by the US, is almost the only news item that arose spontaneously with a positive focus on the EU. It entails a view of the EU as a defender of its citi-zens’ rights as consumers. This item of news was contributed in groups by the younger members, in line with their marked optimism and their fami-liarity with technological issues.

IV.3. Suggested topics (not spontaneous)

Some important topics with considerable media coverage did not arise spontaneously within the discussion groups, and therefore had to be sug-gested by the moderators. We will now focus on the subjects that gave rise to the most discus-sion: The different Europes that we, as Spaniards, perceive; the economic and financial future of the European Union; Cultural and religious diversity; The EU as an international power, and terrorism.

3.a. The different Europes that we perceive

The different groups largely agreed on clearly di-fferentiating between five large regions, which

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reflect the different Europes that exist: Northern Europe; Southern Europe; Central Europe, An-glo-Saxon Europe, and Eastern Europe.

To determine these five regions, the participants primarily relied on the following factors:

An economic factor: differences in purchasing power, industrial capacity and labour market indi-cators (unemployment, insecurity, etc.).

Following rules: differences according to respect for set of shared rules to prevent disputes be-tween Member States.

Culture and customs: different work habits, at-titudes towards making friends and personal re-lationships with neighbours, and other forms of socialising.

Institutions and democratic conscience: accep-tance or rejection of institutionalised corruption and the extent of administrative attitudes and forms of authoritarianism, racism, etc.

These five Europes were situated in three geogra-phical axes:

Northern Europe vs. Southern Europe: this is first of the axes that usually appear, concentra-ting many of the appraisals of the differences between economies, customs and fulfilment of rules. Citizens appear to place the Scandinavian countries and Central European countries at the northern end (specifically in the case of the latter Germany, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece are placed at the southern point. Occasionally, this axis was used to establish a classification as regards compliance with rules: spontaneous compliance (internalised rules) in Scandinavian countries; compliance through effective applica-tion of the law in Central Europe; and difficulties in compliance in southern countries.

Anglo-Saxon Europe vs. the rest: in all groups the United Kingdom was considered a distinct reality, which has always kept a certain distance from the EU. While in the rest of the cases difficulties with integration are usually attributed to contextual or structural conditions, in the case of the United Kingdom they are linked to the attitudes of Briti-sh governments, which are reluctant to fully inte-grate into the European institutions. The United Kingdom represents the position of opportunist use of relations with the EU as a whole. On nu-merous occasions the UK appeared as part of the

origin of Europe’s current problems, as an exam-ple of an EU agreement that is merely instrumen-tal and selfish, based on economic advantages. In any case, the United Kingdom was also described as an economic and cultural hub in Europe, which acts as a pole, drawing citizens from around the world.

Eastern Europe vs. the rest: the countries of the East are currently the other major source of ten-sion as regards European cohesion, according to most participants. The determining factors in this regard are the same ones as for Southern Europe (economy and culture), but with a diffe-rentiating characteristic: the tendency of some of these countries to adopt policies that are seen as authoritarian and racist. The participants agreed that the eastern countries are the ones of which there is the least knowledge, with the exception of Romania, probably due to Romanian immigra-tion into Spain, which gives rise to comparisons. They were sometimes referred to as the countries that have put the EU’s capacity to achieve inter-nal cohesion to the test. They are also conside-red as the substitutes of the southern countries in terms of assistance awarded. In any case, the understanding is that the standard of living in eastern countries is lower than in the southern countries, and in some cases it is mentioned that the prices of certain products can even be simi-lar to those of Spanish products, even with lower salaries.

3.b. The economic and financialfuture of the European Union

In the midst of uncertainties and certainties, participants in the different groups underscored the current and future importance of the euro. Although hesitant or adverse nuclei always emer-ged at every meeting, all of the groups express an expectation and hope that the euro would remain as the currency of the European Union countries, irrespective of its current difficulties. This sensa-tion was present in all of the groups, which ar-gued not based on economic or financial analysis, but rather based on emotions. The consistency of the euro and its implausible fall are directly linked with the implausibility of the disappearance of the European Union.

-The euro will be around for a while, we mustn’t let them scare us… even if the EU were to have problems and six or seven coun-tries were left, the euro would still exist. -But it wouldn’t be the same euro…

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-Yes and no, because when a currency leaves an important mark and has stood its ground for 20, 30 years against the best of them, well…(Group 7. La Rioja)

The voices that are most critical or adverse towards the single currency emerged from two positions that, strangely, are equidistant. From segments of the Catalan secessionist left, which expresses a sort of reproach of the lack of support for the procés from the authorities of the Euro-pean Union, and therefore by extension condemn the euro…

- We believe that the EU is destined for fai-lure, simply because they don’t have a plan. There’s no path for us to be freer in Europe, to allow us to decide in each region what we really want to do. Obviously, that won’t be allowed.- When you say “we”, who are you talking about, because there are people here who are making gestures to show that they don’t agree with you (moderator). - That’s what left-wing people in Catalonia think: The heck with Europe, it never gave us anything, except the euro, of course.- I don’t agree with you and I consider my-self to be left-wing, but not a secessionist, and I think Europe has given us a lot and has supported us tremendously and is still… if you travel around a bit, you can see how many projects are co-funded by the European Union… (Group 5. Barcelona)

…and from right-wing positions, which were more emotional than political, without any capa-city for argument or separation of subjects, but also without reservations or embarrassment in expressing opinions, even though they are aware they are in the minority:

-In my view, not the view of other Spaniards of course, what we ought to do is bring back the passbook my grandparents had, but with mobile phones…-No, not that…-Yes, of course, that would be best and we wouldn’t have to put up with people from outside giving us orders, or having a foreign currency.-But the euro isn’t foreign.-Of course it’s foreign, it isn’t Spanish.

-But it is Spanish…-No. If they’d asked the people of Spain if they wanted to drop the peseta for the euro, they’d have said no. Right? People got it wrong with the referendum on the Constitu-tion. (Group 1. Valencia)

Outside these extreme nuclei, the participants found it impossible to imagine a future in which there was a return to national currencies. Howe-ver, even the most pro-European segments considered it a very remote possibility that the European Union could be governed and contro-lled in economic matters by a single financial decision-making body to which all of the coun-tries would be subordinate. They find it difficult to imagine because they are aware of the disa-greements, of the asymmetry between countries, and above all, of the existing suspicion and re-sentment among Member States. Similarly, they cannot picture the image of an EU government with sufficient capacity and authority to develop economic policies aimed at neutralising the di-fferences between States and promoting greater economic convergence.

- I can’t imagine someone from say… Portu-gal, for example, or Spain, wherever… giving orders to the Finance Minister of Germany or France…- That would be very strange, especially there must be distrust and there must be so many prejudices between the different countries- These things, if they ever happen, need a lot more time… we won’t see it ourselves (Group 2. Madrid)

And finally, the major expectation is to glimpse the implementation of a true, single Fiscal Union and a banking system that replaces the systems of the different States, although the very people who suggest this see it as very distant and cu-rrently unlikely.

- I think at some point, quite a long time in the future… I don’t know if we’ll see it our-selves, as this lady says, I don’t know if we will… but the right thing would be one single fiscal union for everyone… - And a unified banking system, which they’re trying to make, but there’s a lot of resistan-ce… - Yes, that has to happen at some point, but we can’t be so demanding. We mustn’t forget

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that the monetary union isn’t even 20 years old, and in the grand scheme of things that’s very little… but it must happen at some point, it must.(Group 7. La Rioja) - Maybe in Europe very favourable opportu-nities were missed, when all of the countries were more in favour of establishing a fiscal union, and I don’t know why they didn’t.- It can’t be easy to get so many countries with so many parties to agree, with so many differences between the countries… - But when the Eastern European countries joined, when the [Berlin] wall fell, maybe it could have been done, making it a condition- Those who were in hadn’t even agreed on having the same currency, because the Briti-sh never dropped the pound…- Yes… I don’t know… subjects like this go over my head, I don’t know anything about them.- Most of us don’t.(Group 2. Madrid)

3.c. Cultural diversity

The cultural diversity of Europe is the (tangible and intangible) heritage that is most frequently mentioned and most highly valued in the image of Europe and the EU. Everyone agreed that the concept of cultural diversity includes the key as-pects that have given the continent its important position. If Europe can be said to have its own form of wealth, a historical wealth, that is its cul-tural diversity, which is recognised by Europeans and by the rest of the world.

- The impressive thing about Europe is that, unlike the Americas, and with more variety than the United States, Japan or even China, Europe has cultural diversity within a distan-ce of 100 km. - If you travel from the region of Holland to the Netherlands region, which used to be the same thing, now it’s something different.- Well, here [in Spain] you go from Navarre to Aragon, or to La Rioja and in a very small area you’ve got three cultures, two accents, even two different languages, histories…- Food, wine, art, music…(Group 7. La Rioja)

This cultural wealth ranges from the invention of

democracy to the construction of satellites, from the great creators of artistic canons to the most diverse of links with local identity through work, the ways of forming homes, of passing on tradi-tions, of creating cuisines, of weaving folklore, etc.

As we previously indicated, satisfaction is drawn not only from different nationalities, but also the diverse local and regional cultures, which are a crucial part of Europe’s considerable appeal.

However, when reference is made to cultures arri-ving from other continents, or from outside the EU, disagreements reigned once more, and only minority segments were receptive and open to these varieties, as well as defending openness to migration and refugees in the face of the demo-graphic conflict. Nonetheless, in all cases these are the most markedly minority positions. There-fore, the image of cultural diversity tends to allu-de primarily to the variety of Europe, rather than co-existence with other cultural identities.

3.d. Religious diversity

Europe is seen as one of the places where the separation of Church and State has been imple-mented most satisfactorily. This aspect serves to clearly differentiate Europe from the Arab world. The consolidated image that emerged in all of the discussion groups was one, in the context of the EU, of all religions have been domesticated—des-pite the dramas of recent history—with seculari-sed forms of public life, a facet which is unfamiliar and unknown to many segments of the migration population, especially sectors linked to Islamic fundamentalism.

Religious diversity seems to encompass the true conflict arising from the migration situation and asylum policies. More than cultures, religions emerged as the axis concentrating the violence that is feared and rejected. In contrast, at no time did the religious differences within Europe appear as a conflict, but rather as part of the enriching differences that make the EU a civilised amalgam of nuances, beliefs, and faiths, capable of existing alongside each other in peace.

The basis of the arguments that are most oppo-sed to openness to migration focuses on the threat from certain fundamentalist sectors, and this is also the focus of the resistance to “others”.

- The attacks aren’t because there are immi-

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grants, sorry…- No, it isn’t related, but they take advanta-ge of the fact that there are Maghrebi and Sub-Saharan Africans in all of these Euro-pean countries to get through unseen… but that’s not the immigrants’ fault. (Group 4. Bilbao)

However, it must be noted that the main conflict that is of concern to Spaniards as regards migra-tion, which causes them to consider it a threat, is the force of the migratory flow and its capacity to compete in areas of current interest such as employment and access to public services.

3.e. The European Union as an international power

With the exception of several isolated nuclei that see international isolationism as a form of self-affirmation, the majority of participants in these citizens’ consultations acknowledged that the European Union’s most prominent strength is its capacity to meet (or confront) other interna-tional powers as an equal.

- I can’t imagine what would have happened to Spain without all these years in the Eu-ropean Union, and I can’t imagine a Europe that isn’t united on economic and political fronts. That’s why I can’t understand why the Hungarians and the Poland keep taking the piss—excuse my language—you feel like saying: outside the European Union you wouldn’t even exist! - That’s true, we might complain about a lot of things, but being part of a power, it really makes you feel safe. (Group 2. Madrid)

Participants did not have any doubts about the EU’s economic outlook and its position as a con-ciliatory international power (comparing it to China, Russia and the United States), but they appeared more critical of its capacity for politi-cal impact at the international level, where some sectors accused it of weakness, caused by an ex-cess of political do-goodism.

…it’s as if those in charge in the European Union, now, then and further back, all of them, it’s as if they have no idea what Europe

is, really… they’re representing a first-class economic power: with terrific industries.-With an unbeatable capacity for consumer demand, because it is one of the regions of the world with the highest and mostly evenly distributed purchasing power.-Exactly—in finance—the same thing.-And I think, as I said, that there’s too much political do-goodism.-That excessive do-goodism, combined with the importance of the European Union, that’s my biggest complaint.- I agree completely.- We all do. (Group 8. Seville)

3.f. Terrorism

This is a concept to which all participants expres-sed their opposition, without any nuances. In addi-tion, despite attributing certain criminal activities or terrorist activities to specific national identities, paradoxically, the groups did not seem to associa-te terrorism with the migration phenomenon (and rarely with refugees).

In fact, there appears to be a separation between the perceptions of the problems of the two pheno-mena: while migration entails social and cultural conflicts, fear of an excess workforce competing with each country’s workforce, an increase in de-mand for services (social, health and education services…) that take resources and preference away from the native-born, threats of different kinds, such as terrorism, did not appear to be linked to the migration experience, but rather with the development of a world that is both global and divided.

- People think believe they want, and of cour-se I think these terrorist people think that we’re the unbelievers, you know, that Europe is unbelieving and immoral… and it’s very di-fficult to convince them that it’s not like that, because with the corruption, the more liberal societies and the fact that coming from feu-dal societies it all seems immoral to them… the most shocking thing is that they believe they’re doing good- But what we were saying is very important, not all immigrants from Islamic countries are like that- Of course not, and here in La Rioja there are some great examples of very hard-working people, very good people, who also make an

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effort to integrate and you don’t always let them, you know? Don’t forget that. (Group 7. La Rioja)

In addition there were many more expressions of the forms of terrorism and its potential expres-sions. Notably, a long list of terrorist threats was given by participants: Islamic terrorism; oppor-tunist terrorists; chemical and bacteriological threats; deadly gases; newly created viruses, and technological threats.

-But it’s as if only a few Muslims were terro-rists, you’re forgetting what the Russians are doing in England and what the State itself has done with chemical warfare, to do in its own people…--Yes, that’s true, the Russians and the Geor-gians too…(Group 10. Balearic Islands)

-They’re the ones that worry me those most, because they’re morons, but morons who don’t care whether they live or die are dange-rous… you don’t know whether they’re going to get out a knife on a bus, wrap themselves in dynamite, it’s a menace.(Group 6. Madrid)

-Imagine you go outside without a care, you think you’re breathing fresh air and in fact some people have decided to poison part of the population. That could easily happen. -Or in your house… what do you think of chi-lling out in your house and in fact someone’s killing you.(Group 1. Valencia)

-They can kill you with a virus, mad cow di-sease, those resistant flus, what’s that all about? That’s people with financial interests, who want to sell you the latest antibiotic afterwards, and to do that they’re prepared to do terrorist stuff, because that’s what it is… these are terrible dangers facing Euro-pe because, on top of that, we’re always the testing ground for other people’s crazy ideas.(Group 8. Seville)

IV.4. Consensus subjects

The discussion groups revealed unanimity in con-sidering a number of EU measures and actions to be successes. Other measures and actions, in contrast, were more controversial, with calls for reformulation. Lastly, a number of aspects were also identified that were considered by the ma-jority to be the EU’s key failures or weaknesses.

4.a. Unanimous successes

i) Free movement of people

The vast majority of participants had lived in or visited different EU countries, without having to use passports or visas. The elimination of borders, despite this entailing unwanted collateral effects in some cases (primarily the perception of more drug smuggling and an increase in international crime), continues to be perceived and considered one of the most noteworthy successes arising from membership of the EU. The influence on the younger segments is particularly notable, as they have been able to experience immersion in other cultures of the European Union.

- My daughter lives in Germany, the crisis drove her north, of course… she studied engi-neering, and there wasn’t any work here, and she’s been living in Hamburg for 4 years. And I have a German granddaughter, well she’s Spa-nish, but she was born there… what I mean is she’s a truly European girl, born in one place, nationality of another, but that doesn’t mat-ter, the girl is European for all intents and pur-poses, and that’s what I think is marvellous.- When we used to have to go to work on the grape harvest in France, if you didn’t get a visa, you couldn’t cross the border.- The border is a thing of the past in Europe, and that’s brilliant, a brilliant thing about the European Union. (Group 10. Valladolid)

ii) The single currency

The euro was identified as one of the successes, which, despite structural differences between the member countries, has provided impulse and inspired confidence, marking a milestone in the

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history of the EU. Not only did participants un-derscore the benefits of circulation of a single cu-rrency in terms of movement of people, goods and capital, they also highlighted the achievement of being one of the world’s three main currencies. The euro is a clear sign in daily life, of a citizen belonging to a political and economic space that extends well beyond national borders.

- It’s a truly international currency, that’s hi-ghly valued in all the major countries- And in the small ones, because in Mexico and countries with weaker economies, too… you arrive with your euros, or you have to ne-gotiate electricity, for example in my job, and you say, well in euros, I don’t care what the dollar’s trading at… or in Japan, forget the yen, I want to know how the euro’s doing…- With pesetas that would never have happe-ned. (Group 4. Bilbao)

iii) The EU as a mark of quality

Health-related controls on food:

The participants had a clear conviction that if a food product is approved under EU rules on pro-duction, handling and distribution, it is immedia-tely accepted as genuine and proper.

- I remember when those rules didn’t exist. - What happened with the rape-seed oil. [A 1981 case of food poisoning in Spain, with hundreds of fatalities.] - That’s just one, and with other products.- With shellfish, with everything.- The truth is that it gives you peace of mind when you see on the packaging that it meets the European Union rules.- I pay a lot of attention to that. - Of course, but if it does, if it complies with the rules, that’s enough for me… I don’t need to know anything else.(Group 6. Madrid)

Rules on medicine controls:

This area was specifically identified, particularly by women, as one in which EU rules have been es-pecially significant in establishing a framework of quality and trust for the wide range of products, their specifications, their expiries, and the adver-se effects that each of them can have.

Service quality rules:

In all kinds of services, those that are rendered to populations in general or services that are taken on at the individual level: laws for the operations of service companies, for the portfolio of services they offer consumers. The elimination of roaming charges was highlighted as a success by users of mobile phone users from all EU countries, in favour of protecting and defending consumer ri-ghts.

- Possibly one of the very important things for working people not just in Spain but in Europe. For me it’s extremely important.- And for me, although I’m sure I don’t travel as much as you… but even if you go on holi-day for a few days, this August we’re going to northern Italy and, well, being able to call my family in Malaga, with the peace of mind that you’re not being bled dry by the phone companies, that’s appreciated.- With things like these we forget how impor-tant the European Union government is, but they’ve given us quality in our day-to-day li-ves in many areas… just like we were saying with medicines, food, all of that is regulated by Europe. (Group 8. Seville)

iv) The Erasmus programme

A true metaphor for the best of the EU. The Eras-mus programme was valued very positively by all of the groups, including those that had not parti-cipated in Erasmus or did not have close acquain-tances who had. For many of the participants the programme is a true space to nurture Europeans who are open to the variety of countries and cul-tures, as well as enabling new languages to be learnt.

- This is brilliant, man… it’s the best thing they’ve thought of.- I wish there’d have been a plan like that when I was studying.- In my case, they sent me to an Irish family straight out of the 19th century, but, well, all of my children have gone on Erasmus, even my youngest who’s a real mummy’s girl and didn’t want to, and in the end she had a won-derful time.- That’s how you really build Europe, it’s not just what you learn at university, it’s life in another culture, being immersed in that,

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that’s invaluable.- And also kids come from all sorts of diffe-rent sectors …the son of one of the people we have at home too, and I think that’s ama-zing.(Group 8. Seville)

v) Structural Funds

The regional development funds are possibly the ones that are best known by everyone, since they have been used widely in all of Spain’s Autono-mous Communities. Participants referred to them as funds with a significant present in the past, which were very effective in supporting develop-ment of Spain’s Autonomous Communities and of the region of Europe as a whole.

- Well, here, thanks to the ERDF funds a lot has been done and is done, that’s true - But also in La Rioja, they’re really wides-pread, in Cameros, here in Haro, the winema-king centre.- In the mushroom business too.- In my area, where there’s a lot of organic farming, without the ERDF I don’t think we could have done it.- Those funds are highly valued throughout La Rioja. (Group 7. La Rioja)

vi) Caring for the environment

This is another of the achievements that partici-pants attributed to the EU; above all, in relation to the importance of achieving awareness that the responsibility lies with all sectors of society, from citizens and companies to national gover-nments. Participants highlighted the proactive attitude and initiative of the EU in reaching inter-national agreements to protect the environment.

The first achievement that was attributed to the EU is having raised widespread awareness of the levels of vulnerability that have been reached, as a result of a lack of care in a situation of expo-nential growth, in response to which sustainable growth mechanisms must be urgently developed. The second is the willingness to implement dras-tic measures to halt the environmental decline, an undertaking in which they contrast European society with other powers, and especially with the United States and China.

- I think the European Union is doing the most to defend the environment, well what we really ought to call the ecological disaster we’re heading for… - I agree, the thing is there are times it seems its calls fall on deaf ears, because with the Paris agreement, Trump and friends have al-ready said they won’t follow it, and if they don’t you can forget the Chinese… and those are two extremely important regions of the world.- But here there’s more and more awareness: companies, hydroelectric plants, even oil fir-ms… we have to change the system because if we don’t tackle the sustainable side, you tell me…- For that, you have to take your hat off to the European Union. (Group 2. Madrid)

4.b. Improvable achievements

Below are a number of subjects that the partici-pants unreservedly classified as achievements, but for which they called for reformulated strategies and/or procedures.

i) The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)

Not only was this policy received with interest by the participants who are most closely involved with agriculture, it was also well received by most of the segments consulted. However, they called for the policy’s ambitions to be redefined, with new more daring and strategic approaches, rela-ting to an idea of Europe that combines sustaina-ble development, working cultures, demographic growth, redistribution of the population, opening up of new life and work opportunities, and even, for certain ideological outlooks, a way of contai-ning and giving meaning to the migration flows.

- A new CAP has to be put together, taking into account the new problems we’ve been talking about. We have to stop the countryside from emptying, and to do that we have to design a CAP that is able to attract people, to give a new meaning to life in rural areas. (Group 7. La Rioja)

- What I don’t understand is my son, who’s 20,

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wanting to go to a farm outside Copenhagen, to an ecological rural development plan, and him not having the chance to do that here, when Teruel is empty, the centre of Girona is empty… I mean there are towns where they are closing schools and health centres becau-se there are no people. Doesn’t the European Union realize that’s where investment is nee-ded? (Group 9. Barcelona)

ii) Subsidization policies

The participants considered that when subsidies pass through Spanish institutions they tend to lose force. The participants had not doubts over the importance of many of the subsidies received from Europe, of the various bodies that manage funds and of the good ideas they encompass. However, they were of the opinion that the me-chanisms for requesting, and above all managing, subsidies should be revised. They expressed a range of attitudes ranging from suspicion about the Spanish administrations’ poor means of awar-ding subsidies at the local, regional and central government levels, to a lack of criteria and appro-priate distribution when deciding who to award them to.

-It’s true that there are places that need them, that’s true, but if you look at Vizcaya there people doing things, I’m not saying they aren’t, but receiving a subsidy for the third or fourth year in a row, I don’t think that’s right. (Group 4. Bilbao)

- Here grants have been awarded to re-mu-nicipalize the water. That’s unheard of! …the water was always municipal, what was private was the management, but not the water… and they gave that to the previous government, not this one, - That can’t go on. Cereals on the other hand, since it isn’t a priority region… (Group 10. Valladolid)

iii) Bologna Process - Universities

Young people and professionals who have had the experience of university education under the Bologna Process agreements noted the absur-dity of some of the contents and, above all, the stifling paperwork involved. Those who criticized the process did, at the same time, appreciate the boldness of its design. However, even though the proposal is praiseworthy and its goals are defen-sible, they believed that it needs to be reviewed in order to make it an instrument of knowledge and not of form-filling.

-You could spend your whole time at universi-ty filling in forms. It’s unbelievable; in the end you’re not sure what you’re studying or what you should be focusing on. The truth is that it’s a bit sad how much time you have to waste, and not only you, but the administrative staff, the teachers, everyo-ne... It seems that what matters is knowing how to fill in forms instead of knowing about physics.(Group 2. Madrid)

iv) New rules on data protection

Given that this citizens’ consultation has prac-tically coincided with the entry into force, on 25 May, of the GDPR (General Data Protection Re-gulation), the participants were very aware of it, as well as of all the criticism of it. The most dis-proportionate impact has been that all the ins-titutions, companies, forums, media, brands in general, etc. with which they interact, even if only occasionally, have asked them for authorization to save their address in order to get in touch with them; therefore, there is a significant underlying feeling of harassment. Even though the Regu-lation protects users’ interests, the EU has not communicated it well, and neither have national governments, at least in Spain. It is an example of how an EU initiative is perceived as negative and is criticised, not for its content, but for the lack of communication.

v) The different EU enlargements

The initial phases of the creation of the EU already saw tensions, resulting from the incorporation of the United Kingdom under conditions different

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from those of the other countries. These profiles perceived this as the seed of the “evil” that has spread throughout the EU in recent years, namely the attempt to have an excessively self-interes-ted relation with the EU, for one’s one profit; i.e., an instrumental relationship, to the detriment of efforts being made to deliver benefits to the en-tire community.

The participants distinguished two phases in the subsequent expansion of the EU: one, with the accession of Spain and Portugal, and the other, leading to the current 28 members. The first pha-se was usually defined as a success in terms of integration, although it gave Spain a second-rate position on the EU’s political and economic map, and sometimes one even lower than that. Se-condly, for the sectors most critical with the Eu-ropean project’s evolution and current situation, the leap to 28 countries, with the incorporation of Eastern European countries and several of the former Soviet Union republics, was seen as a cri-tical moment for EU integration difficulties and, therefore, constitutes a challenge in terms of ex-cessive diversity and differences. Moratoriums for countries such as Romania and Bulgaria at times confirmed that image of forced integration. The-re is probably a mental dissonance with the un-derlying notion of Europe as limited to Western Europe.

-I think there was greater stability before the latest countries joined, I mean, when we went from a Europe of 12 to a Europe of 20-wha-tever. I think there was greater equality, it was more integrated, and now, as a matter of fact, many of the countries that joined af-terwards, like Poland, for example, have not even joined the Monetary Union. In Poland, price tags already had the equivalent in eu-ros 10 years ago, and they still haven’t joined the euro, I mean, there has really been...(Group 15. Zaragoza)

As a backdrop for forecasts, we find the appli-cations for accession by countries such as Tur-key and even Morocco. In general, the scenario was assessed as negative (except among youn-ger Spaniards), and represents a challenge for the EU’s integration capacity, one that is unsur-mountable for most of the participants. These countries’ culture is very different from Europe’s, especially because they do not have something which for the participants is a hallmark of Europe: separation between religion and State, and equal rights for men and women.

vi) Management of the 2008 crisis

For those having the lowest level of material and educational resources (position in the labour market and years in school), the economic crisis and the subsequent public debt crisis were the turning point that illustrated the breakdown of the idea of integration, balance and solidarity wi-thin the EU. For them, the crisis revealed that na-tional and/or European institutions are no longer capable of meeting the demands of their citizens; and the action of the Troika and diplomatic con-flicts between countries, especially with Greece, highlighted the differences between regions in terms of their development, capacities and finan-cial stability.

An anti-European discourse can be glimpsed in the profiles with the lowest qualifications. The EU was blamed for not having been more flexible with Spain’s public debt, and a feeling of humi-liation can be felt, almost leading to a demand to exit the EU. Other groups referred to the case of Greece to assert that the EU did not take in to account special situations and the harm that the measures applied could do to the population, while, at the same time, it is allowing countries like Italy to violate agreements on immigration.

Therefore, the 2008 crisis appears in debates as marking a before and after in the EU’s capaci-ty to make taking the step from values to rights feasible. The crisis entailed internal conflicts in a considerable number of countries and among countries, as well as responses by the EU (Troika), which for many were proof of the existence of a multi-speed Europe.

Among the most vulnerable sectors (for example, unskilled young people), leaving their own coun-try to try their luck in a northern European coun-try was seen as making the best of a bad situa-tion, even when they were aware of the danger of precarious jobs and poor working conditions poor:

-For me Europe is a place where I‘ll have to go to find work. Right now I’m training to be a carpenter because books aren’t my thing; I’ve been a bad student since I was a kid, I’m better at using my hands... but I heard that in Denmark there’s farm work going, and even if you don’t get paid, you get fed and you can learn English. I might stay out the-re if I don’t think that this country (Spain) is

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going anywhere or that we could live better there. Here, it’s either become a waiter or no-thing, because you can’t even be a bullfigh-ter any more... So I might learn English and see what’s out there; at least it’ll be one less mouth for my family to feed.(Group 1. Valencia)

4.c. Failures and weaknesses

We will now list what the participants consider to be the principal failures and weaknesses in the implementation of the European project. In no way is this meant to be an in-depth description, and even less so a judgement about the impor-tance of these issues, giving them priority over others that have not been mentioned or simply not identified. In other words, this is what the groups, during the debates, have identified as possibly being considered failures of the EU, from their own viewpoints.

i) The European Constitution

The immense majority of participants consider the lack of agreement on the Constitution a fai-lure of a symbolic nature. Before this failure, Eu-rope already had a flag and an anthem that was accepted by the majority of Europeans, but it was lacking a Magna Carta, which never reached approval, and left a vacuum that—in the interlo-cutors’ minds—has not been disguised with sub-sequent agreements, such as the Lisbon Treaty, or with other achievements. This constitutional vacuum—the details of which are not recalled by the participants—is noted as an important failu-re, especially by the groups who show the grea-test Europeanist spirit.

-But, for example, they didn’t manage to pass the Constitution, and back then, it na-turally gave us all some pause for thought.-The thing is, a Union of States that does not have a constitution, is basically just adminis-trative.-No, and moreover, they are left with no power over the other governments, because each one of these is sovereign, and if there are no laws giving Europe authority, then there’s nothing at all.(Group 9. Barcelona)

ii) Lack of democratic transparency

This is not only a matter of not understanding the EU’s institutional architecture, but of not be-ing sure of the extent to which and the manner in which democratic procedures are guaranteed in this institutional morass. Only the European Par-liament seems to be governed by criteria of links to social majorities; however, there are also opinions stating the opaque nature of the MEPs’ work.

-There is no democratic transparency, and if there is, you can’t see it, you can’t understand what the people there are doing.-And, most of all, you don’t know how those people were chosen.-I really like that Draghi guy and I want him to stay. But what can I do to say so.-Of course, it’s impossible.-But the question is: Who elected him? And the truth is, I’m glad he was elected, but I don’t know how he got there.-Well, you speak when you vote.-But I didn’t vote for Draghi. I would, but I can vote for the PSC, for Ezquerra. For Ciutadans or for the PP, which I don’t think I will, but not for Draghi... And I don’t know how he got the-re, and I’m talking about him because I like him.-The thing is, Europe’s administrations are obscure.-They’re obscure and inaccessible.(Group 9. Barcelona)

iii) Soft leadership inside and outside the EU

There is an image of an institutional framework of representatives that do not represent anything, and who, moreover, despite flaunting their Euro-peanness (in the face of the USA, China, Turkey, Israel, and even the United Kingdom), appear as having weak positions and no potential interna-tional leadership. However, the figure of the EU always stands out as an international moral leader in spheres such as human rights, the welfare state, environmental protection, and web neutrality.

In the EU, this lack of authority can be seen in the manner in which sanctions or warnings against those who violate guidelines, agreements, etc. are enforced. The case of the ship Aquarius and Italy’s standoff with the EU, by preventing migrants from

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disembarking, reveals that the EU’s authority is li-mited and that it is not always equally applied.

I don’t know what the problem is, whether there is one or more than one problem, but it is clear that the Polish and the Hunga-rians are doing their own thing and ignoring everything that the EU and other European countries are telling them... What I can’t un-derstand is why there aren’t any mechanisms to demand that if they want to be here, they have to stay through thick and thin, and if they don’t, we can show them the door.(Group 6. Madrid)

Therefore, it is not only a matter of lack of leader-ship on the international scale vis-à-vis the other major powers, but also of a lack of authority with regard to EU Member States with which there are clear conflicts. This image fractures the European Union’s image and strengthens the idea of a struc-tural weakness that is difficult to conceal and that consolidates doubts and questioning. The EU’s in-capacity to speak with a single voice does not help overcome the asymmetry between Member States; to the contrary, it only increases inequality and con-solidates the hegemony of some over the others.

iv) Poor control of funds

This weakness has been identified, in particular, among the business and professional sectors most closely linked to the management of structural as-sistance funds. Also among certain segments wor-king in specific sectors such as the automobile in-dustry, products derived from ecological crops, etc. This appears as the other side of the excess pa-perwork coin, but both factors count towards the image of a diversification of bodies that only leads to lack of control and ineffective management.

-It’s what this lady’s saying... they have so many bodies to control the same thing that nobody is doing anything.-That’s the way it is, it’s a shame, but that’s the way it is... it turns out there are no ins-pections, and if there are, they’re carried out by the Junta [Regional Government] and of course, since they know you work hard and give jobs to lots of people, well there’s no inspection. On our lands we’ve never had any inspection, and we did ask for grants.... well, we’ve never had any, and I mean for years.(Group 8. Seville)

v) The image of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)

There is a generalised feeling that being an MEP is a prize awarded by the different countries’ po-litical parties to their “oldest figures” in exchange for doing nothing.

-MEPs? That’s a prize that political parties give to their own for their services. It’s plain to see they don’t do a thing.-They spend their whole time flying first class like the jet set and couldn’t care less about Europe, their countries or anything...-It does seem like a prize they get so they can have a paid vacation.-That’s what it is.

-You’re saying that we all vote for MEPs, well yes and no... because we all know that when parties want to get someone out of the way they send them to Brussels as an MEP.-It’s a prize, they are awarded with time to rest in Brussels. Why? What do they do the-re? -They don’t do a thing all day, all they do is travel and enjoy the good life.(Group 6. Madrid)

ESGLOBAL / ECFR

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Hablamos de Europa Consultations: citizen’s proposals

V

43

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To take the leap from debating to making pro-posals, our principal instrument have been the citizens’ consultations carried out by the stee-ring group. Most of these events have been an opportunity for experts, and civil society groups with a European vocation, together with the ge-neral public, to meet. The sharing of ideas among these three types of participants has resulted in proposals organised around the principal areas or sectors.

During the Hablamos de Europa [Talking about Europe] project, we paid special attention to the drafting of proposals. Participative processes very often exhaust all their efforts and energies in the prior communication phase and in the dynamics that take place during the participation itself, and forget the importance of identifying a list of pro-posals stemming from those processes.

Therefore, we now present 100 proposals that ori-ginated in the debates during these months, dis-tributed in 13 areas. However, before listing each one of the proposals, it is necessary to clarify certain aspects about the procedure we followed when drafting this list.

1. As we mentioned in the methodology, the prin-ciple of accountable autonomy has been the bac-kbone of the entire process. The members of the steering group, as well as the volunteers’ group and the collaborating European institutions, have been responsible for submitting a report on the results of the survey, using a standard form. Each one of those reports has been the essential ingre-dient for drafting the list of proposals. But they have not been the only ingredient. We have also used our own observations, personally attending a significant number of consultations in order to get a clearer picture of them.

2. The information generated has been steadily recorded in a database. This has made it possible to match different information in order to learn about details of the context in which those pro-posals have originated. Table 2 is an approxima-tion to the description of the framework in which the list of proposals originated. For example, the column “number of citizens’ consultations” (No. CC) lists the number of events where these ideas have been suggested. The other columns provide information about the total number (and range)

of participants, as well as the duration and loca-tion of the consultations. Noteworthy here is the information about the percentage of time dedi-cated to presentations by experts, and the time dedicated to debate or to Q&A.

3. The proposals have been classified into diffe-rent areas. Obviously, a proposal may belong to more than one area. In this case, we have chosen the area we consider to be principal. For example, the proposal “make paternity leave and maternity leave equal” involves gender and equality policies just as much as it does the development of the social pillar. It was decided to include it in the area of gender and equality. This has also occurred with many other proposals.

4. Once the proposals were classified, the next step has been to draft each proposal in a more concise manner. For example, one of the outputs of one consultation was: “A true European public opinion can only be such with regard to decisions made directly by the citizens about major Euro-pean projects.” This output was reworded as fo-llows: “Foster decisions made directly by citizens about major European projects.”

5. At times, the same proposal may have been mentioned in several consultations. This is the case, for example, of the creation of transnational lists of candidates for the European elections. In such cases we have emphasised their importance in the summary made for each bloc of proposals, without discarding the possibility that in the futu-re more sophisticated systems could be used for selecting proposals, e.g. through voting systems. Moreover, on the one hand, it must be taken into account that the drafted list of proposals may in-clude ideas that are contradictory or even mutua-lly exclusive (this is a common dilemma in citizen participation) (Fernández-Martínez et al., 20186), and, on the other, even if we know that a propo-sal occurred in a specific consultation, we cannot guarantee that said proposal represents the ma-jority opinion of Spaniards.

6. Lastly, we are aware that such a large number of proposals may, at times, lead to the temptation of randomly choosing among them. Therefore, and given other limitations that we have mentio-ned, it seems advisable to develop a participatory process in which a maximum of 15 proposals are prioritised.

6 Fernández-Martínez, J. L., López-Sánchez, M., Aguilar, J. A. R., Rubio, D. S., & Nemegyei, B. Z. (2018). Co-Designing Participatory Tools for a New Age: A Proposal for Combining Collective and Artificial Intelligences. International Journal of Public Administration in the Digital Age (IJPADA), 5(4), 1-17.

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Area No. CC

Cities Total no. of participant(range)

Principal interest groups present at the events Average duration(range)

% timepresentation vs.debate

Communica-tion

5 Madrid (x2), Zaragoza, Getafe y Baena

331 (20-160)

Academic community, Europeanist organizations, trade unions, associations and NGOs, and secondary school students

3,9h(2h-9h)

40 / 60

Culture 3 Madrid 308(60-160)

Representatives from the sphere of culture, academic community, and Europeanist organizations

7,5h(6h-9h)

43 / 57

Education 4 Madrid 498(50-225)

Europeanist organizations and academic community

4,5h(2h-9h)

51 / 49

Gender and equality

3 Madrid(x2) y Getafe

80(20-30)

Justice professionals, local and regional political parties and representatives

4h(1.5h-8.5h)

51 / 49

European identity

5 Madrid (x4), Getafe y Baena

573(15-225)

Europeanist organizations, trade unions, academic community, associations and NGOs, secondary school students, media, and diplomats

4.5h(2-9)

34 / 66

Immigration 11 Madrid (x 6), Jerez, Barcelona, Baena, Cádiz, Santa Cruz de Tenerife y las Palmas.

823(43-300)

Journalists, Europeanist organizations, academic community, pensioners, national police, trade unions, diplomats, local and regional political parties and representatives, and immigrants’ groups and associations

3h(1.5h-8h)

30 / 70

Environment 5 Madrid (x2), Getafe, Boal y Baena

194(20-70)

Academic community, pensioners, trade unions, associations and NGOs, and secondary school students

2.5h(2h-2.5h)

20 / 80

Economy 6 Madrid 158(45-63)

Academic community, Confederation of Employers’ Organizations (CEOE), journalists, political scientists, and Europeanist organizations

1.5h(1h-2h)

37 / 63

Institutional architecture

9 Madrid (x6), Zaragoza, Santander y Barcelona (x2)

1163(45-300)

Journalists, Europeanist organizations, diplomats, and academic community

3.5h(2h-9h)

No info

Political participation

6 Madrid (x3), Baena y Getafe

323(20-110)

Trade unions, Europeanist organizations, academic community, secondary school students, and journalists

3.5h(2h-6h)

43 / 57

Social pillar 7 Madrid (x4), Getafe, Zaragoza y Cádiz

537(20-300)

Trade unions, academic community, diplomats, journalists, political scientists, and Europeanist organizations

3.5h(3h-8.5)

35 /65

Fiscal policy 5 Madrid (x3), Cádiz y Getafe

187(20-50)

Academic community, trade unions, Europeanist organizations, and justice professionals

2h(1.5h-2h)

26 / 75

Security 5 Madrid (x2), Barcelona, Baena, Santa Cruz de Tenerife y las Palmas

178(22-90)

National police, academic community, pensioners, Europeanist organizations, diplomats, and secondary school students

4.5h(2h-8h)

24 /76

Table 2. Characteristics of the framework in which the proposals have been made

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Communication

Proposals on communication mainly focused on the following three aspects: guarantee the pre-sence of content about the European Union in the media; include the European political agenda in national political debates; and, thirdly, impro-ve the manner in which institutional information about the European Union is conveyed.

Proposals:

1. Establish quotas for the creation of sections on European news in private media and in the public administrations

2. Increase the dissemination of TV programmes dedicated to European public debates

3. Encourage the media to strengthen informa-tion on the European Union

4. Promote open broadcasts by the EURONEWS TV channel to make it easier for citizens to learn about the EU

5. Entreat politicians to talk about Europe in their speeches

6. Foster European debate in local, regional and national elections

7. Improve the information system for citizens about the reality of the European Union

8. Better explain the EU’s economic contribution to territories

9. Better disseminate information on the finan-cial funds available in the European Union, so that EU financing instruments are really com-prehensible and accessible to citizens

Culture

Proposals relating to culture involve promoting macro-events at the EU level and supporting the cultural industry both in its budget and in moni-toring grants. A novel way of promoting cultural education could be through the creation of vou-chers which would serve to exchange points ob-tained by taking part in cultural training activities for tickets or discounts to shows (see Proposal 15).

Proposals:

10. Increase and enhance major European cultu-ral events

11. Foster European cultural industries

12. Better allocate grants aimed at the world of culture

13. Harmonize copyright protection in the EU

14. Creation of a common cultural card providing access to all European entities

15. Creation of a cultural voucher recognising extra-academic skills, exchangeable for one year for activities promoting the cultural growth of young people (discounts at thea-tres, cinemas, museums, etc.)

Education

A great many proposals on education involve the idea of mainstreaming content about the Euro-pean Union in every stage of the educational sys-tem, paying particular attention to compulsory education. They also underline the need to train teachers on European affairs.

Proposals:

16. Greater presence in the syllabus of European culture and contributions

17. Improve teacher training on the EU

18. Extend Erasmus to secondary education and vocational training

19. Increase collaboration between universities and the public and private sectors

Gender and equality

Proposals relating both to equality between men and women and to including the gender pers-pective mainly addressed two issues. Firstly, they highlighted the need to give greater visibility to structural inequalities between men and women in the institutions’ daily practice, especially as re-

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gards spaces of influence. Secondly, and in close relation to the social pillar and labour rights, the focus was placed on issues relating to maternity and paternity leave, as well as on the need to ad-vance in policies for work-life balance.

Proposals:

20. Eliminate the unconscious gender bias from institutional practice

21. Improve transparency in decision-making, to make the gender gap visible

22. Protect women’s labour rights as regards maternity, including the granting of financial assistance

23. Improve work-life balance

24. Make maternity leave and paternity leave equal

European identity

One of the main issues that arose during the consultations was the need to intensify the sen-timent of European identity. The proposals that addressed this issue most directly ranged from those that emphasised the need to hold comme-morative events to foster European sentiment, to those focusing on aspects that could facilitate relations between the EU administration and its citizens.

Proposals:

25. Increase the presence and significance of common European symbols (commemora-tions, anthems, etc.)

26. Declare Europe Day an EU-wide holiday

27. Streamline the EU administration to prevent citizen disaffection

28. Foster cultural and sectoral (for professional groups and civil servants) exchange program-mes to create a European identity and share know-how and working styles

29. Creation of a single European passport

30. Approve an EU Citizens’ Charter as an ex-pression of this society’s values, which would reflect citizens’ rights, non-discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, religion, and sexua-lity, and any other rights that could pertain to the citizens of the European Union.

31. Inform Spaniards that they can communicate with the EU institutions in their own langua-ge, either in Spanish or in any other of Spain’s languages.

Immigration

As expected, immigration was one of the most re-current issues during the citizens’ consultations. The proposals were organised around four the-mes: i) greater investment in funds aimed both at cooperation and development policies in the countries of origin, and at policies for reception, integration and inclusion in the territory of the European Union; ii) advancement towards com-mon migration legislation, with particular empha-sis on administrative procedures regulating the granting of asylum and different types of visas; iii) addressing border management as an EU issue; and iv) for the media to be careful in addressing the migration phenomenon.

Proposals:

32. Greater investment in cooperation and deve-lopment, prioritising the opening up of trade relations with migrants’ countries of origin

33. Initiate a Marshall Plan for Africa so that it may manage its own development

34. Increase Europe’s existing integration funds for foreigners

35. Accompany the arrival of migrants with a hi-ring policy that will enable collecting more Social Security contributions

36. Create common legislation on migration is-sues

37. Reform the Common European Asylum Sys-tem to respond to the increasing number of migrants

38. Improve the administrative procedures for granting visas and international protection

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39. Improve the regulations so that foreigners in an irregular situation who cannot return to their countries of origin may become settled in this country

40. Respect the distribution of quotas for accep-ting migrants

41. Establish direct and legal migration routes with the African countries of origin as a mea-sure to counter irregular migration

42. Create coordination institutions in Europe for border management, and strengthen Frontex

43. Improve identification systems

44. Create quotas to foster and organize regular migration

45. Determine the European Union’s co-respon-sibility regarding the arrival of migrants in Andalusia, which is a European border

46. Design a best practices guide for the media to address migratory issues

47. Implement immigration policies using inclu-sive language

48. Resolve the question of stateless persons in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

Environment

The EU’s stance on environmental policy is viewed favourably. However, it is considered to be insuffi-cient and lacking in well-defined, long-term road maps. The proposals addressed two main issues: Energy transition and rural depopulation. In the case of Spain, rural depopulation is an extremely serious issue requiring urgent measures. Empha-sis was placed on increasing penalties for Mem-ber States that fail to meet the agreed objectives, and on the need to direct aid towards small-scale activities with strong roots in rural areas. Finally, although the Common Agricultural Policy was considered positively in the majority of consulta-tions, there are minority sectors with a great ca-pacity for influencing public opinion that call for its budget to be reduced (see proposal 56).

Proposals:

49. Ensure that the CAP plays a strategic role as regards the environment, primarily to mi-tigate the severe rural depopulation of two Spanish regions: the Celtiberian range and the area bordering Portugal (affecting the provinces of Salamanca, Zamora and León).

50. Change the unit of measurement for analy-sing depopulation. Stop measuring depopu-lation by province or by autonomous com-munity, and group municipalities together as recommended by the European Commission.

51. Ensure that broadband internet access is available in every corner of Spain.

52. Immediately begin an energy transition towards renewable energies, ensuring that workers who lose their jobs in this transition process receive assistance and work oppor-tunities in the emerging sector.

53. Improve environmental taxation.

54. Impose greater control over the funds allo-cated to rural development, prioritising the allocation of funds to those who carry out ongoing initiatives to conserve the territory.

55. Favour small-scale undertakings utilising tra-ditional skills and practices.

56. Reconsider the obligation to digitize public services in the case of small municipalities: the Administration cannot place the same administrative requirements on small munici-palities as on large cities.

57. Invest in rural areas to foment European growth through grants aimed at the digital economy and infrastructure to prevent depo-pulation.

58. Reduce the EU budget allocated to agricul-ture, given that it represents approximately 30% of the total budget, and only 7% of the European labour force works in agriculture.

Economic, trade and financial model

The proposals regarding economic and monetary matters focused on two principal issues: changing the productive model and creating new financial

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tools and institutions. As regards the first issue, the aim of all the proposals is the same: to com-mit to an economic model in which innovation, knowledge and energy transition are key featu-res. On the other hand, those best acquainted with the functioning of the Economic and Mone-tary Union call for a strengthening of the financial policy through tools such as European deposit guarantee schemes, the issue of Eurobonds, the Banking Union and a European Monetary Fund.

Proposals:

59. A comprehensive industrial policy anchored in innovation, technological development and digitalization, to make the European Union more attractive to potential investors and avoid the risk of businesses being reloca-ted outside the EU

60. Promote a circular economy model in which recycling, the design of zero waste products, the fight against climate change, and the pro-motion of renewable energies are key aspects

61. Redirect European investment in physical ca-pital (such as infrastructure) towards invest-ment in human capital (such as education)

62. Foster links between the academic world and the private sector and the public administra-tion to promote a shift in productive model and ensure that knowledge generates pros-perity

63. A realistic Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027 that is able to meet the cu-rrent and future challenges, in particular as regards revenue, and with the strategic goal of generating a more competitive European business environment

64. A full Banking Union which provides for a Eu-ropean deposit guarantee scheme

65. An open trade policy, which highlights the advantages of opening up new international markets on the basis of revised rules, com-monly shared on a global scale.

66. Introduction of Eurobonds

67. Constitution of a European Monetary Fund

Institutional architecture

It is interesting to hear the proposals put forward by civil society groups whose interests relate to the project of building Europe. These groups have reflected extensively on the organization and structure of the European Union and frequent-ly present proposals which, at minimum, could shape European public opinion. Unquestionably, one of the proposals repeated most frequently during the consultations is the possibility of es-tablishing transnational lists for the European elections. This proposal is in line with other ideas, such as that of a single constituency, and those related to the political participation of European citizens, which we shall address in the following point. One proposal worth mentioning is for the creation of an institutional architecture based on concentric circles, which to a certain extent is in line with the two-speed Europe debate, but for-mulated in less exclusive terms.

Proposals:

68. Initiate a public debate on transnational elec-toral lists

69. Create a single constituency for the Euro-pean Parliament, sometimes referred to as a Pan-European District

70. Create a eurozone Parliament

71. Empower the European Parliament to propo-se new legislation

72. Increase the executive capacity of the Euro-pean Commission to ensure it is more than a mere hotchpotch of representatives from di-fferent political parties, thereby preventing it from fully exercising a governance role

73. Design a “concentric circles” institutional ar-chitecture, through enhanced cooperation. The eurozone countries would occupy the main circle. The single market and the cus-toms union would occupy the second largest circle. Associations within a preferential poli-tical and trade framework would occupy the third

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Political participation

Proposals:

There are numerous ways to strengthen and im-prove political participation by citizens. From tho-se aimed at increasing the political influence of citizens through the direct election—without in-termediaries—of the principal representatives of European institutions, to those aimed at listening more closely and more consistently to the voice of the citizens. In short, the goal is to create a European public opinion, with debate on relevant issues, and this requires the establishment of me-chanisms for citizen participation.

74. Direct election by the citizenry of a large number of representatives in different insti-tutions

75. Direct election by the citizenry of the Presi-dent of the European Council

76. Establish forums for discussion that trans-cend national borders, and develop web pla-tforms in which community representatives can debate specific proposals with citizens (e.g., Parlement & Citoyens in France)

77. Promote direct decision-making by citizens on major European projects to generate a Eu-ropean public opinion

78. The Parliament’s working committees should include representatives from the citizenry or from civil society, depending on the issues to be addressed, in preference over institutio-nalised political stakeholders

79. Creation of a European Youth Council

80. Ensure that the general public has access to the EU’s existing tools of participation and debate.

81. There is no European Electoral Law that stan-dardises criteria such as the age at which people can stand for election, constituen-cies, electoral thresholds, or the requisites for new parties

82. Advance towards an open and electronic go-vernance model that allows for fluid campaig-ns for citizen consultation and participation

Pillar of social rights

Proposals relating to what is known as the Eu-ropean pillar of social rights are habitually per-ceived as a solution for curbing the rise of Euros-cepticism. Among the proposals most frequently repeated throughout the consultations, that of implementing a European unemployment insu-rance scheme is of particular interest. Moreover, there is a perception of a huge power imbalance between the different economic players at the European level, and the positions of the different trade unions are practically invisible beyond na-tional borders.

Proposals:

83. Establish a European unemployment insuran-ce scheme

84. Establish a European minimum wage and mi-nimum pension

85. Be unafraid to increase the trade unions’ ca-pacity for influence

86. Favour transnational trade unionism

87. Create a true common framework for basic labour rights

88. Strengthen sector-specific collective bargai-ning agreements that are framework agree-ments for specific groups

89. Promote a European labour strategy that avoids policies fomenting competition be-tween Member States

Fiscal policy

One of the most frequently recurring proposals in this area is aimed at improving tax harmonization to prevent unfair competitive practices between countries, which also favour intra-EU tax havens.

Proposals:

90. Increase environmental taxes

91. Advance in tax harmonization in different areas, such as corporate tax and personal income tax, to prevent the existence of in-

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tra-EU tax havens such as Luxembourg or Ireland

92. Progressively increase the budget of the Eco-nomic and Monetary Union to 7% of the Eu-ropean GDP

93. Introduce a European tranche into the perso-nal income tax structure

Security and defence

The debate focused on the situation of the diffe-rent State security forces, primarily that of the National Police. In general, citizens are more in favour of strengthening and improving coordi-nation on specific issues than of creating a Eu-ropean police force, due to the diverse situations that arise in each Member State.

Proposals:

94. Increase the security budget to strengthen EUROPOL as an office for coordination

95. Regulate and define the competencies of the different police forces at the European level to avoid duplications and gaps in the law

96. Increase controls in incidents of cybercrime at the European level, providing the police with greater access to information

97. Develop specific legislation to protect users from cyberattacks

98. Improve the Witness Protection Act, alloca-ting more resources to witness protection

99. Increase security initiatives on the ground in the immigrants’ countries of origin

100. Ensure collaboration between the United Kingdom and the European Union in areas re-lating to external security

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ANNEX I.Complete schedule

DATE EVENT NAME CITY03/05/2018 Citizens’ consultations on the future of Europe Madrid04/05/2018 European citizenship and democracy: The path towards a federal Europe? Madrid04/05/2018 The EU and Spain on electoral reform: transnational lists Madrid07/05/2018 Citizens’ Dialogue Aranda de Duero07/05/2018 Café con Europa Aranda de Duero08/05/2018 Cybersecurity in the EU: regulation and perspectives Barcelona08/05/2018 Meeting with Tajani. European Year of Cultural Heritage Madrid08/05/2018 Progress and challenges since the Treaty of Rome Oviedo09/05/2018 9 May, Europe Day Bilbao12/05/2018 The future of Europe: non-formal education Bilbao18/05/2018 Europe is the message: keys for effective communication Madrid19/05/2018 Political, economic and social challenges for the future of the EU Bilbao23/05/2018 Keys to understanding the new politics in Italy Madrid24/05/2018 Citizens’ Dialogue Alcañiz24/05/2018 Cross-border citizens’ dialogue Alcañiz28/05/2018 Citizens’ consultations on the future of Europe Avilés01/06/2018 Healthcare research in Europe Barcelona08/06/2018 Corruption in Spain and Europe Barcelona08/06/2018 Citizens’ consultations on the future of Europe Bilbao11/06/2018 Diversity, equality and inclusion in the EU Bilbao11/06/2018 Café con Europa Calatayud11/06/2018 Citizens’ Dialogue Calatayud18/06/2018 Thinking about Europe in the academic community Madrid18/06/2018 Café con Europa Jaca18/06/2018 Citizens’ Dialogue Jaca18/06/2018 Priorities for a more transparent Europe Madrid21/06/2018 Growth and inequality in Europe Madrid27/06/2018 Challenges and opportunities arising from migration policy in Europe Madrid28/06/2018 Provide a space for dialogue, making proposals and having more influence in the EU Madrid02/07/2018 Debates on the future of Europe: Youth on the Move Madrid02/07/2018 Café con Europa Monforte de Lemos

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02/07/2018 Citizens’ Dialogue Monforte de Lemos03/07/2018 Café con Europa Riveira03/07/2018 Citizens’ Dialogue Riveira04/07/2018 Café con Europa Pontearas04/07/2018 Citizens’ Dialogue Pontearas05/07/2018 Nation Lab: Let’s talk about Europe Madrid05/07/2018 Migration, the challenge of the EU. The Canary Islands, successful laboratories Sta. Cruz y las Palmas23/07/2018 Rewriting the European social contract Santander09/08/2018 Losers of globalization and the extreme right Jerez de la Frontera31/08/2018 European social policies to strengthen the EU Santander06/09/2018 Refugees: solutions for people seeking protection Madrid13/09/2018 Can European values overcome nationalism? Barcelona13/09/2018 What can the EU do for our production framework? Barcelona13/09/2018 The new labour markets and the fear of robotization Sevilla14/09/2018 Gender equality, reconciliation and domestic violence Sevilla18/09/2018 Economic growth, employment and investment in Europe Zaragoza19/09/2018 Citizens’ dialogue on Social Europe Getafe19/09/2018 CEOE’s European Union Commission on the future of Europe Madrid19/09/2018 Gender gaps in the EU: Policies and strategies Madrid19/09/2018 Free trade versus protectionism in the EU Valencia20/09/2018 Citizens’ dialogue on environmental Europe Madrid21/09/2018 Citizens’ Dialogue Arévalo21/09/2018 Café con Europa Arévalo21/09/2018 Debate on free trade agreements Barcelona21/09/2018 Citizens’ dialogues on the future of Europe L’Ampolla21/09/2018 We want more of Europe. We want a better Europe: Proposals for the future of the EU Madrid21/09/2018 Café con Europa Quart de Poblet21/09/2018 Citizens’ Dialogue Quart de Poblet21/09/2018 European identity and citizenship Sevilla24/09/2018 Forum on the future of the EU Baena24/09/2018 Citizens’ dialogue on security in Europe Madrid25/09/2018 European citizenship, identity and values Madrid26/09/2018 University debates on the future of Europe Madrid26/09/2018 Model of the European Parliament: Conversations with young peopleMadrid26/09/2018 From citizens’ consultations to proposals for action Madrid26/09/2018 You are European! Your opinion counts in Europe Villaviciosa27/09/2018 A more participative democracy in a federal Europe Alcalá de Henares27/09/2018 Citizens’ dialogue on Social Europe Cádiz27/09/2018 Challenges for the 2019 European elections Madrid28/09/2018 Design Thinking workshop on European identity Madrid28/09/2018 Debates on the future of Europe: Democracy and participation Madrid29/09/2018 Sustainability of Asturias in Europe Boal02/10/2018 Citizens’ dialogues on the future of Europe Santa Coloma de Gramanet08/10/2018 Café con Europa Plasencia08/10/2018 Citizens’ Dialogue Plasencia15/10/2018 Citizens’ Dialogue Cuellar

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15/10/2018 Café con Europa Cuellar19/10/2018 The European Union’s problems Oviedo19/10/2018 The environment and new types of clean energy in the EU Santander24/10/2018 Citizens’ consultations on the future of Europe Madrid25/10/2018 Europeanization and international profile of the European Union Córdoba26/10/2018 Citizens’ consultations on the future of Europe Alicante26/10/2018 Depopulation and regional funds Zamora29/10/2018 Citizens’ dialogues on the future of Europe Gironella06/11/2018 Citizens’ dialogues on the future of Europe Gavà06/11/2018 The major challenges for a more social Europe Castellón08/11/2018 Citizens’ dialogues on the future of Europe Campdevánol15/11/2018 Citizens’ dialogues on the future of Europe Olesa de Montserrat16/11/2018 Radicalization, deradicalization and public safety and security in the EU Barcelona22/11/2018 Citizens’ dialogues on the future of Europe Mahón23/11/2018 Disinformation and European elections Barcelona27/11/2018 Citizens’ dialogues on the future of Europe Hospitalet de Llobregat

Consejo Canario del Movimiento Europeo

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ANNEX II. List of speakers

Adrián Vidales, Con Copia a Europa AssociationAdriana Maldonado, specialist consultant on international economicsAgustín Barroso Núñez, Head of Operations at FRONTEX in the Canary IslandsAlejandro Fernández, Spokesperson for the Partido Popular in the Catalan Regional Parliament Alejandro Peinado, Young European Federalists of SpainAlex López, Kiribil networkAlicia Torrego, Fundación ConamaÁlvaro de la Cruz, European Institute of Innovation & TechnologyAna Alonso, El Independiente digital newspaperAna Enguídanos, Europe DirectAna Isabel González, University of OviedoAna Mar Fernández Pasarín, Jean Monnet Chair in European PoliciesAna Moreno, Helsinki EspañaAna Nieto, Helsinki EspañaAndrea Rizzi, El País daily newspaperÁngel Luis Sánchez Muñoz, Regional Government of AndalusiaAntonio Acín, Doctor in Theoretical PhysicsAntonio Najarro, Director of the Spanish National BalletAntonio Tajani, President of the European ParliamentAscensión Ortega Reyes, Association for the Development of Guadajoz and the rural eastern area of Cordoba (ADEGUA)Bartolomé Martínez, representative of the Ombudsman.Belén Becerril, Paneuropa EspañaBelén Carreño, journalist specialising in economic affairsCarlos Carnero, Fundación AlternativasCarlos Poza, Education Officer of the Erasmus Student Network Spain Carlos Trias Pinto, European Economic and Social CommitteeCarlos Uriarte Sánchez, Rey Juan Carlos University and Paneuropean UnionCarolina Darias San Sebastián, Speaker of the Regional Parliament of the Canary IslandsConstantino Méndez, former Secretary of State for DefenceConsuelo Laiz, Complutense University of MadridCristina Manzano, esGlobal digital newspaperCristina Mazas, former Head of the Department of Economy and European Affairs of the Regional Gover-nment of CantabriaCristina Monge, sociology professor at the University of Zaragoza

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Daniel Sarmiento, lawyer and professor at Complutense University of MadridDiego López Garrido, Fundación AlternativasDimitri Barua, European CommissionDolores Muñoz Dueñas, University of CordobaElena Costas, Autonomous University of BarcelonaElena Sánchez-Montijano, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)Enrique Baron, Union of European Federalists - SpainEuropean Agency for Safety and Health at Work (OSHA)Europe Direct BizkaiaEsther Lynch, Secretariat of the European Trade Union Confederation Eugenio Nasarre Goicoechea, Spanish Federal Council of the European MovementFélix García-Moriyón, Autonomous University of MadridFermín Rodríguez Gutiérrez, Centro de Servicios Universitarios de AvilésFernando Llagas Gelo, University of CórdobaFernando Maura, Spanish MPFernando Rocha, Fundación 1º de Mayo.Francisco Aldecoa, Spanish Federal Council of the European MovementFrancisco Conde, Regional Government of GaliciaFrancisco Fonseca, European CommissionFrancisco Pérez-Bes, General Secretary of the Spanish National Cybersecurity Institute (INCIBE)Gema Sánchez Medero, Complutense University of Madrid Helen Darbishire, Access Info Europe Hugo Cuello, cc/EuropaInmaculada Valencia, Cantabria Regional Representation Office in BrusselsIrene Bello Quintana, Alianza por la solidaridad – Canary IslandsIsabel Benjumea, Red FloridablancaIsabel Rodero, Fundación 1° de MayoIsrael Alonso, University of the Basque Country Janis A. Emmanouilidis, European Policy CentreJavier Zarzalejos, Foundation for Analysis and Social StudiesJesús Cimarro, Academy of the Performing ArtsJesús Gallego, UGT International Policy SecretaryJesús Orcaray, Guadalquivir rural development groupsJesús Rojano Aguilera, Mayor of Baena and Chair of the Association for the Development of Guadajoz and the rural eastern area of Córdoba (ADEGUA)Jonás Fernández, MEPJorge Martín Frías, publisher of Red FloridablancaJorge Toledo, former Secretary of State for European AffairsJosé Alba Alonso, Asturian Council of the European MovementJosé Antonio Barrientos, Mayor of BoalJosé Luis Pardo, philosopher and essayistJosé Luis Pontijas Calderón, CESEDEN analystJosé Luis Ruiz de Munain, Foro ImpactoJosé María Larrea, Chair of VOLT España José Moisés Martín, economist and editor of Agenda PúblicaJosé Rafael Martos, association of municipalities of GuadajozJosé Ruiz Vicioso, Red FloridablancaJosé Vicente González, Confederation of Employers and Industries of Spain (CEOE)Josep Borrell, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the European Union and Cooperation

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Juan Antonio Falcón, Aragonese Council of the European MovementJuan Carlos García Suso, Mayor of AlcañizJuan Carlos Lorenzo, Spanish Commission for Refugees (CEAR) - Canary IslandsJuan Cuesta, Europa en SumaJuan M. Ramírez-Cendrero, Complutense University of MadridLaura Gómez Urquijo, Jean Monnet Chair, University of DeustoLeopoldo Tolivar Alas, Asturian Council of the European MovementLucas González Ojeda, European Commission in SpainLuis Caballero, Instituto de la Juventud (INJUVE)Luis Marco Aguiriano, Secretary of State for the European Union, MAEUEC Magdalena Reifs López, European Documentation Centre, University of CórdobaManuel Muñiz Villa, IE School of Global AffairsMaria Andrés Marín, Office of the European Parliament in MadridMaría Bustelo, Complutense University of MadridMaría Ramos, University Carlos III of Madrid and PolitikonMariano Abad Fernández, Jean Monnet ChairMario Regidor Arenales, Union of European Federalists - Canary IslandsMiguel Ángel Benedicto, Secretary-General of the Spanish Federal Council of the European MovementMiguel Ángel Estevan, Senator for TeruelMiguel Ángel Lucía, Aragonese Council of the European MovementMiriam Tey, Catalan civil societyMónica Frassoni, former MEPMontserrat Hinarejos, University of Alcalá de HenaresNathalie Loiseau, French Minister of European AffairsNicolás Sartorius, Fundación AlternativasNúria González Campaña, Club TocquevilleOliver Soto, Union of European Federalists of Madrid and Complutense University of MadridOlivier Longué, Action Against Hunger SpainPablo Faura, Union of European Federalists of Madrid Pablo Simón, Carlos III University of Madrid and PolitikonPaloma López Bermejo, MEPPaola del Vecchio, Il Messaggero and Il Mattino newspapersPascual Navarro, Director-General for Coordination of the Internal MarketPatricia Gabaldón, IE Business SchoolPatricia Manrique, Pasaje Seguro (immigration activist group)Patxi Aldecoa, Vice-President of the European Movement in SpainPedro Pereira, European CommissionRamón Cosío Bustillo, Unified Police Union (SUP)Raquel González, Mayor of Aranda de DueroRogelio Pérez Bustamante, Jean Monnet ChairRosa Quintana, Regional Government of GaliciaSantiago García Granda, University of OviedoSaya Sauliere, Medialab-PradoSergio Gutiérrez, MEPSilvia Clavería, Carlos III University of MadridSilvia Escobar, former Human Rights Ambassador for SpainSteve Purser, Head of Core Operations of ENISASusi Denison, European Council on Foreign RelationsTeófilo Rodríguez, Asturian Council of the European Movement

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Teresa Benítez, Local rural development group for the mountainous region of south-western SevilleTeresa Freixes, Autonomous University of Barcelona Teresa Frontán, European Commission’s Representation in SpainTom Morgan, European Parliament Office in SpainToni Roldán, European Council Foreign RelationsVíctor Lapuente, University of GothenburgVidal Galicia, Mayor of ArévaloXavier Prats Monné, Director-General for Health and Food Safety EC Xosé Represas, Mayor of Ponteareas

Universidad de Córdoba: Centro de Documentación Europea de la Universidad de Córdoba

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ANNEX III.Decalogue of best practices for organising a citizen’s consultation

Bear in mind at all times:

1. The event is not just about informing citizens, it is about giving them a voice

The events of the citizens’ consultations program-me are not intended to be purely informational. The consultations entail raising issues around which there is uncertainty or debate and on which a decision has yet to be made. They are not for the purpose of reporting on something that has already been done, or on actions that have already been agreed upon. On the other hand, providing citizens’ with a voice means being open to allowing participants to discuss the issues that concern them without being totally limited by the format of the event.

2. Transparency and information on the process as a whole

It is important to convey an idea of the global pro-cess of citizens’ consultations. During the event, inform participants of the general objectives of the project, the foreseen schedule (including other talks that might be being held in your city) and the scope of the process. As regards the spe-cific act you are going to organize, provide infor-mation on the issues you are going to address, who is going to participate and the expected for-mat for the debate.

Before the event:

3. Seek a plurality of perspectives at the event

We must bear this in mind both with regards to those who will participate in the event and tho-

se who will attend it. Do not be concerned by disagreement or debate: the objective of the pro-cess is for different proposals and opinions to be heard. There are different formats to choose from, ranging from dialogues between political repre-sentatives or groups of experts with different positions to events aimed at specific groups, etc.

4. Choose someone to act as a debate facilitator

The facilitator must not be the star of the event but endeavour to ensure it runs smoothly. They may or may not be the person who presents the event, or be one of the potential speakers. Their main function is to keep an eye on the time, en-courage as many people to participate as possi-ble, and take note of the ideas and concerns that arise in order to reach an agreed list of proposals before the event is concluded.

5. The role of experts and authorities

The participation of experts and authorities may be useful to ensure the relevance and visibility of the event. They may raise pertinent issues on the political agenda that are the subject of uncertain-ty and debate. However, it is the facilitator’s res-ponsibility to ensure that they do not monopolize the event in terms of focus or time. It is essential to clearly state the time that will be allocated to each participant at the beginning of the event and ensure that these time allocations are res-pected.

During the event:

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6. Facilitate discussion among participants

Different debate formats are possible, i.e. speakers debating with participants, or partici-pants discussing amongst themselves. If a lot of people (more than 40) attend the event, then small groups can be created (never put more than 10 people in each group). In this case it is impor-tant to keep an eye on the time and to choose a spokesperson.

7. Agree on a list of proposals before concluding the consultation

It is important to complete the diagnostics stage and conclude the debate. At the beginning of the event, the participants must be informed of the need to agree on a list of proposals. Ideally, the list of proposals will be agreed at the event itself, in the presence of the participants.

8. How to make a list of proposals

We recommend a maximum of 5-7 proposals. You can use phrases such as the following: “Beyond the debate and all the issues addressed herein, if we had to submit a few of the proposals to the European Commission which ones would we choose?” Set aside sufficient time to do this. If you consider it necessary, you can prioritize the proposals depending on how much support they receive. Finally, the proposals must be clearly for-mulated. A topic, complaint or personal concern does not constitute a proposal.

After the event:

9. Publish the results of the consultation

We recommend that the organisers publish the main conclusions once the consultation has been completed. If possible, the public in general—not just the consultation participants— should be able to access this information.

10. Finally, choose a trusted individual who participated in the event to fill out a short questionnaire on the main conclusions of the event

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ANNEX IV.Composition of the focus group

GROUP 1: Middle-class (in the broadest sense of the term) men and women aged between 18 and 25, engaged in the following occupations/ac-tivities: currently in education, with a vocational training qualification or similar, and in precarious employment. Three members of this group were Spanish nationals with immigrant parents. Valen-cia, 11 July 2018.

GROUP 2: Middle- and upper-middle-class men and women aged between 24 and 28, all with uni-versity qualifications, and having studied an Eras-mus within the European Union. Some members of this group had completed a Master’s degree, Doctorate and/or MBA and others are already working; half of them lived in their parents’ ho-mes. Madrid, 2 July 2018.

GROUP 3: Middle- and lower-middle-class men and women aged between 26 and 35, working in the services sector and in contact with other Eu-ropean citizens, half of them in precarious emplo-yment. Palma de Mallorca, 12 July 2018.

GROUP 4: Upper-middle class men and women aged between 32 and 40, professionals and execu-tives, some of them enrolled in a Master’s program-me or at a business school, some linked to new in-dustries (one app developer and two IT specialists). Bilbao, 10 July 2018.

GROUP 5: Middle-class men and women aged between 36 and 45, retail and administrative employees from different areas. Barcelona, 4 July 2018.

GROUP 6: Middle-class men and women aged between 46 and 56, freelance and/or self-emplo-yed workers in different areas (e.g., taxi, trans-port, retail, small service companies). Madrid, July 2018.

GROUP 7: Middle- and upper-middle-class men and women aged between 50 and 60, linked to rural activities (high-tech agrarian and farming activities). Haro (La Rioja), 21 July 2018.

GROUP 8: Upper-class men and women aged between 50 and 60, with different professional profiles, all with stock market portfolios and/or investments in different sectors (construction, chemical, pharmaceutical, textile, services and the agri-food sector). Seville, 3 July 2018.

GROUP 9: Middle-class men and women aged between 40 and 50, working in various industrial sectors, in stable employment; 50% of them were trade union members. Barcelona, 4 July 2018.

GROUP 10: Middle- and lower-middle class men and women aged between 55 and 65; some in early retirement and the rest close to retirement; some of them participated in senior citizen’s as-sociations, and others helped their children out financially. Valladolid, 7 July 2018.

GROUP 11: Men and women, aged between 18 and 24. With university qualifications. Children of professionals, executives or senior management staff, specialists, freelance workers and sma-ll business owners. Four had participated in the Erasmus programme. All of them spoke one other European language besides Spanish. Madrid, July 2018.

GROUP 12: Men and women, aged between 30 and 60. With university qualifications. Working as specialists or in positions with a certain degree of managerial responsibility, three in multinatio-nals. Four had participated in Erasmus program-mes. Three had lived and worked abroad. Two fre-quently traveled to other EU countries for work purposes. Madrid, July 2018.

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GROUP 13: Men and women, aged between 40 and 60. With university qualifications. Mi-ddle-class: mid- to high-level public sector em-ployees (secondary school teachers, municipal council specialists) and small business owners / entrepreneurs. Valencia, July 2018.

GROUP 14: Men and women, aged between 60 and 70. Middle class: several of them held and others continue to hold mid- and low-level po-sitions in the public administration or in private companies, or are business owners without qua-lifications. Zaragoza, July.

GROUP 15: Men and women, aged between 60 and 70. Upper-middle-class: working or had worked in jobs with a certain level of responsibi-lity, mid-level civil servants, middle- management bank personnel, management heads at SMEs, lawyers, etc. Three of them had already retired. Zaragoza, July 2018.

This report was written by José Luis Fernández Martínez, specialist in citizens’ participation, under the supervision of Joan Font Fábregas, researcher at the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC).