NATO - Towards the New Strategic Concept

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Towards the new Strategic Concept

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Table of Contents

Te North Atlantic reaty (1949) 3

Te Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1991) 21

Te Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999) 33

Te Comprehensive Political Guidance (2006) 47

Te Declaration on Alliance Security (2009) 52



Te North Atlantic reaty (1949)

Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reafrm their aith in the purposes and principles o the

Charter o the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all

governments.

They are determined to saeguard the reedom, common heritage and civilisation o

their peoples, ounded on the principles o democracy, individual liberty and the rule o

law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their eorts or collective deence and or the preservation

o peace and security. They thereore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set orth in the Charter o the United Nations, to settle any

international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceul means in such a manner

that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to rerain in their

international relations rom the threat or use o orce in any manner inconsistent with the

purposes o the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the urther development o peaceul and riendly

international relations by strengthening their ree institutions, by bringing about a better

understanding o the principles upon which these institutions are ounded, and by promoting

conditions o stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conict in their international

economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all o them.

Article

In order more eectively to achieve the objectives o this Treaty, the Parties, separately and

jointly, by means o continuous and eective sel-help and mutual aid, will maintain and

develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion o any o them, the territorial

integrity, political independence or security o any o the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more o them in Europe or North

America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, i

such an armed attack occurs, each o them, in exercise o the right o individual or collective

sel-deence recognised by Article 51 o the Charter o the United Nations, will assist the

Party or Parties so attacked by taking orthwith, individually and in concert with the other

Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use o armed orce, to restore and

maintain the security o the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereo shall immediately be

reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security

Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace

and security.



4

Article 6 (1)

For the purpose o Article 5, an armed attack on one or more o the Parties is deemed to

include an armed attack:

• on the territory o any o the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian

Departments o France (2), on the territory o or on the Islands under the jurisdiction o

any o the Parties in the North Atlantic area north o the Tropic o Cancer;• on the orces, vessels, or aircrat o any o the Parties, when in or over these territories

or any other area in Europe in which occupation orces o any o the Parties were

stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into orce or the Mediterranean Sea or

the North Atlantic area north o the Tropic o Cancer.

Article 7

This Treaty does not aect, and shall not be interpreted as aecting in any way the rights and

obligations under the Charter o the Parties which are members o the United Nations, or the

primary responsibility o the Security Council or the maintenance o international peace and

security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none o the international engagements now in orce between it and

any other o the Parties or any third State is in conict with the provisions o this Treaty, and

undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each o them shall be represented,

to consider matters concerning the implementation o this Treaty. The Council shall be

so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such

subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a deence

committee which shall recommend measures or the implementation o Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to

urther the principles o this Treaty and to contribute to the security o the North Atlantic area

to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing

its instrument o accession with the Government o the United States o America. The

Government o the United States o America will inorm each o the Parties o the deposit o

each such instrument o accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratifed and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with

their respective constitutional processes. The instruments o ratifcation shall be deposited

as soon as possible with the Government o the United States o America, which will notiyall the other signatories o each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into orce between the States

which have ratifed it as soon as the ratifcations o the majority o the signatories, including

the ratifcations o Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United

Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into eect with respect

to other States on the date o the deposit o their ratifcations. (3)



5

Article 12

Ater the Treaty has been in orce or ten years, or at any time thereater, the Parties shall,

i any o them so requests, consult together or the purpose o reviewing the Treaty, having

regard or the actors then aecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including

the development o universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter o the

United Nations or the maintenance o international peace and security.

Article 1

Ater the Treaty has been in orce or twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one

year ater its notice o denunciation has been given to the Government o the United States o

America, which will inorm the Governments o the other Parties o the deposit o each notice

o denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, o which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in

the archives o the Government o the United States o America. Duly certifed copies will be

transmitted by that Government to the Governments o other signatories.

1. The defnition o the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2o the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession o Greece and Turkey

signed on 22 October 1951.

2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insoar as the ormer

Algerian Departments o France were concerned, the relevant clauses o this Treaty

had become inapplicable as rom July 3, 1962.

3. The Treaty came into orce on 24 August 1949, ater the deposition o the ratifcations

o all signatory states.



6

Protocol to the North Atlantic reaty on the Accession of Greece and urkey

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949,

Being satisfed that the security o the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accessiono the Kingdom o Greece and the Republic o Turkey to that Treaty,

Agree as ollows:

Article 1

Upon the entry into orce o this Protocol, the Government o the United States o America

shall, on behal o all the Parties, communicate to the Government o the Kingdom o Greece

and the Government o the Republic o Turkey an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic

Treaty, as it may be modifed by Article 2 o the present Protocol. Thereater the Kingdom o

Greece and the Republic o Turkey shall each become a Party on the date when it deposits

its instruments o accession with the Government o the United States o America in

accordance with Article 10 o the Treaty.

Article 2

I the Republic o Turkey becomes a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6 o the Treaty

shall, as rom the date o the deposit by the Government o the Republic o Turkey o its

instruments o accession with the Government o the United States o America, be modifed

to read as ollows:

For the purpose o Article 5, an armed attack on one or more o the Parties is deemed to

include an armed attack:

1. on the territory o any o the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian

Departments o France, on the territory o Turkey or on the islands under the

jurisdiction o any o the Parties in the North Atlantic area north o the Tropic o Cancer;2. on the orces, vessels, or aircrat o any o the Parties, when in or over these territories

or any other area in Europe in whicH occupation orces o any o the Parties were

stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into orce or the Mediterranean Sea or

the North Atlantic area north o the Tropic o Cancer.

Article

The present Protocol shall enter into orce when each o the Parties to the North Atlantic

Treaty has notifed the Government o the United States o America o its acceptance thereo.

The Government o the United States o America shall inorm all the Parties to the North

Atlantic Treaty o the date o the receipt o each such notifcation and o the date o the entry

into orce o the present Protocol.

Article 4

The present Protocol, o which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be

deposited in the Archives o the Government o the United States o America. Duly certifed

copies thereo shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments o all the Parties

to the North Atlantic Treaty.



7

Protocol to the North Atlantic reaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on April 4, 1949,

Being satisfed that the security o the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accessiono the Federal Republic o Germany to that Treaty, and Having noted that the Federal

Republic o Germany has, by a declaration dated October 3, 1954, accepted the obligations

set orth in Article 2 o the Charter o the United Nations and has undertaken upon its

accession to the North Atlantic Treaty to rerain rom any action inconsistent with the strictly

deensive character o that Treaty, and

Having urther noted that all member governments have associated themselves with the

declaration also made on October 3, 1954, by the Governments o the United States o

America, the United Kingdom o Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic

in connection with the aoresaid declaration o the Federal Republic o Germany, Agree as

ollows:

Article 1

Upon the entry into orce o the present Protocol, the Government o the United States o

America shall on behal o all the Parties communicate to the Government o the Federal

Republic o Germany an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. Thereater the

Federal Republic o Germany shall become a Party to that Treaty on the date when it

deposits its instruments o accession with the Government o the United States o America in

accordance with Article 10 o the Treaty.

Article 2

The present Protocol shall enter into orce, when

a. each o the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notifed to the Government o the

United States o America its acceptance thereo,

b. all instruments o ratifcation o the Protocol modiying and completing the Brussels

Treaty have been deposited with the Belgian Government, and

c. all instruments o ratifcation or approval o the Convention on the Presence o Foreign

Forces in the Federal Republic o Germany have been deposited with the Government

o the Federal Republic o Germany.

The Government o the United States o America shall inorm the other Parties to the North

Atlantic Treaty o the date o the receipt o each notifcation o acceptance o the present

Protocol and o the date o the entry into orce o the present Protocol.

Article



copies thereo shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments o the other

Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.



8

Protocol to the North Atlantic reaty on the Accession of Spain


Being satisfed that the security o the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accessiono the Kingdom o Spain to that Treaty,

Agree as ollows:

Article 1

Upon the entry into orce o this Protocol, the Secretary General o the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization shall, on behal o all the Parties, communicate to the Government o the

Kingdom o Spain an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with

Article 10 o the Treaty, the Kingdom o Spain shall become a Party on the date when it

deposits its instrument o accession with the Government o the United States o America.

Article 2The present Protocol shall enter into orce when each o the Parties to the North Atlantic



Atlantic Treaty o the date o receipt o each such notifcation and o the date o the entry into

orce o the present Protocol.

Article







9

Protocol to the North Atlantic reaty on the Accession of the Czech Republic


Being satisfed that the security o the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accessiono the Czech Republic to that Treaty,

Agree as ollows :

Article 1


Organization shall, on behal o all the Parties, communicate to the Government o the Czech

Republic an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with article 10

o the Treaty, the Czech Republic shall become a Party on the date when it deposits its

instrument o accession with the Government o the United States o America.






Article



copies thereo shall be transsmitted by that Government to the Governments o all the Parties


In witness whereo, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol.

Signed at Brussels on the 16th day o December 1997.



10

Protocol to the North Atlantic reaty on the Accession of the Republic of Hungary


Being satisfed that the security o the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accessiono the Republic o Hungary to that Treaty,

Agree as ollows :

Article 1



Republic o Hungary an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with

article 10 o the Treaty, the Republic o Hungary shall become a Party on the date when it







Article









11

Protocol to the North Atlantic reaty on the Accession of the Republic of Poland


Being satisfed that the security o the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accessiono the Republic o Poland to that Treaty,

Agree as ollows :

Article 1



Republic o Poland an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with

article 10 o the Treaty, the Republic o Poland shall become a Party on the date when it







Article









12

Protocol to the North Atlantic reaty on the Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria


Being satisfed that the security o the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accessiono the Republic o Bulgaria to that Treaty,

Agree as ollows:

Article 1


Organisation shall, on behal o all the Parties, communicate to the Government o the

Republic o Bulgaria an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with

Article 10 o the Treaty, the Republic o Bulgaria shall become a Party on the date when it







Article







1

Protocol to the North Atlantic reaty on the Accession of the Republic of Estonia


Being satisfed that the security o the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accessiono the Republic o Estonia to that Treaty,

Agree as ollows:

Article 1



Republic o Estonia an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with

Article 10 o the Treaty, the Republic o Estonia shall become a Party on the date when it







Article







14

Protocol to the North Atlantic reaty on the accession of the Republic of Latvia


Being satisfed that the security o the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accessiono the Republic o Latvia to that Treaty,

Agree as ollows:

Article 1



Republic o Latvia an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with

Article 10 o the Treaty, the Republic o Latvia shall become a Party on the date when it







Article







15

Protocol to the North Atlantic reaty on the accession of the Republic of Lithuania


Being satisfed that the security o the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accessiono the Republic o Lithuania to that Treaty,

Agree as ollows:

Article 1



Republic o Lithuania an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with

Article 10 o the Treaty, the Republic o Lithuania shall become a Party on the date when it







Article







16

Protocol to the North Atlantic reaty on the accession of Romania


Being satisfed that the security o the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accessiono Romania to that Treaty,

Agree as ollows:

Article 1


Organisation shall, on behal o all the Parties, communicate to the Government o Romania

an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with Article 10 o the Treaty,

Romania shall become a Party on the date when it deposits its instrument o accession with

the Government o the United States o America.






Article







17

Protocol to the North Atlantic reaty on the accession of the Slovak Republic


Being satisfed that the security o the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accessiono the Slovak Republic to that Treaty,

Agree as ollows:

Article 1


Organisation shall, on behal o all the Parties, communicate to the Government o the Slovak

Republic an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with Article 10

o the Treaty, the Slovak Republic shall become a Party on the date when it deposits its

instrument o accession with the Government o the United States o America.






Article







18

Protocol to the North Atlantic reaty on the accession of the Republic of Slovenia


Being satisfed that the security o the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accessiono the Republic o Slovenia to that Treaty,

Agree as ollows:

Article 1



Republic o Slovenia an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with

Article 10 o the Treaty, the Republic o Slovenia shall become a Party on the date when it







Article







19

Protocol to the North Atlantic reaty on the Accession of the Republic of Albania


Being satisfed that the security o the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accessiono the Republic o Albania to that Treaty,

Agree as ollows:

Article 1



Republic o Albania an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with

article 10 o the Treaty, the Republic o Albania shall become a Party on the date when it







Article






Signed at Brussels on the 1st day o April 2009.



20

Protocol to the North Atlantic reaty on the Accession of the Republic of Croatia


Being satisfed that the security o the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accessiono the Republic o Croatia to that Treaty,

Agree as ollows:

Article 1



Republic o Croatia an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with

article 10 o the Treaty, the Republic o Croatia shall become a Party on the date when it







Article






Signed at Brussels on the 1st day o April 2009.



21

Te Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1991)

agreed by the Heads o State and Government participating in the Meeting o the North

Atlantic Council

At their meeting in London in July 1990, NATO’s Heads o State and Government agreed onthe need to transorm the Atlantic Alliance to reect the new, more promising, era in Europe.

While reafrming the basic principles on which the Alliance has rested since its inception,

they recognised that the developments taking place in Europe would have a ar-reaching

impact on the way in which its aims would be met in uture. In particular, they set in hand a

undamental strategic review. The resulting new Strategic Concept is set out below.

Part I - The Strategic Context

The new strategic environment

1. Since 1989, proound political changes have taken place in Central and Eastern

Europe which have radically improved the security environment in which the North Atlantic Alliance seeks to achieve its objectives. The USSR’s ormer satellites have

ully recovered their sovereignty. The Soviet Union and its Republics are undergoing

radical change. The three Baltic Republics have regained their independence.

Soviet orces have let Hungary and Czechoslovakia and are due to complete their

withdrawal rom Poland and Germany by 1994. All the countries that were ormerly

adversaries o NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological

hostility to the West. They have, in varying degrees, embraced and begun to

implement policies aimed at achieving pluralistic democracy, the rule o law, respect

or human rights and a market economy. The political division o Europe that was the

source o the military conrontation o the Cold War period has thus been overcome.

2. In the West, there have also been signifcant changes. Germany has been united and

remains a ull member o the Alliance and o European institutions. The act that thecountries o the European Community are working towards the goal o political union,

including the development o a European security identity, and the enhancement o

the role o the WEU are important actors or European security. The strengthening o

the security dimension in the process o European integration, and the enhancement

o the role and responsibilities o European members o the Alliance are positive and

mutually reinorcing. The development o a European security identity and deence

role, reected in the strengthening o the European pillar within the Alliance, will not

only serve the interests o the European states but also reinorce the integrity and

eectiveness o the Alliance as a whole.

3. Substantial progress in arms control has already enhanced stability and security by

lowering arms levels and increasing military transparency and mutual confdence

(including through the Stockholm CDE agreement o 1986, the INF Treaty o 1987and the CSCE agreements and confdence and security-building measures o 1990).

Implementation o the 1991 START Treaty will lead to increased stability through

substantial and balanced reductions in the feld o strategic nuclear arms. Further

ar- reaching changes and reductions in the nuclear orces o the United States and

the Soviet Union will be pursued ollowing President Bush’s September 1991 initiative.

Also o great importance is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

(CFE), signed at the 1990 Paris Summit; its implementation will remove the Alliance’s

numerical ineriority in key conventional weapon systems and provide or eective

verifcation procedures. All these developments will also result in an unprecedented

degree o military transparency in Europe, thus increasing predictability and mutual

confdence. Such transparency would be urther enhanced by the achievement o

an Open Skies regime. There are welcome prospects or urther advances in arms



22

control in conventional and nuclear orces, and or the achievement o a global ban

on chemical weapons, as well as restricting de-stabilising arms exports and the

prolieration o certain weapons technologies.

4. The CSCE process, which began in Helsinki in 1975, has already contributed

signifcantly to overcoming the division o Europe. As a result o the Paris Summit, it

now includes new institutional arrangements and provides a contractual ramework

or consultation and cooperation that can play a constructive role, complementary to

that o NATO and the process o European integration, in preserving peace.

5. The historic changes that have occurred in Europe, which have led to the ulflment o

a number o objectives set out in the Harmel Report, have signifcantly improved the

overall security o the Allies. The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat

which was the principal concern o the Alliance in its frst orty years has disappeared.

On the other hand, a great deal o uncertainty about the uture and risks to the

security o the Alliance remain.

6. The new Strategic Concept looks orward to a security environment in which the

positive changes reerred to above have come to ruition. In particular, it assumes

both the completion o the planned withdrawal o Soviet military orces rom Central

and Eastern Europe and the ull implementation by all parties o the 1990 CFE Treaty.The implementation o the Strategic Concept will thus be kept under review in the

light o the evolving security environment and in particular progress in ulflling these

assumptions. Further adaptation will be made to the extent necessary.

Security challenges and risks

7. The security challenges and risks which NATO aces are dierent in nature rom what

they were in the past. The threat o a simultaneous, ull-scale attack on all o NATO’s

European ronts has eectively been removed and thus no longer provides the ocus

or Allied strategy. Particularly in Central Europe, the risk o a surprise attack has been

substantially reduced, and minimum Allied warning time has increased accordingly.

8. In contrast with the predominant threat o the past, the risks to Allied security that

remain are multi-aceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to

predict and assess. NATO must be capable o responding to such risks i stability in

Europe and the security o Alliance members are to be preserved. These risks can

arise in various ways.

9. Risks to Allied security are less likely to result rom calculated aggression against the

territory o the Allies, but rather rom the adverse consequences o instabilities that

may arise rom the serious economic, social and political difculties, including ethnic

rivalries and territorial disputes, which are aced by many countries in central and

eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should

not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity o members o the Alliance.

They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed

conicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having

a direct eect on the security o the Alliance.

10. In the particular case o the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertainties that accompany

the process o change cannot be seen in isolation rom the act that its conventional

orces are signifcantly larger than those o any other European State and its large

nuclear arsenal comparable only with that o the United States. These capabilities

have to be taken into account i stability and security in Europe are to be preserved.



2

11. The Allies also wish to maintain peaceul and non- adversarial relations with the

countries in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East. The stability and peace o

the countries on the southern periphery o Europe are important or the security o

the Alliance, as the 1991 Gul war has shown. This is all the more so because o the

build-up o military power and the prolieration o weapons technologies in the area,

including weapons o mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable o reaching the

territory o some member states o the Alliance.

12. Any armed attack on the territory o the Allies, rom whatever direction, would be

covered by Articles 5 and 6 o the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must

also take account o the global context. Alliance security interests can be aected by

other risks o a wider nature, including prolieration o weapons o mass destruction,

disruption o the ow o vital resources and actions o terrorism and sabotage.

Arrangements exist within the Alliance or consultation among the Allies under Article

4 o the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination o their eorts

including their responses to such risks.

13. From the point o view o Alliance strategy, these dierent risks have to be seen in

dierent ways. Even in a non-adversarial and cooperative relationship, Soviet military

capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the

most signifcant actor o which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the

strategic balance in Europe. The end o East-West conrontation has, however, greatly

reduced the risk o major conict in Europe. On the other hand, there is a greater

risk o dierent crises arising, which could develop quickly and would require a rapid

response, but they are likely to be o a lesser magnitude.

14. Two conclusions can be drawn rom this analysis o the strategic context. The frst

is that the new environment does not change the purpose or the security unctions

o the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity. The second, on the other

hand, is that the changed environment oers new opportunities or the Alliance to

rame its strategy within a broad approach to security.

Part II - Alliance Objectives And Security Functions

The purpose o the Alliance

15. NATO’s essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the

London Declaration, is to saeguard the reedom and security o all its members by

political and military means in accordance with the principles o the United Nations

Charter. Based on common values o democracy, human rights and the rule o law,

the Alliance has worked since its inception or the establishment o a just and lasting

peaceul order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged.

The nature o the Alliance

16. NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security o North America ispermanently tied to the security o Europe. It is the practical expression o eective

collective eort among its members in support o their common interests.

17. The undamental operating principle o the Alliance is that o common commitment

and mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support o the indivisibility o

security or all o its members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and

eect by NATO’s daily work in both the political and military spheres, ensures that

no single Ally is orced to rely upon its own national eorts alone in dealing with

basic security challenges. Without depriving member states o their right and duty to

assume their sovereign responsibilities in the feld o deence, the Alliance enables

them through collective eort to enhance their ability to realise their essential national

security objectives.



24

18. The resulting sense o equal security amongst the members o the Alliance, regardless

o dierences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative

to each other, contributes to overall stability within Europe and thus to the creation

o conditions conducive to increased co-operation both among Alliance members

and with others. It is on this basis that members o the Alliance, together with other

nations, are able to pursue the development o co-operative structures o security or

a Europe whole and ree.

The undamental tasks o the Alliance

19. The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve the peace

will continue to include the maintenance o a military capability sufcient to prevent

war and to provide or eective deence; an overall capability to manage successully

crises aecting the security o its members; and the pursuit o political eorts

avouring dialogue with other nations and the active search or a co-operative

approach to European security, including in the feld o arms control and disarmament.

20. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance perorms the ollowing undamental

security tasks:

I. To provide one o the indispensable oundations or a stable security environmentin Europe, based on the growth o democratic institutions and commitment to the

peaceul resolution o disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or

coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use o

orce.

II. To serve, as provided or in Article 4 o the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic

orum or Allied consultations on any issues that aect their vital interests,

including possible developments posing risks or members’ security, and or

appropriate co-ordination o their eorts in felds o common concern.

III. To deter and deend against any threat o aggression against the territory o any

NATO member state.

IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

21. Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE also have roles to play,

in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these felds. The

creation o a European identity in security and deence will underline the preparedness

o the Europeans to take a greater share o responsibility or their security and will

help to reinorce transatlantic solidarity. However the extent o its membership and

o its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can perorm all our

core security unctions. NATO is the essential orum or consultation among the

Allies and the orum or agreement on policies bearing on the security and deence

commitments o its members under the Washington Treaty.

22. In defning the core unctions o the Alliance in the terms set out above, member

states confrm that the scope o the Alliance as well as their rights and obligations as

provided or in the Washington Treaty remain unchanged.

Part III - A Broad Approach To Security

Protecting peace in a new Europe

23. The Alliance has always sought to achieve its objectives o saeguarding the security

and territorial integrity o its members, and establishing a just and lasting peaceul

order in Europe, through both political and military means. This comprehensive

approach remains the basis o the Alliance’s security policy.



25

24. But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the

opportunities or achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater

than ever beore. It is now possible to draw all the consequences rom the act that

security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as

well as the indispensable deence dimension. Managing the diversity o challenges

acing the Alliance requires a broad approach to security. This is reected in three

mutually reinorcing elements o Allied security policy; dialogue, co-operation, and themaintenance o a collective deence capability.

25. The Alliance’s active pursuit o dialogue and co-operation, underpinned by its

commitment to an eective collective deence capability, seeks to reduce the risks

o conict arising out o misunderstanding or design; to build increased mutual

understanding and confdence among all European states; to help manage crises

aecting the security o the Allies; and to expand the opportunities or a genuine

partnership among all European countries in dealing with common security problems.

26. In this regard, the Alliance’s arms control and disarmament policy contributes both

to dialogue and to co-operation with other nations, and thus will continue to play a

major role in the achievement o the Alliance’s security objectives. The Allies seek,

through arms control and disarmament, to enhance security and stability at the lowest

possible level o orces consistent with the requirements o deence. Thus, the Alliance

will continue to ensure that deence and arms control and disarmament objectives

remain in harmony.

27. In ulflling its undamental objectives and core security unctions, the Alliance will

continue to respect the legitimate security interests o others, and seek the peaceul

resolution o disputes as set orth in the Charter o the United Nations. The Alliance

will promote peaceul and riendly international relations and support democratic

institutions. In this respect, it recognizes the valuable contribution being made by

other organizations such as the European Community and the CSCE, and that the

roles o these institutions and o the Alliance are complementary.

Dialogue

28. The new situation in Europe has multiplied the opportunities or dialogue on the part

o the Alliance with the Soviet Union and the other countries o Central and Eastern

Europe. The Alliance has established regular diplomatic liaison and military contacts

with the countries o Central and Eastern Europe as provided or in the London

Declaration. The Alliance will urther promote dialogue through regular diplomatic

liaison, including an intensifed exchange o views and inormation on security policy

issues. Through such means the Allies, individually and collectively, will seek to

make ull use o the unprecedented opportunities aorded by the growth o reedom

and democracy throughout Europe and encourage greater mutual understanding o

respective security concerns, to increase transparency and predictability in security

aairs, and thus to reinorce stability. The military can help to overcome the divisions

o the past, not least through intensifed military contacts and greater militarytransparency. The Alliance’s pursuit o dialogue will provide a oundation or greater

co-operation throughout Europe and the ability to resolve dierences and conicts by

peaceul means.



26

Co-operation

29. The Allies are also committed to pursue co-operation with all states in Europe on the

basis o the principles set out in the Charter o Paris or a New Europe. They will seek

to develop broader and productive patterns o bilateral and multilateral co-operation

in all relevant felds o European security, with the aim, inter alia, o preventing crises

or, should they arise, ensuring their eective management. Such partnership between

the members o the Alliance and other nations in dealing with specifc problems will

be an essential actor in moving beyond past divisions towards one Europe whole

and ree. This policy o co-operation is the expression o the inseparability o security

among European states. It is built upon a common recognition among Alliance

members that the persistence o new political, economic or social divisions across the

continent could lead to uture instability, and such divisions must thus be diminished.

Collective Deence

30. The political approach to security will thus become increasingly important.

Nonetheless, the military dimension remains essential. The maintenance o an

adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common

deence remain central to the Alliance’s security objectives. Such a capability,

together with political solidarity, is required in order to prevent any attempt at coercion

or intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance

can never be perceived as an option with any prospect o success. It is equally

indispensable so that dialogue and co-operation can be undertaken with confdence

and achieve their desired results.

Management o crisis and confict prevention

31. In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the success o the Alliance’s

policy o preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past

on the eectiveness o preventive diplomacy and successul management o crises

aecting the security o its members. Any major aggression in Europe is much more

unlikely and would be preceded by signifcant warning time. Though on a much

smaller scale, the range and variety o other potential risks acing the Alliance are less

predictable than beore.

32. In these new circumstances there are increased opportunities or the successul

resolution o crises at an early stage. The success o Alliance policy will require a

coherent approach determined by the Alliance’s political authorities choosing and

co-ordinating appropriate crisis management measures as required rom a range o

political and other measures, including those in the military feld. Close control by the

political authorities o the Alliance will be applied rom the outset and at all stages.

Appropriate consultation and decision making procedures are essential to this end.

33. The potential o dialogue and co-operation within all o Europe must be ully

developed in order to help to deuse crises and to prevent conicts since the Allies’

security is inseparably linked to that o all other states in Europe. To this end, the Allies will support the role o the CSCE process and its institutions. Other bodies

including the European Community, Western European Union and United Nations may

also have an important role to play.



27

Part IV - Guidelines For Defence

Principles o Alliance strategy

34. The diversity o challenges now acing the Alliance thus requires a broad approach

to security. The transormed political and strategic environment enables the Alliance

to change a number o important eatures o its military strategy and to set out newguidelines, while reafrming proven undamental principles. At the London Summit, it

was thereore agreed to prepare a new military strategy and a revised orce posture

responding to the changed circumstances.

35. Alliance strategy will continue to reect a number o undamental principles. The

Alliance is purely deensive in purpose: none o its weapons will ever be used except

in sel-deence, and it does not consider itsel to be anyone’s adversary. The Allies will

maintain military strength adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the use

o orce against the territory o one o the Allies would meet collective and eective

action by all o them and that the risks involved in initiating conict would outweigh any

oreseeable gains. The orces o the Allies must thereore be able to deend Alliance

rontiers, to stop an aggressor’s advance as ar orward as possible, to maintain or

restore the territorial integrity o Allied nations and to terminate war rapidly by makingan aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. The role o the

Alliance’s military orces is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence

o its member states, and thus contribute to peace and stability in Europe.

36. The security o all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. Alliance

solidarity and strategic unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites or collective

security. The achievement o the Alliance’s objectives depends critically on the

equitable sharing o roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefts, o

common deence. The presence o North American conventional and US nuclear

orces in Europe remains vital to the security o Europe, which is inseparably linked

to that o North America. As the process o developing a European security identity

and deence role progresses, and is reected in the strengthening o the European

pillar within the Alliance, the European members o the Alliance will assume a greaterdegree o the responsibility or the deence o Europe.

37. The collective nature o Alliance deence is embodied in practical arrangements that

enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages o

collective deence, and prevent the renationalisation o deence policies, without

depriving the Allies o their sovereignty. These arrangements are based on an integrated

military structure as well as on co-operation and co-ordination agreements. Key

eatures include collective orce planning; common operational planning; multinational

ormations; the stationing o orces outside home territory, where appropriate on a

mutual basis; crisis management and reinorcement arrangements; procedures or

consultation; common standards and procedures or equipment, training and logistics;

joint and combined exercises; and inrastructure, armaments and logistics co-operation.

38. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind o coercion, the Alliance will maintain

or the oreseeable uture an appropriate mix o nuclear and conventional orces

based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a signifcantly

reduced level. Both elements are essential to Alliance security and cannot substitute

one or the other. Conventional orces contribute to war prevention by ensuring

that no potential aggressor could contemplate a quick or easy victory, or territorial

gains, by conventional means. Taking into account the diversity o risks with which

the Alliance could be aced, it must maintain the orces necessary to provide a wide

range o conventional response options. But the Alliance’s conventional orces alone

cannot ensure the prevention o war. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution

in rendering the risks o any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they

remain essential to preserve peace.



28

The Alliance’s new orce posture

39. At the London Summit, the Allies concerned agreed to move away, where appropriate,

rom the concept o orward deence towards a reduced orward presence, and to

modiy the principle o exible response to reect a reduced reliance on nuclear

weapons. The changes stemming rom the new strategic environment and the altered

risks now acing the Alliance enable signifcant modifcations to be made in the

missions o the Allies’ military orces and in their posture.

The Missions o Alliance Military Forces

40. The primary role o Alliance military orces, to guarantee the security and territorial

integrity o member states, remains unchanged. But this role must take account o

the new strategic environment, in which a single massive and global threat has given

way to diverse and multi-directional risks. Alliance orces have dierent unctions to

perorm in peace, crisis and war.

41. In peace, the role o Allied military orces is to guard against risks to the security o

Alliance members; to contribute towards the maintenance o stability and balance

in Europe; and to ensure that peace is preserved. They can contribute to dialogue

and co-operation throughout Europe by their participation in confdence-buildingactivities, including those which enhance transparency and improve communication;

as well as in verifcation o arms control agreements. Allies could, urther, be called

upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing orces or United Nations

missions.

42. In the event o crises which might lead to a military threat to the security o Alliance

members, the Alliance’s military orces can complement and reinorce political actions

within a broad approach to security, and thereby contribute to the management

o such crises and their peaceul resolution. This requires that these orces have a

capability or measured and timely responses in such circumstances; the capability to

deter action against any Ally and, in the event that aggression takes place, to respond

to and repel it as well as to reestablish the territorial integrity o member states.

43. While in the new security environment a general war in Europe has become highly

unlikely, it cannot fnally be ruled out. The Alliance’s military orces, which have as

their undamental mission to protect peace, have to provide the essential insurance

against potential risks at the minimum level necessary to prevent war o any kind, and,

should aggression occur, to restore peace. Hence the need or the capabilities and the

appropriate mix o orces already described.

Guidelines or the Alliance’s Force Posture

44. To implement its security objectives and strategic principles in the new environment,

the organization o the Allies’ orces must be adapted to provide capabilities that can

contribute to protecting peace, managing crises that aect the security o Alliance

members, and preventing war, while retaining at all times the means to deend, i

necessary, all Allied territory and to restore peace. The posture o Allies’ orces will

conorm to the guidelines developed in the ollowing paragraphs.

45. The size, readiness, availability and deployment o the Alliance’s military orces will

continue to reect its strictly deensive nature and will be adapted accordingly to

the new strategic environment including arms control agreements. This means in

particular:

a. that the overall size o the Allies’ orces, and in many cases their readiness, will be

reduced;



29

b. that the maintenance o a comprehensive in-place linear deensive posture in the

central region will no longer be required. The peacetime geographical distribution

o orces will ensure a sufcient military presence throughout the territory o the

Alliance, including where necessary orward deployment o appropriate orces.

Regional considerations and, in particular, geostrategic dierences within the

Alliance will have to be taken into account, including the shorter warning times to

which the northern and southern regions will be subject compared with the centralregion and, in the southern region, the potential or instability and the military

capabilities in the adjacent areas.

46. To ensure that at this reduced level the Allies’ orces can play an eective role both

in managing crises and in countering aggression against any Ally, they will require

enhanced exibility and mobility and an assured capability or augmentation when

necessary. For these reasons:

a. Available orces will include, in a limited but militarily signifcant proportion,

ground, air and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements able to respond to

a wide range o eventualities, many o which are unoreseeable. They will be o

sufcient quality, quantity and readiness to deter a limited attack and, i required,

to deend the territory o the Allies against attacks, particularly those launched

without long warning time.

b. The orces o the Allies will be structured so as to permit their military capability to

be built up when necessary. This ability to build up by reinorcement, by mobilising

reserves, or by reconstituting orces, must be in proportion to potential threats to

Alliance security, including the possibility - albeit unlikely, but one that prudence

dictates should not be ruled out - o a major conict. Consequently, capabilities or

timely reinorcement and resupply both within Europe and rom North America will

be o critical importance.

c. Appropriate orce structures and procedures, including those that would provide

an ability to build up, deploy and draw down orces quickly and discriminately,

will be developed to permit measured, exible and timely responses in order to

reduce and deuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly inpeacetime.

d. In the event o use o orces, including the deployment o reaction and other

available reinorcing orces as an instrument o crisis management, the Alliance’s

political authorities will, as beore, exercise close control over their employment

at all stages. Existing procedures will be reviewed in the light o the new missions

and posture o Alliance orces.

Characteristics o Conventional Forces

47. It is essential that the Allies’ military orces have a credible ability to ulfl their

unctions in peace, crisis and war in a way appropriate to the new security

environment. This will be reected in orce and equipment levels; readiness and

availability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and orce

build-up capabilities, all o which will be adjusted accordingly. The conventional

orces o the Allies will include, in addition to immediate and rapid reaction orces,

main deence orces, which will provide the bulk o orces needed to ensure the

Alliance’s territorial integrity and the unimpeded use o their lines o communication;

and augmentation orces, which will provide a means o reinorcing existing orces in

a particular region. Main deence and augmentation orces will comprise both active

and mobilisable elements.



0

48. Ground, maritime and air orces will have to co-operate closely and combine and

assist each other in operations aimed at achieving agreed objectives. These orces

will consist o the ollowing:

a. Ground orces, which are essential to hold or regain territory. The majority will

normally be at lower states o readiness and, overall, there will be a greater

reliance on mobilization and reserves. All categories o ground orces will require

demonstrable combat eectiveness together with an appropriately enhanced

capability or exible deployment.

b. Maritime orces, which because o their inherent mobility, exibility and

endurance, make an important contribution to the Alliance’s crisisresponse

options. Their essential missions are to ensure sea control in order to saeguard

the Allies’ sea lines o communication, to support land and amphibious operations,

and to protect the deployment o the Alliance’s sea-based nuclear deterrent.

c. Air orces, whose ability to ulfl their undamental roles in both independent air

and combined operations - counter-air, air interdiction and oensive air support

- as well as to contribute to surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic warare

operations, is essential to the overall eectiveness o the Allies’ military orces.

Their role in supporting operations, on land and at sea, will require appropriatelong-distance airlit and air reuelling capabilities. Air deence orces, including

modern air command and control systems, are required to ensure a secure air

deence environment.

49. In light o the potential risks it poses, the prolieration o ballistic missiles and

weapons o mass destruction should be given special consideration. Solution o this

problem will require complementary approaches including, or example, export control

and missile deences.

50. Alliance strategy is not dependent on a chemical warare capability. The Allies remain

committed to the earliest possible achievement o a global, comprehensive, and

eectively verifable ban on all chemical weapons. But, even ater implementation o a

global ban, precautions o a purely deensive nature will need to be maintained.

51. In the new security environment and given the reduced overall orce levels in uture,

the ability to work closely together, which will acilitate the cost eective use o

Alliance resources, will be particularly important or the achievement o the missions

o the Allies’ orces. The Alliance’s collective deence arrangements in which, or those

concerned, the integrated military structure, including multinational orces, plays

the key role, will be essential in this regard. Integrated and multinational European

structures, as they are urther developed in the context o an emerging European

Deence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in

enhancing the Allies’ ability to work together in the common deence. Allies’ eorts to

achieve maximum co-operation will be based on the common guidelines or deence

defned above. Practical arrangements will be developed to ensure the necessary

mutual transparency and complementarity between the European security anddeence identity and the Alliance.

52. In order to be able to respond exibly to a wide range o possible contingencies,

the Allies concerned will require eective surveillance and intelligence, exible

command and control, mobility within and between regions, and appropriate logistics

capabilities, including transport capacities. Logistic stocks must be sufcient to

sustain all types o orces in order to permit eective deence until resupply is

available. The capability o the Allies concerned to build-up larger, adequately

equipped and trained orces, in a timely manner and to a level appropriate to any risk

to Alliance security, will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and

deence. This capability will include the ability to reinorce any area at risk within the

territory o the Allies and to establish a multinational presence when and where this

is needed. Elements o all three orce categories will be capable o being employed



1

exibly as part o both intra-European and transatlantic reinorcement. Proper use

o these capabilities will require control o the necessary lines o communication as

well as appropriate support and exercise arrangements. Civil resources will be o

increasing relevance in this context.

53. For the Allies concerned, collective deence arrangements will rely increasingly on

multinational orces, complementing national commitments to NATO. Multinational

orces demonstrate the Alliance’s resolve to maintain a credible collective deence;

enhance Alliance cohesion; reinorce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen

the European pillar. Multinational orces, and in particular reaction orces, reinorce

solidarity. They can also provide a way o deploying more capable ormations than

might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efcient use o scarce

deence resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to

specifc tasks and unctions.

Characteristics o Nuclear Forces

54. The undamental purpose o the nuclear orces o the Allies is political: to preserve

peace and prevent coercion and any kind o war. They will continue to ulfl an

essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind o any aggressor about the nature

o the Allies’ response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression o

any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee o the security o the Allies

is provided by the strategic nuclear orces o the Alliance, particularly those o the

United States; the independent nuclear orces o the United Kingdom and France,

which have a deterrent role o their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and

security o the Allies.

55. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration o Alliance solidarity and

common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation

by European Allies involved in collective deence planning in nuclear roles, in

peacetime basing o nuclear orces on their territory and in command, control and

consultation arrangements. Nuclear orces based in Europe and committed to NATO

provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North

American members o the Alliance. The Alliance will thereore maintain adequate

nuclear orces in Europe. These orces need to have the necessary characteristics

and appropriate exibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and eective

element o the Allies’ strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the

minimum level sufcient to preserve peace and stability.

56. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation,

including conventional orce levels in Europe maintained in relative balance and

increased reaction times, NATO’s ability to deuse a crisis through diplomatic and

other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successul conventional deence

will signifcantly improve. The circumstances in which any use o nuclear weapons

might have to be contemplated by them are thereore even more remote. They can

thereore signifcantly reduce their sub-strategic nuclear orces. They will maintainadequate sub-strategic orces based in Europe which will provide an essential link

with strategic nuclear orces, reinorcing the trans-Atlantic link. These will consist

solely o dual capable aircrat which could, i necessary, be supplemented by oshore

systems. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal

circumstances on surace vessels and attack submarines. There is no requirement

or nuclear artillery or ground-launched short- range nuclear missiles and they will be

eliminated.



2

Part V - Conclusion

57. This Strategic Concept reafrms the deensive nature o the Alliance and the resolve

o its members to saeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The

Alliance’s security policy is based on dialogue; co-operation; and eective collective

deence as mutually reinorcing instruments or preserving the peace. Making ull use

o the new opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security at the lowestpossible level o orces consistent with the requirements o deence. In this way, the

Alliance is making an essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceul order.

58. The Allies will continue to pursue vigorously urther progress in arms control and

confdence-building measures with the objective o enhancing security and stability.

They will also play an active part in promoting dialogue and co-operation between

states on the basis o the principles enunciated in the Paris Charter.

59. NATO’s strategy will retain the exibility to reect urther developments in the politico-

military environment, including progress in the moves towards a European security

identity, and in any changes in the risks to Alliance security. For the Allies concerned,

the Strategic Concept will orm the basis or the urther development o the Alliance’s

deence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear orce posture

and its collective deence planning arrangements.

60. In July 1997, NATO Heads o State and Government agreed that the Strategic

Concept should be re-examined to ensure that it remained ully consistent with

Europe’s new security situation and challenges. The Council was requested to initiate

the work with a view to completing it in time or presentation at the next Summit

Meeting in 1999.



Te Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999)

approved by the Heads o State and Government participating in the meeting o the North

Atlantic Council in Washington D.C.

Introduction

1. At their Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999, NATO Heads o State and

Government approved the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept.

2. NATO has successully ensured the reedom o its members and prevented war in

Europe during the 40 years o the Cold War. By combining deence with dialogue, it

played an indispensable role in bringing East-West conrontation to a peaceul end.

The dramatic changes in the Euro-Atlantic strategic landscape brought by the end

o the Cold War were reected in the Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept. There have,

however, been urther proound political and security developments since then.

3. The dangers o the Cold War have given way to more promising, but also challenging

prospects, to new opportunities and risks. A new Europe o greater integration isemerging, and a Euro-Atlantic security structure is evolving in which NATO plays a

central part. The Alliance has been at the heart o eorts to establish new patterns

o cooperation and mutual understanding across the Euro-Atlantic region and has

committed itsel to essential new activities in the interest o a wider stability. It has

shown the depth o that commitment in its eorts to put an end to the immense

human suering created by conict in the Balkans. The years since the end o

the Cold War have also witnessed important developments in arms control, a

process to which the Alliance is ully committed. The Alliance’s role in these positive

developments has been underpinned by the comprehensive adaptation o its

approach to security and o its procedures and structures. The last ten years have

also seen, however, the appearance o complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace

and stability, including oppression, ethnic conict, economic distress, the collapse opolitical order, and the prolieration o weapons o mass destruction.

4. The Alliance has an indispensable role to play in consolidating and preserving the

positive changes o the recent past, and in meeting current and uture security

challenges. It has, thereore, a demanding agenda. It must saeguard common

security interests in an environment o urther, oten unpredictable change. It must

maintain collective deence and reinorce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance

that allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibility. It must deepen its

relations with its partners and prepare or the accession o new members. It must,

above all, maintain the political will and the military means required by the entire range

o its missions.

5. This new Strategic Concept will guide the Alliance as it pursues this agenda. It

expresses NATO’s enduring purpose and nature and its undamental security tasks,

identifes the central eatures o the new security environment, specifes the elements

o the Alliance’s broad approach to security, and provides guidelines or the urther

adaptation o its military orces.



4

Part I - The Purpose and Tasks of the Alliance

6. NATO’s essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to

saeguard the reedom and security o all its members by political and military

means. Based on common values o democracy, human rights and the rule o law,

the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceul order

in Europe. It will continue to do so. The achievement o this aim can be put at riskby crisis and conict aecting the security o the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance

thereore not only ensures the deence o its members but contributes to peace and

stability in this region.

7. The Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the security o North America is

permanently tied to the security o Europe. It is the practical expression o eective

collective eort among its members in support o their common interests.

8. The undamental guiding principle by which the Alliance works is that o common

commitment and mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support o the

indivisibility o security or all o its members. Solidarity and cohesion within the

Alliance, through daily cooperation in both the political and military spheres, ensure

that no single Ally is orced to rely upon its own national eorts alone in dealing with

basic security challenges. Without depriving member states o their right and duty to

assume their sovereign responsibilities in the feld o deence, the Alliance enables

them through collective eort to realise their essential national security objectives.

9. The resulting sense o equal security among the members o the Alliance, regardless o

dierences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities, contributes

to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance does not seek these benefts or its

members alone, but is committed to the creation o conditions conducive to increased

partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with others who share its broad political

objectives.

10. To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance o nations committed to the

Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance perorms the ollowing

undamental security tasks:

Security: To provide one o the indispensable oundations or a stable Euro-Atlantic

security environment, based on the growth o democratic institutions and commitment

to the peaceul resolution o disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate

or coerce any other through the threat or use o orce.

Consultation: To serve, as provided or in Article 4 o the Washington Treaty, as an

essential transatlantic orum or Allied consultations on any issues that aect their vital

interests, including possible developments posing risks or members’ security, and or

appropriate co-ordination o their eorts in felds o common concern.

Deterrence and Deence: To deter and deend against any threat o aggression against

any NATO member state as provided or in Articles 5 and 6 o the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability o the Euro-Atlantic area:

• Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in

conormity with Article 7 o the Washington Treaty, to contribute to eective

conict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis

response operations.

• Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with

other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim o increasing transparency,

mutual confdence and the capacity or joint action with the Alliance.





6

18. As stated in the 1994 Summit declaration and reafrmed in Berlin in 1996, the Alliance

ully supports the development o the European Security and Deence Identity within

the Alliance by making available its assets and capabilities or WEU-led operations.

To this end, the Alliance and the WEU have developed a close relationship and put

into place key elements o the ESDI as agreed in Berlin. In order to enhance peace

and stability in Europe and more widely, the European Allies are strengthening their

capacity or action, including by increasing their military capabilities. The increase othe responsibilities and capacities o the European Allies with respect to security and

deence enhances the security environment o the Alliance.

19. The stability, transparency, predictability, lower levels o armaments, and verifcation

which can be provided by arms control and non-prolieration agreements support

NATO’s political and military eorts to achieve its strategic objectives. The Allies

have played a major part in the signifcant achievements in this feld. These include

the enhanced stability produced by the CFE Treaty, the deep reductions in nuclear

weapons provided or in the START treaties; the signature o the Comprehensive Test

Ban Treaty, the indefnite and unconditional extension o the Nuclear Non-Prolieration

Treaty, the accession to it o Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as non-nuclear

weapons states, and the entry into orce o the Chemical Weapons Convention. The

Ottawa Convention to ban anti-personnel landmines and similar agreements make animportant contribution to alleviating human suering. There are welcome prospects

or urther advances in arms control in conventional weapons and with respect to

nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) weapons.

Security challenges and risks

20. Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the act

that large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the

possibility o such a threat emerging over the longer term exists. The security o the

Alliance remains subject to a wide variety o military and non-military risks which are

multi-directional and oten difcult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and

instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility o regional crises

at the periphery o the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in andaround the Euro-Atlantic area ace serious economic, social and political difculties.

Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or ailed eorts at reorm,

the abuse o human rights, and the dissolution o states can lead to local and even

regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises aecting Euro-Atlantic

stability, to human suering, and to armed conicts. Such conicts could aect the

security o the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO

countries, or in other ways, and could also aect the security o other states.

21. The existence o powerul nuclear orces outside the Alliance also constitutes a

signifcant actor which the Alliance has to take into account i security and stability in

the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained.

22. The prolieration o NBC weapons and their means o delivery remains a matter oserious concern. In spite o welcome progress in strengthening international non-

prolieration regimes, major challenges with respect to prolieration remain. The

Alliance recognises that prolieration can occur despite eorts to prevent it and can

pose a direct military threat to the Allies’ populations, territory, and orces. Some

states, including on NATO’s periphery and in other regions, sell or acquire or try to

acquire NBC weapons and delivery means. Commodities and technology that could

be used to build these weapons o mass destruction and their delivery means are

becoming more common, while detection and prevention o illicit trade in these

materials and know-how continues to be difcult. Non-state actors have shown the

potential to create and use some o these weapons.



7

23. The global spread o technology that can be o use in the production o weapons

may result in the greater availability o sophisticated military capabilities, permitting

adversaries to acquire highly capable oensive and deensive air, land, and sea-

borne systems, cruise missiles, and other advanced weaponry. In addition, state and

non-state adversaries may try to exploit the Alliance’s growing reliance on inormation

systems through inormation operations designed to disrupt such systems.

They may attempt to use strategies o this kind to counter NATO’s superiority intraditional weaponry.

24. Any armed attack on the territory o the Allies, rom whatever direction, would be

covered by Articles 5 and 6 o the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must

also take account o the global context. Alliance security interests can be aected

by other risks o a wider nature, including acts o terrorism, sabotage and organised

crime, and by the disruption o the ow o vital resources. The uncontrolled movement

o large numbers o people, particularly as a consequence o armed conicts, can

also pose problems or security and stability aecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist

within the Alliance or consultation among the Allies under Article 4 o the Washington

Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination o their eorts including their responses

to risks o this kind.

Part III - The Approach to Security in the 21st Century

25. The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the

importance o political, economic, social and environmental actors in addition to

the indispensable deence dimension. This broad approach orms the basis or the

Alliance to accomplish its undamental security tasks eectively, and its increasing

eort to develop eective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic

organisations as well as the United Nations. Our collective aim is to build a European

security architecture in which the Alliance’s contribution to the security and stability o

the Euro-Atlantic area and the contribution o these other international organisations

are complementary and mutually reinorcing, both in deepening relations among

Euro-Atlantic countries and in managing crises. NATO remains the essential orum orconsultation among the Allies and the orum or agreement on policies bearing on the

security and deence commitments o its members under the Washington Treaty.

26. The Alliance seeks to preserve peace and to reinorce Euro-Atlantic security and

stability by: the preservation o the transatlantic link; the maintenance o eective

military capabilities sufcient or deterrence and deence and to ulfl the ull range

o its missions; the development o the European Security and Deence Identity

within the Alliance; an overall capability to manage crises successully; its continued

openness to new members; and the continued pursuit o partnership, cooperation,

and dialogue with other nations as part o its co-operative approach to Euro-Atlantic

security, including in the feld o arms control and disarmament.

The Transatlantic Link

27. NATO is committed to a strong and dynamic partnership between Europe and

North America in support o the values and interests they share. The security o

Europe and that o North America are indivisible. Thus the Alliance’s commitment

to the indispensable transatlantic link and the collective deence o its members is

undamental to its credibility and to the security and stability o the Euro-Atlantic area.



8

The Maintenance O Alliance Military Capabilities

28. The maintenance o an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to

act collectively in the common deence remain central to the Alliance’s security

objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, remains at the core

o the Alliance’s ability to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and

to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be

perceived as an option with any prospect o success.

29. Military capabilities eective under the ull range o oreseeable circumstances are

also the basis o the Alliance’s ability to contribute to conict prevention and crisis

management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations. These missions can

be highly demanding and can place a premium on the same political and military

qualities, such as cohesion, multinational training, and extensive prior planning, that

would be essential in an Article 5 situation. Accordingly, while they may pose special

requirements, they will be handled through a common set o Alliance structures

and procedures.

The European Security And Deence Identity

30. The Alliance, which is the oundation o the collective deence o its members andthrough which common security objectives will be pursued wherever possible,

remains committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership.

The European Allies have taken decisions to enable them to assume greater

responsibilities in the security and deence feld in order to enhance the peace and

stability o the Euro-Atlantic area and thus the security o all Allies. On the basis o

decisions taken by the Alliance, in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, the European

Security and Deence Identity will continue to be developed within NATO. This

process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, i and when

appropriate, the European Union. It will enable all European Allies to make a more

coherent and eective contribution to the missions and activities o the Alliance as an

expression o our shared responsibilities; it will reinorce the transatlantic partnership;

and it will assist the European Allies to act by themselves as required through the

readiness o the Alliance, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its

assets and capabilities available or operations in which the Alliance is not engaged

militarily under the political control and strategic direction either o the WEU or as

otherwise agreed, taking into account the ull participation o all European Allies i they

were so to choose.

Confict Prevention And Crisis Management

31. In pursuit o its policy o preserving peace, preventing war, and enhancing security

and stability and as set out in the undamental security tasks, NATO will seek, in

cooperation with other organisations, to prevent conict, or, should a crisis arise, to

contribute to its eective management, consistent with international law, including

through the possibility o conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The

Alliance’s preparedness to carry out such operations supports the broader objective

o reinorcing and extending stability and oten involves the participation o NATO’s

Partners. NATO recalls its oer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on a case-

by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other

operations under the authority o the UN Security Council or the responsibility o the

OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. In this context

NATO recalls its subsequent decisions with respect to crisis response operations in

the Balkans. Taking into account the necessity or Alliance solidarity and cohesion,

participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions o

member states in accordance with national constitutions.



9

32. NATO will make ull use o partnership, cooperation and dialogue and its links to

other organisations to contribute to preventing crises and, should they arise, deusing

them at an early stage. A coherent approach to crisis management, as in any use o

orce by the Alliance, will require the Alliance’s political authorities to choose and co-

ordinate appropriate responses rom a range o both political and military measures

and to exercise close political control at all stages.

Partnership, Cooperation, And Dialogue

33. Through its active pursuit o partnership, cooperation, and dialogue, the Alliance is a

positive orce in promoting security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.

Through outreach and openness, the Alliance seeks to preserve peace, support

and promote democracy, contribute to prosperity and progress, and oster genuine

partnership with and among all democratic Euro-Atlantic countries. This aims at

enhancing the security o all, excludes nobody, and helps to overcome divisions and

disagreements that could lead to instability and conict.

34. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will remain the overarching ramework

or all aspects o NATO’s cooperation with its Partners. It oers an expanded political

dimension or both consultation and cooperation. EAPC consultations build increased

transparency and confdence among its members on security issues, contribute to

conict prevention and crisis management, and develop practical cooperation activities,

including in civil emergency planning, and scientifc and environmental aairs.

35. The Partnership or Peace is the principal mechanism or orging practical security

links between the Alliance and its Partners and or enhancing interoperability between

Partners and NATO. Through detailed programmes that reect individual Partners’

capacities and interests, Allies and Partners work towards transparency in national

deence planning and budgeting; democratic control o deence orces; preparedness

or civil disasters and other emergencies; and the development o the ability to

work together, including in NATO-led PP operations. The Alliance is committed to

increasing the role the Partners play in PP decision-making and planning, and making

PP more operational. NATO has undertaken to consult with any active participant

in the Partnership i that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity,

political independence, or security.

36. Russia plays a unique role in Euro-Atlantic security. Within the ramework o the

NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, NATO

and Russia have committed themselves to developing their relations on the basis

o common interest, reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive

peace in the Euro-Atlantic area based on the principles o democracy and co-

operative security. NATO and Russia have agreed to give concrete substance to their

shared commitment to build a stable, peaceul and undivided Europe. A strong, stable

and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting

stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

37. Ukraine occupies a special place in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and is animportant and valuable partner in promoting stability and common democratic values.

NATO is committed to urther strengthening its distinctive partnership with Ukraine on

the basis o the NATO-Ukraine Charter, including political consultations on issues o

common concern and a broad range o practical cooperation activities. The Alliance

continues to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity,

democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear

weapons state as key actors o stability and security in central and eastern Europe

and in Europe as a whole.



40

38. The Mediterranean is an area o special interest to the Alliance. Security in Europe is

closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. NATO’s Mediterranean

Dialogue process is an integral part o NATO’s co-operative approach to security.

It provides a ramework or confdence building, promotes transparency and

cooperation in the region, and reinorces and is reinorced by other international

eorts. The Alliance is committed to developing progressively the political, civil, and

military aspects o the Dialogue with the aim o achieving closer cooperation with, andmore active involvement by, countries that are partners in this Dialogue.

Enlargement

39. The Alliance remains open to new members under Article 10 o the Washington

Treaty. It expects to extend urther invitations in coming years to nations willing and

able to assume the responsibilities and obligations o membership, and as NATO

determines that the inclusion o these nations would serve the overall political and

strategic interests o the Alliance, strengthen its eectiveness and cohesion, and

enhance overall European security and stability. To this end, NATO has established a

programme o activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations or possible

uture membership in the context o its wider relationship with them. No European

democratic country whose admission would ulfl the objectives o the Treaty will beexcluded rom consideration.

Arms Control, Disarmament, And Non-Prolieration

40. The Alliance’s policy o support or arms control, disarmament, and non-prolieration

will continue to play a major role in the achievement o the Alliance’s security

objectives. The Allies seek to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible

level o orces consistent with the Alliance’s ability to provide or collective deence

and to ulfl the ull range o its missions. The Alliance will continue to ensure that

- as an important part o its broad approach to security - deence and arms control,

disarmament, and non-prolieration objectives remain in harmony. The Alliance will

continue to actively contribute to the development o arms control, disarmament,

and non-prolieration agreements as well as to confdence and security buildingmeasures. The Allies take seriously their distinctive role in promoting a broader, more

comprehensive and more verifable international arms control and disarmament

process. The Alliance will enhance its political eorts to reduce dangers arising

rom the prolieration o weapons o mass destruction and their means o delivery.

The principal non-prolieration goal o the Alliance and its members is to prevent

prolieration rom occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic

means. The Alliance attaches great importance to the continuing validity and the ull

implementation by all parties o the CFE Treaty as an essential element in ensuring the

stability o the Euro-Atlantic area.

Part IV - Guidelines for the Alliance’s Forces Principles

Of Alliance Strategy

41. The Alliance will maintain the necessary military capabilities to accomplish the ull

range o NATO’s missions. The principles o Allied solidarity and strategic unity remain

paramount or all Alliance missions. Alliance orces must saeguard NATO’s military

eectiveness and reedom o action. The security o all Allies is indivisible: an attack

on one is an attack on all. With respect to collective deence under Article 5 o the

Washington Treaty, the combined military orces o the Alliance must be capable o

deterring any potential aggression against it, o stopping an aggressor’s advance

as ar orward as possible should an attack nevertheless occur, and o ensuring

the political independence and territorial integrity o its member states. They must

also be prepared to contribute to conict prevention and to conduct non-Article 5



41

crisis response operations. The Alliance’s orces have essential roles in ostering

cooperation and understanding with NATO’s Partners and other states, particularly

in helping Partners to prepare or potential participation in NATO-led PP operations.

Thus they contribute to the preservation o peace, to the saeguarding o common

security interests o Alliance members, and to the maintenance o the security

and stability o the Euro-Atlantic area. By deterring the use o NBC weapons, they

contribute to Alliance eorts aimed at preventing the prolieration o these weaponsand their delivery means.

42. The achievement o the Alliance’s aims depends critically on the equitable sharing o

the roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefts, o common deence. The

presence o United States conventional and nuclear orces in Europe remains vital to

the security o Europe, which is inseparably linked to that o North America. The North

American Allies contribute to the Alliance through military orces available or Alliance

missions, through their broader contribution to international peace and security, and

through the provision o unique training acilities on the North American continent. The

European Allies also make wide-ranging and substantial contributions. As the process

o developing the ESDI within the Alliance progresses, the European Allies will urther

enhance their contribution to the common deence and to international peace and

stability including through multinational ormations.

43. The principle o collective eort in Alliance deence is embodied in practical

arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource

advantages o collective deence, and prevent the renationalisation o deence

policies, without depriving the Allies o their sovereignty. These arrangements

also enable NATO’s orces to carry out non-Article 5 crisis response operations

and constitute a prerequisite or a coherent Alliance response to all possible

contingencies. They are based on procedures or consultation, an integrated military

structure, and on co-operation agreements. Key eatures include collective orce

planning; common unding; common operational planning; multinational ormations,

headquarters and command arrangements; an integrated air deence system; a

balance o roles and responsibilities among the Allies; the stationing and deployment

o orces outside home territory when required; arrangements, including planning,or crisis management and reinorcement; common standards and procedures or

equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined doctrines and exercises when

appropriate; and inrastructure, armaments and logistics cooperation. The inclusion

o NATO’s Partners in such arrangements or the development o similar arrangements

or them, in appropriate areas, is also instrumental in enhancing cooperation and

common eorts in Euro-Atlantic security matters.

44. Multinational unding, including through the Military Budget and the NATO Security

Investment Programme, will continue to play an important role in acquiring and

maintaining necessary assets and capabilities. The management o resources should

be guided by the military requirements o the Alliance as they evolve.

45. The Alliance supports the urther development o the ESDI within the Alliance, includingby being prepared to make available assets and capabilities or operations under the

political control and strategic direction either o the WEU or as otherwise agreed.

46. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind o coercion, the Alliance will maintain

or the oreseeable uture an appropriate mix o nuclear and conventional orces

based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a minimum

sufcient level. Taking into account the diversity o risks with which the Alliance

could be aced, it must maintain the orces necessary to ensure credible deterrence

and to provide a wide range o conventional response options. But the Alliance’s

conventional orces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons

make a unique contribution in rendering the risks o aggression against the Alliance

incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.



42

The Alliance’s Force Posture

The Missions o Alliance Military Forces

47. The primary role o Alliance military orces is to protect peace and to guarantee

the territorial integrity, political independence and security o member states. The

Alliance’s orces must thereore be able to deter and deend eectively, to maintain orrestore the territorial integrity o Allied nations and - in case o conict - to terminate

war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and

withdraw. NATO orces must maintain the ability to provide or collective deence

while conducting eective non-Article 5 crisis response operations.

48. The maintenance o the security and stability o the Euro-Atlantic area is o key

importance. An important aim o the Alliance and its orces is to keep risks at a

distance by dealing with potential crises at an early stage. In the event o crises

which jeopardise Euro-Atlantic stability and could aect the security o Alliance

members, the Alliance’s military orces may be called upon to conduct crisis

response operations. They may also be called upon to contribute to the preservation

o international peace and security by conducting operations in support o other

international organisations, complementing and reinorcing political actions within abroad approach to security.

49. In contributing to the management o crises through military operations, the Alliance’s

orces will have to deal with a complex and diverse range o actors, risks, situations

and demands, including humanitarian emergencies. Some non-Article 5 crisis

response operations may be as demanding as some collective deence missions.

Well-trained and well-equipped orces at adequate levels o readiness and in sufcient

strength to meet the ull range o contingencies as well as the appropriate support

structures, planning tools and command and control capabilities are essential in

providing efcient military contributions. The Alliance should also be prepared to

support, on the basis o separable but not separate capabilities, operations under

the political control and strategic direction either o the WEU or as otherwise agreed.

The potential participation o Partners and other non-NATO nations in NATO-ledoperations as well as possible operations with Russia would be urther valuable

elements o NATO’s contribution to managing crises that aect Euro-Atlantic security.

50. Alliance military orces also contribute to promoting stability throughout the Euro-

Atlantic area by their participation in military-to-military contacts and in other

cooperation activities and exercises under the Partnership or Peace as well as those

organised to deepen NATO’s relationships with Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean

Dialogue countries. They contribute to stability and understanding by participating

in confdence-building activities, including those which enhance transparency and

improve communication; as well as in verifcation o arms control agreements and

in humanitarian de-mining. Key areas o consultation and cooperation could include

inter alia: training and exercises, interoperability, civil-military relations, concept

and doctrine development, deence planning, crisis management, prolierationissues, armaments cooperation as well as participation in operational planning and

operations.

Guidelines or the Alliance’s Force Posture

51. To implement the Alliance’s undamental security tasks and the principles o

its strategy, the orces o the Alliance must continue to be adapted to meet the

requirements o the ull range o Alliance missions eectively and to respond to

uture challenges. The posture o Allies’ orces, building on the strengths o dierent

national deence structures, will conorm to the guidelines developed in the ollowing

paragraphs.



4

52. The size, readiness, availability and deployment o the Alliance’s military orces

will reect its commitment to collective deence and to conduct crisis response

operations, sometimes at short notice, distant rom their home stations, including

beyond the Allies’ territory. The characteristics o the Alliance’s orces will also reect

the provisions o relevant arms control agreements. Alliance orces must be adequate

in strength and capabilities to deter and counter aggression against any Ally. They

must be interoperable and have appropriate doctrines and technologies. They mustbe held at the required readiness and deployability, and be capable o military success

in a wide range o complex joint and combined operations, which may also include

Partners and other non-NATO nations.

53. This means in particular:

a. that the overall size o the Allies’ orces will be kept at the lowest levels consistent

with the requirements o collective deence and other Alliance missions; they will

be held at appropriate and graduated readiness;

b. that the peacetime geographical distribution o orces will ensure a sufcient

military presence throughout the territory o the Alliance, including the stationing

and deployment o orces outside home territory and waters and orward

deployment o orces when and where necessary. Regional and, in particular,geostrategic considerations within the Alliance will have to be taken into account,

as instabilities on NATO’s periphery could lead to crises or conicts requiring an

Alliance military response, potentially with short warning times;

c. that NATO’s command structure will be able to undertake command and control

o the ull range o the Alliance’s military missions including through the use o

deployable combined and joint HQs, in particular CJTF headquarters, to command

and control multinational and multiservice orces. It will also be able to support

operations under the political control and strategic direction either o the WEU or

as otherwise agreed, thereby contributing to the development o the ESDI within

the Alliance, and to conduct NATO-led non-Article 5 crisis response operations in

which Partners and other countries may participate;

d. that overall, the Alliance will, in both the near and long term and or the ull range

o its missions, require essential operational capabilities such as an eective

engagement capability; deployability and mobility; survivability o orces and

inrastructure; and sustainability, incorporating logistics and orce rotation. To

develop these capabilities to their ull potential or multinational operations,

interoperability, including human actors, the use o appropriate advanced

technology, the maintenance o inormation superiority in military operations,

and highly qualifed personnel with a broad spectrum o skills will be important.

Sufcient capabilities in the areas o command, control and communications as

well as intelligence and surveillance will serve as necessary orce multipliers;

e. that at any time a limited but militarily signifcant proportion o ground, air and sea

orces will be able to react as rapidly as necessary to a wide range o eventualities,including a short-notice attack on any Ally. Greater numbers o orce elements will

be available at appropriate levels o readiness to sustain prolonged operations,

whether within or beyond Alliance territory, including through rotation o deployed

orces. Taken together, these orces must also be o sufcient quality, quantity and

readiness to contribute to deterrence and to deend against limited attacks on the

Alliance;



44

. that the Alliance must be able to build up larger orces, both in response to any

undamental changes in the security environment and or limited requirements, by

reinorcement, by mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting orces when necessary.

This ability must be in proportion to potential threats to Alliance security, including

potential long-term developments. It must take into account the possibility o

substantial improvements in the readiness and capabilities o military orces on the

periphery o the Alliance. Capabilities or timely reinorcement and resupply bothwithin and rom Europe and North America will remain o critical importance, with a

resulting need or a high degree o deployability, mobility and exibility;

g. that appropriate orce structures and procedures, including those that would

provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down orces quickly and selectively,

are necessary to permit measured, exible and timely responses in order to

reduce and deuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in

peacetime;

h. that the Alliance’s deence posture must have the capability to address

appropriately and eectively the risks associated with the prolieration o NBC

weapons and their means o delivery, which also pose a potential threat to the

Allies’ populations, territory, and orces. A balanced mix o orces, response

capabilities and strengthened deences is needed;

i. that the Alliance’s orces and inrastructure must be protected against terrorist attacks.

Characteristics o Conventional Forces

54. It is essential that the Allies’ military orces have a credible ability to ulfl the ull

range o Alliance missions. This requirement has implications or orce structures,

orce and equipment levels; readiness, availability, and sustainability; training and

exercises; deployment and employment options; and orce build-up and mobilisation

capabilities. The aim should be to achieve an optimum balance between high

readiness orces capable o beginning rapidly, and immediately as necessary,

collective deence or non-Article 5 crisis response operations; orces at dierent levels

o lower readiness to provide the bulk o those required or collective deence, orrotation o orces to sustain crisis response operations, or or urther reinorcement

o a particular region; and a longer-term build-up and augmentation capability or

the worst case -- but very remote -- scenario o large scale operations or collective

deence. A substantial proportion o Alliance orces will be capable o perorming

more than one o these roles.

55. Alliance orces will be structured to reect the multinational and joint nature o Alliance

missions. Essential tasks will include controlling, protecting, and deending territory;

ensuring the unimpeded use o sea, air, and land lines o communication; sea control

and protecting the deployment o the Alliance’s sea-based deterrent; conducting

independent and combined air operations; ensuring a secure air environment and

eective extended air deence; surveillance, intelligence, reconnaissance and

electronic warare; strategic lit; and providing eective and exible command andcontrol acilities, including deployable combined and joint headquarters.

56. The Alliance’s deence posture against the risks and potential threats o the

prolieration o NBC weapons and their means o delivery must continue to be

improved, including through work on missile deences. As NATO orces may be called

upon to operate beyond NATO’s borders, capabilities or dealing with prolieration

risks must be exible, mobile, rapidly deployable and sustainable. Doctrines, planning,

and training and exercise policies must also prepare the Alliance to deter and deend

against the use o NBC weapons. The aim in doing so will be to urther reduce

operational vulnerabilities o NATO military orces while maintaining their exibility and

eectiveness despite the presence, threat or use o NBC weapons.



45

57. Alliance strategy does not include a chemical or biological warare capability. The

Allies support universal adherence to the relevant disarmament regimes. But, even

i urther progress with respect to banning chemical and biological weapons can be

achieved, deensive precautions will remain essential.

58. Given reduced overall orce levels and constrained resources, the ability to work

closely together will remain vital or achieving the Alliance’s missions. The Alliance’s

collective deence arrangements in which, or those concerned, the integrated military

structure plays the key role, are essential in this regard. The various strands o NATO’s

deence planning need to be eectively coordinated at all levels in order to ensure the

preparedness o the orces and supporting structures to carry out the ull spectrum

o their roles. Exchanges o inormation among the Allies about their orce plans

contribute to securing the availability o the capabilities needed or the execution o

these roles. Consultations in case o important changes in national deence plans

also remain o key importance. Cooperation in the development o new operational

concepts will be essential or responding to evolving security challenges. The detailed

practical arrangements that have been developed as part o the ESDI within the

Alliance contribute to close allied co-operation without unnecessary duplication o

assets and capabilities.

59. To be able to respond exibly to possible contingencies and to permit the eective

conduct o Alliance missions, the Alliance requires sufcient logistics capabilities,

including transport capacities, medical support and stocks to deploy and sustain

all types o orces eectively. Standardisation will oster cooperation and cost-

eectiveness in providing logistic support to allied orces. Mounting and sustaining

operations outside the Allies’ territory, where there may be little or no host-nation

support, will pose special logistical challenges. The ability to build-up larger,

adequately equipped and trained orces, in a timely manner and to a level able to ulfl

the ull range o Alliance missions, will also make an essential contribution to crisis

management and deence. This will include the ability to reinorce any area at risk

and to establish a multinational presence when and where this is needed. Forces o

various kinds and at various levels o readiness will be capable o exible employment

in both intra-European and transatlantic reinorcement. This will require control o lineso communication, and appropriate support and exercise arrangements.

60. The interaction between Alliance orces and the civil environment (both governmental

and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success o operations.

Civil-military cooperation is interdependent: military means are increasingly

requested to assist civil authorities; at the same time civil support to military

operations is important or logistics, communications, medical support, and public

aairs. Cooperation between the Alliance’s military and civil bodies will accordingly

remain essential.

61. The Alliance’s ability to accomplish the ull range o its missions will rely increasingly

on multinational orces, complementing national commitments to NATO or the Allies

concerned. Such orces, which are applicable to the ull range o Alliance missions,demonstrate the Alliance’s resolve to maintain a credible collective deence; enhance

Alliance cohesion; and reinorce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the

ESDI within the Alliance. Multinational orces, particularly those capable o deploying

rapidly or collective deence or or non-Article 5 crisis response operations, reinorce

solidarity. They can also provide a way o deploying more capable ormations than

might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efcient use o scarce

deence resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to

specifc tasks and unctions, an approach which underlies the implementation o

the CJTF concept. For peace support operations, eective multinational ormations

and other arrangements involving Partners will be valuable. In order to exploit ully

the potential oered by multinational ormations, improving interoperability, inter alia

through sufcient training and exercises, is o the highest importance.



46

Characteristics o Nuclear Forces

62. The undamental purpose o the nuclear orces o the Allies is political: to preserve

peace and prevent coercion and any kind o war. They will continue to ulfl an

essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind o any aggressor about the nature

o the Allies’ response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression o

any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee o the security o the Allies

is provided by the strategic nuclear orces o the Alliance, particularly those o the

United States; the independent nuclear orces o the United Kingdom and France,

which have a deterrent role o their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and

security o the Allies.

63. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration o Alliance solidarity and

common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation

by European Allies involved in collective deence planning in nuclear roles, in

peacetime basing o nuclear orces on their territory and in command, control and

consultation arrangements. Nuclear orces based in Europe and committed to NATO

provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North

American members o the Alliance. The Alliance will thereore maintain adequate

nuclear orces in Europe. These orces need to have the necessary characteristics

and appropriate exibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and eective

element o the Allies’ strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the

minimum level sufcient to preserve peace and stability.

64. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation,

including reduced conventional orce levels in Europe and increased reaction times,

NATO’s ability to deuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should

it be necessary, to mount a successul conventional deence has signifcantly

improved. The circumstances in which any use o nuclear weapons might have to

be contemplated by them are thereore extremely remote. Since 1991, thereore,

the Allies have taken a series o steps which reect the post-Cold War security

environment. These include a dramatic reduction o the types and numbers o NATO’s

sub-strategic orces including the elimination o all nuclear artillery and ground-

launched short-range nuclear missiles; a signifcant relaxation o the readiness

criteria or nuclear-roled orces; and the termination o standing peacetime nuclear

contingency plans. NATO’s nuclear orces no longer target any country. Nonetheless,

NATO will maintain, at the minimum level consistent with the prevailing security

environment, adequate sub-strategic orces based in Europe which will provide an

essential link with strategic nuclear orces, reinorcing the transatlantic link. These

will consist o dual capable aircrat and a small number o United Kingdom Trident

warheads. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal

circumstances on surace vessels and attack submarines.

Part V - Conclusion

65. As the North Atlantic Alliance enters its sixth decade, it must be ready to meet the

challenges and opportunities o a new century. The Strategic Concept reafrms

the enduring purpose o the Alliance and sets out its undamental security tasks.

It enables a transormed NATO to contribute to the evolving security environment,

supporting security and stability with the strength o its shared commitment to

democracy and the peaceul resolution o disputes. The Strategic Concept will govern

the Alliance’s security and deence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional

and nuclear orce posture and its collective deence arrangements, and will be kept

under review in the light o the evolving security environment. In an uncertain world

the need or eective deence remains, but in reafrming this commitment the Alliance

will also continue making ull use o every opportunity to help build an undivided

continent by promoting and ostering the vision o a Europe whole and ree.



47

Te Comprehensive Political Guidance (2006)

endorsed by NATO Heads o State and Government on 29 November 2006

Introduction

1. This Comprehensive Political Guidance provides a ramework and political direction

or NATO’s continuing transormation, setting out, or the next 10 to 15 years, the

priorities or all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence. This

guidance, to be reviewed periodically, also aims to increase their coherence through

an eective management mechanism.

Part 1 - The Strategic Context

2. NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept described the evolving security environment in terms

that remain valid. This environment continues to change; it is and will be complex

and global, and subject to unoreseeable developments. International security

developments have an increasing impact on the lives o the citizens o Allied and other

countries. Terrorism, increasingly global in scope and lethal in results, and the spreado weapons o mass destruction are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance

over the next 10 to 15 years. Instability due to ailed or ailing states, regional crises

and conicts, and their causes and eects; the growing availability o sophisticated

conventional weaponry; the misuse o emerging technologies; and the disruption o

the ow o vital resources are likely to be the main risks or challenges or the Alliance

in that period. All o these actors can be inter-related or combined, most dangerously

in the case o terrorists armed with weapons o mass destruction.

3. Peace, security and development are more interconnected than ever. This places a

premium on close cooperation and coordination among international organisations

playing their respective, interconnected roles in crisis prevention and management.

O particular importance because o their wide range o means and responsibilities

are the United Nations and the European Union. The United Nations Security Councilwill continue to have the primary responsibility or the maintenance o international

peace and security. The European Union, which is able to mobilise a wide range o

military and civilian instruments, is assuming a growing role in support o international

stability. The Organisation or Security and Cooperation in Europe also continues to

have important responsibilities in this feld.

Part 2 - Implications or the Alliance

4. The Alliance will continue to ollow the broad approach to security o the 1999

Strategic Concept and perorm the undamental security tasks it set out, namely

security, consultation, deterrence and deence, crisis management, and partnership.

5. Collective deence will remain the core purpose o the Alliance . The character o

potential Article 5 challenges is continuing to evolve. Large scale conventional

aggression against the Alliance will continue to be highly unlikely; however, as shown

by the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 ollowing which NATO invoked

Article 5 or the frst time, uture attacks may originate rom outside the Euro-Atlantic

area and involve unconventional orms o armed assault. Future attacks could also

entail an increased risk o the use o asymmetric means, and could involve the use o

weapons o mass destruction. Deence against terrorism and the ability to respond to

challenges rom wherever they may come have assumed and will retain an increased

importance.



48

6. The Alliance will remain ready, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus,

to contribute to eective conict prevention and to engage actively in crisis

management, including through non-Article 5 crisis response operations, as set out

in the Strategic Concept. The Alliance has undertaken a range o operations o this

kind since the end o the Cold War. Experience has shown the increasing signifcance

o stabilisation operations and o military support to post-conict reconstruction

eorts. The role o the UN and EU, and other organisations, including as appropriatenon-governmental organisations, in ongoing operations and uture crises will put a

premium on practical close cooperation and coordination among all elements o the

international response.

7. Against this background, NATO must retain the ability to conduct the ull range

o its missions, rom high to low intensity, placing special ocus on the most likely

operations,being responsive to current and uture operational requirements, and

still able to conduct the most demanding operations. There will continue to be a

requirement or a mix o conventional and nuclear orces in accordance with extant

guidance. In particular, the Alliance needs to ocus on:

a. strengthening its ability to meet the challenges, rom wherever they may come, to

the security o its populations, territory and orces;

b. enhancing its ability to anticipate and assess the threats, risks, and challenges it

aces, with special attention to the threats posed by terrorism and the prolieration

o weapons o mass destruction;

c. providing orces able to conduct the ull range o military operations and missions;

d. being able to respond quickly to unoreseen circumstances;

e. ensuring that NATO’s own crisis management instruments are eectively drawn

together. While NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly or civilian

purposes, it needs to improve its practical cooperation, taking into account

existing arrangements, with partners, relevant international organisations and,

as appropriate, non-governmental organisations in order to collaborate more

eectively in planning and conducting operations;

. continuing to adapt planning processes to meet the new demands.

8. The evolving security environment requires that commitments rom nations,

recognising the primacy o national political decisions, to NATO operations be

translated into concrete terms by the development and felding o exible and

sustainable contributions, and also by a air sharing o the burden. It is also important

to have an early indication o the likely military demands and potential availability o

orces and resources when making an Alliance decision to launch an operation.

9. All o this requires Allies to continue the process o transormation, including

conceptual and organisational agility and the development o robust capabilities that

are deployable, sustainable, interoperable, and usable.

Part – Guidelines or Alliance Capability Requirements

10. Given the likely nature o the uture security environment and the demands it will

impose, the Alliance will require the agility and exibility to respond to complex and

unpredictable challenges, which may emanate ar rom member states’ borders

and arise at short notice. The Alliance will also require eective arrangements or

intelligence and inormation sharing. As in the past, intelligence and lessons learned

rom operations will also inorm capability development.



49

11. In order to undertake the ull range o missions, the Alliance must have the capability

to launch and sustain concurrent major joint operations and smaller operations

or collective deence and crisis response on and beyond Alliance territory, on its

periphery, and at strategic distance; it is likely that NATO will need to carry out a

greater number o smaller demanding and dierent operations, and the Alliance must

retain the capability to conduct large-scale high-intensity operations.

12. Regardless o its overall size, each operation is likely to require a command and

control structure able to plan and execute a campaign to accomplish a strategic

or operational objective, employing the appropriate mix o air, land and maritime

components. It also requires orces that are structured, equipped, manned and

trained or expeditionary operations in order to respond rapidly to emerging crises, or

which the NATO Response Force would be a key element, eectively reinorce initial

entry orces, and sustain the Alliance ’s commitment or the duration o the operation.

13. On this basis, the Alliance requires sufcient ully deployable and sustainable land

orces, and appropriate air and maritime components. This requirement is supported

by political targets as set out by Deence Ministers or the proportion o their nation’s

land orces which are structured, prepared and equipped or deployed operations

(40%) as well as the proportion undertaking or planned or sustained operations at

any one time (8%), and by the Allies undertaking to intensiy their eorts, taking into

account national priorities and obligations, to this end.

14. NATO and the EU and their respective members states have already agreed

procedures to ensure coherent, transparent and mutually reinorcing development

o the capability requirements common to both organisations. NATO’s planning

disciplines should continue to take ull account o these principles, objectives and

procedures.

15. The development o capabilities will not be possible without the commitment o

sufcient resources. Furthermore, it will remain critically important that resources that

Allies make available or deence, whether nationally, through multi-national projects,

or through NATO mechanisms, are used as eectively as possible and are ocused

on priority areas or investment. Increased investment in key capabilities will requirenations to consider reprioritisation, and the more eective use o resources, including

through pooling and other orms o bilateral or multilateral cooperation. NATO’s

deence planning should support these activities.

16. Over the next 10 to 15 years, the evolving security environment and the need to deal

with conventional and especially asymmetric threats and risks, wherever they arise,

will put a premium on improvements in meeting the ollowing capability requirements:

a. the ability to conduct and support multinational joint expeditionary operations ar

rom home territory with little or no host nation support and to sustain them or

extended periods. This requires orces that are ully deployable, sustainable and

interoperable and the means to deploy them. It also requires a ully coordinated

and, where appropriate, multinational approach to logistic support;b. the ability to adapt orce postures and military responses rapidly and eectively

to unoreseen circumstances. This requires, inter alia, an eective capability to

analyse the environment and anticipate potential requirements, a high level o

readiness or our orces, and the necessary exibility to respond to any sudden

shits in requirements;

c. the ability to deter, disrupt, deend and protect against terrorism, and more

particularly to contribute to the protection o the Alliance’s populations, territory,

critical inrastructure and orces, and to support consequence management;

d. the ability to protect inormation systems o critical importance to the Alliance

against cyber attacks;



50

e. the ability to conduct operations taking account o the threats posed by weapons

o mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazards,

including the ability to deend deployed NATO orces against theatre missile

threats;

. the ability to conduct operations in demanding geographical and climatic

environments;

g. the ability, through appropriate equipment and procedures, to identiy hostile

elements, including in urban areas, in order to conduct operations in a way that

minimises unintended damage as well as the risk to our own orces;

h. the ability and exibility to conduct operations in circumstances where the various

eorts o several authorities, institutions and nations need to be coordinated in a

comprehensive manner to achieve the desired results, and where these various

actors may be undertaking combat, stabilisation, reconstruction, reconciliation and

humanitarian activities simultaneously;

i. the ability to bring military support to stabilisation operations and reconstruction

eorts across all phases o a crisis, including to establish a sae and secure

environment, within the ull range o missions; military support to reconstruction

eorts will be provided to the extent to which conditions in the theatre o operations

prevent other actors with primary responsibilities in this feld rom carrying out their

tasks. This should embrace the ability to support security sector reorm, including

demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration, and to bring military support, within

available means and capabilities, to humanitarian relie operations;

j. the ability to feld orces with the greatest practicable interoperability and

standardisationamongst Allies, and the exibility also to cooperate with the orces

o partners, including, to the extent possible, through the release o appropriate

standards.

17. Delivering these capabilities requires an openness to new technologies, concepts,

doctrines and procedures supporting, in particular, an approach to operations which,

bearing in mind the provisions o paragraph 7e above, aims at the coherent andcomprehensive application o the various instruments o the Alliance to create overall

eects that will achieve the desired outcome. Such an eects based approach should

be developed urther and might include enhancing situational awareness, timely

operational planning and decisionmaking, improving links between commanders,

sensors and weapons, and deploying and employing joint expeditionary orces

coherently and to greatest eect.

18. Among these qualitative requirements, the ollowing constitute NATO’s top priorities:

joint expeditionary orces and the capability to deploy and sustain them; high-

readiness orces; the ability to deal with asymmetric threats; inormation superiority;

and the ability to draw together the various instruments o the Alliance brought to bear

in a crisis and its resolution to the best eect, as well as the ability to coordinate with

other actors. The NATO Response Force is a undamental military tool in support othe Alliance and a catalyst or urther transormation and has top priority together with

operational requirements.

Part 4 - Principles or a Management Mechanism

19. The NATO committees and bodies responsible or the relevant planning disciplines,

including operational planning and intelligence, are to implement the Comprehensive

Political Guidance in their work through the development, as necessary, o detailed

policies, directives and guidance which they in turn provide or their respective

disciplines.



51

20. An eective Management Mechanism is an integral part o the implementation o the

Comprehensive Political Guidance. The Management Mechanism will be established

by the NATO Council in Permanent Session to provide or the development o urther

detailed guidance, and or monitoring and ensuring compliance o these planning

disciplines with the provisions o the Comprehensive Political Guidance and ensuring

coherence and harmonisation among them*. The Management Mechanism will

comprise a system o eective arrangements, including, as required, ormal direction,with the aim o achieving aligned planning processes, consistent guidance and

harmonised requirements and supporting structures.

21. Implementation o this Comprehensive Political Guidance should lead to the

development o more usable capabilities or uture operations and missions.

(*)The Management Mechanism was established in February 2006.



52

Te Declaration on Alliance Security (2009)

issued by the Heads o State and Government participating in the meeting o the North

Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009

We, the Heads o State and Government o the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, met today in Strasbourg and Kehl to celebrate the 60th anniversary o our Alliance. We have reafrmed

the values, objectives and obligations o the Washington Treaty which unite Europe with

the United States and Canada, and have provided our transatlantic community with an

unprecedented era o peace and stability. We have also reafrmed our adherence to the

purposes and principles o the Charter o the United Nations.

NATO continues to be the essential transatlantic orum or security consultations among

Allies. Article 5 o the Washington Treaty and collective deence, based on the indivisibility

o Allied security, are, and will remain, the cornerstone o our Alliance. Deterrence, based on

an appropriate mix o nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element o our

overall strategy. NATO will continue to play its part in reinorcing arms control and promoting

nuclear and conventional disarmament in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Prolieration

Treaty, as well as non-prolieration eorts.

NATO’s enlargement has been an historic success in bringing us closer to our vision o a

Europe whole and ree. NATO’s door will remain open to all European democracies which

share the values o our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities

and obligations o membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security

and stability.

Today, our nations and the world are acing new, increasingly global threats, such as

terrorism, the prolieration o weapons o mass destruction, their means o delivery and cyber

attacks. Other challenges such as energy security, climate change, as well as instability

emanating rom ragile and ailed states, may also have a negative impact on Allied and

international security. Our security is increasingly tied to that o other regions.

We will improve our ability to meet the security challenges we ace that impact directly on Alliance territory, emerge at strategic distance or closer to home. Allies must share risks and

responsibilities equitably. We must make our capabilities more exible and deployable so

we can respond quickly and eectively, wherever needed, as new crises emerge. We must

also reorm the NATO structures to create a leaner and more cost-eective organization. We

will strengthen NATO’s capacity to play an important role in crisis management and conict

resolution where our interests are involved.

We aim to strengthen our cooperation with other international actors, including the United

Nations, European Union, Organization or Security and Cooperation in Europe and Arican

Union, in order to improve our ability to deliver a comprehensive approach to meeting these

new challenges, combining civilian and military capabilities more eectively. In our operations

today in Aghanistan and the Western Balkans, our armed orces are working alongside many

other nations and organisations. In Aghanistan, our key priority, we are committed to helpingthe Aghan Government and its people to build a democratic, secure and stable country that

will never again harbour terrorists who threaten Aghan and international security.

NATO recognizes the importance o a stronger and more capable European deence and

welcomes the European Union’s eorts to strengthen its capabilities and its capacity to

address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a signifcant contribution to these

eorts in which their ullest involvement possible is important, as agreed. We are determined

to ensure that the NATO-EU relationship is a truly unctioning strategic partnership as agreed

by NATO and by the EU. Our eorts should be mutually reinorcing and complementary.



5

We will develop our relationships with all our partners, both in our neighbourhood and

beyond, with whom we have a joint commitment to cooperative security. Our partners are key

in enabling us to implement our vision o a community o shared values and responsibilities.

We value the support that many o our partners bring to our operations and missions.

A strong, cooperative partnership between NATO and Russia, based on respect or all theprinciples o the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration, bestserves security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We stand ready to work with Russia to addressthe common challenges we ace.

We are committed to renovating our Alliance to better address today’s threats and to

anticipate tomorrow’s risks. United by this common vision o our uture, we task the

Secretary General to convene and lead a broad-based group o qualifed experts, who in

close consultation with all Allies will lay the ground or the Secretary General to develop

a new Strategic Concept and submit proposals or its implementation or approval at our

next summit. The Secretary General will keep the Council in permanent session involved

throughout the process.



54





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NATO - Towards the New Strategic Concept