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Nature and Function of Skepticism in Chinese PhilosophyAuthor(s): Chung-ying Cheng

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 27, No. 2, Dialogue in Skepticism (Apr., 1977), pp. 137-154Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1397612 .

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Chung-ying Cheng Nature and function of Skepticism in Chinese

philosophy

TWO SENSESOF SKEPTICISMAND THEIREXEMPLIFICATIONS

What is skepticism? In answer to this question, two senses of skepticism, the

negative and the positive, can be given. In a negative sense, skepticism is a

philosophical position intended to negate or invalidate all knowledge claims

and truth claims: if the totality (as indicated by the term 'all') of knowledge

and/or truth claims is unlimited, the skeptical position clearly cannot be

adequately articulated, and the very nature of the skeptical position would

then remain unanswered, unstated, unilluminated. Whether it should be

called a philosophical position becomes a question. When Wittgenstein saysthat "Whereof one has nothing to say, one should be silent," he might refer to

such a situation; whatever is true cannot be spoken and whatever is spokenis not true.

It appearsclearly then that, if a skeptical position is to be without contradic-

tion, it must be applied to a specific set of knowledge claims and/or truth

claims which excludes at least the claim of the skeptical position itself. Giventhis restriction, the skeptical position still can be negative in the sense that

the purportof the skeptic is to attack and destroy a given set of truth/knowledgeclaims. There is no specific effort to clarify or enlighten other positive pointsof the skeptical position. In the extreme case, the skeptic claims that if there is

any truth at all, the truth is that there is no truth. But this truth has no positivecontent. It is not even proved on a second-order level. The restricted skepticin the negative sense simply produces agnostic arguments that, given anyclaim of truth or knowledge, there is no validity for that claim. He need onlyhold that his own claim is different and belongs to a metaphysical or meta-

philosophical level, and therefore need not be included in the claims he negates.The restricted skepticism in the positive sense, on the other hand, takes

one forward step beyond the negative thesis of restricted skepticism. It argues

positively for higher level truth and knowledge above and over the skepticallycriticized knowledge and truth. The positivity of this skeptical position alwaystends to draw distinction between two levels or two realms of truth and knowl-

edge: The affirmation of the higher level of truth and knowledge is based on

the negation of the lower level of truth, and knowledge and leads in some wayto a reaffirmationof the lower level of truth and knowledge. When this dialectical

process takes place, the negative skepticism transforms itself into the positive

skepticism in which skeptical elements become integrated into a system of

philosophical ideas concerning reality and nature in the world.

In light of a close examination of the tradition of skepticism in Western

philosophy, we may suggest that skepticism in the Western philosophy is

sometimes negative in nature and sometimes positive in nature and thus serves

a positive theoretical purpose. As an example of the restricted form of negative

Chung-yingChengis Professor of Philosophy at the Universityof Hawaii.

PhilosophyEast and West 27, no. 2, April 1977. C by The University Press of Hawaii. All rights reserved.



138 Cheng

skepticism, we may cite the distrust of the law of contradiction underlyingAristotle's defense of that law. Aristotle knows that even the denial of the

validity of the law of contradiction has to presuppose its validity if the denial

is to make any sense at all. Thus, the skeptical view with regard to the law

of contradiction is reduced to a state of nonarticulability. A second example of

negative skepticism, perhaps less extreme than that of the Aristotelian critics,

is that of Sextus Empiricus, who argues for the uncertainty and untrust-worthiness of judgments, perceptions, and beliefs concerning the external

world. He has producedvarious arguments against thevalidity of our knowledgeof the world. He makes efforts to show how one may arrive at tranquility of

mind by suspending judgments about the world. He even describes skepticismin the following terms:

Skepticism is an ability or mental attitude which opposes appearances to

judgments in any way whatsoever,with the resultthat, owing to the equipollence

of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought directly first to a stateof "unperturbedness"or quietude (ataraxia).'

From this description, it is clear that no judgments of knowledge can be

considered valid against what is considered "appearance" and that, knowing

the opposition between "appearances" and judgments, we shall naturally

suspend our judgment and enjoy a state of tranquility. This skeptical position

appears then to have a positive side. How do we account for this result? The

answer is that the positive side of skepticism consists in a practical and sup-

posedly beneficial situation which, however, bears on no higherlevel of illumina-tion or understandingof truth. The simple point of the skeptic is that once all

judgments are withdrawn, we are not to be, disturbedby uncertain expectation

or vexation about the future, and thus we are able to enjoy the present.This is a

position of agnosticism combined with determinism aiming at achieving a

happy state of well-being. Though Taoism (an example of the positive form

of skepticism) in Chinese philosophy shares this practicality with Pyrrhonism,

it goes beyond Pyrrhonism in trying to exhibit an ultimate metaphysical truth

in terms of which petty or lower forms of truth become possible. Because of

the lack of a metaphysical interest, and perhaps because of some implicit

opposition to metaphysical thinking, the skeptical position in the West remains

basically negative even though sometimes practical-minded.

The antimetaphysical bent of negative skepticism furthermore is well-

illustrated in the works of Hume. With his psychology Hume's philosophy

goes beyond Pyrrhonism in extending skeptical doubt to not only knowledge

of the external world but also to knowledge of the self and other minds. He

has no scruplesfor rejecting metaphysicalthinkingon the basis of his skepticism.

He has no reservation in urging us to lead a life of common sense and practical-ity. Thus, the negative skeptical theory does conduce to a positive practical

life.2 The negative side of Hume's skepticism is underscored by Kant insofar



139

as Kant tries to meet Hume's challenge by asserting and proving that we do

have valid knowledge of the empirical world, even though we are unable to

know reality in an ultimate metaphysical sense. Kant even attempts to show

that, in the employment of practical reason, we may come to know certain

truths of reality and thus transform a simplistic practicality of Pyrrhonisminto a positive noumenon-certifying practical reason. It is indeed through

Kant that the Western tradition of negative skepticism is transformed into astill positive weapon against metaphysical thinking and an instrument for

seeking positive truths in other areas.

In light of what we have said about negative skepticism, we may indeed

define the skeptical position as a position satisfying the following conditions:

a. It is impossible for man to reach any knowledge of any truth or the real.b. It is impossible for man to articulate any knowledge of any truth or the realin any coherent and systematic way.

c. There is no reason for man to believe that what we claim to know representstruth or the real.

On the basis of these conditions, skeptics will draw the following conclusions:

a. Knowledge of the self is impossibleb. Knowledge of the external world is impossiblec. Knowledge of other minds is impossibled. Knowledge of ultimate truth is impossible

It is clear that this skeptical position can be applied to a priori knowledgeas well as to empirical knowledge. A thoroughgoing and consistent skepticwho considers knowledge impossible in the fullest sense possible will have to

remain silent and turns out to be a mystic or a practicalist (like Hume) who

accepts life and customs as they are without raising questions of rational

justification.

Before we turn to the question of how skepticism functions in Chinese philo-

sophy, we must mention the distinction between the skeptical position and the

skeptical method or the method of doubt. For a genuine skeptic, skepticaldoubts destroy the validity of experiences and reason, and he would not resort

to other ways of knowing (including revelation, faith, intuition) as a way out

of his skeptical doubt. He has no intention to retrieve or reconstruct what is

destroyed by his skeptical doubt. But when the method of doubt is applied by

Augustine or Descartes, there are positive reconstructive ends in view in their

philosophy. Doubt sets the limit of reason and experience but introduces other

positive ways of knowing or reaching truths-the same truth indeed which

was destroyed by the doubt. In this regard, we can see that there is indeed a

dialectical element in Cartesian or Augustinian skepticism. We may considerthese along with Kant as an example of positive skepticism in the Western

tradition.3



140 Cheng

DIALECTICALROLESOF POSITIVESKEPTICISM N CHINESEPHILOSOPHY

Though we cannot be certain that there never was any negative skepticism in

Chinesephilosophy, we are certain thatwhat is referredto as positive skepticism

is well exemplified in and, in fact, dominates the Chinese philosophical tradi-

tion. In light of the general consensus of Chinese views on nature, life, and

reality, it seems consistent to expect that all skeptical views in Chinese philo-

sophy tend to be positive and highly constructive. I just want to explain this

form of positive skepticism and its dialectical role in Chinese philosophy and

then offer an explanation as to the grounds and reasons for positive skepticism

in Chinese philosophy, as well as for the absence of negative skepticism.

The most typical form of positive skepticism, together with its transforming

function, is philosophical Taoism or Taoistic philosophy. In this article, I do

not have space to give a full explication of Taoism. I shall confine the discus-

sion to the explanation of how skeptical elements help to establish the Taoistposition or conversely how the Taoist position helps to apply the skeptical

method in a positive and constructive way. It suffices to say, in general, that

Taoism represents a criticism of the commonsensical view of morality, life,

and the world as embodied in early Confucianism. But the Taoistic criticism

is based on and, indeed, provides a way toward a view and an experience of

life, reality, and morality which are not skeptical. Skepticism is used by Taoism

as a method of criticism for establishing an ultimate antiskeptical view of

philosophy. In this sense, Taoism clearly is not a negative skeptical position:

it is a constructive philosophy which contains skeptical elements for construc-tive purposes.

By concentrating on the logic and ontology of Taoism, we will understand

why ultimate skepticism (the skeptical position) does not develop in Taoism,

and how skeptical arguments used by Taoists to criticize morality and knowl-

edge rely on antiskeptical metaphysical presuppositions, and finally how the

very way in which the skeptical method was developed would necessarily lead

to a nonskeptical or even an antiskeptical metaphysical view. The philosophical

lesson we can drawfrom this is that

skepticismcannot

developinto an ultimate

position in a Taoistic metaphysical framework. Questions can be raised as to

whether there is a metaphysical framework for developing skepticism of the

extreme kind. One might even suggest that for a consistent skeptical position

no articulatable metaphysics is possible or required, and that should such a

metaphysics exist, it would coincide with an unutterable mysticism.

Taoism, in the writings of Lao Tzu (sixth or fourth centuries B.C.) and

Chuang Tzu (399-295 B.C.), provides skeptical arguments or theses against

conventional and commonsensical, empirical and rational claims of knowl-

edge, politics, and morality. Simultaneously, it also provides an antiskepticalmetaphysical and yet ultimately, practical view regarding nature, reality, and

life. Now whether skeptical arguments come first or whether the metaphysics



141

of taoa comes first is an interesting question. Historically, it is possible to hold

that skepticism regarding knowledge, politics, morality, and society comes

before the development or the full development of the metaphysics of tao.

Indeed, a few currentscholars tend to hold this view.4 The social and historical

contexts in which Taoism arose lend a high degree of probability to the view

that Taoism begins as a reflection on the cause and nature of chaos, conflict,

and unhappiness in the dynamic social and political processes of change and

gradually grows into a metaphysical position in terms of which the individual

as versus society and government may nevertheless receive fulfillment in his

deep contemplative experience of the tao or ultimate truth and reality. But, on

the other hand, from a logical and phenomenological point of view, the rise

of Taoistic philosophy must have its experiential basis. For pure social and

political criticism is incapable of generating a metaphysics. Only metaphysical

insight and contemplation of truth as truth leads to a blooming of metaphysical

thought.The

experienceof tao thus is not derived from social and

politicalreaction alone but instead has roots in a deep-seated original understanding of

life and nature. Because of these double aspects of Taoism, we may simplyassume that skeptical arguments and metaphysics of tao reinforce each other

and form a dialectical process of establishing a theory of distinction between

lower level (limited) truth and higher level (unlimited) truth, as communicated

in Chuang Tzu.

Let us begin with Taoistic skeptical arguments against knowledge, morality,and value. The very basis of these skeptical arguments consists in recognizing

the relativity, subjectivity, limitedness and the ill effects of the commonsensicalknowledge; and, on the other hand, recognizing the transrelativity, univer-

sality, the unlimitedness as well as the good consequences of the metaphysicalwisdom of the Tao for the others.

In Lao Tzu, strong stress is laid on relativity of perception and value and

knowledge, on the one hand, and the ill effects of them on the other. Regarding

relativity of perception, value, and knowledge, Lao Tzu has this to say:

If everyone knows why beauty is beauty, there is then the uncomeliness; [if

everyone] knows what good is good, there is then the non-good; thereforebeing and non-beings are mutually generative, the difficult and the easy aremutually completing, the long and the short are mutually forming, the highand the low are mutually leaning upon, the monotone and the rhythmic voiceare mutually harmonizing; the fore and hind are mutually following.5

Values, existence, qualities, relations of space, time, and other relations are

therefore distinguished in contexts where there is contrast. They are, therefore,

individually identifiable relative to their correlative opposites. Their existence

conditions and is conditioned by existence of their opposites. What is relative

is dependent on other conditions and does not exist independently of otherconditions. Thus, to know what is relative does not yield any genuine knowl-

edge of the total and ultimate truth or the tao. But to know is to recognize



142 Cheng

distinctions which are relatively conditioned. This knowledge, however, can

not contribute to understanding of the truth (the tao). This is referred to byLao Tzu as learning (hsiiehb),which is opposite to tao. Lao Tzu says:

To do learning is to accumulate daily; to do tao is to diminish daily. We dimin-ish again and again so that we can arrive at nonactivity. When nothing is done,nothing will not be done.6

The contrast between hsiieh and tao is one between relative knowledge and

absolute knowledge. The former is conditioned, the latter unconditioned.

Though Lao Tzu does not explicitly say that "doing learning(hsiieh)"as versue

"doing tao" does not yield trueknowledge; it is clear from the contrast between

"doing learning" and "doing tao" that, in order to have true knowledge

(namely, "doing tao"), we must abandon "doing learning." "If we abolish

learning, we shall have no worry."7 In learning we tend to hold to one or the

other side of relative distinctions which hide the truth, but in tao all distinctions

are not taken seriously and, in fact, are to be ignored so that one would nothold one side of a relative distinction against the other. The state of nondistinc-

tion or the state where no relative distinction commands attention is described

by Lao Tzu as that of voidness(kungc) and/or the state of tranquility(chingd).

It is a state where everything and all things are allowed to thrive and one can

see a natural return of them to their origin-the tao. Thus Lao Tzu says:

To reach for the voidness to the ultimate, to hold steadfast quietitude, tenthousand things will simultaneously thrive-and I shall see their return (fu).8

Thus the skeptical criticism with regardto knowledge of things is clear. Knowl-edge of things depends on recognition of existing relative distinctions which

block total truth from showing. Relativity of distinctions furthermore leads

to one-sidednessof one's view, which again blocks the total truth from showing

itself.

The argument against knowledge and perception from ill effects of them is

straightforwardin Lao Tzu. Lao Tzu simply points out:

Five colors make one's eyes blind; five sounds make one's ears deaf; five spicesmake one's mouth

tasteless; ridingon the horseback to do

huntingmakes one's

mind mad; precious commodities make one's behavior secretive. Thus the

sage only wishes to satisfy his stomach, but not to seek satisfaction of eyes.Thus he gets rid of latter and takes former.

Perception of five senses and the knowledge based on them tend to produce a

disturbing effect on one's mind and will and leads one to a state of aroused

emotions and desires. If one wants to avoid unhealthyor excessive emotions

and desires, one would have to limit or diminish the uses of one's senses or not

to let one's perception and knowledge become too complicated and involved.

Thus Lao Tzu holds: "To have a simple appearanceand to hold a

simplemind, one should have less private feeling and less desires." Lao Tzu is insight-

ful in linking knowledge to the volitional and appetitive nature of man. He



143

appears to believe that the more knowledge one possesses, the more excessive

his desires and needs are, and the more numerous the latter become the more

will the former will be generated. This is a vicious circle which will lead to the

destruction of man as a wholesome entity. Thus, the skeptical criticism with

regard to knowledge for Lao Tzu concerns not only its validity but its moral

and metaphysical soundness.

In the writings of Chuang Tzu the positive skeptical arguments based relati-vity and ill effectsof knowledge, perception, and value are even more elaborated

and developed than in Lao Tzu. The relativity of knowledge was developedinto an ontological principle to the effect that everything in the world, if well

defined and distinctive, for its definition or distinction must depend on an

opposite and, in fact, may be considered as derivable from an opposite. Thus,

nothing is separate and separable from a relational context, and the relativityof a thing is precisely this relational dependence.

Nothing is not that; nothing is not this. From the point of view of 'that', onecannot see clearly 'this', but form the point of view of 'this' one can see ourself

('this') clearly. Thus it is said: "that is derived from this and this is dependenton that." (Chi Wu Lun)

Chuang Tzu furthermore points out:

This is that; that is this. That represents one sort of distinction between 'rightand wrong.' (Chi Wu Lun)

Insofar as "that" and "this" represent different and opposite points of view

or perspectives, they must generate different and opposite knowledge or per-ception which cannot be other than relative. No judgment in knowledge and

perception is absolutely right nor absolutely wrong and therefore has absolute

validity.Like Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu points out that behind the relative perspectives

of things, there is the absolute and unconditioned position of nonfixation and

noncommitment to any specific position, it is the position where the oppositionbetween that and this becomes irrelevant,nondetermining, and does not gener-ate any specific knowledge or any attachment to such: It is the position of the

tao or the axis of tao (tao-shue). He says:

Is there in reality a distinction between 'that' and 'this'? Is there in reality nodistinction between 'that' and 'this'? When 'that' and 'this' are not opposed,the position will be called the axis of tao (tao-shu). When one holds the axis oftao, one is the center of the circle of things and can respond to infinite distinc-tions between right and wrong. [Since] there is an infinity of right, and /since/there is an infinity of wrong, so it is said that it is better to use the method ofmutual illumination /to reach truth/ /than to rely on one distinction or another.

Thus forChuang

Tzu, and for Lao Tzu aswell,

truth or trueknowledgecomes from denial of ordinary knowledge or perception based on an ordinary

limited point of view and relative distinction. The skeptical criticism against



144 Cheng

knowledge becomes an instrument for reaching a higher or deeper knowledge.In fact, the criticism is that one should not take ordinary knowledge on its face

value for, if one does, one will not see truth; but, on the other hand, one should

see the limitation and relativity of ordinary knowledge and thus reach knowl-

edge of the ultimate truth. Thus, what is skeptically denied or criticized serves

a positive function of introducing the deeper knowledge. What is even more

importantto note is that, when the deeperknowledge is introducedand revealedby the skeptical criticism, what is thus skeptically criticized, namely, ordinary

knowledge, can be reintroduced or reaffirmed without being eliminated. It

will be accepted as far as it is useful and insofar as it constitutes a condition

for recognizing higher and total truth. This is the twofold dialectical role of

doubt in Taoism: to reach the total truth and to reintroduce the limited relative

truth or knowledge after the total truth is reached.

Chuang Tzu also agrees with Lao Tzu on the ill effects of knowledge and

perception. The knowledge and perception which he rejects as introducing ill

effects, useless or ineffectual, is primarily knowledge of skills and other know-

how. In one of his essays called "Opening a Box," Chuang Tzu described how

a masterful thief may carry away the box which a person has skillfully sealed

in order to prevent loss of its content. Thus he asks:

With regard to what the world calls the most knowledgeable person, is he not

storing something for a masterful thief?1'

Thus Chuang Tzu recommends that

Therefore only when sagehood is abolished and knowledge abandoned, will

the great thief cease to be.12

It is clear from this that Chuang Tzu considers knowledge as basically harmful.

Even though the knowledge considered here may include simply know-how,

it need not be so interpreted. From the preceding, Chuang Tzu could agree

that partial knowledge and knowledge of distinctions are what producestech-

nology and induce emotion,and as such, they are thereforemorally and socially

undesirable.

Chuang Tzu has many other arguments logically well-developed in criticism

of knowledge, perception, and value judgments, beside those from relativity

and ill effects. The arguments from relativity of standardsof judgments streng-

then the point that ordinaryjudgments presuppose some unexamined assump-

tions and depend on them as grounds of validity. But there is no proof nor

necessity of accepting those assumptions. Thus, he points out that although a

feather of a bird in the autumn may appear to be small but can be judged to

be large, yet it is very small when compared with much largerthings. Similarly,

with matters concerning duration in time, thereis no absolute

longor absolute

short in time; and, with matters regarding values of good or bad, beauty or

ugliness; similarly, there exist no absolute standards of judgments for them.



145

Chuang Tzu's intent is to show that one should not be misled by knowledgeand perception of things: they are partially true at most, and they represent

parts of things. Because of these they need not be trusted or taken seriously.Insofar as Chuang Tzu's argument is based on subjectivity of knowledge

and relativity of things, his position resembles Pyrrhonism. But Chuang Tzu,

however, differs from the Pyrrhonist by drawing a positive conclusion from his

own skeptical criticism: he urges a person to identify himself with Heaven andEarth and all the ten thousand things. He says:

Heaven and Earth co-live with me; ten thousand things identify with me.13

In doing so he comes to recognize subjective judgments as merely subjective

and to recognize the usefulness as the useless. He will freehimself from ordinary

commitment to what is called reality and ordinary doubt toward dreams. His

well-known parableon his dream of becoming a butterflyillustrates an ultimate

noncommittalposition toward reality, knowledge, and experience, which could

encompass everything without anything being either affirmedor rejected. This

is a non-Pyrrhonian position.

Finally, Chuang Tzu clearly makes the point that no judgment of right or

wrong can be made in any dispute and that no truthor falsity can be ever estab-

lished. His argument for this is basically one from a third person. For, giventwo disputing persons or given two opposite sides, no matter what ajudge does,

he can be equally questioned on a higher level, and another judge would have

to settle the issue. But this leads to infinite regress. Chuang Tzu says:

Whom should I ask to judge? Do I make the judge the person who argueswithmy opponents? Surely he has agreed with my opponent, how could he judge?Do I make the judge the person who agrees with myself? Surely he has agreedwith me, how could he judge? Do I make the judge the person who disagreeswith both me and my opponent? But surely he already has disagreed with meand my opponent, how could he judge? Do I make the judge the person whoagrees with both me and my opponent? Surely he has already agreed with meand my opponent, how could he judge? Thus I myself, my opponent, and athirdperson all could not know the true, and then whom do I want for knowingthe true ?14

What is interesting in this reductio ad absurdum is that a logical argument is

used to show that argument does not logically settle any dispute about truth

and knowledge. Chuang Tzu's recommendation is that one should treat the

opposition between the two sides as if it is not an opposition, and thus "har-

monize it with natural relations (t'ien-ni'). Let it go as freely as nature allows"

(Chi Wu Lun). This means that one should not take the opposition seriouslyand should make no assertion whatsoever. This also amounts to accepting all

sides of opposition in a comprehensive framework. This is indeed ChuangTzu's

true intention.Skeptical tendencies are found in the Ch'an Buddhistic philosophy. Ch'an

Buddhism may be described as holding that no knowledge of ultimate truth



146 Cheng

(truth in Enlightenment) is possible by way of language, speculation, and

reasoning. But neither does the Ch'an Buddhist deny the relevance of the

ordinary experience of life and the ordinary use of language and the ordinary

perception of the concrete situations of life. Ch'an Buddhism introduced an

implicitmetaphysical(ontological) perspectivewhich makes skepticisma means

for reaching Enlightenment, but not a negative self-defeating methodology;

namely, skepticism is employed not to establish any metaphysical view but to

positively reveal that none is relevant or necessary for the ultimate goal of

enlightenment. A common Ch'an motto says:

/The Ch'an teaching is such that/ the truth is transmitted outside the scriptures;there is no setting up of words and letters; point directly at a person's mind;one attains Buddhahood by seeing his self-nature.15

According to this motto, Ch'an Buddhists are found to be skeptical of all

scripturalwritings and, byextension of all

statements,about truth in

language.But the Ch'an skepticism again is not negative, for by rejecting all scripturaland linguistic approaches to truth, the Ch'an Buddhist would simultaneously

approach truth. In fact the very rejection of language and scriptureis an occa-

sion for reaching truth in the sense that truth will be shown, and one will see

the truth. Because of this capacity for rejection, what is originally rejectedcan

be reinstituted insofar as it is divested of the force of misguiding persons seekingtruth. Thus Ch'an skeptical doubt serves a positive twofold function: it reveals

truth and in doing so neutralizes the value of scripture and language.

The Ch'an dialogue in the form of koans (public case, kung-ang) s developed

precisely for the purpose of achieving the double positive functions of skeptical

doubt. To understand these two functions of skeptical doubt embodied in

koans is to understand the logic of koans hidden under the appearance of the

apparent irrationality, irrelevancy, and sometimes even bizarreness. The use

of such koans as "Show me your original face," "Show me the clap of a single

hand," etc. is intended to push aside all conceptual presuppositions about

truth and is intended to induce truth to show itself or to give an opportunity

for truth to show itself. Once thedisciple

sees this andgrasps

the truth, he can

use language in a free and creative fashion, which his enlightenment (seeing

truth) brings, and this can give an answer to a question without regard to

relevancy and meaning. Truth is attained and use of language is reinstituted,

and the original skeptical doubt has performed a positive twofold function.16

BACKGROUND EXPLANATIONOF PRESENCEAND ABSENCEOF NEGATIVESKEPTICISM

Earlier I have explained the distinction and difference between two kinds of

skepticism in their nature and function as respectively exemplified in the

Westernand the Chinese traditions. I hold that the Western tradition is charac-terized by the presence of the negative kind of skepticism, and the Chinese

tradition is characterized by the absence of the negative kind of skepticism.



147

Given this characteristic difference, it is both natural and desirable to seek

reasons why such a characteristic difference exists. To do so is to explain and

give an account of what compelling circumstances have brought about or made

possible thischaracteristicdifference,or indeed, what compelling circumstances,

if at all, brought about skepticism or skeptical doubt, whether negative or

positive. It is obvious that no one can hope to historically trace and theoretically

elaborate all elements which contribute to the development of skepticismin such a short article. Without claiming historical details and theoretical

thoroughness, I wish to present some scheme for explanation in terms of which

some major conditions for development or lack of development of negative

skepticism will be made clear.

In the first place, I wish to point out that skepticism in general is a result of

certain restrainingconditions man has introduced in his search for knowledge.It is not something rooted in human instinct or human reason. It is an outcome

of reflective experience over the frustration and disappointment in a zealous

quest for knowledge. More specifically it is a result of certain restraintsman has

formed and imposed in his quest for knowledge regarding the method, the

concept, or the model of knowledge. Thus, skepticism as the negation of the

quest for knowledge is conditioned by the context of the quest for knowledge.Two observations, however, must be made about this view on the origin of

skepticism. First, though skepticism originates from the quest for knowledge,it is not necessary that all the forms of the quest for knowledge must result in

skepticism. Skepticism exists only relative to certain specific restrainingcondi-

tions one imposes on the quest for knowledge and on the concept of knowledgeitself. This means that for certain other specific conditions there will be no

skepticism and indeed that these other conditions will tend to prevent skepti-cism from arising. When we are clear about what conditions contribute to

skeptical doubt, we shall then understand what other conditions will contri-

bute to the elimination of skeptical doubt. For example, it can be shown that

in the Confucian-Neo-Confucian philosophy, skepticism indeed does not exist

even though there is a nondogmatic philosophy of knowledge and an intense

quest for knowledge.

Second, though skepticism is basically an epistemological position in thecontext of quest for knowledge, nevertheless it has an ontological significance,because it is based on some fundamental metaphysical or ontological vision or

understanding of reality. Thus, I wish to hold that skepticism reflects not onlyan epistemological attitude, it also embodies an ontological stand. Conse-

quently, one can consider the existence of skepticism and the nonexistence of

skepticism as mirroring certain basic forms of ontological apprehension of

man in his relation to the world or reality.In the

West,several fundamental

conditions on the quest for knowledge arelaid down after the quest for knowledge is initiated. First, there are the require-ments of ultimacy and totality of knowledge. Second, there are the requirements



148 Cheng

of unique precision and objectivity of knowledge. Third, there is the require-

ment of certainty or certitude of knowledge. With regard to the first require-

ment, ultimacy of knowledge is regarded as the absolute unchanging validity

of knowledge. Ultimate knowledge is held to be demonstratively clear, stable,

and an exact faithful image of the fixed forms of reality. Nothing less than

ultimacy, namely, nothing suggesting uncertainty, changeability, or inexactness

can satisfy this requirementfor ultimacy. This is the Platonic and Aristotelianconception of knowledge to be found or exemplified in logic and mathematics.

It is continued in the rationists' view of demonstrative truth up to the present

time.

The requirement for totality is no less demanding. Knowledge must form a

total system, logically structured and ordered, free from inconsistency, and

complete in principle, if not in details. In fact, if knowledge is not total, one

may not suppose that one has reached the ultimate of knowledge. Totality

seems to be assimilated in the ultimate nature of knowledge. Potentiality for

totality must be proved, if not actual totality. This explains how shocking the

Godel Incompleteness results may appear to be to those who believe in com-

pleteness of mathematical knowledge as implied by the formalism of Hilbert.

The other two requirements, that of exactness (or preciseness or precision

and that of objectivity, are no less restraining for a concept of knowledge.

Though exactness cannot be exactly defined, it is a methodological condition

for proving clarity and distinctness of what we know. Perhaps it is because of

this requirement that complex matters and concepts are analyzed into simple

elements as basic constituents. In similar spirit, the requirement ofexactness

leads to development of reductionism and atomism in Western epistemology.

To have exact knowledge is to have knowledge definablein exact and elementary

units. This search for exactness coincides with the search for simplicity, consis-

tency, and definability and leads to such extreme forms of reductionism as

phenomenalism and logical atomism.

The requirement of objectivity must be understood in the context of an

implicitly introduced distinction and bifurcation between object and subject.

To require objectivity of knowledge is to require knowledge of the object as

detached and independent of the subject: Knowledge in this sense is a mirror

of external things and laws governing them. It involves no value judgments or

anything to be explained in terms of subjectiveexperience of man. The primary

model of an object is a physical object. Together with the requirement for

exactness, the requirementof objectivity tends to reduce subjectiveexistence of

man or man's mind to physical entities. It fosters the deterministic thinking,

and it conduces to modem philosophical physicalism. It moreover leads to

the development of various sciences.

Lastly,but not

leastly,there is the

requirementfor certitude or certainty of

knowledge. This requirementis one for securing the security in knowledge, and

this can be aptly titled "epistemological security." What is required is that



149

which is known is known with certainty or certitude. Certitude or certainty

sometimes obtains when immediate knowledge obtains. But, at other times,

certitude or certainty only comes through a process of proof or evidence-

giving. Thus, in the consequence of requiringcertainty, various forms of proofsand proof procedures are developed in order to satisfy the requirement. This

requirementbecomes the very basis and motivating force for the development

and advancement of logic and scientific methodology. Given the precedingrequirements for knowledge which we can term rationalistic requirements for

knowledge, I will lay down the following postulates which will explain originsof skepticism in its negative form.

1. The more stringent these requirements are, the more difficult it is to satisfythem.2. The more numerous these requirementsare, the more difficult it is to satisfythem.3. The more stringent the requirementsfor ultimacy and totality of knowledge

are, the more likely it is that skeptical doubts will develop.4. The more stringent the requirements for exactness and objectivity are, themore likely it is that skeptical doubts will develop.5. The more stringent the requirement for certitude is, the more likely it is

skeptical doubts will develop.6. The more likely it is the requirementsfor ultimacy and totality of knowledgeare to be satisfied, the less likely it is that the requirements for exactness and

objectivity are to be satisfied and vice versa.7. The more likely it is that the requirement for certitude is to be satisfied, theless likely it is that the requirements for ultimacy and totality and the require-ment of exactness and objectivity are to be satisfied and vice versa.

These postulates are not as precisely formulated as one would like to see nor

are they necessarily proved to be true. They are taken to be background condi-

tions necessaryfor a reasonable explanation of the origins of skepticism. When

I say that they constitute necessary conditions for reasonable explanation for

origins of skepticism, I do not intend that they must give rise to skepticism,because other necessary conditions might be pertinent. But it might turn out

that these conditions are indeed sufficient, but not necessary. In fact, I am

quite willing to take postulates 3, 4, 5 as stipulating stronger necessary condi-

tions for the rise of skepticism. It is clear from these postulates that skepticismarose as a reaction and opposition to the stringency of the requirements for

knowledge. The more stringentthese requirementsare, the strongerthe reaction

and opposition, thus the more likely it is for skepticism to arise. Similarly, the

more numerous the requirements for knowledge are, the stronger the reaction

and opposition. When the requirements for knowledge are both stringent and

numerous, the reaction and opposition to them become strongest. This inverse

relationship between skepticism and requirements for knowledge seems to be

both natural and intelligible. It seems to reflect the nature of reason and thepsychology of the human mind. It is not therefore a simple psychologicalaction but also a rational relation. As a rational relation the inverse relation



150 Cheng

between skepticism and knowledge can be expressed by saying that, if no posi-

tive proof of a thesis is possible, then one would have to give a proof of the

antithesis. Thus, if complete, ultimate, exact, objective, and certain knowledge

is not possible in the sense of being attainable or provable, then its impossibility

must be proved. Skepticism is the effort and result of proving the converse

of knowledge under the requirements for knowledge. Consequently, when

all seven requirementsfor knowledge are stringently demanded for a model ofknowledge, the rise of skepticism as negation of all seven requirementsand thus

of the very model of knowledge satisfying these requirementsis not surprising.

We may indeed present and illustrate the inverse relationships among the

major rationalist requirements for knowledge, the impossibility of satisfying

all of which leads to skepticism:

Diagram 1

Ultimacy and totalityof knowledge

Certitude (certainty)(inverse relationships) or

Epistemological security

Exactness and objectivityof knowledge

Skepticism

We may conclude that negative skepticism is the product of the demand for

satisfaction of all requirements for knowledge. When all requirements for

knowledge are demanded, there is inner tension and incompatability of all

these requirements.Negative skepticism, therefore, can be also regardedas the

outcome of the conflict and incompatability of basic requirements for knowl-

edge.A deeper analysis of the ontological ground of requirementsfor knowledge

and the negation of such in skepticism shows parallel inverse relationships.

Conflict and incompatability among requirementsfor ontological understand-

ing could create ontological anxiety which negates and opposes the satisfaction

of these requirements for understanding a model of reality. The ontological

anxiety in the following diagram corresponds to skepticism in the epistemolo-

gical diagram.

Although there is a parallel structure between these two structures, they do

make a differencein regardto some skeptical positions in the Western tradition.

Apparently, Pyrrhonism wishes to achieve tranquility of mind by suspendingall judgments of knowledge. As with skepticism, Pyrrhonism arises from

demands of satisfaction of all requirements for knowledge in Diagram 1. But



151

Diagram 2

Ultimate and total

reality

(inverse relationships) Tranquility (equilibrium),Exat or ontological security

Exact and defined

object

Ontological Anxiety

as an ontological position it does not argue for ontological anxiety but instead

holds the need for tranquility by negating the search for exact understandingof the

objectiveworld in its

ultimacyand totality. It is clear that a

negativeskeptic can be skeptical in an epistemological sense without being skeptical

in an ontological sense. A negative skeptic thus can be defined in epistemolo-

gical and/or ontological terms.

Regardingthe two diagramswe can also understandhow positive skepticism,as exemplified in Chinese Taoism and Ch'an Buddhism, takes place. In order

to eliminate imbalance and conflict of requirementsfor knowledge, one has to

relinquishsome requirementsfor knowledge. The Taoists and Ch'an Buddhists

generallycan be said to relinquishthe requirementsfor exactness and objectivity

of knowledge in order to preserve those for ultimacy, totality, and certitude.As we have pointed out, the Taoists and the Ch'an Buddhists are skeptical of

objective knowledge of things, and they generally distrust conceptual definite-

ness as this would block their vision of the ultimate and the total. Thus, the

Taoist and Ch'an Buddhist position can be construed as rejecting the require-ments for exactness and objectivity in order to attain ultimacy, totality, and

certitudeof knowledge. In fact, for them this rejectionis necessaryand positivelyuseful for attaining ultimate totality and certitude of knowledge. Once the

ultimate total and certain knowledge is attained (called a state of enlightenmentin Ch'an Buddhism), what is rejected can be recepted in the form of common

sense and ordinary life. What is rejected is the need or urge to seek rational

exactness and objectivity at the expense of the unity of the whole between

object and subject or between the universal and the particular. This positionis what I call positive skepticism. The ontological aspect of positive skepticism

similarly consists in eliminating the notion of exact object and the quest for

exact object in order to achieve the originally assumed unity and tranquilityof mind. For it is assumed that without the quest for exact object, mind and

reality in the ultimacy and totality are one. This is also the ultimate meaningof ontological tranquility that man originally possessed.

It may be asked whether one could, in one's quest for knowledge, converse



152 Cheng

to Taoism and Ch'an Buddhism, relinquish the requirements for totality and

ultimacy of knowledge and concentrate on exactness of objectivityof knowledgeand its certitude. A positive reply to this is clearly in order. In fact, modern

Western science from seventeenth century on is precisely founded on the prem-ises of this possibility. Science, as normally understood, does not have as its

goal to present and achieve an ultimate and total knowledge of world or reality,

which is the dream of the rationalistic metaphysics. Instead science is developedby confining its activity to a specific area of experience. What science stresses

is the exactness and objectivity of knowledge in a specific area. Thus science is

explicit about a distinction between the objective and the subjective and the

need for quantitative mathematics for precision. Science also desires certitude

and creditability. Though there is the inverse relation between degrees of

science strives for certitude and credibility as far as certitude and creditabilityallow and simultaneously strives for exactness and objectivityas faras exactness

and objectivity allow. It may not achieve absolute certitude; and it generallysettles on high probability. Science is even open-minded regarding change-

ability of scientific knowledge. It allows revision and change of framework

insofar as these basic standard requirements for knowledge are maintained

at a reasonable level. In such an effort to achieve balance on a limited scale,

science thus avoids skepticism. It seems evident that once science is pushed to

generate total and ultimate knowledge, science loses its hold on certitude and

tends to induce skeptical doubt and create ontological anxiety.Science in its modem form and in the preceding description had not developed

in China. Though there are many other factors which contribute to the lack ofdevelopment of science in China, a dominating reason seems to be that there

is no stringent demand for an exact and objectiveknowledge and that there is

no earnest need to avoid negative skepticism, because there is no negative

skepticism. The reason for lack of need for exact and objective knowledge is

that there is no exact distinction and bifurcation between object and subjectin reality. In the Chinese experience and Chinese ontology the first proposition

is that man (subject) and Heaven and Earth (object) are one, and there is no

bifurcation between the two. Chinese experience and Chinese metaphysicsalso hold that theory and practice or knowledge and action are inseparable

and that they aremutually constraining so that no external standard of exactness

(such as theoretical mathematics and logic) is needed. As there is no stringent

demand for an exact form of objective knowledge, tendencies toward science

and skepticism are both lessened, even though the ontological need toward

understanding a total and ultimate reality and toward achieving a state of

equilibrium in man are sustained. In fact, noninsistence on the requirementsfor exactness and objectivity of knowledge and the positive elaboration of the

theory of unity of man and Heaven and Earth as well as the theory of unity oftheory and practice in Chinese philosophy enable the total and ultimate knowl-

edge of reality to be compatible with and even conducive to the attainment of



153

epistemological security or certitude. That this is indeed the case is illustrated

and indeed explains why the main Chinese philosophical tradition-Confucian/

Neo-Confucian philosophy does not develop any skeptical tendency.

Confucian/Neo-Confucian philosophy is founded on the experience and the

premise that man and nature form a primordial unity and whole, and this

unity and whole of man and nature seems to provide a solution to the inner

conflict and incompatibility among the requirements for knowledge such asillustrated in Diagram 1. In the first place, the unity of man and nature enables

one to seek the total and ultimate understanding of reality through a processof extension, beginning with man himself. To know the whole is to know

oneself first and gradually reach an illumination of all, by close and careful

scrutiny of things. This is indicated in Chu Hsi's doctrine of investigation of

things. It is no less generally true of Lu Hsiang Shan's or Wang Yang-ming'sdoctrine of the mind.

Regarding the objectivity of knowledge, it has been already suggested that in

Confucian/Neo-Confucian tradition, as in Chinese philosophy, in general,there is no bifurcation between object and subject, and this is possible preciselybecause of the unity between man and nature. Thus truth and knowledgehave both a subjective dimension and an objective dimension which are

mutually supportive. The radical requirement for objectivity at the expense of

subjectivityis stifledin the beginning of the formation of a model of knowledge.

Finally, the unity of man and nature as an experienceof totality and the whole

of man and nature make it both natural and desirable to conceive theory and

practice or knowledge and action as a unity and whole. Knowledge is notvalued or sought only for its own sake, and, thus, no theoretical exactness is

regardedas essential for the comprehension of genuine knowledge. Practicalityin life is sufficient to confirm a high degree of acceptance of knowledge. In this

sense even the knowledge of principles (li) in Neo-Confucianism does not

exclude its application to real ordinary life with all its practical purposefulness.With this new approach to the requirements for knowledge in Chinese

philosophy the tension of conflicts and incompatibilities among them tend to

vanish as they are absorbed into the metaphysics of unity of man and nature.

And indeed the very compatibility and harmony and even unity of the recon-

strued requirements for knowledge help to generate a sense of certitude or

epistemological security, which is derived from an ontological sense of man's

relevance to nature and is continuously reinforced by the ensuring sense of

harmony and adjustment among various possible requirementsfor knowledge.The moral theory of Confucianism/Neo-Confucianism is embedded in the

Confucian/Neo-Confucian metaphysical framework in which morality becomes

a part of the cosmological ontological theory of the unity of man and nature.

Again the principle of internal identification of man with the nature of Heavenand the principle of unity of theory and practice plus the principle of organic

unity of individual, society, and government make any skeptical doubt or



154 Cheng

argument against moral truth lose its relevance or force. Hence unlike Taoism

or Ch'an Buddhismwherebypractical life in society and governmentis divorced

from contemplation and meditation, moral philosophy of Confucianism/Neo-

Confucianism is free and immune from skeptical criticism: morality, like

cosmology, becomes not only self-justifying but self-fulfilling.17In concluding, I assert that the very condition for sustaining skepticism is

the same condition for developing science (and scientific methodology) andlogic. The quest for certainty and absoluteness as well as for specificor specified

simplicity is what motivates both skepticism and logic. Skepticism is logic

used to disprove logic or reason employed to defeat reason, and thus requiresa very basic consciousness of logic and reason. Thus, skepticism goes hand

in hand with reductionism and relativism, which either avoid skepticism or

introduce skepticism at the recognition of the limitations of themselves.

NOTES

1. See Outlines of Pyrrhonism,Bk. I, chapter 4 in Jason L. Saunders, ed., Greek and Roman

Philosophy After Aristotle, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1966), p. 153.

2. A similar strain of thought was found in George Santayana's Skepticismand AnimalFaith.

But Santayana clearly differs from Hume in making an attempt to introduce a metaphysics of

matter, essence, spirit, and truth of his own.

3. But we must note a differentiatingfactor between these examples of positive skepticismand

positive skepticism which dominates Chinese philosophy: the knowledge reconstruedin Descartes

is the same knowledge undermined previously by the method of doubt, whereas the knowledgecriticized by doubt in Taoism, as we shall see, is affirmedalong the affirmationof higher order or

truth or knowledge.4. For example, D. C. Lau in his translation of Tao Te Ching.

5. Tao Te Ching, No. 2





10. Chi WuLun

11. ChuHsia

12. ChuHsia13. Chi WuLun

14. Chi WuLun

15. See Chu TingShih Wan and Shih Men ChengTun.

16. Seemy paper"OnZen (Ch'an)Language and Zen Paradoxes,"Journalof ChinesePhilosophy

I, no. 1 (December, 1973).17. Moral skepticism only arises from relativisticand atomisticconsiderations of the individual

as well as from a bifurcation and a diversificationbetween reason as a faculty of justification and

experience as a faculty of application.

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bhsuiehI f t'ien-ni i,fckung ^ gkung-an Yj

dching d

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