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Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

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Page 1: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

Network and Application Attacks

Contributed by-Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi

CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB)June 2006

Page 2: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

Contents

2

Denial of Service Attacks Single Source Distributed

Fragmentation Attacks Spoofing Attacks DNS Attacks Sniffing Attacks FTP Bounce AttackApplication Attacks

Page 3: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

3

Single SourceDenial of Service Attacks

Page 4: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 4

TCP SYN Flooding (SYN Attack) ICMP_Echo Flooding (Ping Attack) ICMP_Echo Flooding (Smurf Attack) UDP_Echo Flooding (Fraggle) ICMP_ECHO Reply Flooding (Ping of Death) Distributed Denial Of Service

TrinooTribe Flood Network (TFN)

Denial of Service Attacks

Page 5: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 5

SYN Attack

Page 6: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

6

TCP CONNECTION

SYN=1 ACK=0 141521 win 4096 <mss 1024>

SYN = 1 ACK = 1 181521 141522 win 4096<mss 1024>

SYN = 0 ACK = 1 181522

Segment 1

Segment 2

Segment 3

CLIENT SERVER

THREE-WAYCONNECTION

Segment 1 shows the client sending a SYN segment with an Initial Sequence Number of 141521. The ISN is randomly generated. This is called an Active Open. The field win 4096 shows the advertised window size of the sending station while the field <mss 1024> shows the receiving maximum segment size specified by the sender. SYN=1, ACK=0.

Segment 2 shows the server responding with a SYN segment of 181521 and ACKnowledging the clients ISN with ISN + 1. This is called a Passive Open. SYN=1,ACK=1

Segment 3 shows the client responding by ACKnowledging the servers ISN with ISN + 1. SYN=0,ACK=1.

Data can now be transmitted.

THREE-WAY CONNECTION

Page 7: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 7

Attack Method. Most hosts will only support 8-16 simultaneous communication channels. The Hacker sends a sequence of SYN packets.

Each SYN packet (about 120 /second) has a different and unreachable IP address. This consumes all the communication channels and results in a denial to any TCP based

service.Countermeasure.

Expand the number of ports, reduce the time-out period, validate TCP request packets.

TCP SYN Flooding

SYN=1 ACK=0 141521 win 4096 (unreachable address

SYN = 1 ACK = 1 181521 141522 win 4096(unreachable address)

Hacker

SYN = 1 ACK =1 181521 141687 win 4096(unreachable address)

SYN = 1 ACK = 1 181521 141723 win 4096(unreachable address)

SYN=1 ACK=0 141686 win 4096 (unreachable address)SYN=1 ACK=0 141721 win 4096 (unreachable address)

UnreachableIP Address

Legitimate Client is denied access

Legitimate Client

Target Host

Page 8: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 8

PING Attack

Page 9: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 9

Ping AttackThe Hacker sends an ICMP Echo request to the target expecting an ICMP echo reply

to be returned for each request.The hacker, because of the high bandwidth, can send more requests then the target

can handle.Countermeasures

No known defense

ICMP ECHO Flooding

Hacker

INTERNET

Target

Packet 1

Packet 2

Packet 3

Packet 5

Packet 4

Packet n

128K LinkT-1 Link

Packet n

Page 10: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 10

SMURF Attack

Page 11: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

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SMURF Attack The Hacker sends an ICMP Echo request to the target network with a destination

broadcast address and a spoofed source address of the target. The network serves as a "bounce site" and returns an Echo Reply for each station on the

network. The network serves to multiply the effect of the "ping". The Echo Request could be

sent to multiple networks.Countermeasures

Disable IP-directed broadcasts at your router. Configure the workstation to not respond to an IP broadcast packet.

ICMP ECHO Flooding

Hacker

INTERNETTarget

Packet 5

Packet n

Echo Request

Echo Reply

Echo Reply

Echo Reply

Echo Reply

Page 12: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 12

DoS LAND attack

• In LAND attack a crafted SYN packet is send in which a source IP address and Port no is same as of destination IP and port causing some implementations of TCP/IP to allocate excessive resources and slow down and eventually reboot or hang.

Page 13: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 13

Ping O' Death Attack

Page 14: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

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Ping o' Death Attack ICMP, an integral part of IP, is utilized to report network errors. PING (Packet InterNet Grouper) utilizes ICMP Echo and Reply packets to test host

reachability. ICMP messages normally consist of the IP Header and enclosed ICMP data with a default

size of 64 bytes. If the Hacker sends an ICMP Echo request that is greater than 65,536 this can crash or

reboot the system. A newer attack method modifies the header to indicate that there is more data in the packet

than there actually is.Countermeasure

Router updates that check the size of the ICMP packet. Block PING (ICMP) traffic at the Firewall.

ICMP ECHO Request Attack

Hacker

INTERNET

Target

Packet > 65,536

128K LinkT-1 Link

Packet > 65,536

Page 15: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

15

Other

DOS Attacks

Page 16: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

16

Other DOS Attacks

Papasmurf: A combination of Smurf and Fraggle. Land: A spoofed packet where:

Source IP = Destination IP Source Port = Destination Port

Latierra: A Land relative that sends multiple land packets to multiple ports.

Jolt2: A stream of packet fragments none of which have an offset of zero.

Winnuke: Sends out of band packets to port 139 on the victims machine.

Page 17: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 17

DistributedDenial of Service Attacks

- DDoS -

Page 18: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 18

DOS is designed to bring down a network or a computer by overloading it with large amounts of network traffic using TCP, UDP or ICMP.

Past attacks have been from a single source and were relatively easy to detect.

Current attacks now use distributed system tools such as Trinoo and TFN

Distributed DOS tools launch simultaneous attacks from multiple computer systems at individual or multiple targets.

Almost impossible to track to the source.

General

Page 19: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 19

Trinoo/WinTrinoo The earliest DDoS. Initiates a UDP flood attack. Communicates between Master and Agents with unencrypted TCP/UDP. Root access is not needed to launch the attack.

Tribal Flood Network (TFN)/TFN2K)

Employs Smurf, UDP, ICMP and TCP SYN floods. Communicates between Master and Agents with ICMP_ECHO REPLY packets.

Commands are sent as part of the ICMP ID field. The Agent is silent and does not reply to the Master. The Master sends

multiple commands to the agent. Agent host root or Administrator privileges are required.

Common DDoS Types

Page 20: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 20

Fragmentation Attack

Teardrop Attack Fragment Overflow Attack

Page 21: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 21

TearDrop Attack

Page 22: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

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Teardrop Attack

• Teardrop attack involves sending two IP fragments, the later contained entirely in the former, causing the server to allocate too much of memory and crash.• Many Implementations of TCP/IP cannot

handle this behavior.

Page 23: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

23

Teardrop Attack

VERS

FCSPREAMBLEDESTINATION

ADDRESSSOURCEADDRESS

FIELDTYPE

ETHERNET

0-655352668 4

HLEN TOS Total Length4 bits 4 bits 8 bits 16 bits

Identification16 bits

Flags3 bits

Fragment Offset13 bits

TTL8 bits

Protocol17

Checksum16 bits

Source IP Address32 bits

Destination IP Address32 bits

IP Options(if any)32 bits

0 15 16 31

IP Header

UDP Header

IPHEADER

UDPHEADER DATA

UDP Source Port

UDP Message Length

Data

UDP Destination Port

UDP Checksum

. . .

53 53

Page 24: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

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Teardrop AttackVERS HLEN TOS Total Length4 bits 4 bits 8 bits 16 bits

Identification Flags Fragment Offset

TTL8 bits

Protocol8 bits

Checksum16 bits

Source IP Address32 bits

Destination IP Address32 bits

IP Options(if any)32 bits

IP Datagram Data32 bits

0 15 16 31

60 bytes

20 bytes

<= 40 bytes

MTU = 1500 MTU = 1500MTU = 512

Fragment 1TL 512ID 26313DF 0MF 1OS 0

Fragment 2TL 32ID 26313DF 0MF 0OS 1

This attack takes advantage of a bug in the IP fragmentation reassembly code. The code checks for the fragment length that is too large but not for a fragment length that is too short. The attack is directed toward NT, WIN 95 and Linux boxes

Encapsulate a UDP packet inside an IP packet. Spoof the source IP address and Port Create two specially constructed IP fragments

The first packet has the OS = 0, MF = 1 and a size of N.The second packet has the OS < N, MF = 0 and a size < N.

NT/WIN 95 can normally withstand 5-10 pair attacks before it crashes or reboots. Fixes have been posted by Microsoft.

Teardrop Attack Concept

0Rec Fragment 1

Hacker Target

Rec Fragment 22

512 bytes32 bytes

Page 25: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 25

Fragmentation OverflowAttack

Page 26: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 26

Fragment Overflow Attack

Attack Method The IP Data Length field is 16 bits so each datagram can have a maximum size of

65515.Intermediate routers can fragment the datagram based upon the MTU of the next

network. The MF flag set to 0 indicates the last packet.

If the receiving station does not receive a last packet it keeps allocating buffer space until an overflow occurs and the system crashes.

CountermeasuresNo known defense

VERS HLEN TOS Total Length4 bits 4 bits 8 bits 16 bits

Identification16 bits

Flags Fragment Offset13 bits

TTL8 bits

Protocol8 bits

Checksum16 bits

Source IP Address32 bits

Destination IP Address32 bits

IP Options(if any) (<= 40 bytes)

IP Datagram Data

0 D F

F

M

Page 27: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 27

Spoofing Attacks

Page 28: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 28

Spoofing Attacks

IP Spoof.TCP Sequence Attack.

ARP Spoof. ICMP Spoof. RIP Spoof.

Page 29: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 29

IP Spoof Attack

The IP attack is really a trust-relationship exploitation. A trusted relationship only requires IP address based authentication.

The attack is composed of several components.Identify a host target.Identify a host with a trusted relationship with the target.Execute a Denial of Service attack against the trusted

host(eg.A TCP SYN Attack). Sample and guess the TCP sequence number of the target.Impersonate the trusted host and attempt a connection that

only requires address based authentication.

Page 30: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 30

IP SPOOFING

Screening Router

181.10.10.2

181.10.10.3

181.10.13.1 Hacker

packet APPEARS to come from 181.10.13.1

1. Hacker assumes source

address 181.10.13.1 in order to fool the screening Router by appearing to reside on the internal network ( a trusted host).

2. Screening Router is fooled into believing that this packet is coming from an internal address.

Internet

From:181.10.13.1To: 181.10.10.2

NET: 181.10.13.0

NET: 181.10.10.0

Target

CountermeasureThis attack can be defeated by filtering on both the input and output ports of the Firewall.

packet REALLY comes from hacker

Page 31: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 31

DNS Attacks

Page 32: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 32

DNS Attacks

DNS Cache Poisoning

Page 33: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 33

DNS Attacks

Background1.The DNS Server:

Translates hostnames into IP addresses.Translates IP addresses into hostnames.Provides host information, etc.

2. There are three main categories of DNS servers: primary: There is only one primary server for each domain. All domain data is derived from this server.

It is loaded by the Domain Administrator. The primary server is authoritative. secondary: There can be more than one secondary server per domain. It acts as a backup to the primary.

The domain database is transferred, zone file transfer, from the primary to the secondary on a scheduled basis.

cache-only: These servers acquire their information from other name servers. It then caches the information. These servers are non-authoritative.

Internet

DNS.Server.Com

Host.Target.Com

Hacker.Bad.Com

DNS.Bad.Com

Page 34: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 34

DNS Attacks

Background Contd3. DNS server does this by maintaining the following files:

named.hosts: The zone file that maps host names into IP addresses.named.rev: The reverse main zone file that maps IP addresses into host names.named.ca: Addresses pointing to the root domain servers.named.local: The loop back address - 127.0.0.1.named.boot:: Contains the named parameters and points to the source of the domain data base information.

4. The local DNS server maintains a cache of its most recent queries. It examines this cache first to see if it already knows the answers. If not it forwards the query to other DNS servers for an answer. Upon receiving the answer it updates its DNS cache and forwards the response to the client.

Internet

DNS.Server.Com

Host.Target.Com

Hacker.Bad.Com

DNS.Bad.Com

Possible Attacks.Poison the DNS cache.Poison the Name Server.Imitate the Name Server.

Page 35: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 35

Attack 1: DNS Cache Poisoning

1. The hacker.bad.com sends a recursive query to DNS.server.com requesting the IP address of unknown.bad.com.2. DNS.server.com is not authoritative for this domain so it queries DNS.bad.com.

The Hacker is monitoring this query to determine the recursive query ID. The Hacker needs this ID to fool the DNS server into taking the poison.

3. Hacker.bad.com submits a query to DNS.server.com looking for the address of www.anyone.com.4. The hacker immediately spoofs the reply with a response of www.anyone.com = 127.0.0.1.

This seeds the DNS server . The IP address could be any address specified by the Hacker.

The Seed

Internet

DNS.Server.ComHost.Target.Com

Hacker.Bad.Com

DNS.Bad.Com

(1) What is the IP address of Unknown.Bad.Com?

(2) What is the IP address of www.anyone.com?

(3) What is the IP address of www.anyone.com?(4) The IP address of www.anyone.com is 127.0.0.1!

Page 36: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 36

Attack 1: DNS Cache Poisoning

Internet

DNS.Server.Com

Host.Target.Com

1. Target.good.com sends a query to DNS.server.com wanting to connect to www.anyone.com.2. DNS.server.com responds with the address in the poisoned cache.

The SpoofHacker.Bad.Com

DNS.Bad.Com

What is the IP address of www.anyone.com?

The IP address of www.anyone.com is 127.0.0.1!

Page 37: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 37

Sniffer Attack

Page 38: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 38

B

B

Ethernet operates in a broadcast mode. Each station looks for its physical address. The Hacker can operate a Sniffer on the Ethernet LAN in the promiscuous mode to look for:

Unencrypted passwords Encrypted passwords Private data Financial information(account numbers) Low level protocol information

A Sniffer attack is normally a prelude to other type attacks.

Host A

Host B

Hacker Host A Telnets to Host B with its User Name and Password. Hacker steals password for later use.

Concept

Action

Sniffer Attack

Segment the LANs. Encrypt the passwords w/ a timestamp. Zero-knowledge authentication (card, ring ,etc)

Countermeasures

Page 39: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 39

FTP Bounce Attack

Page 40: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 40

Normal FTP Connection1. The Client opens a FTP command channel to server (Port 21) and tells the server its data

port number (Port 4141).2. The server acknowledges the request.3. The server opens the data channel (Port 20) to the clients data channel (Port 4141).4. The client acknowledges this connection.

The Attack Concept.1. The PORT command has the form n1,n2,n3,n4,n5,n6.2. The client IP address(n1.n2.n3.n4) and port(n5 x 256+n6)

FTP CONNECTION EXAMPLEFTP Server FTP Client

Port 20 Port 21 Port 4140 Port 4141

Port (IP Address, 4141)

:"OK"Data Channel

:"OK"

Page 41: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 41

Normal FTP ConnectionThe Client opens a FTP command channel to server (Port 21) and tells the server its data port number (Port 4141). The server acknowledges the request. The server opens the data channel (Port 20) to the clients data channel (Port 4141). The client acknowledges this connection.

FTP CONNECTION EXAMPLE Contd

FTP Server FTP Client

Port 20 Port 21 Port 4140 Port 4141"Port 4141"

:"OK"Data Channel

:"OK"

:"PASV"

:"OK 2266"

Port 2266

Data Channel

:"OK"

Passive FTP Connection

The Client opens a FTP command channel to server (Port 21) in a passive mode. The server acknowledges the passive mode and allocates Port 2266 to be the clients data channel. The client opens the data channel from it data channel (Port 4141 to the servers data channel (Port 2266). The server acknowledges the data connection.

Page 42: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 42

FTP Bounce Attack Concept

Hacker Server Bounce Server

The Target Server will allow a connection from the Bounce Server.

The Hacker cannot access the Target server. The hacker can perform the ftp passive mode on

her machine.

A world writable directory is available to the incoming ftp connection.

The Hacker

The Hacker can open an ftp passive mode on her server.

Target Server

Page 43: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 43

FTP Bounce Attack - Phase 1

Hacker Server

The Hacker

The Hacker opens an ftp connection to her server.She changes to a writable directory and issues an:

ftp "pasv" command and an ftp "stor" command

She remembers the IP address and port(H,H,H,H,P,P) returned by the "pasv" command.

She constructs a file called "retrvit" containing a series of ftp commands that will:

Sign onto the Target Server. Change the directory to the desired file. Use the FTP Port command to specify the IP address

and port(H,H,H,H,P,P) of the Hacker Server.

Page 44: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

44

FTP Bounce Attack - Phase 2

Hacker ServerBounce Server

Target Server

The Hacker

She then: Transfer the file "retrevit" to the

Bounce Server, Opens a port to the target and issues the command "retrevit"

She opens an ftp command connection to the Bounce Server, logs in anonymously and changes to a world writable incoming directory.

This series of commands opens a port to the target server and executes the ftp commands contained in the "retrivit" command.

The commands contained within

"retrevit" specifies that a : connection should be established to

the IP address and port (H,H,H,H,P,P) of the Hacker Server and that

the desired fields should be downloaded to the Hacker Server.

Page 45: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 45

Web Attacks

• Cross Side Scripting• SQL Injection• Directory transversal• Command Injection• Malicious Code Execution

Page 46: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 46

Cross Side Scripting

• Cross-site scripting attacks place malicious code in locations where other users see it. The intention of the attack is to steal cookies that contain user identities and credentials, or to trick users into supplying their credentials to the attacker.

• Many web sites use cookies to store information about users. Cookies contain identifying information such as username and password. A hacker may want to steal cookies in order to illegally use someone else's identity.

• When someone browses to a web site to view a page, they send to the web server an HTTP request that contains their cookie. The web server usually keeps cookies for only a short time.

Page 47: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 47

XSS

• Many web sites contain forms, which are used to post information such as names and addresses, or comments on bulletin boards. The hacker can inject scripting code into the vulnerable web server using the forms.

• Scripting code includes tags such as <SCRIPT>. The code can instruct the server to send its cookies to another location, such as another web site (hence the name: Cross Site Scripting), where the hacker can see the cookies. These cookies might contain the login credentials

Page 48: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 48

XSS

• Another variety of Cross-site scripting attack does not steal cookies, but rather dupes the victim into supplying his or her credentials. The attacker enters scripting code to a form. When a user accesses that form, the script causes a popup form to appear that asks the victim to supply his or her details. The form sends those details to the attacker.

• Instead of targeting holes in your server's operating system or web server software, the attack works directly against the users of your site. It does this by tricking a user into submitting web scripting code (JavaScript, Jscript, etc.) to a dynamic form on the targeted web site. If the web site does not check for this scripting code it may pass it verbatim back to the user's browser where it can cause all kinds of damage

Page 49: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 49

XSS

• Consider the following URL: http://www.example.com/search.pl?text=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>

• If an attacker can get us to select a link like this and the Web application does not validate input, then our browser will pop up an alert showing our current set of cookies. This particular example is harmless; an attacker can do much more damage, including stealing passwords, resetting your home page, or redirecting you to another Web site.

Page 50: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 50

SQL Injection

• In SQL injection attack the attacker can Execute commands thru forms or as a URL.• With SQL, the CGI inserts the input data into a string which is then submitted to an

SQL server. The attack is to add characters to the input so that extra SQL commands are performed or so the action is done on more database entries than expected.

• Example- a web address www.example.com/article.asp/id=2 it has a file, parameter and value fields.

Page 51: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 51

SQL Injection

• In this case a script may use only numeric values. If a letter is sent instead, the script should reject the request. Not doing so means malicious commands can make it to the database.

• The commands can be SQL query and based on the result of the query the attacker can proceed with other queries.

• Also the attacker can bypass login.

Page 52: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 52

SQL Injection

• Start with a single quote trick. Input something like: hi' or 1=1-- Into login, or password, or even in the URL. Example: - Login: hi' or 1=1-- - Pass: hi' or 1=1-- - http://duck/index.asp?id=hi' or 1=1-- If you must do this with a hidden field, just download the source HTML from the site, save it in your hard disk, modify the URL and hidden field accordingly.

Page 53: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 53

SQL Injection

• <FORM action=http://duck/Search/search.asp method=post> <input type=hidden name=A value="hi' or 1=1--"> </FORM>

• If luck is on your side, you will get login without any login name or password.

Page 54: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 54

Command Injection

• Command injection attacks allow a remote attacker to execute operating system commands disguised as a URL or form input to the web server. A successful system command execution can provide a remote attacker with administrative access to a web server. This could result in damage such as defacement of the web site, data theft or data loss.

• Commands are to be Injected using HTTP request like %20%ls%0x81

Page 55: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 55

Directory Transversal

• Attacker try to access files and folders he is not supposed to access and may run malicious code by just typing deep character crossing root directory like www.example.com/abc/Newuser?Image=../../database/rbsserv.mdb

• Also can try with encoded characters like • http://<HOST< a>>/............/autoexec.bat%5%2%a% etc.

Page 56: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 56

Defense

• Block /Script tags• Form input should be validated before passing to database.• Invalid value should not give information about wrong input.• Non ASC II characters should be blocked.• Block some unsafe HTTP methods like Delete, Options, Trace etc.

Page 57: Network and Application Attacks Contributed by- Chandra Prakash Suryawanshi CISSP, CEH, SANS-GSEC, CISA, ISO 27001LI, BS 25999LA, ERM (ISB) June 2006

PIRMG 57

Links

• http://www.antiserver.it/Cisco-Exploit/• http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/ddos/• http://www.extropia.com/tutorials/sql/toc.html• http://www.l0t3k.org/security/tools/packetgenerator/• http://www.zone-h.org/en/download/category=52/• Some Tools used-• Hping, SendIP, Retina Scanner, Nmap, Nessus, Nstealth, Web Sleuth, Webinject, Netcat• Some other tools- John-The ripper, Lophtrack, Legion, SubSeven.