New Functional Ism

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RepdntdfrorrTh. Sca"di"6lisn |o&"al ol Pcyclnlogtr97r, Vol. t2, No. r, ?9-52

THE NEW FUNCTIONALISMLENNART SJO ERG

ALMQVIST & WIKSELL . STOCKHOLM

Copyright 1971 Lennart Sjberg


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THE NEW FUNCTIONALISMLINNART SIoBrRc

Deputndt aJAlcholast, Untu*rny oJ Gdtebols,S@eddSJdBRd, . The new functionalism, .da J. Pt,nol., 1971, 2, 29-s2.The paper eviws he devlopment f Btuswik's probabilisilcfunctionalism,Brussikt major contibution is hdd to be his onsistentcnph$is of theimporEnce of tle e.olocr. Brif revicws are the! siven of the m.ny recenrdpplicationsfprobabilisticundion,lism n per.eption,e.rnins,andappliedpsycholosy.jrally, a mentalisticpproach o psycbolosys cotsidcrcd ssnalt$native to functionalism-

In modernpsychologyon usuallyassociateshe rerm functionalismwith the Chicagoschoolandthe nanes Dewey (1896),Angell (r9o7) and Caff (I9r5, r93o).The functionalists, Dderin{uene of Darwin md Willi.n James r89o), regarded he task of psychology o be thestudy of the importance of consciousnesand behavior or the adaptationof the organism.Hotrver, the Chicago functionalists vte eclectics. They never developed an experimentalproglam that difiered much flom that of other contemporary psychology (xcept fron thestlucturalismof Wundt and Titchener). BoriDs (1952)and HeidbfederG933) describe hdevelopment of Chicago functionalisn as a eradual a.d va$e merging withthe core ofAme-rican psychology.After Carr there was hardly any prominent functionalist eft in the USAprovidcd, of course, hat Americu psychology s not co$idered as ntrinsically uncrionalist.But that nould b.oaden the meaning of the term functionalism so much as to render it

Howcver, a fu!.tionalistic plogram was under preparation n Eulop at the sme time asChicago unctionalism anguished.TheEuropean unctionalismdevelopedwithinthepsycho-logy of perception,or , more specifically, D the study of the perceptualconstancies.

The significationof the constancyphenomena s that perception ends to miror certainpropertiesof the environment (of the objects, he so-calleddistal stimuli) rather than thestrongly varying pattern of stimulation that is in direct contact with the sensory receptors(the proximal stimulus). For example,we experience hat a personhas I certain corstantheight regardless of his distance, despite the fact that the retinal image of the persoD varisas a function of distaoce. It seems, then, that the perceptual system corrcts for certainunimpoltant, accidental ariation n the pattern ofstimulation. We seem o be programmedto see,hear and feel asolid and constantenvironment.

Th constancyphenomenahave been discussed y many authors since he beginning ofpsycholosy (seeBoring, 1943 nd 1952). The Chicaso functiomlists were, of course, awarof the existence of these phenomena. The following quotation flom Angell's r9o4 textntitlcd Psychology:an ntroductory study of thc structule and functionofhumanconscious-ness' llustratesclearly this awareness:'Now it requjies orly a moment's reflection to convince us that, as w stmd at a little distancefrom the chai!, the imse of its seat, shich is reflectedon th retina, is not squar at aIl, but isa kind of rhomboid, with two acute ard two obtuse dgles . . . Now, how dos t com .bout that

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30 LENNART JO3ERCwe cm perceiv a rhomboid 6 a square, which we mquestiombly do in this case?'(Angell,

A largee{perinenl,l programseems ot to havebeen nitiatedbefore atherlale,hoNever.SeeKatz (r9rr). Latz did not belong o the core Gestalt psychologists, ut it goeswithoutsaying that thc lattef were also intcnsely intercsted in the constmcy phcnomena (see Kofika,1935, hap.6) .

The tust steps toward a functionalist psyc[ology of pe.ception were, hovever, taken byHeider (19"6, r93o).1Heider stressed hat r study of perceptionmust take nto account herole of perception in adaptation. This role is to establish a contact between the organismand its solid environment; to enable,as it {ere, the organism o see'through' he snsorystimulation to the constant trvironment. The nvironment car be a world of objects or aworld of munings, as it is when we see through' the ltters to the underlying mcaning.These objects and meaninesconstitute causalcenters n our environment. They are theultimate sources of the sensory stimuli that reach us. Adaptation can never be succesfulwithout a prior contact {ith thse crusal centrc.

However, secory stimulation is ambiguous. t gives only incomplcte nformatioD aboutits soure. The sam stimulatioD can be caused by several objects. Hence, the task of theperceptual system is to integrate many cues, each of which is itself, to a certain extent, un-reliable. The perceptual slstem is usually quite succesful in accomplishing this task.

The following quotation from Heider illustrates his thinking.r'Dds wadtli.he und ltual;ante ih I'Vdlrnehnnesc$.tuhd lieEt it.ler Beziehne del be;.lcnSchihten D und D', dr Ors.nismus lebt hit ud in dem Dhsen, dem lebensrelev@tenGscheheD,ud das ehzli der Vrmitduns ist witsehend varierbar, ersetzbar und ohneabsoluteZuordnuns dazwischen esetzt . .' (Heider,r93o,p.385, author's talics)

Egon Brunswik, partly under the i!fluence of Heider, started an extensive esearch ro-gram on the perceptualconstanciesoward the eild ofthe rgzo's. He summlized his resulsand presenteda functionalist program in the book 'Wahrnehnung und Gegenstaqdswelt'(1934)with the subtitle'Grundlegung einerPsychologie on Gegenstand er'.

This important work has not yet been translated into English, excpt for a few samplepassagesvailablen a volume editd by Hammond (1966).A nore readily available scrip-tion of the functionalistic program was later written in the form of ajournal article (Bruns-wik, 1937).Tolman's reviewof the bookis also ucid and well worth reading Tolnan, 1934).Some of the main them$ of th book may be illustrated by the folloving sumary ofBrunswik's work on the so-c 1led const@ct rahio. F\$t, the task of perception is defi.ed interms of some applopriatephysicalmeasufe.For example,suppose hat we study the per-cived height of objects.A corrct perception should, in some serse,be in tune with themeasuredheight. In practice,perception s studiedbymeans of verbal udgmentsor match-ings. Srunswik suggested simple index of how well the responss orlespond with the

r Heider's mos! import.nt lapers are availablc n an Enslish translation Heider, r9s9).' D denotes lhysic.l object rnd D' the corspondins subjcctivccxpricnce,



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THn NlW IUNCTIONAI-ISM 3rIn this equation,c is the constancy atio, / the resPonsea verbaljudgment or a mtching, inany c6 expressedon a physical scale), B the co[ect value and P the value that would havebeen the subject's responsef only the 'directly relevanCproxinal stimulus had been at-tended o (total lack of constancy).

The foltowing exanple mry further clarify the meaning of the constancy ratio Consider'again,our experimenton the perceptionof height.A certain standardstimulus s presentedat a certain distance from the subject. His task is to match the sizeof the stadard bv varyingthe size of variable stimulns at a difretdt d;stance. Here B : the height of the standard stimulus, /:the actual matching produced by the subjcct and P:the matching that wouldhave beenproduced f the subject had totaily disregafded he distances o the stimuli andmatched he visual angles fthe standardand the variablestimuli.

When th matching s eaactlycorrect (B-l) we have .: I when the matching followsthe proximal stimulus we have F:r and e:o. The constancy atio has certaindravbacks,butwe shattby-pass hem in the presentcontext seeBrunswik, r94o). Instead'w not thatthe usc of the constancy atio led to some ntelesting emPirical esults.Firstly, the ratio wtsusually ess han r, indicating a lack of plfect coctancy Secondly, he iatio was di$erentfor difierentperceptual ontinua.Sizeconstancywas leariybetterthan brightnessand shapeconstancy.Thirdly, there was an effectof set on the constancy atio. The nornal value inthc caseof size wasabout o.8o. When the subjectwas nstructed o disregarddistanceandjudge the visual angle(projectedsize n a froatal plane) he ratio dropped, as expected, oabout o.3o. Further re;nforcemnt owards either of th two extremeswas produced byinstructions o utilize knowledgeabout the geometryofperspective,etc. It was hen possibleto increashe ratio to o.9o and to decrede it to o.r5.

This summaryofthe research n the constancy tio toucheson cenain recurent themesjr BruDswik'shinkiDg that w shdl meet againand again n his ater works.Thev are:(r) It is assund that perceptionutilizes cltain cues n thc proximal stimulatiofl. How-

ever, only ore such cue is not sufncient to account or the pefceptual constancv. n ourexample he sizeofthe retinal mage s a cue o the sizeofthe objct But, surelv'Perceptionmust alsoutilize other cues; or example,cues hat carry information about the distanceofrheobje(r .Brun'$ik sr ,ess.d.u"( [ke Heiderhrd doae. hai even erygood ues aro onLvprobabilistic nformation about the distal objects.Because f this perceptionmav be con-sidereda seliesofhypothsesabour he distal world.

(2) Perception s habitually directed towards crtain distal proPetties. n our example tmay be argued that perception is mainly directd towards the physical size of objects Theempirical evidence for this asseftion is the finding that it is usually more difficult to changethe constancy atio towaids o than towards r by meansof changesn set.

(3) Behador is defined as achievement.This means har we observebehaviorbv meansof classifyi.g behavior irstances rc 'right' or rwrong'. Such formal classification rules iverealso common itr th cotrtemporary testing movenent and itr animal studies of leahing.

In closing tbis introduction, we may ask in what way Brunswik's position difiered fromthrt of th Chicngo functionalists. There sems to be many similarities betwecn Brunswikand the latter. However, there were also certain imPortant difierences ln the first place,Brunswikpostulated hat perceptionmust be foundedon insufficientevidence nd attemptedto analyze n a detailed manner the implications of this uncertainty. Scondlv,Blunswik

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32 LENNARISJ6BERCaimed at an objective psychology. Thirdly, Brun$,ik started the iNestigation of the im_portance of the ecology for adaptation and he discussed the consequenca of such an ecolo_gical orientation for experimental deign.Brunswik was, of course, under the influence of other trends in the psychology of histime (say, 1925-1935).we have already mentioned Heider,s importance.The goal of anobjective psychology had, of course, been ser by behaviorism. Brunswik,s most orieinalcontriburions mry be found in his discussions f rhe mporranceof rhe ecology.But all this will be treated n som dtail larer in this paper.We now turn to some bio-gfaphicaland bibliogriphical notes.

LIFE AND WORKS OF EGON BRUNSWIKWoths

Brunswik's producrion was not very extensive and the literature about his ideas is ratherlimited. An incomlete isting of his writings may be found in Hammond,s volume (1966).Brunswih's most important publications,exceptrhc book ,Wahnehmung und cegen_standswclt',are the monographs Disral focussingof perception:size-constancyn a repre_sentative ampleof situations' rgaa), ,The conceptual rameworkof psycholosy, 1952)and'Perceptionand the representative esignof psychological perimcnts' G947; 1956).Twojournal articlesare particularly jmportant (Tolman & Brunswik, 1935;Brunswik, 1955).Btunswik teDded to be somewhat repetitive ir his wrirings. A study of two of the mono-sraphs(r9S2; 1956)givesa very sood comprehesive view of his Nhole production.The most important cont.ibutions to the discussion fBrunswik's ideasmay be found inthe publishedpape$ presented t a 'Symposiumon the probabiliry approach n psychology,(Psr.hologial Redru, 1955,62, No.3), and in papersby Tolman (1956) and postman &Tolman G9S9).Heider gavsome nrerestingcomments 1939),as well as Hull G943). rnHamnond s volune 'The psychology of Egon Brunswih, the present author found the papersb y H a m m o D d h i m , d f r n d b \ L e e p p r r o b e p a t r i . u l c r t y h e l p f u l . H o u e v e r , L h * " i - " o a . . l rthat the best reviewofBlunswik's work is the oDegiven by postmar & Tolnan.L;fe

Brunsiltk was horn in r9o3 in Budapest.He studied in Vienna, where he receivedhisdoctor'sdgree n 1927and became.n a3sisranr lofessor n 1934. n 1933Tolman visitedVienna and he and Srxnswik becameacquainted.Tolman and Brunsx,ik found ouicHv aremark.ble onvcrgencef rhi r inesof 'eedr .h. one n percepdon BrunsqiL)and rheoth"r in leuning (Tolman). The -e.utr was rhe fcmou, joinr paper (Totman & Brunswik,1935) and mutual, stlongly positive reviews. Thus Brunswik reviewed Tolman,s ,purposivebehavior in animals and men' fot the ze;tschift fib p'J.rorop, (1935) and Totrnan reviewedBnnswik's 'Wahrnebmung und cegenstandswelt' tor rl]tep1.hotagical Buttet;n (r%9.A few years later Bnnswik joind the Brteley departmnt of psychology, where he re-mained until his death in 1955. Ir appears that Snnswik,s emigrarion to the USA iDvotvda chans in his stle of research. In Vienna he had been invotved in an extensive enpiricalp.ogram with many co-worters and students. In Berkeley, holvever, he @ncentlated hisinterest on theoretical analysis and rhe history of psychology.sc6A. J.Plrtbal.,Yol. t2, te7,



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MOLAR BEHAVIORISMWe haveseen he beginni.gs of a functionalisticpiogram in the study ofconstancypheno-

me.a around r93o. The meetirg of Tolnan .nd Brunswik connected his program to thecontemporarybehavioristic tudy of learning.A cenfual uestion n the study oflearning was how to definebehrvior.Watson'sown position rvc vulnerable.He treated he question,e.9., n the book 'Psychologyfrom the stand-poiot of a behaviorist'(r9r9, pp. ro-r2). Watsor seems o havebelieved hat it waspossibleto dcfine beharior fo! psychology n a manner quite similar to that of physioiogy 'nuscletwitches'). The orly difierefte world be that behavior, as studied in psychology, s morecomplex and extended n time.

It wassoon ound in the empilical study oflearning that this view neglected distinctionbetweenpsychologyand physiologywhich was of paramount mportance. t appeared hatthe animal did not learn an invariant, albeit complexand extendcd, esponse hainin, e.g.,a maze. nstead, the animal behaved, rom a peripheral poirt of view, quite dilTerntly tditrerent trials. A famous jllustration of this fact was made by Macfanane (r93o). In hisstudy rats first learneda maze n the usual manner. The maze$'as hcn filled with later.The result was, dut the rats were successfuln the waterfilledversionof the maze, n spiteof the requirment of quite dilTerentphysicalmovements.

It was natuial to corclude from such studies hat the animalschanged n sone centnlaspects n the course of the experiment. Learning did not appear o be strengtheningofassociaiioDs et{een physical stimuli and proximal responses 'nuscle twitches'). Theanimals earned,apparently, o reacha distal goal accordingto several iferent and mutually

Thcse problems rvere acknowledgedby all the leading learning theorists around r93o:Lashley (r9"9), Hunter (r93r) and Tolman (r93r), to nme only the possiblymost inflnen-tial names.Some authors had recommended he study of distal acbivment ven earlier,e.g. E. B. Holt (!9r5), who alsovoiced argumntsconsonant ith Heider's and Brunswik's'psychologyfrom thestandpoint ofthe object'. Weiss r9?S) omulated the fanous raindropanalogy,which goesas ollows. Th raindrops all in many difierentplaces ndmove n rnanyditrerent directionswith varying velocities.But I thesevery difierent novemenis haveonething in comon: they all lead o the sea. nth samemanner here s a confusingvariabilityof behavior,uhich can be clarifredonly by an understanding f the fact that behavior onver-ges to certain go.ls. When these goals are understood we can also explain behavior and irsvariability is no longer seemingly haotic.

After r93o the most inportant theoreticaldevelopments re due to Tolman (r93r). Hesuggested hat certain conceptsshould be placedbetween he stimulus and the responseterms of the theoreticalsystm.Tolman often gave hseconceptsa mentalistic nane (e.g.expectancy) d he argued or the heuristicvalue of common sensand phenomenologicalanalysis.However, he conceptshaveno cldm to an existence ftheirown outsidethetheore-tical system; he system s connectedwith empiiical facts only in the stimuli and the re-sponses. olman called his type ofconcept an inteivening variable.Heiefollows an e{ampleoftbe use ofthe inteflening variable purpose'.

s..nd.l. Pltrbol., VoL t2, !97rCopyright 1971 Lennart Sjberg


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34 LENNART SJOBERGInlercue aboutrtltlo'e ba'ed on a beha"r, nudr

Suppose hat a rat is moving on an obstacle reeplane.At a certainmoment we canobservethe direction n which the lat i moving. The problem is to infer the purposeof its motions,if any.

This problen h approached y placing he animal n new positionsand observing ts newmovement directions. Four cales are possible.trtrllL ' l : - ' l at )N- " I t - . - - lI r l l \ lFrc. i. Conkrscnt beh5vio..Flc, 2, Dive.sent behavior.Frc. 3. A distant goal.

Frc. 4. No sic! of gool-dircted ehavior,Frc. 5. Imprcwd infolmtion by mole than two observations.

(r ) The two directions ntersect n a certainpoint P (converging ehavior).Conclusion: heaninai intends o reachP. SeeFig. r.(2) The two movement directions diverge from a point P. Conclusionrthe at avoidsP.SeeFig. z.

(3) The two directionsare parallel.Conclusion; he animal moves oward o! from a distant(4) Behavior s not consonantwith cas I-3. Conclusion: he raCsbehavior s Dot purpo-

siveor the purposewasdifierent at the two occasions. eeFig 4Th conclusioDs can be reinforced by naking several obseflations in idditiotr to only

two. A caseofconvergentbhavior s illustiated n Fig. 5.A similar ki.d of reasoning an be applied o behaviorwhich cannotbe described xhaus-tively in spatial erms. The method s, generally, o study behavior n severalditrerentsitua-tions, e.g.by introducing obstlcles n the sittration. n eachsituation we canusually not dif-ferentiateamong severalPossiblententions,but whn the number of situations s increasedve deffeae the core of possiblealternativehypothesG. Wc may, of course, ind that ',hypothesis an explain all behaviorsamplsand that would correspond o case4 abov Inpractice we probably conclude hat the intntion is the one consistentwith most behaviorsampls and that is clearly a better explanation th.D th next best hypothsis.

Some dramatic advances n the history of psychology have been concemed with the estab-Iishmentof intentions hat lay 'deep' and connectbehaviorsarnples hat are *emingly un-related (psychoanalysis).EMonnal aspe.tsofintdreri S oat;dbtes

An interestingaspectof the power of good inteffening concpts s the economicalone(Miller, 1959).The interveningvariablegivesa concisesunmary of the relatiom mons aScd"d.. Ptl.hol., Vol. ! 2, 47,



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THt NEw F.NCTIONALTSM 35number of stimulus and responsevariabtes.The folowing .dictionaryeaample,givesanillustratioD of this function of the intersening variable.Suppose hat we have5o extinct languages nd 5o livin8 tanguages.We wlllt to translatefrom each extinct langlage to ach living language and {or this purpose v need a number ofdictionaries.At airst glanceitseems hat z,5oodictionaies arenecessary. norherapproach

TT

is to write, firstly, dicrionaries for traGlarion from each extinct languag to an intemediarylanguage (e.g. English) and, scondty, fd translation from the intermediary language toeach iving iangtage.This strategy equiresonty roo di.tionnies: a reduction o onty j.7" orthe original amountof worL. The two app.oaches re llustEted jn Fie. 6.The intermed,ary languagecorresponds o an inrervening uriabte in a ps)chotogicattheory. The information from the stimulu variables (the exrind languages) is concentntedin a point (the intmediary language)and then it bems out to the tivi,g tanguagestheresponse variables). In this way it is possible to simptii, and sunmarize the descriprion ofthe stimulus response elations.Sunnary of nolal behaaibism

Tolman's molar behaviorism is impoitant for the purposes of the prsent paper for three( r) The attempt at a periphenl or proximal definition of behavior was abandoned. Instead,class of behavior nsranceswer u.ed, vhose elenenrscouLi be ent;retydissimitar ron a

physiological point of view. The ctasseswere based on achievemenc reachingthegoal boxinthe maze,prGsing rhe ever n a Stinner-box, etc.(2) Theofies wre insened betweetr stimuti and !sponses. phenomnolosical anatvsisand common-sense orionswere ofren uritized n the initial phae of rhe creari* .r,r,. ,i..ories. Later, metrtalistic trminotogy ws often kept.(3) If successful, the intrvening variables a[owed a tremendous simplification of thdescription of stimulus-response retations.Final cotundt on nolt beha.;tin

Tolrnan's intervening variables connected stimulu and responsebut they gave no advice.s to on what basis one should erct the srimulus and responsevariables thmselves. Whatrulesof clasification should be used?

Fr.. o. Thc econo crl fulRjon or,n inteftnin! var!able: the didionary xamDle

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36 LENNART JoBERcThis question has rarely been discussed see, however, Skinner' 1935). Hull tried to

approach he issueswith his conceptof a'hierachical habtt family' (1934).Hull proposed,that a closestudy would revealcrtaiflproximl similaritiesamoDgall responses elongingto a crtain category 'fractionrl antecipatorygoal respoftes'). Howevr, th existeDce fthseeventscouldneverbeactuallydemonstratedn a convincingmarner. Hull alsodeseltedthe idea rather soon(ct Heider, 1939).Neither did Tolm.n makc much Progrsswith theproblen. His last important theoretical paper (t959) gives nothing new on this issue ascompared o his 1932book.

The problen requires the formation of disjunctive concepts.Expedmental studies ofconcept foimation have demonstrated hat such conceptsare Particulally hard to form(Bruner, Goodnow & Austin, 1956). Comider the tsk of predicting responses, iven rcc*ain stimulus.The fotm of this prediction s a disjunctiverule: given S, we predict theoccurrence f RD or R,, or &, ctc. We simply have no orderly phenomcnauntilrules havebeen ound for forming thesedisjunctive esPonse oDcePts

Thus, each behavioralvariable may be regaidedas a classification f behavior nstancesThe systen of disjunctiverulesmust be applied at this basic evel.The problemshould notbe confusedwith the discussionof tdt ahtJ (e.g. Nliller, 1959),which conccrnsclasses f.a/ublrs rather than behavior nstances. uch classes f variablesare often discussedn traitpslchology, where it is attemptd o collect severalvatiables hat measure he same atenttrait (e.s. Lazarefeld,1959).The cla$ification of indicantshas beenmuch more frequentlydiscussedhan the .lassificationof behavior stances.

In conclusion: hc first and fo.emostquestion or all psychologicalesearchconcerns hedefinition of behaviorvariables.However, molar behaviorismquickly accepted he notionthat behaviorshould be definedand studied as achievement. ndthisnotionwasfounded onthe insight that the achievement ariable wasgenerated y i disjunctive ul: the vicarious-

Achicvementand vicariousness-the door htd been eft wide open to functionalism.

PROBABILISTIC FUNCTIONALISMA.quintion ol hntuhdsc and WPosirP bPhaior

We have followed the development of corst.ncy research and molar behaviorism until1935.At this time Totman & BrunswiL, (1935)perceived he greatsimil ities between he

Constancy research developed a systematic view of the .cquisition of knowledge.r Wemay conceiveof the acquisition of knowledgeas a seriesof events lirst, we consider heenvironmental conditions that are of importance to the organism-th distal stimutus(S,). However, heseare rot directly accessiblo the organism.He is in co.tact only withcertaincuesor proximl stinuli (Sp). It is, then, up to the organism o integrate hesecuesto an nference oncerning he distal conditions.This integration s, in the case fperception,rathr automatic and unconscious.

Molar behaviorismdevlopeda sinilar point of view as to purPositbehaviorand needI BruffriL himself was mostly interesied n perception,but his onalysis m be applied o all kindsof acquisitionof lnoNledse.

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THE NIW NTNCTIONALISMsatisfaction.We starr out with a certain need, ormulated as a dsired relationbetwen horganism and the environment. This dsird ielation can be obtained in several ways, allof which are, however,usually uncertain.The final act of consurotion co.cludes he series

Fis. t l'is. 2Frc. 7. The lensmodelappliedo perception,Frc, 8, Thc lcre modl applied o purposivebehavior,

We may summarize the formal resemblanceof th two analysesas follows:Aequis;tion of kwwledge

(r) Certain nfornation desired(z) Cues are 'studied'0) rnference

A cenain relation to theenvironmentdesired

The two approachesmay alsobe illustrated of Brunswik's ns model (seeFigs. 7 and 8).The lens model has nspired a very effcient and subtleaoalysis f the acquisitionof Lnow-ledge (Hursch, Hammond & Hursch, 1964). f stimuli and responses an be givetr metricdescriptions, s s the case, .g., vith sizeperception, t is possibletousecorrelationstatisticsin order to desclibe and analyze he achievements f the organism.tThe most importmtterms of the lens model an^lysis ate the eeologi.alulTtlir, which rfer to the corrGpondencebtween s, and Sp, and th degrees f cue utilization,which refer to the correspondencebetween Sp and X, the response. Another important factot isthe;ntla-aologi.al.6telatiotlt,i.e. the intercorrelations fthe variouscues.

The applicltion of th lens model to purposivebehavior nvolves he assumption bat aneed generates eitain 'habits' with valying degrees f probability. These 'habits' in turnlead to the nnal goal with varying dgrees of probability. The nodel has only rarely beenapplied to purposive behavior, probably because t seems difficult to 6nd resonable empi-dcal interpretationsof its key concpts.Thus, the acquisition of knovledge and puryosive behavior became the two main themesr The csse of non-metric $imuli dd ftsponses must be appro.ch with prolabilit statisti, Se

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38 LINNARTsJOBnRcof functionalism. Brt at the sam time certrin important qucstions were relatively neglected.How is knowledgeused in purposivebehavio!?And how is the acquisitionof knowledgeguided by needs? he two themeswle clearlydelinated, ut their interaction vas nsuffi-ciently attended o. Parts ofthe areaof resench generared y rhe interaction questionshaslater been much studied n psychologyunder the heading decisionnaking'.

The definition of a goal as I certair relation between he organismand its cnvironmenrleads o difficulties.It is preferrable o defrnea goalas a cerraincondition of rhe ego (needsatisfaction). he following erampl mly illustrare his idea.Suppose hatweobserve a man,who is Iooking fo( an open grocerystore. His goal could be defined as harof finding such astorc, and it would then be phrased nterms ofa relationbetween he mln and his environ-ment. But, suddendy, the man resignsand entersa restauianr.He has made a shift to anntirely ditrerent purposiveresponse hain, bnt his need s of course he same.Thus, de-6ning a goal as need satisfiction gi1'esa clearer picture of behavior than defining it in ternsof organism-environmentelations.

This approach o the defrnitionof a find goal introducesa .ew form of vicariousness,which Brunswik did not clearly distinguish rom the vicariousnes of cues and methods.r Irefer to the vicariousness f consummatoryacts. This is a basic notion in psychoanallricthinking (Brunswik, 1952),but natunlly also a comnonsensenotior litde nore rmarkablethan the facr that the hung! drive is satisfied both by a Hamburger and a steal. lt is im-poltant that the vicariousness f consummatoryacts be distinguished rom that of 'habits'and cues.The rclevantknowledge n the caseofconsummatory acts efers o the anticipatedefiect of dre act on the organism itself ("F. on the state af need).The kno\\ledee concerning'habits' is directed exactly n the opposite diiection: what is dre ctrect of behavioron the

We may also frame these considerations in terms of ditrerent kinds of hienrchical struc-tures.Firstly, we must @Bider the convergencefbehavior on certain elationsbetween heorgmism and the environment.Secondly,we must consider he fact that there is a kind ofvicariousness ithin certain classes f suchrlations.This is the questioD fthe srrucrureofthe consummatoryacts. n order to explain behaviorwe must take both structures nto ac-

Brunswik presented bistoricalanalysist952) in which he tried to show that psychologyconvergsowards hc functionalisticapproach.Here follom a brief summary of his histo-A very important theme in the analysis consists of a splitting up of psychological problens

into several egions-With a basis tr the central organismicregion (O) we may llustrateBrunswik'sconceptsas ollows:Distant and "deep" causes Objccr Stimulation O Muscle movement Effects Distal effecrs

c b a O A B CEarly psychophysics (and contempo(ary psychophysics, too, for that mrtter) was directedtowards elationsbetwen& and O. Structuralism uder influenceofthe atomisticphysio---;;;; B.""",,ik'" disasion or prycho.nalysis !es2).

se"d. L Ptrcbol,Yal.12, etrCopyright 1971 Lennart Sjberg


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,THENEWTUNCTIONALISM 39logy ofthe senses fthe rgth century-directed its attention o 4-O, searchiDgor sensationelements n experience i.e. n O). The relation O has 1atrbeenattended o in studiesofsocialperception, beins mental events n another ndividual (Heider, 1958).The psycho-physicistsand structuralistswere succeeded y the Gestalt psychologists,who interestedthcmselves n other a- and O-properties (6eld propelties), but still mostly studied d Orelat;ons.Al l ofthe three early apprcacheso prceptionNeie dependent n a rather nformaluse of languagen order to study O processes. rDnswikconsideredheir interest n centralevents unfortunate and thcir methodology naive. He naturally also @ndemned their interestin a events: he distal events , and .) are decisive n the acquisirionof knowledge, yhileproximal eventsare chaotic'.Finally, .ll three schoolsneglected o study achicvement.

Contemporarywith the European revolution against structnralism the USA producedanother revolution .gainst the same argets, but with a very difierent result behaviorism(Watson,r9r3). Classical ehaviorism as at least n priDcipledirected owrrds the study ofr ,4 relations.Watson made shucturalism objective.The sensationslverereplacedas ele-mentsby conditionedrenexes,association y conditioning. Conscquently,behaviorismhasbeen criticized much in the samemanner 6 structuralism.lClassical ehaviorismwasant;theoreticaland neglected he importanceof motivation.'

The later devlopmertof behaviorism,nolably due to Hull, naturally involved an intenseinterest in both psychologiei theory and motivational phenomena Hull, 1943). But, ac-cording to Brun${ik, Hull rvasstil tid, rt least n principle, to a-l relitions, althoughhisresearch f course nvolved also he study ofB-variables.

We should finally note in vhat ways Brunswik disagleedwith Tolnan's molar behalio-rism. Brunswik was not enthusiastic bout nterest n the studv of O events.nor in theoriesabout such events.True, he did flot consid!such a ccntrally focussedpsychologyas naiveor unpermissible,but he held that one should give p.iority to a functionalistic analysisoforganismicachievements,.e. ,-B relations,or, in the future, . 3 oi r ., B relntions.

Brunswik's functionalism was piobabilistic from two difierent points of vierv. F;st, heconsideredhe task ofthe organism o be adaptation o an environment hat $as only larelyperfecily predictable /o/ tle o/gu su. (This has nothing to do with the question of whethersciencewill ever achieveperfect predictions.)Bruswik's probabilism in this senseseemscorrect and almostunavoidable.However, he took a fulther siep and argued hat becausethe organism ives n a piobabilistic world, a theoiy about the organismmust alsobe proba-bilistic. This is Brunswik's'nethodological postulateof behavior-research somorphism'.

The rquirement of in principle deteministic fheories s no longr taken seriouslybynany psychologists.Howeler, it has been defended airly recently (Hull, 1943). n olderworks one may even 6nd the notion that non-deterministic heories are 'unscient'fic'(e.g.Borine, r92r).

1 SeeHumphrcy 09sr, chap. r). Se lso Dewey G896) vho dticip,ted both Gstdt psycbolosyard ttl *eak points of beiaviorism almost 20 yeas bcfore the rwo.chools developed.Humphry'sexposirion s, however,more cohpl.te md clen..1 Both theseproperties sm slilL o charaderizepaft of the *udy of irtelligencevnhin dife.erti.llsychology. It 's interestins o note rhat tcst psycholosywas founded n ils modem fom in rhe USAdurins th hay d,ys ofclasical behaviorism,wiz. he decde 1915-192s.5.6d. I, Pirchol.,, VaL 12, rsTt



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40 IINNART SJOBERCMost contemporary psychologistswould, then, probably a$ee with Brunswik in hisplea or a probabilistic heor/. However, t is still of interst o analyzehis point of view, forit seems hat Brunswik's own line of reasoDingwas not tenable.There is another recon,more acceptablen the view of the presentauthor,why behaviord6!ed asachievements inpinciple not perfectly predictable rom a psychological heory, except n certain conftived

laboratorysituations.Brunswil's postulate s not at dl convincingas t stands.Behavio!need not be unpredic-table just because he organismcannotprcdict vents n its environment.On the contrary,uDcltaintymay well lead o stcrotype,and easilypredictable,behavior.But consider he fact that behaviorisdefindasachievenent, .e. $ a result n the environ-ment. A man is trying to build a house. fhe succeeds,'iveote a cae of 'correcr'behavior,

and if he fails we note a case of incorrect' behavior. But suppose that just before the mandrives n the last nail the house s struck by thunder and @mpletely destroyed.Clearly thisis then a caseof incorrect' bch.vior.

In order to predict the behavioialvariablehouse

building' we need (at least)a theoryabout the man and one about thunderstorms. f we only have a psychologicalheory wecannot hope to make perfect predictionsof his achievements. hus, functionalismmust beprobabilistic,siriply bcause ehavior has been defined so as to be dependentboth on theorganismand on certainevents n the environment.And if the psycholosicalheory concernsonly the organism t doesnot dealwith the other causalagent.The exampleshows hat ana.alysis of the ecology s neccssaryf behavior s to be predictedas otrg a we stick to rhefunctionalisticdefnition of behavior.

A tiaditional way out of the dilemna is, of cours, o construct an ecolosj (a laboratory)sher ive can guarantee univocalrelationbetweenbehaviorand its etrects n the environ-ment. Behaviorcould still be definedas achievement, ut as ong as we wo.k in this univocalenviroDmentwe would need o take only one causalagent .to account: he organism.Thisshowsat least hat psychology s possiblewithout rn analysis f the naturalecology nd hat aprobabilistic psychology n any casedoesnot necessarilyollow frcm the dfirition of beha-

IMPORTANCE OF THE ECOLOGY: SYSTEMATICVS REPRESENTATIVE DESIGN

As noted above, t may Nell be thtt Brunswik's plea for represntadve esign was thcmost original part of his functionalism. Brunswik arguedagainst he raditional deolosyofthe laboratory n severalways,always reaching he conclusion hat the organism must bestudied n its natuial environment.The efects of independent ariableson behaviorcouldthen be studiedwith suitablestatisticalmethods,such as partial corehtions.Bnrnswik'sstarting point was th notion that the task ofpsychology is to prdict and ex-plain the achievements f the organism.Since he achievemcnts cpend parrly on the envi-.onment, Ne must askourselves: chievencnt n what environment? t is certainly rempting

to refer to the normal or natural env;o.ment. In rhis mannerwe re{ch in a naruralsay rherequirement of a repiesentative ampling of situations,as contrasted o the manipulated,conhived environmentof the laboratory.Scd,l.J.Plr.baL,Vol. , re7r



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THE NEW FUNCTIONAI,TSMBrunswik'spositionnas entirely empirical. He did not discuss he possibilityof making

predictions rom relevalt theory concerning he organismand the environment seeBjdrk-man, 1969r). Instad, Blunswik attacked he systematic xperimentjust becauser involvesmanipulating the environment.

The present author does not agree with Brunswik's requirement of .eprsentative design,but his discussion is still enlightening from cert.in points of view. First, it becomesclear thata detailed study of the ecology cannot be avoided if we want to predict behavior defined asachievernnt. A ralization of the importance of ecology hs come very late and slow inpsychology. Brunswik should probably be attributed with much of the hotror for the awaken-ing that $'e now witness.Second, t may be argued hat analysis fthe ecologyshould havegreat heuristic value. What are the problems facing the organisn? If we knew th answersto that questionwe should be in a favorablepositionto study the structur and function of

We now turn 6rst to a discussion of tr{o of th most important arglments for representa-tive dcsignput fomard by BrunswiL.

The present section is concluded with sorne remarks corce ing efiects of experimentalmanipulationand the statusofthe dependent diables in Brunswik'ssystem.

Suppose hat we work with persons as stimuli, e.g. in the fom of photographs.Weinstruct our subjects o rate h intelligenc f the persons.Then we study how these atingscorrelrtc with stimulus variables.Clearly, ve must suspect hat the rBufts dependpartlyon rhe particdar sampleof pe$ons that we use.Thereforewe should havesampled ur per-sons andonly fiom somespecifed population of interest.

Hre, the requirementsecns rasonableand rather easy o live up to), but the exampledoesnot allow codclusions bout system,tic elperiments n genEl.

When scrutinized,we find the argument o be a somewhatnew form of the ancient dcaofuniqueness we never enter the same iver twice). The idea hat every situation s uniquecatr, of cours, b voiced against ur)r' enpirical research (and it keeps on being redjscovered byeverynew generation f personological sychologists).We must alwaysnake the assumptionthat ertainpropertiesof an experimentaldesignwere ofno importance or the results.Andsuch assumptionsmust alsobe madewhenstimuli havebeen andomlysampled rom aspeci-fied popul,tion ofstimuli. This is so because he population tsclf hasmany unique ploper-

In summary, t is clear hat the uniqucnessargument cm be voiced againstall empiricalresearch. It cannot be used, as Brunswik did, to .rgxe against ststematic in favor ofrpresen-

In the 3o's Brunswik conducteda study of the perceptionof artificial faccs.He used afactorial design and worked with such independentvariablesas nose ength and distancebetwen eyes. However, cerlain combinations of values of the independent variables gaverise to ridiculousstimuli that had to be deleted rom th study.According o Biunswik, suchstrangestimuli could have been avoidd f a representative ampleof faceshad ben used.



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42 LENNART SJOAERCThis seens, however,not at all to be assured. s it Dot h case hat celtain real facesareridiculous or terlifying?The real importance of the example is quite difierent from what B!uns{;k auempted toshow, viz. that m experiment alwa)s involves giving the subject a certain structured task.The task mplies, among othe! things, certain xpectationsegarding he stimuli. And this

n rruc both of sysremaric rd repreg(ntatiteerperimenrs.Thus, the subjecthasan expectatior egardingwhat type of stimuli is go;ng o be exposed.And he is set to behave n a cenain vay towards thesestimuli. If we suddenly elpose adilTerentand maybe enotionally piovocativestimulus there is reason o expecta breakdownofthe subject's et and a resultantconfused, ncomparabte esponse.Inall controlledpsycho-logical rcsearch here must be a congruence etwenexpected nd exposed tirnuli (ifwe arenot actuallystudyin8 the efiect of incon$uence). This has nothing to do with the stimulibeing replesentative r not. Representative timuli may well be incongruent.

The efre.t oJ nan;pulat;rnSystematicdesign makes t possible o predict the eliect of manipulation on behavior.This cannot be done as efficiently f we hav only studied the effecto{ naturally occurringvariation of the independentvaiiables.We have here an aspectof systematic esignwhichwasneglected y Brunswik.

Inpssing, we note hat it may be relevant o extend he requirementof representativenessto include also representativemanipulations.Such a clain seems o be in placeat least ncertain appLiedwork. Fo! example,suppose hat we want to investigatehc eficct ofa certainkind of psychotherapy.We co.side( a largescaleapplicltioD of the technique fif is success-ful. In this c$e it seems uitable oworkwith iepreseltativesamples fboth rherapists ndpatieDtsn order to make possibleawell founded conclusion egarding he value ofthe treat-

The neglectof manipulation in Brunswik's system has vry seriousconsequences.Wemay ask What type of functionalisticresearch ccording o BruDs\rik'spresdiptiors couldguideus in maling pfedictionsregarding he efiectsofshifting from one ecology o another?To make such predictionswe must haveknowledgeconcerning he oiganism as a separateentity, ditrerent rom thc particularecology r which it is studied. t is thc viewofthe presentauthor that the necessity fsuch knowledge s a decisive rgument n favor of a treatmentofthe orgmism and the ecologyas separatd rom eachothcr.The de,e dert aad indeten ldt ,a/;abl6

Brunswik required only the values of the ikdepekdekt variables to be rpresentativelysampled.His treatment he depehde4tariablesw6 quite conventional:he used only oneora few variables picked on a p-bt grounds. Once or twjce he serns o have played with thethought ofsampling depeDdcnt ariables, ut he did not follow this line of thousht very far.Had he done so, he result might have benquite interesting,sincea samplingof dependentvar;ableswas discussedn contemporary est theory (e.g. Tryon, r957).

Blunswik claimed, that it was possible o study maDy more independentvariables n areprsentative esjsn han in a systematicone. This is not necesslrilycorrect. An analysisof the etrectsof many independentvariables equires a lalge nunber of observations, venScdnd.. Prt.bal.,VoLe, r97r



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TIIE Nnlv TUNCTToNALISM 43if it is, of ourse, rot necessary o 6tudy all possible combinations, as in ' complete factorialdesign. In the caseof systematic esearch t is alsopossible o avoid studyiry all conbina-tions.) It is not at all self evident hat it is easiered cheaPr o male all theseobservationsin the caseof represefltative esign. n addition to this i. doesnot seem hat the quesrionofavailability s what keps esruch workers fron including nany indepndentvariables ntheir studies.The main re6on appearso be the difficulty of interpreting the rcsultsusuallyencountered in studis using many independent variables. Such diffrculties are, of coursq tobe expectedboth in representative nd systematicdesigns.They can even be larger n thelepresentativecase,because f the difnculties connectedvith the P.oblem of causality nnon-experimentaldesigns.

A final comment: Brunswik's terminology sometimes conveys th imPression that to himthe variableshad, as t were,a life oftheir owr Thus, he criticized he earlyPsychophysicistsand claimed that their single ndependentvariables n reality sere variablepsckages. ut,of course,a1lsiturtions are variablepackages. he variablesmerely constituteconcepts hatwe use to describe he stimutus s;tuations.A simple univariatevaiiation in onc conceptualsystemmay be replesentedas a complex compositeof variabls n a ditrerentsystem Butthis doesnot mean that thc secondsystemnecssarily is in any sese better or indicativeofa mor profound iDsight han the first. It merely reflectsour choice o describe eality in a

what variables r,r/d be used? n other words, what is a relevantdescriptionof the eco-logy? The question is of fundamental mportance to any functionalistic psychology Weshallhave opportunity to touch it aSain ater in this paper. Brunswik'sneglectof this ques-tion is perhaps he ultimat teason or his tendency o write a if he regarded he systemofvariable as self evident.

APPLICATIONSwe havenow discussedhe basic hemesof Brunswik'sprobabilistic unctiomlism The

paper will be concluded with a few additio.rl critical comments. But before that we turn toa brief revielvof someofthe enpirical research hat hasbeeninsPiredby pfobabilistic func-

Rcsearchon p,cePtiotAl i ust/atioe tudr aJ s;2, .mta,c,. Brunswik invcstigated he importancc of distal andproxinal cues n size perception n a famousstudy (Brmswik, r9+4). The subjectmade sizejudgnents of objects n a natural environment.The distancebetween he subjectand thestimuli varied. For cachobject ts real sizewrs measured nd rhe sizeof its retinalprcjection

Thejudgmnts weremade undr a naiveand an analyticalattitude. In the latter case hsubject was instructed to stimate the retinal size The number of objects was 93.

The correlation betweareal and tetinal size, conputcd over the 93 objects,was o93.Thc correlationbetweennaive sizejudgmentsand the real sizew6 o 99. Hence' the subjectmust have madeuse of other cues n addition to retinal size.The correlationbetween udg-mentsand retinalsizewas o.73.When the subjctadoptedan analyticalattitud his corela-

Sc."d.J.P$.hal.,Val. 12, reTr



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44 LENNARTl6BrRction increased o o.85. This illustratesa rather ypical etrectofset. While an analyticalser sto a certainextent efiecient t is still lessso than the naive, ealisticattitude.Another interestingresult was the finding that retinal size seemed o bc a rather unim_portant cue. The partial correlationbetweenudgments and real size with rtinal size heldconstantwas as high .s o-98!This showsclearly he imporranceof cues other thaD .etinat

Othet?erceptualcsearch. runswikhas publishedgoodreviewsof the perceptuat esearchcaried out urder his direction (1934,1956).The excellent eviw paperby postman&Tol_maD (r959) may alsobe consulted.The theme of Brunswik'sperceptual esearchwas to investigate he degreeofadaptationpossibleand which cueswre used o re.ch it. Furthernoie, he 1{asalso nrerste.In theinportance of set as well as n the efects of learningand devetopment n pelceptuatadapta_Many sensorymodalitieswere studied, often in interactionaldesigns,such as studiesof

the size-weight llusionwherea kinesretic nd avGualcue nteract.In somestudiesBrunswikinvestigatdjudgments fthe aleaof stimuli madeup of coinsand stamps.He found that thejudgmentswere nfluencedby the monetaryvalue of the stimuli. Brunswik consideredhesestndies o be palticularly interestingbecausehey itlusrrate he importancot ^ t arurt cle(monetaryvalue)on pefceptualudgments.It is alsopoxibte to see hesestudiesas ustra_tions ofthe interactionbetweensensoryand grtioh cues;an instanceof interactionbetweenthinking and perception.The latter point of view '1ay be most congenial or those nterstedin so-cilled motivatdperception.This line of rsearchwas niriated under the influenceofBiunswik's studies Brune. & coodnm, r9,t7).However, Brunswik himself always tlessedadaptation, he tendency ro lespond at least appiox;mately correct. Othe! psychologists(e.g. Brune4 uere riostly inlerestd n these phenomenabecause hey revealeda rlative

Lcaming studiesconstitutedonly a very minor part o{ Blunswik's perceptual esearch.He argued,however, har the perceptualsystem n cerrainsituatio.s could be influcncedbylearning. Such ls.ning is often independentof inteltectual nsight. Iurthermole, it takesplace n a slow and unstableway (von Ficandt, 1936,1938).Brunswikwasalso nterestedn developmentat pects ofpcrceprion.He studied hedvel_opmcnt ofthe perceptual onstancies nd found that they improvedup to the ageof ro.The elTects f learning rnd developmenton perceptionhave,of course,auracted muchinterest since hc time of Brunswik's pioneeringetrolts (scepostman, 1965;Epstein, rq67;Gibson, r969).Brunswik madenuch use ofthe method of progressive u reducrion n order to elplorethe impo.tance of various cues. The starting point in .n applicationof the method is anatural situationwhere all cucsare allowed o influenceperception o rheir maximum capa-city. The cues are thcn eliminatedstepwiseand the efficiencyof the percptualsystem smeasured newat eachstep. In studiesof vision one may, e.g., go f.om binocular o mono_cula. vision and, thus, eliminate he cue ofretinal disparity.Another cuemay be eliminated

by fixating the subject'shad so as to eliminarea possibte ue resultingfrom the efiectsofheadmovementsotr the retinal mag. n this way one can, n principle,elimimte all postu-latedcues,after which there existonly a Dumberof uDtDow., subtie cues,whosecombinedScaA. l. P!r.bal., Vol. t2,1s7r



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lHE NEW FUNCTIONAL]SMefct we may fina1ly masure. An example of a reccnt study using Brunswik's method isgiren by Kiinnapas(r968).

Modelh o;t;.isn aJ Bru.s@,n's /er. Gibson (1959)and Hochbers (1966)pointed out thatthe retinal magemay yield more nJolmation than Brunswik seens o haveconsidefed Cr-tain higher-orde{ variables, uch ns density, make po$ible a univocal correspondence e-twn distal and proximal stimulus. This strong claim neednot be accePted ut, still, onemay clearly argue hat the'e is no'e information in the proximal stimulus than Brunswik

The criticism appean well founded mainly becauseBrunswik seems o have been littleinterested n a more profound analysisof sensoryprocesses. hat we should accePt 3proximal stimulus must, ultimately, depend on the sensorycapacityof the orglnism, theway it utilizes,as t ere, he physicalpattern ofstimulation.

Th point raisedby Gibson s oflitde use as ong as we h,ve not shown hat the informa-tion present rom a logicaland physicatanalysis fthe pattern ofstimulation can also r factbe utilized by the sensory-perceptualystem.Thc uncertainryof the proximal cues, hus,has ivo sources: lack of correlationb.wendistal and proximal stimuli and a lack of sen-

Cotrelation xs. rcgles;ar [om. The dualism of contemporary psychology between thestudy of achievcment nd the study of mental processes ecomcsparticularly clear fwe,fora moment, considerBrunswik as a psychophysicist.He was, of course,a psychophysicistnthe sense hat he studied the relation between responses nd distal stimuli. However, hewas not interestedn the/o/ro oftbis relation.He was concernedwith how well hcouldpte-dict the response, ivcn the stimulus. Dlta analysiswas carried out by mea.s of corielation

For the contemporary establishment'in the'new psychophysics'such as S. S. Stevensand G. Ekman) Brunswik's question must appear rivial. The 'new psychophysics's con-cernedwiththe form of the reglession unctionris it logarithmic(Fechner)or a simPlepowerfunction (Stevens) ! a power unction Nith a constantadded o the stimulusscale Ekman)?what appeared o Brunswik as he true core ofpsychologicalphenonena appears o be onlyilrelevant'scatter' to contemporarypsychophysicists-

The du.lisln appeared s early as in the work of Fullerton & Cattell (1892),vho denicdthat it was possible o measuresubjective ntensity. Instad, they proposed o study theachievements f the percptualsystem. t is interestirg to note that Thurstone (r927a, ,)dviseda mthod ivherebya scaleof intensitycan be deived from disffiminationdata Thiswas, n a sense, n anticipationof molar behaviorism. n both cases ne started rom beha-vior, defind n tems of achievment, rd tried to reach conclusions bout mcntal events,specifiedwithin the frame$'ork of theoreticalsystems.

Thiih;ng-?erceptiott. Brun$vik discussed in mny places the Problem ofwhat kind ofpro@ss had senerated he responses e.g. Brunswik, 1956,1957).Brunswik's ideas aboutthis problem uere quite interesting,but the Plesentauthorvonders about their place n theframeworkofprobabilistic functionalism.Does t, from a functionalisticpoint of view, matterifa certain achievementwasnade possibleby thinking or percePtion?We should iret mention certainsupport for at all making a distinctionbetweenperceptionand thinking. It is, e.g., well known that certain illusions renain in spite of the subject's

Scnd. I. Pstchol.,VoL r2, re7r



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46 LlNNAxr sldBERcbeing fully inforned about their nature (Miiller-Lyer). Research n perceptual earningalsoindicates,as mentiondabov, hat the perceptualsystem erists as a rather automatic andpre-programmed ystem,diffficult to inffuenceby larning.

To commit the stimulus error in a perceptualstudy involvespermitting analyticalcon-siderations o influenc he responss. runswik trid to approach his problem by instrucr-ing his subjects o mdim;ze the stimuius error and useall knowtedge bout the stimuli thatthey.onddered to be relevut ('bettirg attitude')-The resultsunder rhis condirioncould rhenbe compardwith other conditionsand conclusionscould be ieachedas to the relativein-dpendence f th stimulus error. An elegantstudy by Bolles& Bailey 1956)aifordsanotherexampleof how to obtain relevant nformation concerning he influenceof thinting onper-cptual udgments.They replicatedB.unswik's classical tudy of sizeperceptionGg44)withthe change that the subject was never allowed to see the stimuli, only to hear what type ofobject they were. The correlationbetween udgments and real size was surprisingly high,but lower than Brunswik'svalue.

The last senteDcen Brunswik's 1956 monographgives r fai sumary of his extensivework on the distinction btlven hinking and perceptioJr nd des es to be cited in itsentirety also or its distinctiveBrurswikian styl:'Pei.eption, then, emerges s that relativelyprimirive, parrly autonomous,nstitutionrlized,ratiomorphic subsystemof cognitionwhich achieves rompt and richly detail.d orientationhabituallyconcenins the vitally rlevant,mostly distalaspects f the enviroMent on the basisof mutually vicarious, relatively restricted md stereoRped, hsufficienr evidence n mcertainty-geated interaction md compromise. seemingly followins the highesr probability for smallnessof tor at the eapens f the hishest requercy of prcision.' Brunswik,1956,p. t46)

We finally mention papersby Jenkin & Hymatr (1959)and by Carlson 1960).Judgmentsmade under a naive attitude were coffelatedwith judgments under an aralytical attirud.The two types of judgment lppeared fairly uffelated. This is further support for thedistinction betweenanalyticaland intuitiv (cf. Sjijberg, 1968).

Brunswik was also interested n ploblens of learning, possibly due to influence fromTolnan (Brunswik, 1939).He was one of the first to study the efects of varying reinforce-ment probabilities.These were allowed o tahe valuB other than o ard r. Thus, the situa-tion was madenncertainand came o resemblea natural ecology.Probability learning wm one of the themes of the mathematical arnins heoliesdevl-oped in the so's (e.9.Ests, 1959).Attempts wefe made o formulate mathematicalmicrotheories for this type of drta. A more directly functionalistic attitude waq howevr, not veryconmon amons earnine theoriestsof the so's (seeSrnedslund,1955, or an exception). tappeas that functionalistic esearch n learnisg is at the prsentbecomingmor common(Uhl, 1963;Nwton, r965i Todd & Hammond, 1965;Azuma & Cronbach, 1966;secalsoHursch, Hammond & Hursch, 1964).We should also mention the work car.ied out byBjiirkman,who earlierwas essconcernedwith the cological pproach 1965)but larer hsdBcribed a functionalistic progran (1966, i969r) and repolted functionalisticstudies oflarnins (r968, r969a).

Recent work has been devoted o an interestinedeveloDment f Brunswik's lers modlrrtM. I. f!t.bat , vor. r2, t97r



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(Hursch,Hanmond & Hursch, 1964;Bjorkinan, 967) which rnakes ossibleamoredetailddescriptionof achievement n the metric (Hurcch et al.) dd non-metric (Bjijrkman) cases.Bjorkman (1966) ofered a formal anallsis of the typesof problems he otganism s facins

The distinction betweetranal!'ticaland intuitive functioning s relevantalso n the caseoflearning. Lindahl (1964, 1968, r97o) has given interesting demonstrations mplyirg thatsubjects seemto prefei intuitive functioning, if such functioning is possibie, and that certainexpriment manipulationsmay cause h subjects o chang o an analytical evel.

Studies of Mtula y occuttiis behaa;orBrunswik criticized Lewin, arguing that Lewin's psychologywas 'encapsulated',posF

perceptul and pre-behavioral' (Brunswik 1943, 1952). Lewh dnied his to some extent(1943,but his argumentare not very convincing).Ho{ever, Bruns\tik's criticism came o beof great irnportancc or the further developmentof Lewinian psychology.Cartwright hasdescribedhow Lewin and his co-workeregraduallycame o be more and more interested nth colosicalapproach r9S9).

Barker & wright have, under the joint influence of Brunswik and Lewin, studied thebehaviorofchildren in natu.al situations Barkr& Wright, 1955;Barker,1963,1965).Thisis a line ofrsafch hat leads o probtemsand resultsquite ditrerent rom what is producedby the traditional psychologicalaboratory.Thse studiesactualizewhat may be self evidentbut still somchowoften neglcted n the academic ndition: the fact that behavior argely sproducedby intentions (cl Thu6tone, 1924).Maybe the reison for our reglect is that theexpenmentalpaadigm is most easily followed if the environment s used as the agent ofinfluence.Thus we have folgotten the importance of causal actors other than those thatare ocated n the environment. t appsrs that studi$ of'spontaneous'behaviorare necessary to study phenonena of will ard intention.

However, an ecological approach does not appear absolutely essential for such studies.Studies of vill in the labolatory are, ho$ever, exceedingly are in modeln psychology.Neithr 'intention' nor 'will' occur 6 ertrles in the Prychological ,4rrta.&. The researchc ried out under the hading'decision making' is, while quite ;nteresting n itself, certainlynowher near a psycholosy of volition.

Applbd plytholosyMost appled functionalistic$ork has been carried out in the clinical field (Grebstein,

1963;Hammond, 1954, 1955; Hammond, Hulsch & Todd, 1964; Hamnond & O'Kelly,rgSS;Hotrman, 1960; Sarbin, Taft & Bailey, 1960).Bjitrkman (1966)and Brehrner 1967)have approached baffic psychology within a functionalistic framework.

Brunswik's influence on applied psychology appears stilt to be small, though it is, possibly,increasing.It doesnot appear hat Brunswikhimselfwasvery interestedn appliedproblems.For exanple, he did not dealwith the acquisitionof information hrough vrbalcornmunica-tion, which appears o be a problem ofparamount applied mportance, hough it was hardlydealtvith by the experimental sychologyof Brunswik's ime.

47

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+8CONCLUSTONS

In certain ways functionalism is conventional and justifiabte only on vagu srrutegicgrounds by referring to 'fruitful' and 'interesting'empidcal implications.Quire possibly,it must be the case or any psychological esearch deology hat its ultimate ustifcation isto be sought n such stlategic notions,although his is often not anticiparednor accpted yits originator(e.g.Saugstad, 965;Sjitberg,1966).

It is convenient o discussspamtelydependentand indepe.dent variabls n the finalcornmentson functiomlism that now follow.

We have earlier ffiticized the rapid adoption of achieveoent variables within molar be-haviorisrn. The decision does not seem to have been founded on a extensile analysis ofalternativebehavioraldefinitions. However, n the caseof functionalism t is quite naruralto b4e the definition of behavioron achievement riteria.But there s a problemin the definitioDofbehavior also of functionalism.Achievement sdefinedwith leflence o the organism's rrrrbr. How are w to find out about ntentionslBrunswik's transition from the constancy atio to the use of correlatios (rgao) was notjustified on the ground that colrelationswere btter mesures of achievement.The reasonwas simply that he wanted to study the interactionof severil cues,which is hard to do withconstancy atios.Andstill, th transition mplied a vely important changeas o the definitiotrof achievemcnt:attentiotrwas no longer paid to the full metlical correspondence etweenstimuli and responses,nly to th degree f linear relationship.Suppose here s a large con-st4nt erlorin thersponses. This is simply neglectedn computing he correlationcoeflicient,though it obviously.a, be of crirical mportanc o adaptation.

It appears that functionalistic psychology has not attmpted to make a profound analysisofhow one should go abotrtdefining achievehentwith refe!nce o the organism'sntention.Thus, ue do not know ifthe corrlationcoefficient onstitutes relevantme6ule of achieve-

Functionalism is in principle objective. Tolman used the phrase 'a behnviorism' in hisrcaie\| of Wahnehnung und Geg^tan.lsuelt (r%5). But SruBwik's objectivity was lirtlebut theo.etical. tr his empiricalwoik he usedverbalreports.Now od then he hinted at thepo$ibility of using objectivperformancemdures but he reve! did so. BrunswiL was, n avay, a mentalist n behavioristicdisguise.The fact thlt he found verbal epons useful (helike so many others) cafl be tahen as a starting point frcm which to develop quite a ditreienrattitude towardspsychology han Bruswik did. We shallprsently eturn to the mentalistic

In.lepdddt uiablesWe haveeaflierpointedout that Brunswik'sproximal variableswere not basedon a pro-

found anallsis of sensoryprocesse. They instead nded o be rather 'dist l' in nature, rheoutcomes of fomal considerations.And what about th distal variables henselves?They had to be specifiedby meansofphysical conceptualsystems e.e. length). Certainly fiey were not somerhing'out there'.J.tu. 1 (! t.ttot.,v ot,r 2, r 9J



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TII' NEw FUNCTTONAIiSM 49They wer cultural conventions. Physical length is the outcome of a long culturat develop_menr leading o currenr physicalconvenrjon..

Brunswik was clearly awaie of this fact (Brunswik, 1937). But why should we axune acoincidence of iDtntioo and scientific convention? The difficutty is particularly clear itrBrunswik'sstudiesofsocial perception.His subjctswere nstructed ojudge Ie frorn photo_graphs.The distalvariablewasdefineds the test scores f the stimulusDersonslThe n.ntaliti altmathJeWe haveoften pointed ro meDtalismas an alternative o functionalism.Fifty_seven earshave passed since the behavioristic y'rrs., d4 yeq b-day mentalism appears very nuchalive. The good rGults obtainedby meansofveibal reportsjustify the mentalist,sclaim.Smedslund !cently pointed to the need for .psychological diagnosrics' ( r9696) in a mannerquite convincingto the presentauthor. His pessimisric ttitudetowardspsychologicatheory(1969a)need,however,not be acceptedwithin the mentatistic ramework.Smedslurd argued hat the phnomenaof psychologyare mental eventsand that theleare no 'lawtul' relations between such evnts and srimuti and behavior. The problem ofobjectivity s approached y refeffing ro 'pubtic meanings', .e. to socialconsensus f inter-pietation. In the realm of mental evenrs here is no place or causat oDnections, nly forlogical ones. PcychologiLal hcory become., r\en. simply Lautologicat, ommon-senseThe present author prefers to regard physical events (stinuli and bhavio4 asthe pheno_rncna o bestudied bypsychology.Thesecan, n principleat least,be studied n an objectivenanner. As stressedn severalpiacesabove, he raw instances fbehavior must be ciassifiedbcfore anythingfulther is done. Such classificrtionmay wel be done to-dayon the basisof'public neanings' but it should, eventually, be made on a theoreticrl basis.Smedstund,sclaim that thre is no 'la$ful' relation between,e.g.,stimulus and maning s misle.ding.The question s not how to connect rhe two 'woflds' but how to find usful conceptualschemes or dealingwith stimuti and responses.Maybe Smedstund ame o his pessimisticattitude ultimatly becauseh apparentlyconsidred hat psychologyshoutd be built onmental stufi rather than physical, that it, a it were, should be about ,me-from the inside,rather than 'you ffom the outside'. Be that as t may, the presenrauthor wishes o pledgehis allegianceo the 'you-from the outside'canp.This firet draft of this paper was wiitten while the author {s a visitins associateDrofesorn rhedrparhenr of Psycholocy.nivr , i ry f C, l : fomia r Berkpley.hatnatwo,L $assuo-porred v ,he Swedi(hCou( i l to, Socid lS. ,p,(e Rescarch, hichaho pa,, t intuurhec; tsof publishins his paper.

ANGELL, J. R. Geo4). Prycftolosr. New Yort:Hoh.ANGILL,J. R. (reoz). The provinceof functionalpsycholosy.P$r.rol ReL, r 4, 6\-9r.AzuM^, H- & CRoNllcn, L. J. Ge66), conceptattainment {ith probabilistic fccdback. InK. R. H.mond lEd.t, The t,.holopr ofE6'd BzruslA. Ne$ Yo;k: Holi, hi"eJ;;r d,I 'inston.Pp, 258-2t6.

Be@, R. G. Ge63).Oq th nature of the env!romenr. J. Sacet tBM, re, t1-18.Beffi, R. G. (r965). ExploBtion! r; e.oloei.rlpsycholo4y.Anet. Pt!.hoLotnt, 20 , Fta.Blffi, R, C, & Wnrcrr, H F.lts\


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LINNART SJOBERCaspecti based on sn ecolosi.al orientation,S.and. 1. P$tchol., 7, 43-57.DliirKIN, M. G967). Stimul6-event leorningmd cvcnt ledrning as concufent pr.cesses,Ory. Beha.. Eum. Pdfo/n., 2,2t9-46.BrijR(uN, M. Ge68).The cft ct oftinins,ndnumber oi stimuli on the responsevariancein .orrelation learDins, Utte Ptt hal. Ret.,

BJdR(MAN,M. G969a). Individuol perfomancein a single-cue probabiliry learnins tsL.s.an.l. J. Psrchol., to , 1r3-r23.BJdRNAN, M, G969r). On the ecologicalr-levance of psycholosical research, ,Sc4rd,r.Pst.hal., to , t45-157.Bords, R. C. & B^rBy, D. E. (19s6). mport-,n.e or objcct recosnition in size constancy.J. e4. Psrchal.,5r , zzz 22s.BoRrNc,E. G. (1e2r).The stimulus-e[or. Ird.J. Psr.hol., 32, 44q-4Jt.Boihc, E. G. \'942). Sdtation a"d ?./c.ptknin the hita,r aJ .tptindral plr.holasr. N.wYort: Appleton-Century.BoRrNc, E. G. (re52). I ni;n r oJ e'poinmtattst)choloEy. New Yorh: Appleton-century-Bruee, B. (196?).Ett f6rs6k till generaliselinaav Bruns*jlG linsmodellteori och en tillamp-nins av den seneraliserade to.in !a inLirninsav fysikauska hsbundnheter. UDpublishedthesis, Univelsity of Umr.BRuNtrR, . & GooDMN, c. G94?). value andneed as orsanizing factors in perception. .abno/n, soc.Pstchol,,42,33 44.BNMA, J. S., GooD^-ow,J. J. & AusrlN, G. A.lt9'6t. A nLdj aJ thinhif,s, Nw York: WilyBRuNswr(, E. (r%i. wahlnehnury und Geeen-rrzrdJ,.lt. Leipzis: Dcltict.BtuNswr(, E. (1935).Revi{ of E. c. Tolman,Purposive beh@iol in afliflub a"d M. z,Pq.hal., r35,206 211.BRUNswtK, , (r93t). Psycholosy$ a scienccofobjecrive rcl^tions. Phil. oJ sci., 4, 227-zao,BnNswnr, !. G939).Probability as. detminerof mt behavior.J. e,p. Pry.noL, 25, \7 s rs7.BRUNSUK,E, (r94o), Thins constancy sme.s-ured by correlation @efficientd. Pr!.hol. Rea.BRUNBvrx,D. G943). Organismic achievebnthd enviromental prcbabilitr. Pstchol. Rd.,BRNswr(, E. (!gaa). Dislal fo@sing ofpercep-tion: size-.onstancyn a represe.rative amFlcof sirnarions. Psrchol. Mdasr., s6 (r, WholcBquNswre, E. (1947). Prr,rtion M.t the re,resd-tati"e deecf, oJ P'r.hotosiat e,pornent'. (tstcd.) Brteley: Univ. of Californis Pre$.BRWswrE,E. (r9s2). The concptudl rmeworkof psycholosy. Lr, En.t.l. ,tl/. S.t., r, No,BRUNSwrx, . G95t, Rpresentative sisn ndprobabilistic theory io d functional psycho-loqy, ?tychol.Rtu.,62, i93at7.BRUNswr(, E. Ges6). P#.,rtia, af,d the r.?,[email protected]. Ptrcbol.,Vol,12 , r97,

tati.e dqisn oJp'rcholoeaal *pdr@ts. (2tded.) Derk1y:Univ. of Crlifornis Presc.BRUNswrk,E. (1957).Scope and aspectsof thecognitivproblm.In H. Graber, R. Jc$or &K. Hd@ond (Eds.), C,er,:tior: The Cototddos]r'p,Ju,. CMbrids Mass.; Harvard Univ.CARBoN,v. R. c96o). OveFstimation n size-constancy judcments. lzel. J. Psrchol., 13,C^m, H. A. G 9?t, -Psr.nolory, Ncw York Lons-CN, H. A. G$o). Function,lisn. I! C.Mlrchison (Ed.), PJy.rologi.s aJ t93o. Wot-cester,M.ss.: Clark Univ- Pre$. Pp, 59J8,csNucm, D. G959). Lewinian theory as acontcmporary systematic flamework. In s,Koch (Ed.), P'r.l,l,gr: d Jtudt oJ a !.id.e,vo1. L New Yor!: McGnw-Hi[, Pp. 7 9r.D!wF, W. G896). Thc reflx arc concpt np9ycholoqy, Pt!.hol. R@., 3, 357-370.EpsGrN, W. (re6z). vanen.s aJbe,.eirrat tean-trg. Nw Yoik: Mccraw-Hili.EsG, W, K. (1959),The statistical pproach 10lcainins thsly, In S, Koch (Ed..),Pst.holasr:a studt oJ a r.r'd'.., !ol. iI. New York:Mccrav-Hill. Pp. 38o 49r.loN F,NDr, K. Ge36). Drc$urFuche ander Farbenwahrncnmuns. ,/ch, Ces,Pstchol,.t6, +67-491voN FlsNDr, K. Oers). Uba sehe" un TieJd-Eebidd bei ee.hselnde/ BeldchtunesnchtunE.Citd by K. von Fiezndr (1966), The uondof plception. }Iome*66d, Ill.: TLe DorscyFulLlRroN, G. s. & carrELL, J. McK. G8q2).Ofl rheOe/..prian oJ na difrel,.es, Philadcl-phia: Pub. Univ, Pcmsylvania, No, 2.CrBsoN, E. J. Gq69). P/i,"p lesaJpd.eptMt t antins and dd.lainent. Nciv York Appleton-GIBsoN,J. J. G95e). Pe.ception2s a function orstimulation. In S. Koch (Ed.), Prr.tolosgj aa !"rlJ, oJa ti.fte, !ol. I. Nev York MccrawHill. Pp. 456-50r.GEBSTBN,L. (1963).Relative,6uracy of zctua-rial prediction, experienced clinicians and

sradu*e students in a clibiol jud8mcnt task.J. Coadt, Pst hal.,3?, r27-r32.HaMMoND,K. G9s4), Represnt,tivevs. .y*&matic desisn in clinicsl psyciolosy. Psy.hol.Bull., 5r,1Sers9.HeMoND, K, Ggss), Plobabilistic functioninsand the clinicsl method. Ps!.ha|. Rd., 62,HeMoND, K. (r 966).Prob,bilistic functionalism:Egon Brunswi!'s jntesraiion of the history,iieory, snd method of psychology. In K.Hammond (Ed-), The Frcholoql oI Esana'!rr&&, Nw Yort: Holt, Rinehart &Winston, Pp. rsio.HTMMoND,K., HuRscH,C. & ToDD, F. (re6a).Analyzins compoDenGof cli.ical infercn.e,P!!.hol. Rd., 12, BB 4s6.H^MMoND,K. & O'KELLy, L. G95t. A not or



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THN Nll]g FUNCTIONALISMadjstmnt 6 achievemcnt. t dbaot"- su. L[ND^HL, M.-8. Ge6a). The impdtanc_ ofPi.hal, 5t, 372-J74, snJresv in a complex $rn ng hs[. S.dd. r.H.IDBMDm, E. (rerl), ,5..m rtr.lolos?., New Psr.hal. 5. t7!-r9o.York Applton-centffy,HETDBR,. (1926).Dins und Medim stur,-

HETDER,'. G93o).kistuog deswahrnehmuDgs-sysrehs. Z. Pty.L./., r r 4, 31r-394.HIIDER, F. G939). Enviromntal d&min.ntsof psychological heoris, Psychol Reb , 46,HBosR, l', ( r9s8), Tr, ,ry.rolqt oJ ntlpeltuaat/laftbtt. Nw YorL Wily.HEr!R, F. G959). On pclcPtion md eventstructure, and rhe psychologicaL environmentPryrl,ol,7s., r, No,3.HocHlBc, l. (rq66). Representative 'mplingand the purloses ol per.eptual reserrch:pic-tures of the world, and th {orld of pictures-rn K. Hahhond \Ed.), The tst.halast oJEsd B,tauih. New York Holt, Rinehart &

Winston.Pp,361 38r .HoFFM^N,P. (1960).TLc p3hdo.phic rcPrcsen-ta t ion f chn.J l iudgmlnr .Pq.ha l But t ,57 .HoLr. E. B- (rqrt- The Frcudida uitn Md its,/a.. i2 .,lirs, New York HoltH!;1, c. L. (re3a). The coDceptof the habit-family-hiedrchy and maze earnins, Psy.rDl.Rdr , ,? ! ,33 54, 34-r54.IJuLL,C-L. (rsa3a) P,in.iqtesoJ behaaior'N.wH!LL, C, L, G943r), The p.oblem ofinte.veninswarjs6les in mola. hehrvior l}]eoa. Ps|.h.l.

Rtu., 50 , zt1-291.H!Mrr rsey, G ( '95 r ) . I r tA i ,s . Nc$ yorL :HuNtER,W. S. ( I932).The psycholosogical tudv.f ben^ri.r. Ptj,chol. Rtu, 39, ra4.HuFcF, c., HaMMoND,K. & H@cH, J Ge64).Some metlodolosical coDsidtions n mul_tiplc-cue probability $udies, Ptycrdl. Xe,r,"i.lll.-iisro. rh. InnaptdaJp'!.hotos'JNdN, N. & HYMAN, R. Gese). Attitlde anddisiancestimation s variabls n size-match-jns. Ana. J. PstLhol J2.6a-16KArz, D. ('qrr). Die Erscheinungsweiscn crFtben, Z. Pst.ha|., E s. bd 7KoF!M, (. Ge3t. Pftartes o.f Ge'tab ps!.ha-logy. New Yorki Hdcourt, Brace & coK0NNrpis, T, (1968).Distanceper.cplon as afun tion ofdvailablcues J e,t.Psrchal-I7,LN;L;, K. s. (,42e).Learntns: I Theneflosmechanism i. learnits. In C Mur.hisonlEd.j, TheJonda!io6 oJ e:Pe,indtat r'yeho-t"s). Worce,ter, Ma$: Chrk Univ PressL{AlmD, P. F. ('959). Latcnt sFucture.naly-

$s. In S. lGch (Ed.), Pry.rolosit: a sttdy oJad.n e, !al- llI. Ne{ York: Mcctd*_Hill,LEwrN, K, (rq43). Deinits the 'fild at a sivntime'- Ptlchal. Rd,, 5a,292'3to.

LTND EL, M.-8. G968).On trdnsnions rcm p6-ceptual to @n.pturl !arnin8, ,s.aza tPttchol,, 9,2a6 216.LNDAHL, M.-8. Ge?o). Stratqr modification incbssincadon lcarnins. Rp. Ptychdl. Lab.,Univ. Uppsala, No, ?6.MacF raNE, D. A. (r93o). The roleofkioesthe-sis in m,ze r.mins. U"i!. CaA. PubLPsj.hol., 1,2JJ1a5.MrLLk, N. E, G959),Liberaliz.tion ofbasi. S-Rcon.cpts: xtensionso conflict bhavior,mo-tivation,nd social carnirs. ID S. Koch(Ed.),Ps!.halasJ,: a stutl,, oJ a tcie,.., vol. IL NewYorli: Mccraw-Hill. Pp. r96 2q2.NEwrcN, J. R. G96t.ludsmcnt and fedbac! 'a quasi-cliniel situaton. J. P8. s... Pstchol.,

Posfr^N, L. G96t, Perceprion and lca.nins,In S, Koh (Ed.), Psrchal.sr: a sttdt aJ ard'a'd,, vol. V- New York Mccrdw-Uill Pp.PosrMAN, . & TorMAN, E, C. G 9s9).BrunssiL'sprobalilistic functiomlism. In S. Koch (Ed),Ps!.holast: a rizdr, o/ vt,p, vol. L NwYort: Mccraw'Hill- Pp. 502-564.SsrN , T, , TFr , R. & BatLE, D, (1966) .Clif,ical inJdae a,!1 coqn;rtue *eo4) Ne\9Yo!t: HoL, Rinchart & wins!o..s^u6sro, P. (re6t. -4, ':rquht inta ,heJarn ta-tia"s .J ityrhalasJt. Oslo: Scsndinalitn Uni-sjitlBc, t- . (1966).Rcviw of P. sausstad, 4,incui,r into theJ.undatio aJpa.h.loer.Nord,?tJhol , ra, 3g5-f99Slo t rnc, L . 0968) . when.an th subFd betrured not to rturJ,.Rl .and l Ptr.hol , 9,SnNNsR,B. F. G93s), The genericnature of theconcepB of stimulus and rsporsc. ,. gaPtachal.,r2,4c6s.SMEDSLUND.. (ress). Mzl,ipte-ltubabiti5tt an-tns, Oslo. Akdmisk Forlrs.SMEDSLUND.. (rq6qa) Meaninss, implicationsand universals: towa.ds a psycholocy of man.

Scdd. J. Pslehol., to, '-'5.SMEDSLUND,, (r9696).Psychologieldilsnostics.P\tchal. Br ., Jr, 2t7-2aaTeRsroNE, L. L. ($zaJ. The aature aJ int t-,?d.e. rnndon: Routledge and Kes.n Paul,TsunsroM, L, L. C9274). A law ofcomparativcj\AgtuenL PrychoL, d., 34,2n-246.TmEroNB, L. L, 092?b). Psycbophysicalna-llrs- And. J. Ps!.hol., 33 , 368 3as.ToDD, F. & HAMvoNo, K ('165) Differentialfeedbackn t*o multiplccuprobabiliry carn_ins tasls. -a"140. ^9ci, ro, 429-+35TRyoN, R. C. (r95t). Rliability aod behaviordomain validityr kfomulstion tnd njstoricalcnhquc, Prr.rol. BuU, 51, 229-24aTo!M^N. E. C. ( t qr z) P!.tasiue behati[ ia anr,aIJ dd ffi. Nev York CeDturY.ToNN, E. C, (r93s). Rcview dfE. Bruts{ik,

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LENNARTSJOBRCWahm.ltdsg- u-"d G.gtuts.ku.h, Pttcholbur., 32 , noHr4-ToluN, E. C. Ge56). Eulosy. Egon B!1mwih,.*R:'B:'.."(ffii JS:f;i;:l'"1,ffi;behsvior. In s. Ko.h \Ed.), P't hotoxlr: dth!4r oJ a Mifu,rol.ll. New York Mccew-Hill, Pp. 92-rs7.Towa, E.C. & BRUNSMR,E.rgrs).Thcorga- wBlss,A. p. (rers).I rrtulai.dt b&isa, fhutu^ru3mdd the causalx re of rhe dviroa- ,,rzuid. Cotmbus, Ohio: R. C. Addm,henr. Pc.hoL R@.,42,4317.

UttL, C. (1963). Lehins of inlelvl concelre. I.Etrdtt of difrdqes in stiEul@ weirht3. 7.ct?. Ptt.hoL, 66, z64an.w^coN. J. B. (r9r3). Psyclorosyd thebh.vio-ri.i vim it. Prr./rol, R&., 20, rr8-rrr.W^rsoN, I. B. Gere). P$,.rotox1)on th. 'taad-point o! a beh@io,itt. Philadetphiar Lippio-

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