New Guinea Campaign (1943)

8/9/2019 New Guinea Campaign (1943)

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NSPORTOPER

JAN. FEB.

1943.p-8r::

EVALUATION

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A IR EVALUATION BOARDSOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

AP O 92 5

10 June 1945

The Air Evaluation Board was established by

th e War Depar tment fo r th e purpose of eva lu a t i ng

th econduct and effectiveness of air attack in

th e Southwest Pac i f i c Thea te r.

Th e Batt le of Wa u was selected fo r evaluat ion

because it presented Air Transport with it s f i r s t

opportunity to prove it s potential value to f u tu r e

opera t ions in th e Southwest Pac i f i c Area.

Wi . E. LMaj Gen, USA,

Director.


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BRIEF

The s ign i f i cance o f th e ba t t l e fo r th e Wau

air strip commencing 27 Ja n 1943 was twofold . In

th e first place , th e airfield was a s t r a t e g i c pr ize ,

upon control of which depended to a considerable ex-

tent th e immediate success of th e Allied effort to

continue it s march northwestward up the New Guinea

coast. Second. and the reason for this report, Ai r

Transport provided the most dramatic instance up to

that time in this Theater of it s potentialities as

an e ff ec t i ve arm of th e armed fo rces . The surprise

reinforcement by air saved th e beleaguered Australian

garrison from possible elimination an d preserved this

indispensable strip for future operations. Altho

there had been some experience in reinforcement of

ground t roops by air p r e v i o u s l y, th e r i sk , ca l cu l a t e d

an d assumed in this operation, demonstrated tha t

such employment of air transport provided a mature

and potent weapon.


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EVALUATION

1. The re in fo rcement of t roops and s u p p l i e s by a irwas th e major f ac to r in th e s u c c e s s f u l defense of Wau.

2. Due to th e r ugged terrain, air transport was th e

only method for movement of troops and supplies by whichthe mission could be accomplished.

5. The e lemen t of surpr i se was obta ined by th eemployment of ai r t r anspo r t .

4. The isolation of the battlefield was accomplishedby air attacks on th e enemy supply lines and troop concen-trations.

5. All ied f i gh t e r s main ta ined s u f f i c i e n t control-ofthe air to permit th e air transports to accomplish theirmission.

6. Eff ic iency of th e a ir opera t ions was impaired bypoor communications and weather reporting facilities,insufficient t ra ined mechanics , lack of maintenance fac-ilities and spare parts, and lack of standardization ofaircraft types.

7. D i f f ic u l t ie s of maintenance were reduced byingenious improvisation.

8. Adverse e ff ec t s of unfavorab le weather, poorterrain, lack of weather reporting and efficient commun-

ications were reduced by superior pilot technique an ddetermined effort.

9. The t echn iques and l e ssons learned in air t r an spo r topera t ions during th e Wau Campaign provided va luab le da tafo r th e employment of air t r a n s p o r t in subseq.ient operations.

10. The Wau Campaign, conc lus ive ly demonstra ted tha tair transport had ripened into a cogent weapon of thearmed forces.


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An unimpressive looking strip withno apparent va lue . In a l l i e d handsit constituted a threat to nearbyenemy Lae an d Salamaua. The Japsneeded it to protect their operationsa g a i n s t Por t Moresby. A battle fo rth e strip wa s inevitable.


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The A u s t r a l i a n s had occupied Wau inMarch 19142 s h o r t l y fo l lowing Japinvasion of Lae and Salamaua to th e

nor thwes t . In th e suimer, however,the enemy moved below it down th e

coas t , t ak ing Buna an d nearby Gonae.The All ied garrison was isolated,

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THE SITUATION

In 1942 th e t i de eas tward of Japanese v ic to ry in

New Guinea had continued. The enemy had landed at Lae and

Salamaua on 8 March, giving them an excellent foothold from

which to launch t h e i r f u r t h e r advance down th e New Guinea

coas t . Buna an d Gona fo l lowed on 22 Ju ly. Although temp-

orarily set back by the desperate action of th e Australians

a t Milne Bay on 26 August, th e stream f lowed on in a n o t h e r

direction via Kokoda and over the Owen Stanley Mountains

with th e o b j ec t of e n g u l f i n g all-important Port Moresby.

The f inge r s of t h i s advance had been pruned on th e Kokoda

trail, a t Kokoda itself an d by All ied r e cap tu r e of Buna and

Gona in September. In January 1945, however, th e enemy

succeeded in r e in fo rc ing its ga r r i son a t Lae, even th o th e

convoy had been under attack by Allied Air Power. From this

successful reinforcement the enemy started his advance toward

Wa u .

Wau strip la y l i ke a diamond s e t in from th e New

Guinea coas t l i ne , smal l but a glittering reward for those

who would c o n t r o l it. Regarded as an o u t p o s t in th e defense

of Port Moresby, it likewise constituted a potential threat.

to th e Japanese pos i t i ons at Lae and Salamaua. Conversely,

it could be used by the enemy as an a d d i t i o n a l base in con-

tinuing it s operations against Moresby, only 15 0 miles to

th e s o u t h e a s t . In f a c t , in September 19 142 he had made a


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P o r t Moresby area sp r i ng board fo r Al l i edo p e r a t i o n s nor th westward in 19h2.Figh te r s and bombers based on its severa ldromes (Ward's drome upper r i g h t corner )was th e g r e a t e s t stumbling block to Jape ffo r t s to complete t he i r occupa t ion ofN ew Guinea. Wau found its s ign i f i canceas an o u tpo s t in th e defense of Moresby.


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substantial raid with 2 1 bombers in an attempt to knock

o u t th e Ward and Jackson dromes a t Por t Moresby, and sub-

sequently sen t over nuisance r a i d s a t f r e q u e n t i n t e r v a l s .

Wau's importance had been anticipated by the Allies,

fo r in March 1942, Australian troops had been sent boldly

in to th e area . The i n t en t i on was to prepare fo r and fore-

stall Jap seizure of it as w e l l as to reconnoitre th e

surrounding area. This garrison had been isolated fo r

months as th e enemy had long since established bases below

it down the north side of th e New Guinea coast . Neverthe-

less, during th e subsequent eleven months it had ambushed

Ja p pa t ro l s and on one occas ion , ear ly January 1943, had

bad ly mauled th e Ja p outpos t a t nearby Mubo.

As fa r as th e Japanese were concerned, they were

conf iden t they could take Wau a t their l e i su re . It was

obvious e a r l y in January t h a t p r e pa ra t i o n s were being made.

Air reconnaissance activities were observed and an increase

in barge 'traffic along the coas t was apparen t . On 27 Jan-

uary an a t t ack was made by a relatively s t rong fo rce of

ground troops which had proceeded over th e extremely rugged

mountain sec t i on separa t ing th e Lae and W au areas . The

Aus t r a l i an s were compelled to retreat and th e enemy a c t u a l l y

reached the p e r i m e t e r defense of th e air strip in a com-

pa ra t ive ly s h o r t t ime.

It had long been realized that overland supply to

th e garrison was an impossibility due to the New Guinea


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t e r r a i n in th e area - dense jungles , h igh mountains an d

many r i ve r s . An a t t empt had been made to utilize n a t i v e

bearers as a human freight line but had failed. Supplying

these troops via the sea route, moreover, was imposs ib le

with the Japs at Lae an d Salamaua only 30 miles up the

coast. The job would be done by air or not at all . Indeed,

preparations had been taken shortly previous to the battle,

little realizing that a desperate need fo r reinforcements

would arise so soon.


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Terrain between Port Moresby and Wauover which our Transports operatedin reinforcing th e garrison. Thebald spo t in th e cen t e r of th e p i c t u r eillustrates th e type of targets usedin dropping of suppl ies . In manycases these Targets were only 25 to

50 yards long and 10 to 20 yards wide.

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FACTORS IN THE OPERATION

General lessons had been learned from th e transport

and f ree dropping operations on the mainland of Australia

and in N ew Guinea which were to bear fruit. Shor tage of

transport. planes and consequent disregard of pay loads were

an ol d story. Altho present in Australia after December

19L2, rad io ranges were n o t a v a i l ab l e in New Guinea un t i l

April 1943. Short, rough strips surrounded by mountains,

t r i cky wind cur ren ts , and th e compulsion of s i d e s l i p p i n g

at low speeds to make landings, were prevailing conditions.

Fl igh t s from Por t Moresby over th e Owen Stan ley Mountains

to forward un i t s had been sub jec ted to a t tack from enemy

aircraft. P i l o t s were forced to r e s o r t to every poss ib l e

trick - extensive use of camouflage to blend the planes

with the terrain, flying in clouds despite th e extreme dang-

er of mountain peaks common to th e area, and t ree to p l eve l

approaches .

Engineering an d maintenance had long presented an

acute problem. There were few transport planes, most of

them of the Douglas type . Many had been taken over from

Aus t r a l i a n and Dutch commercial l i ne s , most ly DC-2s, DC-3s

and DC-5s. The ins t rument read ings o f th e Dutch planes

were in liters and ki lomete rs , and all i n s t ruc t ions n a t u r a l -

ly in that tongue. A good percentage of tools were almost

primitive. Spare parts were barely obtainable and had to


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One of the worst landing strips inPauua - only 3,600 f e e t long , wi tha g ra s s sur face eas i ly sof tened by

cons t an t r a in s . The mountains com-pelled an approach from only oned i r e c t i o n on a field with a fantasticgradient of 1 to 10 feet.

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be salvaged from crashed planes and from dumps. Miracles

o f improvisation had been performed by th e unde r s t a f f e d

force of mechanics. Epics o f recorded i n g e n u i t y are th e

instances of filed Aussie sixpences being used as magneto

poin ts and Kotex employed as filters. By February, 1943

th e pressure was p a r t l y r e l i eved by th e a r r i v a l o f some

new C-47s and consequent s t anda rd i z a t i on o f pa r t s .

New Guinea weather had a dynamic qua l i t y p re sen t i n g

a constant problem. This condition was due first to the

Doldrum or Bad Weather Belt , which fo r seven months of the

year covers th e I s land and severe ly a ff ec t s its weather ;

and, second, to th e extremes of New Guinea local fogs and

rain, turbulence, and rapid build-ups over th e mountains.

Weather reports were either unreliable or out of date, and

conditions changed so rapidly that only planes which had

recently returned were capable of reporting on any given

area . For the most pa r t , pilots took o ff from Por t Moresby

or advanced bases t ru s t ing to luck and their own f l y ing

skill an d convinced that weather over th e Owen Stanleys

was as serious a hazard as enemy fighters.

Communication between Por t Moresby and Wau were es -

tablished at th e time of the operation. In 1942 an

Aust ra l ian mobile s i g n a l u n i t ha d been f lown in to W au with

radio facilities. This equipment was powerful and reliable.

Contac t over th c i n t e r v e n i n g mountains was on occas ion

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The difficulties of landing C-.7s on

Wau strip are apparent in th is picturean d t h a t on page 12. The strip waslocated in th e Wau Valley 3,300 feetabove sea level, some 30 miles in fromth e coas t , an d surrounded by high mountains .

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frequently interfered with , however, for a period of as

much as th ree hours , due to th e ac t ion of the Heav i s ide

layer an d other physical phenomena.

The Wau air strip was located 30 miles southwest of

Salamaua, about 3,5300 feet above sea level but deep in a

valley. Mountains surround it with particularly high and

rugged ones to th e northwest towards Salamaua. The strip

was 3,600 f e e t long, 450 f ee t wide a t th e nor theas t end,

narrowing to 220 feet on th e southwest, and had a gradient

of 1 to 10. Landings were made uphill an d takeoffs downhill.

Because of th e l o ca t i on o f the surroundi 'ng mountains , t he r e

was only one approach, from th e northeast low end to the

southwest high end. The strip was marked by th e use of

painted fuel drums set on either side of it . The grass

sur face ha d bumps and depress ions t r ave r s ing it, causing

rough l and ings . Drainage was on ly fair and dur ing the wet

weather t r anspo r t s would cu t into th e s l ippery sur face 8

to 12 inches . Wau air strip was not a f i e ld sub j ec t to

normal operations.


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Jap ground fo rces ha d reached th eperimeter of the strip on 27 Jan. '[3

and practically surrounded th e beleaguered

Aus t r a l i an ga r r i son . In th e course offou r days A ir Tr a n s p o r t made 214 l and ings ,s h u t t l i n g t roops and m a t e r i a l from PortMoresby. Only these re inforcements by a irsaved th e day.


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THE OPERATION

The Allies, as previously indicated, had made prepar-

ations to reinforce the Australian garrison. In fact, on

25 January, loaded C-47s were wai t ing on th e air strip at

Port Moresby, held there on account of uncertain weather

over Wau. There was no immediate sense of urgency. It was

not until noon of th e 27th that th e gravity of th e situation

was realized. Information forwarded by air reconnaissance

and ground pa t ro l s ind ica ted t ha t th e enemy meant bus iness .

Ground contact shortly developed and for the following 36

hours Company A of the 6th Australian Battalion, although

forced back to the perimeter defense of th e strip, managed

to avoid being wiped out .

The night of th e 28th almost four inches of rain fe l l

and there was little promise of any break. Altho at 0700

the next morning Wau Valley was densewith clouds, they

suddenly and unexpectedly rolled back. At 0900 high flying

Allied fighters sent over to observe th e weather radioed

back-to Por t Moresby t ha t th e f ie ld was open. During that

day 57 transport landings were made upon th e strip, subject

both in landing and in taking off to enemy rifle an d machine

gun f i r e . Many of th e A u s t r a l i a n t roops were wounded so

soon fo l lowing their landing t h a t they were evacuated on

th e same planes which had t r an sp o r t ed them to Wau. The

reinforcements by air enabled strong patrols to drive th e


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Wau was not hosp i t ab l e territory,but the enemy wanted the strip.The illustration shows the ruggednature of the terrain around th e

p e r i m e t e r of the field, which Japtroops reached after crossing th e

almost impassable mountain rangebetween Wau an d Lae.

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Japs back. The pressure was re l i e v ed .

Vic tory was assured, however, when a t 0925 of th e 30th

air transports delivered 25 pounder f ie ld guns and addition-

a l troops. By 1330 of that day shells from these guns were

scattering enemy troops back up into the rugged mountains

between WVau an d Lae, and to all i n t en t s and purposes th e

b a t t l e was over. The strip had been saved.

A ir Transpor t demons t ra t ed its versatility dur ing this

f o u r day period. It shu t t l ed between Por t Moresby and Wau

244 times, landed on one of the most difficult strips in

Papua, and supplied both personnel and materiel to a sore-

ly pressed command.

The price paid ( f ive C-47s), particularly in view of

the circumstances of th e operations, was a cheap on e fo r

th e ob j ec t i ve s obtained. The first day of air p a r t i c i p a t i o n

(2 9 Jan), th e 57 landings were made with no losses an d only

minor damage. The fo l lowing day 3 C-47s were l o s t when one

pilot in landing crashed into 2 parked planes. On 31 Jan-

uary another C-47 was l o s t due to mechanical f a i l u r e in

taking off at Port Moresby, and on 7 February one plane

never arrived, presumably due to th e activity of Zeros in

the vicinity.

All ied f i g h t e r cover of air t r a n s p o r t flights had been

improving in New Guinea in th e fall of 19)2. In th i s

operation the cooperation was excellent. The supply runs

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N o t only indispensable troop reinforce-ment s were l anded by ai r bu t also 25 pounde r

field g u n s . T h e e n e m y w as forced b a c k intothe surrounding hi l l s where shells f r o m these

guns dec ima ted h im.

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were made unopposed. Allied planes, moreover, made persistent

a t t a cks upon enemy supply l i ne s and t roop concentrations. So

f a r as th e Jap was concerned, th e Wau battlefield was isolated.

It was no t until 6 February t h a t th e enemymade a determined,

a l b e i t t a rdy aireffort. On t ha t day 18 medium bombers and some

55fighters came over th e Wau area, achieved little damage and

found it to be an unprofitable venture. Thirtyeight planes

were lost, distributed as fol lows;

Destroyed Probably DamagedDestroyed

Jap All ied Jap. Allied Jap. All ied

Fighters 20 0 8 0 2 0

Bombers 3 o o o 5 o

U n i d e n t i f i e d 2 0 0 0 0 0

In addition to the movement of troops and supplies into

W u, air t r a n s p o r t opera t ions were used effectively in dropp ing

s u p p l i e s to f r o n t line troops in t h a t area. The difficulties of

transporting s u p p l i e s from th e Wau airstrip to th e f r o n t l i ne ,

often resulted in troops being in urgent need of ammunition an d

food. The difficulty of locating f r o n t linetroops in th e dense

jungles on the seaward slopes on the densely wooded mountains;

was almost unsurmountable . Desp i te th e jungle, fire fromf ront

l i ne un i t s , and poor weather, air t r a n s p o r t planes dropped many

much needed supplies to our advance elements, a good percentage

of i h i ch were recovered.

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CONCLUSION

Th e en em y raid of 6 Feb rua ry m a r k e d th e en d of its

attempts to interrupt th e Allied supp ly run from Port

M o r e s b y to Wau, and , in effect, the conclusion of the

W a u Ca mpa ign . There is little doubt that but fo r the

success of the Ai r Transport operations the Wa u battle

w o u l d have t e rmina t e d b y Jap o ccup a t i on of th e s t r i p .

T he C a m p a i g nw as m a r k e d in that the principle of surprise

was employed by both parties: first by the Japanese in

su rmoun t ing the r u g g e d t e r r a i n an d a t t a ck ing wi th ground

troops; and s u b s e q u e n t l y b y the Allies in their unexpect-

ed air r e i n f o r c e m e n t of the garrison. T he action mater-

ially c on t r i bu t ed to the subs eque n t Allied campaign in

the H u o n G u l f w h e r e b y th e v i t a l enemy bases of Lae and

Sa l amaua were d e s t r o y e d .

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Symbolic of th e Wautroops backed up by

Campaign Aussiea C-17.

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AI R UNITS PARTICIPATING IN THE WAU OPERATION

pe o f O p e r a t o n

8 th Photo Squadron . .7 th Figh t e r Squadron . .

49th Fighter Group9 th Figh t e r Squadron . .

49th Fighter Group59th Figh te r Squadron

49th Fighter Group40th Figh te r Squadron

35th Fighter Group

30th F i g h t e r Squadron55th Figh t e r Group

7 1 s t Bomb Squadron . .38th Bomb Group

38th Bomb Squadron . .3rd Bomb Group

374th Troop Ca r r i e r Group6 th Squadron21st Squadron22nd Squadron33rd Squadron

517th Troop Car r i e r Group

h9th Squadron0th Squadron41st Squadron16th Squadron

. . . Pho to Reconnaissance

. . . . Fighter E s c o r t

. . .. Fighter Escort

. . . .. Interception of enemyaircraft

S. . . . Fighter Escort

)

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Ground Strafing

Photo Reconnaissance

Photo Reconnaissance

Transpor t ing t roopsand supplies

Unit


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Battle of Wau, Official Army Australian PublicationDaily Situation ReportsHistory of 374th Troop Carrier GroupMeteorological Data, Meteorological Bureau, BrisbaneChronology of Air Force Activities in Pacific Wa r

Papuan Campaign, US War DepartmentAllied Geographical Section, SWPA, No . 6

RAAF Weather and CommunicationsIn t e l l i gence S i t ua t i on Report, All ied Air Forces and

RAAF Command, July 19)2 to Latest Current DateDai ly In t e l l i gence Report, Hq FEAF, Sep 43 to Lates t

Cur ren t DateATIS (Al l ied Tr a n s l a t o r and I n t e r p r e t e r Section)

Enemy In fo rmat ion and Data, June 4 to December 44ATIS I n t e r roga t i on Report , October to L a t e s t CurrentDate .

Objective Folders, Allied Air Forces, 23 June 35 to

23 March 44.Objective Folders, CIU, 19)2 to Present Date.H i s t o r y of 22nd Troop Car r i e r SquadronMission Reports , D. o f I. Summary, February 42 to

Curren t DateMission Summaries, Allied Air Forces, 1 December 42

to 31 March 43 .


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Documents

New Guinea Campaign (1943)