Recent Research in Psychology

Seymour L. ZelenEditor

New Models,New Extensions ofAttribution TheoryThe Third Attribution-Personality TheoryConference, CSPP-LA, 1988

With 18 Illustrations

Springer-VerlagNew York Berlin Heidelberg LondonParis Tokyo Hong Kong Barcelona

Seymour L. ZelenCalifornia School of Professional PsychologyLos Angeles CampusLos Angeles, CA 90057USA

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataAttribution-Personality Theory Conference (3rd : 1988 : CSPP-LA)

New models, new extensions of attribution theory / the ThirdAttribution-Personality Theory Conference, CSPP-LA, 1988 ; SeymourL. Zelen, editor.

p. cm. - (Recent research in psychology)Includes bibliographic references and index.ISBN-13:978-0-387-97492-7l. Attribution (Social psychology)-Congresses. I. Zelen,

Seymour L. 11. Title. Ill. Series.HM29l.A875 1991302'.12-dc20 90-22660

C1P

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© 1991 Springer-Verlag New York Inc.All rights reserved. This work may not be translated or copied in whole or in part without the wriuenpermission of the publisher (Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY10010, USA), except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use inconnection with any form of information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation. computer soft­ware, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed is forbidden.The use of general descriptive names, trade names, trademarks, etc., in this publication. even if theformer are not especially identified, is not to be taken as a sign that such names, as understood bythe Trade Marks and Merchandise Marks Act, may accordingly be used freely by anyone.

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ISBN-13 :978-0-387-97492-7 e- ISBN-13 :978-1-4612-3126-4DOl: 10.1007/978-1-4612-3126-4

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the continuous support of the students and theadministration of the California School of Professional Psychology-Los Angeleswho helped make this series of conferences possible. No book emerges as it isfirst presented. I wish to express my thanks to David Cutler for his .carefulformatting and editing and his dedication in producing this volume and theprevious volume.

Contents

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Attribution Theory: New Models and Applications,an Ongoing Scientific Phenomenon

Seymour L. Zelen .

Wisdom and Humanity:Remarks Honoring Dr. Bernard Weiner

Seymour L. Zelen .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Self Reflections: The Origins of anAttribution Theorist

Bernard Weiner 7

Attributions as Decisions: A TwoStage Information Processing Model

Craig A. Anderson 12

The Measurement of Attribution Process:Trait and Situational Approaches

Daniel W. Russell . . . . .. .. . . . .. . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Existential Versus Causal Attributions:The Social Perceiver as Philosopher

Paul T.P. Wong 84

Perceptions of Success in Work EnvironmentsIrene Hanson Frieze, Mira Moss, andJosephine E. Olson 126

viii

Understanding Close Relationships:An Attributional Perspective

Frank D. Fincham 163

Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Attribution Theory: New Modelsand Applications, an OngoingScientific Phenomenon

Seymour L. ZelenCalifornia School of Professional Psychology,Los Angeles

There is a saying from the Talmud: "There is no one that

does not have a future, and there is nothing that does not have

its hour." It seems to me that this is essentially the message of

the United States and, even more so, the purpose of its

educational institutions. Universities and graduate schools are the

keepers of the established knowledge, but at the same time, they

function to provide new knowledge through research. It is with

this in mind that CSPP-LA has sponsored, and, hopefully will

continue to sponsor, the Attribution-Personality Theory

Conferences. Every learned conference should have at least two

main purposes: (1) to integrate and synthesize existing theoretical

and research positions and (2) by raising questions, offer new

explanations and novel points of view leading to new and useful

directions in the area to which the conference is addressed.

In each of the first two Attribution-Personality Theory

Conferences we have emphasized innovative theoretical thinking,

model building and empirical research. In the present conference

we have continued to work toward these goals. It is my

2

continuing hope that this kind of blend will provide the

stimulation for further imaginative steps and the forum to present

them. But always imaginations must be coupled to a process of

empirical validation. In this present conference, each presentation

puts forward this necessary blend.

It has been said that there is no single, unified "Attribution

Theory" -- only a set of mini-theories tied together by a common

phenomenon, the cognitive-ascriptive process. This level of

integration, or perhaps lack of integration, is often true when the

basic data of the specific area of interest are at a beginning or

entry level. The fact that we are offered, at this conference, a

further number of mini-theories then should not be perceived as a

point against "attribution theory," but rather merely speaks to the

youth and vigor of this approach. In the cycles of investigation

of any science or body of knowledge these mini-theories arise and

seem discrete. Then as more data evolve and more maturity

develops they become increasingly integrated and unified into a

"grander -- if not grand -- theory." So in this conference we are

putting forth a two stage model of the attributional-cognitive

decision process presenting how attributions/explanations may be

primed and then evaluated. Following this we will deal with a

trait versus state dichotomy, an attempt to cope with a long-term

problem in psychology. The third chapter poses another

dichotomy, that of providing meaningful explanations within a

causal context and secondly that of providing existential, perhaps

even cross-cultural explanations of meaning in people attempting

to make sense and/or purpose out of what is happening to them.

3

All of these papers are supported by empirical data, so that

we are not confronted with so much intellectual verbiage, "blowing

in the wind," but rather by dilemmas with empirical solutions

and integration.

In the fourth chapter we can grapple -- along with our

presenter -- with the problems of how the scripts that people

create for themselves (i.e. complex, serial explanations/attributions

developed in advance) dictate or influence subseque'nt outcomes

and our feelings about them. The relation of attribution theory

to script theory is clearly illuminated here.

The final chapter illustrates how attribution theory can be

applied to the problems of couples in marital therapy. All too

frequently in the past, clinicians have worked with patients from a

position based on outcome data rather than from an input­

p'!'edictive approach. Our last presenter makes a fresh start using

attributional approaches to marital-couples therapy. Each chapter

presents new issues and new research in examining attributions

from such diverse points of view as existential attributions to

information processing and decision making to examining feelings

of success in terms of corporate scripts in the workplace.

All in all new light will be shed by our participants in

developing their own research.

However, I would like to take an additional moment to say a

few words about our honoree, Dr. Bernard Weiner.

Wisdom and Humanity: RemarksHonoring Dr. Bernard Weiner

Seymour L. ZelenCalifornia School of Professional Psychology,Los Angeles

When I was much younger, and in graduate school, I

published my first article. I was proud of it, and ordered

reprints - with covers - and presented one to my parents. My

mother, whose father had written for the Yiddish papers in Russia

was quite proud and praised me. My father, who was a

businessman, on the other hand asked me what they paid me for

the article. When I replied "nothing," he asked me: "Then why

did you do it?"

We can ask Bernie Weiner, "why did you do it?" many

times over. And the answer, I expect we would get is: "Because

I was interested in finding something out and then informing

others." We have to be very thankful for Bernie's inquiring and

logical mind.

Bernie is not only a prolific researcher, (he has published

extensively, with four books which he has authored and

coauthored and three books which he has edited and contributed

to.) He has also written fifteen chapters in books and published

(as of now) 79 articles. He is a professor of psychology at

5

UCLA and has served as a consulting editor for five

different journals.

It is he, more than anyone else, who has wedded attribution

to motivation. It was he who brought achievement motivation to

the world of attribution theories. It is he who first and most

clearly made the case that explanations do not take place in a

vacuum. Particularly in our culture where achievement is so

valued, ascriptions about behavior take on the added dimension

of the judgement of success or failure (i.e. the value of

achievement and the "worthlessness" of failure).

This enriched viewpoint has been most fortunate for

psychology, particularly for personality theory and clinical

psychology. It, as much as anything else, helped provide the

intellectual substrate for the reformulated theory of learned

helplessness and for a host of other clinical applications. When

Weiner's contributions are added to those of Heider, Kelley and

Jones, we have a straight line of research, inducing attribution

theory to leap the bonds of a laboratory social-psychology into

real-life, personality theory.

Aside from even these major contributions which led directly

to a more comprehensive and better integrated understanding of

the psychology of self-presentation, Bernie Weiner's research and

logical analyses have sparked an interest in another major

dimension of attribution theory, namely intentionality. This in

turn, has influenced research (some of it his own) in excuse

theory and script theory, or how people use excuses to influence

the behavior of others.

6

If Kelly established many of the dimensions of attribution

theory (after Heider) and Jones provided a new perspective for

attribution theory, Weiner established the logic and the

motivational factors in attribution theory, for example when he

along with Dan Russell and David Lerman demonstrated the

emotional consequences of different patterns of attribution.

By developing this pattern or multi-dimensional approach, he

pioneered the way for many of the clinical applications of

attribution theory, as for example the multidimensional approach

of Abramson and Seligman incorporating an attributional approach

in their reformulated theory of learned helplessness.

His has been an original mind which has stimulated countless

others and has produced a host of estimable doctorates and post­

doctoral students, of whom we have four on our program. So, as

is the custom from preceding conferences, we honor Dr. Bernard

Weiner for all these things and for much more that may have

been unmentioned, in the knowledge that much more will come in

the future. We now present to you, Bernard Weiner, this plaque

honoring you for showing us the answer to my father's question

not only why you did it, but how to do it.

Self Reflections: The Origins ofan Attribution Theorist

Bernard WeinerUniversity of California, Los Angeles

The attainment of an award provides the occasion for self­

reflection, a time to be self-indulgent, and even perhaps the

opportunity to provide guidance to others striving for

accomplishment and recognition. Hence, at this time I would like

to think back autobiographically and reconstruct some of the past

to explain, in my own biased way, what events might have been

responsible for the receipt of this award.

I think I am best known for a 2 x 2 taxonomy of causal

attributions that was presented in 1971 and for my analysis of the

dynamics associated with causal explanations. These related ideas

all originated with the same event that happened to me somewhat

early in my life -- actually, when I was in the 5th grade.

While in the 5th grade, I decided to run for student

government. A number of different positions were being

contested in our class of 25 students. I first considered running

for student president. That had the highest utility, but typically

the president is the most popular student in class. Hence, I

rejected that possibility. Note, then, that already I had decided

8

to embrace Expectancy X Value theory, recognizing that if

expectancy of success is zero, then the action should not, and will

not be pursued.

Next I considered the possibility of vice president. That also

had high utility. Unfortunately, that position is held usually by

the second most popular class member. Guided again by

Expectancy X Value theory, I therefore dismissed that idea also.

Treasurer was next on my hierarchy of desired offices, but that is

held by the most trusted class member, and I had to discard that

thought. Finally, I considered being class secretary. But that

post is held by the person with the best handwriting. Those of

you who know me will immediately understand why I gave up on

that pursuit.

There was one possibility left -- becoming a member of

student council. I reasoned as follows: Each of the offices of

president, vice-president, treasurer, and secretary will be pursued

by two students. This eliminated eight of the most successful of

my peers from seeking to be on the council, and leaving

seventeen class members. Of these, seven are elected to serve on

the council. Quick calculation revealed that my probability was at

least .50 of a victory, and being on the council did have some

prestige and other perqs. I thus threw my hat into the council

member ring. Unfortunately, I lost.

Now, the reader may be wondering what on earth does this

have to do with taxonomies and classifications, and how does this

relate to the dynamics of causal attribution? That is easily

answered. At this time I noticed who was elected president, and

9

knew that this person had received numerous other awards and

plaudits. I also recognized others in my class who had never

been recognized for any of their major or minor accomplishments.

And it then dawned on me that there were two kinds of people

in the world -- those who received honors, awards, social

recognition, and the like, and those that do not. This was my

very first psychological taxonomy, and it came to be during the

fifth grade. It also became clear that, in my classification, I was

included with the non-recipients. This taxonomy, like many of the

later ones in psychology, basically contrasted the "good guys" or

the winners, with the "bad guys" or the losers.

Now, I then asked one of my first attributional questions:

"Why did the winners if fact win, and why did the losers lose?"

And the first answer was that it was deserved. The president, by

virtue of his merits and accomplishments, "should" be president,

and similarly for the vice-president, treasurer, secretary, and the

members of the student government. Antedating Kelley but not

perhaps Hume, I presumed that the covariation between

accomplishments and election results would provide a causal

explanation. But this proved to be incorrect. Close analysis of

the participants revealed that the president indeed deserved his

position, but this was not true of the vice-president nor the

treasurer. Similarly, about on-half of the members of the student

council in my estimation deserved their position, but not the other

one-half. That is, deservingness proved to be entirely independent

of award winning. In this manner I developed my first 2 x 2

taxonomy, which on one dimension included winners and losers,

10

and on the other dimension was anchored with deserved and

not deserved.

It was clear that I was a loser on one of the dimensions, and

another fact was also clear to me -- I deserved to be a winner.

Now, this might now be called "hedonic bias," and in fact I take

credit for discovering the phenomenon while I was in the fifth

grade, in the year 1946, well before the Heider book.

This world-view served me well for more than forty years. It

explained many facts in my environment; it was a very convenient

and useful construct system. And it provided the foundation for

my later attributional work related to taxonomy and dynamics.

But now I am thrown into turmoil. With this award, I have

to change my position in the 2 x 2 table. had assumed that

being a loser was a trait -- it had long-term stability. Now I find

that I am no longer a loser, but actually a winner. I have to

change my construct system, and those of you who are followers

of George Kelly know that any impending change in construct

systems produces threat. And, moving from winner to loser, has

elicited another source of anxiety. Do I really deserve it?

Perhaps some of the readers will find out that the most

complicated statistic I can do is a Chi-Square; they will be told

that I do not know where the computer center is; they will

discover that I write with a typewriter; they will read that my

latest references are in the 70's; and they will learn that I do not.

have plans for a forthcoming research program. That is , I may

have gone from a person who did not deserve to lose to a person

11

who did not deserve to win! I fear I may be uncovered as an

imposter. As you know, this is labeled "The Imposter Syndrome."

I thus have learned that receiving an award has its costs, as

well as its benefits. I have gone from self-righteous indignation

to fear and guilt.

But, I must admit that on balance I prefer the latter state.

I want to thank Sy Zelen and the California School of

Professional Psychology for this award. I feel very happy (an

outcome-dependent affect); increased self-esteem (an attribution to

sustained effort, which also results in the tendency to bask in my

glory); and great gratitude (based on my ascription of success to

my many students and colleagues). Thank you so much, Dr.

Zelen and the Professional School, for providing me this

fine honor.

Attributions as Decisions: ATwo Stage InformationProcessing Modef,2

Craig A. AndersonUniversity of Missouri

Attribution theory is the most important development in

social psychology. This audience hardly needs convincing; for

skeptics all we need to do is to point out the dominance of

attribution articles in the journals, chapters in edited volumes, and

original books. Attribution theory has contributed to our

understanding of traditional social psychology problems such as

attitude change and resistance to change (e.g., Jones & Harris,

1967; McGuire, 1985), impression formation (e.g., Schneider,

Bastorf, & Ellsworth, 1979), helping and altruism (e.g., Bradand &

Lerner, 1975; Meyer & Mulherin, 1980), conformity (e.g., Ross,

Bierbrauer, & Hoffman, 1976), aggression (e.g., Dyck & Rule,

1978; Zillman, 1978), and stereotyping (e.g., Hamilton, 1981).

Less purely social areas have also been influenced by attributional

work. For instance, the literatures on judgment and decision

making (e.g., Nisbett & Ross, 1980), clinical problems (e.g.,

Anderson & Arnoult, 1985a; Arkin & Baumgardner, 1985), and

lThis paper is based on a talk presented at the Third AttributionConference, honoring Bernie Weiner, at the California School of ProfessionalPsychology, Los Angeles, 1988.

2Please address all comments, criticisms, and suggestions to: Craig A.Anderson, Department of Psychology, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.

13

memory for traits and behaviors (e.g., Crocker, Hannah, & Weber,

1983) all have benefited by attribution theory. Of course,

attribution theory also has advanced in sophistication and accuracy

from a liberal borrowing of ideas from a variety of areas.

Types of Attribution Models

Normative Models

Much attribution work can be classified as being of one of

three general types. The first is what I call normative models.

These are models of the attribution process that specify how a

rational, accurate attribution process may proceed. In many

instances, such models represent ideal types, or what people

should do for the sake of accuracy. They are prescriptive in

nature. To some extent, they also describe what people can do

under fairly restrictive, special, and ideal circumstances. The

most obvious example of such a normative model comes from Hal

Kelley's work (Kelley, 1967; 1973). Kelley has proposed proper

attributional processes (analogous to the scientist role) for

multiple instance cases (e.g., the covariation principle, the

ANDVA cube) as well as for single instance cases (e.g.,

discoun ti ng, a ugmen ting principles).

The primary role of normative models, in my view, is as

point of comparison for examination of what people really do in a

variety of situations. Deviations from optimal or normative

attribution processes are not to be seen as "defects" for the

models, because nobody (well, almost nobody) ever seriously

believed that people used the normative processed perfectly.

14

Rather, deviations are useful because they tell us where to look

for the actual processes people use. Indeed, "accuracy" may come

about via a variety of processes; biases and errors point the way

to the processes people actually use.

True Process Models

A number of researchers and theorists have occasionally

mistaken normative models for what I call "true process" models.

By process models I mean models of the attribution process

designed to represent how people actually go about making

attributions. Thus, Kelley's ANOVA cube has been interpreted as

a model of what people actually do. Although it is true that the

processes Kelley popularized (Le., covariation detection,

discounting, augmenting) are used by people under some

circumstances, it is equally true that people do no typically think

in the rational way suggested by the model. Other, more

complicated processes are at work.

Three additional types of process models deserve brief

mention here. Jones and Davis 1965; (see also Jones & McGillis,

1976) proposed a theory of correspondent inferences as a model

of how people infer dispositions from behavior. An admittedly

oversimplified summary of this model is that people infer

dispositions that correspond to the observed (and labeled)

behaviors. Thus, aggressive behavior is seen as being caused by

aggressive dispositions. Jim Uleman's work on spontaneous

attributions (Uleman, 1987) confirms that such correspondent

inferences are fairly common and are made quickly and with little

15

effort or awareness. Jones and Davis (and others) have noted a

number of variables that influence this process.

Motivational models posit a direct influence of deep (usually

hidden) motives or needs on the attribution selection process

(Zuckerman, 1979). Unfortunately, such models have usually been

without a theoretically meaningful process, usually relying on a

homunculus (ego) defending itself against threatening information.

Claims that a particular attribution pattern is the result of an

ego-defensive process require proof beyond the circular argument

that the effects defend the ego. Specifically, some theoretical

process is needed, as is independent empirical support for the

process. In my view, neither the process nor supporting data

currently exist. It is clear that self-serving "patterns" of

attributions (i.e., accepting more responsibility for success than for

failure outcomes) may be found in a wide array of situations

(Arkin, Cooper, & Kolditz, 1980; Bradley, 1978). But no clear

theoretical process has been proposed or tested, leaving the

cognition/motivation debate in this area unresolved (Tetlock &

Levi, 1982).

A final type of process model has received relatively little

attention, but warrants development. This is the type called

"Bayesian" decision models (Wetzel, 1982). The key point to

these, one usually ignored by motivational models, is that prior

beliefs influence the current attribution process. Obviously,

people do not compute Bayesian probabilities when making a

decision, but just as obviously, they do take into account the

16

strength of the prior belief as well as the subjective reliability of

the new data for the attributional case at hand.

As is readily apparent, the first two types of attribution

models, normative and true process, overlap considerably. This is

because even the normative models are process oriented. The

distinguishing feature used to tell when a model (e.g., Kelley's, or

a Bayesian one) is being used as a normative one versus as a

true process one lies in whether the scholar involved claims that

the model truly represents what people do, or simply is seen as

similar to what people can and should do.

Effects of Attributions

The third general type of attribution work focuses on the

"effects" of attributions on other variables. Although hUlldreds

(thousands?) of scholars have contributed to this work, one

scholar in particular is identified with this approach -- Bernie

Weiner (1986). Bernie has, of course, contributed much to the

development of process models as well (e.g., Wong & Weiner,

1981), but in my view he has dominated and continues to

dominate the attribution effects scene (along with his many

excellent students, who are well represented at this conference).

The kinds of questions asked by effects scholars are: What types

of attributions do people make (e.g., Frieze, 1976)? What is the

underlying organization or structure of attributions (Wimer &

Kelley, 1982)? and most importantly, What are the effects of

attributions on variables such as affect, success expectancies,

motivation, performance, interpersonal interactions (e.g., Fincham,

17

1985; Weiner, Nierenberg, & Goldstein, 1976; Weiner, Russell, &

Lerman, 1979)?

In short, much progress has been made over the last 30

years (since Heider's seminal work in 1958). This is particularly

true, in my view, for Effects models. We know a great deal

about how people respond to particular attributions for successes

and failures, in both the achievement and the interpersonal

domains. We know when people will get angry, depressed, happy,

proud. We know when they will work harder, quit, or try a

different approach.

However, our understanding of the attribution process itself is

still quite limited. We know that people with different

perspectives will often give different attributions (e.g., actor­

observer differences). People with different information sets will

often make different attributions -- this certainly is the major

aspect of actor/observer differences (Eisen, 1979; Monson &

Snyder, 1977). Numerous researchers have proposed that ego­

defensive needs directly influence the attribution process, but I

have not yet seen a convincing process model of how motive

manipulations and features influence attributions. In all cases, the

underlying "motives" or motive manipulations produce informational

differences that by themselves are sufficient to account for

observed attributional patterns.

Similarly, Kelley's ANOVA cube describes what people can do

under ideal circumstances. The proposed processes (or more

likely, analogous judgmental heuristics) are sometimes used.

18

In general, though, the model does not describe well how people

actually make attributions.

Correspondent inference theory does little more than describe

a truism relevant to those cases where a person attribution is

being made -- aggressive behaviors are produced by an aggressive

person, not a shy one. To be sure, the theory (and subsequent

data) suggest conditions which promote or preclude correspondent

inferences, but it does not really tell us much about attribution

processes in general (nor was it intended to do so).

Overview of Today's Presentation

My goal today is to describe a process theory of attributions,

and to present a few scattered tests of it. The theory has not

been tested extensively, and several similar versions of it can

account for the results I am going to present. This doesn't

bother me, because all acceptable versions must change radically

the way we look at the attribution process in order to account for

the results. That is, the traditional models (e.g., Kelley's cube,

correspondent inference theory, motivational models) are either

silent on the research questions to be addressed, or they are

contradicted by the empirical data to be presented. Three fairly

common assumptions in particular are contradicted by the theory

and data. First, it has been assumed (almost always implicitly)

that people carry around (in their heads) a list of attributions,

and apply the list to every attributional situation that arises. The

2-stage theory assumes, instead, that people have both specific

and generic knowledge structures concerning various situations and

19

sit.uation types, and that one part of the knowledge structures

consists of a relatively small set of likely causes for the specific

outcome. That is, there is a general causal structure for each

type of situation, and these causal structures differ for different

situations types.

Second, many scholars have assumed that people have deep,

hidden needs that directly influence the attribution process. The

2-stage theory assumes that the attribution process proper (i.e.,

final selection of an attribution) is unaffected by such hidden

needs. However, situational manipulations or features that

activate such vaguely defined motives as ego-involvement, ego­

defensiveness, self esteem motives, and so on, change the

information seen as relevant or appropriate to an objective

attributional analysis. Thus, motivational effects occur before the

attribution process, and occur for nonmotivational reasons.

A third common assumption also is contradicted to some

extend, but I haven't thought about it long enough yet to feel

comfortable declaring its overthrow; I also lack sufficiently

powerful data for this task. Nonetheless the assumption is worth

discussing here, for this group is most likely to benefit from

whatever insight I have here, and (more importantly) is most

likely to improve my own thinking on it. Here it is recent

work (sparked again by Bernie Weiner) has noted the importance

of the location of a cause on several dimensions -- locus, stability,

controllability. This dimensional approach assumes that the

location of a cause in multidimensional space determines its

effects; two specific causes sharing the same location should yield

20

the same effects on variables such as success expectancies, affect,

motivation (effort and direction of effort), and performance. My

own work (as well as others) on attributional styles of depressed,

lonely, and shy people has benefited from this dimensional

approach (Anderson & Arnoult, 1985b; Feather, 1983; Seligman,

Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979).

However, people do not think in dimensional terms, unless

asked to do so by some nosy psychologist (there may be two

exceptions to this -- liking and intelligence -- but my own recent

work on implicit personality theory suggests otherwise). People

do not attribute their recent miserable performance on a blind

date to something that is internal, stable and uncontrollable; they

attribute it to their social incompetence. This is not a problem

for the dimensional approach if one regards dimensions as "second

order" concepts useful to scientists (again, as pointed out by

Weiner, and others). The problem, though, is that the kinds of

attributions people make carry more information than the

dimensional locations. Thus, I suspect that one can find

attributions that are located in (essentially) the same place in

multidimensional space, but that have different effects.

As an example, consider two possible attributions for initial

failure at the task of persuading people to donate blood -- lack

of effort, use of a poor strategy. Both attributions are in the

same multidimensional space -- internal, unstable, and controllable.

The primary implication of a lack-of-effort attribution is that one

try harder. The person may try different strategies, or may not.

The strategy attribution, though, implies that one should continue

21

trying hard, and that one should try a different strategy. Thus, if

the task is one in which strategies are both important and non­

obvious, the strategy attribution should lead to greater

improvements in performance over time. However, if the task is

one in which effort is important, and strategies are unimportant

or are so obvious that the person selects the best one initially,

the effort attribution should lead to greater improvements. I

hope to have time to discuss this later, but as it is not central to

the 2-stage theory, let's move on now.

Let me summarize this introduction by referring to Figure 1

and discussing it briefly. First, note that Bernie and his students

have contributed to both the attribution process and the

attributional effects sides of this figure. Attribution process

questions include asking when it occurs, how it occurs, and what

the contents or outcomes of the process are. The contents, of

course, are attributions, and the effects of various contents have

been documented across a wide array of important variables such

as success expectancies, motivation, performance quality, and

affect.

FIGURE 1. Attribution Process versus Attribution Effects

Attribution Process

*When*How*CoI\tents

vs. Attributional Effects

Effects of Content on:

*Success Expectancies*Motivation*Performance Quality*Affective Reactions

22

The Two Stage Model

Testing Strategies

My focus today will be on my work concerning how the

attribution process proceeds. There are two ways of testing

process models, as can be seen in Figure 1. Most obviously, one

can assess attributions and other cognitive contents of the process.

In the first three sets of studies to be presented this approach

was used. Alternatively, one can assess the various effects

manipulating process variables to see if and when theoretically

relevant manipulations produce important changes in them. The

second set of studies to be presented used this approach.

The Two Stage Model

Here, then is the two stage model of attributional processing.

I should point out that this model borrows heavily from Arie

Kruglanski's (1980) work on lay epistemological processes.

Problem Formulation. The first stage, problem formulation, is

one in which the causal candidates are generated and information

relevant to testing them is brought to mind. First, a guiding

knowledge structure is selected, based on a variety of criteria

such as its accessibility (salience, chronic usage or recent

priming). It is featural similar to the problem at hand (for

example, only interpersonal knowledge structures will be recruited

for use in explaining an interpersonal outcome), and goal

congruency (two major goals are public self-presentation, which we

are not concerned with today, and private attributions, which are

intended to be accurate). The guiding knowledge structure

23

FIGURE 2. The Two Stage Model of Attribution Processing

Stage 1

Problem Formulation

1. Select AppropriateKnowledge Structure* Accessibility* Featural Similarity* Goal Congruency

2. Collect Information* Past Experiences* Current Situation

Outcome

Stage 2

Problem Resolution

1. Kelley Type Analysis* Covariance* Discounting* Augmenting

2. Bayesian TypeAnalysis

1. Make Attribution or

2. Return to Stage 1 or

3. Abandon Search

contains information about the plausible causes for the specified

outcome (i.e., the causal candidates) and about what further

information is needed to test each of the causal candidates.

24

This guiding knowledge structure also prompts a search for this

additional information, which may come from the person's past

and from the current situation. It is at this stage that I

propose to locate motivational effects. Specifically,

motivational variables influence the kind of information seen as

relevant to the attributional analysis, via activation of various

knowledge structures.

Problem Resolution. At stage two the information gathered

at stage one is assessed via the kinds of processes postulated by

a variety of scholars (though imperfectly). Covariation detection

is done (to the extent possible by the "lay statistician"), the

discounting and augmenting principles come into play (but less so

than would be expected by a perfect judge), prior beliefs and

probabilities are revised (or not). The outcome of all of this

depends upon a variety of factors. If one of the causal

candidates garners enough support, it becomes the attribution. If

not, then one of two things can happen. The process may return

to stage one and begin again, but with a different guiding

knowledge structure. Alternatively, the search may be abandoned.

The amount of time and resources available, as well as the

perceived importance of attributional search will determine which

of these courses will be followed.

This is a bit vague, but two unique points are worth

mentioning. First, the model emphasizes the importance of real

world knowledge brought to bear on the problem by the

attributor. Attributions are not made in a vacuum, but in a

historical context. Second, there are a variety of cognitive

25

processes going on, and a variety of nonnormative effects arise

from these processes. For instance, priming various knowledge

structures or causal candidates will influence the final outcome.

In addition, various cognitive judgmental processes (such as

covariation detection) differ from what a normative model

specifies (Crocker, 1981; Lane, Anderson, & Kellam, 1985).

Empirical Tests of the Two Stage Model

Consideration of this model leads to a variety of unique

predictions. Let's turn to several of these, and to the

relevant data.

Different Causal Structures for Different Situation Types

The first assumption I wish to challenge is that people carry

around one generic list of causal candidates that is used in

different types of situations. Specifically, the two stage model

assumes that people have specific knowledge structures for

different types of situations, and that these knowledge structures

include a small set of plausible causal candidates relevant to the

particular type of situation. In essence, there is a causal

structure of situations that varies from one type of situation to

another. What this means operationally is that if you ask people

to think about a particular type of situation and to generate

plausible causal candidates for the specified outcome (i.e., success

or failure), you will get different lists of causes for different types

of situations. At one operational level this prediction is trivially

true; playing professional sports requires an extremely high level

26

of physical ability whereas conducting original basic scientific

research requires an extremely high level of intellectual ability.

There are two operational levels at which the prediction is

not trivial. First, one can examine the generated causes to see if

different general types emerge for different types of situations.

In the sports and science examples just mentioned, the causes

(extremely high physical and intellectual ability) are of the same

general type, namely, ability. Thus, we can test to see if such

general types of causes are equally likely to be generated as

plausible causal candidates for different types of situations.

Second, one can examine the dimensional location of the

gc:nerated causes to see if generated causes for different types of

situations are differentially located in multidimensional space.

Again, the previous sports and science examples yielded causes

that are located in the same multidimensional space (i.e., internal,

stable, uncontrollable) despite being quite different at a very

specific level. Thus, to test the causal structure prediction in a

nontrivial way one must look at the generated causal candidates

(generated in response to different types of situation) from a

more general perspective, either in terms of types (or clusters) of

causes or in terms of multidimensional space location.

Several years ago I conducted research to examine this

question (Anderson, 1983a). Three groups of subjects participated

in this work. The first group examined four types of hypothetical

situations contained in the Attributional Style Assessment Test

(version I) (Anderson, Horowitz, & French, 1983) -- interpersonal

success, interpersonal failure, noninterpersonal success, and

27

noninterpersonal failure. There were five situations of each type.

These subjects were instructed to generate several plausible causal

candidates for each situation (not attributions). Two researchers

examined these causal candidates and rewrote them into a more

general form, eliminating duplicates. For example, "worked hard

at making friends" became "worked hard." This resulted in a set

of 63 causal candidates, each worded in both a success and a

failure direction (e.g., worked hard; did not work hard).

These 63 (success/failure) causal candidates were typed on

individual cards and presented to a second group of subjects,

whose task was to sort them into similar piles. These similarity

sort data were then subjected to a cluster analysis procedure.

Thirteen clusters, or general types of causes, emerged. This

empirically derived classification scheme was then used to classify

the causes generated by the original subjects in response to the

four types of situations. Specifically, for each type of cause I

examined (via 2 x 2 ANOVAs) the frequency with which it was

generated as a function of the two independent variables of

interpersonal versus noninterpersonal and success versus failure.

The two stage model predicts that general causal types will not

be generated with equal frequency across types of causes. The

results strongly supported this prediction. There were quite a few

main effects and interactions involving the type of situation

variables. Figure 3 shows the interpersonal versus

noninterpersonal main effect results.

28

FIGURE 3. Frequency of Generation of General Causal Types asa Function of the Interpersonalness of the Situation Types

Mean frequency of causes as a function of typeof situation (Range: 0-10)

Causal Clustero 0.5

I1.0

I1.5

I2.0

I2.5

I

Behavioralpre pa ra tion

Effort level

In terperso naltra i ts

Experience &skills

Externalfactors

Generalknowledge

Interpersonalskills & concern

Av.ailability ofItems ofinformation

Charismaticstyle

Intelligence

Physicalattributes

Friendships

*wr~~Wj~~~-8m~fiW

•

I0.5

I1.0

®ill!! Interpersonal situations_ Noninterpersonal situations

ii;~1'~~~M~!liif~~lii~lit~~~~

29

The third group of subjects rated the 63 causes on each of

six causal dimensions, derived from previous attribution work.

Thus, for each causal candidate one could derive scores indicating

its location in multidimensional space. These scores were assigned

for each dimension for each causal candidate generated by the

first group of subjects. Thus, it was possible to see if the

dimensional location of causes differed as a function of the type

of situation that led to its generation. The results of this

analysis also strongly supported the two stage model predication;

there were many main effects and interactions involving the

interpersonal versus noninterpersonal and success versus failure

variables. Figure 4 shows only the interpersonal versus

noninterpersonal main· effect results. Again, the original report

has more detailed results.

In sum, different types of situations do seem to have

different causal structures. Thus, people do not consider the

same set of causal candidates for different types of situations.

This work demonstrates that interpersonal situations differ from

noninterpersonal ones, and that the causal structure of success

differs from that for failure, even for the same task. Obviously,

there are other ways of partitioning situations; I suspect that

many of them would yield comparable causal structure effects.

Causal Structure/Attribution Relation

A second prediction from the two stage model concerns the

effects of causal structure, which is a feature of stage one

processes, on attributions at stage two. Knowing the causal

30

FIGURE 4. Mean Dimensional Location of Causal Candidates asa Function of the Interpersonalness of the Situation Types

Mean dimension of causes as a function of typeof situation (Range:0-9)

Causaldimension

5.0I

5.5I

6.0I

6.5I

7.0I

Changeablity

Locus

Globality

Stability

Intentionality

Con trolla bili ty

I5.0

I5.5

I6.0

I6.5

I7.0

rum Interpersonal situations_ Noninterpersonal situations

structure of a set of situations should allow one to predict the

attributions that will be made for those situations. That is, there

should be a correlation between causal structure and attributions.

A corollary to this involves the different information available for

actor and observer subjects. In general, observers will have less

relevant information than will actors. Thus, observer attributors

are particularly dependent on the causal structure information.

31

Actor attributors, however, tend to have more individuating

information such as their own past performance in past similar

situation. Thus, actor attributors are more likely to reject the

causal structure suggested by the first run through the two stage

process, and are more likely to search for alternative knowledge

structures (with different causal candidates). There is some

evidence in support of this, in terms of processing times to

certain kinds of attributional questions (see Smith, 1984). The

main point here, though, is that actor attributions are expected to

deviate more from the causal structure than observer attributions

because of actors' superior information base.

Both of these predictions were tested in a recent study of

mine (Anderson, 1985). Subjects made attributions for themselves

and for an unknown other person, for each of the hypothetical

situations used in the earlier causal structure research. The

correlations between causal structure of these situations and the

attributions generated for them were computed separately for

actors and observers. As expected, knowing the causal structure

of the situation did allow very good prediction of the attributions,

as shown by the high correlations presented in Figure 5. Also as

predicted, observer attributions correlated significantly higher with

the causal structure than did the actor attributions.

Relocating Motivational Effects

The third prediction to be considered today concerns recent

work on the effects of motivational manipulations. As mentioned

earlier, numerous scholars in this area subscribe to the notion

32

FIGURE 5. Correlation Between Observer and Actor Attributionsand Causal Structure Across Situational Types

Causal structure correlations with actor andobserver attributions

Observer r = .97

Actor r = .88t(diff) = 3.91 .p < .002

that the motivational state of the person can directly influence

the attribution process. That is, an ego-involved person will make

attributions that protect or enhance the ego. In my view, the

motivation/cognition debate in attribution theory has consisted of

two separate patterns. The motivation theorists have

demonstrated a variety of interesting and important effects, such

as the finding that people typically accept more responsibility for

successful outcomes than they do for failure ones. They have

then assumed that the result of this attributional pattern (i.e.,

self-enhancement or protection) is also the cause of it. But no

process, other than some magical, circular, or teleological one, has

been proposed. The cognitive theorists (e.g., Miller & Ross,

1975), on the other hand, have devoted considerable energy to

explaining away the important phenomena discovered by the

motivational theorists, but in nonmotivational terms. Indeed, they

have provided a variety of cognitive processes through which such

seemingly motivational effects occur. For example, people are

more likely to perceive a covariation between their behaviors and

33

success than between their behaviors and failure, primarily because

success is congruent with their intentions, their efforts, and

their expectations.

The most recent motivational paradigm was designed to rule

out such cognitive process differences between the success and

failure situations, by manipulating motivational factors (e.g., ego­

involvement) after the success or failure experience has taken

place. For example Miller (1976) had subjects succeed or fail on

a "social perceptiveness" test. Afterwards, they were given

information about the supposed validity of the test in order to

manipulate ego-involvement. High involvement subjects were told

that the test was very valid, had been given to many people, was

used in job candidate selection, and was related to marital

satisfaction and other social perceptiveness type variables. Low

involvement subjects were told that the test was new, hadn't been

given to many people, and didn't seem to correlate with much of

anything. Then, subjects were asked to attribute responsibility for

their performance on the test. Because the ego-involvement

manipulation took place after the outcome feedback, the

informational differences supposedly had been ruled out. Thus, if

the high ego-involvement subjects showed a stronger self-serving

pattern of attributions (i.e., more personal responsibility for

success than failure) than low ego-involvement subjects, the effect

must be due to a motivational impact on the attribution process.

However, this line of reasoning assumes that the cognitive sets of

the two ego-involvement groups will be the same at the time

the attribution process is engaged, an assumption that is

34

demonstrably false. The two state model predicts that the

motivational manipulation changes the knowledge structures

brought to bear on the attributional problem. Specifically, highly

ego-involved subjects are more likely to see their past

performances in related domains as being relevant to the current

analysis. This informational difference, arising from stage one

processes, produces the attributional difference seen at the end of

stage two processes. The model essentially relocates motivational

effects from attribution selection (stage two) to problem

formulation (stage one). Furthermore, it provides a clear process

model for motivational influences, and it is (in my view) a

cognitive one, though I have no strong objection to those who

wish to call it motivational. Figure 6 displays this relocation.

FIGURE 6. Relocating Motivational Variables

Relevant, SalientAvailable, Information

MotivationalVariables

Priva teAttributions

PublicAttributions

Model depicting motivational influences on the attribution process.

MotivationalVariables

SituationalVariables

Relevant, SalientAvailable, Information

IPrivate Attributions r

IPublic Attributions I

Model depicting motivational influences on the informationselection process, both not on the attribution process.

35

The simplest way to test this idea consists of several steps.

First, one must show that motivational manipulations do produce

knowledge structure differences in problem formulation. The best

way is to do this with uninvolved observer subjects, because

obtained informational differences cannot be attributed to ego­

involvement. In one such study (Anderson & Slusher, 1986,

experiment 1), I gave observer subjects the same high versus low

ego-involvement instructions used by Miller, though of course, they

were not ego-involved because they did not take the "social

perceptiveness" test and knew they were not going to do so.

They were asked to indicate what kinds of information abcut

another person they would deem useful in interpreting that

person's performance on the test. We predicted that those who

saw the High involvement description of the test would be more

likely to ask for relevant information, such as marital satisfaction.

Next, subjects rated several different pieces of potential

supplementary information for how relevant it would be in

interpreting a target person's performance. Some of the items

were "relevant" (e.g., marital satisfaction); some were not (e.g.,

eye-hand coordination). Figure 7 presents the results. As

expected the so-called ego-involvement manipulation influenced the

knowledge structures used in problem formulation by these

uninvolved observer subjects. High involvement descriptions of

test validity led to more requests of relevant information, and

higher relevance rating of relevant information than did low

involvement descriptions.

36

FIGURE 7. Observer Requests for and Ratings of RelevantInformation as a Function of the Ego-Involvement Instruction Set

Ego-involvement InstructionsHigh Low High-Low

Involvement Involvement Difference

% Subjects Spontaneously 77% 33 % 44 %Requestin~ at least 1Relevant iece of info.

Average Relevance Ratings 7.05 5.86 1.19of Relevant Information

Average Relevance Ratings 3.84 4.27 -.43of Irrelevant Information

In two subsequent experiments we (Anderson & Slusher,

1986) demonstrated that this stage one informational difference

was sufficient to reproduce the exaggerated self-serving pattern of

attributions in observer subjects who made attributions about some

unknown other person. Figure 8 presents the results from one of

these experiments. Because these observer subjects were not

making self-attributions, we concluded that there was no evidence

that the motivation manipulations in this paradigm had any

influence on the stage two attribution process. Rather, motivation

manipulations seem to have their impact on stage one knowledge

structure selection processes.

37

FIG URE 8. Observer Responsibility Attributions

Test Performance

6-Success

4-

AttributedPersonal 2-Responsibility

0-

-2-Failure

ILow

Involvement Information

IHigh

Priming Causal Candidates

The final two predictions I wish to discuss concerning priming

effects. The two stage model suggests that by changing the

knowledge structure used at stage one, the attributions made at

stage two as well as subsequent behaviors may be changed. In

particular, if one makes different sets of causal candidates

available at stage one, and if the candidates available include

truly plausible ones (i.e., they are likely to be accepted at stage

two), then one should be able to influence success expectancies,

motivation, and performance (as well as other variables).

38

Figure 9 presents a simple attributional model of motivation

and performance, with the two stage model detailed as "Generate

Causal Candidates" (stage one) and "Test Causal Candidates"

(stage two). I will not describe the model in detail here, both

because it is fairly self-explanatory, and because more detailed

models of a similar nature have been presented elsewhere by

Bernie, of course, and others (e.g., Anderson & Arnoult, 198?).

My point here is that knowing something about the effects of

various types of attributions allows one to test attribution process

models by manipulating variables designed to influence

attributions, and then measuring various outcome effects. One

could also attempt to measure attributions, but the realistic

situations in which I'm interested tend to elicit public attributions

influenced by self-presentation concerns rather than private

attributions. Thus, we get better tests of the model by looking at

other types of effect variables.

Priming In and Out of Context. The fourth prediction, then,

is that by priming a particular cause (thereby changing the stage

one knowledge structures and causal candidate list) one should be

able to change the performance of people in a given task.

Furthermore, the priming effect should occur in situational

contexts that are very different from the priming situation. For

example, priming someone to attribute failure at a basketball

shooting task to lack of ability should influence reactions of

failure in that task, and to failure in a subsequent interpersonal

task as well.

39

FIGURE 9. Attribution Model, With Attribution Process Detailed

Attribution Process

PerformanceOutcome

Attribution foroutcome

AffectiveReaction

Of particular interest to me is people's performance after

exposure to initial failures at a task. The main reason for this

interest is that many people display self-defeating reactions to

failure, and attributions play an important role in these reaction.

In a recent experiment (Anderson, in preparation), these

priming notions have been tested, though I should note that I

want to replicate the study before concluding the predictions are

entirely confirmed. Subjects performed two tasks. In one they

40

tried to score as many points as possible in one minute in a

basketball shooting task, using a child's basket and a foamball.

Subjects had to shoot with their non-preferred hand, and were

allowed to choose to shoot from one of several places marked on

the floor. The locations had varying point values, and there were

several one minute trials. The second task consisted of preparing

and delivering (on several trials) a one minute TV commercial

designed to persuade people to donate blood to a local blood

bank. In both tasks, subjects received failure feedback on initial

trials. Also, subjects were video taped performing both tasks.

Order of task was counterbalanced across subjects.

The priming manipulation was delivered by a confederate. As

the subject entered the lab, the confederate walked out with the

experimenter. While discussing the task with the experimenter

(whichever one the subject was going to do first), the confederate

mentioned one of three types of causes -- ability, strategy, or

effort. The conversation was staged such that the subject had to

hear it. These three causes were chosen because the effects

literature suggests that they produce clear and different outcomes.

Ability attributions for failure typically produce lower motivation

and performance quality, whereas strategy and effort attributions

typically produce higher motivation and (often) improved

performance. These effects are often context dependent, but

seemed applicable to the tasks at hand. Strategy and effort were

both used as a preliminary test of the notion that dimensional

locations of causes do not capture all the important information

contained in an attribution. Specifically, strategy and effort

41

attributions are located close to each other dimensionally (they

are internal, unstable, controllable). But I expected them to

produce some different effects.

After the subjects completed the first task, the experimenter

primed the cause again, but related it to the first task. Thus,

the primed cause was never mentioned in conjunction with the

second task.

Only two of the various dependent measures are of interest

in the present context. One was a measure of the number of

strategy changes subjects displayed across trials. Even though

effort and strategy attributions are located in essentially the same

multidimensional space, they have slightly different meanings.

Failure attributed to effort should lead to increased effort, and

perhaps to a few strategy changes. That is, trying harder often

involves trying something else, but does not guarantee trying

something else. Failure attributed to use of a poor strategy

should lead to continued high effort, but also guarantees a shift

in method or strategy. Thus, the priming manipulation should

result in more strategy changes in the strategy primed subjects

than in the ability primed subjects, with effort primed subjects

showing an intermediate level of strategy changes.

For each task, strategy changes scores were converted to

z-scores so that an overall analysis could be done. The results,

as shown in Figure 10, confirmed the two stage model prediction

of priming. Furthermore, there were no main or interaction

effects of order (first vs. second task), indicating that the prime

was equally effective even on the out-of-context task.

42

FIGURE 10. Strategy Changes as a Function of PrimingManipulations

0.4-

StrategyChanges(Z-Score

Means)

0.2-

0.0-

-0.2 -

-0.4-

-0.6-+.-- _

Effort Ability Strategy

Attributional Priming Manipulation

The second measure of interest was change in performance

quality. For both tasks, this was measured by dividing the

difference in performance between the late and early trials by the

sum of the late and early trial performances. Positive scores

therefore indicated improvement whereas negative scores indicated

declines in performance.

43

Predictions for the TV Commercial task were straightforward,

based on similar previous work. Strategy subjects were expected

to show the most improvement on this task. Because subjects

typically work very hard at this task, and because the task is

strategy dependent, it was expected that effort subjects would not

show unusually high improvement. Ability subjects also were

expected to show relatively little improvement.

The basketball task is somewhat different, though.

Performance certainly is both strategy and effort dependent. But

the best strategy may be obvious to most subjects -- pick a

distance which allows one to make many shots but not one so

close that the point value is to low. Thus, shifts in strategy may

not help performance much. Effort level is important in the

sense that the faster one recovers the ball the more shots can be

taken. In addition, the more attention one pays to the task, the

quicker one learns to adjust to shooting errors. Thus, effort

subjects were expected to show lots of improvement relative to

the ability subjects. Strategy subjects were expected to show

intermediate levels of improvement.

Note that the two stage model merely predicts that the

priming manipulation would have some reliable effects on

performance. Specific predictions, as outlined above, depend on

the adequacy of the effects models being used. Figure 11

presents the results of the performance improvement measures.

As expected, the strategy subjects showed the most improvement

in the TV Commercial task, whereas the effort subjects showed

the most improvement in the basketball task. These effects were

44

both significant, as were the task by attributional prime

interaction. However, as expected the task order variable did not

interact with the prime and the task variables, suggesting that the

priming effects were essentially the same on both the first and

second task.

FIGURE 11. Performance Changes as a Function of PrimingManipulations.

0.8-

0.6-

Improvementin 0.4-Performance

0.2-

0.0-

TV Commercial Ba ketball

%M Effort_ Ability2m Strategy

One final feature concerning these data also are of interest.

Note that strategy and effort are located in essentially the same

multidimensional causal space (internal, unstable, controllable).

Thus, according to a dimensional approach they should yield the

45

same effects. That they did not do so on either the strategy

change or the performance quality measures suggests that the

specific attributions themselves carry important information (see

also Sujan, 1986). Obviously, one can create more dimensions to

account for such failures of the dimensional approach, but it is

not clear to me how valuable it would be to do so.

Priming Congruent versus Conflicting Causal Candidates. The

fifth and final prediction I want to discuss concerns attributional

style and the interpersonally debilitated. Numerous researchers

have demonstrated that people with various problems in living

such as depression, loneliness, and shyness have different

attributional styles than do their non-debilitated counterparts. In

addition, attributional style differences are particularly pronounced

when assessed for interpersonal failures (e.g., Anderson &

Arnoult, 1985b; Anderson, Horowitz, & French, 1983; Anderson,

Jennings, & Arnoult, 1988). Specifically, people suffering from

these problems in living are relatively more likely to attribute

interpersonal failures to uncontrollable causes such as their lack

of ability or their personality traits, and are relatively less likely

to attribute such failures to controllable causes such as insufficient

effort and use of an ineffective strategy. Indeed, one of the

problems of past motivational models of attribution has been their

inability to account for self-deprecating patterns of attributions

displayed by such clinically troubled groups. A typical

motivational explanation has been to posit a different set of

hidden needs for these people. The two stage model (as well as

research in self-schema theory) suggests that the self-deprecating

46

pattern arises from stage one processing. That is, the knowledge

sets used by depressed people (for instance) are different than

those used by nondepressed.

There are two likely sources of difference at stage one. One

possibility is that the debilitated people have a different and

maladaptive causal structure for the problem situations. The

other possibility is that the causal structures are essentially the

same, but that the self-relevant information (e.g., beliefs, prior

probabilities, recall of past experiences) brought to bear on the

problem is different. Of course, it is also possible that both

are different.

Let us assume, for the moment, that the difference is the

causal structure perceptions. What does the two stage model

have to say about performance and interventions designed to

influence performance in interpersonal settings? Briefly, it

suggests that attributional priming manipulations should have

significant and specific effects on variables such as success

expectancies, motivation, and performance. People with

maladaptive attributional styles for interpersonal failure should be

more adversely affected by initial failures than people with

adaptive attributional styles. Priming adaptive cases should

improve the failure response of people with a maladaptive

attributional style, but should have little impact on people with an

adaptive style. Conversely, priming maladaptive causes should

hurt the performance of people with an adaptive style, but should

have little impact on people with a maladaptive style. This is

because the priming manipulations would affect the knowledge

47

structures and causal candidates lists of subjects only when the

prime "contradicts" the attributional style.

At the moment there are no data on possible differences in

causal structure between people with adaptive versus maladaptive

attributional styles. I do have one relevant priming study, though

(Anderson, 1983). Subjects were preselected for having either a

maladaptive or an adaptive attributional style for interpersonal

failures, and performed an interpersonal persuasion task. Prior to

the task they were assigned to one of three attributional priming

conditions. Some subjects received no prime; these were expected

to perform as a function of their attributional style. Maladaptive

style subjects were expected to have lower success expectancies,

lower motivation, and poorer quality performances than were

adaptive style subjects. Other subjects received adaptive primes.

Specifically, they heard mention of strategy and effort causes as

potential explanations for performance. The remaining subjects

received maladaptive primes, hearing mention of ability and trait

causes. The priming manipulations were embedded in the

experimental instructions, presented quite some time before

task performance.

The task was to persuade people on the telephone to donate

blood to the local blood bank. This is a difficult interpersonal

persuasion task, guaranteeing much failure. Subjects examined

relevant blood bank information and made a (rigged) failure call

in the laboratory. Subsequently, they called from their homes for

a one week period, and then returned to the lab. The three

48

primary dependent measures were success expectancies, motivation,

and performance quality.

On all three measures the predicted results (outlined above)

were obtained. A z-score composite index of these results is

present in Figure 12. Attributional style had a dramatic impact

on performance in the absence of causal primes. It had no

impact in the priming manipulation conditions. In those

conditions, subjects' performances depended upon the causal

primes. Thus, it appears that part of the problem of people

with maladaptive attributional styles lies in their causal

structure of the problem situations. Further work is needed on

this point, however.

Conclusions

To summarize, the two stage model views the attribution

process as a variant of Kruglanski's epistemic problem solving

process. Specifically, the first stage consists of problem

formulation; the second stage consists of problem resolution.

Problem formulation is influenced by a variety of factors,

including the salience or accessibility of relevant guiding

knowledge structures. In stage one a variety of knowledge

structures are brought to bear on the problem, including

information about one's past performance in the domain, one's

expectancies and intentions, and other information from the

present situation. Motivational manipulations and motive levels

have their impact at this stage, by influencing the selection of

relevant knowledge structures. Problem resolution is the actual

49

FIGURE 12. Performance Quality (Z-Score) as a Function ofAttributional Style and Priming Manipulation

StrategyChanges(Z-Score

Means)

0.4­

0.3­

0.2­

0.1­

0.0-

-0.1 -

-0.2 -

-0.3 -

-0.4 -

oManipulation

AbilityTrait

StrategyEffort

Attributional Manipulation

mm\ Controllable_ Uncontrollable

attribution process. People do use the various attributional

process proposed by Kelley and others, but do so imperfectly.

For example, people do something like a covariation assessment,

but do so through use of various judgmental heuristics (see the

edited volume by Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).

The main advances of this model are: (a) It takes into

account the knowledge held by the perceiver concerning the past,

the target of the attribution analysis (self or other), situations,

and causes; (b) It relies on demonstrated information processing

effects at the attributional stage, rather than normative principles;

(c) It accounts for motivational variables in testable, process

50

terms; (d) It suggests that people's knowledge about causes goes

beyond dimensional thinking, and thus accounts better for our

intuitions and for our data; (e) It suggests a fairly detailed

account of attributional style problems; and (f) It suggests

practical ways of modifying maladaptive thought processes and

subsequent self-defeating behaviors by modifying the underlying

social cognitions.

Future work will be directed at testing some of the

presently untested predictions, and further specification of the

admittedly vague premises in the present version. Those of you

who have ideas or data relevant to any of this are invited to

share them with me. I would certainly appreciate any assistance

or insight offered.

51

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The Measurement of AttributionProcess: Trait and SituationalApproaches}

Daniel W. RussellCollege of MedicineUniversity of Iowa

Measuring Causal Attribution Processes:

Trait and Situational Approaches

In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to

measurement issues in the context of attribution research.

Comparative analyses of different methods for assessing causal

attributions (e.g., Elig & Frieze, 1979; Russell, McAuley, &

Tarico, 1987) as well as the publication of scales to assess

attribution processes, including attributions for specific events

(Russell, 1982) as well as dispositional tendencies to make certain

types of causal attributions (e.g., Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer,

Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982; Lefcourt, 1981), have

served to improve research methodology in this area.

The development of these new measurement procedures does,

however, pose a conceptual problem for research on causal

attribution process. Fundamentally, researchers have been

lPaper presented at the conference entitled, "New Models - NewExtensions of Attribution Theory to Clinical Uses," Held at the California Schoolof Professional Psychology, Los Angeles, CA, January 30 and February 6, 1988.

56

focusing their attention on two different facets of the attribution.

Some assessment procedures are designed to measure casual

explanations for specific events that have occurred (i.e., the

situational approach), whereas other procedures assess cross­

situational tendencies to explain events in a particular way

(i.e., the trait approach). Although both of these approaches

to measurement are clearly relevant to a complete understanding

of the causal attribution process, the relations among the

constructs being assessed in not understood, either theoretically

or empirically.

The purpose of this paper is to examine these two

approaches that have been taken to assessing attribution

processes. Problems that are apparent with each assessment

strategy will be noted, and relations among the trait and

situational measures of attribution processes are examined.

Implications of these findings for models of the attribution process

are discussed, along with recommendations for future research in

this area.

Methods of Assessing Attribution Processes

Three basic methods of assessing causal attribution processes

can be identified from the literature. Two of these methods

involve the assessment of causal attributions for specific events,

and therefore represent a situational approach to measurement.

The third method involves the assessment of dispositional

tendencies to make certain types of causal attributions across

situations, and therefore represents a trait approach.

57

Historically, the first and still most prevalent method of

measurement involves the assessment of specific causal attributions

for events (i.e., ability, effort). A number of different procedures

have been used to assess these causal explanations, including

coding of free response attributional statements, percentage ratings

of the extent to which different causes contributed to the outcome

(that sum to 100%), and independent likert scale rating of the

importance of different causes as determinants of an event. Elig

and Frieze (1979) examined the reliability and validity of these

different methods of assessing causal attributions, and concluded

that independent importance ratings appeared to provide the most

reliable and valid methods of assessment.

A second method of assessing attributions for a specific event

has been developed more recently. Rather than focusing on the

causal attribution the individual has made for an event, this

approach attempts to assess directly how the individual perceives

the cause or causes of an event in terms of the causal dimensions

hypothesized by Weiner (1979, 1985, 1986) to underlie causal

attributions. Russell (1982) has developed the Causal Dimension

Scale as a multi-item measure to assess the causal dimensions

described by Weiner. Other investigators have also attempted to

directly assess causal dimensions, by relying on single item

measures of the causal dimensions.

Both the causal attribution and causal dimension approaches

are situation-specific, being focused on the individual's explanation

for an event that has occurred. The trait approach to assessing

attribution processes attempts to measure cross-situational

58

tendencies to make certain types of attributions for events.

One well-known example of this type of measure is the

Attributional Style Questionnaire developed by Seligman and his

colleagues (Peterson et aI., 1982) as an aspect of their learned

helplessness model of depression. Other dispositional measures of

attribution processes have been developed by Anderson, Horowitz,

and French (1983) and Lefcourt (1981).

These three methods of attribution measurement appear to

highlight different facets of the causal attribution process. Both

the causal attribution and causal dimension approaches focus on

cognitions surrounding a particular event, such as an achievement

outcome. Thus, these two methods of assessment are situation­

specific. The attribution and dimension approaches differ,

however, in the level of cognitive processing that is measured.

The causal attribution approach attempts to identify the factor of

factors that the person believes were responsible for the event.

By contrast, the causal dimension approach moves to a higher

level of abstraction, in attempting to assess the dimensional

properties of the cause or causes as perceived by the attributor.

The trait approach to attribution measurement focuses on the

individual's general tendencies to explain events in a particular

manner. As such, it would appear that this approach to assessing

attribution processes is focusing on a construct or constructs that

are antecedent to the person's explanation for a particular event.

One might predict that dispositional tendencies to make certain

types of causal attributions would combine with characteristics of

the situation (e.g., consensus or consistency information, the

59

achievement outcome; see Weiner, 1986) to determine causal

attributions for a specific event. Thus, this approach to

measurement appears to be assessing a distinct aspect of the

attribution process from the causal attribution or causal

dimension approaches.

In the next section, I will discuss the situational approach to

measuring attributions, focusing particular attention on the relation

between causal attribution and causal dimension approaches to

measurement. Following that, the trait approach to measurement

will be discussed, with particular attention paid to the relation

between dispositional tendencies to make certain types of casual

attributions and how the individual explains specific events.

Assessing Causal Attributions for Specific Events

An issue that arises concerning the assessment of causal

attributions for specific events involves the importance of the

cause or causes cited by the attributor versus the dimensional

properties of the cause or causes. Theoretical models of the

attribution process emphasize the dimensional properties of causal

attributions, and not the specific cause arrived at by the

individual in explaining why the event occurred. For example, in

Weiner's (1979, 1985, 1986) attribution model, it is the

dimensional properties of attributions that are viewed as

determining such consequences of the attribution process as

affective reactions and future expectations of success. Similarly,

in research of actor-observer differences in causal attributions, the

focus is on whether the causal explanation is to a facet of the

60

situation or to the person, and not on the specific causal

explanation offered by the actor or observer.

As a consequence of this theoretical focus on causal

dimensions, researchers have attempted to "dimensionalize" the

causal attributions that have been offered by subjects in their

studies. On the basis of the theorized dimensional properties of

specific causal explanations, researchers have classified attributions

into categories (e.g., internal vs. external), and then tested

predictions from models such as Weiner's on the basis of this

categorization of the cause. For example, if an individual cited

"ability" as a cause of his or her success, that attribution would

be categorized by the researcher as representing an internal,

stable, and uncontrollable cause in Weiner's model and, in turn,

certain relationships between that attribution and the individual's

affective reaction to the outcome and expectations of future

success would be predicted.

Two problems with this approach to assessing causal

dimensions can be identified. One difficulty is conceptual. In

Wiener's attribution model, an implicit assumption is that

individuals dimensionalize the causal explanation they have arrived

at, and that this dimensional representation serves in turn to

influence the person's affect and expectations. Weiner's model

suggests that an abstraction process occurs, wherein the individual

develops a representation of the cause in terms of dimensional

properties. Support for this inferred dimensionalization process

comes from multidimensional scaling studies of causal explanations

(Michela, Peplau, & Weeks, 1982; Passer, 1977; Passer, Kelley, &

61

Michela, 1978; Stern, 1983), where dimensions similar to those

hypothesized by Weiner (1979, 1985, 1986) have been found to

underlie how individuals perceive causes. Thus, it appears

that the causal dimensions are not merely in the minds of

attributions researchers, but are also used by subjects to

evaluate causal attributions.

The measurement problem posed by this theoretical

perspective is that the individual's perceptions of causal

attributions may not agree with our theoretical view of the

dimensional properties of specific causes (Russell, 1982; Russell,

tvlcAuley, & Tarico, 1987; Weiner, 1979, 1983). To illustrate this

point, consider the data presented in Figures 1, 2, and 3. These

data come from a study of causal attributions for performance on

a midterm examination (Russell et aL, 1987), where students were

asked to state a causal explanation for their performance and

then indicate how they perceived that attribution in terms of the

locus of causality, stability, and controllability dimensions

described by Weiner (1979, 1985, 1986). The free response

attributional statements were then coded according to which of

eight different causes the statement represented. Dimensional

ratings by students of three of the causes (Le., ability, unstable

effort, and task difficulty) that were cited by at least 10 of the

students in explaining their exam performance are presented in

the figures.

As can be seen in Figure 1, the ratings of the locus of

causality of these causal attributions agree with theoretical

expectations. Ability and effort were both viewed by students as

62

FIGURE 1. Ratings of Causal Attribution on the Locus ofCausality Dimension

27Internal

Locus ofCausality

External3

FIGURE 2. Ratings of Causal Attributions on the StabilityDimension

27Stable

Stability

Unstable3

Ability UnstableEffort

63

FIGURE 3. Ratings of Causal Attributions on the ControllabilityDimension

27Controllable

Controllability 15

Uncontrollable3

Ability UnstableEffort

TaskDifficulty

~l$%mw1'WwJ[o}w!r~!~~I~oow>%mW!!'mfWWWm;tl%?~'Wlf~=~:mm'~aj'\maim~

internal causes, whereas task difficulty was rated as an external

cause. Also consistent with theoretical expectations, ability was

perceived as a stable cause, whereas effort was perceived as an

unstable cause (Figure 2). However, in contrast to theoretical

expectations, task difficulty was viewed by students as unstable.

Finally, as shown in Figure 3 all three causal explanations were

perceived by students as being controllable, including ability and

task difficulty, which are theorized to be uncontrollable causes.

The second difficulty with the traditional approach to

assessing causal attributions concerns the psychometric properties

of the measurement procedures. In a recent paper, Russell et a1.

(1987) examined the reliability and validity of three different

methods of assessing causal dimensions. Two of these methods

involved the assessment of casual attributions cited by the

individual in explaining the event, and then coding these

64

attributions into dimensions based on theorized properties of the

causes. The third approach involved the direct assessment of how

the individual perceived the cause or causes he or she had cited

in explaining the event, using the Causal Dimensions Scale

(Russell, 1982).

One interesting set of findings from this investigation

concerned the reliability of these different methods of assessing

causal dimensions. The free response coding of attributions into

categories was found to be reasonably reliable (Kappa =.76).

Reliabilities of the casual dimension measures based on the

importance ratings of different causal attributions and the Causal

Dimension Scale are presented in Table 1. As can be seen, the

reliability of scores based on the importance ratings of causes was

very low. This was due to the method of calculating these scores.

For example, in computing a locus of causality score, one sums

together the importance ratings of the internal causes and the

ratings of external causes, and subtracts these two values from

each other. These values therefore represent difference scores,

and the equation for computing the reliability of difference scores

given by Lord and Novick (1968) was employed in calculating the

reliability of these measures. The low reliabilities shown in Table

1 resulted from the positive intercorrelation of scores representing

the opposite ends of the causal dimensions, Ranging from .24 to

.41. So, for example, individuals tended to rate both internal

and external causes as being important in determining their

performance, rather than seeing the two types of causes as

65

mutually exclusive. Therefore, it appears that this method of

calculating causal dimension scores is particularly problematic.

Table 1 Reliability of Different Methods of Assessing CausalDimensions

ImKor~ance CausalCausal Dimension atmgs Dimension Scale

Locus of Causality .389 .787

Stability .043 .855

Controllability .079 .511

The reliability data shown in Table 1 for the Causal

Dimension Scale indicates that the locus of causality and stability

subscales are reasonably reliable. For the controllability subscale,

however, the alpha coefficient was quite low, suggesting the need

to improve this subscale. We recently have added four additional

items to the scale that are designed to assess controllability. This

version of the Causal Dimension Scale was administered in a

recent study of causal attributions for midterm exam performance

(to be described in more detail below). where the reliability of

the controllability subscale was found to be much higher

(coefficient alpha = .72).

66

Russell et al. (1987) also conducted a multitrait-multimethod

analysis of the causal dimension measures, comparable to the

analyses reported by Elig and Frieze (1979) for causal attribution

measures. An interesting result from that analysis concerned the

relation between the locus of causality and controllability

dimensions, as estimated in a confirmatory factor analysis across

the three methods of assessment. That correlation, !:. = .928, was

sufficiently high to raise questions regarding the discriminant

validity of measures designed to assess these two causal

dimensions. Table 2 presents results using the Causal Dimension

Scale to assess the locus of causality and controllability

dimensions in three different settings. These studies involved

causal attributions for exam performance (Russell et aL, 1987),

student performance on a mathematics test (Russell et al., 1985),

and feelings of loneliness (Russell, Cutrona, Rose, & Yurko,

1984). As can be seen in Table 2, the relationships among these

causal dimensions vary greatly, ranging from essentially no

relationship in the context of attributions for performance of

another to a relatively strong relationship when explaining

personal performance on a midterm examination. These relations

appear to vary depending on the nature of the causal attributions

made for the event. For example, our coding of attributions for

exam performance indicated that most of the causal attributions

were to effort (e.g., not studying hard enough for the exam) or

task difficulty (e.g., the test was very easy; see Russell et al.,

1987, Table 2). Since students tended to make either internal

and controllable attributions or external and uncontrollable

67

attributions, it is not surprising that these dimensions were

strongly and positively correlated in that study. In conclusion, it

appears from these data across studies that the measures of the

locus of causality and controllability dimensions from the Causal

Dimension Scale are assessing distinct constructs.

Other analyses reported by Russell et aI., (1987) examined

the construct validity of the three methods of assessing causal

dimensions, on the basis of predictions from Weiner's (1979, 1985,

1986) attribution model. Specifically, the impact of the

achievement outcome and expectations of success on the causal

dimensions was tested, as well as the relation between the causal

dimensions and affective reactions to exam performance. Although

none of the methods of assessment provided support for every

prediction from Weiner's model, the general pattern of results

clearly indicated that the direct assessment of the individual's

perception of the dimensions as operationalized by the Causal

TABLE 2 Correlations Between Locus of Causality andControllability

Event

Exam Performance

Student. Performance

Loneliness

Correlation

.lS2C*

QThese data are from Russell, McAuley, and Tarico (1987).df= 128.

bThese data are from Russell et al. (1985). df=77.cThese data are from Russell, Cutrona, Rose, and Yurko (1984).

df=471.*I! < .001.

68

Dimension Scale provided the most valid assessment of the

causal dimensions.

The available evidence therefore suggests the utility of

directly assessing how the individual perceives the causal

attribution for an event in terms of the causal dimensions. As

noted previously, Weiner's attribution model hypothesizes that the

dimensional properties of causal attributions determine the

consequences of the attribution process (i.e., affective reactions

and expectations for future success). Two implications of this

model need to be examined in future studies. First, this model

implies that the causal attribution made by the individual is input

into a dimensionalization process, where the person extracts

certain properties of the cause. Alternatively, the causal

attribution may actually represent an epiphenomenon in the

context of this dimensionalization process. That is, various

determinants of the attribution process (e.g., consensus or

consistency information, dis positional characteris tics; see We iner,

1985, 1986) may directly lead the person to view the cause of an

event as having certain dimensional properties (e.g., reflecting an

aspect of them selves; being stable over time). This information

may be turned to for a possible causal attribution when prompted

by a why question. However, in the absence of such an external

stimulus, a specific causal attribution may not be identified by the

person. Careful information processing investigations are required

to determine the process by which the individual arrives at both a

causal attribution and a dimensional representation of the cause.

69

A second point concerns the impact of causal attributions and

causal dimensions on such consequences of the attribution process

as affective reactions to success and failure and expectations of

future success. Weiner (1979, 1985, 1986) proposes a mediation

model, wherein the causal dimensions are hypothesized to mediate

the effects of the causal attributions on these consequences. To

date, few attempts to test directly this hypothesis have been

reported. Russell and McAuley (1986) found there was some

evidence of direct relations between causal attributions for success

and failure and affective reactions, that was not mediated by the

causal dimensions. An example of these results is presented in

Table 3. Both the specific causal attribution for the outcome and

the dimensional properties of that causal explanation appear to

influence the individual's affective reaction to success and failure.

These findings suggest that either (a) there are direct relations

between specific attributions and the consequences of the

attribution process. or (b) other characteristics or dimensions

underlying causal attributions for success and failure are also

relevant to affective reactions, which need to be assessed. Future

studies need to further examine this mediation question, in order

for us to develop a better understanding of the relation between

causal attributions, causal dimensions, and consequences of the

attribution process.

70

cr~~mmryN$~?~%-:fu~~~m~mE~~m~4:~&w~em~itmgMM&8g~~

TABLE 3 Variation in Affective Reactions to Success and FailureAccounted for by Causal Attributions and Causal Dimensions

Causal Causal JointAffect Attributions Dimensions Effects

Competent .085* .050* .479

Gratitude .101 * .006 .097

Positive Affect .021 * .067* .218

Anger .056* .021 * .137

Guilt .030* .019* .119

Surprise .129* .007 .123

Negative Affect .052* .002 .018

*1! < .05.

Trait Measures of Attribution Processes

The first measure of dispositional tendencies to make certain

types of causal attributions was the locus of control scale

developed by Rotter (1966). This tradition of research can be

traced to the more recent development of domain-specific

measures of locus of control, such as scales to assess health locus

of control (Lau & Ware, 1981; Walls ton & Walls ton, 1980) and

the Multidimensional-Multiattributional Causality Scale (Lefcourt,

1981 ) that is designed to yield locus of control scores for

achievement and affiliative situations.

A second tradition of research on dispositional attribution

tendencies has been inspired by the learned helplessness model of

depression developed by Seligman and his colleagues (Abramson,

71

Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). These investigators developed the

Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) to assess dispositional

tendencies to perceive the causes of events in a depressive

fashion (Peterson et aI., 1982). Similar instruments have also

been developed by other researchers (e.g., Anderson et aI., 1983).

These attempts to develop dispositional measures of

attribution assume that individuals are consistent across situations

in their explanations of events. This assumption appears

questionable given the general thrust of attribution research within

social psychology. Although some studies have found relations

between personality characteristics (e.g., achievement motivation,

self-esteem) and causal attributions for success and failure

outcomes, a substantial body of literature suggests that situational

characteristics (e.g., achievement outcome, consensus and

consistency information) can greatly influence the causal

attributions made by the individual (see Weiner, 1985, 1986).

Thus, one can question the assumption that individuals will be

consistent across situations in their explanations for events.

Research employing the Attributional Style Questionnaire also

raises questions regarding this assumption of cross-situational

consistency in causal attributions. Cutrona, Russell, and Jones

(1985) conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of responses to

the ASQ, finding only weak evidence of tendencies to make

certain types of attributions across situations. In addition to

factors reflecting the three causal dimensions employed by

Seligman and his colleagues in assessing attribution tendencies

(i.e., locus of causality, stability, and globality), factors reflecting

72

each of the specific situations on the ASQ were found. These

results are shown in Figure 4. These findings are even more

striking given the hypothetical nature of the situations on the

ASQ. Thus, there appears to be evidence of situational specificity

in attributions even for events that have not actually occurred.

In a second study, Cutrona et al. (1985) examined whether

attributional style scores would be predictive of attributions for

negative events. Relations between the attributional style measure

and causal explanations for actual events were very weak,

averaging from .125 for locus of causality to .245 for globality.

These findings have been replicated in a more recent study by

Follette and Jacobson (1987). They examined the relations

between ASQ scores and attributions for failure on a midterm

examination. They found a small but statistically significant

relationship, I (41) .38, 12 < .05.

We have recently completed a study examining trait and

situational determinants of causal attributions, where we examined

the impact of dispositional attribution tendencies on causal

attributions for performance on a midterm examination. Several

weeks prior to their midterm examinations in an introductory

psychology course at the University of Iowa, a sample of 254

students completed a number of different measures, which

included the Multidimensional-Multiattributional Causality Scale

(MMCS) developed by Lefcourt (1981) and the Attributional Style

Questionnaire developed by Peterson et al. (1982). These two

scales were selected since they employ different methods of

assessing dispositional tendencies to make certain types

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74

of attributions. The MMCS instrument assesses the individual's

use of certain causal attributions (i.e., ability, effort, and luck) in

achievement and affiliative situations, whereas the Attributional

Style Questionnaire has individuals rate the causes they cite for

hypothetical events on the causal dimensions of locus of causality,

stability, and globality, Thus, we anticipated that scores of the

first measure of trait attribution would be predictive of causal

attributions made for exam performance, whereas scores on the

ASQ would be predictive of how the individual perceived the

causal attribution in terms of the causal dimensions.

After receiving their grade on the midterm examination,

students were asked to indicate how successful they were on the

examination and to make causal attributions for their performance.

In terms of causal attribution measures, students rated the

importance of eight different causes of their exam performance

and completed the revised Causal Dimension Scale (Russell, 1982)

described earlier. Finally, students reported their affective

reactions to their outcome on the examination on a series of

rating scales and indicated how well they expected to perform on

the final examination in the course.

Table 4 presents the results of analyses examining the

relation between the trait attribution measures and causal

attributions for exam performance. Scores on the dispositional

measures were derived in the following manner. First, for both

instruments we restricted the analyses to items assessing

perceptions of the causes of achievement outcomes. Separate

scores were developed for success and failure outcomes, and a

75

total trait score across success and failure outcomes was also

computed. For the measures of attributions for exam

performance, students were divided into success and failure groups

on the basis of performance ratings, and a total attribution score

across outcome was also computed.

;?t1;~~1m.3~~.J~~~jW~~~~~~g®;~@?tlW&11f.~~~~~mm~tJm}m@~§f:J~:q:~~~Ji

TABLE 4 Correlations Between Trait and Situational Measures ofAttribution

Attribution Failureo Successb Overall'

Ability .192 .069 .114*

Effort -.034 -.059 .047

Luck .446*** .381*** .360***

Causal Dimension

Locus of Causality .116 .083 .092

Stability .312** -.034 -.006

°df=63. bdf= 161. cdf=252.*I!. < .05. **I!. < .01. ***I!. < .001.

The results in Table 4 generally indicated little relation

between the trait measures of attribution tendencies and causal

attributions for exam performance. Considering the relation

between scores on the MMCS and the importance ratings of

different causal attributions, only luck attributions were found to

be related to the trait measure. Individuals who generally tend to

attribute achievement outcomes to luck were also found to rate

that cause as an important determinant of their exam

performance. For the Attributional Style Questionnaire, only one

76

of the correlations with scores on the Causal Dimension Scale was

found to be statistically significant. Individuals who performed

poorly on the midterm examination and who tended to make

stable attributions for failure in response to the hypothetical

situations on the ASQ also perceived the cause of their exam

performance as being stable.

To summarize, these findings in conjunction with the results

of previous studies (Cutrona et aI., 1985; Follette & Jacobson,

1987) suggest that trait measures of attribution tendencies have

little effect on the causal explanations arrived at by the individual

for actual events. The results of these studies pose an interesting

dilemma for attributional models of motivation, such as Weiner's

model of achievement motivation or the learned helplessness

model of depression developed by Seligman and his colleagues.

An assumption made in both of these models is that trait

measures of attributional tendencies should influence motivation

through their effects on the individual's causal explanations for

actual events. Thus, one would predict that (a) trait measures of

attribution would be related to explanations for actual events that

occur, and (b) that causal attributions for these events would

mediate the effects of trait attributions on motivation (e.g.,

affective reactions and expectations of future success). Given that

these trait measures are not predictive of causal attributions for

actual events, we would expect from both of these models to find

that these trait measures are not predictive of motivational

variables. However, these measures do appear to be predictive of

77

such outcomes as depression (Cutrona, 1983) and reactions to

stressful experiences (Lefcourt, 1983).

To illustrate this point, consider the results presented in

Table 5. These data are drawn from our recent study of

attributions for exam performance. For students who indicated

that their performance on the examination was unsuccessful, we

examined the impact of trait and situational measures of

attribution on feelings of depression. A hierarchical multiple

regression analysis was conducted, in which the first set of

variables to enter the equation were the three subscale scores

from the Causal Dimension Scale. After these variables were

entered into the regression equation, the total score from the

Attributional Style Questionnaire was entered into the equation,

which reflects the student's tendency to make internal, stable, and

global attributions for failure.

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TABLE 5 Impact of Trait and Situational Attributions onDepression

Predictor

Locus of Causality

Stability

Controllability

Attributional Style

aJl < .10.*p. < .05.

Beta

.253*

.173

-.009

.214*.044*

78

In combination, the three causal dimension scores from the

Causal Dimension Scale accounted for approximately 11 % of the

variation in depression following failure, E (3, 60) = 2.41, Q. =

.07. As shown in Table 5, only the locus causality subscale was

a statistically significant predictor. The direction of this

relationship indicated that students who made internal attributions

for failure also reported greater depression. After these three

predictor variables entered the equation, the attributional style

score was entered. An additional 4% of the variation in

depression was explained by this variable. As can be seen in

Table 5, individuals who tended to make internal, stable, and

global attributions for failure on the ASQ also reported greater

depression in reaction to failing on their midterm examination.

Thus, these results indicate that the trait measures of attribution

tendencies influenced the level of depression reported by

students over and above the influence of the situational

attribution measure.

To summarize, it appears that trait measures of attributional

tendencies are predictive of such important motivational variables

as affective reactions to events, despite the lack of relationship to

the individual's causal explanations for events. These results pose

an interesting dilemma for attribution-based models of motivation,

since cognitions about the causes of specific events do not appear

to account for the effects of these trait attribution measures.

79

Conclusion

In conclusion, the results of the investigations reviewed in

this paper indicated a need to examine carefully the relations

among trait and situational measures of attribution processes, in

order to develop a more complete understanding of how

attributions influence motivation. Concerning the relation between

causal attributions and causal dimensions, research needs to

evaluate the cognitive processes linking these two sets of

variables. We need to understand how the individual goes from

an explanation for an event to a dimensional representation of

that cause. In addition, the relative influences of causal

attributions and causal dimensions on such motivational

consequences as affect and expectations needs to be better

understood. Do the causal dimensions mediate these relations, or

are there direct relations between causal attributions and the

consequences of the attributions process?

Understanding the process by which trait measures of

attribution processes, such as the Attributional Style Questionnaire

and the Multidimensional-Multiattributional Causality Scale

developed by Lefcourt (1981), influence motivational variables such

as affect and expectations is also an important topic for future

research. In contrast to existing attribution-based models of

motivation, the available evidence indicates that these trait

variables affect motivation through processes that are not

80

attributional in nature. One possibility is that other cognitive

processes, such as self-efficacy cognitions, may be affected by

these trait variables. Clearly, it is an important task for future

research to understand better the role of these trait variables in

motivation, and to attempt to better integrate these factors in

attribution-based models of motivation.

81

References

Abramson, L.Y., Seligman, M.E.P., & Teasdale, J. (1978).Learned helplessness in human beings: Critique andreformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49-74.

Anderson, C.A., Horowitz, L.M., & French, R. deS. (1983).Attributional style of lonely and depressed people. Journalof personality and Social Psychology, 45, 127-136.

Cutrona, C.E. (1983). Causal attributions and perinataldepression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 92, 161-172.

Cutrona, C.E., Russell, D., & Jones, R.D. (1985). Cross­situational consistency in causal attributions: Doesattributional style exist? Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 47, 1043-1058.

Elig, T.W. & Frieze, I.H. (1979). Measuring causal attributionsfor success and failure. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 37, 621-634.

Follette, V.M., & Jacobson, N.S. (1987). Importance ofattributions as a predictor of how people cope with failure.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 1205-1211.

Lau, R.R., & Ware, J.E. (1981). Refinements in the measurementof health-specific locus of control beliefs. Medical Care, 19,1147-1157.

Lefcourt, H.M. (1981). The construction and development of theMultidimensional-Multiattributional Causality Scales. In H.M.Lefcourt (Ed.), Research with the locus of control construct(VoU, pp. 245-277). New York: Academic Press.

Lefcourt, H.M. (1983). The locus of control as a moderatorvariable: Stress. In H.M. Lefcourt (Ed.), Research with thelocus of control construct: Vol. 2: bevelopments and socialproblems (pp. 253-268). New York: Academic Press.

Lord, F.M., & Novick, M.R. (1968). Statistical theories of mentaltests. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Michela, J.L., Peplau, L.A., & Weeks, D.G. (1982). Perceiveddimensions of attributions for loneliness. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, .11., 929-936.

Passer, M.W. (1977). Perceiving the causes of success and failurerevisited: A multidimensional scalie; afcproach. Unpublisheddoctoral dissertation, University ofaliornia, Los Angeles.

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Passer, M.W., Kelley, H.H., & Michela, J.L. (1978).Multidimensional scaling of the causes of negativeinterpersonal behavior. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 36, 951-962.

Peterson, C., Semmel, A., von Baeyer, C., Abramson, L.Y.,Metalsky, G .L., & Seligman, M.E.P. (1982). The AttributionalStyle Questionnaire. Cognitive Therapy and Research, Q.,287-300.

Rotter, J.B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versusexternal control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs,80, 1-28.

Russell, D. (1982). The Causal Dimension Scale: A measure ofhow individuals perceive causes. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 42, 1127-1135.

Russell, D., Cutrona, C.E., Rose, J., & Yurko, K. (1984). Socialand emotional loneliness. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 46, 1313-1321.

Russell, D., Lenel, J., Spicer, C., Miller, J., Albrecht, J., & Rose,J. (1985). Evaluating the disabled: An attributional analysis.Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 11, 23-31.

Russell, D., & McAuley, E. (1986). Causal attributions, causaldimensions, and affective reactions to success and failure.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 1174-1185.

Russell, D., McAuley, E., & Tarico, V. (1987). Measuring causalattributions for success and failure: A comparison ofmethodologies for assessing causal dimensions. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 52, 1248-1257.

Stern, P. (1983). A multimethod analysis of student perceptionsof the causal dimensions. Unpublished doctoral dissertation,University of California, Los Angeles.

Wallston, K.A., & Wallston, B.S. (1980). Health locus of controlscales. In H.M. Lefcourt (Ed.), Research with the locus ofcontrol construct (Vol. 1, pp. 189-243). New York: AcademicPress.

Weiner, B. (1979). A theory of motivation for some classroomexperiences. Journal of Educational Psychology, 11, 3-25.

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Weiner, B. (1983). Some methodological pitfalls in attributionresearch. Journal of Educational Psychology, 75, 530-543.

Weiner, B. (1985). An attributional theory of achievementmotivation and emotion. Psychological Review, 92, 548-573.

Weiner, B. (1986). An attributional theory of motivation andemotion. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Existential Versus CausalAttributions: The Social Perceiveras Philosopher}

Paul T.~ WongTrent University and University of Toronto

During my sabbatical leave at UCLA, Bernie Weiner and I

collaborated on a number of studies on spontaneous attributions.

The paradigm we employed was rather straightforward. Inasmuch

as attributions are answers to "why" questions, we simply asked

subjects to write down the questions or thoughts that came to

their minds in various achievement situations. We wanted to

find out when people ask why questions. We were also interested

in the temporal process and the heuristics of attributional search.

This series of studies was later published (Wong & Weiner, 1981).

The main finding is that given an unexpected or a negative

outcome, individuals tend to ask the following three types

of questions:

(1) Attributional - The subjects ask themselves what causes

the outcome. They entertain various hypotheses in their causal

search, such as Did I study enough? Do I have the ability to do

well? Is the exam too difficult? Is the instructor a hard marker?

IPreparation of this chapter was partially supported by a grant from theSocial Sciences Council of Canada to the author.

85

(2) Coping Appraisal - In the case of an undesirable

outcome, individuals also assess their coping resources and

consider possible courses of action. They ask such question as

What can I do to improve my grade? Should I talk to the instructor?

Who will give me some help on this subject?

(3) Re-evaluation - for wanting of a better label, the term

re-evaluation was used to classify questions which re-examine the

value or purpose of pursuing university education. This type of

questions includes What am I doing here? What is the value of a

university degree? Is it worth my while to spend a few years of my

l~fe in university?

Since then, our findings of spontaneous causal search have

been replicated and extended (Weiner, 1985a; Wong, Delerga, &

Wilson, 1988). However, I am somewhat disappointed that people

have not paid enough attention to the heuristics of attributional

search. This line of research should further our understanding of

the hypothesis-testing strategies.

Our finding on appraisal is probably the first piece of

evidence of spontaneously generated coping appraisal. This

finding supports Lazarus' contention that individuals consider what

can be done when they are confronted with a threat or a

challenge, and such assessment is referred to as secondary

appraisal (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).

It is rather surprising that very few people have investigated

the relationships between causal attribution and coping appraisal,

because the two processes are closely related. For example,

appraisal of personal coping resources (Is there anything I can do

86

about this problem?) should be linked to internal and controllable

attributions (I am responsible for what has happened. I could have

avoided this problem.)

One of the main assumptions of attribution theory is that

people are motivated to seek causal understanding in order to

predict and control. Knowing what causes a problem would

facilitate the choice of appropriate coping actions. Unfortunately,

the conceptual distinctions between causal attributions and

secondary appraisal have not been articulated and the interactions

between these two variables remain an uncharted territory that

awaits further research.

The third type of spontaneously generated cognitions which

we labeled re-evaluation -- has probably received the least

attention from researchers, but I hope that this situation will

change in the near future. When we first discovered this type of

cognitions, we found it interesting and intuitive, but never gave it

much thought. However, in the past few years a number of

observations have made me realize the tremendous importance of

re-evaluation, which may be more appropriately labeled as

existential attribution. In this chapter, I present some evidence

concerning the role of existential attribution in the achievement

domain and stressful encounters, compare these two kinds of

attributions conceptually and empirically, and propose a model of

existential search.

87

Observations in the achievement domain

Kwong, a visa student from Hong Kong, was very bright and

studious. He maintained a straight A record. Unexpectedly a

mid-night telephone call came from home. He was devastate by

the news that his father had just died of a heart attack. As he

grieved over the untimely death of his father, life lost its

meaning, and education lost its appeal. His grades deteriorated

steadily. Before the end of the school year, he withdrew from

the university and returned to Hong Kong.

Lisa was an intelligent and energetic student. She excelled in

all subjects during her first two years of university. However,

starting in her third year, her performance took a nose dive.

During the mid-year review, which we do at Trent every year with

our students, I asked her why she did so poorly. The answer was

simple: she had just discovered that there was more to life than

getting good grades and she failed to find any meaning in the

"rat race" for high marks. She wanted to spend a couple of years

in Europe traveling before deciding what to do with her life.

There are many such under-achievers and college drop-outs.

In some cases, it is due to a personal trauma, such as breakup of

a romantic relationship or death of a family member. In other

cases, it is simply a matter of realizing that university education

is no longer a meaningful experience for them. If you ask them

about the cause of their poor performance, they can clearly tell

you that it is due to a lack of efforts on their part. But if you

tell them that they should improve their grades by working

harder, they would retort by asking yo:" What for? To what end?

88

Their under-achievement does not seem to have anything to do

with causal attribution, but has everything to do with existential

attribution. They no longer achieve, because they can not find

any good reason for studying hard.

The same kind of existential analysis can also be applied to

over-achievement. Recently, there is considerable interest in the

high levels of academic achievement attained by Asian immigrants.

In the cover story of a recent issue of Time magazine on Asian

Whiz Kids (Brand, 1987), we learn that educators are wondering:

Why do these oriental kids, many of whom are first generation

immigrants with a language handicap, out-perform their North

American counterparts? What enables them to win a

disproportionately large number of prizes and awards? Some

researchers, like Dr. Arthur Jenson and Dr. Philip Ruston, would

argue that Asians are more endowed intellectually. But the most

common explanation is that the oriental students are more

motivated because of their cultural values (Bond, 1986; Leung &

Foster, 1985; Ross, 1977; Sue & Sue, 1973). For example,

Chinese parents place a special premium on education and push

their children for scholastic success (Chenug, 1986; Yeh, 1985).

The impact of Confucius' teaching on filial piety is still evident in

that many Chinese students consider respect for the parents and

family honor as most important (Mak, 1988; Yang, 1986). There

is some empirical evidence that Chinese-Canadian adolescents have

internalized their family value and feel that they would shame

their family if they fail to live up to parental expectations (Mak,

1984). Another source of motivation for the Chinese students is

89

that they perceive a good university education as a necessary

stepping stone towards financial security in a foreign country

(Wong, 1979). In short, Chinese students seem to be under more

external pressure to achieve academically than their majority

peers. These differences in cultural values and individual

ascriptions for the meaning of education seem to be a more

compelling interpretation of the superior Chinese achievement than

differences in causal attribution.

Research on cultural differences in causal attributions has

shown that Chinese students are more likely to make self-effacing

attributions, such as attributing success to luck (Wan & Bond,

1982). This reflects their concern to maintain harmonious

interpersonal relationships (Leung & Bond, 1984; Yu, 1980).

Recently, Mak (1988) has obtained data indicating that both Hong

Kong Chinese students and Canadian Chinese attribute self-failure

to lack of effort, while their Euro-Canadian peers attribute it to

high task-difficulty. Bond (1983) has pointed out that cross­

cultural comparisons have been limited by the fact that

attributional categories derived from an individualist culture may

not be relevant to oriental cultures that emphasize interpersonal

harmony. In any event, available findings on cultural differences

in causal attributions between Chinese and Caucasians are neither

robust nor consistent. Research is needed to determine the

relative contributions of causal and existential attributions to

academic achievement.

To illustrate further the relevance of existential attribution in

the achievement domain, we will try to explain the phenomenal

90

economic success achieved by Japan. Experts have been trying to

understand what makes Japan such a formidable competitor in the

world market (e.g., Morishima, 1982; Vogel, 1979). A hypothesis

that has gained considerable currency is that Japanese productivity

is importantly related to their management style, which emphasizes

consensus and the involvement of workers in quality control and

decision making (e.g., Ouchi, 1981; Vogel, 1979). The adversary

model of management vs, labour, which is so prevalent in North

America, is rare in Japan. Big Japanese corporations model after

the traditional family, with management functioning as caring

parents, and workers faithfully carrying out their "filial" duties.

It is a common practice for the Japanese workers to put in extra

hours and sleep in the factory in order to get the job done.

Some experts have advocated that if we adopt the Japanese

management style, productivity should improve. The results of

such experiments have been mixed. For example, in some

Japanese auto plants in America, where the Japanese management

philosophy is implemented, tension between management and

workers has been on the increase. Many workers protest that

they are made to work too hard. Others have reported that

without the protection of a union, workers who complain about

the management are liable to get fired. Therefore, instead of

harmony and high morale, hostility and dissatisfaction creep in.

What has gone wrong? Why is it that the Japanese management

style does not work well in these auto plants in the

American context?

91

The answer has to do with cultural differences in values and

existential attributions. If you were to ask a Japanese worker:

Why do you work so hard? He would probably answer: I want to

do my very best for my company, and for my country. He might

even explain to you that the survival of Japan, and the survival of

his company importantly depend on the quality and productivity of

his work. He believes that what is good for the country and the

company is good for him. If he is assured of anonymity, he may

also mention the external pressure to conform to group norm and

company expectation. The Japanese worker knows the

consequences of putting self-interest above company interests! In

short, his existential attributions would reveal that collective

interests and loyalty to the company are the primary sources of

motivation. Thus, it is not possible to understand Japanese

individual achievement and productivity apart from their collective

orientations (Maehr, 1974; Maehr & Nicholls, 1980).

If you were to pose the same questions to a typical American

worker, his answer would be very different. He would tell you

that he is in it for the money. He has to work hard simply

because of the demand imposed by the boss. He would tell you

that he is more concerned about his own benefit package than the

profit margin of the company. As for his country, sure he is

patriotic, but he believes that what is good for him is good for

the country, and not the other way around. His beginning point

is self-interests. His self-centeredness is further reinforced by the

fact that the objective of most unions is to bargain for maximum

benefits with a minimum of work. These differences in values

92

between Japanese and American workers (e.g., Engel, 1988) are

perhaps the main reason why the Japanese workers are more

productive. Some of these differences have recently been

confirmed empirically. For example, Engel (1988) reports that

American workers place more value on individualism, independence

and self-sufficiency, while Japanese workers place a higher value

on group involvement, loyalty to employer and country.

The above observations suggest that existential attributions,

which are based on cultural and personal values, play an

important role in academic achievement as well as in economic

productivity. Therefore, a viable theory of achievement motivation

should take into account ascriptions of personal meaning for

schooling or work.

One way to contrast causal and existential attribution is in

terms of levels of attributional process. At the surface level, the

social perceiver is concerned with causal attribution, which is

equivalent to Aristotle's sufficient cause (Rychlak, 1976; Taylor,

1967). For example, hard work is the cause of Johnny's school

success, while laziness is the cause of Bobby's school failure.

However, if one wants to pursue why questions even further by

asking: Why does Johnny study hard, while Bobby does not? What

accounts for the difference in motivation? sooner or later one

would resort to existential attribution. Thus, Johnny has a serious

purpose for his studies because he wants to be a medical doctor.

Bobby does not know what he wants to do and cannot find any good

reason for staying in school. At a deeper level, the social

perceiver is concerned with existential or teleological attribution,

93

which is similar to Aristotle's final cause. It serves to explain

the purpose behind the immediate, sufficient cause.

Similarly, the social perceiver may not always go beyond the

level of causal analysis in self attribution. However, when one

becomes disillusioned with education or work, and when causal

analysis fails to provide a compelling reason for further pursuit,

then existential attribution becomes necessary. Further research is

needed to identify the antecedents for existential search in the

achievement domain.

Observations in the domain of stress and coping

A woman in her late fifties is dying of cancer. When she

first learned about this fatal disease, she was troubled by the

thoughts that she might be punished for being a bad person in

the past. Such self-blame is simply a part of the attribution

process aimed not so much at finding the cause of her illness as

searching for the meaning and purpose of her suffering. Initially,

she regarded her illness as a retribution for her past sins. As a

result, her physical pain was compounded by feelings of guilt and

regrets. Eventually, she is able to find relief only when she

comes to accept it as coming from God, who knows what she is

going through, and who will work out His perfect will in her life.

In another case, a professor lost his son, who, on his way

home from school, was brutally murdered by a teen gang. The

parents know the cause of their son's untimely death -- he is one

of the many innocent victims of senseless violence. Yet for years,

they were tormented by obsessive thoughts that the tragedy could

94

have been prevented, had they sent their son to a different

college to study, or had their son come home earlier that fatal

evening. As well, they struggled to find some meaning and

purpose in this tragic loss. They still cannot talk about it

without experiencing the pain. However, he eventually managed

to gain a certain measure of serenity, when he came to accept

the suffering and death are an inevitable part of life, and that to

make something out of life, one must endure pain. He concedes

that one may gain a glimpse of insight, but will never find a

definite answer to the mystery of suffering. After all the struggle

for meaning is an on-going process which will not cease until life

comes to an end. This existential view somehow makes his pain

more bearable and grants him some sense of personal control.

What kinds of existential attribution we arrive at may have

important implications for health and psychological well-being.

For example, in a recent TV interview, the longest surviving AIDS

patient Mr. Turner stated that one of the reasons why he has

survived so long is because that he has a purpose in life; and

that in the struggle against this deadly disease he has found

something worth surviving for.

In the past five years, in my research on successful aging, I

have repeatedly found that those who maintain a relatively high

level of health and happiness are more likely to demonstrate

existential acceptance and affirmation of meaning in coping with

stressful life events (Wong & Reker, 1984; Wong, 1989).

There is now a growing literature which demonstrates that

following a personal crisis, individuals try to make sense of what

95

has happened to them (see Silver & Wortman, 1980 for a review.)

For example, Bulman and Wortman (1977) reported that most of

the spinal-cord injured patients they interviewed asked the

question "why me" and came to some kinds of ascriptions of

meaning. They reported that the only patient who was not able

to answer the question was judged by the staff as coping least

well. They concluded that self-blame was adaptive and that the

patients attributions reflected a need to find some meaning for

their injury. To state that something good had resulted from

their injury was described by Bulman and Wortman as

"reevaluation of the victimization as positive". Although their

conclusion regarding the adaptive benefits of self-blame has been

challenged (Heinemann, Bulka, & Smetak, 1988; Nielson &

MacDonald, 1988), their observations of ascriptions of meaning for

undesirable events have been supported (e.g., Heinemann, et aI.,

1988; Silver, Boon, & Stones, 1983). In a similar vein, Taylor

(1983) has recognized that the search for meaning is a major

cognitive theme in adapting to threatening events. These findings,

together with my own observations, have made me realize that the

quest for meaning is a common reaction to undesirable events,

and that the reevaluation questions triggered by school failure

(Wong & Weiner, 1981) are simply examples of this existential

search. When a tragedy has shattered one's beliefs and sense of

control, a frantic search for meaning is inevitable.

It appears that people's attributional response to undesirable

life events occur at two levels. At one level, people are engaged

in causal search, which will help them to find the cause of their

96

problem and take appropriate actions. At a deeper level, people

are engaged in existential search, which will help them to restore

a sense of meaning and coherence in a time of personal crisis.

In the past few years, an increasing number of studies have

examined whether attributing the cause to one's own behavior

yields adaptive benefits in coping with personal disasters (e.g.,

Affleck, Tennen, Croog & Levine, 1987; Janoff-Bulman & Frieze,

1983; Nielson & MacDonald, 1988; Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood,

1984). I believe that this issue cannot be resolved without

differentiating between causal and existential attributions. It

seems reasonable to assume that self-blame would be adaptive if

the accident were avoidable, and that self-blame would be harmful

if the accident were beyond anyone's control. However, one's

existential answer to the question "why me" may have a great

adaptive significance. The affirmation that the undesirable

serves a higher purpose may yield adaptive benefits regardless

of one's causal attributions. Thus, it is important for the

researcher to examine possible interactions between causal and

existential attributions.

One of the reasons for this neglect is that the conceptual

distinctions between the two types of attributions have not been

fully recognized. For example, Rychlak (1976) has pointed out

that modern attribution theory has been almost exclusively

concerned with sufficient cause. Buss (1978) has criticized that

attribution research has failed to distinguish between cause and

reason and argued that both causes and reasons are required for

an adequate explanation of human behavior. Some of the cases

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involving reason explanations including evaluating and justifying

one's action or stating the goal or purpose of one's action.

Kruglanski (1979) considers that teleological (reason-type)

explanation belongs within the broader attributional domain, and is

one among a vast number of possible explanatory types.

Debate has continued for some time over whether

explanations are always causal, and whether there are more than

one kind of Why questions (Buss, 1979; Harvey & Tucker, 1979;

Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Jaspars, Fincham, & Hewstone, 1983).

I have just demonstrated that certain observations demand at least

two types of explanation. In the causal type, the social perceiver

is concerned with cause-and-effect analysis, whereas in the reason

type, the social perceiver is concerned with the meaning, purpose

and personal significance of the event.

Fisk and Taylor (1984) have pointed out that the view of the

social perceiver as a naive scientist has overly narrowed the

domain of research. They also propose that future social

cognition research should consider other views of people, "as

fantasizers, ignoring objective reality; as hermits, isolated from the

social environment; as archivists, forever looking backward..."

(p. 417). While these different views of people are indeed valid

and worth pursuing, it may be more fruitful to focus on models

that are applicable to most individuals, such as people as

philosophers, seeking the abstract truth of meaning and purpose;

or people as moralists, striving to decide between right and

wrong. After all, people live not only in a social environment,

they also live in a phenomenological world in which the meaning

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and value of events are measured by subjective experiences.

Furthermore, they inhibit a moral universe, where actions are

evaluated as being ethically right or wrong (Kohlberg, 1984). For

example an individual is concerned not just what can be done

about a problem, but also with "determining what course of action

would best fulfil a moral ideal, what ought to be done in the

situation". (Rest, 1979, p. 561). By entertaining these alternative

models, researchers can gain a better understanding of the

different cognitive processes in the social perceiver.

Existential vs. causal attributions

In this section, I will elaborate on the conceptual distinctions

between existential and causal attributions. Existential attribution

is a subjective, intuitive understanding of the meaning and

significance of events, while causal attribution is a common-sense

explanation of sufficient causes. Examples of existential search

include: Why me? What for? What is the purpose? What good

does it do? What is the use? Why should he die of AIDS at such a

young age? What is the meaning of this tragedy? Examples of

causal search include: What caused it? How did it happen? Who

was responsible for this? What was the cause of death for this young

man? Was this brought about by his own negligence?

Naive scientist vs. lay philosopher. The above two sets of

questions are clearly concerned with different issues. In causal

attribution, people function as a naive scientist. They attempt to

understand their own behavior and that of others in much the

99

same way as a scientist. They test hypotheses, and try to

establish causal relationships. They are concerned with prediction

and control, even though they may not be conscious of such a

motive. As a naive scientist, they intuitively know that without

causal knowledge, it is difficult, if not impossible to predict and

control. The cognitive process involved is a logical, rational

analysis of the cause and effect relationships. This process entails

the use of hypothesis testing. For example, the hypothesis that

one's failure outcome is due to a lack of ability can be tested

empirically. This hypothesis is rejected if one can demonstrate

that one has succeeded many times on a similar task. There are

generally accepted principles and rules which allow one to

determine whether a particular causal explanation is acceptable.

In contrast, the basic assumption of existential attribution is

that within each individual resides a philosopher. This creature

may lie dormant for long periods of time, but always makes his

presence known in time of personal crisis or major transition

points. For those who are prone to self-reflection, philosophical

musings may occur more frequently. But, even for those who are

only interested in sampling small pleasures from day to day, the

philosopher inside them will not simply go away.

The cognitive process involved in existential attribution is

very different from that in causal analysis. Consider the example

of the woman dying of cancer. She can not refer to general

causal rules in her quest for meaning. Nor can she answer the

question "why me" through rational thoughts. It is in the spiritual

realm of faith an prayer and in the philosophical arena of

100

acceptance and reconciliation that she finds her answer. Her

cognitive tools are reflection, review, and even mystical visions.

Her search is guided not by logical analysis, but by personal

values. Indeed, there is no objectively right or wrong answer.

The only criterion is what feels right. The only proof she needs

is whether her ascription of meaning restores a sense of serenity.

And feeling play a much more important role than facts and

logics. It appears that her right brain is more involved than her

left brain in her quest for personal meaning.

The lay philosopher also favours the wholistic approach,

because the meaning of specific events is often derived from

reviewing life as a whole. Events are located in a larger picture,

such as one's past, future or religious beliefs. Only rarely does

meaning reside in an isolated event. At the very least, the lay

philosopher will review the way one's life has been unfolding in

order to reach a sense of coherence.

Perhaps, the two types of attributions can best be contrasted

in the achievement domain. Within the framework of the

"expectancy x value" model of achievement motivation, causal

analysis tells us what to expect. If the cause is stable, then we

have confidence that the same outcome will happen again.

Furthermore, we can predict what will happen, given certain

antecedent conditions. Suppose you know that you have the

ability for a particular task that requires skill and concentration,

then you can expect that the more effort you put in, the greater

the likelihood of success. Similarly, if you know that a particular

outcome is due to chance, and you also know the odds involved,

101

then you are in a good position to predict how likely it will

occur. Thus, causal attribution mediates expectancy.

In the realm of value, causal analysis becomes inadequate.

For example, according to Weiner, value can be reconceptualized

in terms of attribution-specific as well as dimension-related

affective reactions, such as pride or shame. gratitude or guilt

(Weiner, 1985b). It seems reasonable that these feelings should

have some effect on both the quality and the magnitude of

incentive value. For example, a good grade obtained through

cheating would have less subjective value than one obtained

through hard work, because the former evokes feelings of shame.

Although Weiner's analysis of the complex achievement-related

emotions is a significant contribution, it only represents a limited

aspect of the value component of achievement motivation. Surely

value is more than affective reactions. For example, food has

survival value no matter how we feel about it. Some enjoy

eating, some hate eating, but all must eat to survive. Similarly,

the survival value of food is quite independent of one's causal

attribution. Furthermore, value is more than incentive value. We

often assign values on the basis of our needs, beliefs, future plans

and a host of other factors, even before we have the opportunity

to experience the outcome.

In short, Weiner's causal analysis fails to capture the richness

and complexity of the value component in the Expectancy-Value

theory of achievement. Parsons & Goff (1980) have pointed out

that "The most serious problem, in our estimation, with the

traditional achievement model is the omission of incentive value.

102

The question of underlying values, either personal of those

inherent in the task, was not handled in Atkinson's original need

achievement model. Viewed from within the traditional

achievement model, the failure of a highly able individual to

aspire to a high level occupation is incomprehensible." (p.357).

The same criticism can also be applied to Weiner's attribution

theory. Without incorporating the various types of values into

Expectancy-Value formulations (Feather, 1975, 1986, 1988; Parsons,

1982; Parsons & Goff, 1980), we would have difficulties explaining

a wide range of achievement-related phenomena, such as cross­

cultural differences, individual differences in choosing a school or

a major, sustained under-achievement and over-achievement.

Existential attribution, as an ascription of meaning, value and

purpose of achievement behavior, appears to be a more powerful

construct than causal attribution in encompassing the different

sources of the value component of the equation. Existential

attribution is inherently value-laden, because any existential

ascription must be derived from some combinations of cultural

values, an individual's global values, as well as the intrinsic values

specific to that activity. In fact, existential attribution in the

achievement context can be regarded as personal values for

education. While causal attribution reflects an individual's

domain-specific knowledge regarding causal relationships, existential

attribution always reflects one's value orientation.

The above conceptual distinctions between causal and

existential attributions are summarized in Table 1.

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Table 1. Differences Between Existential and Causal Attribution

Existential attribution

Social perceiver as alay philosopher

Mainly a reason explanation

A deeper level of processing

Concerned with purpose andmeaning

Reflects cultural andindividual values

Subjective reflections

Focus on the larger picture

Causal attribution

Social perceiver as anaive scientist

Mainly a causal explanation

A surface level of processing

Concerned with prediction andcontrol

Reflects domain-specificknowledge

Ra tional and obj ective analysis

Focus on specific events

Focus on feelings of fulfillment Focus on problem-solving

Primarily future-oriented

Examples

Why me?

To what end?

God took her "home".

Work is the reason(purpose)for my existence.

There is no good reason forcontinuing my study.

Primarily past-oriented

Examples

Who was responsible?

What was the cause?

She died of cancer.

Hard work is responsiblefor my career success.

Lack of motivation is thecause of my failure.

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An empirical investigation of existential and causal attributions in

achievement

These two types of attribution can also be operationally

differentiated and empirically tested. I now turn to a preliminary

empirical study that attempts to provide separate measurements of

causal and existential attributions and assess their role in

academic achievement.

We first identified the major reasons and purposes for

attending university and the values of university education by

soliciting open-ended answers from university students. Their

responses were then summarized and classified into four factors,

resulting in a 14-item Academic Attitude Scale (AAS), which is

shown in Table 2. (This scale has been revised. A copy of the

revised scale is available on request.)

I would not elaborate on the psychometric properties of the

scale at this point, except to state that the scale seems to capture

the major sources of values associated with university education.

Factor A is labeled "Intrinsic Value", because the accent is on the

challenge and the inherent interest of learning. The value is

derived from the activity or the process itself. Like a canoe trip,

the reward is the journey rather than the destination.

Factor B is labeled "Instrumental or Extrinsic Value". This is

similar to the traditional conception of incentive object or utility

value. The reward is what you anticipate at the end of the road.

University education is valued for the benefits and opportunities it

provides in the future. It is a stepping stone to other life goals.

For example, a student is motivated simply because a high grade

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Table 2. Factors of Existential Attributions for Education

Intrinsic Value

1

1) I find my studies intrinsically interesting.2) The pursuit of knowled~e has value in itself.3) I find university educatIOn challenging.4) What I learn from lecture is mostly trivial. *

Instrument or Extrinsic Value(1) University education is necessary to prepare me for the

competitive working world.(2) The knowledge and skills acquired in university will enable

me to make a useful contribution to society.(3) University education does not contribute to the attainment of

my life goals. *(4) University education has little value to me in real life.*

Personal Growth(I) University education contributes to my personal development.(2) University education helps develop my ability to think

critically and creatively.(3) The discipline and rigor of academic pursuit will make me a

better person.(4) University education does not contribute to the fulfillment of

my potential. *

External Pressure(1) I want to please my parents by doing well academically.(2) I value university education, when I think of how much it

costs me (or my parents).

(* stated in the negative)

point average can open the door of graduate or professional

schools. The instrumental value of university education thus

depends on the totality of future incentives and opportunities that

are contingent on successful completion of undergraduate training.

Factor C is labeled "Personal Growth". Here, the focus is on

personal development -- the stretching of the mind and the

106

building of character. The reward is the process of "becoming".

The benefits that accrue reside in the learner; therefore, they are

less dependent on external circumstances than instrumental values.

Factor D is labeled "External Pressure", because the driving

force comes from outside sources, such as parents. Reward is in

the form of approval from significant others. Negative

reinforcement is also involved here, because achieving good grades

is used as a way of avoiding nagging and other unpleasant

treatments from parents.

Needless to say, these four kinds of existential attributions

serve different functions and reflect different values. For

example, intrinsic value is related to the difficulty value (or

challenge) and inherent appeal of the task. Satisfaction is derived

from "being" and "doing". Maehr & Kleiber (1980) have suggested

that as people grow older, intrinsically satisfying activities may

increase in importance. Thus, intrinsic value may be the primary

motive for a retired person to enroll in university. Personal

growth, although also an internally oriented value, is primarily

concerned with the prospect of achieving desirable changes in

personal attributes through education. The satisfaction comes

from the process of "becoming". Mastery and self-actualization

(Maslow, 1987) would be the primary motive for those who have

moved beyond the concerns for career succes'S. Instrumental value

is related to the number of opportunities of obtaining an incentive

object (Atkinson & Raynor, 1978; Raynor, 1980). This is probably

most relevant to young people. The majority of them would be

107

concerned about getting into the right career and achieving

financial security.

A great deal of research is needed to investigate how these

four types of ascriptions are related to culture, age, sex, and a

wide array of variables, and how these four values differentially

affect achievement-related behaviors, such as persistence, choice,

vigor and affective reactions. It is also important to study the

interactions between causal attributions and these existential

attributions. However, since the effects of these four education

values on academic motivation are all assumed to be positive, it

is predicted that the greater the total score of the Academic

Attitude Scale (AAS), the greater the scholastic achievement.

In this study, the AAS was administered to 75 second year

university students after the midterm examinations, along with Dan

Russell's (1982) Causal Dimension Attribution Scale. They were

asked to explain their mid-term results by using the Causal

Dimension Scale. They were also asked to indicate their expected

final grades. Five months later, we were able to obtain their

actual final grades. The question we are interested in is how

well do existential and causal attributions predict the expected

and the final grades.

Stepwise regressions were performed on the data. The

results indicate that existential attributions are a better predictor

of both expected and actual grades than anyone of the causal

dimensions. In the case of expected grades, the controllability

dimension is the second best predictor. In the case of actual

final grades, the stability dimension is the second best predictor.

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Surprisingly, internality dimension is not a significant predictor for

both expected and actual final grades.

What this study shows is that both existential and causal

attributions contribute to achievement behavior. Both types of

attributions are needed to gain a better understanding of

achievement motivation. It may be hypothesized that causal

attributions are a getter predictor of affective reactions and

performance shortly following an outcome, while existential

attributions are a better predictor of performance over the long

haul. It is a person's values and purposes that sustain him/her

through changing fortunes and emotional swings. Thus, existential

attributions should be a better predictor of steady state

performance and eventual achievement than causal attributions of

a specific outcome.

Existential attributions can also shed some light on

racial/cultural differences in academic achievement. Several

attempts have been made to explain the discrepancy between

black and white students. Studies have been done both on

student attributions (Graham & Long, 1986) and teacher

attributions (Wong, Delerga, & Wilson, 1988). Most of these

studies fail to show consistent differences in causal attributions.

Perhaps, the lower black performance may be due to

environmental deprivation and the lack of personal meaning for

schooling. Suppose you were brought up in a deprived

environment, where very few people in the neighborhood are

interested in academic pursuit, and very few books can be' found

in your home. Let us further assume that your primary concern

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is how to survive on a day-to-day basis in the concrete jungle.

With this kind of background, you probably would have difficulty

seeing how education can playa meaningful role in your life.

Consequently, you would not be interested in scholastic success.

The perspective of existential attribution also promises new

avenues of intervention. One can devise ways of enhancing

achievement motivation through any combination of these four

types of existential attributions. For example, if a student does

not have a clear goal, and is not at all concerned about what

his/her parents think, then the best strategy is to emphasize

intrinsic interests and personal growth.

The main contribution of the present study is that it not only

operationally defines existential attributions for education, but also

demonstrates that causal and existential attributions can be

measured separately. A great deal of research needs to be

conducted to determine the differences and interactions of these

two types of attributions in various life domains. Possibilities for

attribution therapy are greatly enhanced by taking into account

existential attribution.

A model of existential attribution

The following model is one way to illustrate the complex

process of existential attribution. It is assumed that existential

attributional search is more likely to take place under conditions

of discontent, disaster or disconfirmation, as appraised by each

individual. One can be dissatisfied with life in general, without

being able to pinpoint any specific reason. There are also

110

individuals who have everything, yet have nothing; they discover

that life is more than success, possessions and pleasures, yet they

don't know what is missing. In other cases, discontent may occur

in a specific domain, such as marriage or work. For example,

recently an engineer complained to me that "Everyday, I'm so

tired from working long hours, that I begin to wonder what life is

all about."

Disasters are an especially fertile ground for philosophical

musings. Accidents, major illness, death of a loved one are some

of the common personal disasters. We typically react to trauma

as an noxious foreign object intruding into our own body.

Disasters are as undesirable as they are unexpected, because

we all like to see life go on merrily. When something bad

happens to us or to our loved ones, we would protest vehemently:

Who me? What have I done to deserve that? We would try

desperately to find something positive, something meaningful from

a bad experience.

When our fundamental beliefs are violated, we will also

engage in existential search. Here are come of the examples of

disconfirmation -- believe in a friend, but betrayed by him;

believe in the reward of hard work, but fired by a company that

you have served faithfully; believe in a loving God, but lost your

spouse through a tragic accident... In each of these cases, some

fundamental beliefs that endow our lives with a sense of

coherence are shattered, thus creating an existential crisis.

Once the existential search is initiated, it will continue until

some sort of ascription, whether positive or negative, is reached.

111

This search process is accompanied by heightened tension and

uncertainty. The individual is no longer sure what to believe in,

or what to do. In this state of existential vacuum, anxiety level

should be high and motivational level low.

Existential search is characterized by two parallel but related

processes: the search for meaning and the re-assessing of

priorities. The former involves attempts to find something

positive and purposeful from a bad experience. The main

objective is to find some reassurance that one's suffering is not in

vain, and that something good has resulted from it. For example,

it is not uncommon for parents to take comfort from the thoughts

that the death of their children because of an incurable disease

may contribute to a cure for other children in the future (e.g.,

Chodoff, Friedman, & Hamburg, 1964). It is also common for the

bereaved to seek solace from the belief that God has taken the

child home and it is far better for a child to be in heaven than

to grow up in this terrible world. In this particular example, the

contrast between causal and existential attributions becomes

abundantly clear. The idea that God has taken the child to

heaven is not a causal attribution, because the child's death is

caused by an incurable disease; rather, it represents an attempt to

find a positive ascription for a tragic, untimely death.

It does not matter whether the ascription is based on reality

or a leap of faith, as long as it helps remove troubling thoughts,

resolve cognitive conflicts and restore certain measures of

coherence. Since questions of personal meaning are basically

philosophical (Battista & Almond, 1973; Hocking, 1957) or

112

spiritual (Bianchi, 1982; Soderstrom & Wright, 1977), one often

has to venture into the province of philosophy or religion to find

a satisfactory answer.

The process of re-assessment is inevitable when an individual

has lost something valuable, or when some highly cherished object

has lost its appeal. In either case, there is a vacuum of value

and life purpose. The individual must now find some sort of

replacement. He/she must now glean from all that is available

and see if there is something to fill the void. It is more than an

attempt to clarify one's own value structure. It in fact involves

an active search for some worthwhile goal or purpose that can

rekindle the passion for life.

In the course of re-evaluation, the individual often surveys

the entire landscape, from past achievements, present needs to

distant horizons. The individual would consider various

alternatives, deciding which one is most promising and most

consistent with one's own aspirations.

The above two processes are complementary to each other.

Success in finding a positive ascription of a terrible loss would

lessen its pain, and facilitate the search for a replacement.

Similarly, the process of re-assessment would lessen the urgency

for a positive ascription, if the loss is dev~lued or replaced by an

alternative incentive object. Which of these two processes become

predominant would depend on the antecedents. For example, in

the case of achievement failure, re-assessment may be the major

concern (Wong & Weiner, 1981), whereas in the case of personal

disaster, the search for a positive meaning may be most urgent

113

(Bulman & Wortman, 1977). The complex interplay between these

two processes of existential search offers many possibilities for

empirical investigations.

Existential search is successfully completed, only when an

individual finds a positive explanation for a bad event as well as

worthy goal for living. Here are some examples of affirma tive

ascriptions: "There is a higher purpose in what has happened to me."

"Suffering has made me a much better person." "God has saved me

from the path of self destruction through this tragic event." "Without

the crucible of pain, [ would not have gained this precious insight."

"My life has been completely turned around as a result of this painful

experience." "Now, [ have found a new purpose in my life, and a

new song in my heart." "Out of the ashes of death, [ have become a

new person." "I'm glad that many other people will benefit from the

painful lesson [ have learned." "[ believe that everything will work out

for good for those who love God."

All the above expressions are affirmations of the values of

suffering. Systematic research is needed to identify the main

factors or dimensions of affirmative ascriptions. On the basis of

what is already known from the literature, these factors are likely

to include philosophical "acceptance" of what cannot be changed,

"altruism", "personal growth", "optimism", and "belief in a

benevolent God".

The journey from self-doubts to affirmation is often a long

and agonizing one. But the benefits of positive ascriptions can be

substantial. These include the healing of inner wounds, a sense

114

of coherency and comforts, attainment of ego integrity, zest for

life, and the pursuit and achievement of major life goals.

However, for a variety of reasons, existential search may not

be successful. Following an arduous struggle, the individual may

come to the position of Existentialist thinkers, such as Camus and

Satre. "Nothing makes sense." "Life is absurd." "Life is a bowl of

b,s. " "Life is nothing more than blind fate, even though we like to

think that we have control." "I was born under the wrong star, alld

everything is stacked against me." "I have lost everything, and I don't

see any good reason for living." "It really does not make any

difference whether I live or die."

The above negative ascriptions can also be grouped into

several factors or dimensions. In the absence of systematic

research, I would like to suggest that these factors might include

"indifference", "fatalism", "pessimism", and "helplessness". These

negations are likely to be persistent, resulting in major

dysfunctioning and health problems.

If we feel that we are all like Sisyphus, the Greek hero

condemned by the gods to spend his life rolling a rock up hill

only to find it slipping back, and that all our strivings are futile,

we should be overwhelmed by a sense of despair. "Does life have

any meaning?" Camus once asked; "and, if not, why go on

living?" Thus, against the backdrop of nothingness even death

seems to be an attractive alternative.

The above model of existential attribution, as shown in

Figure 1, can be illustrated by writer Gladys Taber's (1963)

touching account of her inner struggle following the death of Jill,

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Figure 1. An Illustrative Model of Existential Attribution

Antecedents The processes The products Consequences

* Disaster

* Disconfirmation

* Discontent

Searching formeaning andpurpose

Re-assessingprioritiesand life goals

Affirmativeascriptions

Negativeascriptions

* Coherence* Ego integrity* Zest for life

* Confusion* Despair* Depression

her friend and companion of many years. At first life seemed

tohave lost its meaning, and just to maintain the basic functions

of day-to-day living was a struggle, The why questions she

grappled with were existential rather than causal. She was not so

much concerned with the cause of Jill's death as with the meaning

of personal loss. After a long "journey through the night", she

was able to move from questioning to acceptance, from negation

to affirmation. The following is quoted from her book entitled

A flolher Palh.

'''My son and his young wife were only taking a plane tothe place his next job was. Why? Why?'

I do not think anybody can understand why death selectsthis one and passes that one by..... I think trying to explainaway death is futile. At least it did not help me at all. Ihad to begin rather, to find a larger solution. I began withthe universe. I had lived all my life without forming anyopinion as to the nature of God, the meaning of life, thedestiny of mankind. Now I found that I believed in anordered universe. If I believed in an ordered universe, itfollowed there was purpose. And purpose implies God. Heis, because He must be.

My finite mind could never encompass this, but my heartcould understand. Even in the first stage of grief, my heartwas eased when I prayed .....

I do not know, nor ever will, why the pattern of my lifewas shaped as it has been, I do not know why I was

116

destined to walk alone for so long. I no longer ask. Iaccept this as I accept rain and wind and weather. I reachout to live with an open hand .....

I think of all the happy reople in the world and of thesorrowing ones. I am a smal humble part of mankind, nomore important than the smallest fragile shell on the greatbeach. The tide of eternity sweeps in, and life and deathare two halves of one whole. One day we shall understandthe mystery, but not yet. Now we journey with faith,remembering that God said, Let there be light, and there waslight."

Conclusions

What began as a minor finding -- that people question the

value of education after failure - has evolved into an important

construct. I have shown that there are actually two basic types

of attributions - causal and existential, and they complement each

other. In every trying situation, the naive scientist would say,

"What causes this problem? What can I do about it? Let me

tryout a few things. There's got to be a logical solution to this

problem." At the same time, the lay philosopher raises a

different voice: "Why me? What is the meaning of it all? To

what end? What is its significance for me? Is life worth living?

There has got to be a purpose."

We do not always go beyond the level of causal analysis, but

we are more likely to pursue existential questions in personal

crisis. Both the scientist and the philosopher come to our aid as

we face the trials and tribulations of life. The scientist isolates

and analyzes the cause(s) of the problem, while the philosopher

places it against the cosmic backdrop, and reflects on its personal

117

significance. One seeks to solve the problem, while the other

attempts to make the pain more bearable. One tries to increase

the sense of mastery in the individual, while the other tries to

affirm the individual's sense of self-worth and coherence. TheJ

two partners work together side by side to provide a balance

between the left and the right brain, between logic and feelings,

and between reality and vision.

I have also shown that the construct of existential attribution

is useful in integrating findings from several domains, such as

stress research, psychotherapy, and achievement motivation. In

all these situations, the outcome depends importantly on whether

we reach an affirmative or a negative ascription in our

existential search.

The model of the social perceiver as philosopher will

undoubtedly broaden the domain of attribution research and

enlarge our understanding of motivational and cognitive processes.

I have already demonstrated that existential attribution for

education is a better predictor of both expected and actual grades

than causal attribution dimensions. Similar lines of research need

to be conducted in the domain of health, such as cancer patients

and disaster victims. Numerous new questions can be raised

about the complex interactions between existential and causal

a ttributions in various life si tua tions.

There is now growing interest in personal meaning as a

dimension of health (e.g., Adler, 1958; Antonovsky, 1979, 1987;

Chamberlain & Zika, 1988; Erickson, 1964, 1976; Frankl, 1967,

1969; Klinger, 1977; Maddi, 1971; May, 1969; Maslow, 1987; Reker

118

& Wong, 1988; Wong, 1989; Yalom, 1980). The present model of

existential attribution provides a promising approach to the study

of meaning. As a conceptual frame work, it will guide future

research on the complex process of quest for personal meaning

that encompasses antecedents, existential search, ascriptions and

consequences. At present, not much is known about any of these

variables either in isolation or in interaction with each other.

Research on existential attribution promises a fruitful marriage

between humanistic psychology and social cognition.

Some philosophers have argued that the answer to the

question whether life has meaning comes through the

disappearance of the question. Others have suggested that the

fundamental question regarding the meaning of life becomes

irrelevant, when one finds meaning in life through activities

(Hocking, 1957). Regardless of which philosophical position one

takes, the question of meaning will surface whenever discontent or

self-doubt creeps in. Some may try to ignore this question by

becoming totally absorbed in work or pleasure seeking, but the

question will not simply go away. In a civilization which has lost

faith in its own values, the cries for meaning become more

frequent and more urgent (Barrett, 1972). When the excesses of

self-indulgence fail to fill the inner void, when the American

dream turns into a nightmare, people begin 'to wonder what life is

all about. All of a sudden, work becomes a treadmill and life a

burden. In the face of death, all activities seem meaningless.

"How could I find meaning in life? Can anyone give me

something to believe in and something to live for?" they cry

119

in silence. As psychologists do we have an answer to their

existential crisis? Do we dare to venture out of the narrow

confines of familiar paradigms to investigate the most fundamental

question in life?

120

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Chinese collective orientation and need forInternational Journal of Social Psychiatry, 26,

Perceptions of Success in WorkEnvironments

Irene Hanson Frieze, Mira Moss, andJosephine E. OlsonUniversity of Pittsburgh

Before it is possible to make an attribution for the cause of

a particular success or failure event, it is first necessary to define

the event as one that was successfully accomplished or not. This

chapter examines this definitional issue as it occurs within work

settings. Using empirical data from our own research as well as

theoretical work within the domain of social cognition and

organizational behavior, we examine the ways people describe the

successes they encounter at work and the steps they feel they

must take to become successful. The chapter concludes with

suggestions for expanding attributional process models to consider

organizational success perceptions and how the interact with

individual conceptions.

Definitions of Success and the Attribution Process

Since the publication in the early 1970's of the work of

Weiner and his colleagues (Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest &

Rosenbaum, 1971), it has been widely accepted that people do

react to success and failure experiences in cognitive as well as

emotional ways (Weiner, 1985a). Research has shown that people

127

use information about the situation in which they have

participated to form an explanation for the outcome they have

experienced. This explanation is the causal attribution for the

particular success or failure. Once this attribution is made, it has

certain predictable emotional and behavioral consequences

(Weiner, 1985b).

Much of the large body of work supporting this theory of

attributions for success and failure has been done in the

laboratory, although there are increasing numbers of applications

in real world settings (Antaki & Brewin, 1982; Frieze, Bar-Tal, &

Carroll, 1979). The laboratory studies of attributions often rely

on manipulations of success and failure. Three common

techniques are used to do this: (1) simply telling subjects that

they had succeeded or failed after working on a task; (2) giving

subjects (fictitious) norms about the performance levels of other

students that allowed them to label their performance as high or

low on the basis of social comparison: or (3) arranging a task so

that the objective performance was either very good or very bad.

After doing a number of studies involving manipulation of

success and failure, Frieze and her students became concerned

about the validity of such procedures. One of Frieze's studies

(Elig & Frieze, 1979) demonstrates the problems. In this study,

students were randomly assigned to a "success" group or a

"failure" group on the basis of the anagrams they were asked to

do (procedure 3 from the above list). Some of these subjects

received problems that had previously been found to be easy

while others were given apparently similar, but actually

128

insolvable problems. Thus, by giving subjects very hard or very

easy problems that did not appear on superficial scanning to vary

on difficulty level, we were causing them to do well or poorly on

the task. We intensified the manipulation with the addition of

social comparison information (procedure 2). After working on

the anagrams for a timed period, subjects were given norms about

how well other college students did on the task they had just

done. The norms were rigged so that the "success" group

performed better than 75% of other college students. The

"failure" group was clearly lower than 75% of other students on

the basis of their performance. Subjects were expected to use

this normative information in addition to their own performance

levels to evaluate their own level of performance as a success or

failure. In spite of the strong manipulations used, we found that

not all of our subjects placed them selves in the assigned group

in our manipulation check question. Of the original 250 students

in the study, about 20% did not rate themselves "correctly" as

succeeding or failing when asked how successful they had been on

the anagram task.

Another of Frieze's studies demonstrates this same lack of

correspondence between the objective event and the subjective

labeling of the event. As part of a larger study of the

attribution process as it actually functions in the classroom.

Frieze, Snyder & Fontaine, 1978) asked fifth graders to evaluate

their performance on either a social studies or a mathematics

exam. The correlation between the subjective success ratings and

the actual score was .74. Although this is a rela tively large

129

correlation, it is sufficiently below 1.00 to suggest that subjective

success ratings are influenced by a variety of factors in addition

to objective performance. Other analyses indicated that students

who actually performed at a high level (high objective score) saw

themselves as exerting much effort, whereas those who perceived

themselves as most successful (regardless of their objective scores)

rated their ability relatively high.

A plausible explanation for this lack of correspondence

between objective and subjective appraisals of success is that

people have many ways of defining success. For the student who

is pleased with a "C" grade, even being close to 75% of other

students may have been seen as success. For the superior

student, being just above 75% of other students may have been

defined as a failure. Students may reject the experimenter's

outcome label for other reasons as well. Social comparison is

only one of many criteria used to determine whether one has

been successful. Comparison with one's past level of performance

or comparison with one's expected performance level may be more

important than comparison with everyone in a large group.

Others may feel successful if they managed to perform adequately

in spite of barriers such as being sick (Frieze et aI., 1983).

Along with variations in the criteria used to decide whether a

performance is a success or not, there are also differences in the

activities one associates with success. Meece and Frieze (1982)

surveyed 80 fifth and sixth graders and 111 undergraduate

psychology students, asking them to complete the sentence "I was

very successful when " (elementary school students) or

130

"Describe a time when you felt successful." Answers to these

open-ended questions were coded for the type of activity

described and the criteria used to determine success. Academic

activities made up less than half of the success experiences

described. An equally large group chose to describe winning a

game or participating in some other sporting event as providing

them with success experience. Other success activities included

social activities and work-related events. Looking at how success

was defined across domains, ability-related standards and others'

evaluations were most common, along with objective outcome.

These studies strongly suggest that if one wants to understand

how people think about success and failure, one has to move

outside the laboratory and outside of the educational system. For

adults, one of the major success domains is the workplace. After

a discussion of other theoretical work on ways of conceptualizing

success, the remainder of this paper focus on success perceptions

in work setting l.

Individual Differences in Conceptualizing Success

Although one generally thinks of the labeling of an outcome

as a success or failure as the first step in the attribution process,

there is evidence that the attribution made for the event affects

the labeling of the event. For example, Maehr (1974) suggested

that a person does not feel successful in doing a task unless

1Another major focus of Frieze's work has been on reactions tovictimization -- the failure side of the theoretical applications.

131

there is a sense that the outcome of the task resulted from

factors under the control of the person doing it. Frieze and her

colleagues (Frieze et a1., 1983) replicated this observation, in

which, college students rated themselves as most successful if their

outcome was attributed to effort. "Success" attributed to cheating

or to luck received much lower ratings as subjectively success.

Many other factors have been shown to relate to a success

judgment. As reviewed by Frieze et a1. (1983), achievement

researchers have always had to deal with the question, "what is

success?", and they have often arrived at different answers.

Perhaps the most influential of all of these definitions was offered

by McClelland who defined "success" as meeting or exceeding a

personal standard of excellence (McClelland, 1961). Other success

standards proposed by researchers include doing better than

expected, doing better than one's peers, doing better than one's

own past performance, and doing what is defined by the culture

as important (Frieze et a1., 1983).

A number of generalizations can be drawn from the extensive

work on varying conceptualizations of success. First, although

there are generally accepted ideas about what types of

performances would be defined as successful, such definitions are

particular to a cultural group. There are wide cross-cultural

variations in concepts of success (Maehr & Nicholls, 1980). There

are also individual differences within a culture in how success is

defined. Finally, success may be thought of differently within

different domains. While the exertion of effort may be seen as a

necessary condition for one to feel success in school, at least in

132

the United States, quite different associations may exist in the

workplace or on the playing fields.

Defining Success in Work Settings.

In order to answer the question of how people think about

success in their lives, it seems natural to focus on work settings.

Much of our daily achievement activity occurs at work, especially

for cOllege-educated professionals. In these important, real-life

activities, do we find the same variation in the ways people define

success? Or, can we measure work success in more standardized

ways -- with money and position?

Success Experiences at Work. Our first assessment of how

people think about success at work was an exploratory study done

with a sample of nurses and business students. Frost, Frieze and

Perloff (1987) asked professional nurses to "Describe [a] successful

nursing experience in which you were involved" and why they gave

this example of work success. Staff nurses as well as

administrative and teaching nurses were in the sample.

Data were coded into categories similar to those used by

Meece and Frieze. In general, there was little difference among

the three groups of nurses; all types of nurses looked back to a

patient experience as a time when they felt successful. Patient

improvement was often cited as the success criterion, along with

praise from patients or coworkers. Sample responses are in

Table l.

We next asked business students similar questions to see

how success experiences differed between a male and a

133

TABLE 1 Perceptions of Successful Work Experiences

- Describe this successful nursing experience in which you wereinvolved.

*

*

*

*

Published an article in a nationally known nursing journal.[Was successful because of] receiving recognition by peers andmentors. Self-fulfillment. [28 year old female nursingeducator].

I participated in organization and instruction of a series ofgroup sessions for out-patients on hypertension. [Wassuccessful because of] positive feedback from patients.Personal satisfaction of accomplishing things I was afraid todo. [35 year old female primary care nurse].

Made rounds with a doctor who abruptly told patient that hemight have surgery in near future, then left the room. Thepatient became quite anxious. I spent time with him andthen with he and his wife later. I listened to him, answeredsome of his questions and was able to have him reach aconstructive solution ... [37 year old female nurse educator].

I ascertained that one of my patients was changing... anddocumented this and collected appropriate drug screens/labwork even though everyone else thought I was crazy. Thepatient arrested abut 4 hours later and through the lab workI had sent off it was discovered that he was toxic and hewas saved. [Was successful because] I had maintained myprofessional judgment despite peer pressure from manyfriends/co-workers ... [25 year old female staff nurse].

- Describe this successful business experience in which you wereinvolved.

*

*

Development and implementation of accounting systems for anew remote plant site using existing equipment. [Wassuccessful because of] job well done resulting in continuingpositive responses from users. [32 year old male MBAstudent].

Having audit report accepted by client despite strongrecommendations. [Was successful because j it showed that Icould be convincing (and that I had presented byrecommendations appropriately) ... [28 year old female MBAstudent].

(Continued on next page)

*

*

134

(Continued from previous page)

I helped design a walkthru of a new Inventory RecordingComputer System so that people who are going to use thesystem have some idea of how it will work. [Was successfulbecause] other people felt that they had benefited from itand I felt that I had done something WORTHWHILE. [22year old female MBA student].

Being promoted from a technical to a supervisory position.[Was successful because] showed the fruit of hard work andinvolvement. [28 year old male MBA student].

Data collected and analyzed by Frost, Frieze, & Perloff (1987).

female-dominated field. We were surprised at the similarities.

Doing one's work well and feedback from others were often the

basis of success for the business students as well as for

the nurses.

Perceptions of Professionals in Business and Librarians.

Based on the results of this first exploratory study, we decided to

do a more formal study with a more clearly defined sample.

First, Olson and Frieze (1987) surveyed over 2000 graduates of

the Master of Business Administrations Program at the University

of Pittsburgh. A final sample of over 1400 of 1973 to 1982

graduates was obtained. Questions on the surveys asked about

work histories, income, and a variety of attitudes about work and

family issues. We also collected similar data (in collaboration

with Detlefsen) in 1986 using a survey of graduates of the Master

of Library Science (MLS) program at the University of Pittsburgh.

This survey yielded about 960 responses and also included

masters' level professionals who had been working in their

135

careers for many years. Multiple mailings of the surveys allowed

us to receive responses from about 70% of both of the original

survey sam pIes.

The question of most importance for assessing perceptions of

work success was "how do you personally define success in your

company?". The first two open-ended responses to this question

were coded into about fifty categories by a coder naive to the

hypotheses of the study. Coding reliability was established

through a minimum percentage agreement of responses across

coders of at least 80 percent. Since the large number of

categories made it difficult to make comparisons across gender

and professions, the personal success criteria were recoded into

six aggregate categories. These success categories and the

frequencies of the first responses by sex are shown in Table 2 for

all MBAs and MLSs working full time at the time at the time of

the survey.

Looking first at the data for the MBAs, the results in Table

2 show that even for supposedly financially-oriented business

people, economic definitions (such as money) and job level or

position were not the most important single criterion for their

personal success. For both men and women MBAs, "Doing good

work and getting results" was the most frequently cited indicator

of success. Economic criteria were, nevertheless, important. Over

half of the MBA sample listed the traditional success criteria of

economic factors, job level, power, and promotions as their first

success criterion. However, the remainder of the MBAs (nearly

half) listed aspects of success that are not strongly economic

136

TABLE 2 Definitions of Success for Two Professions

Percent Within Each GroupMBA MLS

Men Women Men Women

Doing Good Work. Getting Results. 27.7 21.3

Other 17.6 21.7

How do you personally definesuccess in your company?

Economic Definitions

Job Level or Position

Power or Responsibility

Promotions

Number Responding

What would your life need to be like10 years from now in order for youto consider yourself a success?

Work Related

Marriage/Children

Material Possessions/Money

Personal Growth/Other

Number Responding

11.4 7.3

10.0 10.8

17.7 18.5

15.6 20.4

823 314

49.4 51.2

20.2 26.7

20.7 12.9

9.7 9.2

796 303

10.7 5.1

4.9 3.3

3.9 4.5

3.9 2.7

41. 7 35.9

35.0 48.5

103 334

63.6 62.5

10.3 18.6

15.0 11.4

11.2 7.5

107 387

For MBA group.

For MLS group.

Sex difference in success definitions significant(p<.03)Sex difference in long-term goals significant(p<.Ol)Cell sizes to small to test for sex differences insuccessSex differences in long-term goals borderline(p< .13)

(con tin ued on next page)

137

(Continued from previous page)

For Males. Field difference in success definitions significant(p<.OOI)Field difference in long-term goals significant (p< .02)

For Females. Field difference in success definitions significant(p<.OOI)Field difference in long-term goals significant (p< .02)

~~m;w./*:·r$r@[r~&.~A~tal{M~~~~~i®m~~&~~~mmgm~m11~ffi~~m~E.WI:~~~

in nature. In addition to doing good work, these included "Other"

responses such as being recognized by others, meeting personal

goals, and interpersonal definitions. Although the results

indicate there are significant sex differences in the responses of

the MBAs, the differences do not lie along the dimension of

economic versus noneconomic criteria for this sample of male and

female managers.

How does the MBA data compare with success perceptions of

librarians? We anticipated that the female-dominated profession

of librarianship would yield less traditional success definitions.

Looking again at Table 2, it can be seen that "doing good work"

and "other" criteria were even more important to the MLS

graduates than to the MBAs. And, as one might expect given the

notoriously low salaries of librarians, the first four categories,

which are the mostly economically oriented, account for only 28

percent of the men's responses and 15 percent of the women's,

for less than for the MBAs. Because of several small cells, a

test of significance by sex could not be done for the MLS

graduates. However, a test across the two professions indicated

significant differences by field for men and for women.

Other data from the MBA and MLS surveys allowed us to

assess success perceptions in another way. The question we asked

138

was "What would your life need to be like 10 years from now in

order for your to consider yourself a success?" One of the codes

used for this question was the domain mentioned by the person.

The most common domains mentioned were work, family/marriage,

material possessions/money, and personal growth and development.

Frequencies for these responses are shown in at the bottom of

Table 2.

At least half of all four groups defined work as the domain

of their future success, with the librarians being even more work­

oriented than their counterparts in business. In addition, another

substantial percentage thought of future success in the traditional

terms of material possessions or money. This response was most

typical of the male MBAs. Nevertheless, about a third of the

MBAs and a quarter of the MLSs considered family or personal

development as the domain in which they sought to be successful.

Here again, there were some statistically significant sex differences

within the occupational groups, but the occupation differences

tended to be larger.

Both of these sets of data would suggest that those in

different professions have different views of success and that

occupation effects are more important than sex differences. This

is consistent with other research. The "female" professions (such

as librarianship, social work, nursing, and teaching) are often seen

as allowing more opportunity to work with and help other people

(Eccles, 1987). Other research has shown that men and women in

the same occupation tend to share many of the same values

regardless of sex (Bailyn, 1987; Golding, Resnick & Crosby, 1983).

139

Given that there appear to be differences in the ways people

in different occupations define success, one might ask "why?".

There are at least two answers. Does the field itself structure

what is possible? The focus on promotion, position and power as

indicators of success by MBAs, as opposed to the MLSs' focus on

doing work well, could reflect the nature of the tasks in the two

work environments. Performance in many business management

positions can be measured by tangible factors such as net income,

profit margins, or total sales. In addition, there is usually a well

established hierarchial ladder to climb. For librarians, however,

the only measure of a job well done may be the actual

performance on the specific task (Frieze et aI., 1988).

Another possibility is that people who share basic values and

ideas about success differentially select themselves into certain

occupations. A recent study of college students choosing male as

compared to female-dominated occupations indicated that there

were more similarities in motives and ideas about success within

the occupational groups than differences and that occupational

choice was a better predictor of motives and beliefs than sex or

race (Murrell & Frieze, 1990). This would support the idea that

there is some selection that goes on before people enter different

occupations. But, undoubtedly, the structure of the occupation

has a reciprocal influence and also affects ideas about success.

Success Scripts in the Organization

Related to, and in many ways inseparable from the definition

of success, is the question of the steps people believe are needed

140

to achieve success. Within the traditional attributional model, this

question becomes the causal attribution. The attribution answers

the question of "why?" after the event has happened. But, people

have prior conceptions before doing a task about what they will

need to do. Such beliefs are another form of attribution. They

may be specific to a particular, short-term task or they may take

the form of very long-term plans for major life goals. Our work

has also attempted to understand this form of attributional

beliefs better.

Steps Needed for Work Success. Our first attempt to explore

the beliefs that people have about how to be successful in work

was incorporated into our study of the MBA graduates. We also

included this in the MLS comparison survey. In addition to the

question of "What would your life need to be like 10 years from

now in order for you to consider yourself a success?", we asked

"What steps do you feel you need to take to become successful in

these terms?" Coding for this second question was complex

because there were so many different types of responses. Some

people made traditional causal attributions (effort, ability, luck,

etc.). Others mentioned some level of performance, either a high

level or a comfortable level. For others, the performance-related

response was attaining some goal (such as getting a job) or doing

better than one was doing now. A category of nontraditional

success definitions was also added to the coding system.

Data for both questions were coded using a total of 32

categories. These were grouped into four major categories: level

141

of performance, causal attributions, nontraditional success criteria,

and other.

Looking next at the success criteria for those whose domain

was business, Table 3 shows that high levels of performance were

most important of the MBAs while a variety of performance

standards were cited by the MLSs. MBAs more often cited

autonomy while MLSs were more concerned with happiness os a

success criteria. Overall, though, differences were small, There

were even fewer differences when the respondents were asked

about the necessary steps to become successful in the work

domain. Again, only those citing the work domain were included

in this analysis. Here, effort was the single most often cited

factor for both groups.

These data suggest that although people may differ greatly

across occupations in how they define success for themselves,

there is less disagreement on how to attain work success. We

intend to explore this issue in future research.

Success Scripts. Another way of conceptualizing beliefs about

how to become successful is as a "script". Abelson (1981) defines

a script as a "coherent sequence of events expected by the

person". Cognitive psychologists have studied individuals' scripted

knowledge for short-term or daily activities such as "eating at a

restaurant" or "going to the doctor" (Bower, Black & Turner,

1979). Clinicians have written about long-term scripts that may

guide behavior over a lifetime (Carlson, 1981).

Recently, social psychologists have again become interested in

how knowledge structures that embed numerous causal assumptions

142

TABLE 3 Success Criteria Used for Long-Term Success in Work

Percent With Each GroupMBA MLS

What would your life need to be like10 years from now for you toconsider yourself a success?

Level of Performance

High level of performanceImprovement over presentReaching specified goalOther performance criteria

Causal Attributions

Nontraditional Success Criteria

37.2% 16.8%13.3% 8.1%8.9% 17.9%5.8% 14.8%

4.2% 5.3%

Happiness or SatisfactionIndependence or AutonomyOther nontraditional criteria

Other

Number Responding

What steps do you feel you need to taketo become successful in these terms?

Level of Performance

Continue same level of performanceImprovement over presentReaching specified goalOther performance criteria

Causal Attributions

Effort and hard workLearning new skills (Ability)Other attributions

Nontraditional Success Criteria

Other

Number Responding

7.7%11.5%

4.5%

7.0%

573

13.0%9.2%7.5%7.5%

20.6%9.9%

11'.9%

5.5%

14.8%

545

11.8%5.6%5.9%

13.7%

357

7.7%7.3%

12.8%5.4%

21.4%9.3%9.6%

4.5%

22.0%

313

143

act as guides for behavior and affect decision making and future

expectations (Anderson, 1983; Cantor, Norem, Niedenthal,

Langston & Brower, 1987; Pennington & Hastie, 1986; Vallacher

& Wegner, 1987; Wong, 1988). For example, Pennington and

Hastie (1986) suggest that jurors use evidence presented in a trial

to formulate a story about what really happened in the alleged

criminal event. Built into this story are causal assumptions about

why the defendant acted as he or she did. Wong (1988) has also

investigated the reasons for achievement-oriented behavior. These

"existential attributions" are more predictive of long-term behavior

than attributions about any particular event.

Organization theorists such as Gioia and Poole (1984) and

Martin (1982) believe that scripts can be used by individuals to

guide behavior in daily work situations. Specifically, they suggest

that organizational scripts are mental representations of events

that individuals use to guide their behavior in specific contexts

such as staff meetings and performance evaluations. As repeated

activities become learned, they are often given a label that is

understood within the group. For example, strategy meetings that

take a brainstorming form may be identified as "think tank

sessions" as a shorthand for the established script (Gioia, 1986).

Organizational scripts may also take the form of concrete stories

about how a particular individual was successful (Martin, 1982).

Both these types of scripts refer to relatively short sequences of

behaviors. Gioia and Poole further argue that there are scripts

for long-term goal-oriented behavior. These longer term scripts

may contain less sequencing and more interpersonal content (Lord

144

& Kernan, 1987). However, there has been little empirical work

on such scripts (Moss & Frieze, 1987).

In a study designed to test for sex differences in scripted

knowledge about success, Moss and Frieze (1987) asked 127

currently enrolled MBA students to write about how a "fast-track"

male or female manager became successful. As with other

research already described, the scripts were coded for specific

types of behaviors by naive coders. In doing this coding, we

noted that, consistent with theorizing by Gioia (1986), many of

our subjects first referred to the label "fast-track manager" as an

organizing term, and then they proceeded to describe the events

associated with this label.

Using procedures developed by Bower et al. (1979) to

combine the individual script elements, a prototypical management

success script was derived from the open-ended responses

CTable 4). This consensual script contained 10 script elements

mentioned by at least 25% of the sample. The most common

element in all the scripts was hard work. Gaining experience and

skill, having the right personality, and networking with others were

other commonly mentioned aspects of the script. Thus,

traditionally studied attributions were clearly present and were

spontaneously mentioned by large numbers of the study

participants (Weiner, 1985a).

Following a number of popular and scholarly books which

have suggested that one reason that women are not as successful

as men in managerial careers is that they lack knowledge of how

to be successful and how to "play the game" (e.g., Kanter, 1977;

145

TABLE 4 Success Scripts of MBAs for Fast-Track Manager

Have good technical skills 2,4

Have good interpersonal skills 4

Gain experience and develop skills 3

Have the right personality 3,5

Get a job with a growing company 4

WORK HARD 5

Network with others 2,5

Get help from upper management 2

Do one's work well

Be in the right place at the right time.

1.

2.3.4.5.

Item in ALL CAPITAL LETTERS mentioned by 55% or moresubjectsUnderline items (mentioned by 40-54%)All small letters (mentioned by 25-39%)More common for male than female targetsMore common for female than male targetsMentioned more by male subjectsMentioned more by female subjects

Harragan, 1977), we expected to find sex differences in the

success scripts. Contrary to our predictions, there were no

differences in the degree of detail in the scripts between the male

and female respondents. There were, however, some minor sex

differences in the content of the scripts. More males mentioned

ability-related attributes. We also found that regardless of sex,

those who had had more actual work experience were more likely

146

to mention luck (being fortunate or being in the right time and

place) as important to career success. Some difference were also

found in the scripts written about fast-track men as compared to

those about fast-track women. There was more mention of

gaining skills and experience in the women's scripts. Other

hypothesized difference were not found.

While there were relatively few group differences in the

scripts generated by our subjects, there were large variations

across individuals. Some emphasized interpersonal aspects of

management success while others were focused on work imagery.

Once again, further work is needed to understand better the basis

of such differences. Recent work by Kunda (1987) indicates that

people build casual models to explain future events and that these

models emphasize the positive nature of one's own characteristics

in bringing about good outcomes. Perhaps our MBA students

build models emphasizing what they feel that they can do best.

This study was an initial attempt to gain understanding about

the long-term success scripts of individuals before they enter an

organization. Moss and Frieze are now analyzing data on

managerial scripts of undergraduate students to see if these

less-knowledgeable individuals have different types of success

scripts. We also hope to study how success scripts evolve over

time and how they are affected by the particular organizations in

which one works.

147

Shared Success Conceptions and Corporate Culture

Broadening the Attributional Model. Up to this point in this

chapter, we have been concerned with personal conceptions of and

definitions of success. But, once one becomes interested in

success conceptions in real world settings such as the workplace,

it is clear that there is an organizational context to consider as

well. The process of determining what is successful and how to

obtain that success involves a complicated interaction between the

perceptions of the individual and those of the larger group in

which the individual functions.

This interaction, is described in Figure 1 suggests a

broadening of the attributional process that not only includes the

individual and organizational perspectives, but also the degree of

similarity or matching between them. This matching can occur at

the level of what is considered a success (the focus of much of

this chapter), whether a particular event is a success or not, what

information is used to explain the event, and the attribution made

for the event. Presumably, objective indicators of the success of

the individual within the organization would be affected by all of

these forms of matching.

To discuss some ideas about success matching, we first review

research and theory relating to organizational beliefs or

"corporate culture".

Corporate Culture. The culture of an organization is a set

of shared norms, beliefs, and values about how things are done in

that organization (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Schein, 1986). An

important component of these beliefs is the determination of what

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149

is worth striving for and what will be rewarded by the

organization (Maehr, 1987). There are also standards for what

behaviors and practices will lead to success (Martin, 1982;

Shrivastra & Schneider, 1984). As people enter an organization,

they must learn these unwritten rules of the organization about

"how things are done here". One important form for

comm unicating such rules is through stories of particularly

noteworthy employee behavior (Martin, 1982). Martin's work has

demonstrated that concrete stories are more effective in

communicating company policy and are more remembered than

abstract policy statements. Some common types of stories whose

themes are shared by a large number of organizations are:

1. "No mass layoffs" script about an organization's refusal tofire employees when economic times get tough.

2. "Horatio Alger" script about the employee who starts atthe bottom and climbs to the top.

3. "Great man is human" script, where the founder orpresident of a company makes a personal gesture towarda lower-level employee, for example, buying a present fora new baby.

4. "We appreciate and/or tolerate deviance"script, where atop executive goes out of his way to respond well to acomplaint or challenge from a subordinate. (Martin,1983, p. 285).

Over time, it is assumed that individuals within the

organization will share more and more of the same values and

beliefs. Research has demonstrated that newcomers to a group

develop new conceptions of the organization as they enter the

group (Louis, 1980). New quantitative techniques are being

developed to measure such changes using structural equation

procedures (Schaubroeck & Green, 1989).

150

It is further argued in these largely theoretical papers that

shared values or norms enhance group functioning and make the

organization more efficient (Barney, 1986; Enz & Schwenk, 1989;

Feldman, 1984; Schein, 1985). Organizational culture theorists

also assume that shared values within the organization should

predict higher levels of job satisfaction for the individual members

of the group (e.g., Granrose & Portwood, 1987; Wanous, 1980).

Value similarity between employees and top management is

assumed to be especially important (Barney, 1986).

In one of the few studies directly testing the importance of

shared values in the organization, Posner and Schmidt (1984) sent

questionnaires to 6000 managers and executives asking questions

about their values. Nearly three-fourths of those surveyed

reported that pressure to conform to organizational standards was

strong. Other work has shown that those managers who perceived

that they shared the values of the organization felt more personal

success (Posner, Kouzes, & Schmidt, 1985).

Recent work has begun to question some of the assumptions

about the role of culture and shared beliefs. Enz and Schwenk

(1989) studied actual and perceived sharing of values within a

transportation organization. Although they did find that unit

managers who actually shared the values of top management had

higher performances within their units, there was no effect for

actual similarity within a unit to relate to that unit's performance.

In addition, perceived similarity did not relate to the overall

performance of the organization. In another non-confirming study,

Mayberry (1985) found that shared values within the group had no

151

relationship to organizational satisfaction or commitment.

Meglino, Ravlin, and Adkins (1989) did find a positive relationship

between job satisfaction and value similarity for production

workers and their supervisors, but the effects were modest.

These studies, and others that have failed to confirm

matching predictions (e.g., Vandenberg & Scarpello, 1990),

suggest that more attention needs to be given to the effects

associated with particular types of matching. Of most interest for

us here is the matching of ideas about how to be successful in

the organization.

Effects of Matched Success Definitions. Much of the work

done thus far on the matching of values has not looked at

specific types of values. Instead, more generalized matching of

job rewards and preferences for particular types of rewards (e.g.,

Vandenberg & Scarpello, 1990; Wanous, 1980) or matching of

individual and organizational career plans (Granrose & Portwood,

1987), or even more general types of matching have been done.

There is reason to believe that definitions of success should

be especially important components of organizational culture.

Matched success definitions within the organization should lead to

higher performance levels and to more recognition in the form of

higher salaries for those who do match. There should also be

higher job satisfaction for those who fit in well in terms of

matching. However, as we have seen, the empirical support for

such ideas is still weak. In addition, most of the work has taken

an organizational approach, and has not looked at the effects of

matching on the individual. Are those who see themselves as

152

most similar to others in the group the most successful? Are

they the most satisfied with their work?

The above questions were addressed in a paper by Russell,

Frieze, & Olson (1987). We argued that an organizational

member who can "listen" and incorporate the appropriate

behaviors and values is more likely to succeed than those who do

not "fit" as well. At the same time, those with shared values

were also expected to be more satisfied with their jobs. Using

the same sample of University of Pittsburgh MBAs described

earlier, we tested these ideas regarding matching. The questions

used were the one about how they defined success in their work

and a question about how they felt that their co-workers defined

success. In this case the original 50 categories of success criteria

were used and the first personal success response was compared

to first response for the co-worker's success criterion. If the

same code was used for one's own success definition and for the

success definition of co-workers, the person was considered to be

matched in success values. Overall, 46% of the group was

matched. This was a much higher proportion of matching than

we had anticipated, especially given the exact matching requires.

One demographic variable was related to matching. There

was a trend for women more often to be matched than men

(x2J =2.7, p<.08). Over 50% of the women had matched success

definitions as compared to 44% of the men. Higher levels of

matching for women is consistent with other research. For

example, in their survey of 6000 managers and executives, Posner,

Kouzes and Schmidt (1985) found that women reported more

153

pressure to conform than men. In a review of other research,

Colwill (1982) has noted the women tend to be more likely to

echo traditional male definitions of success, particularly "the

acquisition of money, advancement and recognition in the world of

employment" (p. 89). It seems reasonable to hypothesize that

women who are successful managers are the most accepting of

traditional male definitions of success that dominate the

managerial work environment.

Going back to the more general question of the impact of

matching on salary, a series of regressions were performed. In

order to test our first hypothesis that those whose success values

matched those of their co-workers would have higher salaries, a

multiple regression equation was estimated using a dummy variable

equal to one if success values matched and three other variables

which our previous studies (e.g., Olson, Frieze and Good, 1987)

had found were significant determinants of MBA salaries. These

three variables were years of full-time employment before

receiving the MBA, years of full-time employment after receiving

the MBA, and a dummy variable for sex (l=female). The

criterion variable was the MBA's 1983 full-time annual salary.

The overall F for this regression was highly significant (F41014 =

115, P < .01). All the individual coefficients in the equation

were significant at the .01 level of confidence and the percentage

of variance in salary accounted for by the equation was 31 %.

The resulting equation was:

Salary = 24.7 + 1.3 Years Work Before MBA

+ 2.3 Years Work After MBA - 2.9 Sex + 2.2 Matched.

154

As expected, those whose success values matched their perception

of those of their coworkers earned significantly more than

those managers whose values did not match. The difference

translates into an average of $2200 in additional annual salary

for those managers whose values matched. The regression

results also replicated earlier studies which showed that women

earned less than men and the salary tended to increase with years

of experience.

A similar analysis was done to assess the effects of matching

on job satisfaction. Respondents were asked to rank their overall

job satisfaction on a five-point scale (1 = very dissatisfied and

5 = very satisfied). In this regression equation, job satisfaction

was used as the criterion variable; the same variables as in the

salary regression were used as predictors along with the addition

of salary. Results were less significant. The overall F was

highest with only salary level and matching; both coefficients were

significant at the .05 level. The F declined with the addition of

years of full time work and years of previous employment and

sex. In the full equation, the overall F 51013 = 7.02 (p < .01).

The resulting equation was:

Satisfaction = 3.3 + .01 Salary

- .03 Years Previous EmploymeDt + .08 Matched

+ .02 Years Full Time Employment + .06 Sex

Although matching was related to job satisfaction in the predicted

direction, the coefficient for matching was not statistically

significant; neither were the coefficients for sex or years of

155

full time employment. Those with more years of previous

employment were less satisfied with their current positions when

we controlled for salary. The strongest predictor of satisfaction

was salary level.

The results of this work indicated, as expected, that

organization members whose personal definitions of success in

their company matched their perceptions of their coworkers'

definitions of success tended to earn higher salaries and to have

somewhat higher levels of job satisfaction. Since salaries are

determined by many factors (e.g., Olson & Frieze, 1987), the

strength of these findings suggest that matching is indeed

important to organizational success.

Conclusions and Questions for Future Research

As this paper has suggested, the question of how people

define success is complex. There is evidence that ideas about

success are individualized and that many people use definitions

that have not been widely acknowledged by achievement

researchers. Even MBAs define success in other than financial

terms. Librarians rarely think of success economically. They are

much more likely to see success in terms of doing their work

well. But, at the same time that we find these wide individual

differences in perceptions of success, there are also similarities

within professional groups. Gender may also differentiate people.

These studies have shown that men and women often tend to

think of success differently, even today when so many women are

entering the work force. We hope to continue to study individual

156

differences in success definitions and the implications of such

definitions for upward mObility and for satisfaction in one's work.

As reported earlier, many people may not routinely experience

success in their work. What are the conditions that maximize

such success feelings? Clearly, this is an important theoretical

and practical question.

Moving beyond the individual, there are also important

questions about the interaction of individual success perceptions

and organizational values and ideas about how to be successful.

Is "fitting in" especially necessary in terms of how one defines

success within the organization as we argue here? Another

question for future research is to identify what types of people

are the most likely to match their success values to the

organization. Posner and Schmidt (1984) asked managers whether

they faced conflict between the organization's goals and their own

values. It is interesting to note that upper level managers had

the least problem with this, while supervisory level managers were

highest in conflict. It follows that those who subscribe to the

organization values and goals are the ones who will stay and grow

in that environment. Those who have conflicts are more likely to

be passed over for promotions or to leave the organization in

order to relieve the conflict caused by this dissonance. At the

same time, the highest level managers may see themselves as

unique and may be less likely to define personal success in the

same way that they feel their coworkers do. Once again, further

research is needed on this issue.

157

Finally, we acknowledge that most of our work has

concentrated on questions raised by the left hand portion of

Figure 1. As attribution researchers move into the workplace,

other attributional questions will be raised. We suspect that the

answers such studies give us will add to and contribute to the

continued development of Weiner's very important work.

158

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Understanding CloseRelationships: An AttributionalPerspective J

Frank D. FinchamUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Social psychologists became concerned with the study of

cognition shortly after the first social psychological experiment

conducted by Triplett in 1897 and this cognitive emphasis was

reaffirmed and expanded in the founding of modern social

psychology (d. Lewin, 1951; Heider, 1958). Although the interest

in cognition has remained constant, the dominant conceptual

framework has changed regularly. For example, attribution theory

replaced cognitive dissonance theory in the late 1960s and it is

apparent that the information processing approach has now

replaced attribution theory as the guiding theoretical framework in

social psychology. Such changes are natural and healthy

developments. However, in their enthusiasm to embrace new

conceptual frameworks, social psychologists tend to overlook the

untapped potential of the conceptual framework that is replaces.

This is certainly the case for attribution theory, a theoretical

framework that is still proving fruitful in the study of close

relationships, particularly marriage.

lThe author thanks Susan Gano and John Grych for their helpfulcomments on an earlier draft of this manuscript.

164

To illustrate the value of an attributional approach for the

study of close relationships, this chapter is divided into three

sections. First, a rationale for studying attributions specifically in

the context of close relationships is presented. Second, a brief

summary of attributional research on marriage is provided. Third,

a rough cartography for future avenues of inquiry is offered so

that the potential of an attributional approach to marriage might

be realized more fully. The chapter concludes with a summary of

its major themes.

Why study attributions in close relationships?

Heider's (1958) analysis of "naive" or common sense

psychology provided the single most important foundation for

contemporary attribution theory and research. According to

Heider, causal explanation or attribution is fundamental to

common sense because "Attribution in terms of impersonal and

personal causes, and with the latter, in terms of intent, are

everyday occurrences that determine much of our understanding of

and reaction to our surroundings" (Heider, 1958, p. 16). Not

surprisingly, Kelley and Michela (1980) uncovered over 900 papers

on attribution for the ten year period prior to their review, and

attribution research, particularly on applied topics, has since

continued to thrive.

Given this wealth of information on attribution, why

investigate attributions in marriage? Surely, the findings of basic

attribution research is social psychology apply to marriage?

Although not explicitly stated, a positive response to the last

165

question was assumed by clinical psychologists as they became

increasingly aware of the importance of attributions in marital

therapy. For example, Jacobson and Margolin (1979, p. 108)

noted that spouses" "Typically view therapy as a way to

demonstrate to the partner and to themselves that they are

blameless, and that the other is at fault." They also noted that

"theories of ... causal attribution figure prominently in the

derivation of treatment strategies" (Jacobson & Margolin, 1979,

p. 31). At the time of this observation there were no published

studies on attributions in marriage and to the extent that

attribution theory informed marital therapy, this application rested

on the unarticulated assumption that the application of basic

attribution research to marriage was straightforward.

This assumption deserves closer scrutiny, however, because the

generalization of basic attribution research to close relationships is

contraindicated by several findings. For example, it has been

shown that attributions vary as a function of (a) expected

interaction with the attribution target (Knight & Vallacher, 1981),

(b) the nature of the attributor's relationship (e.g., friend,

acquaintance, spouse) to the attribution target (Taylor &

Kouivumaki, 1976), and (c) the affect experienced towards the

attribution target (Regan, Straus & Fazio, 1974). These findings,

combine with the observation that most basic research investigated

attributions made in regard to hypothetical others or strangers,

suggest that the results of attribution research in social psychology

may not apply to attributions in marriage. Despite the

voluminous attribution literature available in social psychology,

166

research on attributions in marriage therefore began to appear in

the 1980s and has developed relatively independently of basic

attribution research in social psychology. As will become

apparent later in the chapter, marital research has enriched the

study of attributions and has resulted in the identification of new

attributional phenomena. However, it will be argued that recent

attribution research in social psychology also has the potential to

advance the study of attributions in marriage.

Overview of attribution research on marriage

There has been an explosion of research on marital

attributions in the last few years. Currently, there are at least 30

published studies on attributions in marriage, only five of which

appeared prior to 1985. Because it has been suggested that this

research shows "little cohesion" (Baucom, Epstein Sayers & Sher,

1989), a framework for reviewing and evaluating marital

attribution research is offered in this section. The following

overview is not intended to be exhaustive as a comprehensive

review of this domain already exists (see Bradbury & Fincham,

1990). Rather, the goal is to provide a brief introduction to this

research domain by identifying the major themes that underlie the

bulk of research on marital attributions.

Interest in marital attributions was motivated by applied

concerns and has therefore focused on marital satisfaction, the

final common pathway that leads couples to seek therapy. More

specifically, it has been widely assumed in clinical writings that

(a) attributions explain variance in marital satisfaction and (b)

167

attributions may help us understand the patterns of behavior

exchange found in distressed and nondistressed couples. Each of

these assumptions is examined in turn.

Attributions and marital satisfaction

The assumption that attributions account for variance in

marital satisfaction can be broken down into two propositions:

1. Attributions maintain current levels of satisfaction. This

assumption requires as a minimum the demonstration of an

association between attributions and marital satisfaction.

2. Attributions can precipitate changes in marital satisfaction.

The implied causal relation between attributions and marital

satisfaction in the previous assumption is quite explicit in the

present one. This assumption therefore calls for evidence to show

that attributions influence marital satisfaction.

The typical marital attribution study asks distressed and

nondistressed spouses to generate causes for marital events (most

often hypothetical partner behavior, marital difficulties or, less

frequently, actual partner behaviors) and to rate these causes

along causal dimensions such as the locus of the cause (for an

exception, see Epstein, Pretzer & Fleming, 1987). The rationale

for focusing on causal dimensions, rather than the content of

attributions, is that the same cause (e.g., "My husband didn't do

his chores because he was preoccupied with this work") can be

viewed differently (e.g., the husband's preoccupation may be

viewed as a response to temporary circumstances, an external and

unstable causal attribution, or as a trait, an internal and stable

168

attribution) and it is the underlying dimensions that are most

relevant for understanding the consequences of attributions (cf.

Weiner, 1986). Because couples presenting for therapy often

express feelings of helplessness and because of the salience in the

clinical literature of the attributional reformulation of learned

helplessness (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978), research has

focused on the causal dimensions of locus, the stable versus

unstable nature of the cause, and the extent to which it was seen

as global versus specific.

Although clinicians typically discussed attributions in terms

of responsibility or blame (see earlier quotation from Jacobson &

Margolin, 1979), they did not initially investigate these

constructs and unwittingly followed the practice in basic

attribution research where data on causal judgments serve as the

basis for statements about responsibility and blame. This practice

is intriguing because there is a body of attribution research in

social psychology that clearly documents differences in responses

to questions regarding cause, responsibility, and blame (see

Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Schultz & Schleifer, 1983; Shaver, 1985)

and shows that lawful relationships exist between these different

judgments (e.g., Fincham & Roberts, 1985; Fincham & Schultz,

1981).2 Briefly stated, causal judgments deal with who or what

7he distinctions between cause, responsibility, and blame have beendiscussed in detail elsewhere (e.g., Bradbury & Fincham, 1990; Schultz &Schleifer, 1983; Shaver, 1985). Although a distinction can be drawn betweenresponsibility and blame, it is quite subtle because the criteria underlying the twojudgments are the same. Whether this distinction is important for understandingmarriage is an empirical question. However, clinical experience suggests that thedistinction is unlikely to reflect psychological functioning in marriage. In this

169

caused an event (i.e., they are primarily descriptive) whereas

responsibility and blame deal with accountability for the event and

with sanctions (Le., with evaluation) once the cause of the event

is known.

Recognition of the distinctions between various attributional

judgments, not only places the study of attribution on a firmer

empirical foundation, but also has important conceptual

implications. This can be illustrated in relation to the perceived

intent of a behavior. Intent is not a property of causes but of

Qeople, and inferred intent is critical to understanding a

perceiver's affective and behavioral response to an observed action

(Heider, 1958). Because intent is acknowledged to be a problem

for theories of causal attribution, it is accorded a minor role in

such theories (cL Weiner, 1986).3 However, when cause is

distinguished from responsibility and blame, intent assumes a

central role because a freely chosen, intentional behavior is the

quintessential act for which one can be held responsible

(Hart, 1968).

Noting these discrepancies in clinical and social psychological

writings, an attempt was made to expand the attributions studied

in marital research (Fincham, 1983, 1985a). Spouses were

therefore also asked to rate responsibility criteria such as partner

chapter, responsibility and blame are therefore used interchangeably. This usageis consistent with marital attribution research where judgments of blame havebeen used to assess responsibility.

~his is again curious because, as Heider (1958) notes, inferred intent isfundamental to the perception of personal causality (see beginning of section,"Why study attribution in marriage?").

170

motivation, intent and blameworthiness. Table 1 shows the

distribution of studies relevant to examining the association

between attributions and marital satisfaction and the possible

causal nature of this association.

The skewed distribution of studies shows markedly uneven

development of research on a possible concurrent and causal

relation between attributions and marital satisfaction. Because a

comprehensive review of the studies investigating a concurrent

relation between attributions and satisfaction is available elsewhere

(Bradbury & Fincham, 1990), only a summary of the findings for

negative marital events is given. The findings for negative

maritalevents are highlighted as negative events are more likely to

give rise to attributions (Holtzworth-Mumoe & Jacobson, 1985;

Weiner, 1985).

TABLE 1. Distribution of Studies Investigating a Concurrent andCausal Relationship Between Attributions and (a) MaritalSatisfaction and (b) Marital Behavior.

Association

Concurrent

Causal

MaritalSatisfaction

18

3

MaritalBehavior

4

1

Table 2 shows that consistent support has been found for an

association between attributions and negative marital events. Over

60% of the studies show that compared to happy spouses,

171

dissatisfied spouses are more likely to see the cause of negative

marital events as stable, global, and located in the partner, and

to see the partner's behavior as intentional, selfishly motivated,

and blameworthy. That is , relative to their nondistressed

counterparts, distressed spouses make attributions that are likely

to maximize the impact of negative behavior. No study has shown

a pattern of attributions opposite to that described.

This compelling evidence may make the absence of research

on a possible causal relation between attributions and satisfaction

TABLE 2. Summary of Studies Showing an Association BetweenAttribution Dimensions for Negative Marital Events and MaritalSa tisfaction

Number of Full/Partial NoAttribution Dimension Studies Support Support

Locus 13 69% 31%

Stability 11 63% 36%

Globality 10 100% 0%

Blame 8 63% 38%

Intent 6 67% 33%

Motivation 3 100% 0%

Note. Support was assigned to a study if the results wereentirely consistent with the hypothesis under consideration, or ifthey were consistent for either sex, for any of the groups studiesor any operational definition of the dimension uses.

This table summarizes the findings reviewed by Bradburyand Fincham (in press; see also Fincham & Bradbury in press-b).

172

appear surprising. However, experimental research that will allow

causal inference is on both ethical and practical grounds very

difficult to conduct in this area of inquiry. Introducing a

temporal factor to this research provides slightly stronger grounds

for causal inference. Thus, a pattern of findings in which

attributions predicted later marital satisfaction and in which

marital satisfaction did not predict later attributions would be

consistent with a causal relation in which attributions influenced

satisfaction. This is precisely the pattern of findings obtained in

the three longitudinal studies that have investigated attributions

in marriage.

In the first study, Fincham and Bradbury (1987a) assessed

marriages at two points separated by a 12-month interval and

found that initial causal and responsibility attributions predicted

wives', but not husbands', later marital satisfaction. This

relationship did not simply reflect a general association over time

between cognitive variables and satisfaction because unrealistic

relationship beliefs did not predict later satisfaction. In the

second study, Bradbury (1989) also found that attributions

predicted marital satisfaction over a 12-month period for husbands

but not wives. In a third study, Fincham and Bradbury (1990)

showed that causal attribution dimensions predicted marital

satisfaction for husbands and wives with spouses' level of

depression statistically controlled. These effects are particularly

noteworthy because they were found (a) even when initial

happiness/satisfaction was removed from the longitudinal

associations reported, (b) in established marriages where one

173

might expect relative stability in attributions and satisfaction, and

(c) for an arbitrarily chosen lag (12 months) that may not reflect

the causal lag between attributions and satisfaction. However, the

reason for the inconsistent sex difference found across the studies

is unclear. On the one hand, it suggests that the influence of

attributions on satisfaction may be unreliable, On the other hand,

it is encouraging in that it shows that a causal relation may exist

for both wives and husbands.

Attributions and marital behavior

As mentioned earlier, the second major assumption underlying

marital attribution research is that attributions may help us

understand the patterns of behavior exchange found in distressed

and nondistressed couples. That is, a specific spouse behavior

(e.g., wife arrives home late from work) is thought to result in an

attribution (e.g., "she's late because she cares more about her

work than about me" versus "she had extra work to do") that then

mediates the partner's response to the behavior (e.g., upon

spouse's arrival, "I've just had enough of the way you treat me"

and storms off versus "It's been a long day for you. Can I get

you a drink?"). The pattern of attributions associated with

mari tal dissatisfaction (see last section) is consis ten t with this

assumption and with the greater rates and reciprocity of negative

behavior in distressed marriages (see Weiss & Heyman, in press).

Demonstrating a causal relation between attributions and

behavior is quite difficult (see section, "Investigating the causal

role of attributions") and hence most research has examined

174

whether attributions and behavior are associated. However, in the

absence of such an association, the need to investigate a possible

causal relation is moot. Table 1 shows the distribution of studies

that examine the concurrent and causal relation between

attributions and marital behavior. Following the precedent of

basic attribution research where behavior is equated with

behavioral intention (a judgment), two initial studies investigated

the association between attributions and behavioral intentions

(Fincham, Beach & Nelson, 1987; Fincham & O'Leary, 1983). In

both studies little evidence was obtained to support an association

between causal attribution dimensions and behavioral intentions.

However, when responsibility attributions were examined (Fincham,

Beach & Nelson, 1987), a strong association was found with

intended behavior. That is, the more negative partner behavior

was seen as negatively intended, selfishly motivated, and

blameworthy, the more punishing was the intended response;

attributions accounted for approximately half of the variance in

behavioral intentions. This finding was obtained even when

marital satisfaction was statistically controlled.

Although encouraging, such data on intended behavior cannot

replace the investigation of overt behavior. Two further studies

have examined attributions and observed behavior. Fincham and

Bradbury (1988a) showed that causal attributions (summed ratings

of partner locus, causal stability, and globality) and responsibility

attributions (summed ratings for intent, selfishness, and

blameworthiness) correlated positively with negative behaviors for

both husbands and wives and negatively with wives' positive

175

behaviors during a discussion in which the couple attempted to

resolve a marital difficulty. Bradbury (1989) also found that

attributions were related to specific affects exhibited in a

problem-solving discussion. A similar causal attribution measure

correlated positively with husbands' whining and wives' anger and

negatively with wives' sadness. In contrast, the responsibility

attribution measure correlated negatively with wives' interest and

positively with wives' anger and contempt. Most importantly, the

associations reported between attributions and behavior are not

due to shared variance with marital satisfaction because this

variable was partialled out of the correlations in both studies.

Such evidence, however, does not address directly the

assumption that attributions mediate behavior exchanges. More

direct evidence for this assumption requires the documentation of

an association between attributions and sequences of behavior.

That is, attributions should be associated with the likelihood that

a spouse will respond negatively to an immediately preceding

negative partner behavior and respond positively to an

immediately preceding positive, partner behavior. Table 3 shows

the correlations between responsibility attributions and the

likelihood of a spouse reciprocating partner behavior (Bradbury &

Fincham, 1988a). It can be seen for both husbands and wives

that two thirds of the correlations were significant and that

spouses' attributions correlated with their response to partner

behavior in the expected manner. For example, the positive

correlation between husbands' intent attributions and the

reciprocation of negative behavior shows that husbands who

176

tended to see negative wife behavior as intentional responded

negatively to such behavior. In sum, available data suggest that

attributions are related to marital behavior and attributions may

indeed mediate spouse behaviors.

TABLE 3. Correlations Between Responsibility Attributions andLikelihood of Behavior Sequences in roblem Solving Discussion.

Behavioral SelfishSequence Intent Motivation Blame

Husbands

W+ --- > H+ -.36 -.26 -.25

W- ._-> H- .31 ns ns

Wives

H+ ... > w+ -.45 -.26 ns

H- --- > w- ns .36 .36

Note: ns - nonsignificant correlations (~ > .05).Higher attribution scores reflect more negative intent, more

selfish motivation, and greater blame.

With an association between attributions and behavior

established, Fincham and Bradbury (1988b) manipulated

attributions for a negative partner behavior in the laboratory to

investigate the impact on subsequent behavior towards the partner.

They recruited one spouse as a confederate. The confederate was

asked to assist the experimenter by writing a negative description

of his or her partner. The experimenter provided an outline of

177

the description and the confederate's task was to choose from a

list of items that could be inserted into the description so that

his or her spouse would find it credible. Once this was done, the

confederate copied the complete description onto a sheet of

paper. The experimental manipulation consisted of the

instructions that appeared on the top of the page onto which the

description was copied. In one condition, the instructions simply

asked for "an honest account of your partner's qualities". In a

second condition, the instructions provided a plausible external

cause for the negative description, thus allowing the subject

spouse to discount the causal role of the confederate spouse.

The instructions in this condition asked for a description of "your

spouse's negative qualities and his/her personal weaknesses".

Fincham and Bradbury (1988b) found that the behavior of

distressed spouses was affected by the manipulation: spouses who

located the cause of the negative behavior in the confederate

were more negative towards their partner in a subsequent

discussion than those who attributed the negative behavior to the

circumstances. However, they also exhibited more positive

behavior towards the partner. To account for this unexpected

finding it was argued that an internal attribution for the negative

partner behavior led to greater arousal in distressed spouses and

that the valence of the behavior resulting from this arousal was

influenced by the constraints of the laboratory situation (i.e.,

public behavior recorded on Videotape) leading spouses to present

themselves in a balanced way to the experimenters. In any event,

178

there is preliminary evidence consistent with the view that

attributions influence behavior.

Unfortunately, data relating to attributions and behavior

reflect several important limitations. First, the correlational

studies described earlier relate observed behavior to general

attributions regarding a marital difficulty rather than to

attributions for specific spouse behaviors to which the spouse then

responds. Ultimately, a more microanalytic approach is needed to

address the mediational assumption under consideration. For

example, a study currently underway asks spouses to indicate the

perceived intent of each partner communication in an interaction

so that the relation between this attribution and the spouse's

response to the communication can be examined. Second, no

attempt has been made to determine whether attributions meet

the criteria of a mediating variable. At the very least, a

significant correlation between a spouse behavior and a partner

response should disappear when the partner's attribution for the

behavior is statistically controlled (see Baron & Kenny, 1986).

Third, the single experimental study on attributions and

behavior yielded weak results and a replication of this study is

therefore underway. As a consequence of these limitations,

existing data only suggest a possible causal relation between

attributions and behavior and cannot be used to draw strong

conclusions about the attribution-behavior relation.

The relation of attributions to marital satisfaction and to

marital behavior do not exhaust the issues investigated in marital

attribution research. Attention has been devoted to several

179

additional issues, including the relation between attributions for

partner behavior and for own behavior (Fichten, 1984; Fincham &

Beach, 1988; Fincham, Beach & Baucom, 1987; Lavin, 1987), the

measurement of attributions (e.g., relating to causal dimensions,

Fincham, 1985b; Bradbury & Fincham, 1989b; spontaneous

attributions, Bradbury & Fincham, 1988b; Holtzworth-Munroe &

Jacobson, 1988; Stratton, Heard, Hanks, Munton, Brewin &

Davidson, 1986), responsibility for contribution to marital activities

(e.g., Fincham & Bradbury, 1989a), attributions for turning points

in the relationship (Lloyd & Cate, 1985; Surra, Arizzi &

Asmussen, 1988), attributional style (Baucom, Sayers & Duhe,

1989), individual difference variables (e.g., Bradbury & Fincham,

1988c; Fincham & Bradbury, 1989b), and the role of attributions

in jealousy (Buunk, 1984), relationship termination (e.g., Fletcher,

1983; Harvey, Weber, Galvin, Huszti, & Garnick, 1986), sexual

dysfunction (Fichten, Spector & Libman, 1988), and marital

violence (for a review see Holtzworth-Munroe, 1988).

However, the two assumptions identified, that attributions

account for variance in marital satisfaction and mediate behavior

exchanges in marriage, are central to this field of research.

Indeed, they constitute the raison d'etre for contemporary marital

attribution research. The preceding review shows that

considerable progress has been made in providing an empirical

foundation for these assumptions. It is also apparent, however,

that the task of providing evidence for these assumptions is far

from complete. Moreover, once fully documented, the associations

raise the more important question of why they exist. Our

180

exploration of attributions in marriage has therefore only just

begun and the remainder of this chapter is devoted to the

question, "where to?"

Quo vadis?

The goal of this section is to highlight directions for future

research suggested by the earlier review of the marital attribution

literature. Particular emphasis will be placed on avenues of

inquiry that will facilitate a more complete empirical foundation

for the assumptions made in marital attribution research and

increase our understanding of the role of attributions in marriage.

Four issues are addressed: (a) increasing confidence in basic

findings; (b) investigating the causal role of attributions; (c) the

need for conceptual integration; and, (d) strengthening ties with

the social psychological literature on attribution.

Increasing confidence in basic findings

The preceding review shows that the association between

attributions and marital satisfaction is a reliable phenomenon, but,

as Huston and Robins (1982, p. 919) note, "It is rare for research

on close relationships to approach, in a systematic fashion, the

problem of ruling out plausible alternative explanations of the

obtained effects." There are several alternative explanations for

this association.

Methodological artifact. The most obvious alternative

explanation is that the attribution findings in marital research

are a methodological artifact. This concern is manifest in two

181

forms. The first involves possible overlap in the content of

measures used to assess attributions and satisfaction. The second

arises from the observation that spouses may only make

attributions when asked to do so by psychologists. Each is

considered in turn.

Inspection of the items used in standard measures of marital

satisfaction arises the possibility that attributions and satisfaction

may be associated due to overlapping item content. For example,

standard satisfaction inventories typically include questions

regarding the degree to which spouses agree versus disagree about

various marital issues (e.g., finances, in-laws). Because marital

dissatisfaction thereby is defined, in part, as the tendency to

report disagreement across several martial domains, scores on

these inventories are likely to be related to a tendency to see

causes of events as operating across many areas of the marriage.

That is, both assessments entail the degree to which negative

events occur across many areas of the relationship.

One means of addressing this problem is to use only overall,

evaluative judgments of the marriage to assess marital satisfaction

(see Fincham & Bradbury, 1987b). Unfortunately, no published

studies have examined this issue. However, Baucom, Bell and

Duhe (1982) found the usual association between a daily

satisfaction rating and the global causal dimension. In a more

complete investigation of this issue, we found essentially the same

results for causal and responsibility attribution dimensions using

different measures of satisfaction. Table 4 shows the correlations

obtained between the attribution dimensions and a standard

182

measure of marital satisfaction (Marital Adjustment Test, Locke &

Wallace, 1959), two measure of satisfaction that consist solely of

evaluative items (Marital Quality Index, Norton, 1983; Kansas

Marital Satisfaction Scale, Schumm, Paff-Bergen, Hatch, Obiorah,

Copeland, Meens & Bugaighis, 1986), and a measure of

satisfaction comprising three semantic differential items (good-bad,

pleasant-unpleasant, satisfied-dissatisfied). It can be seen that the

correlations obtained between attributions and these various

measures of marital quality are very similar. It therefore appears

that the association between attributions and marital satisfaction i&

not due to overlap in the measures of these constructs.

The second concern, that attributions may not occur

spontaneously, takes two forms. First, it might be argued that

spouses seldom make attributions spontaneously and that findings

are relevant only to the reactive methods used to assess

attributions (i.e., explicit questions about causes). Second, the

hypothetical partner behaviors used as stimuli in most studies may

not be relevant to everyday life.

Some existing studies provide data that address these issues.

For example, Holtzworth-Munroe and Jacobson (1985) found that

attributions coded from open-ended responses to partner behavior

were not only related to marital satisfaction but also to spouses'

ratings of the attributions on underlying causal dimensions.

Similar findings have been obtained for dating couples (Grigg,

Fletcher & Fitness, 1989). As regards hypothetical stimulus

behaviors, Fincham and Beach (1988) showed that while

attribution ratings of hypothetical behaviors and real behaviors

183

TABLE 4. Correlations Between Attribution Dimensions andMeasures of Marital Satisfaction.

AttributionDimension

Husbands (n= 105)

Locus

Stability

Globality

Intent

Motivation

Blame

Wives (n= 110)

Locus

Stability

Globality

Intent

Motivation

Blame

MAT

-26*

-42

-42

-42

-41

-38

-34

-43

-39

-39

-33

MQI

-25*

-33

-39

-44

-43

-36

-34

-32

-34

-31

KSS

-34

-43

-49

-43

-40

-29*

-40

-39

-46

-35

SD

-31

-38

-41

-42

-39

-26*

-37

-39

-38

-31

Note: MAT = Marital Adjustment Test, KSS = KansasSatisfaction Scale, MQI = Marital Quality Index, SD = SemanticDifferential.

Nonsignificant correlations (l! > .01; and decimal pointshave been omitted.

* denotes significance at l! < .01 all other correlationsare significant at 2 < .001.

~mW%'~~~~Wlr,m~t$"~

184

differed in absolute values, the pattern of differences found in

prior research distinguished distressed from nondistressed spouses

for both types of events.

These results are encouraging but leave unaddressed the

question of whether attributions occur spontaneously (without any

prompting) in marital interaction and, if so, the conditions under

which they occur. Attempts to code attributions in marital and

family interactions have been undertaken but are highly

problematic (for a detailed discussion see Bradbury &

Fincham, 1988b). In any event, unlike attributions that remain

private, public or communicated attributions are likely to be

affected by the social environment in which the occur and the

rules of discourse.

Different factors may therefore influence private and

communicated attributions. Thus it is questionable whether

communicated attributions can be used as a criterion for the

occurrence of private attributions. It appears that "unsolicited

attribution" produced, for example, by a request to think out loud

may be the most appropriate criterion for evaluating the

occurrence of private attributions. Judged by this standard, there

is some evidence for the occurrence of attributions (e.g.,

Holtzworth-Munroe & Jacobson, 1985). To in~rease confidence in

the relevance of attributions, replication of this basic finding is

needed together with further delineation of the events most likely

to engage attributional processing.

Spouse attributions as reports of marital events. A second

rival hypothesis for the association between attributions and

185

satisfaction is that attributions are simply accurate reports of

the events distressed and nondistressed spouses experience in

their marriages. That is, compared to happy spouses, distressed

spouses are likely to encounter higher rates of negative behavior,

and it may be accurate to infer that the causes of such behaviors

are located in the spouse, are stable, and influence many areas of

their marriage, and that their partners are responsible for these

repeated negative experiences.

There is a hidden assumption in this viewpoint, namely, that

there is some objective criterion against which the accuracy of

attributions can be evaluated. If such a criterion exists for

marital attributions, it has not been articulated, and any attempt

to erect such a criterion should take into account the fate of

earlier attempts in social psychology to determine the accuracy of

social judgments (cf. Cronbach, 1955). Nonetheless, the issue of

accuracy in social judgments has recently been resurrected and

therefore requires further consideration.

Funder (1987) offers two pragmatic criteria for determining

the accuracy of social judgments. The first, interobserver

agreement, is difficult to apply to marital attributions. For a

given partner behavior, a spouse and another observer may make

different attributions as a function of their prior experiences with

the partner, the relevance of the behavior to them, and its

implications for future interaction. As indicated earlier, these

variables are known to influence attributions. Despite a lack of

agreement, the two attributions are equally valid and it would be

inappropriate to label either of them as inaccurate. The second

186

standard is that a social judgment is accurate if it allows

prediction of behavior. To the extent that the issue of

accuracy remains applicable to marital attributions, our review

showed that attributions do predict the attributor's behavior in

marital interaction.

However, the accuracy position is weakened further by the

fact that (a) satisfied and dissatisfied spouses are found to make

different attributions when responding to identical, hypothetical

stimuli and (b) attributions made for hypothetical stimuli and

stimuli unique to each marriage predict marital satisfaction equally

well (Fincham & Beach, 1988). Although it could be maintained

that spouses transform the hypothetical stimuli in a way that

makes them unique to their marriage, this implies nonetheless that

a psychological process is in fact at work and that attributions do

not simply mirror an external "reality".

It is not clear that attributions in marriage can be classified

as accurate or inaccurate. In any event, no research has

examined the issue of accuracy, an issue that must be addressed

if a plausible standard for evaluating the accuracy of attributions

can be found.

The role of depression. It is also possible that the

attribution patterns found in the marital literature do not reflect

a marital phenomenon but instead occur because attributions and

satisfaction covary with depression (see Gotlib & McCabe, in

press; Robins, 1988). An attempt has been made to address

this question. Fincham, Beach and Bradbury (1989) found that

responsibility attributions made for hypothetical, negative partner

187

behaviors accounted for variance in marital satisfaction with levels

of self-reported depression held statistically constant in a sample

of community wives. They also showed that maritally distressed

wives diagnosed as clinically depressed following a structured

diagnostic interview and nondepressed wives who were maritally

distressed did not differ in the responsibility attributions they

offered for hypothetical, negative partner behaviors. However,

both groups differed in the usual manner from happily married

wives. Fincham and Grych (in press) showed also that both

husbands' and wives' self-reported depression does not account for

the association between satisfaction and attributions for partner or

child behaviors.

Although there is as yet no evidence to suggest that the

attribution-satisfaction association is an artifact of depression, our

understanding of the relation between attributions, depression and

marital satisfaction is very incomplete. For example, the

attributional reformulation of learned helplessness predicts that

depressed spouses should locate the cause of negative marital

events in themselves. In contrast, the marital attribution

literature suggests that depressed (distressed) spouses should

locate the causes of such events in the partner. These

contradictory predictions need to be evaluated empirically.

Research is also needed to investigate the possible causal

relations among attributions, depression, and marital satisfaction to

increase confidence that the marital attribution findings reflect a

phenomenon associated with marriage rather than depression.

188

Spouse attributions are not unique to marriage. A related

rival hypothesis is that spouse attributions for marital events are

not unique to the marriage but reflect a manner of making

attributions that is used across various interpersonal relationships.

At first glance, this hypothesis appears to be inconsistent with

earlier cited research that attributions ratings vary across

relationships (e.g., Taylor & Kouivumaki, 1976). However, this is

not the case because the pattern of findings across happy and

distressed spouses may remain the same. That is, it is possible

that happy spouses, compared to dissatisfied spouses, make more

benign judgments regarding the behaviors of spouses, other family

members, friends and so on even though the magnitude of ratings

varies across relationships.

There is some evidence to support this view. Fincham and

Grych (in press) found the same pattern of causal attributional

differences between distressed and nondistressed spouses when

they rated the causes of marital difficulties and child behaviors.

Indeed, the ratings of causal locus, stability, and globality

correlated significantly. These findings provide limited evidence

because the majority of variance in these judgments was not

shared (common variance ranged from 9% to 11%). Thus the

evidence to support the view that spouses view attributions

consistently across relationships is quite weak. Greater attention

needs to be paid to this issue to increase our confidence that the

patterns of attribution found in the marital literature indeed

reflect a marital phenomenon.

189

Investigating the causal role of attributions

The earlier review shows that insufficient attention has been

given to establishing the potential influence of attributions on

marital satisfaction and marital behavior. Although the difficulty

of this task makes this neglect understandable, it does not

diminish the importance of evaluating the consequences of

attributions in marriage. Testing the impact of attributions In

marriage not only poses practical and ethical difficulties but also

conceptual ones. How might researchers tackle this critical issue?

Recognition of the clinical roots of marital attribution

research suggests a natural context in which the impact of

attributions can be tested, namely, marital therapy outcome

research. The goal of therapy is to improve marital satisfaction

and hence it lends itself to experimental manipulation of variables

such as attributions. Although four outcome studies have

attempted to change attributions in therapy (Baucom & Lester,

1986; Emmelkamp et al., 1988; Epstein, Pretzer & Fleming, 1987;

Margolin & Weiss, 1978) they do not provide data to assess the

impact of attributions. For example, none of them include

measures of attributions following therapy and thus do not

examine (a) whether the intervention actually altered attributions

or (b) whether the rationale provided to clients for alternative

interventions affects attributions. It is therefore difficult to

interpret the results of these studies in regard to attributions, a

difficulty compounded by the fact that none of the studies

investigate specifically the effect of attribution change

because they use multifaceted cognitive interventions. Thus, In

190

clinical outcome research there remains "no direct evidence that

the modification of attributional processes leads to behavior

change" (Berley & Jacobson, 1984, p. 32).4 This is indeed an

unfortunate state of affairs given the status accorded attributions

in clinical writings.

The current status of outcome research should not blind us

to its potential for increasing our understanding of the impact of

attributions. This potential is briefly illustrated by describing an

outcome study that would address the causal status of attributions.

Before turning to this task, it is necessary to outline an important

conceptual problem. Setting aside the radical behaviorist view

that unobservable variables (e.g., cognitions) are not the proper

domain of psychological inquiry, it must be recognized that it is

not possible to demonstrate the influence of attributions on

satisfaction or behavior. As a hypothetical construct, an

attribution can only be inferred from behavior (e.g., response

ratings) and can never be measured directly. Thus in

experimental research we can only demonstrate that the

manipulation of stimulus conditions hypothesized to influence

attributions are related to particular outcomes. This observation

is critical because it has important methodological implications as

illustrated below.

4Despite at least a dozen studies on attribution retraining in research onlearned helplessness (see Forsterling, 1988), there has been no demonstrationthat this training (repeatedly telling children that they failed on an academic taskbecause they did not try hard enough) changes attribution style or that changesin attribution actually produce changes in behavior. It is quite possible, forexample, that this clinically naive intervention induces guilt that is responsible forany behavioral change (for further discussion see Fincham, 1988).

191

Consider an outcome study where there are two treatment

groups and a wait list control group. The treatments consist of a

cognitive intervention designed to change attributions and a

standard behavioral intervention that focuses on communication

and problem solving skills. Assessments are made immediately

prior to treatment, at the end of therapy, six months following

therapy and one year following therapy. The variables assessed

include marital satisfaction, attributions, observed behavior

during a problem solving discussion, and daily reports of behaviors

over a two week period. How can these data address the issue

under consideration?

Most obviously they allow one to examine whether the

treatments were successful in altering marital satisfaction

(treatment versus control) and differed from each other (cognitive

treatment versus behavioral treatment). Positive findings would

suggest that attributions influence satisfaction. However, further

tests are needed to justify such a conclusion. It must be shown

that (a) the cognitive intervention actually changed attributions

(pre cognitive treatment versus post cognitive treatment); (b) that

these changes are correlated with changes in marital satisfaction;

and, (c) statistically controlling attributions reduces significantly

the effects obtained for satisfaction. Similar tests could be

conducted to examine attributions and daily behaviors and

behaviors observed during problem solving discussions. Notice

that an analogous set of analyses can also be conducted to

examine the impact of the behavioral intervention. Thus it is

possible to determine whether changes in satisfaction are produced

192

by attributions, behavior to both of these variables. Finally,

examination of the follow-up data allow one to test whether

further changes in attributions and behavior are associated with or

predict relapse (marital distress).

There are several other issues that would need to be

addressed when the proposed study is considered from a clinical

perspective. For example, the actual implementation of an

attributionally oriented intervention is not straightforward.

However, these need not be outlined in the present context. It is

sufficient to note that more compelling evidence relating to the

causal status of attributions is potentially available and can be

obtained in an ethically acceptable manner. Because considerable

resources are needed to conduct such research, it should also be

noted that appropriate analysis of correlational evidence can

enhance our current understanding of the impact of attributions.

Specifically, correlational data on attributions, satisfaction, and

behavior could be used to examine whether attributions are a

mediating or a moderating variable. For example, do attributions

mediate behavior exchanges? That is: (a) does partner behavior

account for a significant portion of the variance in subsequent

spouse attributions?; (b) is variation in spouse attributions related

to changes in spouse behavior?; and, (c) does a previously

significant relation between partner behavior and spouse behavior

disappear when attributions are held constant statistically?

Failure to meet anyone of these tests would indicate that

attributions are a moderating rather than a mediating variable

(see Baron & Kenny, 1986).

193

Conceptual integration

"We shall not attain a conceptual framework by collecting

more experimental results. Rather, conceptual clarification is a

prerequisite for efficient experimentation" (Heider, 1958, p. 4).

Although applicable to many areas of psychology, Heider's

observations are particularly relevant to the study of marital

attributions. This field has arisen in the relative absence of

theoretical models to guide research and it is perhaps not

surprising that it has been viewed as confused and incoherent

(e.g., Baucom, Epstein, Sayers & Sher, 1989). By making the

tacit assumptions in this research explicit, an attempt was made in

the earlier review to rectify this perception. Nonetheless, the

assumptions identified do not provide the kind of theoretical

guidance needed to advance this field of inquiry.

The need for three steps towards conceptual integration is

particularly salient. First, there is a clear need to offer a

framework that integrates the study of attributions, behavior, and

satisfaction. Attributions have been studied in relation to either

satisfaction or behavior with little attention to how these three

variables might be interrelated. It seems likely that spouse

attributions influence behavior which, in turn, alters partner

behavior and that this process leads ultimately to changes in

spouse satisfaction. An attempt to provide such a framework is

outlined elsewhere (see Bradbury & Fincham, 1990).

Second, the study of attributions in marriage needs to be

integrated with the broader field of research on cognition. When

this is done several omissions in marital attribution research

194

become evident. For example, current research is devoted

exclusively to the study of cognitive content, that is, what

judgments are made. However, the study of cognition shows that

more complete understanding of a cognitive variable such as an

attribution requires attention to the (nonconscious) cognitive

processes and cognitive structures that influence attribution

judgments, that is, how judgments are made. For example, a

spouse who is asked to make an attribution for a recent argument

is likely to recall similar arguments and determine whether the

causes of these arguments aid in understanding the cause of the

present one. In fact, determining the implication of the cause of

the present argument for the future (judging the stability of the

cause), rests on recall of the causes of past arguments and/or

knowledge about the general properties of the cause in question.

Thus factors that affect the retrieval of relationship relevant

material and/or general knowledge from memory require attention

for a complete understanding of attributions in marriage. A more

detailed exploration of the implications of integrating attribution

research with the study of cognition can be found in Fincham,

Bradbury and Scott (in press).

Third, the study of attribution needs to be integrated into a

broader contextual model that includes consideration of

personality, cognitive variables, affective variables, and behavior.

This is particularly relevant in view of the observation that most

theories in the marital domain "either effectively explain a small

segment of the marital interaction, but lack the scope and range

of the many factors involved, or else have the range and broad

195

perspective, but lack detail and intricacy at the practical dyadic

level of analysis" (Newcomb & Bentler, 1981, p. 92). Placing

attributions into a broader contextual model would thus provide a

level of analysis seldom found in the marital literature (for an

attempt to fill this gap, see Bradbury & Fincham, 1989a).

Strengthening ties with the social psychological literature

Although the idea of investigating attributions in marriage was

certainly influenced by the dominance of attribution research in

social psychology (see Fincham & Bradbury, in press), research in

this domain has proceeded relatively independently of basic social

psychological research on attributions. For example, the classic

attribution models (e.g., the ANOVA model, correspondent

inference theory) have had no impact on marital attribution

research. It is arguable whether this has hindered progress

because these models are not easy to apply to marriage and they

have been shown to have serious deficiencies (e.g., inattention to

the role of world knowledge for attributions, see Hewstone, in

press). However, it is disturbing that the relative merits and

demerits of these models for marital research have not been

discussed, an omission that could indicate ignorance of them.

The need to study attributions specifically in the context of

close relationships should not be seen to imply that basic social

psychological research and theory is irrelevant to this enterprise.

On the contrary, there is much to be gained from strengthening

ties with this research literature. Of particular note is Weiner's

(1986) book, An attributional theory of motivation and emotion, a

196

monograph that sets forth what is perhaps the first fully fledged

attribution theory. On an occasion honoring Bernard Weiner

there is a particular poignancy to concluding the present analysis

by noting the value of this work for marital research.

Earlier a limitation of Weiner's theory was noted, pertaining

to the treatment of inferred intent, and it must be acknowledged

at the outset that his theory arises mainly from work on

achievement motivation.5 This is important to acknowledge

because, as Weiner himself notes, he is concerned with

attributions for the outcomes of behavior and not with attribution~

for the behavior per se. In close relationships outcomes are less

clear and much of the commerce of these relationships concerns

attributions for behavior. Notwithstanding these observations,

Weiner's (1986) theory could serve as a rich theoretical framework

for marital research, especially in view of it detailed treatment of

emotion, a factor central to understanding close relationships.

Although this is not the context in which to provide a

detailed review of Weiner's theory, its value for the study of

marriage can be briefly illustrated. According to the theory, each

causal attribution dimension results in specific affects (e.g.,

locating the cause of negative events in the self will effect pride

and self-esteem). Simply incorporating this core feature of the

5Weiner believes his theory applies equally to the relationship domain andindeed provides interesting data relevant to this claim. However, these data arelimited in that they deal with matters such as requests for dates where a clearoutcome can be specified and where there is no extensive history between thepartners. Thus the status of his theoretical claims for close relationships requirefurther empirical evaluation.

197

theory into marital research will provide a finer level of analysis

of attributions as no dimension specific hypothesizes have been

evaluated in marital research. Such research could, in turn,

provide a "real world" evaluation of Weiner's (1986) theory. In a

similar vein, aspects of the theory have already influenced

theorizing on marital conflict. For example, Weiner (1986)

predicts that causal stability influences behavioral expectancies

that, in turn, give rise to the emotions of hopelessness and

hopefulness and that expectancies and emotions mediate the

relation between the stability dimension and behavior. Drawing

on Weiner's (1986) work, a similar sequence of events has been

hypothesized in a recent model of conflict in close relationships

(Fincham, Bradbury & Grych, in press). The latter model,

however, incorporates responsibility attributions in this sequence,

an omission in Weiner's (1986) theory that may limit its ultimate

usefulness in marital research. However, this is an empirical

question that, regardless of outcome, should not detract from the

gold mine of ideas relevant to marital research in Weiner's

attributional theory of motivation and emotion.

Conclusion

The major goal of this chapter was to illustrate the value of

an attributional approach for understanding marriage. To this

end, existing research was organized in terms of the two tacit

assumptions found in the marital attribution literature. This

exercise demonstrated that the literature shows far greater

coherence that previously assumed. However, it also showed that

198

the bulk of research focuses on the concurrent relation between

attributions and marital satisfaction and is therefore quite limited.

This lead naturally to a consideration of the ways in which the

contribution of an attributional approach to understanding

marriage might be more fully realized.

Four avenues of future inquiry were therefore identified.

Two of these, increasing confidence in basic bindings and

investigating the causal role of attributions, entail further research

on the two assumptions identified in the review. Although

important, such efforts are insufficient to advance significantly our

understanding of attributions in marriage. The assumptions

evident in the marital attribution literature have not been related

to each other and do not amount to a coherent conceptual

framework. Consequently, two additional avenues of future inquiry

were discussed, namely, the need for conceptual integration and

development and the strengthening of ties with the social

psychological literature on attribution.

There is little doubt that research on attributions in marriage

has established itself as a legitimate field of inquiry in psychology.

The gains made are impressive and have resulted in a more

complete understanding of close relationships and of attributions.

However, the field may be at a crossroads. It no longer suffices

to document the concurrent associations between attributions and

marital satisfaction/behavior; yet no clear alternative body of

research has emerged. At the present time, the key to advancing

this literature is likely to lie in taking stock of its strengths and

weaknesses and in offering conceptual frameworks to guide future

199

research. In the absence of such efforts, there is the danger that

this field may collapse under the weight of its own (incoherent)

data. Avoiding this eventuality presents a challenge because the

demands of the next generation of research in this domain are

much greater than those of present one. However, the benefits

are also far greater and include not only an increased

understanding of marriage but also the potential to enrich

attribution theory and research in social psychology.

200

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Author Index]Abelson, (1981) 141Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, (1978) 70, 168Adler, (1958) 117Alffleck, Tennen, Croog, & Levine, (1987) 96Anderson, 12Anderson & Arnoult, ~198?) 38Anderson & Arnoult, 1985a) 12Anderson & Arnoult, 1985b) 20, 45Anderson & Slusher, (1986) 35, 36Anderson, ~1983) 47, 143Anderson, 1983a) 26Anderson, 1985) 31Anderson, Horowitz, & French, (1983) 26, 45, 58, 71Anderson, Jennings, & Arnoult, (1988) 45Antaki & Brewin, (1982) 127Antonovsky, (1979) 117Antonovsky, (1987) 117Arkin & Baumgardner, (1985) 12Arkin, Cooper, & Kolditz, (1980) 15Atkinson & Raynor, (1978) 106

193

175179, 184179195179

166, 170,

Bailyn, (1987) 138Barney, (1986) 150Baron & Kenny, (1986) 178, 192Barrett, (1972) 118Battista &. Almond, (1973) 111Baucom & Lester, (1986) 189Baucom, Bell, & Duhe, (1982) 181Baucom, Epstein, Sayers, & Sher, (1989)Baucom, Sayers, & Duhe, (1989) 179Berley & Jacobson, (1984) 190Bianchi, (1982) 112Bond, (1983) 89Bond, (1986) 88Bower, Black, & Turner, (1979) 141, 144Bradand & Lerner, (1975) 12Bradbury & Fincham, 1988a)Bradbury & Fincham, 1988b)Bradbury & Fincham, 1988c)Bradbury & Fincham, 1989a)Bradbury & Fincham, 1989b)Bradbury & Fincham, 1990)Bradbury, (1989) 172, 175Bradley, (1978) 15Brand, (1987) 88Bulman & Wortman, (1977) 95, 113

166, 193

IDate is in parentheses after the name of the author. Page numbersfollow next.

208

Buss, (1978~ 96Buss, (1979 97Buunk, (19 4) 179

Cantor, Norem, Niedenthal, Langstom, & Brower, (1987) 143Carlson, (1981) 141Chamberlain & Zika, (1988) 117Chenug, (1986) 88Chodoff, Friedman, & Hamburg, (1964) 111Colwill, (1982) 153Crocker, (1981) 25Crocker, Hannah, & Weber, (1983) 13Cronbach, (1955) 185Cutrona, (1983) 77Cutrona, Russell, & Jones, (1985) 71, 72, 76

Deal & Kennedy, (1982) 147Dyck & Rule, (1978) 12

Eccles, (1987) 138Eisen, (1979) 17Elig & Frieze, (1979) 55, 57, 66, 127Emmelkamp et aI., (1988) 189Engel, (1988) 92Enz & Schwenk, (1989) 150Epstein, Pretzer, & Fleming, (1987) 167, 189Erickson, (1964) 117Erickson, (1976) 117

Feather, 11975) 102Feather, 1983) 20Feather, 1986) 102Feather, 1988) 102Feldman, (1984) 150Fichten, (1984) 179Fichten, Spector, & Libman, (1988) 179Fincham 163Fincham & Beach, (1988) 179, 182, 186Fincham & Bradbury, 1987a) 172Fincham & Bradbury, 1987b) 181Fincham & Bradbury, 1988a) 174Fincham & Bradbury, 1988b) 176, 177Fincham & Bradbury, 1989a) 179Fincham & Bradbury, 1989b) 179Fincham & Bradbury, 1990) 172Fincham & Bradbury, in press 195Fincham & Grych, in press 187, 188Fincham & Jaspars, (1980) 97, 168Fincham & O'Leary, (1983) 174Fincham & Roberts, (1985) 168Fincham & Schultz, (1981) 168Fincham, !1983) 169Fincham, 1985) 17Fincham, 1985a) 169

138

209

Fincham, (1985b) 179Fincham, Beach, & Baucom, (1987) 179Fincham, Beach, & Nelson, (1987) 174Fincham, Beach, & Bradbury, (1989) 186Fincham, Bradbury, & Grych, in press 197Fincham, Bradbury, & Scott, in press 194First, Olson, & Frieze, (1987) 134Fisk & Taylor, (1984) 97Fletcher, (1983) 179Follette & Jacobson, (1987) 72, 76Frankl, (1967) 117Frankl, (1969) 117Frieze 126Frieze et aL, (1983) 129, 131Frieze et aL, (1988) 139Frieze, (1976) 16Frieze, Bar-Tal, & Carroll, (1979) 127Frieze, Snyder, & Fontaine, (1978) 128Frost, Frieze, & Perloff, (1987) 132, 134Funder, (1987) 185

Gioia & Poole, (1984) 143Gioia, (1986) 143, 144Golding, Resnick, & Crosby, (1983)Gotlib & McCabe, in press 186Graham & Long, (1986) 108Gramose & Portwood, (1987) 150, 151Grigg, Fletcher, & Fitness, (1989) 182

Hamilton, (1981) 12Hanagan, (1977) 145Hart, (1968) 169Harvey & Tucker, (1979) 97Harvey, Weber, Galvin, Huszti, & Garnick, (1986) 179Heider, (1958) 163, 164, 169, 193Heinemann, Bulka, & Smetak, (1988) 95Hocking, (1957) 111, 118Holtzworth-Munroe, & Jacobson, (1985) 170, 182, 184Holtzworth-Munroe, & Jacobson, (1988) 179Holtzworth-Munroe, (1988) 179Huston & Robins, (1982) 180

Jacobson & Margolin, (1979) 165, 168Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, (1983) 96Jaspar, Fincham, & Hewstone, (1983) 97Jones & Harris, (1967) 12Jones & McGillis, (1976) 14Jones & Davis, (1965) 14

Kahneman, Slavic, & Tversky, (1982) 49Kanter, (1977) 144Kelley & Michela, (1980) 164Kelley, (1967) 13Kelley, (1973) 13

25

60

151

210

Klinger, (1977) 117Knight & Vallacher, (1981) 165Kohlberg, (1984) 98Kruglanski, (1979) 97Kruglanski, (1980) 22Kunda, (1987) 146

Lane, Anderson, & Kellam, (1985)Lau & Ware, (1981) 70Lavin, (1987) 179Lazarus & Folkman, (1984) 85Lefcourt, (1981) 55, 58, 70, 72, 79Lefcourt, (1983) 77Leung & Bond, (1984) 89Leung & Foster, (1985) 88Lewin, (1951) 163Lloyd & Cate, (1985) 179Locke & Wallace, (1959) 182Lord & Kernan, (1987) 144Lord & Novick, (1968) 64Louis, (1980) 149

Maddi, (1971) 117Maehr & Kleiber, (1980) 106Maehr & Nicholls, (1980) 91, 131Maehr, (1974) 91, 130Maehr, (1987) 149Mak, (1984) 88Mak, (1988) 88, 89Margolin & Weiss, (1978) 189Martin, (1982) 143, 149Martin, (1983) 149Maslow, (1987) 106, 117May, (1969) 117Mayberry, (1985) 150McClelland, (1961) 131McGuire, (1985) 12Meece & Frieze, (1982) 129Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins, (1989)Meyer & Mulherin, (1980) 12Michela, Peplau, & Weeks, (1982)Miller (1976) 33Miller & Ross, (1975) 32Monson & Snyder, (1977) 17Morishima, (1982) 90Moss 126Moss & Frieze, (1987) 144Murrell & Frieze, (1990) 139

Newcomb & Bentler, (1981) 195Nielson & MacDonald, (1988) 95, 96Nisbett & Ross, (1980) 12Norton, (1983) 182

211

Olson 126Olson & Frieze, (1987) 155Olson, Frieze, & Good, (1987) 153Ouchi, (1981) 90

Parsons & Goff, (1980) 101, 102Parsons, (1982) 102Passer, (1977) 60Passer, Kelley, & Michela, (1978) 61Pennington & Hastie, (1986) 143Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, &

Seligman, (1982) 55, 58, 71, 72Posner & Schmidt, (1984) 150, 156Posner, Kouzes, & Schmidt, (1985) 150, 152

Raynor, (1980) 106Regan, Straus, & Fazio, (1974) 165Reker & Wong, (1988) 117Rest, (1979) 98Robins, (1988) 186Ross, (1977) 88Ross, Bierbrauer, & Hoffman, (1976) 12Rotter, (1966) 70Russell 55Russell & McAuley, (1986) 69Russell et aI., (1985) 66, 67Russell, (1982) 55, 57, 61, 64, 74, 107Russell, Cutrona, Rose, & Yurko, (1984) 66, 67Russell, Frieze, & Olson, (1987) 152Russell, McAuley, & Tarico, (1987) 55, 61, 63, 65-67Rychlak, (1976) 92, 96

Schaubroeck & Green, (1989) 149Schein, (1985) 150Schein, (1986) 147Schneider, Hastorf, & Ellsworth, (1979) 12Schultz & Schleifer, (1983) 168Schumm, Paff-Bergen, Hatch, Obiorah, Copeland, Meens, &

Bugaigh, (1986) 182Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, (1979) 20Shaver, (1985) 168Shrivastra & Schneider, ~1984) 149Silver & Wortman, (1980 95Silver, Boon, & Stones, 1983) 95Soderstrom & Wright, (1977) 112Stern, (1983) 61Stratton, Heard, Hanks, Munton, Brewin, & Davidson, (1986)

179Sue & Sue, (1973) 88Sujan, (1986) 45Surra, Arizzi, & Asmussen, (1988) 179

212

Taber, (1963) 114Taylor &. Kouivumaki, (1976) 165, 188Taylor, (1967) 92Taylor, 1983) 95Taylor, ichtman, & Wood, (1984) 96Tetlock & Levi, (1982) 15Triplett, (1897) 163

Uleman, (1987) 14

Vallacher & Wegner, (1987) 143Vandenberg & Scarpello, (1990) 151Vogel, (1979) 90

70( 1980)89

151

Wallston & Wallston,Wan & Bond, (1982)Wanous, (1980) 150,Weiner 7Weiner, 1979) 57, 59, 61, 67, 69Weiner, 1983) 61Weiner, 1985) 57, 59, 61, 67-69, 71, 170Weiner, 1985a) 85, 126Weiner, 1985b) 101, 127Weiner, 1986) 16, 57, 59, 61, 67-69, 71, 168, 169, 195-197Weiner, rieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, & Rosenbaum, (1971)

126Weiner, Nierenberg, & Goldstein, (1976) 17Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, (1979) 17Weiss & Heyman, in press 173Wetzel, (1982) 15Wimer & Kelley, (1982) 16Wong 84Wong & Reker, (1984) 94Wong & Weiner, (1981) 16, 84, 95, 112Wong, ~979) 89Wong, 1988) 143Wong, 1989) 94, 117Wong, elerga, & Wilson, (1988) 85, 108

Yalom, (1980) 117Yang, (1986) 88Yeh, (1985) 88Yu, (1980) 89

Zelen 1, 4Zillman, (1978) 12Zuckerman, (1979) 15