NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT ANNUAL … york city police department annual firearms discharge report 2009

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT

2009

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT

ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT

2009

RAYMOND W. KELLY POLICE COMMISSIONER

This report was produced by the New York City Police Department

Office of Management Analysis and Planning, Special Projects

© 2010, NYPD


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2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................... vii USE OF FORCE...................................................................................................................................... ix THE INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW PROCESS .................................................................................. xii ANATOMY OF A FIREARMS DISCHARGE INVESTIGATION............................................................... xv GLOSSARY OF TERMS.......................................................................................................................... xvi HISTORICAL SNAPSHOT 1999‐2009.................................................................................................. xviii 2009 FIREARMS DISCHARGE SNAPSHOT.......................................................................................... xix 2009 FIREARMS DISCHARGE SCOPE…............................................................................................... xx 2009 FIREARMS DISCHARGE OVERVIEW.......................................................................................... xxi

ANALYSIS OF 2009 FIREARMS DISCHARGES BY CATEGORY INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE – ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT OVERVIEW..................................................................................................................................... 3 REASONS FOR DISCHARGES........................................................................................................... 3 DATES AND TIMES OF DISCHARGES............................................................................................... 3 LOCATIONS OF DISCHARGES......................................................................................................... 3 REASONS OFFICER INVOLVED........................................................................................................ 6 OFFICER RESTRAINT....................................................................................................................... 7 OFFICER PEDIGREE......................................................................................................................... 9 SUBJECT PEDIGREE........................................................................................................................ 11 INCIDENT OUTCOMES................................................................................................................... 15 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................. 18 INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE – ANIMAL ATTACK OVERVIEW..................................................................................................................................... 21 REASONS FOR DISCHARGES........................................................................................................... 21 DATES AND TIMES OF DISCHARGES............................................................................................... 21 LOCATIONS OF DISCHARGES......................................................................................................... 21 REASONS OFFICER INVOLVED........................................................................................................ 23 OFFICER RESTRAINT....................................................................................................................... 25 OFFICER PEDIGREE......................................................................................................................... 26 INCIDENT OUTCOMES................................................................................................................... 28 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................. 29 UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE OVERVIEW..................................................................................................................................... 31 REASONS FOR DISCHARGES........................................................................................................... 31 PURELY UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGES......................................................................................... 31

UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE – ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT............................................................ 31


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ANALYSIS OF 2009 FIREARMS DISCHARGES BY CATEGORY continued UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A FIREARM

MISTAKEN IDENTITY OVERVIEW....................................................................................................................................... 37 DEFINITION...................................................................................................................................... 37 HISTORICAL CONTEXT..................................................................................................................... 37 MISTAKEN‐IDENTITY SHOOTING OF OFFICER OMAR EDWARDS..................................................... 42 PREVENTING MISTAKE‐IDENTITY INCIDENTS.................................................................................. 45

APPENDIX HISTORICAL DATA................................................................................................................................. 49 FIREARMS TRAINING............................................................................................................................ 52 ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT RESULTING IN A SUBJECT’S DEMISE....................................................... 54 SUBJECTS SHOT BY POLICE BY RACE/ETHNICITY, SINCE 1997........................................................ 58 SUPPLEMENTAL DATA………………………………………………........................................................................ 60

OVERVIEW....................................................................................................................................... 35 SUICIDE............................................................................................................................................ 35 DISCHARGE BY OTHER THAN OFFICER............................................................................................ 35 OTHER............................................................................................................................................. 35 OUTCOME....................................................................................................................................... 35

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT TABLES, CHARTS, AND FIGURES

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PAGE Anatomy of a Firearms Discharge Investigation...................................................................... xv Historical Snapshot by Category, 1999–2009.......................................................................... xviii Total Incidents for Year, 1999–2009........................................................................................ xviii Adversarial Conflict, 1999–2009.............................................................................................. xviii Unintentional Discharge, 1999–2009...................................................................................... xviii Animal Attack, 1999–2009....................................................................................................... xviii Comparison, 2008 to 2009....................................................................................................... xix Breakdown by Category, 2009................................................................................................. xix Firearms Discharge Scope........................................................................................................ xx INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE – ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT

A.1 Type of Threat Intentional Discharge – Adversarial Conflict (ID‐AC)....................................... 3 A.2 Precincts with More than One ID‐AC Incident......................................................................... 4 A.3 ID‐AC Incidents By Borough..................................................................................................... 4 A.4 MAP: Locations of ID‐AC vs Locations of Criminal Shootings, 2009........................................ 5 A.5 Criminal Shootings vs ID‐AC Incidents, Frequency by Borough............................................... 6 A.6 Criminal Shootings vs ID‐AC Incidents, Percentage by Borough.............................................. 6 A.7 Top Five On‐duty Assignments................................................................................................ 7 A.8 Officer’s Actions Prior to Shooting........................................................................................... 7 A.9 Shots Fired by Officers............................................................................................................. 8 A.10 Shots Fired per Incident........................................................................................................... 9 A.11 Race/Ethnicity of Officers........................................................................................................ 10 A.12 Years of Service........................................................................................................................ 11 A.13 Rank of Officers Involved in ID‐AC Incidents........................................................................... 11 A.14 Race/Ethnicity of 49 Known Subjects Involved in ID‐AC Incidents.......................................... 12 A.15 Race/Ethnicity of Nine Known Subjects Firing on Officers...................................................... 12 A.16 Subjects Involved in ID‐AC Incidents vs Persons Arrested for Firearms Possession, 2009...... 13 A.17 Subjects Who Fired on Police vs Criminal Shooting Suspects, 2009........................................ 13 A.18 43 Known Subjects with Prior Arrests...................................................................................... 14 A.19 List of Known Weapons Possessed/Used by Subjects............................................................. 15 A.20 Officers Injured During ID‐AC Incidents................................................................................... 16 A.21 Actions of Subjects Shot and Killed.......................................................................................... 17 A.22 Actions of Subjects Shot and Injured....................................................................................... 17 INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE – ANIMAL ATTACK

B.1 Intentional Discharge – Animal Attack Incidents (ID‐AA), by Tour.......................................... 21 B.2 Jurisdiction of Incidents........................................................................................................... 22 B.3 ID‐AA Incidents by Borough..................................................................................................... 22 B.4 Locations of Animal Attacks..................................................................................................... 23 B.5 Type of Job to Which Officer Was Assigned............................................................................ 23 B.6 MAP: Locations of ID‐AA Incidents, 2009................................................................................ 24 B.7 Bureau/Precinct of Assignment, Two or More Officers........................................................... 25 B.8 Officer Assignment.................................................................................................................. 25

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT TABLES, CHARTS, AND FIGURES

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INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE – ANIMAL ATTACK continued B.9 Shots Fired per Officer................................................................................................................ 26 B.10 Shots Fired per Incident.............................................................................................................. 26 B.11 Race/Ethnicity of Officers........................................................................................................... 27 B.12 Rank of Officers Involved in ID‐AA Incidents............................................................................... 28 B.13 Years of Service........................................................................................................................... 28 UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE

C.1 Findings, All Unintentional Discharges........................................................................................ 33 UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A FIREARM None

APPENDIX Officers Shot and Injured by Subjects, 1971–2009..................................................................... 49 Officers Shot and Killed by Subjects, 1971–2009........................................................................ 49 Subjects Shot and Injured by Officers, 1971–2009..................................................................... 50 Subjects Shot and Killed by Officers, 1971–2009........................................................................ 50 Total Shots Fired, 1971–2009..................................................................................................... 51 Total Incidents, 1971–2009......................................................................................................... 51

Subjects Shot by Police — Race/Ethnicity................................................................................... 58 Subjects Shot by NYPD Officers, 1997–2009............................................................................... 59 Gunfire in New York City, 2009................................................................................................... 59 Discharge Incidents by Day of Week........................................................................................... 60 Discharge Incidents by Tour........................................................................................................ 60 Discharge Incidents by Month.................................................................................................... 60 Discharge Incidents by Borough.................................................................................................. 61 Discharge Incidents by Precinct.................................................................................................. 61 Discharge Incidents by Duty Status............................................................................................. 63 Breakdown by Incident, 2009..................................................................................................... 64

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MISTAKEN IDENTITY None

Center Mass................................................................................................................................ 53

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT INTRODUCTION

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THE ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT: AN INTRODUCTION One of the most abrupt, dynamic, and potentially traumatic incidents that can happen in a po‐lice officer’s career is the line‐of‐duty discharge of his or her firearm. As much as handcuffs, the uniform, or the shield, the gun is a symbol of the officer’s authority. It is, moreover, a physical embodiment of the officer’s responsibility. The weapon on an officer’s hip is a con‐stant reminder—for officer and citizen alike—of the officer’s role and the trust society has given. Forty years ago, the New York City Police Department adopted Department Order SOP 9 (s.69) and began to collect in‐depth documentation of discharges during hostile encounters, for the stated purpose of “[increasing] the safety potential of each member of the force.” The policy quickly expanded beyond police‐involved combat, however, and came to include the study of all firearms discharges by police. Since the early 1970s, the NYPD has endeavored to record and evaluate every instance in which an officer discharges his or her weapon, whether the dis‐charge occurs purposefully, accidentally, or, in rare instances, criminally. The SOP 9 process has been demonstrably effective. When annual recordkeeping began in 1971, there were 12 NYPD officers shot and killed by another person; 47 officers were shot and injured. Officers, in turn, shot and mortally wounded 93 subjects, and another 221 sub‐jects were injured by police gunfire. These statistics are difficult to conceive of today. In 2009, for the first time since recordkeeping began, not a single NYPD officer was shot by a criminal subject, while police shot and mortally wounded 12 subjects, and injured 20. Four decades of annual analyses have altered the way officers respond to, engage in, and even assess the need for firearms discharges. Information gleaned from the annual reports has saved the lives of citizens and officers alike, and there has been Department‐wide change—tactical, strategic, and cultural—with regard to how officers use and control their firearms. The Department has made restraint the norm. Today, the reports serve an additional but equally important role: they are statistical engines for the development of training, the adoption of new technologies, and even the deployment of Department assets. New instructional scenarios are implemented from these reports, new hardware—from bullet‐resistant vests to speed loaders to semi‐automatic handguns to con‐trolled‐energy devices—is introduced, and violence‐prone hotspots are identified for inclusion in Operation Impact. Tracking how, when, where, and why officers discharge their weapons is an invaluable tool for working towards the Department’s ultimate goal of guaranteeing that, for every discharge, no option exists other than the use of a firearm.


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2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT USE OF FORCE

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USE OF FORCE Police officers are among a select few to whom society has granted the right to use force in the course of their duty. Under New York State law, police may use force to ef‐fect arrest or prevent escape, as well as to protect property or people. With certain very specific exceptions, a private citizen’s ability to resort to force is limited to self‐defense and is also predicated on first ex‐hausting all attempts at retreat. Police, on the other hand, are not only obligated to stand their ground, but required to pursue fleeing malefactors and use force, if neces‐sary, to terminate that flight. An officer’s role encompasses service, crime control, and order maintenance, and the last two regularly require officers to issue in‐structions and orders. Compliance in these matters is not optional. The vast majority of police encounters involve nothing more than words, but when words are insufficient—when people choose to ignore or actively resist police—officers have an ascending ar‐ray of force options to compel others to sub‐mit to their lawful authority. These options extend from professional presence up through verbal force, physical force, non‐impact weapons (e.g., pepper spray), impact weapons like batons, and, finally, deadly physical force. All of these are tools at the officer’s disposal, and the officer is under no obligation to move sequentially from one to the next; he or she may jump from verbal force to pointing a firearm—or vice versa—if the situation dictates. But an officer’s permission to use force is not unlimited. According to both federal and

state law, as well as the Department’s regu‐lations, officers may exercise only as much force as they believe to be reasonably nec‐essary. Reasonableness, more than any other factor, is the most salient aspect of an officer’s legitimate use of force. In federal case law, both Tennessee v. Gar‐ner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) and Graham v. Con‐nor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) delineate a stan‐dard of “objective reasonable‐ness” (Graham) that restricts an officer’s prerogative to compel or constrain another citizen. Tennessee v. Garner, while disallow‐ing the use of deadly physical force against any felon, affirmed an officer’s right to use force against certain suspects, stating that if a fleeing suspect were to inflict or threaten anyone with serious physical harm, the use of deadly force would “pass constitutional muster.” The New York State Penal Law, for its part, allows an officer to use physical force only when he or she “reasonably believes such to be necessary” to effect arrest, prevent es‐cape, or defend a person or property from harm. And the state limits an officer’s ability to exercise deadly physical force even fur‐ther—Penal Law §35.30(1) provides that po‐lice may only use deadly physical force against a subject in three very specific in‐stances: 1) when the subject has committed or is attempting to commit a felony and is using or about to use physical force against a person, or when the subject has committed or is attempting to commit kidnapping, ar‐son, escape, or burglary; 2) when an armed felon resists arrest or flees; and 3) when the use of deadly physical force is necessary to defend a person from “what the officer rea‐sonably believes to be the use or imminent


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use of deadly physical force.” The use of deadly physical force, then, is properly restricted by statute. But NYPD pol‐icy represents an even more stringent guide‐line, and the Department goes further than the law in its efforts to control the use of force by its personnel. State law, for exam‐ple, allows the use of deadly physical force to protect property (e.g., to prevent or ter‐minate arson or burglary); the Department does not. NYPD policy emphasizes that “only the amount of force necessary to overcome resistance will be used,” and warns that “EXCESSIVE FORCE WILL NOT BE TOLER‐ATED” (Patrol Guide 203‐11). Specifically re‐garding the use of deadly physical force, the NYPD states that “Uniformed members of the service should use only the minimal amount of force necessary to protect human life” (Patrol Guide 203‐12). GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF FIREARMS

To this end, the Department promulgates nine rules that guide a New York City police officer in his or her use of deadly physical force. They are as follows:

Police officers shall not use deadly physical force against another person unless they have probable cause to believe they must protect themselves or another person pre‐sent from imminent death or serious physi‐cal injury. Police officers shall not discharge their weapons when doing so will unnecessarily endanger innocent persons. Police officers shall not discharge their weapons in defense of property. Police officers shall not discharge their weapons to subdue a fleeing felon who pre‐sents no threat of imminent death or serious

physical injury to themselves or another per‐son present. Police officers shall not fire warning shots. Police officers shall not discharge their fire‐arms to summon assistance except in emer‐gency situations when someone’s personal safety is endangered and unless no other reasonable means is available. Police officers shall not discharge their fire‐arms at or from a moving vehicle unless deadly physical force is being used against the police officer or another person present, by means other than a moving vehicle. Police officers shall not discharge their fire‐arms at a dog or other animal except to pro‐tect themselves or another person from physical injury and there is no other reason‐able means to eliminate the threat. Police officers shall not, under any circum‐stances, cock a firearm. Firearms must be fired double action at all times.

REASONABLENESS

In the final telling, both legal standards and the Department’s expectations assess the appropriateness of an officer’s exercise of deadly physical force based on reasonable‐ness. Police are regularly exposed to highly stressful, dangerous situations, and the risks they face and the experience they gain are appreciated and conceded by those who write and interpret the law. In Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921), Justice Holmes noted that “detached reflection can‐not be demanded in the presence of an up‐lifted knife.” Sixty‐eight years later, the Su‐preme Court wrote, in Graham v. Connor, that “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the per‐spective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” And in People v. Benjamin, 51


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NY2d 267, 271, the New York courts wrote “It would, indeed, be absurd to suggest that a police officer has to await the glint of steel before he can act to preserve his safety.” These rulings explicitly acknowledge the strain under which officers make life‐or‐death use‐of‐force decisions. The law should and does provide latitude for those who carry the shield and protect the common good.

TRAINING Latitude is not unrestricted discretion, of course, but rather an admission that reason‐ableness is fluid. In order to make the right conclusion about whether and how to use deadly force, an officer in these situations relies on nerve, judgment, and skill, but most of all, on training. It is training that sets the officer apart from the civilian, and is an anchor in those dangerous situations that most people never face. The main purpose of the Annual Firearms Discharge Report is to ensure that the NYPD’s training is the best it can be.

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT THE INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW PROCESS

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INVESTIGATION The New York City Police Department recog‐nizes the serious nature of police‐involved firearms discharges, and it seeks to record and evaluate every such incident. The man‐date for such recordkeeping was first pub‐lished in Department Order SOP 9 (s. 1969), but the intervening forty years have greatly refined the NYPD’s process. Today, investi‐gations are conducted in accordance with two guiding documents: 1) Patrol Guide Pro‐cedure 212‐29; and 2) a handbook entitled “The Firearms Discharges Investigation Man‐ual; The NYPD guide to the preparation of a Shooting Incident Report.”

THE SHOOTING TEAM When an officer discharges his or her fire‐arm, on‐ or off‐duty, or when a firearm owned by an officer is discharged, a patrol supervisor responds to the incident and takes charge of the scene and secures and inspects the involved officer’s firearm. He or she also immediately notifies the chain of command. A Patrol Borough Shooting Team, led by a shooting‐team leader in the rank of captain, is then dispatched. The shooting team is an ad hoc entity that may be com‐prised of personnel from investigatory units, community affairs units, the Emergency Ser‐vice Unit, the Firearms and Tactics Section, and/or any other personnel whose training or expertise may prove valuable to the pending investigation. The shooting‐team leader, under the super‐vision of an Inspector, undertakes an in‐depth examination of the discharge incident, and begins by contacting and conferring with the District Attorney. In many in‐

stances—including nearly every instance in which a subject is killed or injured—the Dis‐trict Attorney will advise that any officer who fired should not be interviewed, in or‐der to preserve the integrity of the Grand Jury process. Whether or not the District At‐torney allows an interview, the shooting‐team leader will, in every instance, direct the officer who fired to prepare a Firearms Discharge/Assault Report, or FDAR. If a discharge causes death or injury, the of‐ficer who fired is required to submit to a Breathalyzer test. He or she is also automati‐cally reassigned to an administrative posi‐tion for the next three consecutive work days. Investigations into discharges that cause death or injury are supervised by ex‐ecutives in the rank of Chief. If the discharge incident appears legally or administratively problematic, or if malfea‐sance is suspected, the shooting‐team leader, in conjunction with personnel from the Internal Affairs Bureau, will remove the shooting officer’s weapon and modify or suspend his or her duty status. An officer’s weapon must also be removed in all in‐stances of self‐inflicted injury (absent ex‐tenuating circumstances). Each shooting investigation is thorough and exhaustive, and includes canvasses, area searches, witness interviews, subject inter‐views, evidence collection, crime‐scene sketches and investigation, hospital visits, and firearms/ballistics analyses. Afterwards, all available investigatory results are collated into a Shooting Incident Report and for‐warded to the Chief of Department, ordinar‐ily within 24 hours of the incident.


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THE SHOOTING INCIDENT REPORT As much detail as possible is included in the Shooting Incident Report, but the con‐straints of producing an important docu‐ment in a compressed timeframe mean that the information it contains is unavoidably preliminary. The primary means of mitigat‐ing this is the use of the Firearms Discharge Investigation Manual. The manual, in its current incarnation, is a 72‐page instruction booklet that provides a template by which shooting‐team leaders can produce accurate, data‐rich Shooting Incident Reports in a timely manner. It en‐sures that pertinent questions are asked and relevant avenues of investigation are pur‐sued, even in the wake of a dynamic, some‐times chaotic incident. Firearms discharges, especially those that occur during adversar‐ial conflict, can be tremendously complex events. The Firearms Discharge Investigation Manual functions as a checklist, promoting both uniformity and specificity. Each Shooting Incident Report should end with a statement, made with appropriate caveats, assessing whether or not the dis‐charge was consistent with Department guidelines and whether or not the involved officers should be subject to Departmental discipline. Often, if involved officers have not been interviewed, the shooting‐team leader may not make a determination, but rather state that the investigation is ongo‐ing. This does not preclude the shooting‐team leader from offering a tentative deter‐mination, however, nor from commenting on the apparent tactics utilized during the incident.

THE FINAL REPORT Within 90 days of the incident, the com‐manding officer of either the precinct of oc‐currence or the applicable Borough Investi‐gation Unit prepares a finalized version of the Shooting Incident Report. This final re‐port is a reiteration of the original, but in‐cludes any clarifications or re‐evaluations that may have been developed in the mean‐time. Because of the speed with which the initial report is prepared, tentative data is unavoidable. Accordingly, the final report will contain material that was not initially available to the shooting‐team leader (e.g., detective’s case files, forensic results, and medical reports). And because information is more extant, more complete subjective as‐sessments are possible. Generally, with regard to discharges that occur during adversarial conflict and involve injury or death to a subject, the final report cannot be finished within the 90‐day period. Instead, it must wait until the investigation into the incident has been completed, or at least until the district attorney from the county of occurrence has permitted the offi‐cer or officers who shot to be interviewed. At times it must wait even longer, until all relevant legal proceedings have been con‐cluded. When a final report is delayed—whether because of ongoing legal proceedings or in‐complete investigations—the Borough In‐vestigation Unit submits monthly interim‐status reports. Once the final report is fin‐ished, however, it is forwarded, through channels, to the Chief of Department.


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REVIEW After a firearms discharge have been investi‐gated and the final report has been pre‐pared, and after the District Attorney’s office has determined whether the incident re‐quires prosecutorial action, the NYPD initi‐ates a tertiary examination in order to assess the event from a procedural and training perspective and, if necessary, to impose dis‐cipline. This third layer of oversight is the purview of the Firearms Discharge Advisory Board and the Firearms Discharge Review Board.

THE BOROUGH FIREARMS DISCHARGE ADVISORY BOARD

The review of firearms discharges is two‐tiered, and conducted at the borough and executive levels. Members of the borough Firearms Discharge Advisory Board are su‐pervisors assigned to the borough in which the incident took place. This board further scrutinizes the incident, with the benefit of new material contained in the final report. Based on the accumulated evidence, the borough Firearms Discharge Advisory Board issues preliminary findings regarding whether or not the officer’s actions violated the Department’s firearms guidelines or use‐of‐force policy. The preliminary findings, along with a preliminary disciplinary recom‐mendation, are appended to the final report and presented to the Chief of Department’s Firearms Discharge Review Board for deter‐mination.

THE CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT’S FIREARMS DISCHARGE REVIEW BOARD

The Department’s Firearms Discharge Re‐view Board is the penultimate arbiter of any given discharge incident. It issues determi‐nations concerning the tactics used during the incident, the propriety of the officer’s actions, and the disciplinary action to be taken. The Review Board gives due consid‐eration to and often concurs with the origi‐nal recommendations of the shooting‐team leaders and the subsequent findings and rec‐ommendations of the borough Advisory Board, but in some cases it overrides, alters, or clarifies the preceding assessments and arrives at new, more accurate findings or more appropriate disciplinary results. The Chief of Department then produces a Final Summary Report—a single document that memorializes and synthesizes the whole of the exhaustive investigation and review process—and presents it to the Police Com‐missioner.

THE POLICE COMMISSIONER The final decision in all matters related to these incidents rests with the Police Com‐missioner. Using the recommendations from both the Advisory and the Review Boards, the Police Commissioner makes a final de‐termination as to the incident. Once the Commissioner has issued this final determination, the incident is considered closed. The results of the 2009 findings are published throughout this report.

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT ANATOMY OF A FIREARMS DISCHARGE INVESTIGATION

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An officer discharges a firearm or a firearm owned by an officer is dis‐

charged.

If the discharge results in injury, the Internal Affairs Bureau Command Center is notified and IAB members respond to assist in the investigation; additionally, the officer who fired must submit to a Breathalyzer test.

The District Attorney is notified in all cases and conducts a separate inves‐tigation (if warranted). The DA may present the case to a Grand Jury to

determine justification.

A supervisor responds, secures the scene and the firearm in question, and

makes proper notifications.

The Duty Chief is notified and re‐sponds to supervise investigations for discharges that result in a seri‐ous injury by gunfire or death to

anyone or when an officer is injured by gunfire.

The morning after the shooting incident, the applicable Borough Chief or Bureau Chief and execu‐tive staff meet with and brief the

Police Commissioner.

The Commanding Officer of the pre‐cinct of occurrence or of the Borough Investigations Unit prepares a final report within 90 days and submits it

to the Chief of Department.

The shooting‐team leader prepares a preliminary Shooting Incident Report, which is submitted to the Chief of

Department.

The Duty Inspector responds and su‐pervises the investigation.

A Shooting Team is established and a shooting‐team leader (Captain) re‐sponds to conduct an investigation.

If the officer receives charges and specifications the case is sent to the Department Advocate for a Depart‐

ment Trial.

In all matters related to the incident, the final determination rests with the

Police Commissioner.

The Borough Firearms Discharge Advisory Board formally reviews the incident and submits preliminary findings and recommendations to

the Chief of Department.

The Chief of Department Firearms Discharge Review Board reviews the incident and Borough Advisory Board findings and recommendations and

then makes a determination.

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT GLOSSARY OF TERMS

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Officer For this publication, refers to a sworn Uniformed Member of the New York City Police Department of any rank.

Subject A person engaged in adversarial conflict with an officer or a third party, in which the conflict results in a firearms discharge.

Civilian A person who is not the subject in the adversarial conflict but is in‐cluded as a victim, bystander, and/or injured person.

Firearms Discharge An incident in which an officer of the New York City Police Depart‐ment discharges any firearm, or when a firearm belonging to an offi‐cer of the New York City Police Department is discharged by any per‐son. This does not include a discharge during an authorized training session nor while lawfully engaged in target practice or hunting. Ad‐ditionally, it does not include a firearms discharge at a firearms safety station within a Department facility.

Intentional Firearms Discharge – Adversar‐ial Conflict

A firearms discharge in which an officer intentionally discharges a firearm in defense of self or another during an adversarial conflict with a subject. May include firearms discharges that are inside the scope of the officer’s employment but outside Department guide‐lines. This does not include discharging a firearm against an animal attack.

Intentional Firearms Discharge – Animal Attack

A firearms discharge in which an officer intentionally discharges a firearm in defense of self or another against an animal attack. May include firearms discharges that are inside the scope of the officer’s employment but outside Department guidelines.

Intentional Firearms Discharge – No Con‐flict

A firearms discharge in which an officer intentionally discharges a firearm to summon assistance. May include firearms discharges that are determined to be legally justified but outside Department guide‐lines.

Unintentional Fire‐arms Discharge

A firearms discharge in which an officer discharges a firearm without intent, regardless of the circumstance. Commonly known as an acci‐dental discharge.

Unauthorized Use of a Firearm

A firearms discharge that is considered unauthorized and is not listed as an intentional firearms discharge. In these instances the firearm is being discharged without proper legal justification and/or outside the scope of the officer’s employment. This includes instances when an unauthorized person discharges an officer’s firearm.

Use/threaten the Use of a Firearm

A contributing factor in which a subject discharges or threatens the discharge of a firearm by displaying a firearm or what reasonably ap‐pears to be a firearm, or by simulating a firearm or making a gesture indicative of threatening the use of a firearm.

Firearm For this publication, includes any pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, or variation of such.

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT GLOSSARY OF TERMS

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Imitation Firearm For this publication, includes any instrument that is designed by the manufacturer or modified by a person to appear as if it were a firearm. This includes air pistols, toy guns, prop guns, and replicas.

Use/threaten the Use of a Cutting Instrument

A contributing factor in which a subject cuts, stabs, or slashes a person with any cutting instrument or threatens or attempts to do the same while armed with a cutting instrument or what rea‐sonably appears to be a cutting instrument.

Cutting Instrument For this publication, includes any knife, razor, sword, or other sharp‐edged instrument, such as a broken bottle.

Use/threaten the Use of a Blunt Instrument

A contributing factor in which a subject strikes another person with a blunt instrument or threatens or attempts to do the same while armed with a blunt instrument or what reasonably appears to be a blunt instrument.

Blunt Instrument For this publication, includes any solid bat, stick, pipe, metal knuckles, or other instrument that, when used as a weapon, can cause blunt‐force trauma to an individual. This includes automo‐biles and unbroken bottles.

Use/threaten the Use of Overwhelming Physical Force

An incident in which a subject or subjects physically attack a per‐son or threaten or attempt to do the same, and while doing so put the person at risk of serious physical injury or death. This in‐cludes gang attacks and attempting to push a person from a roof or train platform. This also includes attempting to take an officer’s firearm.

Proactive Policing Instances in which officers engage in operations or activities that actively seek out violators of the law. This includes undercover operations, traffic enforcement, checkpoints, verticals, street nar‐cotics enforcement, warrant execution, quality‐of‐life enforce‐ment, and Anti‐Crime operations.

Reactive Policing Instances in which officers respond to a call for service from the public. This includes calls of a man with a gun, crimes in progress, domestic disputes, and quality‐of‐life complaints. This also in‐cludes calls for service in which proactive police units respond.

Attacked

Instances in which officers are not engaging in proactive or reac‐tive policing but are set upon by a subject. This includes off‐duty instances when the officer is a victim of a crime (e.g., robbery, burglary, assault), or involved in an altercation that is escalated by the subject (e.g., a traffic incident, a neighbor dispute). This also incorporates instances in which on‐duty officers are performing administrative or non‐patrol assignments (e.g., guarding a pris‐oner, processing reports, securing a location).

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT HISTORICAL SNAPSHOT 1999‐2009

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CATEGORY 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT 61 63 57 55 61 51 59 *59 45 49 47 ANIMAL ATTACK 43 39 40 38 35 26 32 30 39 30 28 UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE 37 26 27 24 25 27 25 26 15 15 22 MISTAKEN IDENTITY 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 *1 0 0 1 UNAUTHORIZED USE – FIREARM 8 1 7 0 2 5 **6 **8 **6 **3 **4 SUICIDE/ATTEMPT 5 5 5 2 7 5 3 3 6 8 3 TOTAL INCIDENTS FOR YEAR 155 134 136 119 130 114 125 127 111 105 105

TOTAL INCIDENTS FOR YEAR

155

134 136119

130114

125 127111 105 105

1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009

ANIMAL ATTACK

4339 40 38

35

26

32 30

39

30 28

1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009

* Numbers modified from previous reports to include mistaken identity incident erroneously reported as adversarial conflict incident. ** This category modified in 2005 to include incidents in which an officer’s firearm is discharged by persons other than the officer (e.g., a family member accidentally discharges the weapon, a perpetrator gains control of an offi‐cer’s firearm and discharges it, etc.).

ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT

61 6357 55

61

5159 59

4549 47

1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009

UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE37

26 2724 25 27 25 26

15 15

22

1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT FIREARMS DISCHARGE SNAPSHOT

xix

CATEGORY 2008 2009 %CHANGE INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE – ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT 49 47 ‐4% INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE – ANIMAL ATTACK 30 28 ‐7%

UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE 15 22 47%

UNAUTHORIZED USE OF FIREARM 11 7 ‐36% TOTAL FIREARM DISCHARGES FOR YEAR 105 105 0.0 TOTAL OFFICERS FIRING 125 130 4% TOTAL SHOTS FIRED 364 296 ‐19% TOTAL OFFICERS SHOT AND INJURED BY SUBJECT 3 0 N/A TOTAL OFFICERS SHOT AND KILLED BY SUBJECT 0 0 N/A TOTAL SUBJECTS SHOT AND INJURED BY OFFICER 18 20 11% TOTAL SUBJECTS SHOT AND KILLED BY OFFICER 13 12 ‐8%

MISTAKEN IDENTITY 0 1 N/A

INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE – ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT 2009 SUBJECT USED/THREATENED THE USE OF A FIREARM 30 SUBJECT USED/THREATENED THE USE OF A CUTTING INSTRUMENT 8 SUBJECT USED/THREATENED THE USE OF A BLUNT OBJECT 3 SUBJECT USED/THREATENED THE USE OF OVERWHELMING PHYSICAL FORCE 2 OFFICER PERCEIVED THREAT OF DEADLY PHYSICAL FORCE 4 TOTAL 47

BY CATEGORY

INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE – ANIMAL ATTACK 2009 DOG ATTACK 28 OTHER ANIMAL ATTACK 0 TOTAL 28

UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE 2009 DURING ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT 8 HANDLING FIREARM 14 TOTAL 22

UNAUTHORIZED USE OF FIREARM 2009 SUICIDE 3 ATTEMPTED SUICIDE 0 UNAUTHORIZED INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE 2 UNAUTHORIZED PERSON DISCHARGED OFFICER'S FIREARM 2 TOTAL 7

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT FIREARMS DISCHARGE SCOPE

xx

CATEGORY TOTAL NUMBER

NEW YORK CITY TOTAL POPULATION (U.S. Census, July 1, 2009)

8,391,881

NYPD TOTAL OFFICER STAFFING (2009 Annual Average)

34,953

TOTAL CIVILIAN CONTACTS (APPROXIMATE) 23,000,000

TOTAL RADIO‐RECEIVED ASSIGNMENTS 4,444,091

RADIO ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVING WEAPONS 205,939

WEAPONS ARRESTS 29,807

GUN ARRESTS 6,238

CRIMINAL SHOOTING VICTIMS 1,729

CRIMINAL SHOOTING SUSPECTS 1,511

INCIDENTS OF INTENTIONAL POLICE DISCHARGE DURING ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT 47

SUBJECTS SHOT AND INJURED 20

SUBJECTS SHOT AND KILLED 12

OFFICERS SHOT AND INJURED 0

OFFICERS SHOT AND KILLED 0

NOTE: all numbers are for CY 2009

OFFICERS SHOT AND KILLED (MISTAKEN IDENTITY) 1

NOTE: The numbers and percentages described in this report are often rounded to the nearest whole number and are prelimi‐nary and subject to further review.

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT FIREARMS DISCHARGES OVERVIEW

xxi

TOTAL FIREARMS DISCHARGES In 2009, the New York City Police Depart‐ment saw the same number of firearms dis‐charges as in 2008: 105 total incidents, the smallest number of firearms discharges since the recording of police shootings in the City began. Furthermore, the most serious category of discharges—shootings involving adversarial conflict with a subject—has also seen a steady historic decline, down 25 per‐cent since 1999. In a city of 8.4 million peo‐ple, from a Department of nearly 36,000 uni‐formed members who interacted with citi‐zens in approximately 23 million instances, 68 officers were involved in 47 incidents of intentional firearms discharges during an adversarial conflict, with 20 subjects injured and 12 killed. The figures are a testament to police offi‐cers’ restraint, diligence, and honorable per‐formance of duty. But they also show that, over the past four decades, attacks on both police and citizens have steadily declined. The drastic reduction in violent crime over the past decade is sociologically reflexive: as crime decreases, criminals and police enter into conflict less often. Neither the Department nor the officer on the street can afford complacency, however. Although crime (and the total number of po‐lice firearms discharges) is down, the num‐ber of incidents of intentional discharges during adversarial conflict is up 4 percent since 2007. This fact illustrates the officer’s perpetual need for vigilance, and for the training that these reports facilitate. The 2009 Annual Firearms Discharge Report is subdivided into several categories. Each

category is analyzed based only on the in‐formation in that category. This allows the Department to better understand a specific type of incident and adjust training and pol‐icy to continue to reduce those incidents. Insofar as statistical analysis is concerned, the small sample studied for this docu‐ment—105 discharge incidents total, only 47 of them in the category of “adversarial conflict”—limits the predictive value and conclusions that may be derived.

CATEGORIES Firearms discharges are broken down into five categories. • INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE – ADVERSARIAL CON‐

FLICT: when an officer intentionally dis‐charges his or her firearm during a con‐frontation with a subject

• INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE – ANIMAL ATTACK:

when an officer intentionally discharges his or her firearm to defend against an animal attack

• UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE: when an offi‐

cer unintentionally discharges his or her firearm

• UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A FIREARM: when an

officer discharges his or her firearm out‐side the scope of his or her employ‐ment, or when another person illegally discharges an officer’s firearm

• MISTAKEN IDENTITY: when an officer inten‐

tionally fires on another officer in the mistaken belief that the other officer is a criminal subject

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT FIREARMS DISCHARGES OVERVIEW

xxii

2009 vs 2008

In 2009, total firearms discharges remained the same compared to the previous year, although all categories saw a fluctuation in percentages. The greatest reduction was realized in the category of Unauthorized Use of a Firearm, which was reduced by 36 percent from 2008. Intentional Discharge — Animal Attack was also reduced by 7 percent from 2008. Intentional Discharges — Adversarial Con‐flict also decreased in 2009, down 4 percent from 2008. The number of Unintentional Discharges in 2009 increased 47 percent from 2008, but has nevertheless declined historically, and is down 41 percent from 1999. The following pages present an analysis of each section and the study’s findings. The report contains information compiled from preliminary and final shooting reports, de‐tective case files, medical examiner reports, Firearms Discharge Assault Reports, arrest and complaint reports, Firearms Analysis Section reports, Firearms Discharge Review Board findings, and previous yearly firearms discharge reports, as well as information complied from city and state computer data‐bases and official websites.

2009 FIREARMS DISCHARGES BY CATEGORY


2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE — ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT

3

OVERVIEW There were 47 incidents of intentional fire‐arms discharge during an adversarial conflict in 2009. This represents a 4 percent de‐crease from 2008. Sixty‐eight officers inten‐tionally fired their weapons during these in‐cidents, up 13 percent from 2008. During these 47 incidents, two officers were fired upon but did not return fire. No officer was injured by gunfire during these incidents. There were 49 subjects involved in these 47 conflicts. Twenty subjects were injured and 12 subjects were killed.

REASONS FOR DISCHARGES Officers intentionally discharging their fire‐arms during adversarial conflict did so to de‐fend themselves or others from the threat of serious physical injury or death. In the majority of these incidents (64 per‐cent) the threat came in the form of a fire‐arm. Officers also acted to defend them‐selves from the use or threat of a blunt in‐strument (6 percent), the use or threat of a cutting instrument (17 percent), a perceived threat (9 percent), or the use or threat of overwhelming physical force (4 percent) [see Figure A.1].

DATES AND TIMES OF DISCHARGES

Two‐thirds of the adversarial conflict inci‐dents in 2009 occurred in the second and fourth quarters. Seventeen percent occurred in the first quarter and only 15 percent oc‐curred in the third quarter. Eleven incidents

occurred in April, but each month had at least one incident. Seventy‐nine percent of these incidents oc‐curred during the first or third platoons. More than a quarter of the incidents (26 percent) occurred on a Saturday.

LOCATIONS OF DISCHARGES Three of 47 incidents occurred outside of the city, in Nassau and Suffolk counties. Of the remaining 44 incidents, six discharges took place in or on New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) premises, one was within the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) transit system, and 37 were in the jurisdiction of the patrol precincts. The majority of the incidents occurred in the Bronx (28 percent) and Brooklyn North (23 percent). Percentages of discharges per bor‐ough are depicted in Figure A.3 on the fol‐lowing page. These incidents took place in 27 separate precincts, down from 30 in 2008. Eleven pre‐

Figure A.1

TYPE OF THREATINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE‐ADVERSARIAL

CONFLICT (ID‐AC) (47 INCIDENTS)

6%4%

9%

17%64%

USED/THREATENED THE USE OF A FIREARM

USED/THREATENED THE USE OF A CUTTING INSTRUM ENT

USED/THREATENED THE USE OF A BLUNT OBJECT

USED/THREATENED THE USE OF OVERWHELM ING PHYSICAL FORCE

OFFICER PERCEIVED THREAT OF DEADLY PHYSICAL FORCE


4

cincts experienced two incidents, and the 43 Precinct, 67 Precinct, and 77 Precinct each had three [see Figure A.2]. For management purposes, the Police De‐partment divides New York City’s five geo‐graphic boroughs or counties into eight “Patrol Boroughs.” Each of these patrol bor‐oughs has eight to 12 police precincts, with the exception of Staten Island, which has three. Three‐quarters of the incidents occurred outside.

LOCATIONS OF CRIMINAL SHOOTINGS When the locations of police shootings are compared to the locations of criminal shoot‐ings in 2009, a correlation appears. The map on the next page [Figure A.4] depicts the precise location of the city’s 1,420 criminal shootings (represented by blue asterisks) and overlays them with all 44 incidents of intentional discharge during adversarial con‐flict (represented by red dots) that occurred within New York City in 2009. The map shows, very clearly, that police go where

they are needed: police firearms discharges occur in those areas of the city most plagued by gun violence. As illustrated by Figure A.6 on page six, the correlation is explicit with regard to relative rate, as well—on a percentage basis, police‐

ID‐AC INCIDENTS BY BOROUGH (47 INCIDENTS)

BROOKLYN SOUTH13%

BROOKLYN NORTH23%

BRONX28%

QUEENS NORTH 9%

OUTSIDE CITY6%

QUEENS SOUTH 4%

MANHATTAN SOUTH2%

MANHATTAN NORTH15%

Figure A.2

Figure A.3

PRECINCTS WITH MORE THAN ONE ID‐AC INCIDENT, 2009

22

322

322

3222

2232

333441424344476769757779109


5

LOCATIONS OF 44 INTENTIONAL DISCHARGES DURING ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT* vs LOCATIONS OF 1,420 CRIMINAL SHOOTINGS, 2009

RED — INTENTIONAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE BY POLICE DURING ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT

BLUE — CRIMINAL SHOOTINGS

*Does not include three (3) incidents that occurred outside the city limits

Figure A.4


6

involved shootings and criminal shootings are dispersed similarly by borough. Despite this correlation, the absolute num‐ber of these police‐discharge incidents is small when compared to the number of criminal shootings [see Figure A.5]. Only 3 percent of the city’s shooting incidents in‐volve police.

REASONS OFFICER INVOLVED Officers become involved in incidents of in‐tentional discharge during adversarial con‐flict for a variety of reasons. The Annual Fire‐arms Discharge Report categorizes incidents by whether the officers involved were en‐gaged in reactive police work (55 percent) or proactive police work (32 percent), or were attacked (13 percent).

CRIMINAL SHOOTINGS vs ID‐AC INCIDENTS, PERCENTAGE BY BOROUGH

1%

9%

28%

3% 3%2%5%

9%

0%

17%

26%

12%

30%

16%

25%

14%

MS MN BX BS BN QS QN SI

CRIMINAL SHOOTINGS (1,420) ID‐AC INCIDENTS (44)

CRIMINAL SHOOTINGS vs ID‐AC INCIDENTS, FREQUENCY BY BOROUGH

18

128

404

238

374

173

44 417 6 2 041

13 11

MS MN BX BS BN QS QN SI

CRIMINAL SHOOTING INCIDENTS (1,420)

ID‐AC INCIDENTS (44)

Figure A.5

Figure A.6


7

Of on‐duty officers discharging their fire‐arms during these incidents, the plurality was assigned to Anti‐Crime units (21 per‐cent) or the Organized Crime Control Bu‐reau, or OCCB (23 percent). Anti‐Crime units and OCCB both deploy personnel to seek out armed individuals and perpetrators of vio‐lent crimes. The next‐largest proportion of officers (18 percent) was assigned to patrol duties [see Figure A.7].

The majority of incidents involved officers responding to reports of violent crime—including robberies, assaults, and shots fired—or to reports of emotionally disturbed persons. Another 19 percent of the incidents involved officers conducting stops based on reasonable suspicion [see Figure A.8].

OFFICER RESTRAINT When officers did discharge their firearms during an adversarial conflict, the over‐whelming majority of officers (90 percent) fired five or fewer times [see Figure A.9]. Forty percent of the officers discharging their firearms in adversarial‐conflict inci‐dents only fired one shot. Only one officer fired more than eight rounds. This pattern of control is again apparent when analyzing the number of shots fired per incident. The majority of incidents (84 percent) involved five or fewer shots being fired. In 36 percent of adversarial‐conflict incidents, the total number of shots fired by all police officers involved was one . Figure A.7

Figure A.8

TOP FIVE ON‐DUTY

ASSIGNMENTS(61 OFFICERS)

21%18%

23%

8% 8%

ANTI‐CRIME

PATROL OCCB EMER.SVCS.UNIT

IMPACT

OFFICER'S ACTIONS PRIOR TO SHOOTING (68 OFFICERS)

34%

19%

7%

21%

1%

3%

1%

1%

12%

RESPONDING TO VIOLENT CRIME

RESPONDING TO EDP

BUY AND BUST

SQF INCIDENT

QOL ENFORCEMENT

VERTICAL PATROL

CANVASSING FOR PERP

OBSERVED MAN WITH GUN

ATTACKED/ROBBED/BURGLARIZED


8

In total, 184 shots were fired by officers dur‐ing these incidents, down 7 percent from 2008. This decrease highlights NYPD officers’ restraint, but does not actually stem from it. Rather, it is largely attributable to the fact that no incident involved a protracted gun battle. A single anomalous exchange of high‐volume gunfire can noticeably distort the real picture. Because of the absence of such a gunfight, however, 2009’s data are more reflective of what has been the Depart‐ment’s trend over the past decade: NYPD officers shoot rarely, and, when forced to fire, discharge few rounds.

When working with such small numbers of incidents, shooting officers, and rounds fired, typical use of means and medians can lead to false conclusions. Additionally, as noted above, a single incident can signifi‐cantly skew averages. Because of this, the Department does not utilize mean averages. For small samples, the mode can be most revelatory. The mode for the number of shots fired by police is one.

OBJECTIVE COMPLETION RATE Similarly, the Department does not calculate average hit percentages. Instead, the objec‐tive completion rate per incident is em‐ployed as it is both more accurate and more instructive. Like combat, the objective completion rate per incident is pass/fail. When an officer properly and lawfully adjudges a threat se‐vere enough to require the use of his or her firearm, and fires at a specific target, the only relevant measure is whether he or she hit the target. This is the objective comple‐tion rate, and it is determined irrespective of the number of shots the officer fired at the target. In these 47 incidents, officers hit at least one subject per incident 31 times, for an objec‐tive completion rate of 66 percent. During the incidents in which officers were being fired upon, however, the objective comple‐tion rate decreased to 50 percent.

SHOOTING TECHNIQUE Utilizing a two‐handed grip, standing, and lining up a target using the firearm’s sights is the preferred method of discharging a fire‐arm, but it is not always practical during an adversarial conflict. Of officers reporting their shooting techniques, 62 percent gripped the firearm with two hands, 59 per‐cent state that they were standing, and 31 percent stated that they were able to utilize the sights on their firearms. Only 25 percent of reporting officers were able to make use of some type of cover dur‐ing the incident. Lack of cover is a factor in

Figure A.9

SHOTS FIRED BY OFFICERS(68 OFFICERS)

6‐109%

11‐201%

1‐590%


9

the need for a firearms discharge.

TRAINING The Department’s firearms training, which instructs officers to shoot to stop and to aim for center mass, is discussed at length in the Appendix, on page 52.

OFFICER PEDIGREE All 68 officers who intentionally discharged a firearm during an adversarial conflict were males; 83 percent of the Department’s uni‐formed personnel are males. Fifty‐two percent of the officers who inten‐tionally discharged a firearm during an ad‐versarial conflict were white. This is slightly less than the percentage of white officers employed by the Department (53 percent). [See Figure A.11 on the next page.] When compared to Department staffing, black officers who fired are slightly under‐represented, constituting approximately 16 percent of the Department but 12 percent of shooting officers. Hispanic officers, in con‐trast, are slightly overrepresented, constitut‐

ing 26 percent of the Department but 30 percent of the officers firing.

ATTIRE The number of on‐duty plainclothes officers intentionally discharging their firearms in adversarial conflict was higher than the number of on‐duty uniformed officers who fired (36 and 25, respectively). Considering that plainclothes officers repre‐sent a smaller portion of officers in the field than those in uniform, their relative overrep‐resentation in discharge incidents is note‐worthy, and is possibly a reflection of the plainclothes officers’ assignments. Of the 36 on‐duty plainclothes officers involved in these incidents, 39 percent were conducting OCCB operations. Another 36 percent were engaging in Anti‐Crime operations.

YEARS OF SERVICE In 2009, 47 percent of the officers who dis‐charged their firearms during adversarial conflict had between one and five years of service [see Figure A.12 on the following page]. This means that a group of officers

SHOTS FIRED PER INCIDENT (47 INCIDENTS)

13%11%

9%15%

6%4%

2%2%2%

36%1234567121530

SHOTS

PER

INCIDEN

T

PERCENT OF INCIDENTS

Figure A.10


10

who constitute one third of the Department engage in almost half of its adversarial‐conflict shootings. The most likely explana‐tion for this discrepancy is that greater pro‐portions of less‐tenured officers perform patrol duties. Operation Impact, for exam‐ple, under which officers are sent to crime hotspots throughout the city to assert a pro‐active police presence, is staffed almost en‐tirely by officers with one to five years of service. And, as discussed earlier, officers assigned to patrol and Anti‐Crime duties are often the first officers to respond to danger‐ous jobs involving firearms. The majority of officers with fewer than five years of service are assigned to patrol precincts performing these types of duties. In a slight departure from last year’s statis‐tics, when officers with between 16 and 20 years of service represented 22 percent of staffing but only 10 percent of shooting offi‐cers, in 2009 officers in this category were involved in nearly twice as many adversarial‐conflict incidents.

Figure A.12 compares years‐of‐service distri‐bution among officers who fired to years‐of‐service distribution throughout the Depart‐ment. (The Department staffing numbers only indicate the percentage of officers who are in these categories of tenure; they do not indicate the assignments of those offi‐cers, nor their level of exposure to the dan‐gers that increase the likelihood of an inten‐tional police discharge.)

RANK Sixty‐two percent of the officers discharging their firearms in these incidents were in the rank of police officer [see Figure A.13]. Be‐cause police officers are the front line, and represent the majority of officers respond‐ing to violent jobs and actively seeking out criminals, this is unsurprising. Additionally, the rank of Police Officer forms the majority of the Department and therefore the pool of officers who may become involved in adver‐sarial conflict is greater.

RACE/ETHNICITY OF OFFICERS

6%12%

30%

52%

5%

16%

26%

53%

ASIAN BLACK HISPANIC WHITE

OFFICERS DISCHARGING FIREARMS (68) DEPARTMENT STAFFING (34,953)

Figure A.11


11

POLICE WEAPONS Officers used their service weapons in the overwhelming majority of the incidents (82 percent). The remaining officers utilized off‐duty weapons (13 percent) or weapons spe‐cific to the Emergency Services Unit (4 per‐cent).

SUBJECT PEDIGREE There were 49 subjects involved in the 47 incidents of intentional police discharge dur‐ing adversarial conflict. The identities of 48 are known. (One individual was not appre‐hended and remains at large; he is consid‐ered unknown and his specific pedigree in‐formation is unavailable. This individual was identified by race and gender, however; he was a male black.) Of all 49 subjects, 47 were male and two were female. For the 48 known subjects, their ages range from 15 to 49, although 58 percent were between of the ages of 15 and 25.

SUBJECT RACE All 49 subjects could be identified by race. In NYPD paperwork concerning suspects, race is determined by complainants and/or vic‐tims. In arrest paperwork, the officer filling out the report generally determines the sub‐ject’s race. This determination may be based on a subject’s self‐identification, existing

YEARS OF SERVICE

33%

18% 20% 21%

8%

47%

25%

7%

19%

1%

1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 20 over 20

DEPARTMENT STAFFING 2009 (34,953) OFFICERS DISCHARGING FIREARMS (68)

Figure A.12

RANK OF OFFICERS INVOLVED IN ID‐AC INCIDENTS (68 OFFICERS)

P.O.62%

Det.28%

Sgt.10%

Figure A.13


12

government‐issued documentation, racial/ethnic physical characteristics, or other fac‐tors. Additionally, although the Department sub‐categorizes Hispanics as black Hispanic or white Hispanic, the Annual Firearms Dis‐charge Report combines all Hispanic persons into a single group.

Of the 49 adversarial‐conflict subjects, 73 percent were black. This percentage is smaller than black suspects’ representation among criminal‐shooting suspects. In a city‐wide analysis covering the calendar year 2009, approximately 80 percent of racially identified criminal‐shooting suspects were black. Hispanics, on the other hand, are over‐represented among adversarial‐conflict sub‐jects in comparison to their representation among criminal‐shooting suspects. Twenty‐seven percent of adversarial‐conflict sub‐jects were Hispanic; approximately 18 per‐cent of racially identified criminal‐shooting suspects were Hispanic [see Figure A.14 and

Figure A.17]. (The racial identification of black and His‐panic suspects is provided by victims, not the Department. And with regard to crimi‐nal‐shooting victims, it must be noted that 73 percent of such victims are black and 23 percent are Hispanic.) Among subjects who fired on officers, 56 percent were black and 44 percent were His‐panic. [See Figure A.15.] The races of persons arrested in 2009 for firearms possession also seem to mirror the races of persons who engaged in adversarial conflict with police. See Figure A.16 for a visual representation of these comparisons. In summary, in 2009, blacks and Hispanics represent 51 percent of New York City’s population, but represent 98 percent of ra‐cially‐identified criminal‐shooting suspects, 96 percent of criminal‐shooting victims, 94 percent of those arrested for firearms pos‐session, and 100 percent of those firing on police.

RACE/ETHNICITY OF NINE SUBJECTS FIRING ON OFFICERS

Hispanic44%

Black56%

Figure A.15

Figure A.14

RACE/ETHNICITY OF 49 KNOWN SUBJECTS INVOLVED IN ID‐AC

INCIDENTS

Hispanic27%

Black73%


13

SUBJECTS INVOLVED IN ID‐AC INCIDENTS (49) vsPERSONS ARRESTED FOR FIREARMS POSSESSION (6,238), 2009

73%

27%

0% 0%

70%

24%

4%1%

Black Hispanic White As ian

SUBJECTS INVOLVED IN ID‐AC PERSONS ARRESTED FOR FIREARMS POSSESSION

SUBJECTS WHO FIRED ON POLICE (9) vs RACIALLY IDENTIFIED CRIMINAL SHOOTING SUSPECTS (988)*, 2009

56%

44%

0%

80%

18%

1%

Black Hispanic White

SUBJECTS WHO FIRED ON POLICE CRIMINAL SHOOTING SUSPECTS

Figure A.16

Figure A.17 * Of 1,511 shooting suspects in 2009, only 988 were identified by race.


14

PRIOR ARRESTS Although there were five incidents in 2009 in which officers faced subjects about whom they had prior knowledge, this is generally not the case. A subject’s arrest history is usually unknown to the officer at the time of a typical incident. Nevertheless, arrest his‐tory is pertinent. It is indicative of a subject’s propensity for criminal conduct and capacity for violently confronting a police officer, and it can evince itself in a subject’s bearing, ac‐tions, and reactions. An arrest history, pend‐ing charges, or parole status may make a subject more willing to attempt to avoid ar‐rest by confronting the officer. Of the known subjects in these incidents, 92 percent had prior arrests—and 77 percent had multiple prior arrests [see Figure A.18].

Two subjects were wanted by authorities at the time of the incidents and another was on parole. Twenty‐eight of the subjects with prior arrests had been arrested for violent crimes such as robbery, assault, and resist‐ing arrest, and two had been arrested for murder or attempted murder. Forty‐six per‐cent of the subjects with prior arrests had arrests for weapons possession, including 14 subjects arrested for possessing or using a firearm. Thirty‐nine percent had prior rob‐bery arrests. (It should be noted that individ‐ual subjects may be identified in several of the previous categories.)

SUBJECT WEAPONS

The subjects in these incidents utilized a va‐riety of weapons when confronting officers. The most frequently used weapon was a firearm. Thirty‐two subjects carried firearms, 13 of whom fired those weapons. Of the known firearms possessed or used by sub‐jects, 9mm and .45 caliber semi‐automatics were the most popular, accounting for 12 of the 28 known firearms used [see Figure A.19]. Eight incidents involved subjects who at‐tacked or menaced officers with cutting in‐struments. Six of these incidents occurred indoors. Five involved emotionally disturbed persons and one was an attempted robbery. Two incidents involved subjects who em‐ployed an automobile as a weapon. Depart‐ment policy forbids using firearms against subjects who so use a vehicle as a weapon, unless the subject is also presenting a threat via another method, such as shooting a gun from a car. The Penal Law, however, does not prohibit officers from firing at vehicles if

44 KNOWN SUBJECTS WITH PRIOR ARRESTS

21

37

28

20

14

17

2

2 OR MORE PRIORS

PRIOR VIOLENT CRIMES

PRIOR WEAPONS POSS.

PRIOR FIREARMS POSS.

PRIOR ROBBERY

PRIOR MURDER, ATT. MURDER

WANTED BY POLICE

ON PAROLE

Figure A.18 NB: Individuals may be represented in more than one category


15

they reasonably believe that deadly physical force is necessary to defend themselves or another. This is a prime example of the NYPD demanding more restraint than even the law requires.

ACCOMPLICES While officers fired upon 49 individuals in these 47 incidents, at least 73 persons were present and complicit in the incidents. For example, in one instance in the Bronx, an officer observed an armed bank robber leav‐ing the location of a robbery attempt and entering a waiting getaway vehicle occupied by two accomplices. When the officer went to stop the suspect, he observed that both the robbery suspect and one of the accom‐plices were armed. The officer only dis‐charged his firearm at the robbery suspect, however, when that subject pointed a fire‐arm at him. As a result, the accomplice, al‐though armed as well, is not included in the list of subjects of intentional discharge dur‐ing adversarial conflict. Similar examples include two Anti‐Crime of‐ficers who thwarted a store robbery by

three perpetrators, at least two of whom were armed, but who fired only on the sub‐ject who pointed his firearm at them; and a sergeant and detective in the Bronx who ob‐served four individuals in possession of a handgun firing shots on New Year’s Eve but fired only on the one subject who fired at them.

INCIDENT OUTCOMES No police officer was killed by a perpetrator in adversarial conflict in 2009. And, for the first time since 1971, when the Police De‐partment began tracking firearms‐discharge incidents, no police officer was injured by gunfire during an adversarial conflict. Thirty‐one of this year’s 47 incidents resulted in injury to or the death of a subject.

OFFICER INJURIES Eight officers sustained non‐gunfire injuries during adversarial conflict. Four officers were stabbed by perpetrators; one was saved from grievous injury by his bullet‐resistant vest. Of the four, one was attacked and stabbed by an emotionally disturbed

Figure A.19

LIST OF KNOWN WEAPONS POSSESSED/USED BY SUBJECTS

.25 cal iber

.32 cal iber.38 ca l iber

.40 cal iber.45 cal iber

.357 ca l iber.380 ca l iber

10 mm9 mm

imitation fi rearm

screwdriverkni fe

vehiclecrowbar

unknown fi rearm

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10


16

male wielding a screw‐driver; two were struck by barricaded emotionally disturbed males, including the officer saved by his vest; and one was severely slashed by an emotionally disturbed female. Three officers were physically assaulted by subjects, including two undercover officers working on two separate narcotics opera‐tions; and one officer who was the victim of a robbery in which a subject struck him with a crowbar. [See Figure A.20]

BULLET‐RESISTANT VEST Of the eight officers attacked and injured, six were wearing bullet‐resistant vests. In only one instance did the body armor affect the outcome of the attack.

SUBJECT INJURIES Of the 49 subjects involved, 12 were killed and 20 injured by police gunfire. Of the 12 subjects killed, six subjects pos‐sessed firearms, four of whom fired on po‐

lice and/or civilians, one of whom attempted a gunpoint robbery of an undercover officer, and one of whom pointed his firearm at pur‐suing officers. Four subjects possessed knives—three had attacked and injured offi‐cers; the fourth had murdered one civilian and severely stabbed another. One subject attempted to run down officers and civilians with his vehicle. The final subject physically assaulted an undercover officer and then attempted to take the officer’s firearm. Eight of the 12 killed were intoxicated or had illegal narcotic or controlled chemical sub‐stances in their systems at the time of the incidents. (Additionally, one subject’s toxi‐cology report was unavailable at the time of this writing.) Toxicology results can only be determined for subjects killed; the percent‐age of remaining subjects who may have been chemically altered cannot be known. [See Figure A.21 and the Appendix.] Of the 20 subjects who were injured by po‐lice gunfire, 70 percent had firearms. Sixty‐five percent had already shot, shot at, stabbed, robbed, or struck an officer or civil‐ian before they were stopped. Five civilians had been shot and injured, and one civilian was stabbed. An officer was also stabbed and injured, and two others were physically assaulted, with one suffering injuries. [See Figure A.22]

BYSTANDER INJURED One innocent civilian bystander was injured as a result of police gunfire when two Police Officers were attacked by a man with a screwdriver in the Transit system. During this incident, a total of five rounds were dis‐charged. Three of these were intentionally

Figure A.20

OFFICERS INJURED DURING ID‐AC INCIDENTS (8 OFFICERS)

ASSAULTED BY GROUP

13%

STABBED BY SUBJECT

49%

ASSAULTED BY SUBJECT

38%


17

ACTIONS OF SUBJECTS SHOT AND KILLED DURING ID‐AC (12 SUBJECTS)

SHOT AT OFFICER OR CIVILIAN33%

THREATENED/ STABBED OFFICER

WITH KNIFE34%

ATTEMPTED TO HIT OFFICER AND

CIVILIANS WITH VEHICLE8%

PHYSICALLY ATTACKED OFFICER

8%

THREATENED OFFICER WITH FIREARM

17%

ACTIONS OF SUBJECTS SHOT AND INJURED DURING ID‐AC (20 SUBJECTS)

DEALING NARCOTICS; MENACED OFFICER

5%

PHYSICALLY ASSAULTED OFFICER

5%STABBED CIVILIAN OR

OFFICER15%

THREATENED OFFICER OR CIVILIAN WITH

FIREARM60%

SHOT AT OFFICER OR CIVILIAN15%

Figure A.21

Figure A.22


18

fired at the subject; two were unintention‐ally discharged by one officer and the sub‐ject when the subject attempted to gain control of the officer’s firearm. It is probable that it was one of these rounds that struck the bystander in the leg.

MALFUNCTION Six officers experienced malfunctions of their firearms. Three of the officers were able to clear the malfunction and fire a sub‐sequent round. No civilians or officers were injured as a result of these malfunctions.

FINDINGS Even when intentional firearms discharges are deemed justifiable in a court of law, they are still reviewed by the Department for tac‐tical concerns and violations of procedure. It must be noted that discipline in these cases does not always relate to the actual dis‐charge of the firearm, but can result from a violation of other Department procedures. At the time of this report, half of the 47 inci‐dents had been reviewed and findings had been issued. Among the officers involved in reviewed incidents, two were held in viola‐tion and ordered retrained. Another individ‐ual was terminated from the NYPD. Thirty‐four officers’ actions did not warrant any type of discipline or corrective retrain‐ing. Reviews of the remaining incidents are pending. It must be noted that all officers who dis‐charge their firearms are sent to a firearms‐retraining course, regardless of the circum‐stances of the discharge.

CONCLUSION There were 47 intentional discharges during adversarial conflicts, involving 68 officers who fired. These conflicts involved 49 sub‐jects, including nine who fired directly on police. In 2009, there were nearly 2,000 victims of criminal shootings and homicides in New York City. The number of intentional fire‐arms discharges by police, comparatively, is small, but every time an officer discharges a firearm he or she risks inflicting injury or death, on subjects, police, or innocent by‐standers. Because of this, the Department strives to ensure that each incident is thor‐oughly investigated and analyzed in order to reduce these events, thereby reducing the likelihood of harm to civilians and officers alike. One method of judging the Department’s relative success is to compare the number of adversarial‐conflict discharge incidents with the number of arrests of armed individuals made by officers each year. In 2009, New York City police officers made 29,807 weap‐ons arrests, including 6,238 gun arrests. More than 7,600 of these weapons recover‐ies stemmed from reasonable suspicion stops. (This number does not include in‐stances in which officers confront armed emotionally disturbed persons and transport those persons to the hospital rather than arresting them.) In other words, there were nearly 30,000 incidents in which an officer took an armed subject into custody without firing his or her weapon.


19

There were, on average, 34,953 uniformed officers employed by the NYPD in 2009. Of them, only 68—0.2 percent—intentionally discharged a firearm at a subject. These officers responded to more than 4.4 million calls for service in 2009, of which more than 200,000 involved weapons. Of the millions of dangerous calls that thou‐sands of officers responded to in 2009 (not including proactive incidents during which officers were actively seeking out crimi‐nals), officers intentionally discharged their firearms in a total of 47 incidents.


20


2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE — ANIMAL ATTACK

21

OVERVIEW There were 28 incidents of intentional fire‐arms discharge during an animal attack in 2009, down 7 percent from 2008 and down 53 percent from 1998. A total of 34 officers intentionally fired their weapons during these incidents, down 17 percent from 2008. Three officers were directly involved in the attack but did not fire. All of the attacks in‐volved dogs. (It should be noted that the fol‐lowing statistics, graphs, and observations are based on this limited sample.) There were eight officers injured in these incidents. Three officers were bitten by dogs and five officers suffered other injuries dur‐ing the attacks. One civilian was also bitten by a dog in the course of an animal‐attack incident. These numbers do not encompass all dog attacks on officers or civilians, only dog‐attack incidents involving intentional firearms discharges by police officers. Of the 31 dogs involved, 15 were killed and eight injured during these conflicts. A more detailed analysis of injuries to all persons and animals involved will be provided in the following pages.

REASONS FOR DISCHARGES Officers who intentionally discharged their firearms during animal attacks did so to de‐fend themselves or others from the threat of physical injury, serious physical injury, or death. In all of the incidents the threat came in the form of a dog attack. Officers, when able, attempt to prevent an animal attack using non‐lethal options, in‐cluding batons and OC spray. A police officer

uses his or her firearm as a last resort to stop an animal attack. DATES AND TIMES OF DISCHARGES

Intentional discharges during animal attacks occurred fairly evenly throughout the four quarters of the year. The first quarter of the year saw six incidents, the second saw eight incidents, and the third and fourth each saw seven incidents. July saw four incidents, the most incidents of any month; every other month had between one and three inci‐dents. Discharges during animal attacks occurred most often on Friday (25 percent). These incidents occurred most often on the third platoon (57 percent), followed by the sec‐ond platoon (25 percent) and the third pla‐toon (18 percent) [see Figure B.1 below].

LOCATIONS OF DISCHARGES

All but one of the intentional discharges dur‐ing animal attacks occurred within the city limits, with 64 percent of the incidents tran‐spiring under the jurisdiction of the patrol

INTENTIONAL DISCHARGE ‐ ANIMAL ATTACK (ID‐AA) BY TOUR

(28 INCIDENTS)

3RD PLATOON

25%

1ST PLATOON

18%

2ND PLATOON

57%

Figure B.1


22

precincts. This is a noticeable departure from intentional discharges during adversar‐ial conflict. While intentional discharges dur‐ing adversarial conflict occurred within Housing jurisdiction only nine percent of the time, intentional discharges during animal attacks occurred within Housing jurisdiction 29 percent of the time [see Figure B.2]. The Bronx experienced the most incidents (36 percent). The pie chart below shows the percentages of discharges per patrol bor‐ough [see Figure B.3]. These incidents took place in 22 separate precincts, with most of those precincts only experiencing a single incident. Five precincts accrued two incidents. Of the 28 incidents, 54 percent occurred outdoors. This is less than the 72 percent for adversarial conflicts. The exact locations of the incidents vary from streets and side‐walks to roofs, stairwells, and alleys.

ID‐AA INCIDENTS, BY BOROUGH (28 INCIDENTS)

BROOKLYN SOUTH14%

BROOKLYN NORTH14%

STATEN ISLAND7%

QUEENS SOUTH11%

OUTSIDE CITY4%

MANHATTAN NORTH14% BRONX

36%

JURISDICTION OF INCIDENTS

6%9%

83%

2%4%

29%

64%

OutsideCity

Housing Patrol Transit

ID‐AC (47 INCIDENTS) ID‐AA (28 INCIDENTS)

Figure B.2

Figure B.3


23

The plurality of occurrences happened in hallways (29 percent). Figure B.4 below indi‐cates the locations and percentages of the incidents. Figure B.6 on the next page maps the exact location of all of the intentional discharges during animal attacks that occurred in 2009. The one attack that occurred outside New York City is not depicted.

REASONS OFFICER INVOLVED A variety of reasons led officers to become involved in incidents of intentional dis‐charges during animal attacks. The most

common (21 percent) was responding to a report of a vicious dog. The next most fre‐quent reasons were responding to a dispute (15 percent), conducting a vertical (12 per‐cent) and executing a warrant (12 percent) [see Figure B.5]. A large proportion of officers (53 percent) were assigned to patrol duties, which in‐clude conducting verticals and responding to calls for service from the public, such as calls for vicious dogs. These calls, as mentioned above, account for 44 percent of the inci‐dents [see Figure B.8 on page 25 for officer assignment].

Figure B.4

Figure B.5

LOCATIONS OF ANIMAL ATTACKS (28 INCIDENTS)

0.04

0.04

0.14

0.04

0.29

0.39

0.07

DOORWAY

LIVING ROOM

DRIVEWAY/OUTSIDERESIDENCE

ROOFTOP

SIDEWALK/STREET

STAIRWAY/HALLWAY/LOBBY

YARD/ALLEY

TYPE OF JOB TO WHICH OFFICER WAS ASSIGNED (34 OFFICERS)

21%

6%

15%

12%

12%

9%

9%

6%

3%

3%

3%

3%

REPORT OF VICIOUS DOGNO JOB ‐ OBSERVED

DISPUTEVERTICAL

WARRANT EXECUTIONPICK‐UP ARREST

ASSAULTASSIST OFFICER

CANVASSFOOT PURSUIT

FIREARMS/CHILD NEGLECTSUSPICIOUS PERSONS


24

LOCATIONS OF 2009 ANIMAL ATTACK INCIDENTS 27 INCIDENTS*

*Does not include the location of the one (1) incident that occurred outside the city limits.


25

Figure B.7 indicates the top bureau or pre‐cinct of assignment for officers involved in intentional discharges during animal attacks. Housing officers accounted for 9 percent of the officers involved in animal attack dis‐charges, compared to 13 percent of the offi‐cers involved in adversarial conflict inci‐dents.

OFFICER RESTRAINT When officers did discharge their firearms during an animal attack, the plurality of offi‐cers (38 percent) fired only one time [see Figure B.9 on next page]. This pattern of restraint is also apparent when analyzing the number of shots fired per incident. In the majority of animal at‐tacks (54 percent) officers fired only one or two rounds [see Figure B.10 on next page]. A total of 71 shots were fired by officers dur‐ing these incidents; this is a 50 percent de‐crease from 2008. Several factors likely con‐tributed to this decrease. Seven percent fewer incidents took place in 2009 com‐

pared to 2008, and 15 percent fewer officers were involved in those incidents. In addi‐tion, only three incidents in 2009 involved multiple dogs attacking the officer(s), com‐pared to eight such incidents in 2008.

Figure B.7

Figure B.8

BUREAU/PRECINCT OF ASSIGNMENT, TWO OR MORE

OFFICERS

3

2 2 2 2 2 2

HOUSING19 40 44 49 50 120

OFFICER ASSIGNMENT (34 OFFICERS)

47%

3%

9%

6%

3%

3%

3%

3%

12%

3%

3%

3%

3%

PATROLHOUSING SUPV

EXECUTING SEARCH WARRANTHOUSING‐PATROL

OFF‐DUTYANTI‐CRIME

IMPACT SUPVDET INV TEAMSPECIAL RMP

REFUELING AUTONARCOTICS

MANHATTAN NORTH TASK FORCENO PARK DETAIL


26

During these 28 incidents, officers hit at least one animal per incident 22 times; this yields an objective completion rate of 79 percent. This is higher than the objective completion rate during adversarial conflict (66 percent) and higher than the objective completion rate of officers under fire (60 percent) [see OUTCOME section for explana‐tion].

SHOOTING TECHNIQUE Last year the shooting techniques of officers defending against an animal attack were similar to those of officers involved in adver‐sarial conflict. This year they are more diver‐gent. Forty‐five percent of the officers in ani‐mal attacks who reported their position, re‐port gripping the firearm with two hands; compared to 62 percent of the reporting of‐ficers in adversarial conflicts. The two types of incidents were more simi‐lar with regard to use of protective cover. The significant majority of reporting officers (75 percent) reported that they were unable to utilize cover during adversarial conflicts. Similarly, the majority of reporting officers

(64 percent) involved in animal attacks also report having no cover during the discharge. Officers who can find cover from an animal attack may not find it necessary to fire. Animal attacks and adversarial conflict inci‐dents are also similar when it comes to shooting position. As with adversarial con‐flicts, the majority of officers involved in ani‐mal attack incidents report being in a stand‐ing position (59 and 72 percent, respec‐tively). Only 9 percent of the reporting officers re‐port utilizing their sights when discharging their firearm during these confrontations, which is dramatically fewer than the 31 per‐cent of the reporting officers who used their sights during adversarial conflict.

OFFICER PEDIGREE As with adversarial conflicts, all of the offi‐cers who intentionally discharged their fire‐arms during an animal attack were male. The race of the officers involved in inten‐tional discharges during animal attacks is

SHOTS FIRED PER OFFICER (34 OFFICERS)

224%

332% 5

3%

138%

43%

SHOTS FIRED PER INCIDENT (28 INCIDENTS)

221%

332%

54% 7

7%

132%

44%

Figure B.9 Figure B.10


27

slightly dissimilar to that of the Department staffing. White officers were underrepre‐sented, comprising 41 percent of officers firing versus 53 percent of Department staff‐ing. Hispanic officers were also slightly un‐derrepresented, comprising 24 percent of officers firing versus 26 percent of Depart‐ment staffing. Black and Asian officers were slightly over‐represented, with blacks ac‐counting for 26 percent of officers firing ver‐sus 16 percent of Department staffing and Asians accounting for 9 percent of officers firing and 5 percent of Department staffing [see Figure B.11 ].

ATTIRE Most officers who discharged their weapons during animal attacks were attired in uni‐form (79 percent). This is a significantly higher percentage of the on‐duty whole than for in‐uniform officers who fired during adversarial conflict (41 percent), possibly because uniformed officers more frequently respond to calls for service regarding vicious animals, and are more likely to conduct foot patrol and verticals where animal attacks are

more likely to occur.

YEARS OF SERVICE As in adversarial conflicts, almost half of the officers who discharged firearms during ani‐mal attacks had between one and five years of service. As years of service increase, the number of intentional discharges during an animal attack decreases [see Figure B.13 on next page]. As discussed earlier, officers assigned to pa‐trol are often the first officers to respond to dangerous jobs involving animals, and the majority of officers with fewer than five years of service are assigned to patrol pre‐cincts performing these types of duties.

RANK A significant majority of officers discharging their firearms in these incidents were police officers (68 percent); again, police officers are most likely to perform duties that ex‐pose them to animal attack [see Figure B.12 on the following page].

Figure B.11

RACE/ETHNICITY OF OFFICERS

41%

24%26%

9%

26%

16%

53%

5%

WHITEHISPANICBLACKASIAN

DEPARTMENT UNIFORM STAFFING (34,953) OFFICERS INVOLVED IN ID‐AA (34)


28

POLICE WEAPONS Officers utilized their service weapons in 32 of the 34 incidents. One of the two remain‐ing officers discharged his off‐duty weapon and the other discharged a special weapon as a member of the Emergency Services Unit.

INCIDENT OUTCOMES Of the 28 intentional discharges occurring during animal attacks, 22 resulted in injury or death to at least one animal. Eight offi‐cers were injured, including three who were bitten by dogs. (The remaining five officers suffered sprains, strains and contusions re‐lated to the incidents.) The bites occurred to officers’ arms, hands, or legs. One civilian was bitten by a dog, and one civilian was injured by shrapnel from a police discharge during these incidents. Of the 31 animals involved, 15 were killed and eight injured by police gunfire. All of the animals involved were dogs, with 87 percent being pit bulls. When officers fired at attacking animals they hit their targets in 79 percent of the inci‐dents. This objective completion rate is higher than for adversarial attacks (66 per‐cent) and higher than for officers under fire (60 percent). A possible explanation is the

Figure B.12

YEARS OF SERVICE

33%

18% 20% 21%

8%

44%

21% 21%

15%

0%

1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 20 20 +

DEPARTMENT UNIFORM STAFFING 2009 (34,953) OFFICERS DISCHARGING FIREARMS (34)

Figure B.13

RANK OF OFFICERS INVOLVED IN ID‐AA INCIDENTS (34 OFFICERS)

Det.12%Lt.

3%

PO68%

Sgt.18%


29

distance between officer and animal. Al‐though in both kinds of attack officers are often attempting to avoid injury by running for cover or physically pushing a subject or animal away, officers in animal attacks are more often within arm’s reach of the animal. Sixty‐two percent of officers report being five feet or fewer from the attacking animal, and no officer reported being farther than ten feet. Only 44 of the 68 officers who fired in adversarial conflict incidents reported their distance from the subject; of those 44, only 48 percent were within five feet of the subject.

MALFUNCTION One officer reported a firearm malfunction during an animal attack. The malfunction did not affect the outcome of the incident. The firearm was tested and was found to be op‐erational.

FINDINGS All of the intentional firearms discharges during animal attacks in 2009 were investi‐gated and, at the time of this report, 93 per‐cent offered findings and recommendations. Of the 32 officers in the completed investi‐gations, one was disciplined. As noted in the previous category, discipline does not neces‐sarily mean that there was a violation of shooting procedure. The one officer in this incident received discipline for improper no‐tification and recording of the incident. Nine other officers did not receive discipline but instead were sent to tactical re‐training, in‐cluding three who were mandated to be re‐trained on the proper handling of dogs.

CONCLUSION In 2009, police officers responded to more than 28,400 calls through 911 for incidents involving dogs and other animals. This num‐ber includes 4,531 complaints about vicious animals made through the 311 system. It does not account for incidents in which offi‐cers proactively encounter dogs or answer civilian complaints that were not processed through 911. From among more than 28,400 calls involv‐ing animals that thousands of officers re‐sponded to, as well as uncounted incidents in which officers came into contact with dogs or other animals, a total of 28 in‐stances resulted in officers discharging their firearms.


30


2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGES

31

OVERVIEW In 2009, there were 22 incidents of uninten‐tional firearms discharge, involving 22 offi‐cers. This is a substantial, 47 percent in‐crease from the 15 incidents that occurred in 2007 and also in 2008. It must be noted, however, that unintentional discharges dur‐ing those two previous years were anoma‐lously low. From 2000 to 2006, the average number of unintentional discharges was 25. There were three officers injured in these incidents. Two were a direct result of the discharge and one was a result of the fire‐arm disassembling and cutting the officer’s hand. No officers were killed as a result of these incidents. No civilians or subjects were injured or killed in these firearms discharges.

REASON FOR DISCHARGES Officers unintentionally discharging their firearms did so in two distinct circum‐stances—either purely unintentionally (14 incidents), or unintentionally during adver‐sarial conflict (eight incidents). Purely unin‐tentional discharges occur while the officer is loading, unloading, or otherwise handling the firearm. Unintentional discharges during adversarial conflict occur while the officer is actively engaged in the arrest or apprehen‐sion of a subject.

PURELY UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGES

There were 14 incidents in which an officer unintentionally discharged a firearm during times when there was no adversarial conflict

or animal attack. In each of the 14 incidents, only one shot was fired.

LOADING/UNLOADING The overwhelming majority of incidents oc‐curred while the officer was loading, unload‐ing, or inspecting the firearm (86 percent, or 12 incidents). The majority of incidents oc‐curred at the officer’s residence or a police facility. The reasons for handling the firearm vary from cleaning the firearm, to attempt‐ing to render the firearm safe, to testing the firearm’s operability. Two incidents occurred during a forensic analysis of the firearm where the weapons malfunctioned and dis‐charged. It is notable that three of the 12 firearms discharged during loading/unloading inci‐dents were not the officers’ regular service or off‐duty firearms. (This trend was noted over the last two years, as well). This may stem from the officers’ lack of familiarity with the firearms in question. Also notable is the fact that the remaining nine firearms were manufactured by Glock (five model 19s and four model 26s). This most likely has to do with the fact that the handler must depress the trigger to disas‐semble the firearm. In 2009 two officers unintentionally dis‐charged their firearms while unloading at a non‐Department safety station. In 2009, as in 2008, one officer unintentionally dis‐charged his firearm while unloading his weapon at a Department of Correction safety station. (Unintentionally discharging a firearm into a firearms safety station is not considered a firearms discharge when it oc‐


32

curs inside an NYPD facility.)

OTHERWISE HANDLING The remaining two purely unintentional inci‐dents occurred while the officer was han‐dling the firearm. In one incident a Highway officer unintentionally chambered a round in his shotgun, took the gun off safety, and de‐pressed the trigger. In another incident the officer discharged his firearm while holster‐ing, unaware that an object was lodged in the trigger guard.

PEDIGREE OF OFFICER Pedigree information appears inconsequen‐tial. Gender, age, race, and assignment vary at random over the 14 incidents.

INJURIES Three officers sustained injuries as a direct result of these 14 purely unintentional dis‐charges. One officer sustained injuries to his buttock, and one officer sustained a wound to his hand. The third officer sustained a lac‐eration to his hand related to the firearm falling apart during forensic testing.

FINDINGS In all the cases for which a finding has been determined, the officer has received some sort of discipline or retraining. See the chart on the next page for a detailed breakdown of discipline against all officers involved in unintentional discharges.

UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE – ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT

There were eight incidents in which officers unintentionally discharged their firearms during an adversarial conflict in 2009. This represents a sharp increase from the three incidents in 2008 and a large percentage of the increase in unintentional discharges for the year. In all incidents only one shot was fired. (Additionally, there was one incident in which an officer discharged his weapon both intentionally and unintentionally. The officer and his partner were attacked by a screw‐driver‐wielding subject on a transit platform and the officer’s partner was stabbed. The officer fired intentionally at the subject and then the officer’s weapon was discharged again, unintentionally, when the subject at‐tacked the officer and grappled with him for control of the weapon. A bystander was in‐jured during this incident, possibly by one of the unintentionally discharged rounds. This incident is carried in the INTENTIONAL DIS‐CHARGE — ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT section.)

REASON FOR DISCHARGE Of these eight discharges, five involved offi‐cers actively struggling with a perpetrator. Of the other three, one slipped on ice while searching for a subject in a wooded area, another tripped while executing a search warrant, and the third discharged her fire‐arm when the vehicle she was a passenger in came to an abrupt halt (while stopping to apprehend a suspect). The sample size of this category is so small that no significant conclusions can be de‐


33

rived. Yet there were some observations worth noting. With one exception, each incident involved a male white officer. No incident involved pre‐cinct sectors; all incidents involved special‐ized units. All but two incidents occurred on the third platoon (the other two occurred on the first platoon). While Glock pistols pre‐dominated in purely unintentional dis‐charges, in unintentional discharges during adversarial conflict Smith & Wesson firearms were the weapon in five of the eight inci‐dents.

INJURIES There were no firearms‐related injuries or deaths to officers as a result of these eight incidents. No subjects or civilians were in‐jured or killed as a result of these uninten‐tional discharges.

FINDINGS Seven of these eight cases of unintentional discharge during adversarial conflict have been finalized. Of the officers involved, all but one were mandated to attend some type of firearms retraining. One incident is still pending at the time of this report. Figure C.1 below encompasses the discipline for all unintentional discharges, including all officers who discharged in the incident.

Figure C.1

FINDINGS ‐ ALL UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGES (22 OFFICERS)

No Violation‐ No Discipline

5%No Violation‐ Retraining18%

Violation‐ Discipline50%

Violation‐ Retraining9%

Pending18%


34


2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A FIREARM

35

OVERVIEW There were seven firearms discharges in 2009 that were deemed to be unauthorized and outside the scope of the officers’ em‐ployment. Three of these incidents involved the suicide of an officer. Of the other four incidents, two involved the discharge of an officer’s weapon by someone other than the owner and two incidents were unauthorized events in which the officers were suspended from service.

SUICIDE Three officers committed suicide in 2009. (In one incident, an officer killed his wife before killing himself.) This total is down from seven officers who took their own lives dur‐ing the previous year. The details of suicide incidents are not dis‐cussed in this report, but rather they are studied and investigated by other units within the Department. DISCHARGE BY OTHER THAN OFFICER With regard to the two incidents in which an officer‐owned firearm was discharged by a civilian, these incidents both involved a fam‐ily member gaining access to an improperly secured firearm. One officer received De‐partment discipline for failure to secure his firearm, the other was disciplined for an im‐proper holster.

OTHER The final two unauthorized incidents in‐volved personal disputes between the offi‐cer and subject(s) and were deemed unau‐

thorized. Each resulted in the suspension of the officer involved. One incident resulted in a non‐life threatening injury to a civilian by gunfire. It is unknown at the time of this re‐port whether the wound was caused by the officer’s discharge or by another subject, who witnesses observed firing a revolver.

OUTCOME The unauthorized use of a firearm owned by a New York City police officer is investigated thoroughly, and more often than not results in discipline against the officer discharging the weapon or the officer charged with the security of the weapon. In cases of serious misconduct, officers are suspended, ar‐rested, and eventually terminated for their actions.


36


2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT MISTAKEN IDENTITY

37

OVERVIEW In 2009, the New York City Police Depart‐ment experienced a rare and terrible event—a mistaken‐identity shooting. On Thursday, May 28, 2009, Police Officer Omar Edwards was shot and killed by another po‐lice officer under the mistaken belief that Officer Edwards was a criminal perpetrator armed with a firearm. This event was an unmitigated tragedy, and the Department has endeavored to learn all it can from the incident and do all it can to prevent future, similar incidents. Police Officer Edwards was posthumously promoted to Detective First Grade, and on June 8, 2010, he was posthumously awarded the Department’s highest honor, the Medal of Honor.

DEFINITION The Department defines an incident of mis‐taken identity as one in which a New York City police officer fires on another New York City police officer or other law‐enforcement agent in the mistaken belief that the subject officer is a criminal and poses an imminent physical threat. Mistaken‐identity incidents are distinguished from crossfire incidents in that the shooting officer is purposefully and intentionally choosing to fire on the targeted officer. Unintentional crossfire incidents and accidental discharges resulting in injury or death to fellow officers are not included in this category. Unauthorized discharges, in which an officer injures or kills another offi‐cer in a criminal manner (e.g., domestic inci‐dents), are also excluded.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT As the Department sought to learn from the incident that took Officer Edwards’ life, part of the learning process involved determining a historical context for mistaken‐identity shootings. Using myriad records, from half‐century‐old precinct log books to archived news reports to personnel orders, the De‐partment culled its institutional memory for precedent. It became clear that these inci‐dents, though lamentable, are markedly un‐common.

MISTAKEN IDENTITY FATALITIES Since 1930, there have been ten known mis‐taken‐identity incidents that resulted in the death of an officer. These ten incidents, oc‐curring over a span of eighty years, are syn‐opsized below: Patrolman Edward P. Keenan, 02/23/1930 On February 23, 1930, at approximately 0100 hours at Sixth Street and First Avenue in Manhattan, probationary Patrolman Ed‐ward P. Keenan was killed during an incident of mistaken identity. Probationary Patrol‐man Keenan was shot by probationary Pa‐trolman Joseph Dugan. Both officers were off duty and in civilian clothes at the time; both were male whites. Patrolman Dugan, observing an altercation in which Patrolman Keenan was involved, confronted Patrolman Keenan. Mistaking Patrolman Keenan for a perpetrator about to draw a weapon, Patrol‐man Dugan shot him. Patrolman Keenan was transported to Bellevue Hospital, where he died. In 1931, Patrolman Keenan was post‐humously awarded the Department’s Medal of Honor.


38

Patrolman John A. Holt, 02/12/1940 On February 12, 1940, at approximately 2030 hours at Bradhurst and 155th Street in Manhattan, Patrolman John A. Holt was killed during an incident of mistaken iden‐tity. Patrolman Holt, a male black, was off duty and in civilian clothes. He was armed and searching for a burglar who had run from Patrolman Holt’s apartment building and entered a neighboring building. During the pursuit, Patrolman Holt had fired several rounds. When a uniformed sergeant and pa‐trolman responded they observed Patrol‐man Holt, with gun in hand, preparing to climb up to the roof. Upon being instructed to drop the weapon, Patrolman Holt instead turned towards the officers and was shot. He died at the scene. Patrolman Holt was posthumously awarded the Department’s Medal of Honor. Patrolman Jacob J. Szwedowski, 04/29/1945 On April 29, 1945, at approximately 1940 hours in front of 13 East 113th Street in Manhattan, Patrolman Jacob J. Szwedowski was killed during an incident of mistaken identity. Patrolman Szwedowski and his partner, both on duty and in plainclothes, had arrested a female for prostitution. The female resisted arrest, screaming that she was being kidnapped and causing a crowd to gather. Patrolman Szwedowski fired a warn‐ing shot in an attempt to disperse the crowd. Patrolman Phillip J. Ryan, on duty and in uniform, was drawn by the crowd and the shot. He fired at Patrolman Szwedowski, causing a fatal wound. Both patrolmen were male whites. Patrolman Szwedowski was posthumously awarded the Department’s Medal of Honor.

Patrolman Donald J. Rainey, 09/29/1965 On September 29, 1965, at approximately 2300 hours in the 20 Precinct, Patrolman Donald J. Rainey was killed during an inci‐dent of mistaken identity. Patrolman Rainey, a white‐shield detective, was off duty and in plainclothes in a bar and grill on 73rd Street when he was shot by off‐duty Patrolman Richard Selkowitz, who was also wounded in the exchange. Both officers were male whites. A citizen had informed Patrolman Selkowitz that there was a man with a gun in a nearby café, and when Patrolman Selko‐witz entered the establishment with his gun drawn, Patrolman Rainey, a patron of the café, mistook Patrolman Selkowitz for a per‐petrator and fired on him, striking Patrolman Selkowitz twice in the hand. Patrolman Selkowitz returned fire, killing Patrolman Rainey. Patrolman David Turman, 10/13/1968 On October 13, 1968, at approximately 0400 hours in front of 2495 7th Avenue in Harlem, probationary Patrolman David Turman, a male black, was killed during an exchange of gunfire resulting from a mistaken‐identity incident. Patrolman Turman was off duty and in plainclothes at the time. He was shot by Housing Police Department Patrolman Taylor Johnson, a male black, who was also off duty and in civilian clothes. Patrolman Turman was attempting to effect an off‐duty, gunpoint arrest of an individual who had impersonated an officer. When Patrol‐man Johnson observed the incident, he mis‐took Patrolman Turman for a perpetrator committing a robbery and drew his own weapon. Patrolman Turman, similarly mis‐taking Patrolman Johnson, turned his weapon on Patrolman Johnson. Both officers fired; Patrolman Johnson was struck in the


39

chest and wounded while Patrolman Tur‐man was struck and killed. Patrolman John‐son was taken to Harlem Hospital in serious condition. Patrolman William R. Capers, 04/03/1972 On April 3, 1972, at approximately 1600 hours in the 103 Precinct, second‐grade De‐tective William R. Capers was shot and killed during an incident of mistaken identity. De‐tective Capers, a male black, was on duty in plainclothes, conducting investigations of a purse‐snatching robbery pattern. Detective Capers was chasing a suspect who was in possession of a firearm and had fired a warning shot before stopping the suspect. Officer Robert Kenny, a male white, on duty and in uniform, responded to the scene and, mistaking Detective Capers for a perpetra‐tor, shot and killed him. On May 26, 1972, a Grand Jury refused to indict Officer Kenny. The use of “color‐of‐the‐day” armbands was widely expanded owing to this incident. Police Officer John Skagen, 06/28/1972 On June 28, 1972, at approximately 1700 hours in the Hunts Point Avenue IRT subway station, Transit Police Department Police Officer John Skagen was shot and killed by NYPD officers during an incident of mistaken identity. Officer Skagen, a male white, off duty and in plainclothes, was returning home from court via the 6 Train subway when he observed a male black suspect in possession of a firearm. Officer Skagen at‐tempted to effect an arrest but the perpe‐trator fled. The two exchanged gunfire, and both were wounded. Police Officers John Jacobson and George Wieber, two on‐duty, male white uniformed officers of the NYPD’s 41 Precinct, heard the gunfire and witnessed the perpetrator fleeing the transit system at

the Hunts Point/Bruckner Boulevard station. The perpetrator, who had hidden his own weapon, told the patrolmen “There’s a crazy man shooting,” and the officers confronted Officer Skagen. Officer Wieber fired six rounds, striking Officer Skagen. Officer Skagen was removed to Lincoln Hospital where he succumbed to his injuries. The per‐petrator was apprehended; he was later convicted of reckless manslaughter and sen‐tenced to 15 years in prison. Police Officer Irving E. Wright, 03/05/1973 On March 5, 1973, at approximately 0245 hours in the 28 Precinct, Police Officer Irving E. Wright was killed during an incident of mistaken identity. Officer Wright, a male black, was off duty and in plainclothes at the time. He was working in a grocery store when a perpetrator entered and robbed the store at gunpoint. After the robber fled, Offi‐cer Wright gave chase. He and the robber exchanged gunfire, and two on‐duty, uni‐formed officers responded. The robber hid beneath a parked car, and Officer Wright was confronted by uniformed Police Officers Michael J. McShane and John H. Sether, both male whites. As Officer Wright turned towards the officers, his weapon acciden‐tally discharged. The uniformed officers opened fire, striking Officer Wright and kill‐ing him. Police Officer Eric Hernandez, 01/28/2006 On January 28, 2006, at approximately 0500 hours in the 46 Precinct, Police Officer Eric Hernandez was shot in an incident of mis‐taken identity. He succumbed to his injuries on February 8. He had been a member of the Department for 18 months. Officer Her‐nandez, a male Hispanic, was off duty and in plainclothes when he became the victim of a


40

gang assault in a Bronx restaurant. His at‐tackers fled, and Officer Hernandez at‐tempted to give chase. He stopped an unin‐volved man outside the restaurant, mistak‐enly believing the man to be one of his at‐tackers, and held the man at gunpoint. Two uniformed officers from the 46 Precinct ar‐rived in a marked patrol car, responding to a radio call of a man assaulted, phoned in by witnesses to the assault in the restaurant. Upon exiting the vehicle, Police Officer Al‐fredo Toro, a male Hispanic who had been with the Department for 19 years, observed a man holding another man at gunpoint. Of‐ficer Toro gave several verbal commands to Officer Hernandez, ordering him to drop the gun. Officer Hernandez did not respond. No‐ticing that Officer Hernandez was holding a weapon commonly used by the NYPD, Offi‐cer Toro asked Officer Hernandez in sum and substance “Are you a cop?” but again received no response. At this point, Officer Toro discharged his weapon, firing three rounds and striking Officer Hernandez three times. Other officers arrived and established a crime scene and attempted to aid Officer Hernandez. It was at this time that Officer Hernandez’s shield was discovered in a jacket on the ground nearby and he was identified as a police officer. Officer Hernan‐dez was removed to Saint Barnabas and died ten days later. The perpetrators who had assaulted him were subsequently arrested and, with one exception, convicted of feloni‐ous assault and sentenced to prison. Officer Toro’s actions were determined to be justi‐fied and within Department guidelines; he has since retired from the service. Police Officer Omar Edwards, 05/28.2009 The incident involving Officer Edwards is de‐scribed at length on page 42.

NON‐FATAL MISTAKEN IDENTITY INCIDENTS SINCE 1995

Reaching as far back into the Department’s history for non‐fatal incidents proved more difficult than the research into fatal inci‐dents. By virtue of their severity and finality, fatal mistaken‐identity incidents are more extant in the records than non‐fatal inci‐dents, some of which do not even result in injury to either party. The merger of the New York City Police Department with the New York City Housing Police Department and the New York City Transit Police Depart‐ment in 1995 compounded the dearth of documentation. Because of the merger, what records there were for the two smaller departments had largely been abandoned or unaccounted for at various unknown reposi‐tories over which the NYPD does not have jurisdiction. In the post‐merger era, however, the De‐partment’s recordkeeping has been compre‐hensive and complete. Since 1995, there have been four non‐fatal mistaken‐identity incidents. They are described below: Police Officer Dennis Labarbera, 01/31/1996 On January 31, 1996, 0240 hrs, PO Dennis Labarbera was shot by Sergeant Marcus Renna in the 32 Precinct when officers re‐sponded to a burglary in progress. Officer Labarbera, a 26‐year‐old male white, and his partner, both in uniform, climbed a fire es‐cape to the location’s roof while the uni‐formed Patrol Supervisor and his operator ascended the stairs. On opening the door to the roof, Sergeant Renna, a 37‐year‐old male white, observed Officer Labarbera. Al‐though Officer Labarbera’s gun was hol‐


41

stered, the sergeant mistook the uniformed officer for a perpetrator and fired once, striking Officer Labarbera in the shoulder and seriously injuring him. Sergeant Renna received charges and specifications. Police Officer Richard Padin, 10/24/1996 On October 24, 1996, 0405 hrs, PO Richard Padin was shot by PO Richard Kuhnapfel in the basement of a bodega in the 83 Precinct. Officer Padin, a 29‐year‐old male Hispanic, and a sergeant had executed a search war‐rant at the bodega hours earlier and had re‐turned, in plainclothes, to look for narcotics described by an arrestee. An employee of the bodega heard unknown persons in the basement and called in a possible burglary at the location. Uniformed officers re‐sponded and descended to the darkened basement where they encountered Officer Padin with his gun drawn. Officer Kuhnapfel, a 33‐year‐old male white, fired one round from about five feet away. He then re‐treated out of the basement and yelled down to identify himself and order the occu‐pants out, at which point Officer Padin and the sergeant identified themselves as fellow officers. Officer Padin was struck once in the chest, suffering blunt‐force injury, but was saved further harm by his bullet‐resistant vest. The officers involved were assigned to the same precinct but belonged to different units. Detective James Conneely, 12/17/1998 On December 17, 1998, 1310 hrs, Detective James Conneely was shot by fellow detective Robert Altieri during a search for a shooting suspect in the 47 precinct. Detective Altieri, a 36‐year‐old male white, heard a noise and saw a firearm come around the corner of a doorway; he shouted “drop the gun” and

fired two rounds, one of which passed through a wall and struck Detective Con‐neely in the chest. Detective Conneely, a 36‐year‐old male white, suffered blunt‐force injury, but was saved further harm by his bullet‐resistant vest. All officers were in plainclothes. Retired Member of the Service, 09/27/1999 On September 27, 1999, 0920 hrs, an on‐duty, uniformed officer was involved in an exchange of gunfire with a retired member of the service in the 75 Precinct. The retired member, a 35‐year‐old male white, had been the victim of a gunpoint robbery and was chasing the suspects. Hearing a shot, the retired member fired on the suspects once. When the perpetrators turned and pointed a firearm at him, he fired again (two shots, zero hits). Sometime between the two shots, a sector car operated by PO Gavin Reece arrived. PO Reece, a 37‐year‐old male black, was in uniform. He heard the retired member shout “Stop them!” and, despite observing the retired member to be armed, attempted to apprehend the fleeing perpe‐trators. At that moment, however, the re‐tired member fired his second round, which struck and shattered the windshield of PO Reece’s RMP. Feeling himself under fire, and no longer certain that the retired member was not in fact a perpetrator, PO Reece re‐turned one round, which did not strike any‐thing. The retired member identified himself and the perpetrators were arrested.


42

MISTAKEN‐IDENTITY SHOOTING OF OFFICER OMAR EDWARDS

SUMMARY OF EVENTS

On Thursday, May 28, 2009, Police Officer Omar Edwards, appointed to the New York City Police Department on July 17, 2007, and assigned to the Housing Bureau Impact Re‐sponse Team, was shot and killed by another police officer under the mistaken belief that Officer Edwards was a criminal perpetrator armed with a firearm.

THE TRIGGERING INCIDENT Police Officer Omar Edwards, a 25‐year‐old male black with two years of service, was assigned to Police Service Area 5, a Housing Bureau precinct located at 221 East 123 Street in East Harlem (within the confines of the 25th precinct). On the night of the inci‐dent, he had ended his tour at approxi‐mately 10 P.M., after receiving permission to leave work an hour and a half early. Shortly after 10 P.M., having changed into blue jeans and an off‐white overshirt, Officer Edwards walked to his private vehicle, which was parked on 2nd Avenue between 124th and 125th Streets, a short distance from the Police Service Area. As he neared his vehicle, he observed a male wearing a black short‐sleeve jersey reaching through the driver‐side window, which had been broken. Offi‐cer Edwards attempted to apprehend this perpetrator, later identified as Miguel Goitia, an undomiciled individual with a long criminal history. Mr. Goitia later alleged that Officer Edwards did not identify himself as a police officer. Mr. Goitia broke free from Officer Edwards’s grip, most likely by sliding

out of his jersey, which was found beside Officer Edwards’s car. Mr. Goitia then fled. Officer Edwards pursued Mr. Goitia, north on Second Avenue and then eastbound on East 125th Street. At an unknown point during the confronta‐tion, but by the time of the pursuit, Officer Edwards removed his authorized service firearm from his waistband. He held his fire‐arm—a silver Smith & Wesson Model 5946 9mm semi‐automatic pistol—in his right hand. Officer Edwards was not wearing a holster. It is believed that Officer Edwards did not have time to call for assistance. His cell phone was recovered at the scene and there was no record of a call to 911.

THE ANTI‐CRIME TEAM At the same time, the 25th precinct Anti‐Crime team, consisting of one sergeant and two police officers, was patrolling the area around 125th Street and 1st Avenue. Anti‐Crime teams are precinct‐based groups specifically tasked with interdicting crime and arresting perpetrators of violent crime and gun possession. Anti‐Crime teams patrol in plainclothes, and their members are spe‐cially selected and trained. On May 28, the 25th precinct Anti‐Crime team consisted of:

• Sergeant John Anzelino, a 30‐year‐old male white with 13 years service

• Police Officer John Musante, a 28‐year‐old male white with six years of service

• Police Officer Andrew Dunton, a 29‐year‐old male white with five years of service


43

The team was patrolling in an unmarked, gray Chevy Impala, equipped with a siren and an emergency light package on the front and rear window. It is unknown whether lights or sirens were used at the time of the incident. Officer Musante drove the vehicle, Officer Dunton was in the front passenger seat, and Sergeant Anzelino was seated in the rear seat directly behind Officer Dunton. Some‐time before 10:30 P.M., while patrolling the precinct, the Anti‐Crime team turned west‐bound on East 125th Street, traveling to‐wards 2nd Avenue. As they did so they ob‐served two males running towards their un‐marked Impala on the south side of 125th Street. The team then observed the males cross over to the north side of the street in front of the vehicle, approximately 225 feet from 2nd Avenue. The second male was holding a firearm in his right hand.

THE CONFRONTATION The Anti‐Crime team, having observed Offi‐cer Edwards pursuing Mr. Goitia, prepared to exit the vehicle and confront both men. Officer Musante attempted to put the car in park when he saw the two men, but the parking mechanism failed to catch and the car continued to move forward. Officer Musante returned to the car to place it in park. Sergeant Anzelino lost his footing while attempting to exit the car from the rear passenger seat and fell to the ground. Neither Officer Musante nor Sergeant Anze‐lino saw the actual confrontation, but each heard Officer Dunton shout “Police! Drop the gun!” As he fell, Sergeant Anzelino also saw Officer Edwards turn towards the un‐

marked vehicle. Officer Dunton later testified that he shouted “Police! Stop!” as he exited the ve‐hicle and confronted the armed male. The male with the firearm slowed down, made eye contact with Officer Dunton, and then turned his body to the right towards Officer Dunton. Officer Dunton shouted “Drop the gun! Drop the gun!” The male then ex‐tended his right arm parallel to the ground, with his elbow locked. Officer Dunton, fear‐ing that he was in imminent danger, dis‐charged his firearm—a Glock Model 19 9mm semi‐automatic pistol—six times, mortally wounding Officer Edwards. Sergeant Anzelino recovered from his fall and pursued Mr. Goitia, who continued to run eastbound on 125th Street toward 1st Avenue. He was apprehended near 1st Ave‐nue. Officer Dunton secured the scene and was directed by Sergeant Anzelino to hand‐cuff Officer Edwards, whom they believed to be a perpetrator. The Anti‐Crime team did not transmit any information over the police radio about this pursuit.

THE RESPONSE At 2229 hours, the 911 police operators be‐gan to receive several calls from persons stating that they had heard shots fired in the vicinity of 1st Avenue and 125th Street. An NYPD Emergency Service Unit, whose mem‐bers are trained EMTs, arrived on the scene and began to render aid to Officer Edwards. During the course of providing medical treatment, the Emergency Service detectives removed Officer Edwards’s outer garment and discovered that he was wearing a NYPD


44

Police Academy gym shirt underneath. In‐scribed on the shirt was his company num‐ber and last name. They also found a police shield clipped inside Officer Edwards’s left pocket. At 2230, the police operator dispatched a signal 10‐13 (“officer needs assistance”) at East 125th Street between 1st and 2nd Ave‐nues. This call also confirmed that a male was shot and that an ambulance was imme‐diately needed at the location. Shortly after the radio transmission, additional police units responded to the scene. An additional Housing Anti‐Crime unit responded to the scene and identified Police Officer Omar Ed‐wards. Officer Edwards was transported to Harlem Hospital where he was pronounced dead at 2320 hours. The Internal Affairs Bu‐reau arrived at the scene of the incident and, according to procedure, administered an alcohol test to Officer Dunton, who regis‐tered a blood‐alcohol content of 0.0. The Shooting Team conducted interviews and investigations at the scene and pre‐pared an initial report for the Police Com‐missioner and Chief of Department, both of whom were present.

THE INVESTIGATION The initial firearms discharge report sets the stage for an internal investigation by the Firearms Discharge Review Board (FDRB), which is chaired by the Chief of the Depart‐ment. The review board handles disciplinary matters related to police‐involved firearms discharges. There are several levels to the FDRB process, including the Shooting Team leader’s initial

assessment of the incident and a Borough‐based review of the incident, as well as in‐vestigations by Internal Affairs personnel. The District Attorney also conducts investi‐gations into officer‐involved shootings. In almost all instances in which injury or death by gunfire is involved, the District Attorney will initiate a Grand Jury proceeding. In such cases, the Department defers its administra‐tive investigation until the completion of the District Attorney’s actions. On the night of this incident, the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office requested that Of‐ficer Dunton not be interviewed, and the Department complied with this request. The District Attorney then convened a grand jury to review the circumstances surrounding the death of Officer Edwards. On August 13, 2009, after hearing testimony from 20 witnesses and reviewing 68 docu‐ments, the grand jury voted not to indict Po‐lice Officer Andrew Dunton on criminal charges related to the death of Detective Edwards. Because no criminal charges were filed against Officer Dunton, the Police De‐partment moved forward with the next phases of its internal investigation into the incident. At this stage, the Department was able to interview Officer Dunton and compel a statement from him. Officer Dunton’s de‐scription of his actions was determined to be entirely consistent with the objective evi‐dence related to the incident, and consistent as well with statements offered by other of‐ficers and civilian witnesses, alike. When Of‐ficer Edwards turned towards Officer Dun‐ton, Officer Dunton believed himself to be in


45

imminent danger and reacted in a manner that was held to be within Department guidelines. PREVENTING MISTAKEN‐IDENTITY

INCIDENTS Despite the fact that Officer Dunton’s ac‐tions were held to be lawful by an independ‐ent Grand Jury, and within Department guidelines by an exhaustive, multi‐tiered Firearms Discharge Review Board process, the outcome of the fatal mistaken‐identity incident in the 25th Precinct was unaccept‐able. The loss of a dedicated young officer is a tragedy that has prompted the Depart‐ment to explore numerous avenues of pre‐vention. Foremost among these avenues is an in‐creased emphasis on training, both previ‐ously existing and newly developed, de‐signed to minimize the risks inherent in con‐frontation situations in which officers, uni‐formed or not, on‐duty or not, encounter one another during enforcement activities. In addition to creating training videos di‐rected at undercover and plainclothes offi‐cers, the Department commissioned an in‐dependent study by a professor from the University of Chicago to research how police training can influence shoot/don’t shoot de‐cisions. And the Department also altered its pistol qualification course and other tactical training programs to incorporate identifica‐tion procedures. To facilitate intra‐service recognition, the Department instituted an ongoing proce‐dure to help uniformed patrol personnel, particularly newly assigned precinct officers, become familiar with plainclothes officers

who perform duty in the same neighbor‐hoods. Plainclothes officers from Patrol, Housing, and Transit commands visit roll calls for uniformed officers assigned to nearby commands and introduce them‐selves. The potential efficacy of a program such as this was quickly apparent when, just six weeks after Officer Edwards’s death, an undercover officer was assaulted and was forced to use his firearm to defend himself. Responding uniformed officers saw an armed male whom they took to be a perpe‐trator, but a violent confrontation was fore‐stalled by the fact that the uniformed offi‐cers recognized one of the undercover offi‐cer’s plainclothes partners, as well as by the undercover officer’s adherence to identifica‐tion procedures established during training. To help foment positive training changes throughout New York State, the Department also participated actively in the New York State Police‐on‐Police Shootings Task Force convened by Governor David Paterson. Detective First Grade Omar Edwards was a dedicated, proud member of the New York City Police Department. The NYPD has pledged to ensure that his loss was not in vain, and to do all that it can to ensure that the incident that took his life is the last of its type.


46


APPENDIX


48


2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT APPENDIX — HISTORICAL DATA

49

OFFICERS SHOT AND INJURED BY SUBJECTS 1971‐2009

47

40

50

17 1611

1611

17

1013

26

13

24

10

26

15

21

31

2428 29

19

1115 15

23

10 118 10

7 74

74

73

0

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

OFFICERS SHOT AND KILLED BY SUBJECTS 1971‐2009

12

67

4

6

1

45 5

10

43

1

4

0

32

65

0

2 2 2 2

0

6

43

0 0 0 0

2 2 2

0

3

0 0

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

These charts represent officers who were shot by criminal subjects and do not represent acci‐dental shootings, suicides, unauthorized shootings, incidents in which officers were personally involved, or mistaken‐identity shootings


50

SUBJECTS SHOT AND INJURED BY OFFICERS1971‐2009

221

145

118

80 87 79 8878 80

10191 87

6348 47

38 3646

6172 81

63 58 61 5848

39 4332

20 19 24 22 23 26 24 19 18 20

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

SUBJECTS SHOT AND KILLED BY OFFICERS1971‐2009

93

6658

41 44

2530

37

28 2533 33

29 26

1118

14

2430

39

27 24 2229 26

30

20 1911 14 11 13 14 11 9

13 10 13 12

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009


51

TOTAL INCIDENTS1971‐2009

810994

665526 454 379

434418394425452 375

349466 369

346351 251329307332 279312331345318 253249 155

134136119130114125127111105105

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

TOTAL SHOTS FIRED1971‐2009

21132510

1906

11991291

99411521222 1040

11501254 1036 831 675 563

528630

7521073

1176

11121094

11931146

17281292 1040 856 621 504

499 386503 352

618541588 364

29619

7119

7219

7319

7419

7519

76

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT APPENDIX — FIREARMS TRAINING

52

OVERVIEW NYPD firearms training emphasizes that the ultimate goal of every police officer is to protect life. This means all lives, those of by‐standers, victims, and subjects—and of offi‐cers and their fellows, too. One of the grim realities of police work, however, is the terri‐ble contradiction that can arise when it be‐comes necessary to protect life by using deadly physical force. According to the New York State Penal Law, and in keeping with the Patrol Guide restric‐tions delineated previously in this report, an officer may use deadly physical force when he or she has probable cause to believe that such force is necessary to protect the officer or other persons from imminent death or serious physical injury. (This includes in‐stances in which a subject is in possession of an object that, because of its appearance and the manner in which the subject holds or uses it, gives the officer a reasonable be‐lief that the object is capable of imminently causing death or serious physical injury—e.g., when an officer confronts a subject menacing people with a firearm that is later revealed to be a replica.)

SHOOT TO STOP Once an officer has determined that deadly physical force is warranted and necessary, the goal of using such force is not to kill, but to stop. Police officers are trained to use deadly physical force to “stop the threat”—i.e., to end the subject’s ability to threaten imminent death or serious physical injury to the officer or another person. If, for example, a missed shot nevertheless

causes a subject to cease and desist, then that one errant round is all that is necessary. If a subject is injured and surrenders, then shooting to stop has been accomplished. But sometimes the only means of stopping a subject is one that results in the subject’s demise. Stated explicitly, however, POLICE OFFICERS DO NOT “SHOOT TO KILL”—they are trained to shoot to stop.

WEAPONS CONTROL NYPD firearms training also emphasizes weapons control. With regard to shooting technique, the mechanics of pistol shooting in a controlled environment include proper grip, sight alignment, sight picture, trigger control, and breath control. All of these re‐quire a degree of concentration and fine motor skills. Unfortunately, in a combat situation, concentration and fine motor skills are sometimes among the first casualties. Training can mitigate this, but officers must be taught to rely on mechanical actions that employ gross motor skills and have as few components as possible. POPULAR CULTURE MISREPRESENTATIONS One of the purposes of this report is to make it clear that, contrary to media‐based misim‐pressions, police officers rarely use their firearms and show great restraint when they do so. (The Hollywood fiction that police shootings have no consequence—that offi‐cers are back on the street immediately af‐ter a firearms discharge, that officers may engage in multiple incidents on a regular ba‐sis—is also dispelled by this report.) Perhaps the worst of popular culture’s purposeful inaccuracies concerns the accuracy of pis‐tols. Thanks to the movies and TV, many ci‐

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT APPENDIX — FIREARMS TRAINING

53

vilians have an mistaken understanding of police and their firearms. Action heroes routinely display miraculous precision with their guns, and they routinely use handguns instead of rifles or long guns. In real life, handguns are much more limited weapons. They are short, making axial sight misjudgment more likely, and they lack a third bracing point (such as a rifle’s butt stock), and are thus more difficult to steady and aim. All NYPD service pistols are “double action only” (DAO), meaning they have a two‐stage trigger pull for each round fired (unlike single‐action weapons, which can be “cocked,” resulting in a one‐stage trigger pull which is smoother and easier). Addition‐ally, all NYPD weapons are also modified to have a heavier trigger pull than provided by factory settings; this diminishes the likeli‐hood of unintentional discharges but also affects aiming.

CENTER MASS Both the impairment of fine motor skills dur‐ing combat stress and the relative impreci‐sion of pistols contribute to the fact that ALL POLICE OFFICERS ARE TAUGHT TO SHOOT FOR CENTER MASS. Police officers never aim for a subject’s extremities; they fire at cen‐ter mass.* The human body’s center mass, also called the center of gravity, is, by definition, the most central and largest area available as a point of aim. Physicians use a quick assess‐ment tool known as “the rule of nines” to divide body surface by region. The torso

represents one third of a human’s surface area, versus a mere 9 percent for an arm or 18 percent for a leg. The torso is also the most stationary portion of the body. Ex‐tremities, on the other hand, are smaller and far less static. Arms flail, legs pump, and in so doing they become nearly impossible to target. This is exacerbated by the stress and dynamism of a combat situation. Additionally, shooting a subject in an ex‐tremity is far less likely to stop him or her than a shot to the center mass. A leg wound, for example, does little to prevent a subject from continuing to use a knife or gun. Stop‐ping a subject from threatening imminent death or serious physical injury to another person is the sole reason an officer utilizes deadly physical force.

CENTER MASS

* In cases in which a subject uses cover and presents only a portion of his or her body, officers are trained to use the geometric center or “barycenter” of the exposed portion as a point of aim in lieu of center mass.


54

ADVERSARIAL CONFLICT RESULTING IN A SUBJECT’S DEMISE In 2009, twelve subjects were shot and killed by officers who intentionally discharged their weapons during adversarial conflict. The taking of life to protect life is a terrible contradiction, and no officer relishes the prospect of encounters such as these. When facing armed, violent suspects, however, these events are a possibility for which officers must be prepared. The tactics used in these confrontations can be analyzed and assessed in order to develop training that can provide officers with more use‐of‐force options or conflict‐resolution opportunities so that, in the future, similar events may have different outcomes. A short narrative of each incident is found below. It is worthy of note that eleven of the twelve subjects had prior arrest histories, and eight were intoxi‐cated and/or had controlled substances in their systems (additionally, one subject’s toxicol‐ogy results were unavailable at the time of this report). On January 15, at 1640 hours, an undercover officer working in the confines of the 33 precinct attempted to purchase narcotics from a male black subject with whom the undercover officer had previously conducted similar transactions. In this instance, however, the undercover offi‐cer came to believe that the narcotics were counterfeit and refused to complete the sale. Fail‐ing in his attempt to defraud the officer, the subject produced a loaded .38 caliber revolver, pointed it at the officer, and demanded money. The officer tendered the cash using his left hand while simultaneously turning away and reaching with his right hand into his pocket where his firearm was secreted. In fear for his life, the officer fired three rounds, striking the subject. The subject was removed to St. Luke’s Hospital where he succumbed to his injuries several days later. The subject had an arrest history for marijuana sales, and had cannabinoids in his system at the time of the incident. On April 8, at 0730 hours, uniformed officers responded to a report of criminal mischief in the 69 precinct. A female black subject had done damage to her landlord’s door, and then re‐treated to her own apartment. When officers went to her residence, they smelled a strong odor of natural gas. Police supervisors and members of the fire department were called to the scene. Officers and firefighters made entry into the apartment in order to address the danger‐ous condition whereupon they were attacked by the subject, who was armed with a knife. The subject stabbed one officer, causing deep lacerations to the officer’s hand. She retreated but then attacked again, at which point two other officers fired three rounds and two rounds, re‐spectively, striking her and causing her demise. The subject had an arrest history related to psychiatric incidents. On April 12, at 1130 hours, uniformed members of the Emergency Service Unit engaged a bar‐ricaded emotionally disturbed male Hispanic subject in the confines of the 43 precinct. The subject had taken his family hostage and used his five‐year‐old son as a human shield. Re‐sponding officers entered into a dialogue with the subject and convinced him to release his


55

hostages after which he retreated to a bedroom. Following lengthy colloquy during which Emergency Service personnel entered the subject’s apartment, the subject exited the bed‐room armed with a knife. He refused several commands and attacked officers with the knife. Officers attempted to use less‐than‐lethal control devices, including a TASER device and a Sage Projectile Launcher, to no avail. When the subject continued to attack with his knife, a ser‐geant and a detective had no recourse but to fire four rounds and two rounds, respectively, striking the subject and causing his demise. The subject had prior arrests and had cocaine in his system at the time of the incident. On May 9, at 1330 hours, an off‐duty detective engaged in a gunfight with two robbery perpe‐trators in the confines of the 67 precinct. The detective was present at an auto‐repair shop when two male black subjects entered and announced a robbery. One subject produced a .45 caliber firearm and attempted to remove a customer’s gold chain. Surreptitiously drawing his firearm, the detective identified himself and immediately came under fire from the armed subject. The detective fired one round in return, striking the subject in the neck and killing him, but suffering a weapon malfunction in the process. This allowed the second subject to procure his fallen accomplice’s gun and race from the garage, firing multiple rounds as he fled. The detective cleared his malfunction and returned one round, but the second subject entered a waiting vehicle and escaped. (He was subsequently apprehended.) The dead subject had multiple priors, including arrests for robbery and firearms possession. He had cannabinoids in his system at the time of the incident. On July 11, at 2000 hours, an undercover officer working in the confines of the 88 precinct was attacked with overwhelming physical force by a male black subject. The undercover officer had been acting as an observer prepared to provide backup for another undercover purchas‐ing narcotics. He was seated on the steps of a building from which the subject emerged and began abruptly striking the officer about the head and torso. The officer identified himself as a police officer but the subject continued to attack, and attempted to grab the officer’s firearm. At this point the officer fired one round, striking the subject and causing his demise. The sub‐ject had numerous prior arrests and was a parolee who had been incarcerated for drug crimes. He had antidepressants in his system at the time of the incident. On July 22, at 2010 hours, an Anti‐Crime officer in the confines of the 34 precinct shot and killed a male Hispanic subject who had rammed several occupied vehicles and was attempting to run down the officer. The subject and his passengers had allegedly committed a robbery in the 33 precinct, and were briefly pursued by uniformed officers from that command. That pur‐suit had been terminated, however, owing to the risks posed to the public by the subject’s reckless, desperate, and dangerous driving. When officers in the neighboring 34 precinct ob‐served the subject, they reengaged. They attempted to box in the subject, but he proceeded to ram police cars and civilian cars. Among the civilian cars were occupied vehicles in the road‐way and unoccupied parked vehicles. The subject also collided with a motorcycle, striking its rider. After officers exited their vehicle, the subject twice accelerated towards the officers.


56

One officer fired two rounds, striking the subject and causing his demise. The subject had nu‐merous priors for burglary, narcotics‐related crimes, and larceny. Forensic toxicology was un‐available at the time of this report. On August 1, at 0230 hours, uniformed officers responded to a radio report of shots fired in the confines of the 41 precinct. A witness pointed out the subject, stating that he was in pos‐session of a firearm. Earlier, the subject had menaced individuals who had allegedly robbed him some time before, and discharged at least one round in the air. When police officers con‐fronted the subject, he produced a Davis .32 caliber semiautomatic and fired multiple rounds at the officers. Three officers returned fire, discharging twenty rounds, six rounds, and four rounds, respectively. The subject was struck and killed. The subject had no arrest history, but was intoxicated and had cocaine in his system at the time of the incident. On September 12, at 1700 hours, in the confines of the 60 precinct, uniformed Emergency Ser‐vice Unit officers shot and killed a male Hispanic subject who had attacked them with a knife. The subject had taken a female victim hostage; the subject and the victim had a long history of domestic violence. After the victim’s mother called police, and police responded to the scene, the victim was able to escape. Officers established a dialogue with the subject and, over the course of nearly five hours, unsuccessfully attempted to entice him out of his barricaded posi‐tion. When the subject broke off contact, it was determined that officers would make entry in order to deploy a camera device to continue to monitor the subject and then exit the prem‐ises. Upon making entry, however, the officers were attacked by the subject who wielded a knife and used a mattress as a shield. The subject swung his weapon viciously and violently at the officers, striking one detective in the side (the detective was saved by his ballistic vest). Two detectives fired one round and three rounds, respectively, from their MP‐5 special weap‐ons; one detective fired two rounds from his pistol. The subject was struck several times and was killed. The subject had a lengthy arrest history, including priors for felony assault, weap‐ons possession, drug sales, and kidnapping. On October 7, at 1845 hours, uniformed Impact Response Team officers responded to a 911 call for an assault in the confines of the 32 precinct. When officers arrived at the scene they encountered a seriously injured victim suffering from multiple stab wounds. Officers entered the building and, moving single file, encountered the subject on the narrow stairs between the second and third floors. The subject was armed with a long, two‐bladed dagger of a type con‐sistent with medieval fantasy designs. The subject refused numerous commands to drop the weapon and instead stated “You want some of this?” while continuing to advance until he was within an arm’s length of the lead officer. With no avenue of retreat, the officer fired six rounds, striking the subject several times and causing his demise. Immediately thereafter, offi‐cers discovered the body of a neighbor, killed by the subject during the initial assault. The neighbor’s two‐year‐old son was alone beside his father’s body. The subject had a history of resisting arrest.


57

On November 15, at 0300 hours, plainclothes Anti‐Crime officers responded to a nightclub brawl in the confines of the 75 precinct. While dispersing the crowd, officers heard gunfire in‐side the location. Moving inside, they confronted a male black subject armed with a Titan .25 caliber semi‐automatic who had just shot a club employee in the chest (a bouncer who was saved by his bullet‐resistant vest). When this subject pointed his firearm at police, one officer fired three rounds, striking the subject three times and causing him to fall to the floor. The wounded subject attempted to hand his weapon to a companion, and officers rushed in to se‐cure him. As they did so, they became aware of a second male black subject armed with a re‐volver. This second subject was a convicted felon employed as a private security officer by the patrons who had rented the club. Surveillance footage from interior cameras shows him in possession of the firearm with his arm extended, pointing in the direction of police. Faced with an imminent threat, one officer fired one round, striking the second subject in the neck and causing his demise. A loaded .357 caliber Smith & Wesson was recovered from his person. The first, wounded subject was apprehended and his weapon recovered as well. The subject who was killed had multiple arrests for robbery and weapons possession. On November 21, at 2330 hours, plainclothes officers assigned to Gang Squad Queens were patrolling the 101 precinct in response to recent shootings in the area. Observing three indi‐viduals walking in Bayswater Park after the park had closed, they attempted to stop the indi‐viduals. One of the suspects fled, and three officers gave chase. During the foot pursuit the male black subject was observed to be in possession of a silver handgun. As the officers gained ground on the subject, he turned and pointed his weapon at police. Three officers fired eight rounds, six rounds, and one round, respectively. The subject was struck multiple times and succumbed to his injuries. A loaded, defaced Jennings 9mm semi‐automatic was recovered. The subject had priors for robbery and weapons possession and had cannabinoids in his sys‐tem at the time of the incident. On December 10, at 1115 hours, in the confines of the Midtown North precinct, a plainclothes Anti‐Crime sergeant and police officer approached a male black subject selling illegal compact discs in Times Square. Upon sighting the officers, the subject fled and the police gave chase. Witnesses state that during the pursuit the sergeant gave several verbal orders that the sub‐ject ignored, and that the subject then produced a machine‐pistol type firearm and pointed it at the sergeant. It was at this point, witnesses state, that the sergeant drew his own firearm. The subject fired at least two rounds at the sergeant, missing; the sergeant returned four rounds, striking the subject and causing him to fall to the ground. Despite his wounds, the sub‐ject continued to resist. Only with the quick arrival of other officers were police able to secure him and remove a 9mm Masterpiece Arms MAC‐10 from his grip. (The weapon had been re‐ported stolen in Virginia in August; it had also suffered a malfunction during the exchange of gunfire.) Once in custody the subject was removed to Roosevelt Hospital where he succumbed to his injuries. The subject had several previous arrests and had cannabinoids in his system at the time of the incident.

58

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT APPENDIX — SUBJECTS SHOT BY POLICE—RACE/ETHNICITY

1998 1999 2000

WOUNDED KILLED WOUNDED KILLED WOUNDED KILLED

WHITE 2 3 1 1 0 6

BLACK 29 7 24 8 15 6

HISPANIC 12 9 7 2 4 2

ASIAN 0 0 0 0 1 0

TOTAL 43 19 32 11 20 14

2001 2002 2003


WHITE 2 0 0 0 1 1

BLACK 11 9 20 7 12 13

HISPANIC 4 2 4 6 10 0

ASIAN 0 0 0 0 1 0

TOTAL 17 11 24 13 24 14

2004 2005 2006 WOUNDED KILLED WOUNDED KILLED WOUNDED KILLED

WHITE 1 1 4 0 1 1

BLACK 15 6 21 7 16 9

HISPANIC 7 4 3 2 6 3

ASIAN 0 0 1 0 0 0

TOTAL 23 11 29 9 23 13

2007 2008 2009


WHITE 0 2 0 2 0 0

BLACK 9 5 12 7 14 8

HISPANIC 9 3 6 4 6 4

ASIAN 1 0 0 0 0 0

TOTAL 19 10 18 13 20 12

59

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT APPENDIX — SUBJECTS SHOT BY POLICE—RACE/ETHNICITY

SUBJECTS SHOT BY NYPD OFFICERS 1997‐2009

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Linear (BLACK) Linear (HISPANIC) Linear (WHITE )

GUNFIRE IN NEW YORK CITY, 2009

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

BLACK HISPANIC WHITE

8.4 MILLION PEOPLE IN NEW YORK CITY6,238 PERSONS ARRESTED FOR FIREARMS POSSESSION988 RACIALLY IDENTIFIED CRIMINAL‐SHOOTING SUSPECTS49 SUBJECTS FIRED UPON BY POLICE GUNFIRE32 SUBJECTS CARRYING FIREARMS32 SUBJECTS HIT BY POLICE GUNFIRE9 SUBJECTS WHO FIRED AT POLICE

2009 ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT APPENDIX — SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

60

DAY OF WEEK ID‐AC ID‐AA UD UUF TOTAL

MONDAY 3 2 1 1 7

TUESDAY 6 5 4 0 15

WEDNESDAY 7 6 4 1 18

THURSDAY 9 3 6 0 18

FRIDAY 6 7 2 1 16

SATURDAY 12 3 4 2 21

SUNDAY 4 2 1 2 9

TOTAL 47 28 22 7 104

TOUR ID‐AC ID‐AA UD UUF TOTAL

0731‐1530 11 7 10 5 33

1531‐2330 22 16 9 0 47

2331‐0730 14 5 3 2 24

TOTAL 47 28 22 7 104

MONTH ID‐AC ID‐AA UD UUF TOTAL

JANUARY 4 2 3 2 11

FEBRUARY 1 1 1 0 3

MARCH 3 2 1 0 7

APRIL 11 4 1 1 16

MAY 2 2 3 0 7

JUNE 3 3 1 1 8

JULY 4 4 2 0 10

AUGUST 1 2 2 2 7

SEPTEMBER 2 1 3 0 6

OCTOBER 8 3 1 1 13

NOVEMBER 7 1 1 0 9

DECEMBER 1 3 3 0 7

TOTAL 47 28 22 7 104

ID‐AC – Intentional Discharge – Adversarial Conflict ID‐AA – Intentional Discharge – Animal Attack UD – Unintentional Discharge UUF – Unauthorized Use of Firearm These numbers do not include the one Mistaken Identity incident in 2009


61

BOROUGH ID‐AC ID‐AA UD UUF TOTAL

BRONX 16 10 2 0 25

MANHATTAN 8 4 4 0 16

QUEENS 6 3 4 1 14

BROOKLYN 17 8 6 2 33

STATEN ISLAND 0 2 2 0 4

OUTSIDE CITY 3 1 4 4 12

TOTAL 47 28 22 7 104

MANHATTAN ID‐AC ID‐AA UD UUF TOTAL

1st PRECINCT 0 0 0 0 0

5th PRECINCT 0 0 0 0 0











22nd PRECINCT 0 0 0 0 0

23rd PRECINCT 1 2 0 0 3









TOTAL 8 4 4 0 16


62

BRONX ID‐AC ID‐AA UD UUF TOTAL 40th PRECINCT 1 2 0 0 3












TOTAL 13 10 2 0 25

BROOKLYN ID‐AC ID‐AA UD UUF TOTAL
























TOTAL 17 8 6 2 33


63

STATEN ISLAND ID‐AC ID‐AA UD UUF TOTAL




TOTAL 0 2 2 2 4

QUEENS ID‐AC ID‐AA UD UUF TOTAL

















TOTAL 6 3 4 1 14

DUTY STATUS ID‐AC ID‐AA UD UUF TOTAL

ON‐DUTY 61 33 14 0 108

OFF‐DUTY 7 1 8 5 21

TOTAL (MOS firing) 68 34 22 5 129


64

ID‐AC

TYPE

OF TH

REAT FR

OM SUBJEC

TS FIRED

UPO

N

OFFICER

S INVOLV

ED S

HOTS

INJURY

FA

TALITY

# SU

BJEC

TS

FIRE

D UPO

N SU

BJEC

T GEN

DER

SUBJEC

T RA

CE

SUBJEC

T AGE

SUBJEC

T WEA

PON

1 FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T FIRE

D AT OFFICER

2

2 and 1

1

Male

Hispanic

25

FIRE

ARM

2 FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T PO

INTED FIREA

RM

1 5

1

Male

Black

28

FIRE

ARM

3 FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T PO

INTED FIREA

RM

1 3

FATA

L 1

Male

Black

18

FIRE

ARM

4 OFFICER

PER

CEIVED

THRE

AT ‐ O

BJEC

T IN HAND

1

1 INJURY

1

Male

Hispanic

27

NONE

5 FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T DISPLAYED FIREA

RM

1 1

INJURY

1

Male

Black

18

FIRE

ARM

6 BLU

NT INSTRU

MEN

T‐ SUBJEC

T MEN

ACE

D OFFICER

1

1

1 Male

Black

19

METAL PIPE

7 BLU

NT INSTRU

MEN

T ‐ SUBJEC

T ATTEM

PTED

TO HIT OFFICER

1

3

1 Male

Black

36

VEHICLE

8 FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T SH

OT CIVILIANS

1 3

INJURY

1

Male

Hispanic

18

FIRE

ARM

9 FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T PO

INTED FIREA

RM

1 5

1

Male

Black

22

FIRE

ARM

10

OFFICER

PER

CEIVED

THRE

AT ‐ S

UBJ. R

UNNING FRO

M SHOOTING

2 3 and 1

1

Male

Black

24

NONE

11

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T DISPLAYED FIREA

RM

1 1

INJURY

1

Male

Black

34

FIRE

ARM

12

CUTTING IN

STRU

MEN

T ‐ SUBJEC

T STABB

ED OFFICER

2

2 and 3

FATA

L 1

Female

Black

48

KNIFE

13

CUTTING IN

STRU

MEN

T ‐ SUBJEC

T ATTACK

ED OFFICER

S 2

2 and 4

FATA

L 1

Male

Hispanic

35

KNIFE

14

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T FIRE

D AT OFFICER

2

1 and 6

1

Male

Hispanic

21

FIRE

ARM

15

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T SH

OT CIVILIAN

1

1 INJURY

1

Male

Black

33

FIRE

ARM

16

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T FIRE

D AT OFFICER

2

8 and 4

INJURY

1

Male

Hispanic

21

FIRE

ARM

17

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T FIRE

D AT OFFICER

1

2

1 Male

Black

27

FIRE

ARM

18

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T DISPLAYED FIREA

RM

1 1

1

Male

Black

26

FIRE

ARM

19

CUTTING IN

STRU

MEN

T ‐ SUBJEC

T STABB

ED OFFICER

2

2 and 3

INJURY

1

Male

Black

32

SCRE

WDRIVE

R

20

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T PO

INTED FIREA

RM

4 1, 1, 2, 1

1 Female

Black

31

FIRE

ARM

21

FIRE

ARM

‐ SU

BJEC

T 1 FIRE

D AT OFFICER

1

2 FA

TAL

2 Male

Black

21

FIRE

ARM

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T 2 FIRE

D AT OFFICER

Male

Black

UNKN

OWN

FIRE

ARM

23

BLU

NT INSTRU

MEN

T ‐ SUBJEC

T HIT OFFICER

1

1

1 Male

Black

19

CROWBA

R

24

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T PO

INTED FIREA

RM

2 2 and 2

INJURY

1

Male

Black

34

FIRE

ARM

22

CUTTING IN

STRU

MEN

T ‐ SUBJEC

T STABB

ED CIVILIAN

3

1, 2, 2

INJURY

1

Male

Hispanic

35

KNIFE

25

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T PO

INTED FIREA

RM

1 3

INJURY

1

Male

Hispanic

48

FIRE

ARM


65

D‐AC

TYPE

OF TH

REAT FR

OM SUBJEC

TS FIRED

UPO

N OFFICER

S INVOLV

ED SHOTS

INJURY

FA

TALITY

SU

BJEC

TS

FIRE

D UPO

N SU

BJEC

T GEN

DER

SUBJEC

T RA

CE

SUBJEC

T AGE

SUBJEC

T WEA

PON

26

FIRE

ARM

‐ SU

BJEC

T PO

INTED FIREA

RM

1 1

INJURY

1 Male

Black

43

FIRE

ARM

27

OVE

RWHELMING PHYSICAL FO

RCE ‐ SUBJEC

T ATTACK

ED &

GRA

BBED

OFFICER

’S GUN

1 2

FATA

L 1

Male

Black

49

NONE

28

BLU

NT INSTRU

MEN

T ‐ S

UBJEC

T ATTEM

PTED

TO HIT OFFICER

1

2 FA

TAL

1 Male

Hispanic

28

VEHICLE

29

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T FIRE

D AT OFFICER

3

20, 4, 6

FA

TAL

1 Male

Hispanic

31

FIRE

ARM

30

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T DISPLAYED FIREA

RM

1 2

INJURY

1

Male

Black

22

FIRE

ARM

31

KNIFE ‐ SUBJEC

T STABB

ED OFFICER

3

2, 1, 3

FA

TAL

1 Male

Hispanic

20

KNIFE

32

FIRE

ARM

‐ SU

BJEC

T PO

INTED FIREA

RM

2 2 and 5

INJURY

1

Male

Black

21

FIRE

ARM

33

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T PO

INTED FIREA

RM

1 2

INJURY

1

Male

Black

17

FIRE

ARM

34

KNIFE ‐ SUBJEC

T MURD

ERED

CIVILIAN

1

6 FA

TAL

1 Male

Black

21

KNIFE

35

KNIFE ‐ SUBJEC

T RO

BBED

OFFICER

1

1 INJURY

1

Male

Black

18

KNIFE

36

FIRE

ARM

‐ SU

BJEC

T DISPLAYED FIREA

RM

1 1

1

Male

Black

20

FIRE

ARM

37

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T PO

INTED FIREA

RM

1 1

1

Male

Black

22

FIRE

ARM

38

OVE

RWHELMING PHYSICAL FO

RCE ‐ S

UBJEC

T HELD OFFICER

WHILE ACC

OMPLICE TH

REATENED

WITH BLU

NT INSTRU

MEN

T 1

1 INJURY

1

Male

Hispanic

18

STEEL GARB

AGE CA

N

(ACC

OMPLICE)

39

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T PO

INTED FIREA

RM

1 1

1

Male

Hispanic

19

FIRE

ARM

40

FIRE

ARM

‐ SU

BJEC

T PO

INTED FIREA

RM

1 1

INJURY

1

Male

Black

15

FIRE

ARM

41

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T PO

INTED FIREA

RM

1 1

INJURY

1

Male

Black

25

FIRE

ARM

42

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T FIRE

D AT OFFICER

1

5

1 Male

Black

25

FIRE

ARM

43

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T 1 SH

OT CIVILIAN

2

3 and 1

INJURY

2

Male

Black

19

FIRE

ARM

FIRE

ARM

‐ SU

BJEC

T 2 PO

INTED FIREA

RM

FATA

L

Male

Black

43

FIRE

ARM

44

OFFICER

PER

CEIVED

THRE

AT ‐ S

UBJEC

T BU

RGLARIZED OFFI‐

CER’S HOME

1 1

1

Male

Black

UNKN

OWN

NONE

45

KNIFE ‐ SUBJEC

T TH

REATENED

CIVILIANS

1 1

INJURY

1

Male

Black

23

KNIFE

46

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T PO

INTED FIREA

RM

3 8, 1, 6

FA

TAL

1 Male

Black

18

FIRE

ARM

47

FIREA

RM ‐ SU

BJEC

T FIRE

D AT OFFICER

1

4 FA

TAL

1 Male

Black

25

FIRE

ARM


66


NYPD

RAYMOND W. KELLY

POLICE COMMISSIONER

MICHAEL J. FARRELL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, STRATEGIC INITIATIVES

DEPUTY CHIEF JOHN K. DONOHUE COMMANDING OFFICER, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS AND PLANNING

New York City Police Department Office of Management Analysis and Planning Special Projects Team Inspector Terrence M. Riley, Commanding Officer Lieutenant Thomas J. Taffe Detective Jonathan C.W. Murad Detective Charles M. Mills Police Officer Cheryl Shea Staff Analyst Louisa Aviles

FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT — 2009

Documents

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT ANNUAL … york city police department annual firearms discharge report 2009