Report of the Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards

Correlating Committee

Dale E. Dressel, Chair Monsanto Co., MO [U]

Merton W. Bunker Nat'l. Fire Protection Assn., MA

(Nonvoting Secretary)

Courtney D. Alvey, Lutherville, MD [SE] William H. Axtman, Gray Gull Assoc. Inc., VA [SE] ohnny W. (Bill) Bass, Forney Int'l Inc., TX [M]

mes R. Bostlck, Bailey Controls Co., OH [M] haddeus Bukowski, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., IL [RT]

Paul L. Cioffi, Babcock & Wilcox, OH [M] William E. Cunningham, Raytheon Engr & Constructors. MA [SE] John C. DeRuyter, The DuPont Co., DE [U] Robert S. Elek, Kemper Nat'l Insurance Cos., OH [I] Ronald E. Fringeli, M&M Protection Consultants, OH [I] Steven K. Funk, The DuPont Co., TX [U]

Rep. American Petroleum Inst. Gordon G. Gaetke, Union Carbide Corp., WV [U] Masaaki Kinoshita, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd, Japan [M] DonaldJ. L. Lin, Qilin Inc., TX [SE] Francis X. Maskoi, Honeywell, Inc., PA[M] Peter B. Matthews, Hartford Steam Boiler Insp & Ins Co.~ CT [1] Russell N. Mosher, American Boiler Mfrs. Assn., VA [M]

{~ rryJ. Moskal, ABB Combustion Engr Inc., CI" [M] ichael C. Polagye, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA [I]

Jpames L. Sherman, Baltimore G,xs & Electric Co., MD [U] eterJ. Gore Willse, Industrial Risk Insurers, CT [I] Rep. Industrial Risk Insurers

Henry IC Wong, Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., NJ [M]

Alternates

Tetsuya Fujino, Mitsubishi Heavy IndustriesAmerica, Inc., CA [M] (Alt. to M. Kinosbita)

Dennis P.Jenkins, Kemper Nat'l Insurance Cos., NC [1] (Alt. to R. S. Elek)

Kenneth N. Lawrence, Honeywell Inc., PA [M] (All. to F. X. M:~skol)

W. Scott Matz, Forney Int'l Inc., TX [M] (Alt. toJ. w. Bass)

John P. O'Rourke, ABB Combustion Engr Inc., CT [M] (All. toJ.J. Moskal)

S. Sam Pagadala, M&M Protection Consultants, IL [I] (AIt. to IL E. Fringeli)

RichardJ. Wachter, Industrial Risk Insurers, CT [I] (Alt. to P.J.G. Willse)

J. C. Waung, Babcock & Wilcox Co., OH [M] (Alt. to P. L. Cioffi)

William G. Yeich, Exxon Research and Engr Co., NJ [U] (/kit. to S. IL Funk)

Nonvoting

Shelton Ehrlich, Palo Alto, CA Thomas B. Hamilton, Hamilton Consulting Services, NC Robert P. Kaltenbach, Burns & McDonnell Engr, MO

StaffLiaison: Merton W. Bunker

Committee Scope: Tiffs Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on the reduction of combustion system hazards in single- and multiple-burner boilers with a heat input rate of 12,500,000 Btu /hr and above. This includes all fuels. This Committee also is responsible for documents on the reduction of hazards in pulverized fuel systems, fluidized-bed boilers, heat recovery steam generators, and stoker-fired boilers, at any heat input rate.

Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers

Boiler Combustion System Hazards

PeterJ. Gore W'dlse, Chair Industrial Risk Insurers, CT [I]

Dale E. Dregsel, V/ce C,~air, Monsanto Co., MO [U]

Courtney D. Alvey, Lutherville, MD [SE] William H. Axtman, Gray Gull Assoc. Inc., VA [SE]

Thaddeus Bukowski, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., IL [RT] fan M. Clark, ABB Combustion Engr, lnc., C'I" [M] Thomas C. Clayton, Black & Veatch, MO [SE]

J ohn M. DeLacy, The Coen Co., CA [M] ohnJ. Eibl, DuPont Engr, TN [U]

RobertJ. Gross, Babcock & Wilcox, OH [I] James IL Lafontaine, Pennsylvania Electric, PA [U] Kenneth N. Lawrence, Honeywell Inc., PA[M]

I acques van Heijningen, Landis & Gyr, Inc., IL [M] • A. "Red" Wagner, Freye Correction, NJ [M] ames C. W'dliams, American Risk Consultants Corp., GA [I]

Nonvoting

Russell N. Mosher, American Boiler Mfrs. Assn., VA

Staff Liaison: Merton W. Bunker

This list represents the membership at the time the Committee i~as balloted on the text of this edition. Since that time, changes in the membership raa~ have occurred. A key to classifications is found at the front of the book.

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primar 7 responsibility for documents coveting the reduction of combustion system hazards and the prevention of boiler furnace explosions in single burner boilers with a heat input rate of 12,500,000 Btu/hr and above. This includes all fuels.

Technical Committe on Pulverized Fuel Systems

Boiler Combustion System Hazards

Thomas B. Hamilton, Chair Hamihon Consulting Services, NC [SE]

Courtney D. Alvey, Lutherville, MD [SE] William H. Axtman, Gray Gull Assoc. Inc., VA [SE] { ohn N. Cannon, Brigham Young University, LIT [SE]

oberttChristianson, Stone & Webster Engr Corp., CO [SE] Thomas A. Collette, Commonwealth Edison, IL [U] David A. Cowdrick, Tampa Electric Co., FL [U] John C. deRuyter, The DuPont Co., DE [U] Mike Doherty, American Electric Power Service Corp., OH [U] Kenneth L. Gardner, Kennedy Van Saun Corp., PA [M] Walter E. Keiser, Georgia Power Co., GA [U] Allan E. Kukoski, Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., NJ [M] Kiran R. Patel, Riley Stoker Corp., MA [M] Robert Piepho, Babcock & Wilcox Co., OH [M] AlanJ. Seibert, ABB Combustion Engr, CT [M] Gary D. Taylor, Duke Power Co., NC [U]

Alternates

Donald Dougan, Babcock & Wilcox Co., OH [M] (Alt. to IL Piepho)

Joel Vatsky, Foster Wheeler Energy, NJ [M] (Alt. to A. E. Kukoski)

Nonvoting

Russell N. Mosher, American Boiler Mfrs. Assn., VA

Staff Liaison: Merton W. Bunker

This list represents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edition. Since that time, changes in the membership may have occurred~ A key to classifications is fou~wl at the front of the book.

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents covering the operation and design requirements of pulverized fuel systems and reduction of hazards associated with those systems. This includes all carbonaceous solid fuels at any heat input rate.

The ReI)ort of the Technical Correlating Committee on Boiler Combusuon System Hazards is presentedfor adoption in 2 parts.

Part I of this Report was prepared by the Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers and proposes for adoption amendments on NFPA 8501-1997, Standard'for Single Burner Boiler Operation. NFPA 8501-1992 is published in Volume 9 of the 1996 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form.

Part I of this Report has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Single Burner Boilers, which consists of 15 voting members. The results-of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report.

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N F P A 8 5 0 1 - - A 9 7 R O P

Part I of this Report has ,also been submi t ted to letter ballot of the Technical Correlating Commi t tee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards, which consists of 23 voting members ; of whom 17 voted affirmatively, 4 negatively after circulation of negative ballots (Messrs. Alvey, C u n n i n g h a m , Gaetke, and Wong) , and 2 ballot(s) were not re tu rned (Messrs. Bukowski and Cioffi).

Mr. Alvey voted negatively stating: "Confi rming my te lephone call to Mer ton W. Bunker ,Jr . on May

29, 1996, I now wish to be recorded as voting NEGATIVE on the release of the repor t of NFPA 8501 (Single Burner Boilers).

My reasons for the negative vote, in addit ion to my previous objection to requir ing a trip but ton at tile boiler room door, are essentially the same as those of Messrs. W ong and C u n n i n g h a m . Too many significant changes in requ i rements and procedures which have s tood the test of t ime are being proposed without sufficient evidence of tile need and without consider ing impact on similar requ i rements and procedures in NFPA 8502."

Mr. C u n n i n g h a m voted negatively stating: "The purpose o f a NFPA meet ing i s to discuss these issues in detail,

this was a reason to mee t in early spring. It makes it very difficult to comment , without the back g r o u n d informat ion f rom the commit tee submit t ing the information. This is also tile reason to have the chairperson of tile commit tee , at the meeting. We also had very little t ime to review and c o m m e n t on these issues. I am in ag r eemen t with the action taken by the commit tee except for the following issues. I wish to vote against the following issues:

8501- 6 (Log #6) - The c o m m e n t s appear to apply to the draft copy of 8501 mad no t the 1992 edition. I am unable to locate a copy of the draft and therefore unable to comment .

8501-9 (Log #12) - I agree with Mr. Lawrence 's c o m m e n t that the r equ i r emen t for an automat ic leak check system shou ld be included. You have to address this issue in detail before you take tile step to permi t the vent valve to disappear. This is a major change to tile NFPA code, which would no longer require the vent valve between the two block valves on a gas system.

This requires some considerat ion because f irms will quickly ~o in this direction to avoid the cost of tile vent valve and piping.

Wha t is tile history on tile purpose of the change, how many people do omit the vent valve and the problems or lack of problems?

If tilis section is approved, it shou ld address the following: a) Proper sequence of valves to avoid gas t rapped between them. b) Do we require a manual valve(s) and manua l vent valve before

the boiler shutoffvalves, with vent piping, to permi t work on the boiler? What happens if a valve leaks, or boiler repair, if the boiler is on a c o m m o n gas header? Sa.few?

c) Do you need a pressure switch between the valves to alert the operator of a leak?

d) What happens if tile second valve should leak, how do you prove it? Compressed air between valves, as a pressure check?

e) Once a s tandard is issued, boilers will become grandfa ther ' s and problems (if any) will be in place for twenty or more years, to their grandchi ldren.

f) NFPA has required tile vent for thirty years, this will expose tile operators to new problems, with no back ups for safety.

g) Refer to 8501-18 (Log #10) below, which requires at least an mmna l leak test, How does this fit into the overall s tandard?

8501-12 (Log #13) - Same c o m m e n t as for 8501-9 (Log #12)° 8501-16 (Log #8) - Commit tee Action Paragraph 4-5.2.3.1 This s t a t emen t will no t permi t tile Burner M a n a g e m e n t System

(BMS) to be combined with any o ther logic system. It t hen has an except ion to permi t the combus t ion control system to become a part of tile bunaer m a n a g e m e n t system. T h i s exception it appears will delete file first s ta tement .

W h e n this issue was first voted upon , tile idea was to give tile operator a back up system, s h o u l d o n e system fail. If the BMS failed and the operator was unable to shu t down tile boiler, he could use the combust ion controls to shu t o f f t he fuel. The combus t ion controls could fail and tile BMS would then be tile back up. This change will do away with titis back up idea. It is t rue tha t some of tbe PLC or DCS problems have improved but again this step is a major step and shou ld be reviewed carefully. The problem of bow a PLC addresses a signal failure mode is no t a problem of the past, it is true today. It requires carefid review and design, with tile back up data f rom tile controls vendor. This problem will be more acute with some control vendors.

Ano the r c o m m e n t is that the combust ion control system can be combined, if separated BMS are provided. Can you also combine the BMS s~stems if the combust ion controls are separated?

How good is tile power source to all of these systems? NFPA talks about internal power su pp lies,,are tile y c o m m o n to both systems ~. R e d u n d a n t power supplies, are they c o m m o n to both systems? R e d u n d a n t power supplies? Once we have a handle on this problem, will we p lug the entire system into a wall 120 VAC socket,~

I believe many issues have to be reviewed before this change is made.

8501-17 (Log#CPI9) - Have we checked with the major valve companies to make sure tha t large valves can close within one second? Please keep in m ind tha t some single burner package boilers are extra large.

8501-18 (Log#10) Please advise how this section shall apply to "8501-9 (Log#12)" it requires an annua l leak test.

8501-24 (Log #CP23), 8501-96 (Log # CP24), 8501-30 (Log #CP25), 8501-31 (Log #CP26), 8501-34 (Log #CP27), 8501-35 (Log #CP28), 8501-36 (Log #CP29)

W h e n we say no less than 15 seconds, this becomes tile s tandard, in a world where people with different amoun t s of BMS experience, it becomes tile defaul t value. I strongly feel the words "or per manufac turers ' s tandard" should apply in this case. Today, a single boiler may be furn ished with gas recirculation fan, also the size of the boiler, which may require addit ional time. Manufacturers furnish m i n i m u m information, unless requested, do in part to possible legal action. This wording would cause the desil~?er to ask tile question. Today, tile code requires tile fans to run. rlowever, it does not state the time, this in tu rn creates the question, how long to the boiler vendor? Tile new s tandard outlines tile t ime 15 seconds, no quest ion will be made of tile boiler vendor, by many controls firms.

8501-27 (Log #CP10) - I assume tha t this c o m m e n t ~oes into section 6-2.4.8 but the section or paragraph informat ion is no t conta ined within the document .

I also assume that unhea t ed oil will no t be requi red to have a high tempera ture trip. If we have informat ion tha t explosions occur due to h igh t empera tu re oil, it should have been a t tached to the comments .

8501-29 (Log #16) - I do no t agree with the change to 6-2.4.6 and 6- 4.2.4 which would n o t p e r m i t recycling of boilers. There may be good reasons for the cbange bu t they do no t appear within the information received. These small boilers are used to heat buildings and unless good reasons exist, no t to recycle will cause other problems such as frozen pipes.

8501-38 (Log #17) - The wording appears to be correct in the 1992 edition, for paragraphs 6-4.2.7(a) (6), 6-4.2.7(b) (6) and 6-7.8(g).

8501-39 (Log #CP15) - Section 7-4.3.4 requires a fuel oil t empera ture alarm, which I assume occurs before the trip. I believe it should remain in tile s tandard to alert t i le.operator and to avoid a trip. Add to 7-4.3.1 high oil t empera ture trip to follow the otber comments , if accepted.

8501-40 (Log #CPI 6) - Section 10-1. I have no p rob l em s with the change in wording.

However, I feel that it is impor tan t in ano the r sen tence to state that tile e q u i p m e n t shall be in "proper operat ing condit ion at all times." Tile inspect ion and ma in tenance will be pe r fo rmed once or twice a year. This should not imply that only du r ing these periods will switches be replaced or recalibrated. If the system is no t in good operat ing condit ion at all t imes (or properly tagged) it could be a danger to all.

Wha t tile commit tee should do is go t hough a system start up with j u m p e r s , j u s t one time, and this paragraph would no t be changed, to omit this wording.

8501-44 (Log #11) - I agree with Mr. Alvey that switches should be located on control boards or in control rooms.

Tile s tandard should include in the appendix that the design of control rooms and boiler houses should have a n u m b e r of exits for tile operator ' s safety. I assume tha t dais is the reason for the trip switches near an exit.

If they wish to have boiler shu t offswitches (master fuel trip switches) at or r~ear these doors, they shou ld be key switches, to avoid unwanted shu t downs. The c o m m o n key could be located in a small glass case near the switch. You shou ld also moni to r these switches in order to trouble shoo t the problems. If some one depresses a switch in error, it is se ldom they raise their hand. The operator will spend t ime trying to f ind out why the uni t tripped, because someone pushed a but ton."

Mr. Gaetke voted negatively stating: "Negative c o m m e n t on 8501-9 (Log #19) (4-2.3): Proposer 's substant iat ion states 'Periodical valve leakage testing as

r e c o m m e n d e d in Appendix A[A-10.A.8(c) (ii) ] is rarely executed ' as basis for automat ic valve proving system as alternative to in termediate vent between two safety shutoffvalves. This approach is no t consistent with 8502.

The r equ i r emen t for t ightness tests with Proposal 8501-18 (Log #10) (4-8.2) adequately addresses proposer ' s concerns."

Mr. Wong voted negatively stating: "My negative vote to the NFPA 8501 ROP applies to 8501-22 (Log

#2), 8501-8 (Log #3), 8501-11 (Log #8), 8501-44 (Log #11 ), 8501-0 (Log #12), 8501-12 (Log #13), and8501-11 (Log #CP5).

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N F P A 8501 ~ A97 R O P

8501-22 (Log #2) 8501's purge requirements should be more consistent with 8502 and 8504. 8501-8 (Log #3) Don't agree that NFPA 8501 should mandate

NFPA 70. How are foreign (IEC) requirements handled? 8501-11 (Log #8) The recommended wording is not consistent

with the wording in 8502 and the 'exception' in line 5 reverses a key component of independence. 8501-44 (Log #11) The 'panic' button requirement is already

included. How and where should be up to the individual designer. 8501-9 (Log #12) and 8501-12 (Log #13) Who defines wimt valves

are "listed"? 8501-11 (Log #CP5) Referring to two different atmospheric vents

has me confused."

Part II of this Report was prepared by the Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems, and proposes for adoption amendments on NFPA 8505-1992, Standard for Pulverized FuelSystems. NFPA 8505- 1992 is published in Volume 9 of the 1996 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form.

Part II of dfis Report has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Pulverized Fuel Systems, which consists of 16 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report.

Part II of this Report has also been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Correlating Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards, which consists of 23 voting members; of whom 17 voted affirmatively, 4 negatively after circulation of negative ballots (Messrs. Cunningham, Kinoshita, Moskal, and Wong), and 2 ballot(s) were not returned (Messrs. Axtman and Matthews).

Mr. Cunningham voted negatively stating: "I wish to change my vote on NFPA 8503 (Pulverized Fuel Systems)

from affirmative to negative. Reason for the change is based on the comments received, per

Merton Bunker's memo of May 29, 1996. The Committee will meet in a few weeks and I believe that it will

permit the members to discuss these issues and vote after the meeting. This should be the main purpose of any of our meetings to discuss different ideas, whicb should offer the best possible standard."

Mr. Kinoshita voted negatively stating: "8503-17 (Log #9) I think that application of sliding expansion

shall not be restricted because 1) [t operated well in many units and 2) Same reason stated in Committee Statement in 8505-12 (Log #5), i.e., the stmldard should not focus on containment of the explosion. So if it withstand 50 psig, it should be o.k."

Mr. Moskal voted negatively stating: "The NFPA 8503 standard should guide users and suppliers toward

safe designs and operating procedures. The code should not attempt to rule out specific designs. This proposal would disallow the use of a specific design. Designs of dais type can be in accordance with the existing NFPA code. Many of these designs have been in successfifl operation for over thirty years."

Mr. Wong voted neg:atively stating: "8503-16 (Log #9) is a specific attempt to ban a design which works

and has had many operating years of safe operation. NFPA sets requirements; it doesn't design."

Mr. Polagye voted affirmatively with the following comment: "Voting affirmatively to release the report of NFPA 8503, but would

like the opportunity to discuss 8503-13, 8505-15, 8503-17, 8503-19, 8505-20 and 8503-21 durlngJune the 1996 Technical Correlating Committee meeting to better understand the committee's positions and plans during the comment phase."

, PART I

(Log #4) 8501- 1 - (1-1.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Dale E. Dressel, Monsanto Company RECOMMENDATION: Revise to read:

1-1.2 This standard is not retroactive. This standard is applicable to new installations and to major alterations or extensions of existing equipment for the preparation and burning of fuel that are contracted subsequent to the effective date of this standard. A-l-l.2 In existing units, it is not always practical to strictly apply

the provisions of this standard. Physical limitations may require disproportionate effort or expense with litde increase in protection. In such cases, the authority having jurisdiction must be satisfied that reasonable protection is assured.

In existing units it is intended that any condition that represents a serious boiler combustion hazard to be mitigated by application of

~opp ropriate safeguards. It is not intended to require modification r conditions daat do not represent a significant threat, even

thou.gh such conditions are not literally in conformance with these requirements. SUBSTANTIATION: Proposed wording provides additional clarification and incorporates material inserted into NFPA 85C (modifications made to adapt it to 8501) during last revision cycle. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

1. Accept proposed change to Section 1-1.2 as submitted. 2. Change Section Add .2 to read as follows: Add .2 In existing units, it is not always practical to apply the

provisions of this standard strictly. Physical limitations could cause disproportionate effort or expense with little increase in protection. In such cases, the authority having jurisdiction should be satisfied that reasonable protection is provided.

In existing units, any condition that represents a serious boiler combustion system hazard should be mitigated by application of appropriate safeguards. Modification of conditions that do not represent a significant threat, even if such conditions are not in strict conformance with the requirements of this standard, are not required. COMMITrEESTATEMENT: Committee Action correlates this standard with NFPA 8509. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #1 ) 8501- 2 - (Chapter 3): Accept SUBMITTER: Nell H.Johnson, sFr , Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add new text:

UniL The confined spaces of the furnace and the associated boiler passes, ducts, and fans that convey the gases of combustion to the stack. SUBSTANTIATION: In 6-2.4.1 (h) "Unit" can be construed to mean "burner unit" resulting in low air flow during purge widl part load burners. Above wording is from NFPA 85C. COMMITrEE ACTION: AcceDe NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #5) 8501- 3 - (Chapter 3): Accept $UBMITTER: Dale E. Dressel, Monsanto Company RECOMMENDATION: Add new definitions as follows: Alterations. A change or modification in a boiler system that

results in a deviation from the original design specifications or criteria.

Extension. An addition to the boiler system such as, but not limited to, air quality control.

Repair. A process that returns the boiler system to its original design specifications or criteria. SUBSTANTIATION: Proposed wording provides additional clarification and incorporates material inserted into NFPA 85C during last revision cycle. COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept. NUMBEROF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

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N F P A 8501 ~ A 9 7 R O P

(Log #CP1) 8501- 4 - (Chapter 3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commit tee on Boiler Combust ion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Add defini t ions to Chapter 3 as follows:

"Automatic. See Burner M a n a g e m e n t System." "Manual. See Burner M a n a g e m e n t System." "Supervised Manual. See Burner M a n a g e m e n t System."

SUBSTANTIATION: To make file d o c u m e n t more user friendly. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 N O T RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP3) 8501- 5 - (Chapter 3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical C o m m i t t e e o n Boiler Combust ion System Hazards,

I RECOMMENDATION: Delete the defini t ion for "Burner Control Systems". SUBSTANTIATION: Definit ion is r e d u n d a n t with definit ion for "Burner M a n a g e m e n t System". See also Recommenda t ions on Commit tee Proposal 8501 -20 (Log #CP2) and Commit tee Proposal 8501 - 46 (Log #CP4). COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: l 1 N O T RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #6) 8501- 6 - (3 Class 1 Igniter, Class 2 Igniter, Class 3 Igniter, and Chapter 4): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Dale E. Dressel, Monsan to C ompany RECOMMENDATION: 1. Remove " (C ondnuous Igniter)" f rom the defini t ion of a Class 1 Igniter. Remove "( In termi t tent Igniter)" f rom die definit ion of a Class 2 Igniter. Remove " ( In ter rupted Igniter)" f rom the defini t ion of a Class 3 Igniter.

2. Add the following line at tile end of the definit ion for a Class 1 Igniter:

"Class 1 igniters shall be permi t ted to also operate as Class 2 or Class 3 igniters."

3. Reword the last sen tence of the definit ion for a Class 2 igniter t O :

"Class 2 igniters shall be permit ted to be operated as Class 3 igniters."

4. Take the 4th and 5th sentences f rom the Class 2 igniter definition, file 3rd d i rough 5th sen tences f rom the Class 3 igniter definit ion and the last sen tence f rom die Class 3 Special definit ion and move these to Section 4-4.1.1 as follows:

44.1.1 The main burner shall be equ ipped with a pe rmanent ly installed igniter.

4-4.1.1.1 l f a Class 1 igniter is used, the main burner f lame shall be proven ei ther by die flanle scanner s ight ing die main f lame directly

roven. or by die igniter f lame being p 4-4.1.1.2 I f a Class 2 igniter is used, it sball no t be used to ignite

main fuel u n d e r uncont ro l led or abnormal conditions. The b u r n e r shall be opera ted u n d e r controlled condit ions to limit the potential for abnormal operation, as well as to limit the charge of fuel to the furnace in die event that ignition does no t occur du r ing light-off, ff the Class 2 igniter is no t shu t down once die main f lame sequence is successfully completed, t hen the main bu rne r f lame shall be proven by f lame scanner independen t ly of die igniter.

44.1.1.3 I f a Class 3 igniter is used, the igniter shall be s h u t d o w n , as a part of the burner l igh t -o f f procedure , when the t ime ta'ial-for- ignition of the main bu rne r has expired. This is to ensure tha t die main f lame is self-supporting, is stable, and is no t d e p e n d e n t upon ignition suppor t f rom die igniter. T he use of such igniters to suppor t ignition or to ex tend the bu rne r control range shall be prohibited. The main f lame shall be proven by f l ame scanner .

4-4.1.1.4 f f a Class 3 Special igniter is used, die individual burner f lame shall be proven by f lame scanner .

Sections 4-4.1.2 througil 44 .1 .4 remain as written. SUBSTANTIATION: T he class o f the igniter refers to die ability of die igniter to light off any credible. ,air-fuel.. mixture enter ing th rough the bu rne r u n d e r any operat ing condiuon. Al though many Class 1 igniters are operated continuously, this is no t a crucial factor in being considered a Class 1 igniter. This c o m m e n t also incorporated material (with modifications) that was included in 85C dur ing the last revision cycle.

I COMMI17I'EE ACTION: Accept in Principle. 1. Accept die submit ter ' s proposal widl the following changes.

2. In submit ter ' s p roposed Section 4-4.1.1.4, change."individuai" to "main".

3. In Section 4-4.1.1.1 change p roposed section as follows: 44.1.1.1 Where a Class 1 igniter is used, the main burner flame

shall be proven by a f lame detector proving either the main f lame or die igniter f lame.

4. In Sections 44.1.1.2, 4-4.1.1.3 and 4-4.1.1.4, change " l fa Class..." to '"COhere a Class...".

5. In Sections 4-4.1.1.2, 4-4.1.1.3, and 4-4.1.1.4, change "scanner" to "detector". COMMITTEE STATEMENT: 1. Single burner boilers have one burner , vice mult iple burners. Editorial change.

2. The word detector encompasses several technologies, including S c a D n e r s .

3. Editorial change of "if" to "where" is for compliance with Manual of Style. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 N O T RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP21 ) 8501- 7 - (Chapter 3, Interlock): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commit tee on Boiler Combust ion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: In the definit ion of "Interlock" in Chapter 3, delete die words "offending or" and "piece o f " . . SUBSTANTIATION: To correlate with the defini t ion modif ied in NFPA 8502 revision. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 N O T RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #3) 8501- 8 - (Chapter 4): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: William E. Cunn ingham,J r . , Raytheon Engineers & Constructors, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add new text:

4-9 Electrical Equipment . 4-9.1 All electrical e q u i p m e n t and wiring shall conform to NFPA

70, National Electrical Code. 4-9.2 Locations where natural gas, p ropane or fuel oil systems are

installed in compliance with this s tandard shall no t be considered a hazardous location for electrical e q u i p m e n t as def ined in NFPA 70, National Electrical Code.

4-9.3 Special fuels or applications may require componen t s for hazardous location and shall be reviewed du r ing die design of the system. SUBSTANTIATION: We address the relationship of NFPA 70 hazardous locations for coal firing equ ipmen t in NFPA 8503. Natural gas and fuel oil applications of the same NFPA 70 s tandard are no t addressed. The n u m b e r o f boilers which have explosion p roof electrical enclosures are indeed few. The inclusion of this paragraph will offer a clear view of the position of NFPA on this I s s u e °

COMMITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle. Accept the Submit ter s proposal with changes as follows: Add new text: 4-9 Electrical Equipment . 4-9.1 All electrical e q u i p m e n t and wiring shall conform to NFPA

70, National Electrical Code. 4-9.2 Special fuels or applications may require componen t s for

hazardous location and shall be reviewed du r ing the design o f the system.

A-4-9.1 Locations where natural gas, p ropane or fuel oil systems are installed in compliance with this s tandard normally are not considered hazardous locations for electrical e q u i p m e n t as def ined in NFPA 70, National Electrical Code. COMMITI'EE STATEMENT: There may be some occasions where the installation may be considered a hazardous location, and the wordingwas moved to Appendix A as advisory material. NUMBER OF COMMrlq'EE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 1 l NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

8501- 9 - (4-2.3): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Jacques van Heijningen, Landis & Gyr RECOMMENDATION: Add to existing wording:

(Log #12)

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N F P A 8 5 0 1 ~ A 9 7 R O P

"As an alternative, two safety shutoff valves in series, supervised by a listed automat ic valve proving system, sball be provided in the gas line to the main burner . Valve proving shall be pe r fo rmed ei ther after every bu rne r shutdown or prior to every burner light-off." SUBSTANTIATION: Periodicalvalve leakage testing as recom- m e n d e d in Appendix A is rarely executed.

Automat ic valve proving systems effectively detect the presence of a leak in boda valves, and prevent bu rne r light-off in case of a leak.

Valves with p roof of closnre switch and intermediate vent valve are only capable of limiting tile leakage to the burner .

Vent ing of u n b u r n t gas into the a tmosphere causes pollution.. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

1. Cbange proposed wording to read as follows: "As an alternative, two safety shutoff valves in series, supervised by a listed automat ic valve proving system, shall be provided in the gas line to the main burner . Valve proving shall be pe r fo rmed after every bu rne r shutdown and prior to every burner light-off. Where the safety sllutoff valves to the main bu rne r are supervised by a listed automat ic valve p rov ing system, no vent valve shall Be required."

2. Add a new definit ion to Chapter 3 as follows: "Valve proving system. A system that proves the leak t ightness o f all

safety shutoffvalves and prevents main burner or igniter light-off if the test is no t satisfied." COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Changes reflect that testing should be done both prior to sma-tup and after shutdown. New te rm needs to be defined, and was added. Changes ,also for correlation with section 4-4.1.3. See also Proposal 8501 - 12 (Log #13). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 10 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLaLcy , Lafontaine, Williams

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: LAWRENCE: The proposed wording o f this changeg ives no

requ i rements for the pe r fo rmance of an au toma t i c l eak check system (valve proving system). This proposal does no t have file equivalent level of safety o f p roof of closure and a vent valve.

There is a Ionghis tory of safety with the cur ren t requi rements of the s tandard. This success should not be compromised without significant study and addit ional data.

(Log #9) 8501- 10 - (4-2.7): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Dale E. Dressel, Monsanto C o m p a n y RECOMMENDATION: Add appendix material to Section 4-2.7 as follows:

A-4-2.7 Aunospher ic vent valves located between shutoffvalves are in t ended to relieve any gas pressure that may build up due to failure of the first (upstream) shutoffvalve. This minimizes the potential for leakage into a furnace. To per form properly, these valves should be large e n o u g h to relieve gas to a tmosphere at a rate equal to the potential leakage rate. In absence of o ther justification, vent pipe sizes and vent valve por t d iameters sbould conform to Table A-4-2.7. W h e n mani fo ld ing is allowed, file cross-sectional area of the manifold pipe should be equal to, or greater than, the sum of the cross-sectional ,areas of die two largest vents involved.

G~ss Supply Line Size

Table A4-2.7

Shutoff System Minimum Vent Port

< or = 1-1/2 in. 3 / 4 in. 2 in. I in. 2-1/2 in. to 3 in. 1-1/4 in. 3-1/2 in. 1-1/2 in. 4 in. to 5 in. 2 in. 5-1/2 in. to 6 in. 2-1/2 in. 8 in. 3-1/2 in. > 8 in. 15% of supply line cross-sectional area

SUBSTANTIATION: The above material would provide guidance in sizing vent lines while no t making it a requirement . The material matches (with modifications to adapt it to 8501) informat ion that was incorporated into 85C dur ing the l ~ t revision cycle. COMMITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle.

1. Accept the submit ter ' s proposal, bu t r e n u m b e r the Table as A-4- 2.3 and add one line to the proposed Table as follows:

"6 1/2 in. to 7 1 / 2 in. 3 in." 2. In Section 44.1.3 , add tile following: "(See also A-4-2.3)."

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: T he first occurrence of vent line is in 4-2.3, vice 4-2.7. Line for 6-1/2 to %1/2 in line added for complete-

257

ness. The r equ i r emen t is also found in section 4-4.1.3 and has been referenced. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP5) 8501- 11 - (4-2.7): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commit tee on Boiler Combust ion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Revise 4-2.7 by adding the words "and vents to a tmosphere" between the words "vents" and"shal l" . SUBSTANTIATION: Needed ' to identify two different types of vent a r rangements . COMMI'VI'EE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 10 NEGATIVE: I N O T RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: ALVEY: This paragraph 4-2.7 relates to requi rements for the

discharge o f vented gas. If there is any difference between "atmo- spher ic vents" and "vents to a tmosphere" in conforming to these requirements , as implied in the substantiation, I am not aware of it. Again, if there is a difference, t hen these two terms need to be def ined in Chapter 3 or the "different types o f vent a r rangements" need to be shown in Appendix A. The paragraph as modif ied by this proposal would only be confusing.

(Log #13) 8501- 12- (4-4.1.3): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Jacques van Heijningen, Landis & Gyr RECOMMENDATION: Insert after the second sentence:

" f f the safety shutoffvalves to the gas ignite are supervised by an automatic valve proving system, no vent valve is required." SUBSTANTIATION: Periodical valve leakage testing as recom- m e n d e d in Appendix A is rarely executed.

Automat ic valve proving systems effectively detect the presence of a leak in both valves, and prevent burner ligl~t-off in case of a leak.

Vent ing of u n b u r n t gas into the a tmosphere causes pollution. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. Accepted in Principle with changes as follows: "As an alternative, two safety shutoff valves in series, supervised by a

listed automat ic valve proving system, shall be provided in the gas line to die igniter. Valve proving shall be per formed after every igniter shutdown and prior to every igniter light-off. Where the safety shutoffvalves to the gas igniter are supervised by a listed automat ic valve proving system, no vent valve shall be required." COMMITrEE STATEMENT: Changes to su bmit ter 's wording were for correlation with section 4-2.3 and for conformance with the Manual of Style. See Commit tee Action and S ta tement on Proposal 8501- 9 (Log#12). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITrEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 10 NEGATIVE: 1 N O T RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: LAWRENCE: The proposed wording of this change gives no

requi rements for the per formance of an automatic leak check system (valve proving system). This proposal does not have die equivalent level of safety a vent valve.

There is a long history of safety with the current requireme'nts of the s tandard. This success should not be compromised without significant study and additional data.

(Log #CP6) 8501- 13- (4-4.4.3 (New)): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commit tee on Boiler Combust ion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Add new paragraphs as follows:

4-4.4.3 The requi rements for die availability of combust ion air shall be de t e rmined f rom NFPA 31, Oil Burn ing Equ ipmen t and NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code.

4-4.4.3.1 Louvers and grilles shall be f ixed in the open position or interlocked with the e q u i p m e n t so that they are o p e n e d automati- cally or manual ly dur ing e q u i p m e n t operation. The interlock shall be placed on the driven member .

4-4.4.3.2 Fans supplying air to the boiler room for combust ion shall be inter locked with the burner so that air flow is proven dur ing e q u i p m e n t operat ion.

N F P A 8501 ~ A 9 7 R O P

SUBSTANTIATION: The other codes are referenced to allow proper sizing of the opening to prevent fuel rich firing. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP7) 8501- 14- (4-4.6.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Teclmical Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: 1. In the last sentence, change die word "can" to "shall" and change "any" to "one".

2. In 4-4.6.2(c), change "appropriate" to "approved" SUBSTANTIATION: The material is in the body of the standard and must be mandatory. The word "approved" is defined. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #7) 8501- 15 - (4-5.2.1 (New)): Accept SUBMITTER: [)ale E. Dressel, Monsanto Company RECOMMENDATION: 1. In the first sentence of Section 4-5.2.1, change the word "recognize" to "evaluate". 2. Add the following to this section: (h) relay coil failure. (i) relay contact failure (fail-on or fail-off). (j) timer failure.

SUBSTANTIATION: All logic systems should be evaluated, not just microprocessor based systems. For Part A, "evaluate" is a better term than "recognize"~ This comment also incorporates material that was accepted for inclusion in NFPA 85C during their last revision cycle° COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETIJRNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #8) 8501- 16 - (4-5.2.3): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Dale E. Dressel, Monsanto Company RECOMMENDATION: Revise 4-5.2.3 as follows:

4-5.2.3 Requirement for Independence. 4-5...2 3 1 The Iogl'c system p. erforming the safety functions for

burner management and boder control systems shall not be combined with any other logic or control system.

4-5.2.3.2 The burner management safety functions shall include, but not be limited to, proper purge interlocks and timing, manda- tory safety shutdowns, trialtiming for ignition and flame monitoring. 4-5.2.3.3 The logic system shall be limited to one boiler only. 4-5.2.3.4 The burner management and boiler control system shall

be provided with independent logic, independent input/output systems, and independent power supplies, and shall be functionally and physically separate from other logic systems (i.e., another boiler system).

4-5.2.3.5 The same hardware type shall be permitted to be used for burner management and boiler control systems as is used for other logic systems.

4-5.2.3.6 Data highway communications between he burner management and boiler control system and other systems shall be permitted. Signals that initiate mandatory safety shutdowns shall be hard wired. SUBSTANTIATION: Clarifies the degree of independence required for control system suppliers. It also matches the intent of material accepted by the 85C subcommittee (with modifications to adapt it to 8501) during their last revision cycle. COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

1. Accept the Proposal, but with the changes below 2. Editorially change "he" to "the" in proposed Section 4-5.2.3.6. 3. In proposed Section 4-5.2.3.6, add the following:

"Where remote I /O communication between a logic system processor and its input/output devices, are used, the failure modes shall be evaluated and addressed.'

4. Add new Section 4-5.2.3.7 as follows: "No logic sequences or devices shall bepermitted that allow momen~try closing and subsequent inadvertent reopening of the main or igniter fuel valves." 5. Change proposed Section 4-5.2.3.1 ,as follows:

4-5.2.3.1 The logic system pertbrmingthe safety functions tot burner management shall not be combined with any other logic or control system.

Exception'. Boiler control systems shall be permitted to be combined with the burner management system.

6. Add the following to proposed Section 4-5.2.3.3 as follows: "Boiler control systems shall be permitted to be combined for more than one boiler, where separated from the burner management system."

7. In proposed Section 4-5.2.3.4, change "independent power supplies" to "independent internal power supplies". COMMITrEE STATEMENT: 1. Cbange is editorial. 2. Standard should address the fact that failure modes of remote I/

O communication need to be evaluated and addressed. 3. The Committee wishes to accurately define the requirements for

independence. N ~ E R OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CPI 9) 8501- 17- (4-8.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: 1. Change Section 4-8 to read as follows: 4-8 Flame Safety Shutdown System. 4-8.1 The response time from flame failure to de-energization of

the safety shutoff valves shall not exceed four seconds. 4-8.2 The response time from de-energization of the safety shutoff

valves to full closure shall not exceed one second. SUBSTANTIATION: Response times for each device needed to be segregated into separate requirements. The former requirement of four seconds was insufficient for some manufacturers. COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafont~dne, Williams

( Log # 10) 8501- 18 - (4-8.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Dale E. Dressel, Monsanto Company RECOMMENDATION: Add a second sentence so that the paragraph would read:

"Permanent means shall be provided for making periodic tightness tests of die main burner gas safety shut-offvalves. Periodic tightness tests of die main safety shutoff valves shall be conducted." SUBSTANTIATION: This more clearly defines the requirements of the testing and also incorporates material that was accepted for use in NFPA 85C during their last revision cycle. COMMITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle.

1. Add new Section 4-9.8 as follows: 4-2.8 Permanent means shall be provided for making leakage

tightness tests of the main burner gas safety shut-off valves. Leakage tightness tests of the main safety shutoff valves shall be conducted at least annually.

2. Delete existing Section 4-8.2. COMM1TrEE STATEMENT: Revised to indicate the type of leakage test and a maximum time frame of annually. Material was more appropriate in Section 4-2.8, rather than 4-8.2. NUMBER OF COMMI'I'I'EE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP8) 8501- 19- (5-1.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Change "qualified operator" to "trained o~erator" and add a definition for 'trained operator" as follows:

Trained Operator. A person meeting the requirements of Section A-10.B.I ." SUBSTANTIATION: Guidelines for training an operator are already covered in Section A-10.B.1. Changing the term "qualified

erator" to "trained operator" clarifies the Committee intent. MMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Cl~/yton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

258

N F P A 8501 - - A 9 7 R O P

(Log #CP2) 8501- 20 - (5-1.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards,

I RECOMMENDATION: In Section 5d.2, change "burner control system" to "boiler". SUBSTANTIATION: Proper terminology. See also Committee Proposal 8501 - 5 (Log #CP3) and Committee Proposal 8501 - 46 (Log #CP4). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: i 1 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP9) 8501- 21 - (6-2.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Change "qualified operator" to "trained operator". SUBSTANTIATION: See Committee Recommendat ion and Substantiation on Committee Proposal 8501 - 19 (Log #CPS). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TOVOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #2) 8501- 22 - (6-2.4.1(h), (i) (New)): Reject SUBMITTER: DouglasJ. Sbaffer, Zum Industries RECOMMENDATION: Take exception to:

"70 percent air flow required at maximum continuous capacity of the unit." "The purge shall be sufficient for at least eight air changes."

Exception to be as stated in the NFPA 85C "Prevention of Furnace Explosions/Implosions in Multiple Burner Boiler-Furnaces," 1991 Edition, Section 6-5.1.5.1 (c) a n d a s defined by the Purge Rate definition to read:

"A constant flow of no t less than 25 percent of the full load volumetric air flow at the point of measurement, for the greater of either: (1) a period of not less than five minutes, or (2) five volume changes." SUBSTANTIATION: Reason: Fan sizing for units in adverse air temperature (cold) will canse over-amperage of fans and trip the unit dur ingpurge . COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITrEE STATEMENT: The existing requirements 'in Sections 6-4.2.1 (h) and (i) bare been proven by use over time. Additionally, the Submitter has not provided sufficient technical substantiation for the reduction in purge requirements. NUMBER OF COMMITTEEMEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION"

AFFIRMATIVE: l 1 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #15) 8501- 23 - (6-Z4.1 (b), (i), and (k)): Reject SUBMITTER: Dale E. Dressel, Monsanto Company RECOMMENDATION: Add a sentence to address variable frequency drive forced draft fans in single burner boiler operations. A proposed wording could be:

"Where variable speed or variable frequency drives are used on the forced draft fan, fan speed interlocks shall be provided along with proof of air pressure. If o ther dampers exist in the combustion air flow stream (,air registers, etc.), an open damper interlock will still be required. SUBSTANTIATION: Variable frequency drives are being used more and more often in the industry. The standard currently does no t address this advancement. Paragraphs 6-2.4.8(a) (3), 6- 2.4.8(b)(3), 6-4.2.1 (h) and (i), 6-4.9.7(a)(3) and (b)(3), 6-6.4(4), 6- 6.8(b), 6-7.4.4(3), 6-7.8(c) and 7-4.3.3(a) may also require some clarifi carl on. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Airflow measurement is an acceptable method, covered by Section 6-2.4.1 (h). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP23) 8501- 24- (6-2.4.5(e)): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Add a sentence to Section 6-2.4.5(e) to read as follows:

"The duration of the post purge shall be no less than 15 seconds at an airflow rate not exceeding that at which the unit was shut down." SUBSTANTIATION: Requirements for post purge were never addressed in theprevious editions of the standard. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP20) 8501- 25 - (6-2.4.6): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: In Secdon 6-2.4.6, change "...water level has dropped.. ." to "..~water level has returned...". SUBSTANTIATION: To correct the terminology used. The water level does no t drop to meet the limits, it raises. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, L,'ffonufine, Williams

(Log #CP24) 8501- 26 - (6-2.4.7(0 (New)): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: I. Add a new Section 6-2.4.7(0 to read as follows:

(f) Perform a post purge of the boiler enclosure. The duration of the post purge shall be no less than 15 seconds at an airflow rate not exceeding that at which the unit was shut down.

2. Renumber subsequent sections as necessary. SUBSTANTIATION: See Substantiation on Committee Proposal 8501 - 24 (Log #CP25). COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP10) 8501- 27- (6-2.4.8): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: 1. Change "qualified operator" to "trained operator".

2. Add a new condition under (a) for high temperature of heated oil as follows: "10. High temperature of heated oil." SUBSTANTIATION: 1. See Recommendat ion and Substantiation on Committee Proposal 8501 - 19 (Log #CPS).

2. When the temperature of the oil gets too hot it can create an explosion, or couldflash in the burner, leading to an unstable situation. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP11) 8501- 28- (6-3.1.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards,

I RECOMMENDATION: Change "qualified operator" to "trained operator". SUBSTANTIATION: See Recommendat ion and Substantiation on Committee Proposal 8501 - 19 (Log #CPS). COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

259

N F P A 8 5 0 1 ~ A 9 7 R O P

(Log #16) 8501- 29 - (6-3.1.1 a n d 6-5.1.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Dale E. Dressel, Monsanto C ompany

[ RECOMMENDATION: Revise first sen tence to read: t "When bigh s team pressure, h igh water t empera tu re or low water

level estabhshes a normal shutdown, the bu rne r shall no t be allowed to recycle." SUBSTANTIATION: The condit ions no ted should be the same as those listed in Sections 6-2.4.6 and 6-4.2.4. This would be referring to the first low water level c u t o f f a n d is no t referring to the auxiliary low water level cutoffwhich is the safety s lmtdown. COMMIT'FEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 N O T RETURNED: 4 Claytou, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP25) 8501- 30 - (6-4.2.5(d) (New)): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commit tee on Boiler Combnst ion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: 1. Add a new Section 6-4.2.5(d) to read as follows:

(d) Perform a p o s t p u r g e of the boiler enclosure. The dura t ion of the post pnrge shall be no less than 15 seconds at an airflow rate no t exceedin-g that at which the uni t was shu t down.

2. R e n u m b e r subsectuent sections as necessary. SUBSTANTIATION: See Subst.antiation on Commit tee Proposal 8501 - 24 (Log #CP23). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 N O T RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP26) 8501- 31 - (6-4.2.6(f)): Accept SUBMITTER:. Technical Commi t tee on Boiler Combust ion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: 1. Add a new Section 6-4.2.6(0 to read as follows:

(f) Perform a post purge of the boiler enclosure. T h e durat ion of the post purge shall b e no less than 15 seconds at an airflow rate no t exceeding tha t at which tile un i t was shu t down.

2. R e n u m b e r subsequen t sections ,as necessary. SUBSTANTIATION: See Substantiat ion on Commi t tee Proposal 8501 - 24 (Log #CP23). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafonmine, Williams

(Log #CPI 2) 8501- 32 - (6-4.2.7): Accept SUBMITTER: Teclmical Commit tee on Boiler Combust ion System Hazards,

I RECOMMENDATION: 1. Change "qualified operator" to " trained operator".

2. Add a new condi t ion unde r (a) for h igh tempera ture of hea ted oil as follows: "10. High tempera tu re of hea ted oil." SUBSTANTIATION: 1. See Recommenda t ion and Substantiat ion on Commi t tee Proposal 8501 - 19 (Log #CP8).

2. When the t empera tu re of the oil gets too ho t it can create an explosion, or cou ldf lash in the burne-r, leading to an unstable situation. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP13) 8501- 33 - (6-5.l.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Teclmical-C.ommittee on Boiler Combust ion System Hazards,

t RECOMMENDATION: Change "qualified operator" to "trained operator". SUBSTANTIATION: See Recommenda t ion and Substant iat ion on Commit tee Proposal 8501 - 19 (Log #GP8). COMMITI"EE ACTION: Accept. " NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 N O T RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP27) 8501- 34 - (6-6.6 Line 5): Accept SUBMITTER: Teclmical Commit tee on Boiler Combust ion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: 1. Add a new Section 6-6.6 Line 5 to read as follows:

(Operator Function) "5. Perform a post purge of the boiler enclosure. T h e dura t ion of the post purge shall be no less than 15 seconds at an airflow rate no t exceeding that at which the unit was shut down°" (Interlock Function) "None."

2. R e n u m b e r subsequen t sections as necessary. SUBSTANTIATION: See Substantiation on Commit tee Proposal 8501 - 24 (Log #CP23). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP28) 8501- 35 - (6-6.7 Line 3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commit tee on Boiler Combust ion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: 1. Add a new Section 6-6.7 Line 3 to read as follows:

(Opera tor Funct ion) "3. Per form a post purge of the boiler enclosure. The dura t ion o f the post purge shall be no less than 15 seconds at an airflow rate no t exceeding that at which t h e uni t was shu t down." (Interlock Funct ion) "None."

2. R e n u m b e r subsequen t sections as necessary. SUBSTANTIATION: See Substantiat ion on Commit tee Proposal 8501 - 24 (Log #CP23). COMMITFEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITFEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 N O T RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williasns

(Log #CP29) 8501- 36 - (6-7.6 Line 2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t tee on Boiler Combust ion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: 1. Add a new Section 6-7.6 Line 2 to read as follows:

(Operator Function) "2. Perform a post purge of the boiler enclosure. The dura t ion of the post purge shall be no less than 15 seconds at an airflow rate not exceeding that at which the unit was shu t down." (Interlock Function) "None."

2. R e n u m b e r subsequen t sections as necessary. SUBSTANTIATION: See Substantiation on Commit tee Proposal 8501 - 24 (Log #CP23). COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP14) 8501- 37 - (7-4.3.1): Accept SUBMITI'ER: Technical Commit tee on Boiler Combust ion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: Add a new condi t ion for h igh tempera ture of hea ted oil as follows: "(d) High tempera ture o f hea ted oil." SUBSTANTIATION: W h e n the tempera ture of the oil gets too hot it can create an explosion, or could flash in the burner , l eading to an unstable situation. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 N O T RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #17) 8501- 38 - (7-4.3.3(f)): Accept SUBMITTER: Dale E. Dressel, Monsanto Company

I E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Change to read: "Low water level as de t e rmined by the auxiliary low water cutout."

SUBSTANTIATION: The line should read die same as Sections 6- 4.2.7(a) (6), 6-4.2.7,b) (6) and 6-7.8(g). COMMrITEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

260

NFPA 8501 - - A97 ROP

(Log #CP15) 8501- 39 - (7-4~&4): Accept S ~ Technical Committee on Boiler Combustion System H a z a ~ . . -

~ A N T / A T I O N : Low temperature already covered by Section 7-4.3.1. COMMtTIT~ ACTION: Accept. ~ o s c o M M r r r ~ m ~ s ~J~C~LETOVOT~ 15 VOTE ON C ~ ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 C~ayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, W'dliam~

~" (Log #CP16) 8501- 40 - (10-1): Accept SUBMITTER: TechniCal Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards~

[ R.ECOMMENDATION: Revise Section 10-1 as follows: ...their activating impulses, ~ ~ L..r~. ;.~: ~. . t ~ ,~ L.. ~,.i~,-g.... •

~t.,.:.~;2;qs ,:.,...,,E~, ,,~ ~l :.;,.,.~. a Ss~stematic and thorougfi idspection and maintenance ~.~ ;~.~.~,~ ~ • SUBSTANTIATION: Clarifies the C'ommittee intent and makes the

the.an ON: A ~ L

NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontalne~ Williams

(Log #CP17) 5 ~ 2 . 3 ) : Accept

Technical Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards, ~ ~

I RECOMMENDATION: Remove the word more .and replace the words "are required with "shall be peyformed". SUBSTANTIATION. ~ Action makes the paragraph a requirement, not a recommendation.

OMMITrEE ACTION: Accept. UMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15

VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 0 a y t o o , Del~cy, La~ntalne, W'dliams

(Log t~-'P18) 8501-42- (10-3): Accept • SUBMI ' r rE~ Technical Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: 1. Replace the words "it is essential that ~ with the word "the".

2. Add ~shall" between "tests ~ and ~'be ~. SUBSTAITrIATION: Clmnges are fro" conformance with the Manual of Style. ' COMMrITEEACTION: Accept. " NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBEltS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMrrTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: I1 NOT RETURNED: 4 (~aymn, DeLacy, Lafontalne, Williams

(Log #14) 8501- 43 - ( Entire Document): Accept in Principle 8UBMITTEI~ Dale E. Dr~sel, MonSanto Compai~y RECOMMENDATION: Execute a word search of the document and change "boiler-furnace" to either "furnace" or *boiler ~ (as appropriate) wherever located in the document. (17 instances by n ~ count). " . ' . "

SUBST .A.N'rIATION: Ap .par_e_ntly there has been some c~nfusion in interpreting tl3e term (in~.luding comment f romthe NFPA 86 Ovem ana vurnaces Gommittees). TI~ 8502 committee eliminated the term in the 1995 edition of NFPA 8502. C O - - A C T I O N : A_~ept in principle. -- 1 . ~ e tioiler-furnaces to '~oilers" in the following section~ 14 o r e w o r n -

Section 1-1.I Section t-2.1

2. Clmnge ~boHer-furuace" to ~boiler ~ in the following sec.~m- Section I:~.4 (2 places) - .~.- Section 2-t.2 (2 places) Section 2-1.$ Section 2-1.5 (2 places) Section 2-0.1 (b) Chapters definition of"Burner Management System" ~emon 7-2(b) (2) * . . 3. Change "boiler-furnaces to ~furnace in the following section~

Section ~ 1--2.2 • Section 2-1.4 (2 places)

4. In Chapter 5, (~tange title of definition of'Boiler-Furnace Endomre" to "Boiler E~dmure"

COMMrrrgE S T A ~ : Committee editorially, defined.aft locatiom of the occurrence, and .clmng.ed them-m to "furnace" in two places, to correlate with the definKiom found in NFPA 8502.

oF ¢OMMrFI~ ~ gLIGmLE TO VOT~ 15 VOTE ON C O ~ ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: II NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #1 I) S 8 5 0 ~ t i r s t e p h e Document): Accept in Principle

en W. Lear, VAMC ~ T I O N : Add new text

Emerge.. ~ ~mt down device. All mfdtipl_e unit powerboiler plants~should have an emergency

shut down device on each individual boiler burner, management system; Activation of the device by the operator should initiate a safety shut d0w~by_ de-energizi~ the beffnef management system, caula~g, the safetyshutotffu~l valves to dose. This device should be ins talh/d on both single and duel fuel units, and should cause all fuel valves m dose. It should be remotely located from the units, as in the control room where it may be reached safely bythe operator in case of emergency. It should activate by being pushed raffler than

lied. ~Uu~ANTIATION: Requiring this device on all systems would im~ove p ~ t uLfety m other mgchinery and operating personnel. It would ago allowthe safetyshutdo~vn of a single unit flue to emergencies that cannot be monitored byautora~on, especially, use roll in facifides that requ~e non-disrupted s tore producuon such as nospit~, and large m~.. UfaCturing prorcesl~., should also be applied tO m i n u t e mimer ooilerL tl-~e term'uni t - rexers m boiler. • My pr@~.__, is based on 22+ ye'~m experience as a boiler plant operator, USN, TVA, D.O.D. ~ad V.A. rangi0g fimm 5,000"lb/hr generation at 40 P.S.L to over 250,000 Ib/Fu:~t 1500 P.S.I., super h¢ ¢atedand non super heated unim. Many times I have seen the n e~12or _such__ a d ~ m m e plants have them and some don't. ~ _ t ~ ACr lu r , : Accept in Princil~. e.

I R~¢ge " se~io~ 4-s~z. ~.h): ~yadd~ the fouowing ~te~ce: eor boilers 16cated imlde a structure, an additiofial switch shall be

located outside t h e b o ~ r room, and shall be d_ _early identified." C O M M r I ' r l ~ b ' r P , ~ : All boilers should have aswitch near the door, r e g a ~ e ~ of the number of unitt, i n the room/plant. NUMBER OF C ~ MI~BERS ELIGIBL~ TO VOTE: 15 VOTZ ON COMMr/ ' r I~ ACTION." AFFIRMATIVE: I0

RETURNED~ 4 .£~a~___n~DeLacy, Lafuntalne, W'dliams EXI~uANATION OF NEC~TiV~ ALVEY: I am strongly opl3o~ed m the Committee Action on this

comment for two 1. P . l ac~ a trip switch outside the structure invites unauthorized

tripping ~ any i~uterby unless it is .p~ocked or otherwise wotectea, in wliid~ case i t wou!d probably be useless in a real

2 .eme~?~mmit tee Actiondoes riot a~pear to be related to the Submitter's concerns, ~ should hd completely satisfied with the requirements of paragraph 4-5.2.2(h ).

(Log #CP30) 8501- 45 - (A-1-2.2): ACcept . • S ~ Technical Committee on Boiler Combustion System ~ d s , I ~ ~ T I O N : Add a new Section A,1-2.2 as follows: A-1-2.2 &lthough NOg and other emissions during start-up and

extremely low-load operation are low** they might not comply with increasinglymj'ngentemimion limits. ~ o n from the light-off p r o c e ~ r e , l>urgel a~! minlmam airflow requirements defined in ttm standard to meetthese limimiS not recommended. There are imu~icient data and operatlt~g experience to justify changes tO this

SUI~rANTIA~ON: Incre~inStystrlngent environmen~ regulatiom are ¢reat i~mfety p r ~ that aeed t0 be addresse~

N U M B n t OF C ~ MID~Htlg~ I~IGIBLE TOVOTR: 15 VOTE ON CoM]M/X' r~ ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNE~. 4 0 a y t o n , DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

8501- 46 - (A-2-7.B.1 ~(e)): ~ Accept SUBMITTE~ Tech~cal Co/a/nittee on Boiler Combustion System H a z a r ~

e'burner cootrol system" t o ' b u r n e r management s~jstem'. SUBSTANTIATION: Proper terminology. C, OMMITrEE ACTION" Accept.

261

N F P A 8501 m A97 R O P

NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBEKS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

(Log #CP22) 8501- 47 - (Figure A-4-1.8): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Boiler Combustion System Hazards, RECOMMENDATION: In Figure A-4-1.8, add a new high oil temperature switch "G" between instruments "U" and "G" and line item description G ,as shown below and on tile attached artwork.

"G High oil temperature switch (not appliicable for unheated oil)"

SUBSTANTIATION: Added requirements for high oil temperature indication for Sections 6-2.4.7, 6-2.4.8 and 7-4.3.1 m Committee Proposal 8501 - 27 (Log #CP10), Committee Proposal 8501 - 32 (Log #CPI2) and Committee Proposal 8501 - 37 (Log #CP14). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 15 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: l l NOT RETURNED: 4 Clayton, DeLacy, Lafontaine, Williams

Clearing J line

:z T

S R U G F ,

Oil . ~ ~ supply ~ZTZ

( ~ / ( ~ Oil N \ , , j burner , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,

Ato iz,ng • ' medium V-I supply W Z

Alternate T r ~ a p atomizing medium supply Drain

A Safety. shutoff valve, spring closing (NC) B Oil recimulation valve atomizing (NO)

(optional for unheated oil) D Oil flow control valve F Low oil temperature switch (not applicable for unheated oil) G High oil temperature switch (not applicable for unheated oil) I Closed position interlock on safety shutoff valve

J Atomizing medium differential control valve L Automatic atomizing medium shutoff valve M Oil meter (optional) N Low atomizing medium pressure switch 0 Oil strainer P Atomizing medium flow interlock differential switch, or pressure interlock switch R Low pressure switch S Pressure gauge T Manual shutoff valve U Oil temperature gauge (optional for unheated oil) W Atomizing medium strainer X Low fire start switch Y Atomizing medium flow orifice Z Check valve

Safety shutdown interlocks (not shown) Flame detector (s) Excessive steam pressure interlock Auxiliary low water cut-off (one required) Combustion air supply interlock

* Caution: Means shall be provided to prevent or relieve excess pressure between these valves

Figure A-4-1.8 Typical fuel and atomizing medium supply systems and safety controls for oil burner.

262

N F P A 8 5 0 3 1 A 9 7 R O P

P ~ T H

(Log #1 ) 8503- 1 - (1-1): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: T h o m ~ B. Hamil ton, Winston Salem, NC RECOMMENDATION: Change Scope to agree with Technical Correlat ing Commit tee Proposal. Also change last line to read:

" . . .where pressure c~m be relieved by fuel being bu rned or collected in a device bu ih in accord,'mce with dais standard." SUBSTANTIATION: First sen tence to comply with o ther NFPA 8500 standards. Second sentence removes a vent as primary emphas is on pressure relief. COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Change scope s t a t emen t to read as follows: 1-1.1 This s tandard shall apply to pulverized fuel systems, beg inn ing

with the raw fuel bunke r ahead of the pulverizer a n d the point at which primary air enters the pulverizing system, and terminat ing at the point where pressure can be relieved by fuel being bu rned or collected in a device built in accordance with dais s tandard. T he pulverized fuel system is def ined to include the pr imary air ducts ups t ream of thepulver ize r to a po in t where pressure can be relieved by application o f a a~itable vent or o ther means. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Change to first l ine was for compli- ance with Manual of Slyle. Proposed text was moved, and accurately reflects the in tent of the submlt ter . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 12 N O T RETURNED: 4 Gardner , Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

(Log #2) 8503- 2 - (1-2.4): Accept SUBMITTER: T h o m a s B. Hamilton, Winston Salem, NC

I RECOMMENDATION: Change second reference from: "2-6.1, 2- 6.2, and 2-6.3" to "2-5.1 and 2-5.2". SUBSTANTIATION: Systems are def ined in 2-5 no t 2-6. COMMI'VrEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 12 NOT RETURNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

(Log #11) 8503- 3 - (1-3.2.1): Accept

SUBMITTERa J o h n C. deRuyter, DuPon t Co. I RECOMMENDATION: Delete "coal flow" so it reads:

"... coal seams may canse interrupt ions in coal flow," SUBSTANTIATION: R e d u n d a n t words. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 12 N O T RETURNED: 4 C, ardner , Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

(Log #3) 8503- 4 - (I-4): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: T h o m a s B. Hamil ton, Winston Salem, NC RECOMMENDATION: Check definit ions to be compatible with NFPA 8502.

Consider application of test procedures for Dus tdgh t Valves. SUBSTANTIATION: Definiuons shou ld he un i form in NFPA 8500 series standards. COMMITrEEACTION: Accept in Principle.

1. In the definit ion of Seal Air, change the word "preventing" to , "min i mizing".

2. Add the following ,definitions: Alarm. An audible or visible signal indicating an off-standard or

abnormal condit ion. Alteration. A change or modification in a pulverized fuel system or

subsystem dlat results in a deviation f rom the original design specifications or criteria. Repair. A process that re turns the pulverized fue l system or subsystem to its origin:d design specifications or criteria.

5. Cha~ge the definit ion of Burner to read as follows: Burner. A device or group of devices for the int roduct ion of fuel

and air into a furnace ztt the velocities, turbulence, and concentra- tion necessary to mainta in ignition and combust ion of the fuel within the fi~rnace.

4. Editorially correct tile reference of NFPA 85C in the definit ion of Igniter.

COMMITI'EE STATEMENT: Definitions added to be consistent with NFPA 8502. Test criteria for dust t ight valves is inappropriate because no relevant s tandards exisL NUMBER OF COMMrVrEE MEMBFARS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NEGATIVE: 1 N O T RETURNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert. Taylor

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: PATEL: Auxiliary Air. Air or inert gas suppl ied f rom an auxiliary

source ~ to mainta in a m i n i m u m fuel mixture velocity in the burner piping or to orovide bu rne r coolin~. Repair. A process ffaat corrects an abnornlai condit ion and or

re turns the pulverized fuel system or subsystem to its des ign specification or criteria.

Dust Tight Valve: Commi t tee shou ld investigate dus t t ight valve s tandards a n d adopt one for m i n i m u m compliance.

(Log #12) 8503- 5 - (1-4 Inert Gas (New)): Accept SUBMITTER: J o h n C. deRuyter, DuPon t Co. RECOMMENDATION: Add a definit ion for "Inert Gas" as given in NFPA 68:

Inert Gas. A gas which is noncombust ib le , nonreactive, and incapable of suppor t ing combus t ion with the contents of the system be ingpro tec ted . SUBSTANTIATION: The term "Inert Gas" is used several t imes in the s tandard with no definition. COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 12 NOT RETURNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

(Log #13) 8503- 6 - (Figure 2-5.1.1 (b)): Accept SUBMITTER: J o h n C. deRuyter, DuPont Co. RECOMMENDATION: Add "Temper ing Air" with an arrow at the t emper ing air line.

(See Figure 2-5.1.1 (b) on page 264.) SUBSTANTIATION: Text omission - will make similar to o ther figures. COMMITYEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITrEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 12 N O T RETURNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

(Log #14) 8503- 7 - (Figure 2-5.1.1 (b)): Accept SUBMI'VFER: J o h n C. deRuyter, DuPon t Co. RECOMMENDATION: Add words to the figure tide to read: "Direct-fir ing pulverized fuel ho t primary, air fan system for suct ion

furrlace." SUBSTANTIATION: Words n e e d e d for more descript ion and to be consistent with other figures. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 12 N O T RETURNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

(Log #15) 8503- 8 - (Figure 2-5.1.1(e)): Accept SUBMITrER: J o h n C. deRuyter, DuPont Co. RECOMMENDATION: Add.words "Raw Fuel Feeder" with an arrow point ing to the feeder.

(See Figure 2-5.1.1 (e) on page 264.) SUBSTANTIATION: Omission. Required to be consistent with o ther figures. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accep~ NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 12 NOT RETURNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

263

N F P A 8503 m A 9 7 R O P

Raw fuel bunker N ,

Raw fuel gate

Hot air \ shutoff damper

Hot air or flue gas

Hot air

Tempering air ~ " ~ control damper

Tempering air ~ . / / ' /r

air / ~ " J, Tempering shutoff damper ¥

Auxiliary air ~ control damper

Auxiliary air ~

Raw fuel feeder

y air

Dust-tighl valve

/ /Burner

I Feeder

X [ ~ piping J

Jtoff d a m p e r / ( ~ J ~ I I ~ I Primary air " ~ ) - - - ~ l I - - - ~ \ control damper ~ Barrier

Primary ] valve air fan

Pulverizer

Suction furnace

Other fuels

Figure 2-5.1.1 (b) Direct-firing pulverized fuel system for suction furnace.

Raw fuel storage bunker

% / j Raw fuel gates EZP

Primary air control damper

Tempering \ air control

Secondary damper / / " ~ air heater Tempering

~.) J ~ air shutoff J - - . r \

For J,4 I I burners

draft fan ~ . I [ Hot air control ~.------'--"~ damper

F Raw fuel feeder

| Dust-tight ~ furnace

i | Pulverizer | I

. ~ " Other Feeder fuels discharge piping

Hot air shutoff damper

~ " Primary' air heater

Primary air fan

Figure 2-5.1.1 (e) Direct-firing pulverized fuel cold primary air fan system for pressure furnace. 264

NFPA 8503 - - A97 ROP

(Log #16) 8503- 9 - (Fignre 2-5.1.2): Accept SUBMITTERg John C. deRnyter, DuPont Co. RECOMMENDATION:

Move "Note: ~ ,Single Pulverize

or Exhanster" Out of the "No Valves" column and place it in die bottom box next

to "Barrier Valves ~ 7 " and "Dust Tight Valves

SUBSTANTIATION: The note is applicable to all parts of the figure and in its present location appears applicable to the "No Valves" column only. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept.

Editorially delete "Note:" NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 12 NOT RETURNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

(Log #17) 8503- 10- (2-5.1.2.2 Note): Reject SUBMITTER: John C deRuyter, DuPont Co. RECOMMENDATION: Add a parenflledcal definition of quick closing, eg., "...be quick closing (up to 2 seconds)." SUBSTANTIATION: Some time limit should be given to minimize closing time. . COMMITrEE ACTION: Reject. COMMI'I"rEE STATEMENT: This is not a practical limitation,

~ ven current technologies. UMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16

VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: PATEL: NOTE: It is r e c o m m e n d e d that one or both valves

described in 2-5.1.2.1 and 2-5.1.2.2 be automated (remotely ¢00t ro l led /and quick closing.

NO VALVES

Single source of fuel; no individual I:~+rners OFF (See 2-5.1,2,9)

(a)

f ' ~ ~ furnace

(b) _

r~_ e

SUCTION FURNACE

Multiple source of luel

(c) ~ _

•

t , ~ O t h e r fuel

Divider

< Exhauster

-2 (d) • ~,

t ~ t ¢ o ~

Pulvefiz~

(e) ~ -

2 fuell

One or more burners OFF; connection to more than one furnace or multiple connection to one burner

|

t

,---~.~' ~therfue,s (g)

i , ~ t ~

,vvyv,

(h) < 2 "~ " S,

I L___~T"a Olher (i) ~ luell

t t ~ " l - ~ ° : : r

Valves interlocked

PRESSURE FURNACE

Multiple source of fuel

u> , H Z I ~ -

t "~---

fuell

(k)

I .',t ~t~::~

tt , ,.,.-~..

Single Barrier valves 7 Dust-tight valves pulverizer or exhauster

Figure 2-5.1.2 Direct-firlng pulverized fuel systems valve requirements in burner piping.

265

N F P A 8 5 0 3 m A 9 7 R O P

(Log #21) 8503- 11 - (Figure 2-5.2.1 (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: John C. deRuyter, DuPont Co. RECOMMENDATION: Add a new figure as shown below and modify the text accordinglyz SUBSTANTIATION: The new figure gives an example of an acceptable system with no vent fan and with an exhauster for a suction furnace. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

1. Editorially change figure reference to 2-5.2.1 (g). 2. In Section 2-5.2.1, change "...Figures 2-5.2.1 (a) through (f)." to

...Figures 2-5.2.1 (a) through (g)." 3. In Section 2-5.2.2.1 change "...Figures 2-5.2.1 (a) and (d) through

I (f)." to "...Figures 2-5.2.1(a) and (c) through (g)." 4. In Section 2-5.2.2.2 change "...Figures 2-5.2.1 (c), (d) and (e)." to

"...Figures 2-5.2.1 (c), (d), (e) and (g). 5. In Section 2-5.2.2.5 change "...Figures 2-5.2.1 (c) through (f)." to

...Figures 2-5.2.1 (a) and (c) through (g)." COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Correct references to figures. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 12 NOT RETURNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

~ ~ g R Raw fuel bunker

~ fuel

Relief vent

T Cyclone

~ Pressure lock

~ ] • Pulverized fuel bin J ~ vent and dust collector

[ -~r i ~ Racwlefue. ~ " V Pulverized fuel bin

/ Pulverized fuel gate

. ° , . , t l ...... ~ll / / JJ~-~empering/~ air Exhauster

Hot air ---'-'~/ /~ 4E--- shutoff damper ~ \ , ~ ,

/ \ \Tempering I I/"/ --/" I HOnt~r ~k' control .L [IF/.

Check vaive " / J ol armer • V / . Vent contr°l valve ~ ~¢J damper t-------~ \ r7 P i ~

He,=, . . I f . - . \ ~/.,~. Suction / / ' ~, ,.~ ) J~ ~ I.-~,,,'~/ furnace

Hot air shutoff dalwOor/~/ ~ y Po~tin~r~ar I~rlar ~/. Hot air control damper j x air fan ~"/

Auxiliary air / ~( control valve /

Auxiliary air inlet

Figure 2-5.2.1

266

N F P A 8 5 0 3 - - A 9 7 R O P

(Log #18) 8503- 12 - (Figure 2-5.2.1 (a)): Accept SUBMITTER: Jo lm C. deRuyter, Dut 'ont Co.

I RECOMMENDATION: Add "Tempering Air" to the arrow pointing to the temper ing air line. (See Figure 2-5.2.1 (a) shown below.) SUBSTANTIATION: Text omission. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 12 NOT RETURNED: ~' Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

(Log #20) 8503- 13- (Figure 2-5.2.1(b)): Accept SUBMITTER: John CL deRuyter, DuPotat Co. RECOMMENDATION: Add words to the figure title to read:

"Pulverized fuel stova.ge firing system for nressure furnace." SUBSTANTIATION: Additional descriptibn to be consistent with other figures in the sumdard. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: PATEL: Add words to the figure to read: "Pulverized fuel storage

firing system for pressnre furnace". Figures 2-5.2.1(a) (c) (d) (e) (0 (g) Consider adding "for suction furnace" to above ment ioned figures.

This will be consistent with Figure 2-5.2.1 (b) final version.

(Log #19) 8503- 14- (2-5.2.2.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: John C. deRuyter, DuPont Co. RECOMMENDATION: Change bracketed information to read:

"[See Figures 2-5.2.1(a) and (c) d t rough (f)]." SUBSTANTIATION: Correction Figure (c) also applies to suction furnaces. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on Proposal 8503 - 11 (Log #21), ~hich incorporates this r e commenda ton . NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 12 NOT RETIJRNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

(Log #4) 8503- 15 - (2-6.1.4): Accept in Principle in Part SUBMITTER: Thomas B. Hamilton, Winston Salem, NC RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

2-6.1.4 The components falling within the requirements of 2-6.1.1, 2-6.1.2 and 2-6.1.3 for a direct fired system shall begin at a point 2 ft (0.61 m) above the inlet of the raw fuel feeder, a t t h e inlet of the hot and tempering air supply ducts to individual pulverizers, and at the seal air connections to the pulverizer system and shall end at the discharge of the pulverizer, external classifier, or exhauster. These shall include, but are not limited to the following: (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) Dampers, damper frames, expansion joints and hot primary air fans. SUBSTANTIATION: This ductworK is exposed to explosion pressures from the pulverizer and experience has shown this equipment to cause serious injuries in pulverizer explosions. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle in Part.

Revise text as follows: "2-6.1.4 The components falling within fl~e requirements of 2-6.1.1,

2-6.1.2 and 2-6.1.5 for a direct fired system shallbegin at a point 2 ft (0.61 m) above the inlet of the raw fuel feeder, at the point of connect ion of ductwork to the pulverizer, and at the seal air connections to the pulverizer system and shall end at the discharge of the pulverizer, external classifier, or exbauster. These shall include, but are not limited to the following:"

Note that present subsections (a) through (e) remain unchanged. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Dampers, damper frames, expansion

joints, and hot primary air fans are covered in Section 2-6.1.6. Cbange in wording for clarification of terminal points. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 12 NOT RETURNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

8503- 16 - (2-6.2): Reject (Log #5) SUBMITTER: Thomas B. Hamilton, Winston Salem, NC RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

2-6.1 Piping. The pulverized fuel piping from the outlet oft_he equipment def ined in 2-6.1.4 shall be designed to withstand an internal explosion pressure of 200 psig (1376 kPa) for containment of possible explosion pressures. SUBSTANTIATION: Tests have shown explosion pressures to exceed 50 psig in the fuel piping. COMMITrEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITrEE STATEMENT: The standard focuses on the prevention of explosions, ra ther than conta inment of them. The Committee believes that safety procedures and safety interlocks are now more common, therefore, reducing the need for these design criteria.

Pulverized Bin vent Feeder fuel bin / "

" discharge _ . . Vent dust Vent ~ ? . / pipinn Haw Tuel collector / ~. p

" t bunker \ Z" ~ I Burner Vent fan Hot air control\ ~. . . - I , ~ /1-- - - [ X ~ Suction

damper I ~ \ / Raw Cyclone ~ I ~'7 / k ] ~ furnace fuel

Hot air I \ \ //,ale \,. ;L,I ]' / . \ kulve,zed or flue gas / ~ $=d t¢ ~ ~ q I / \ / fuel / It, y..

\ t \ T • ~ ) I Pulvedzed \ / / g a l e / \ . ~ / / / / Tempering ~ , ~ I ~ I I I Raw ~ I I !uel ~ , ,

damper feeder ~ , Barrier valve

/ - - - - r " ~ , Primary air Ternpering/~r~( t~, ~ ' ~ Press/uure ~ '~ / Primar~y "" Porir~olYd~mper / " '~ : ~ I I lock ~ ~ir~"

Pulvedzer air ~ - " ~ ~ control damper \ I Pulvedzed

X Pulverizer fuel pump

Pulvedzer air fan

Note: Pulverizer fan or vent fan may not be required.

F'tgure 2-5.2.1 (a) Pulverized fuel storage firing system.

267

N F P A 8503 - - A 9 7 R O P

NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 12 NOT RETURNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

(Log #9) 8503- 17- (2-6.2.3): Accept SUBMITTER: ILR. Piepho, Babcock & Wilcox Company RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows:

"Sliding or telescoping expansion joints requiring more than 1/2 in. (12.7 ram) total travel shall not be used." SUBSTANTIATION: Telescoping expansion joints have been used in vertical runs of pipe near the entry to the respective burners to accommodate vertical expansion of the boiler furnace. This ar rangement requires rigid support of piping upstream from the joints and support of downstream piping by the burner. In practice, it is impractical to provide sufficient s trength in the pipe supports or the burners to resist ,axial separating forces from an air-coal explosion. The reqttired rigidity of the supports makes the use of mecbanical restraints witlfin the jo in t impossible. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 9 NEGATIVE: 3 NOT RETURNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: COWDRICK: Please accept dais change in myvote on the subject

proposal from affirmative to negative. During the meet ing when we reviewed the subject proposal, insufficient information was available for me to evaluate it. It was p rnden t at the time to accept the proposal, subject to filrther review during the next phase of the standard revision process. In tbe interim, you have sent out the reasons for Negative, Affirmative Comments, and other votes which included statements that indicate tbe telescoping joints whicb were in question are designed in accordance with the stand,'u'ds require- ments and have been used successfiflly in many applications, including 100 unit years of operating experience. Based on this new information, I am changing my vote to negative for this proposal.

DOHERTY: The proposal is a direct challenge to one type of design that falls within the NFPA 8503 Standard. We believe this change to the standard is not warranted. We have reviewed tbe pet~'ormance of telescoping joints and have

found no instance where these joints have separated due to a pulverizer explosion. Burner line telescoping joints are designed for a minimum 50 psig explosion pressure as def ined in 2.6.1.1. This design provides a sohdion to handle the vertical expansion of the ste,'un generator and has served the industry very well. This conclusion is based on approximately 100 unit years of operating experience.

KUKOSKI: For your information and action I am submitting a vote against Proposal No. 8503-17, Log No. 9, Article 2-

6.2.3. Tiffs type of pipe expansion jo in t has operated successfully in many applications over the past 25 to 30 years. It provides the designer with a practical solution to accommodate axial expansion in 13iping systems. The designer should have the flexibility, along wire the responsibility, to be able to choose any reasonable design especially if proven by experience. Tbe original proposal is subjective, targeting a specific expansion jo in t design style that meets the intent o f t b e NFPA guidelines.

(Log #10) 8503- 18 - (2-6.6.1 Exception (New)): Accept SUBMITTER: [)ale E. Dressel, Monsanto Company

I RECOMMENDATION: Add an exception to the referenced section as follows:

Exception: Raw coal bunkers of concrete construction are acceptable. SUBSTANTIATION: Per te lephone conversations with the Committee Cbairman, it was not the intent of the Committee to exclude the use of a concrete raw coal bunker (silo). As revised in this proposal, PVC and other combustible pipe materials for the Pculverized coal system would still be prohibited.

OMMrVI'EE ACTI ON: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

F_,XPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: PATEL: Consider deleting ferrous material requirement. "Materials used shall satisfy the strength requirements of 2-6.1 at

temperatures normally encountered in the service of the equipment and capable of withstanding the conditions that gould occur during abnormal incidents, such as nulverized fuel fires.

(Log #6) 8503- 19 - (2-6.6.5): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Thomas B. Hamilton, Winston Salem, NC RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

2-6.6.5 The justification of new materials or improved methods that may be developed shall be the responsibility of the designer. If such materials and methods shall be used for the design of pulver- ized fuel systems components , they shall meet the requirements of 2- 6.1, 2-6.2 and 2-6.6.1. SUBSTANTIATION: Materials shall be "ferrous materials." COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Instead of the submitter 's wording, add the following sentence: "Tbe materials used shall be capable of withstanding the conditions

that could occur during abnormal incidents, such as pulverized fuel fires." COMMITTEE STATEMENT: In the application of new materials, it is important that the designer consider all operating conditions° NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 12 NOT RETURNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

(Log #7) 8503- 20 - (3-2.1.5): Accept "SUBMITTER: Thomas B. Hamilton, Winston Salem, NC RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

"Operation of the pulverizer-burner system with less than the lull complement of burners served by a pulverizer sball be avoided unless the system is specified designed for such operation. If not so designed extra precautions shall be used in isolating out of service burners." SUBSTANTIATION: It is sometimes necessary to operate systems with burners out of service and to prohibit such use is not advisable but cautions are required. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accepu Accept submitter 's wording, except editorially cbange "...is

specified..." to "...is specifically..." COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Editorial for correction. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 11 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: PATEL: "Operation of the pulverizer-burner system with less than

the full complement of burners served by a pulverizer shall be avoided unless the system is specifically designed for such operation. ff not so designed extra precautions shall be taken per the manufacturer 's recommendat ions when isolating out of service burners."

(Log #8) 8503- 21 - (5-4): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Thomas B. Hamilton, Winston Salem, NC RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

5-4 Firing Systems for Rotary Kilns. 5-4.1 Direct Firing System - Description. Add: 5-4.4 Semi-Direct Firing System Description (see 5-2). 5-4._ Storage System for Rotary Kiln Firing - Description (see 2-

5.2). SUBSTANTIATION: Rotary kiln firing systems are increasingly using Semi-Direct and Storage Systems. COMMI'I~fEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Revise Section 5-4 as follows: 5-4 Firing Systems for Rotary Kilns. 5-4.1 Direct-Firing System - Description. 5-4.1.1 This system is a form of direct firing. [See 2-5.1 and Figures

5-4(a) and 5-4(b).] The only special equipment is a dust collector with pressure lock for cleaning hot air or gas (optional).

(See Figures 5-4(a) and 5-4(b) shown on the following pages.) 5-4.1.1.1 Isolation Requirements. 5-4.1.1.1.1 Wben a bypass air system is used, a bypass control

damper shall be installed. 5-4.1.1.1.2 Temper ing damper shall be installed near the kiln hood

to protect the hot gas duct. 5-4.1.2 Operation.

268

N F P A 8503 m A 9 7 R O P

5-4.1.2.1 Starting Sequence. The starting sequence shall be as follows. (See 3-3.1.)

(a) Start pressure lock. (b) Start the primary air fan or exhauster. (c) Start air heaters, if furnished. (d) Start die pulverizer. (e) Start dae raw filel feeder. (f) Adjust primary air and fuel to desired value. 5-4.1.2.2 Normal Operation (see 3-3.2). 5-4.1.2.3 Normal Shutdown. Normal shutdown procedure shall be

as follows. (a) Shut offhot air. (b) When pulverizer is cool, stop raw filel feeder. (c) When pulverizer is empty, stop pulverizer. (d) Stop primary air fan or exhauster. (e) Stop pressure lock. 5-4.1.3 Interlocking (see 2-7.1 and 2-7.2). 5.4.2 Semi-Direct Firing System Description (See Section 5-2). 5-4.3 Storage System for Rotary Kiln Firing - Description (See

Section 2-5.2). COMMITI'EE STATEMENT: Changes were for completeness and compliance wida the Manual of Style. N U M B E R O F COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 16 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 12 NOT RETURNEr): 4 Gardner, Keiser, Seibert, Taylor

- - Pulv. Air Control Damper

Optional Air Heater

I I

_ J

IN

~-- Raw Fuel

G a t e ~ /

FR:edeFrUal'~

-]

F e e d e r ~ D ischarge Piping r

Cold Air -

DUl l Collector

Cold Air Control Damper

Hot Air (or Gas) Control Damper

Press. Lock

Cold Air Inlet Damper o r - - Register I

Primary Air Fan

Bypass Control

Optional Damper Air Bypass

Pulv.

Firing Hood or Cooler

Rotary Kiln

Figure 5-4(a) Direct-fired pulverized fuel systems for rotary kilns.

269

N F P A 8 5 0 3 - - A 9 7 R O P

-- Raw Fuel B in

Raw Fuel Gate

Ho t Air (or Gas) Con t ro l Damper

Cold A i r

= Op t iona l Air Heater

\ - L J

Pulv. Air Con t ro l Damper

Bypass

Cold A i r D a m p e r

Dust Co l lec tor

Raw Fuel Feeder

Press. ~" Lock

r E xhauster

Bypass Cont ro l Damper \

Feeder D~scharge Pip ing

Suctior~ Pulver izer

Hood or Cooler

Figure 5-4(b) Direct-fired pulverized fuel systems for rotary kilns.

Cold Ai r I nlet Damper or Register

I Ro ta ry j K i l n

270