North Korea Energy Profile

North Korea In the Dark:

An Analysis of a Country in Energy Crisis

Chris Leishear

New York University, November 20, 2012

Global Electricity Markets, Professor Jonathan McClelland

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld brought North Korea’s barren darkness and

the paucity of economic activity to light during a 2002 briefing in which he displayed a

satellite image of the Korean peninsula at night, stating “ South Korea is filled with lights

and energy and vitality and a booming economy; North Korea is dark”. Indeed while the rest

of the world was literally aglow against the dark backdrop of night, the northern half of the

Korean peninsula, a 120,538 square kilometer1 area nearly the size of England, was “as

vacant as the oceans2”. A weak glow could be seen for Pyongyang, the capital, but little else.

What scant electricity that is generated and distributed, is unfortunately, the

provenance of the government elite and the military; the vast majority of the country’s 24.6

million citizens3 receive little in the way of electricity. Entire villages vanish into the dusk 4.

Outsiders see the void and think of remote villages of Africa, the Amazon or southeast Asia,

where the civilizing hand of electricity has yet to reach. But North Korea “is not an

undeveloped country; it is a country that has fallen out of the developed world”5.

At some point in the future, the regime of this isolated Communist state, currently led

by the dictator Kim Jeong Un, the grandson of the “hermit kingdom’s” founding father Kim

Il Sung, will collapse upon itself. Or, perhaps in a game of brinkmanship gone too far, the

regime may topple from the outside. Regardless, the purpose of this paper is not to speculate

on the geopolitical future of North Korea, but rather to assess the current status of energy

production, specifically electricity generation. A brief history of energy production,

development and policy will be followed by two potential alternatives towards the

construction of a more viable energy (and economic) future. For whether the regime opens

up to Western investment and aid, collapses from within (or from without), a massive

undertaking will be required to bring the country in from the cold and dark to achieve energy

parity with the rest of the developed world.

Economy

North Korea has one of the world's most centrally planned and least open economies6.

The CIA World Fact Book estimates North Korea’s overall GDP at US $40B, while per

capita GDP is at $1,800, ranking 197th in the world. GDP grew 4% in 2011 and is driven by

agriculture (23.2%), industry (43.2%), and services (33.6%). Exports totaled $2.5B in 2010

and were comprised of minerals, metallurgical products, manufactured goods including

armaments, textiles, fishery and agricultural products. Imports were valued at approximately

$3.5B in 2010 and consisted of petroleum, coking coal, machinery, textiles and grain7.

Energy Policy

North Korean energy policy has evolved largely in response to changing geopolitics

but also in an attempt to stem the losses of dysfunctional and aging infrastructure. Prior to

1945 the North Korean power mix was essentially 100% hydroelectric. This reliance on

hydroelectric power remained strong in the ensuing decades and thru 1970 hydroelectricity

still provided 90% of total generation while keeping pace with growing demand. During the

1980s seven large hydroelectric plants were in operation, four of which were along the Yalu

River, North Korea’s border with China. The facilities had been built with Chinese aid,

jointly managed, and supplied power to both countries.

But by 1989, the share of production from hydro plants had dropped to 60%. Coal

fired thermal plants, and cheap fuel oil subsidized by the Soviet Union8 provided the

remaining 40% In an attempt to counter the aging hydroelectric infrastructure and the

decreasing efficiencies of the hydro grid, (and with the Soviet Union’s patronage), the

construction of coal-fired thermal plants had began in the seventies, decreasing the reliance

on an aging hydro-based system. But the diversification was too late, and the move towards

coal fired thermal plants could not close the energy gap created by the dual challenges of

growing demand and hydroelectricity’s decreasing efficiencies. North Korea began to

experience electricity shortages.

Earlier in the sixties Kim IL-sung had sent hundreds of students and researchers to

Soviet-bloc universities and research centers to develop a corp of technical expertise in

nuclear engineering. Under the Soviet Atoms for Peace program a small research reactor

1Endnotes:? https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html

2 Demick, Barbara. Nothing to Envy; Ordinary Lives in North Korea. Spiegel & Grau, 2009.

3 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html



6 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/north-korea/electricity-production-kwh-wb-data.html

7 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html


(IRT-2000) was built using Soviet technical assistance and materials9. However, the real

goal was nuclear arms. Unable to obtain nuclear weapons from either China or the Soviet

Union, North Korea had their Soviet trained engineers, who used declassified data on the

design and operation of several European reactors (Britain’s Calder Hall, Italy’s Latina), to

reverse engineer their first reactor, a 5 megawatt electric (MWe) gas-graphite reactor, which

became operational in 198610. For North Korea it was an ideal match: gas-graphite reactors

are well suited to countries with limited nuclear construction infrastructure and are perfect

for producing plutonium fuel for a bomb. Natural uranium, which North Korea has in

abundance, is used for reactor fuel, obviating the need for more complex and technically

demanding enrichment facilities11. Touting the benefits of “civilian energy” provided the

necessary cover to begin to develop weapons grade plutonium.

Despite the relatively simplicity of using a gas-graphite reactor to create weapons

grade plutonium, Pyongyang realized that the modern light-water reactors (LWRs), which

South Korea was acquiring from the West, were better suited towards producing electricity.

In 1985, Kim IL-sung asked the Soviets to build two LWRs to meet the North’s growing

demand for electricity. However, the sudden end of the cold war changed those plans.

Almost overnight, North Korea lost access to billions in foreign aid, guaranteed markets, and

“friendship prices” that had been enjoyed from the Soviet bloc, and most importantly the

promise of the 2 LWRs. Concurrently, China moved to open its economy to the West in

support of its market liberalizing agenda. North Korea stood on the sidelines and watched

while both Russia and China reached out to their archrival, South Korea.

In 1992 Pyongyang opened the doors to its nuclear program and allowed inspectors

from the IAEA into the Yongbyon nuclear center. But inspectors uncovered discrepancies

between their nuclear measurements and Pyongyangs’s declarations and the door was

quickly shut. In early 1994 negotiations in Geneva led to the “Agreed Framework”

whereupon Pyongyang was willing to trade its gas graphite reactor program for the promise

9 Hecker, Siegfried S., Lee Sean C., and Braun, Chaim. North Korea’s Choice: Bombs over Electricity,

National Academy of Engineering. http://www.nae.edu/Publications/Bridge/19804/19821.aspx

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

of two, 1,000MWe LWRs from the US. Congressional opposition led to a lack of funding

and project commitments fell behind. A complicated procurement process further slowed the

project and ultimately, administration change killed the Agreement12. Today the pariah state

continues their pursuit of nuclear arms undeterred, including the occasional saber rattling and

missile test.

South Korea had also expressed interest in the nuclear bomb in the seventies. But

under international pressure led by the US, it gave up those aspirations and with international

assistance, turned its nuclear focus toward civilian energy13. The divergent nuclear paths

taken by both Koreas have yielded dramatically divergent results. Today, the South Korean

nuclear industry provides nearly 40% of the countries electricity from 23 reactors with a

combined capacity of 20.7GWe14, while North Korea has at most six nuclear weapons and no

nuclear generated energy. South Korea aims to provide 59% of electricity from 40 units by

2030 and recently won a $20.4 B contract to construct 4 reactors in the UAE15. They also

recently won a bid to construct a research reactor in Jordan and have quickly positioned

themselves to become a global export leader in nuclear plants and operations, behind only

France, the US, and perhaps Russia.

In parallel with their nuclear pursuits, North Korea also went full bore into the

development of small and medium sized hydro plants in the nineties, with close to 7,000

constructed during that time. But the efficiency was poor, in part due to the seasonal and less

reliable flows of smaller rivers, and the plants were under operated. As a result, small hydro

contributed little to reverse the massive freefall in electricity production brought upon by the

abandonment of Russia, who now demanded hard currency for coal, and the curtailment of

Chinese aid as they opened to the West. Aging hydro and the inability to upgrade, or even

maintain, the deteriorating transmission infrastructure cemented the decline. The policy of

small hydro was quickly shelved in lieu of a 3 pronged approach in the new millennia that

includes, 1) refocusing on the construction of large hydroelectric plants, 2) the remodeling of

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf81.html

15 Ibid.

power facilities including plants, transmission and distribution lines and 3) demand side

management to reduce demand. But the investment in support of the latest policy change has

not been adequate.

Sporadic monsoons and droughts did not help reverse the freefall of energy

production and the concomitant drop in per capita consumption. Withdrawal and

diminishment of aid from traditional partners Russia and China have only exacerbated North

Korea’s energy crisis. Unfortunately it is the civilian population that goes without; the

military and elite can still be counted upon to divert resources needed for investment and

public consumption16. Finally, the strong political backlash caused by the North Korean

attacks on the South Korea’s destroyer Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in

2010, has further cooled all global cooperation, including energy aid and development

between the two Koreas17. Future cooperation, assuming the thawing of tensions with the

greater world, will have to be massive and comprehensive to counter years of

underinvestment, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and a focus on non-civilian

energy priorities.

Electricity Generation and Per Capita Consumption

North Korea generally does not release statistics related to energy production but

credible external (and independent) sources are able to extrapolate data and arrive at very

similar results. According to a 2010 World Bank Report posted on the Trading Economics

website (http://www.tradingeconomics.com/north-korea/electricity-production-kwh-wb-

data.html) North Korea produced 21,093,000,000 kWh of electricity in 2009,18 while the CIA

World Fact Book cites 2008 generation levels at 22,520,000,000 kWh. Thus, two different

sources are able to arrive at very similar data points. Since 1990 the supply of oil, coal and

electricity has steadily declined. Annual imports from oil dropped from 23 mn barrels in

1988 to less than 4mn barrels in 1997….causing critical problems in transportation and


17 Yoon, Jae-Young. The DPRK Power Sector: Data and Interconnection Options. The Korean Journal of

Defense Analysis. Vol. 23, No.2 June 2011, 175-190. http://www.kida.re.kr/data/kjda/03_Jae-Young

%20Yoon.pdf


http://www.tradingeconomics.com/north-korea/electricity-production-kwh-wb-data.html

agriculture. North Korea has no coking coal, but does have substantial reserves of anthracite

in Anju province. But because of the Soviet and Chinese withdrawal of fuel concessions

(required to mine and transport), coal production peaked at 43mn tons in 1989 and steadily

declined to 18.6 mn tons in 1998.19

North Korean electricity generated (kWh) annually, 1967-201020

The World Fact book puts North Korea at 68th in electricity produced worldwide (see

chart next page). Production peaked in 1989 with nearly 30TW of electricity produced and

then rapidly declined21 as Communist sponsorship withered.

Country Comparitive Annual electricity generated in Kwh.

19 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_North_Korea#Power_and_energy


21 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_North_Korea#Power_and_energy

22 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2038rank.html

As North Korea’s energy policy has changed with the times and its geopolitical

relationships, so to have its per capita electricity consumption risen and fallen with the

fortunes of the regime. Low cost fuel provided by its larger communist neighbors and

sponsors helped drive North Korean electricity consumption steadily upward thru the

seventies and eighties as it diversified away from hydro. By 1980 per capita consumption

had reached 1,114 kWh, which continued to climb to 1,247kWh in 1990. However, the

effects of the Soviet Union’s collapse, and the inability of North Korea to meet Russia’s

subsequent demand for hard currency for its energy resources, were immediate and

widespread. By 1995, per capita consumption had declined to 912kWh, and continued to

drop to its low point in 2000 of a paltry 712kWh.

North Korean Electricity Consumption Per Capita, 1967-201023

22 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2038rank.html

23 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/north-korea/electric-power-consumption-kwh-per-capita-wb-data.html

Although the real hemorrhaging has stopped, and a slight increase has been seen in

the last decade, reaching the standard of 1990 seems an impossible dream. IEA

documentation reveals that per capita electricity consumption in 2008 was 819kWh,

substantially lower than the 919kWh recorded in 197124. Population growth, coupled with the

dismantling of the Soviet Union, Chinese trade reductions, the continued poor returns from

hydro, poor management and the diversion of funding, have wreaked havoc on the ability of

North Korea to increase per capita consumption. The floods of the 90’s (sediments filled the

storage waters) and droughts of the aughts, and increasingly unreliable seasonal water flows

have further compounded the poor returns from hydro’s aging infrastructure.

Bank of Korea reports corroborate the data on per capita electricity consumption,

reporting that North Korean energy consumption was between 600-800 kWh per person in

2000, (comparable to many South Asian developing countries at the time) which was roughly

the per capita consumption of South Korea in 1980.25 In 2009, the World Bank reported that

South Korea’s energy consumption per capita was 8,900kWh. By 2008, North Korea’s

population had nearly doubled to 23.9m26 from its 1971 level, yet per capita consumption

was still lower than the 1971 level of 919kWh.

Per Capita Electricity Consumption in Selected Asian Developing Countries as of 2000

24 Hong, Kim Tae. Economic Collapse Reflected in Scarce Electricity. August 6, 2012.

http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=9629



%20Yoon.pdf

26 Hong, Kim Tae. Economic Collapse Reflected in Scarce Electricity. August 6, 2012.

http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=9629

Power Quality

Overall, the power quality, voltage, and frequency variation of the North Korean

electricity grid is very poor. Jae-Young Yoon, Director of Korea Electrotechnology

Research Institute (KERI) in his “The DPRK Power Sector: Data & Interconnection Options”

provides data sets from defectors (who have experience with North Korea’s 110kV power

transmission systems) and recent visitors to North Korea who have measured the power

qualities of their accommodations during their stay. For 220V rating, the measured voltage

ranged from 177-209, while for 110kV rating the values were within the 88-99kV range, and

the frequency variations for 60Hz rating were typically between 56.7-59.8[Hz], 51.0-

54.0[Hz]. These three sets of measurements demonstrate a 5-20 percent loss in voltage,

relative to the design rating.27

The electricity grid infrastructure is decrepit and outdated. Routine maintenance is

uncommon and significant investments are not made. One major exception to this general

rule of neglect has been that a SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) computer

system, used for the monitoring and distribution of electricity, was supplied by China under

the auspices of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in the 1990s and has been

operating in several power plants. However, these newer systems have to interface with

aging, infrastructure comprised largely of “made in North Korea” parts that are of

questionable quality. Most of the power plant and grid infrastructure is based on outdated



%20Yoon.pdf

Soviet-era designs, and increasingly without factories to build replacement parts. The grid

itself is actually two separate grids that operate at different effective voltages28. The “flat

line” of the chart below, depicting installed capacity, tells the sad story quite clearly: no new

capacity investment or infrastructure upgrades have been seen since the late eighties29.

KERI estimates transmission loss as typically around 20% due to these weak system

characteristics, and the overall system capacity factor is between 30-35%30. Independent

analysis from the US based Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, which has

studied North Korea’s energy situation for years, estimates transmission loses of close to

25%.31 The chronic electricity shortages are a double edged sword as they make it difficult to

28 Ibid.

29 http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=KN#elec



%20Yoon.pdf

31 Lavelle, Marianne. North Korea: Nuclear Ambition, Power Shortage. National Geographic, December 20,

2011. http://www.greatenergychallengeblog.com/2011/12/20/north-korea-nuclear-ambition-power-shortage/

mine and transport coal used in the thermal plants. The lack of coal leads to further

electricity shortages. Hydro power plants are also below capacity because the huge floods of

the 1990s led to an accumulation of sediment in the water storage facilities. Little work has

been done to clear away the accumulated sediment32.

Potential Energy Plays, a Path Forward

Assuming that North Korea could free itself from the current “international time-out”

in which it finds itself, there are several feasible scenarios and potential plans that could be

restarted to put it back on the path of sensible energy development. In addition to the

possibility of trading their nuclear arms program for a nuclear energy program (a la their

very successful Southern neighbor), North Korea could be a strategic partner in regional grid

interconnectivity of power lines and gas pipelines. Since the KEDO project which would

have brought 6MW of additional nuclear capacity online by 2020 is delayed indefinitely due

to the breakdown of talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, interconnectivity is

the best of a limited set of options. Russia is particularly interested in interconnection

projects, as this open up energy exports from her resource rich Russian Far East (RFE) and

creates new capital markets33.

The so-called NEAREST (North East Asian Region Electrical System Tie) program

of 2005 resulted in preliminary discussions, plans and the invaluable exchange of

information, but has since been tabled due to international sanctioning. The System would

interconnect Northeast Asian countries including North and South Korea, Russia and Japan,

depending on which of the 4 NEAREST scenarios are considered. The two scenarios not

providing North Korea energy (one uses North Korea as a “right of way” for interconnection

and the other involves submarine cables between Russia and South Korea, bypassing North

Korea to shore up South Korean energy security) are not considered here. The first

interconnection scenario involves power exchanges via the construction of an interconnected

power system. Converter stations would be located in each country and would be connected

by a DC overhead transmission line running 1,010 km between Russia (Vladivostok) and

North Korea (Pyongyang) and then 250Km between South (Seoul) and North Korea.

32 Nakano, Akira http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/korean_peninsula



%20Yoon.pdf

Scenario 1: 3 Terminal HVDC Interconnection Diagram (ROK = Republic of Korea and DPRK equals

the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. 34

Russia would supply power to both Koreas with the power flow consistently maintained in

one direction.

The second scenario involves the construction of Back to Back (BTB) converter

stations at the borders foregoing the construction of new long distance HVDC transmission

lines.

Scenario 2: Back to Back HVDC interconnection35

However, this takes on significantly more risk as North Korea’s weak power system

would not guarantee the reliability sought after by its neighbors. This would require North

Korea to significantly upgrade its internal power and transmission systems to make itself a

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

more attractive partner in a BTB HVDC interconnection scenario36.

Scenario 1: 3 Terminal Interconnection Scenario 2: Back to Back converters

Route South, North Korea, Russia South, North Korea, Russia

Min. Power 2 GW 1 GW

Max Power 4 GW 4 GW

Cost Medium Small

Energy Security Normal Bad

Despite the higher cost, current analysis suggests that Scenario 1 is the more realistic

owing to the creation of new Transmission Lines that negate the need to overhaul North

Korea’s aging grid infrastructure37. This would provide the reliability required by South

Korea while bypassing the usage of the tricky North Korean grid.

Renewables

North Korea’s mountainous terrain coupled with an abundance of undeveloped coast

line on the Pacific Ocean and Yellow Sea, make it an ideal candidate for wind power, but

unfortunately because of the more pressing energy concerns (shortages, aging power

systems, lack of investment and international cooperation) this sector has seen little

development. Solar power is not suitable at scale given the limited amount of sunshine per

annum. However, given the challenges faced by the nationwide grid, distributed solar on

residential rooftops at very small scale could at least bring a limited dose of power to the

millions of rural poor currently without a single light bulb at night, but penetration remains

extremely low.

Environmental Impact

For the first 60 years of the twentieth century, relying heavily on hydro for its

generation mix, North Korea was not a tremendous emitter of C02. However, as the

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

generation mix increased the amount of coal and fuel-oil burning thermal plants, C02

emissions rose. Today it is not uncommon to find that coal is pulverized, gasified, and

converted into fertilizer, a highly inefficient and polluting way to make fertilizer. But lacking

natural gas, (the common feedstock for fertilizer), and being cutoff from most global trade

and cooperation, the regime has little choice, much like South Africa during apartheid or

Nazi Germany doing WWII. Because the countryside is largely bereft of electricity, and as is

common in energy-short countries, deforestation is rampant, as people burn wood, twigs and

any other harvestable biomass that can be used for fuel38. As the following graph39 keenly

demonstrates, carbon emissions rose (and fell) with Soviet sponsorship of fuel oils and coal.

38 Lavelle, Marianne. North Korea: Nuclear Ambition, Power Shortage. National Geographic, December 20,

2011. http://www.greatenergychallengeblog.com/2011/12/20/north-korea-nuclear-ambition-power-shortage/

39 http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=KN#cde

Conclusion:

North Korea’s energy prospects are not good. Aging infrastructure, shifting

geopolitics, isolation from the world and poor governance with warped priorities have

conspired to create one of the most pressing energy crisis’ of our time. The lack of energy

and electricity has stunted the country’s economic prospects and growth, has imprisoned the

civilian population in a feudal existence without light and modern technology while those in

power funnel energy resources to reinforce their own sense of grandeur and to maintain their

grasp on power.

South Korea has demonstrated to the world how the transparent development of

nuclear energy can benefit a country but North Korea’s dogged pursuit of nuclear arms has

isolated it from a worldwide community that would otherwise embrace it (as they did South

Korea). North Korea has gotten very little in return for its huge investments in its nuclear

program and even its technical accomplishments have been negated by international

sanctions and isolation.40 Giving up the bomb would be a giant first step in alleviating their

dire economic and energy straits.

While there is some potential for wind and limited solar (distributed at private

homes), there is not enough potential in renewable energies to provide substantial relief to

the national dilemma. International cooperation, cooled for now, is generally available, but

the regime’s history of brinkmanship, saber rattling and unpredictable behavior alienate all

but the most motivated of partners and aid-givers.

There does seem some potential with interconnection to the vast energy stores of

Russia’s Far East and exchanges with South Korea, but this requires stability, commitment,

and transparency, all of which are in short supply within the regime. Their frenetic nature

does not make them an attractive partner. At some point the world will have to grapple with

North Korea and it is better to try and coax them now to invest and upgrade (and abandon

their nuclear arms pursuits) than to wait until chaos intervenes, forcing a more expensive

40 Hecker, Siegfried S., Lee Sean C., and Braun, Chaim. North Korea’s Choice: Bombs over Electricity,

National Academy of Engineering. http://www.nae.edu/Publications/Bridge/19804/19821.aspx

global solution. At some point in time, the sun will set on the Kim dynasty and while it may

not be palatable to continue to try and coerce and cajole them to the negotiations table, it

would be much better in the long run to develop their energy systems now.

Addendum:

41

41 http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=KN#elec

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North Korea Energy Profile