Not Approved by CCMF UNCLASSIFIED 1 Combined Maritime ForcesReady Together Combined Maritime Forces Counter-Piracy Briefing CAPT Chris Chambers 19 May

Not Approved by CCMF UNCLASSIFIED 1 Combined Maritime Forces Ready Together

Combined Maritime Forces Counter-Piracy Briefing

CAPT Chris Chambers

19 May 2009

Overall ClassificationUNCLASSIFIED

2Not Approved by CCMF UNCLASSIFIED 2 Combined Maritime Forces Ready Together

Combined Maritime Forces

Saudi Arabia

United Arab Emirates

New ZealandPakistanPortugal

Singapore

Spain Turkey

United Kingdom

United States

Australi

a

Bahrai

n

Belgium

Canad

a

Denmark

France

German

y

Italy

Japan

Kuwait

Netherl

ands

South Korea

Non-Members with staff presence

Qatar

Yemen

Jordan

Greece• Coalition of the Willing

• Primary Missions:Counter violent extremists

and terrorist networksWork with regional and

coalition partners to improve overall maritime security and stability

• CTF 150Established in support of

Operation Enduring Freedom• CTF 151

Counter-piracy• CTF 152

Arabian Gulf maritime security


Combined Task Force (CTF) 151

• CMF established CTF 151 as a mission based Task Force:– 12 Jan 09 under a UNSCR counter-piracy mandate

• CTF 151 is a mission specific CTF not geographically constrained

• Mandate based upon the range of counter-piracy UNSCRs

• Provides significant flexibility to the command to undertake operations

• Critical factors for mission success:– International force participation in coalition– Maritime merchant community participation and active self defense– Merchant marine active communication with UKMTO/US MARLO to maintain

situational awareness

UNCLASSIFIED


Area of Responsibility

CTF 152

RDML Tidd, USN

CTF 150

RADM Hinden, FR

FOCUSED OP

FO

CU

SE

D O

P

CTF 151

RDML Howard, USN

CTF 151

RDML Bener, TUR


Countering Piracy - Strategic Aspects

• Piracy is an international problem requiring an international solution

• Solution is ashore in Somalia– Must establish conditions ashore that preclude criminal activity at sea

– Enforce the rule of law in Somalia to deny pirates safe havens

• Until the solution is reached ashore, counter-piracy must focus on three interrelated elements

1. Improved security and defensive efforts by the shipping industry

2. International naval presence to deter / disrupt / defeat pirate attempts

3. International legal framework for resolving piracy cases

These elements must be addressed in harmony

None will be successful individually


Piracy – Current Assessment

• There is significant military presence in the GOA (CMF, NATO, EU, National)

– CMF hosts monthly coordination meetings with representatives of most participating navies

– CTF 151 coordinates warship positioning with other maritime participants to maximize effectiveness of limited assets

– Knowledge of piracy Pattern-Of-Life is still in development – military assets focused on deterrence / disruption of pirates rather than intelligence collection

• Favorable weather in Somali Basin has enabled pirates to increase activity

– Seasonal trend that follows the monsoon transition periods

• Somali Basin area is 5 times larger than the GOA– Full military coverage of this area will not be possible

• From 25th February – 31st March 2009, 7% of the unsuccessful piracy attempts were the result of direct military presence and/or intervention

• The proportion of vessels being attacked is still below 1% in GOA, but has peaked at 1.4% in the Somali Basin


Piracy – Current Assessment

• Pirate capacity and capability remains high– Number of ships being attacked and pirated has increased– Total number of ships pirates can hold for ransom unknown

• Greater number of reports of attempts / false alarm calls noted by IMB– Assessed due to better awareness in the merchant shipping community

• Military counter-piracy efforts in the GOA continue to have limited success– No direct correlation between coalition presence and piracy incidents, although

greater military presence on whole has resulted in better chances of preventing a successful piracy attack

• The most effective method for avoiding piracy is still through the merchant ship’s own defensive actions

– Pirates do not give up unless they cannot board or are threatened– Speed with maneuver, charged fire hoses– Professionally trained security teams capable of repelling pirate attacks– Pirates unable to gain control of ship once onboard


Pirate Tactics

• Motherships– Thought to be a requirement for the long range operations in the Somali Basin

• One recent example of this not being the case

– In GOA, may be a pirated vessel (Dhow, fishing vessel, etc) or an accomplice• Recent example of migrant smugglers acting as mother ship

• Length of attack– GOA attacks tend to be 30 minutes or less

• Threat of military intervention

• Target rich environment (go after something easier)

– Somali Basin attacks average one hour or longer• Less threat of military intervention

• Fewer available targets

• Recent piracy events have shown that different pirate teams communicate and coordinate


Piracy Statistics Through 31 March

SECURITY TEAMS ARE AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-PIRACY CAPABILITY

Category

Total Piracy Incidents / (Total Number Including Suspicious Events) 186 - Pirated (security on board) 35 1 27% 52 1 31% - Unsuccessful attempts: MV action (security on board) 68 8 53% 89 8 53% - Unsuccessful attempts: Military Presence (security on board) 26 0 20% 28 0 16%

Total Number of Suspicious Events Reported

Total Piracy Incidents - Pirated (security on board) 26 1 26% 41 1 30% - Unsuccessful attempts: MV action (security on board) 47 8 48% 67 8 49% - Unsuccessful attempts: Military Presence (security on board) 26 0 26% 28 0 21% - Suspicious event / report

Total Piracy Incidents - Pirated (security on board) 9 0 30% 11 0 33% - Unsuccessful attempts: MV action (security on board) 21 0 70% 22 0 67% - Unsuccessful attempts: Military Presence (security on board) 0 0 0% 0 0 0% - Suspicious event / report

(222 days)

TOTAL INCIDENTS

SUSPICIOUS EVENTS

169129

(01 Jan 08 - 31 Mar 09)

17

99 136

12 14

Post-MSPA(22 Aug - 31 Mar)

Total Stats

3 3

30 33

GOA

East Coast

15


Attacks by Time of DayDistribution of piracy events over day and night (GOA)

0

5

10

15

20

25

0000-0100

0100-0200

0200-0300

0300-0400

0400-0500

0500-0600

0600-0700

0700-0800

0800-0900

0900-1000

1000-1100

1100-1200

1200-1300

1300-1400

1400-1500

1500-1600

1600-1700

1700-1800

1800-1900

1900-2000

2000-2100

2100-2200

2200-2300

2300-0000

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Daylight

Piracy Events

Distribution of piracy events over day and night (HOA+SOB)

0

5

10

15

20

25

0000-0100

0100-0200

0200-0300

0300-0400

0400-0500

0500-0600

0600-0700

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0900-1000

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1300-1400

1400-1500

1500-1600

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1700-1800

1800-1900

1900-2000

2000-2100

2100-2200

2200-2300

2300-0000

0

0.2

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1

Daylight

Piracy Events

REMAIN VIGILANT AT ALL TIMES


Piracy Risk To Shipping

• March in GOA, 0.51% of vessels have been attacked and less than 0.05% pirated• March in Somali Basin, less than 1.4% of vessels have been attacked and less

than 0.65% pirated (47% of ships attacked)• In February, 0.049% of vessels were pirated in GOA and 0% in the Somali Basin

Percentage of Vessels Attacked in GOA andSomali Basin

0.0%

0.5%

1.0%

1.5%

Ja

n-0

8

Fe

b-0

8

Ma

r-0

8

Ap

r-0

8

Ma

y-0

8

Ju

n-0

8

Ju

l-0

8

Au

g-0

8

Se

p-0

8

Oc

t-0

8

No

v-0

8

De

c-0

8

Ja

n-0

9

Fe

b-0

9

Ma

r-0

9

Percentage MVs Attacked Somali Basin Percentage MVs Attacked GOAPercentage Pirated Somali Basin Percentage Pirated GOA

31st March 2009

TRENDS SHOW TYPICAL SEASONAL INCREASE IN PIRACY, BUT PROPORTIONALLY INCREASED FROM PREVIOUS YEARS


Total Pirate AttacksMonthly Total Number of Piracy Events with Monsoon Transition Periods

(JAN 2008 - 18 APR 2009)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09Month

Nu

mb

er

of

Pir

acy

Ev

en

ts (

Pir

ate

d, A

ttac

ke

d +

Att

em

pt)

TRANSITION PERIOD BETWEEN MONSOONS

Monthly Total Number of Piracy Events with Monsoon Transition Periods(JAN 2008 - 18 APR 2009)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09Month

Nu

mb

er

of

Pir

acy

Ev

en

ts (

Pir

ate

d, A

ttac

ke

d +

Att

em

pt)

TRANSITION PERIOD BETWEEN MONSOONS

SPIKES IN PIRATE ATTACKS BROADLY COINCIDE WITH FAVORABLE WEATHER TRANSITION PERIODS BETWEEN MONSOON SEASONS


2008 GOA Piracy Events

Piracy concentrated in “High Risk” box during

most of 2008


2009 GOA Piracy Events

Piracy evenly distributed across

GOA in 2009


2008 Somali Basin Piracy

400nm

Most open ocean piracy

events in 2008 were inside

400nm


2009 Somali Basin Piracy

400nm

In 2009, pirates have increased

open ocean activity and

followed vessels out to 600+ nm


0

4

8

12

16

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

GO

A

SB

Pirated Evaded Pirated Evaded PiratedEvaded PiratedEvaded PiratedEvaded Pirated Evaded Pirated Evaded Pirated Evaded PiratedEvaded PiratedEvaded PiratedEvaded Pirated Evaded Pirated Evaded

Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09

PiratedEvaded with No Military presenceMilitary presence

Campaign Results – 243 Days

• 320 pirates encountered:– 175 released– 133 turned over for prosecution– 8 killed– 17 pending

• Pirate vessels destroyed: 24• Pirate vessels confiscated: 12

UNCLASSIFIED

Campaign start – 22 AUG 08, 17 vessels currently pirated

10 10 12 12 12 18 12 16Average Monthly Assets in CP Campaign

• Weapons confiscated: 162 small arms, 30 RPG launchers, 61 RPG projectiles

• Other paraphernalia confiscated : – 28 ladders– 9 GPS – 23 phones

International Response


What Does it all Mean?

• Piracy has increased in the Somali Basin– Spring and fall seasonal monsoon predicted this

• Piracy is further off the coast of Somalia than in previous years– Merchant shipping has heeded advice to transit further east– Pirates have adapted tactics to pursue targets at a greater distance

• Pirates in GOA are still very active– Learning to find the easy targets– Learning to coordinate in effort to counter effects of Naval presence

• Current maritime force cannot defeat pirates alone– Avg number of ships per day is 15-17 units available to patrol high risk areas– IRTC is a 480 x 12 mile corridor = 5760 sq miles of open sea

• Does not account for the whole of the Gulf of Aden (~100,000 sq miles)

– Somali Basin is a 1000 nm coast out to 600 miles = 600,000 sq miles of open sea• Traffic in Somali Basin does not follow a predictable route• Somali Basin is not as well suited as GOA for a transit corridor to manage traffic

• Capture, imprisonment and death are not deterring pirates

INDUSTRY MUST PRO-ACTIVELY PROTECT ITSELF


Countering Piracy - Military Aspects

• Coordination / Deconfliction / Working together– CMF, EUNAVFOR, NATO, Malaysia, Russia, China, India, Japan

• Current naval actions– Presence / deterrence / disruption / suppression of pirate activity

• Intervening against pirate attacks in progress

• Boarding suspected pirate vessels when encountered

• Interdicting motherships

• Collecting information to better understand piracy Pattern-of-Life

– Providing warning to commercial shipping of potential pirate locations

– Group transit plan for commercial shipping

– Surveillance / communications support after ships have been taken

– Providing piracy data and best practice recommendations to industry

What we do now


• There is significant military presence in the region (CMF, NATO, EU, National),

presenting...

– National tasking makes inefficient use of limited assets

– Navies answer to individual national authorities with varying rules of engagement (ROE)

– NATO, EU, CMF, and other forces have independent chains-of-command

– Incompatible communications hamper coordination efforts

– Knowledge of piracy pattern-of-life is still in development – military assets focused on

deterrence / disruption of pirates rather than intelligence collection

– CMF hosts monthly coordination meetings with representatives of most participating

navies – membership is growing

– CTF 151 coordinates warship positioning with other maritime participants to maximize

effectiveness of limited assets

– CMF provides logistics and/or communications services to 20 countries engaged in

counter piracy ops

• Includes fuel, CENTRIXS secure computer network, and development of unclassified common

operational picture (COP)

Challenges and Opportunities

Challenges

… and Opportunities

UNCLASSIFIED


Counter-Piracy Information Sharing / Coordination

MERCHANT / CIVILIAN SHIPPING

INDEPENDENT

NAVIES

(RUS, CHN, MAL, IND, JPN)

CMF

EUNAVFOR

(MSC-HOA, FEXWEB)

UKMTO / MARLO

Communications Hub

CTF 151 has assumed the role of tactically de-conflicting warships in GOA

SHARED AWARENESS AND DE-CONFLICTION TALKS ARE KEY TO COORDINATED EFFORT


Military Coordination/Synchronization

• CMF conducts monthly Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) meeting in Bahrain

– Over 20 nations participate– EU and NATO participate– Developing shared UNCLAS picture– Developing shared UNCLAS database– Refining positioning of assets in the IRTC– Synchronized CMF, EU and NATO operations– Includes industry reps– 30 nations participating in or planning to conduct counter piracy operations

• CTF-151 lead in tactical coordination/de-confliction/synchronization

• UKMTO (Dubai) and MARLO (Bahrain) link navies with industry

UNCLASSIFIED


Countering Piracy – Military Challenges

• Navies answer to individual national authorities– Collective political will to take aggressive military action is needed

– Rules of engagement vary between Navies

• No unified political body under which to consolidate military effort– NATO, EU, & CMF and other forces each have an independent chain of command

– Although a challenge, it is opening new avenues for military coordination between nations (SHADE, daily coordination between Task Forces)

• This is a law enforcement operation– Does not fall under the law of armed conflict

– Limits military options for the use of force

– Strict rules of evidence for prosecuting pirates

• Legal options are limited– Few countries willing to prosecute pirates captured by Naval forces

• Limited military assets to cover a vast area

What limits our ability to respond

THIS PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED BY NAVAL FORCES ALONE


Recommended Risk Mitigation Process

• Conduct thorough piracy threat assessment– If at all possible, avoid transit through areas with pirate threat

• If avoidance of piracy area is not possible…– Conduct timely and deliberate self-assessment to determine risk to vessel– Consider vulnerability factors such as vessel speed, low points of access, and

time of exposure in piracy areas– Consider self-protection options to mitigate risk

• Cost-benefit analysis will determine level of acceptable risk– Benefits of conducting safe transit must outweigh the cost of implementing

protective measures– If costs outweigh the benefits (profits), ships are likely to seek naval escort

• Ships must re-evaluate risk and decide to accept one of the following…– Cost of re-routing– Cost of sufficient protective measures– Risk of piracy

Industry must submit request for escort / protection to UKMTO


Complexity

Vessel Risk Assessment

Exp

osu

re T

ime

in

Hig

h R

isk

Zo

ne

Sp

eed

Lowest Point of Access

UNCLASSIFIED

LowHigh

Fas

tS

low High Risk

Low Risk

Self Protection measures reduce the risk•Enhanced lookout •Physical measure taken on board the vessel (e.g. barbed wire, rigged fire hoses, etc.) •Trained, unarmed security team on board

Trained armed security teams nearly eliminate the risk


Industry Best Practices

• Passive defense measures– Comprehensive security plan to include a risk assessment

– Remove external ladders

– Lookouts at all times

– Speed and maneuver: speed up and take evasive action if pirates approach

– Limited lighting

– Register with Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)

– Stay in communication with MSCHOA, UK Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO), and/or Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO)

– Routing – avoid high-risk areas if possible

– Participate in group transits

• Active defense measures– Secure hatches, limit access to crew and control spaces

– Rig fire hoses

– Rig barriers such as barbed wire, fencing, etc., especially in low access areas

– Non lethal measures such as LRAD, flares, etc

– Professional security teams capable of repelling pirate attacks

Bottom Line: Do not allow yourselves to become easy targets

UNCLASSIFIED


Summary

• Combined Maritime Forces / International Navies have taken action– Maritime Security Patrol Area and World Food Program escorts

– Deter, disrupt, capture, and destroy pirate equipment

– Coordinate, de-conflict, share intelligence / information

– Provide best practices to shipping industry

– Communications support to pirated vessels during negotiations

– Suspected pirates have been captured by DK, US, UK and EU forces• Suspected Pirates taken by DK handed over to the Flag state of the attacked vessel• Suspected Pirates taken by UK, US and EU have been handed over to Kenya per MOUs

• These actions alone will not solve the problem• More aggressive naval actions will not succeed until other elements put in place

– Patrol area is enormous; requires coordinated tasking of naval assets from all countries

– Shipping industry must follow recommended best practices

– Shipping industry should consider embarking security detachments

– Additional airborne reconnaissance required to increase probability of encounter

– Retaking pirated ships involves high risk to the lives of hostages

– There is currently no mandate for military action ashore against pirate bases

THE SOLUTION TO PIRACY IS STABILITY IN SOMALIA

UNTIL THEN, INDUSTRY MUST PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE


Counter-PiracyGlobal Maritime Partnerships

Legend

European Union

CTF 151

CTF 150

National Tasking

Potential Interest

Country

Questions?

Documents

Not Approved by CCMF UNCLASSIFIED 1 Combined Maritime ForcesReady Together Combined Maritime Forces Counter-Piracy Briefing CAPT Chris Chambers 19 May