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Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman, Hebrew University

Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

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Page 1: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European

foreign lending in the 19th century

By

Marc Flandreau,

Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris

and

Nathan Sussman,

Hebrew University

Page 2: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

A typical international

bond: the Chinese Government

1913 Reorganization “Gold” Loan 

Page 3: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

The fixed exchange rate clause

Page 4: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

Goal: understanding the logic of these clauses

• Liability « goldization », « sterlingization », « francization », ….

• Widespread phenomenon• Dangerous (record of the 1890s)• More important problem than short term debt

Page 5: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

Prehistory: some facts

• Very old practice: 18th century• 19th century development « Rothschild

packages »• Gold and silver clauses up to 1873• Triumph of gold clauses with spread of gold

standard• Key currencies: sterling, francs, marks, florins.

Page 6: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

Contemporary explanations?

• Nominal illusion: « investors want fixed income in francs, sterling etc »

• Information asymetries: « investors do not understand exchange rate matters »

• Institutions and credibility: « currency clauses are guarantees ».

Page 7: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

FX clauses and credibility: doubtsCountry Year Yield Yield at issue

Brazil 1824 5% 6.6%

1825 5% 5.9%

1829 5% 9.2%

Buenos Aires 1824 6% 7%

Chili 1822 6% 8.6%

Colombia 1822 6% 7.1%

1824 6% 6.8%

Guatemala 1825 6% 9.5%

Mexico 1824 5% 8.6%

1825 6% 6.9%

Peru 1822 6% 6.8%

1824 6% 7.3%

1825 6% 7.7%

Page 8: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

FX clauses and credibility: further doubtsGroup I: Only exchange rate clauses Group: II Mixed Group III: domestic

Europe: Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden.

Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia,Costa-Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haïti, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay,Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Africa and Middle East:

Egypt, Liberia, Turkey, Tunisia, Transvaal.

English Speaking and Dominions:

USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Other British colonies.

Asia: China, Japan

Europe:

Austria, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Spain, [France]

Europe:

Germany, [Belgium], Great Britain, Holland [Switzerland]

Page 9: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

Primary markets, secondary markets, FX clauses

Getting the facts right:

• IPO and currency clauses

• Secondary markets and internationalization of bonds

Page 10: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

Money markets quoted in London and Paris

Paris (1850) London (1844)

Amsterdam, London, Hamburg, (Berlin), (Augsburg), Frankfort, Madrid, Cadiz, (Bilbao), Lisbon, Oporto, Genoa, Leghorn, Naples, (Venice), Milan, Palermo, Messina, Antwerp, (Basel), Vienna, Trieste, Saint-Petersburg

Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Paris/France, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Berlin, Madrid,

Bilbao, Cadiz, Barcelona, Oporto, Lisbon, Genoa, Venice, Leghorn, Naples, Palermo, Messina, Antwerp, Vienna, Trieste, Saint.-Petersburg, Rio de Janeiro

Page 11: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

Liquidity, Liquidity, Liquidity

• International currencies: ability to trade abroad

• International currencies: vast market at issue

Page 12: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

Key currencies in 1890

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FRA UK GER BEL NLD ITL AH SUI ESP POR RUS US DMK SWE URU NOR BRA

Page 13: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

Dynamics

• History vs Expectations

• How to get rid of fixed exchange rate clauses? Scandinavia vs the US

Page 14: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

1880

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BEL FRA UK GER ITL AH NLD SUI RUS POR ESP BRA URU DMK NOR SWE US

Page 15: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

1890

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FRA UK GER BEL NLD ITL AH SUI ESP POR RUS US DMK SWE URU NOR BRA

Page 16: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

1900

0

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FRA UK GER BEL AH ITL NLD SUI ESP US RUS POR SWE DMK NOR BRA URU

Page 17: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

1910

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FRA UK GER NLD AH BEL SUI ITL US RUS ESP POR SWE DMK NOR BRA URU

Page 18: Old Sins: Exchange clauses and European foreign lending in the 19th century By Marc Flandreau, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Nathan Sussman,

Policy Implications and Conclusions

• Governance and Institutions? ==> Very long run

• Markets and liquidity? ==> Short run