On becoming better human beings by Stein Wivestad

8/14/2019 On becoming better human beings by Stein Wivestad

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On becoming better human beings

Stein Wivestad

1. Education as upbringingTo make oneself better, to cultivate oneself, and if one is evil, to bring forth moralityin oneself that is something the human being should do. But reflecting thoroughly onthe task, one finds it to be very difficult. Upbringing (Erziehung) is therefore the

biggest problem and the most difficult task that human beings can be given. Forinsight [needed to make oneself better?] hangs on the upbringing and upbringingdepends again upon the insight. And therefore ubringing can progress only little bylittle, and only when one generation transfers its experiences and bits of knowledge tothe next (Kant & Rink, 1803, p. 14, my transl.)1

The quotation above actualises two separate but intertwined problems: Can adults really makethemselves better? Can improvement be transferred from one generation to the next? Thispaper is mostly about the first.

What is better depends on what is a good human being and what is a bad human being.If we focus on the negative, we may ask what characterises a movement out of or up from a

bad or inferior condition. If we focus on the positive, we may ask what characterises amovement towards a good condition. A simple expression of this is when a child no longerwants to be small, it wants to become big. The Americans raise, the Germans erziehen,the Norwegians oppdrar and the French leve their children. A pioneer in Englisheducational theory, John Adams, refers to the Latin verb educare, which means to bring up achild physically and mentally (Adams, 1912/1994, pp. 14-15).

The traditional words and metaphors of pedagogical practice presuppose a movement in agood direction, out of something negative and into something positive. To educate may beunderstood as to draw or lead (ducere) someone out of (e orex)a present situation that isseen as inferior, towards (pro) a positive possibility in the future. The e-duction starts withembryogeny and birth, should continue in upbringing and hopefully in some way eventhrough physical decline and death. Earlier it was common to use the verb erudire, to lead outof rawness, roughness or rudeness. This metaphor is biased to the inferior present condition,and the outcome may be an old-fashioned erudition. Pro-duction is biased to specified

positive conditions in the future, and if the specified ends contradict with each other, theoutcome will be a confused effectivity. Education becomes one-sided if it is understood as

either e-duction or pro-duction. Both sides are necessary, both upbringing from andupbringing to. The e-duction addresses our life a whole, and is therefore most important anddifficult. But in a world of global capitalism it is production metaphors that govern language,

1 "Sich selbst besser machen, sich selbst kultivieren, und wenn er bse ist, Moralitt bei sich hervorbringen, dassoll der Mensch. Wenn man das aber reiflich berdenkt, so findet man, da dieses sehr schwer sei. Daher ist dieErziehung das greste Problem und das schwerste, was dem Menschen kann aufgegeben werden. Denn Einsichthngt von der Erziehung und Erziehung hngt wieder von der Einsicht ab. Daher kann die Erziehung auch nurnach und nach einen Schritt vorwrts tun, und nur dadurch, da eine Generation ihre Erfahrungen undKenntnisse der folgenden berliefert " This is taken from a version of Kant's lectures ber Pdagogik

published by one of his former students, F. T. Rink, in 1803, the year before Kant died. We cannot be sure that

the exact wording is Kant's, but the text "is a compact (albeit not always thoroughly consistent), authentic andeminently graspable compendium of Kant's view on education" (Louden, 2000, p. 36). There is an Englishtranslation of the text (Kant, 1899).

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thinking and actions. When everything seems to go smooth and fast forwards, we need to bereminded about our fundamental vulnerability.

If you should go skatingOn the thin ice of modern life

Dragging on behind you the silent reproachOf a million tear stained eyesDont be surprised, when a crack in the iceAppears under your feetYou slip out of your depth and out of your mindWith your fear flowing out behind youAs you claw the thin ice(Waters, 1982, p. 47)

The pictureAngelus novusby Paul Klee (1920) interpreted

by Walter Benjamin questions progress. The angel isstaring on something it is moving away from, and whatwe call progress is a storm from Paradise blowing theangel of history backwards into the future. Where wefancy a chain ofBegebenheiten or special events, theangel sees a single catastrophe, which keeps pilingwreckage upon wreckage2. The only possible results arelifeless fragments that cannot be integrated to a livingwhole. What is this catastrophe? The loss of the virtuetradition? (Tubbs, 2004, p. 551) The history of the modernintellectuals? The angel has a big head and almost no

body. Or is human history as a whole a catastrophe,blowing all away from Paradise?

In Europe there seems to be stability in abortion rates and decline in birth rates. There is nolonger a single country in Europe where people are having enough children to replacethemselves when they die (Specter, 1998). This development can be seen in the light ofgreater individual social security, egoism, experiences of bad relations, a bad society, etc. Butit actualises a basic question: Why do we want to have children? This is the first pedagogicalquestion (Mollenhauer, 1983/1994, p. 17). Prior to questions concerning the self-

understanding and vocation of the teacher (Tubbs, 2005) are questions concerning the self-understanding and responsibility of the human being: Why do we want to have children?There may be good things in our life: what do we want to share with new generations? Thereare bad things in our life: what are the conditions for improving ourselves and becoming

better examples?

2. Conditions for becoming better: four storiesThis section sketches four basic stories: the Aristotelian story about happiness (the A story),

2 Wo eine Kette von Begebenheiten vor uns erscheint, da sieht ereine einzige Katastrophe, die unablssig

Trmmer auf Trmmer huft und sie ihm vor die Fe schleudert (Benjamin, 1940). Where we perceive a chainof events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet (Benjamin,1940/2000).

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the Biblical story about salvation (the B story), the story about liberation from the Cave (the Cstory) and the Modern story about freedom from all authorities and traditions (the M story). Itell them in this order: C, A, B and M. B and A are the ones I favour and have used most timestudying. I tell two versions of the B story; one general and one related to Thomas Aquinas,who integrates A in B. At the end of the section I compare the stories briefly.

Through our language and culture we (Europeans) are influenced by all these stories, eitherwe know them or not. They have different weight and are interpreted differently. Which storyor story-combination that a person is rooted in and lives by is from the beginning determined

by ones upbringing and the persons close to oneself that one has chosen to admire and listento. Dialectics starts with doubt, but our learning does not. I suppose that also Tubbssfascinating dialectical climbing acrobatics has a foundation in upbringing and persuasiverhetoric. And if the basic stories or metanarratives are myths, they cannot be refuted, butonly out-narrated (Milbank, 1991, p. 260). A story about the dangers of all metanarratives,however, may itself become a metanarrative, and as such it is not persuasive. Acceptance ofdifferences should be a part of any story. But if celebration of multiplicity and pluralism

implicitly functions as the basic story, suppressing alternative stories, then confusion, lack ofroots and lack of stable relations has to be accepted as conditions for progress.

The C story. The story about the liberation from the Cave is told by Tubbs (2005, p. 246-250and 323-326). It portrays human beings as sitting in a dark cave where they are unfree andliving by illusions. But there is a path out of (p. 288) this condition up into the upperenlightened world of freedom and truth. As the sun gives light, which we depend on in orderto be able to use our ability to see, so the good gives all things their truth, which we dependon in order to be able to use our ability to know. As light and vision are sun-like, so truth andknowledge are good-like, but not the good itself. As the sun gives and sustains life, so thegood gives all known things their existence and their being, though the good is not being butsomething far surpassing being in rank and power (Plato, 2005, 508a-509c). Progress

towards the divine, the good, makes a real change both in what we see and who we are. Thetransition has to be made gradually, and when the source of the beautiful, true and good isseen at last, it is tempting for the philosopher to stay in the upper world. This should beresisted. The enlightened have a vocation to go down again in the Cave and help the fellow-

prisoners.

The story represents the conditions for improvement as a gradual and difficult and personallearning process. Learning starts with the dim light that is reflected in our souls already, butthis needs to be redirected and refined by the perfect source of light. The philosopher ishandicapped when going from darkness to light or from light to darkness. It is easier to staywith the illusions. Liberation and enlightenment may be very unpleasant and will evoke

resistance. The C story gives a strong metaphor of learning as a personal process

a processof askesis not as asceticism, but as the practice of spiritual exercises. It is a processaiming at a complete turning of the person, a transformation of our vision of the world and a metamorphosis of our personality (Hadot, 1995, p. 83). This presupposes a goodinstructor, tutor or leader, (Plato, 2005, 515c-d and 519c), a person who has already beenliberated and enlightened.

The A story. According to the Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle (later NE) we are all drawntowards what we perceive as pleasant and beautiful. The pleasant and the fine motivateeverything everyone does (Aristotle, 2002, NE 1110b12 Rowe). This compulsion is notsomething forced upon us from the outside without our contribution. We all seek happiness,

but not in the same things. Ordinary people identify happiness with one of the obvious thingsthat anyone would recognize, like pleasure or wealth or honour (1095a23), and most people

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are not even having a conception of the fine and the truly pleasant, since they have had notaste of it3 (1179b11-15). We voluntarily seek the pleasant and beautiful, but are we alsoresponsible for what we perceive as pleasant and beautiful and as aversive and ugly things todo? We ourselves are the origin of our actions, as we are of our children (1113b19). Thechildren are not the origin of themselves. Therefore we need to have had the appropriate

upbringing

right from early youth, as Plato says

to make us find enjoyment or pain in theright things; for this is the correct education (he orthe paideia) (Aristotle, 1985, 1104bIrwin).

The basic action of a child is to choose authorities: choose persons to admire, emulate, listento and obey more than others. Within the given limitations, the children will probably prefer

persons with some degree of moral virtue, wisdom (phronesis) and love. Children experiencewho are doing well towards themselves and others, and who are not. From the beginning theyexperience how they are being fed, warmed, and washed (Burnaby, 1938, p. 302), howadults deal with their anger, and how adults distribute goods between themselves and othersaround them. In play the children may reproduce these experiences. Both good actions and

bad actions we do voluntarily. Thereby we also become responsible for our own character.We may wish to do good things, but it may not help us if we have a long story of choosingwrongly and of doing bad things, and thereby have attained a weak or bad character. It isimpossible for a man to retrieve a stone after it has left his hand, but it depended on himthat it was thrown (NE 1114a18 Rowe). Knowledge of general precepts (ethical theory) doesnot help us if our passions make us blind for the connection between the abstract precepts andthe unique situation here and now, which demands action. Therefore Aristotle is sceptical asto the possibility of moral progress through mere verbal teaching. Our character does not

become good merely by studying ethics. Only those who already are experienced and goodmay benefit from such studies (1095a3-8 and 1179b5-10). Ones sight of the beautiful and

pleasant is made clear by virtue, and clouded by its absence (Sachs, 2002, p. 116, note 172).

Sachs gives reference to NE 1113a29-b1, 1143b13-14 and 1144a30. The basic problem offreedom is how to avoid being blinded and enslaved by our passions. Howard J. Curzer(2002) uses Aristotles descriptions of four groups of imperfect characters (NE 1179b7-16and 1145b8-13), and proposes a possible progress for adults, moving through these charactertypes in order to achieve full virtue. The many (hoi polloi) need external punishment to avoidthe vicious. The generous-minded or civilized (eleutherios) have internalized the punishmentand are feeling shame by actual or possible vicious actions. Thereby they are open to learn bythemselves to find better alternatives. The incontinent (acrates) know what is virtuous to do,

but need support to do it in the actual situation, where their passions sometimes takecommand. The continent or self-controlled (encrates) know what is virtuous and are able todo it in practice, but they have to struggle with themselves. Finally the virtuous (aretai) do the

good out of their character. Their thinking and emotions play together. They find somepleasure in doing virtuous actions, even when the action may be experienced as painful. Avirtuous person therefore spontaneously desires and seeks what is in accordance with thetruly good life that he is trying to lead (Porter, 1990, p. 103).

The B story starts with the condition prior to human misery. On the first page of the Bible it istold that God creates everything from nothing; and all is good, time and change included!(Bouwsma, 1976, p. 82) Human beings are created in the image of God. Therefore obedienceto God is not something externally imposed on us. Gods image (Bild) is the limit of our

3 Tubbs (2004, p. 556) confuses Aristotle's criticism of the many (hoi polloi) with criticism of "the men of

theory", and is thereby falsely widening the gap between the active condition for moral wisdom (phronesis) andthe active condition for theoretical wisdom (sophia). Phronesis is both about the universal and the particular (NE1141b14 and 20).

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Bildung (Gadamer, 1979, p. 11-12). Within this limit the human being is a free agent and nota mechanical instrument; he/she is called to be a fellow worker with God (Burnaby, 1938,

p. 265).The unfree situation is the result of a revolt against God. We wanted to transcend thelimit, wanted to be gods ourselves; and trying to be above change we started to fearexperience (Bouwsma, 1976, p. 84). We became self-centered and egoistic, bound to seek our

own pride independent of God. This is the condition even for the best persons, also those whoseem to be angels. The enemy in moral life is the fat, relentless ego (Iris Murdoc, herefrom Meilaender, 1984, p. 58). Is this the historic catastrophe that Benjamin describes, theeffect of the storm from Paradise? The head of the angel is relatively big compared with therest. Are the best persons in some ways like children, those who have had the least time tostudy and imitate adult cunning, hypocrisy, hatred and war?

Progress in this story is dependent on God. God chooses a people descending from Abrahamand leads them out of slavery, leads them through the wilderness towards the Promised Land;as an example to follow for all people. The followers are always tempted to regress to greatersecurity and wellbeing. The enlightening and correcting truth is Gods word, revealed by

Gods messengers. When Moses came down from Sinai, his face was shining with a light thatwas too strong for the people (Exodus 34:29-30). Listening to the tradition is important for thefollowers. They make the story of the Bible their story (George Lindbeck, here from Wells,1998, p. 55), and understand their own life story as a participation in a great narrative, whichstarts with creation and ends with the final judgement and the hope of a new heaven and anew earth. The task is to identify and fulfil ones own part in the common story. One cannotunderstand Scripture unless one is open to having ones life changed by it (Wells, 1998, p.77). This demands time for listening and praying, worship and sacraments. In this time themoral imagination is formed (p. 122). The task of human creative differentiation is to becharitable, and to give in art (all human action) endlessly new allegorical depictions ofcharity (Milbank, 1991, p. 425-426). Rationality is not the main criterion of progress. Gods

people include mentally handicapped, infants and the mentally ill (Wells, 1998, p. 128).They live in secular time and space, but the new time is constantly breaking in, giving anotherperspective on their actions (pp. 150-162). Only in this new time there is peace, and therebythe temptation to rest in common human illusions can be resisted. All things are good insofaras they exists, but something may become evil in terms of its failure to be related to God, toinfinite peace, and to other finite realities with which it should be connected to form a patternof true desire (Milbank, 1991, p. 432).

Thomas Aquinas has given a Christian interpretation of the B story, integrating A in B.Thomas thought that God works in every will and in every nature, also in those who do not

believe in God, thereby that every creature is oriented toward an end proportionate to its owndeterminate potentialities (Porter, 1990, p. 64). We are determined to have full freedom asrational beings, and we express ourselves in our acts. Ones single actions are like individualtones within the larger melody of ones life (Schockenhoff, 2002, p. 245), and the final endis present in everything one does (p. 244). Therefore it is necessary that all things which a

person desires, he desires on account of a final end4 (Porter, 1990, p. 72). The free humanbeing is one who has made the roles that she occupies into a part of herself by her consciouschoice to accept them, and who takes responsibility for the direction of her own life by fittingthose roles together into an orderly life-plan that is the goal of her life (p. 82). The cardinalvirtues (temperance, courage, justice and moral wisdom) provide a foundation for thisunification of the personality (p. 167). Through moral wisdom (phronesis) I grasp what thegood life requires of me, both as a general sketch and in each particular case (p. 163).

However, this unification will inevitably be partial and vulnerable to tensions and regrets4 necesse est quod omnia quae homo appetit appetat propter ultimum finem (Aquinas, 2005, I-II 1,6 co.).

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(p. 169). The final end, perfect happiness, a personal union with God, is attained outside thislife. Perfect happiness depends on Gods grace alone. The naturally just individual who lacksgrace is objectively as far from salvation as the worst sinners (p. 66). The listening to andliving in the message of the prophets and apostles opens the possibility for the Holy Spirit toinfuse faith, hope and charity (agape) into human hearts, which creates a determination to

stay in relation with Jesus Christ, the new Adam. Baptism represents the drowning(annihilation) of the false human pride and the creation out of nothing (ex nihil) of a newhuman being.Agape completes the unification of the person, and adds something to moral lifethat the cardinal virtues in themselves do not attain: a new motivation for moral behavior,inner harmony and patience (p. 66-67). The infusion of faith, hope and charity is causedin us without any action on our part, but not without our consent (Aquinas, I-II 55,4 ad 6Benziger). Justifying grace is infused into the human being by the Holy Spirit. This happensover time and the Spirit becomes part of ones character. Therefore every action is really myaction, also when God acts immanently in my act (Healy, 2003, p. 86). Also in Christ I amresponsible for all my actions and my character orhabitus, the way I hold myself.

The M story. Kant is one of the philosophers who shaped our modern understanding of theconcept of freedom. A free action must be un-coerced by anything external grounded inyour own reasoning (Tubbs, 2005, p. 259). The Modern story seems to presuppose that thereasoning individual can be absolutely independent of authorities and traditions. And Kantsessay about liberation through enlightenment (1784) may be read in this way. It maintains likethe previous stories that our unfree condition is self-incurred. But unlike both A and B ittells us that the condition is caused by cowardice and laziness, and it seems therefore thatwe rather easily can make our own minds up (Tubbs, 2005, p. 259), become free fromtutelage and make ourself better. Human beings bring themselves little by little out ofrudeness (Rohigkeit), if not one [i. e. the political leaders] intentionally take artificialmeasures to hold them in it (Kant, 1784, p. 492, my transl.)5. Progress happens when the

individual mobilises the courage to use her own reason. Sapere aude! (p. 481), dare tothink! However, do Kants disciples think independently when they follow this imperative?(Tubbs, 2005, p. 405)

The M story seems to be reinforced by the three critiques that Kant wrote during the 1780s.His questions orbit around the I: What can I know? What ought to determine my will? Howcan I judge without concepts? The first critique can be seen as a program for seeking truthindependent of moral and political concerns, the second as a program for seeking the rightthing to do independent of tradition, and the third as a program for appreciating beautiful formindependent of both moral concerns and tradition. His third critique is the keystone, makingthe bridge between epistemology and moral philosophy. He grounds his confidence in the Ion our experience of the beautiful in nature. The Is interest in the beautiful nature gives theI a hint that it is the best of all creatures. Nature points to us as to the ultimate goal ofcreation (Gadamer, 1979, p. 47). The world exists for our sake. Therefore the I can giveitself (auto) the laws (nomoi) to follow. Human beings can confidently use their own reasonand autonomously determine criteria for what is true to think and what is right to do.

If this I is perfect, it can be trusted absolutely. If not, the production of Kant and his modernsuccessors is like a great image of exceeding brightness, standing on feet of clay. A work ofKant from 1793-94 (written after the critiques) paint the human condition with darker colours:

Religion within the limits of mere reason 6 starts with a comprehensive discussion of the

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Die Menschen arbeiten sich von selbst nach und nach aus der Rohigkeit heraus, wenn man nur nicht absichtlichknstelt, um sie darin zu erhalten.6Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloen Vernunft

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problem of evil. Kant maintains that human beings have a propensity to evil. As one knowsthe human being through experience, he cannot be judged otherwise. Therefore evil issubjectively necessary in every human being, even the best7 (Kant, here from Louden,2000, p. 133 and 136). The radicality of the problem requires more than a gradual reform. Wecan become new human beings only through some kind of rebirth, like through a new

creation (John 3:5, compared with Genesis 1:2) and change of heart8

(Kant, 1794/1970, p.698, my transl.). Though this view comes close to the B story, Kants story is different.Kants religion is based on morality, and morality is based on human reason.

Can the fat, relentless ego pull itself up from the hole in the thin ice by its own thinking?Kant asks a similar question, but his answer seems to me like an assertion. He presupposesthat duty demands that we become good, and that duty never demands something impossible.In spite of the fall [from the good to the evil] this commandment keeps soundingundiminished in our soul: we ought to [sollen] become better human beings, consequently wemust be able to achieve it, eventually by making ourselves receptive to some for usunexplorable higher assistance9 (Kant, 1794/1970, p. 695 and 698, my transl.). Perhaps it is

possible to argue for the view that ought to do implies can do, but this view seems strangeto me. Sometimes we utter a word and think immediately that we ought to take it back. But itcan be too late. We ought to and can apologize, but the first word was said and may still hurt.We ought to return a book that belongs to another, but if we wait too long we may forget whoit was. Pauls experience is opposite to Kant: to will [the good] is present with me; but howto perform that which is good I find not" (Romans 7:18 King James). However, Kant

believes that there is a kind of education that can (somehow) cut through natural causes andtemporal circumstances and get to the bottom that is, to the agents manner of thinkingand moral character (Louden, 2000, p. 47). Is this belief well founded?

In the lectures on pedagogic10, Kant is concerned with the difficulties of improvement. Toovercome them it is necessary that one generation transfers its experiences and bits of

knowledge to the next (Kant & Rink, 1803). In other words: We can only learn to think forourselves within the tradition we already belong to before we have formed a single thought.This gives upbringing the key function. And to warrant continuous progress, avoiding thatone generation brings down what the former has brought up, the mechanics in pedagogy

7 er [der Mensch] kann nach dem, wie man ihn durch Erfahrung kennt, nicht anders beurteilt werden, oder mankann es [das der Mensch bse ist], als subjektiv notwendig, in jedem, auch dem besten, Menschen voraussetzen.(Kant, 1794/1970, p. 680)8 er [der Mensch] kann ein neuer Mensch, nur durch eine Art von Wiedergeburt, gleich als durch eine neueSchpfung (Ev. Joh. III,5; verglichen mit I. Mose I,2), und nderung des Herzens werden.9 Denn, ungeachtet jenes Abfalls, eschallt doch das Gebot: wir sollen bessere Menschen werden, unvermindert in

unserer Seele; folglich mssen wir es auch knnen, sollte auch das, was wir tun knnen, fr sich alleinunzureichend sein, und wir uns dadurch nur eines fr uns unerforschlichen hheren Beistandes empfnglichmachen.10 The German concept "Pdagogik" is often translated with "pedagogy". This is misleading. The word"pedagogic" may be compared with "rhetoric", in Greekrhetorike (namely techne), the skill and study of

pursuasive public speaking. Thus the construction of Pdagogik from about 1770 includes both the agogia (thepractical upbringing, guidance or "pedagogy") and the techne (the know-how and theoretical study) ofpaideia(upbringing, human cultivation and culture). "P[dagogik] ist und bleibt bis heute Kollektivsingular fr dasganze Spektrum der praktischen und theoretischen Beschftigung mit Erziehung" (Hgli, 1989, p. 4).Aristotelians may understand Pdagogik as a type ofphronesis. Phronesis can be translated as"moral or

practical wisdom knowledge of what one should do" (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 59 and 190). Persons withphronesis are morally virtuous persons (NE 1144b31) who combine slow theoretical reflection and immediateintuitive judgement (Aubenque, 1963/1986, p. 148), and directs their eventual special technai towards the

attainment of their "wider concerns as a human being" (Dunne, 1993, p. 265)

the good life as a whole.Phronesis is in principle the same active condition (hexis) aspolitike (NE 1141b24), the wisdom that is neededin law-giving and in political action.

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(Erziehungskunst) has to be transformed to academic studies (Wissenschaft) (p. 17, mytransl.). A reliable theory of education is necessary. Have we got such a theory? Kant seescoercion (Zwang) as necessary in upbringing, and formulates the problem of upbringing inthis way: How do I cultivate the freedom through the coercion? (p. 32, my transl.)11 So afterall, also Kant sees positive possibilities in tradition and authority. This brings Kant close to

the Aristotelian story.All the four stories insist on human freedom and responsibility as basic to progress. All haveconceptions of the difficulties of progress. All may be criticised. And all have interestingnuances that may supply the others.

A, the Aristotelian story, contends that moral character goes before moral perception andthinking. C, the Cave story, sees personal improvement and thinking together. M, the Modernstory, seems to put thinking in the leading position. B, the Biblical story, can be seen asabsurd, as it reduces the importance of human thinking and striving. These differences mayexplain the strong position of C and M metaphors in formal education. Tubbs tells the C storyas the (?) answer to the question what is education? (Tubbs, 2005, p. 246)

B addresses directly why human beings started to choose the wrong things and to live inbondage and untruth. The C story does neither tell why we became prisoners in the first placenor how one prisoner could get loose from the bonds for the first time and become tutor forthe others. According to A it is many who seek the wrong things and are content withillusions of the good, but A does not tell why so many emulate vices.

In A and B emotional conditions are seen as important for possible improvement. A issystematic. B is rich on examples. Both A, B and C give a sketch of a good life that is thesame for all, but realised differently by the individuals. M is more focused on the individual.In A the resources for finding and attaining the good life are given in our natural capacities. InB we are dependent on God and in C we are dependent on the good. In B and C the divine

light that enlightens us comes from without and is reflected in human minds. In the M storyhuman beings seem to have the light in themselves. Thinking themselves to be independent ofanything divine, they rely on their own resources to find the right path and to bring or buildthemselves up.

Tubbs gives a refined M story. He contends that teachers today have to rely on modernabstract and aporetic thinking in the tradition of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. Inthis tradition the I (the experiencing and thinking subject) stands in the center, and the maincondition for improvement or upbuilding seems to be the subjects ability to stay patientlyin doubt, doubting also this main condition. The strength of this tradition is said to be itsawareness of the negative in our existence (Tubbs, 2005, p. 407).

C and M stories dominates in Tubbss texts; interpretations of A and B are criticized or areonly indirectly represented. I am thankful to Nigel Tubbs for leading myself and others toSren Aabye Kierkegaard (later SAK). It gave me an impulse to get a glimpse into SAKsown writing. In the next section I try to supply Tubbss rather abstract representation of SAK,first of all with the example SAK gives us in being open for the B story.

3. Is upbuilding possible? Nigel Tubbs (2003) discusses how teaching of truth (religion) and teaching for truth(philosophy) can be combined in a church college context today, aiming at the upbuilding of

11 Wie kultiviere ich die Freiheit bei dem Zwange?

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the individual. Later, in a special issue (2005), he addresses a more general educationalcontext as master and servant on a long dialectical journey, where in the end he turns to SrenAabye Kierkegaard (SAK) and his Upbuilding discourses,for a philosophical, spiritual andreligious examination of the philosophical character of the teacher (Tubbs, 2005, p. 409).SAKs eighteen Opbyggelige Taler, published in his own name in six small booklets12 during

1843-1844, were not addressed to teachers, but to that single individual (hiin Enkelte) whomI with joy and gratitude call my reader. In the beginning this was his beloved Regine. Laterhiin Enkelte was generalised to anyone willing to let the speech (Talen) be transformed toconversation (Samtale), like in the ideal situation of a church congregation when both the

preacher and the listener receives what is spoken as Gods Word, a gift of love from above.SAK wrote not as a teacher but in order to enhance his own upbringing and upbuilding.(Kierkegaard, 1990, historical introduction) These speeches may be of interest to all who wantto become better human beings, teachers included.

Leaning on SAK, Tubbs (2005, pp. 411-413) sketches stages in the upbuilding of the humansoul (in my interpretation): 1. the stage of being possessed, 2. the stage of impatience and

doubt, and 3. the stage of patience in the struggle with oneself. 1. Being possessed. The childexperience itself as Gods child, it has an immediate relation to God (p. 412). Gods houseis right next to his fathers residence, and it is entirely natural for him to be there(Kierkegaard, 1990, p. 242). Growing older, the human soul desires the world and its

pleasures (the external, temporal and imperfect), we dream about being masters, beingcapable of everything (Goethe, 1798). Possessing the world, the soul become possessed by it.But our soul is the contradiction of the temporal and the eternal, and therefore we resist being

possessed by the temporal. The feeling of homelessness created by this contradiction is wellcaptured by Pink Floyd in Nobody home (The Wall): Ive got a strong urge to fly but Ivegot nowhere to fly to (Waters, 1982). 2. Impatience and doubt. The imperfect soul findsitself in a situation of anxiety and doubt. The outcome may be an inpatient search for pleasure

and control or an inpatient movement of thinking to always new positions, a movement whichnever brings truth. Therefore we should deny false doubt, deny the doubt that doubtseverything except the doubt itself. For subjectivity to know itself in doubt is to know itself asthe need for God. God is present in all the ways that we do not understand ourselves andthe world ... He has given us the gift of doubt, and God in doubt offers a potentially strongerrelationship to God than one of professed belief. (Tubbs, 2005, p. 410) 3. Patience in thestruggle with oneself. Perfection of the soul demands patience in the struggle with oneself.The soul belongs to the world as illegitimate possession, it belongs to God as legitimate

possession, it belongs to himself [the human being] as possession, that is as the possession,which is to be gained. Therefore, if he really gains his soul, he gains his soul from the world,of God, by himself13 (Kierkegaard, 1962, p. 151, my transl.; cf 1990, p. 167). Gaining the

soul by oneself (ved sig selv) means struggling with oneself. The first struggle is a struggleagainst being conquered by the external, surrounding world. The soul has to be gained backfrom the world (fra Verden). The second struggle is an internal struggle with oneself againstinward temptations, for example the temptation of false pride, that occurs when the person

12 Although all these 18 short texts are rooted in the Christian Bible and sixteen have an explicit reference to "aWord" from the Scripture in the heading, SAK (in the forewords to each booklet) tells that he did not publish"semons", as he was not ordained to preach. Instead he issued Taler, which can be translated as "speeches". EdnaH. Hong and Howard V. Hong (Kierkegaard, 1990) have instead chosen the title "discourses", perhaps in orderto underline the philosophical character of the texts. All translations are interpretations. I have only read parts ofthis translation, but some places I have felt the need for an alternative.13

Den [sjelen] skal p eengang eies og erhverves, den tilhrer Verden som ulovlig Eiendom, den tilhrer Gudsom sand Eiendom, den tilhrer ham selv som Eiendom, det er som den Eiendom, der skal erhverves. Hanerhverver da altsaa, hvis han virkelig erhverver, sin Sjel fra Verden, af Gud, ved sig selv.

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himself wants to be something (1990, p. 226; Tubbs, 2005, p. 413), instead of gainingeverything of God (af Gud).

Reading Tubbs representation of SAK, I get the impression that the way to upbuilding, thepath up from the Cage to a good relation with God goes through abstraction, doubt, aporeticdoubt in doubt, increase in the importance learning and decrease of the teacher. Doubt is seenas a gift that God has given us (Tubbs, 2005, p. 410), and other gifts (faith, love andlearning) seem to be a function of staying patiently in doubt. Teaching for truth becomes theone thing needful. Professed belief is seen as irrelevant (ibid.), and therefore teaching of truthseems not to be necessary. Tubbs lets SAK join the C and M stories. Reading SAK, however,I get the alternative impression that doubt is a result of human action, that there is no wayfrom us to God, and that confrontation with the message of the Apostles is necessary forupbuilding in faith and love. I contend that SAK primarily is rooted in the B story. In the

preface to Two upbuilding speeches from 1844, Kierkegaard (1990, p. 179) says that thoughthe book has left out something concerning the uncertain, it nevertheless has forgottennothing. The upbuilding speeches are concerned with the moral message of the New

Testament, but the understanding of Jesus as Christ is not forgotten. I interpret them as apreparation for the revelation in Christ. They follow the example of John the Baptist, who wasa messenger (angelos) preparing the way before the Lord (Matthew 11:10 with reference toMalachi 3:1).

In his second speech on James 1:17-22, Every good gift and every perfect gift is from aboveand comes down from the Father of lights, SAK starts with the story about the fruits ofknowledge, which were forbidden to human beings. In the beginning they received all goodgifts without raising questions about the giver. The peace was broken when they ate of theseemingly fine fruits of the tree of knowledge, and experienced the consequences as toil, fearand doubt (Kierkegaard, 1962, p. 118). The cunning of doubt is to give the human being theillusion that doubt can defeat itself by doubting14 (p. 119). It is possible to read the Scripture

without grasping its upbringing care, without letting the Word draw us up to itself. Thereby aword of comfort may become the seed of doubt (pp. 120-122) and close our ears for theineffable speeches sounding from above (1990, p. 132). Human thought knows the way tomuch in the world ... but the way to the good, to the secret hiding place of the good, this itdoes not know, since there is no way to it, but every good and every perfect gift comes downfrom above (1990, p. 134-135). There is no path up from the Cave! The way of the Apostleis the more perfect way, along which you die away from doubt, while the perfect comes toyou15 (Kierkegaard 1962, p. 126, my transl.; cf 1990, p. 135). Without a firm relation withGod in faith, doubts false friendship will repeatedly change everything for you with itsshadows, confuse it with its variations, obscure it with the fogs of night (1990, p. 136). Eventhe condition that makes it possible for us to receive Gods gifts, is a gift from God. Thecondition that we cannot give ourselves is like a new creation, a birth or e-duction: God hasbrought us forth by the word of truth, that we should be a first fruit of his creatures (1990,

p. 137; cf James 1:18). There is a right use of doubt, based in faith. While the eye of faithlongs for the heavenly, the individual may use doubt in the right way, not to doubt whatstands firm and will stand firm forever in its eternal clarity, but to doubt that which willmore and more vanish, to doubt himself, his own capacity and competence (1990, p. 137).For the false doubt doubts everything except itself, the saving doubt doubts only itself by

14 "er det ikke Tvivlens List, at den indbilder et Menneske, at den ved sig selv kan overvinde sig selv". Hong andHong (Kierkegaard, 1990, p. 128) gives this translation: "is it not doubt's stratagem to make a person believe

that he by himself can overcome himself". The impersonal pronoun "den" (masculine) points back to "Tvivlen",not to "et Menneske" which is neuter.15 den fuldkomnere Vei, ad hvilken Du afder fra Tvivlen, medens det Fuldkomne kommer til Dig

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help of the faith16 (1962, p. 128, my transl.) The condition in each person by which one canreceive Gods gifts, is itself a perfect gift (p. 126): to need the Holy Spirit is a perfection in[hos] the human being17 (p. 129, my transl.; cf. 1990, p. 139). Both this need itself, the

prayer for having this need, and the communion (Meddelelsen) of this need is a good andperfect gift from above (p. 129). Doubt as such is not a gift of God, but the doubt in ones

own doubt is useful.The consideration, that to have need for God is a human beings highest perfection, doeswell make life more difficult, but considers it [life] as well after the perfection, and in thisconsideration [of life after its perfection] the human being, by the piecemeal experiencing[Opleven], that is the good understanding with God, comes to learn to know God18(Kierkegaard, 1962, p. 286, my transl.; cf 1990, p. 321). The acknowledgment of the need forGod opens for a piecemeal experiencing of Gods existence in all the small things that we do.In the previous paragraph SAK discusses whether it is a sort of heavyminded pessimism(Tungsindighed) to say that the human being is able to resist bad tendencies in oneself, butunable to overcome oneself. He ends the paragraph with the twice repeated admonition:

Rejoice in the Lord! (Philippians 4:4), where he sees the pause between the two rejoicingsas a room for reflection on all the negative things that may be said about human beings. WhenSAK considers the perfection of life, he contends that the highest that the human being is ableto will is seldom achieved in the world, because the highest is this: that a human being

becomes fully convinced that one is capable of nothing at all, nothing at all19 (1962, p. 274,my transl; cf 1990, p. 307). This is not gloomy pessimism, because this truth about human

beings stands between the repeated rejoicing in the Lord, the good understanding with God.Though this understanding is only a piecemeal experiencing, it is in this faith relation withGod that one gradually learns to know God. Grace is the word that changes everything (pp.267-268; cf 1990, pp. 300-301). The desire to be assured of the grace of God helps thehuman being to see that he needs God, and the more he in his need presses forward to God,

the more perfect he is (1990, p. 303). SAK builds on Gods message to Paul: My grace issufficient for you, for my power is made perfect in weakness (2 Corinthians 12:9 RSV). Inones struggle with oneself, the true outcome is the anihilation of oneself. To be oneself is: toslay oneself, slay the self that is to oneself enough (Ibsen, 1867/1882 Act 5, scene 9 and8). This truth is above human capacity; at most he is capable of being willing to understandthat this smoldering brand [trre Brand] only consumes until the fire of Gods love ignites the

blaze in what the smoldering brand could not consume. Thus man is a helpless creature,because all other understanding that makes him understand that he can help himself is but amisunderstanding, even though in the eyes of the world he is regarded as courageous byhaving the courage to remain in a misunderstanding, that is, by not having the courage tounderstand the truth. (Kierkegaard, 1990, p. 309-310; cf 1962, p. 275-276)

As to know oneself in ones own nothingness is the condition for knowing God, so to knowGod is the condition for [the process] that a human being by Gods help is sanctified after its

16 Thi den usande Tvivl tvivler om Alt, kun ikke om sig selv, den frelsende Tvivl tvivler kun om sig selv vedTroens Bistand.17 det at behve den Hellig Aand er en Fuldkommenhed hos Mennesket18 "Den Betragtning, at det at trnge til Gud er Menneskets hieste Fuldkommenhed, gjr vel Livet vanskeligere,men betragter det tillige efter Fuldkommenheden, og i denne betragtning kommer Mennesket, ved denstykkevise Opleven, hvilket er den gode Forstelse med Gud, til at lre at kjende Gud." The 1990-translationtranslates the verbal noun Opleven, denoting an ongoing activity, as if it was the ordinary noun Oplevelse, aterminated experience, and combines "experience" with an "of" (af), which is not at all in the text. Tubbs partly

corrects the translation in 2003 (p. 64), but not in 2005 (p. 410).19 vi dlge ikke, at det [Hieste] sjeldent blev naaet i Verden; thi det Hieste er: at et Menneske fuldeligoverbevises om, at han selv slet Intet formaaer, slet Intet.

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destiny20 (1962, p. 289, my transl.; cf 1990, p. 325). To need God is not the ultimate end, butmarks the beginning of a process of transforming the human being, a process of Bildungapproaching theBildthat is our destiny. The Button-moulder says to Peer Gynt:

To be oneself is: to slay oneself.But on you that answer is doubtless lost;and therefore well say: to stand forth everywherewith Masters intention displayed like a signboard.21(Ibsen, 1867/1882 Act 5, scene 9)

Before God all human beings are equal. In spite of the many differences, we are equalstewards of Gods gifts. Both when we give and when we receive, we deal with Gods gift,and these gifts should not create inequality between us. The steward of the gift should givewithout conditions and always remember that he or she is less significant than the gift. Thereceiver of the gift should receive with a free response of thankfulness both to the steward andto God. Therefore, if you give money or outward goods, much or little (Kierkegaard, 1962,

pp. 134-137; cf 1990, pp. 144-149), if you give an admonition (p. 137), sympathy, truth (p.

138) or a simple word (p. 139) to another, remember that you are yourself less significantthan your gift22 (p. 139). And when you owe to another human being your insight, youreducation, your thinking and your persuasive speech, your life remember that no human

being can give anything that is not given to himself from above (p. 143, my transl.; cf 1990, p. 156), and that also the receiver is less significant than the gift. Owe no one anything,except to love one another (Romans 13:8).

The general philosophical and religious knowing of God is a knowing that God is (Tubbs,2003, p. 60). By Gods grace we may also know what God is: love (agape), a love that giveswithout looking for rewards, looks for the good sides of others and loves forth the good evenin morally bad persons. (1962, p. 62-63; 1990 p. 60-61).The perfect one whom the Apostle

Paul describes ... boast of his weakness (2 Corinthians 11:30 and 12:5-9), and is jubilantlythrowing himself into Gods arms in unspeakable amazement at God, who is capable of allthings (Kierkegaard, 1990, p. 318).

God is capable of all things, but the process of transformation of the human being will always be imperfect in this life, as the truly blessed relation with God is finalised in heaven(Kierkegaard, 1962, p. 291). A few years after the publication ofOpbyggelige Taler, and nineyears before he died, SAK chose a hymn verse that he wanted on his gravestone.Kierkegaards family grave is located in the Assistens Kirkegrd (cemetry) in Kbenhavn 23and this hymn verse24 is engraved on it:

20

Som det at kjende sig selv i sin egen Intethed er Betingelsen for at kjende Gud, saaledes er det at kjende GudBetingelsen for, at et Menneske ved hans Bistand helliggjres efter sin Bestemmelse.21 "At vre sig selv, er: sig selv at dde. | Dog, p dig er sagtens den forklaring spildt? | Og derfor, lad detkaldes: overalt at mde | med Mesters mening til udhngsskilt." (Ibsen, 1886, p. 246) In a newer Englishtranslation the meaning of the last two lines has got an interesting interpretation. To be oneself is "to showunmistakably | The Master's intention whatever you're doing" (Ibsen, 1989, p. 158). There should be consistency

between our banner or signboard (udhngsskilt) and our everyday practice. But perhaps it could be possible tomistake what is shown outwardly? Kierkegaard's "knight of faith" can be a quite ordinary person (Tubbs, 2005,

p. 408).22 Du selv ringere end Din Gave.23 There is map at http://www.assistens.dk/korta.htm24 "Det er en liden Tid " is verse 10 (of 12 verses) in the hymn "Halleluja, jeg har min Jesum funden",

published by Hans Adoph Brorson in 1739 and sung (probably also by Kierkegaard) on a melody by H. O. C.

Zink from 1796 to "Nu rinder solen op". You may get an impression of the melody from an ugly midi-file athttp://www.ugle.dk/nu_rinder_solen_op.html However, it should be sung slower. My translation can be sung tothe melody. It is this melody that dictates the repetition of the seventh line.

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There is a little time,Then have I won,

Then will the entire strifeBe suddenly gone,Then can I restIn halls of rosesAnd ceaselesslyAnd ceaselessly [with]My Jesus speak.(Watkin, 1996)

A little while I waitAnd then Ill triumph.

Then the entire fightwill swiftly vanish.Then I can rest in peacein halls of roses.Incessantly with easeIncessantly with easecommune with Jesus.(my transl.)

Can human beings make themselves better? If we underline themselves and add withoutGod, SAKs answer (and my answer) will be no. But upbuilding is possible; both when weuse the gifts that God gives to all human beings irrespective of faith, and when we do notclose the possibility for receiving the gifts of love that God wants to give everybody throughJesus Christ.

All the four stories require leaders who exemplify good thinking and action. In the C storythis will be the best philosophers (sophoi), in the A story the morally wise (phronimoi) and inthe B story Gods messengers (angeloi). Believers in the M story may think that theindividual human being can start from scratch, but that is an illusion. Following A and C, theleaders ought to give laws and administer rewards and punishments in order to regulate theactions of all who belong to a society. Thereby also those who are possessed by illusions and

passions to some extent can be restrained from doing the worst actions, and conditions andinstitutions for upbuilding may be planned. But attempts to control the selection andeducation of good leaders will never succeed. All new starts are initiated by failing human

beings. This is clearly acknowledged in the B story and refined variants of the M story.

I would like to encourage and support groups of adults who want to become better examplesfor children. How can the stories be applied to this project? Leading the planning of suchgroups is a great challenge, and the stories can help me to be better prepared for failures.Important tasks are selection, description and ordering of possible content: texts, pictures,films. All the four stories ought to be represented in some way, also the B story, which insome settings is excluded. Texts like Peer Gyntand pictures like Angelus novus represent a

meeting between M and B. Platos Cave story can probably be used directly in some groups,and it could be possible to use texts from the New Testament like 1 Peter 4:7-12, love coversa multitude of sins, perhaps supplied with Kierkegaards first speech on this text. Importantis also to give proposals to the groups concerning progression and dialogue. An interestingchallenge would be to discuss and order the content in relation to phases of improvementdescribed in A combined with phases described by Kierkegaard. Ill develop these ideas inanother paper.

If life is a struggle between the worse and the better parts of ourselves, experiences tell usthat the good parts may resist, but are unable to overcome the worse parts. Sigrid Undset hasexpressed this beautifully, explaining her selection of stories about King Arthur and theknights of the round table: For mores and customs change a lot, as times passes and the

belief of human beings changes and they think differently about many things. But the hearts

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of the human beings change not at all in all days25 (Undset, 1953, p. 256, my transl.). If weadmit that we are powerless and helpless, it is not we who can make ourselves better, butGod. We can only give to others the love that we have been given. His goodness is thefountain of thy worth. / Oh! live to love and set it forth (Thomas Traherne, here fromBurnaby, 1938, p. 300).

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On becoming better human beings by Stein Wivestad