On the Sign According to St. Thomas Aquinas

7/28/2019 On the Sign According to St. Thomas Aquinas.

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ON THE SIGN ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

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I. ON THE SIGN CONSIDERED IN ITSELF.

1. The definition of the sign.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,In IV Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1b, obj. 1 (taken from St. Augustine,On Christian Doctrine, Book II, ch. 1, n. 1):

A sign is a thing which, besides the species it brings into the senses [praeter speciem quam

ingerit sensibus], makes something other than itself come into knowledge.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,In IV Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1b, ad 5 (tr. B.A.M.):

To the fifth it must be said that sign, considered in itself, implies something manifest to us

by which we are led by the hand [maniducimur] to knowledge of something hidden.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,In IV Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1b, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

To the second question it must be said that, as has been said, sign implies something

known to us by which we are led by the hand to knowledge of another thing. But the things

first known to us are things falling under the senses, from which all our knowledge has itsrise, and sosign as regards its first institution signifies some sensible thing according as by it

we are led by the hand to knowledge of something hidden; and in this way the Master takes

sign here. But it sometimes happens that something more known to us, even if it is not a

thing falling under the senses, as if by a secondary signification is called a signas the

Philosopher says in the second book of the Nicomachean Ethics (ch. 2, 1104b 4) that a sign

of a habit engendered in us should be the pleasure the doer takes in the work, which is not a

sensible pleasure, since it belongs to reason.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 60, a. 4, ad 1 (tr. unknown):

To the first, therefore, it must be said that each thing is principally denominated and

defined according to that which belongs to it primarily and through itself [primo et per se],but not by that which belongs to it through something else [per aliud]. But a sensible effect

has through itself [the power] to lead to the knowledge of another thing as if [quasi]

becoming known to man primarily and through itself, because all our knowledge has itsbeginning from sense. But intelligible effects do not have the power [non habent quod

possint] to lead to knowledge of something else except insofar as they are manifested

through something elsethat is, through certain sensibles. And so it is that first and prin-

cipally are called signs things which are offered to the senses, as Augustine says in the

second book of On Christian Doctrine (ch. 1, n. 1), that a sign is that which, besides the

species it brings into the senses, makes something other come into knowledge. But

intelligible effects do not have the character of a sign [ rationem signi] except insofar as they

are manifested through certain signs. And by this mode certain things which are not sensible

are also in some way called sacraments, insofar as they are signified by certain sensibles,which will be treated below.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. De Veritate, q. 9, a. 4, ad 4 (tr. B.A.M.):

To the fourth it must be said that something cannot be called a sign, properly speaking,

unless from it one come into knowledge of another thing, as by discoursing. And according

to this, there is no sign among the angels since their knowledge is not discursive, as has been

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established in the preceding question. And on account of this, also among us signs are sen-

sible, since our knowledge, which is discursive, arises from sensible things. But commonly

we may call a sign anything known in which something [else]1 is known, and in this respect

an intelligible species can be called the sign of a thing which is known through it.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,In I Sent., dist. 1, q. 4, art. 2, ex. (tr. B.A.M.):

To [the preceding objection] it must be said that this division [sc. of signs and things] is

not given through opposite things, but through opposite accounts according to absolute andrelative. For a sign is what has been instituted in order to signify something [signum enim est

quod est institutum ad aliquid significandum]; but a thing is what has absolute signification

not related to something else. And so it is not unfitting that the same thing be a sign and a

thing in respect of diverse things, as the same [man] is a father as well as a son.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., III, q. 6, art. 4, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

But a sign is that by means of which someone arrives at knowledge of another thing

[signum autem est per quod aliquis devenit in cognitionem alterius].

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 60, art. 4 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

Article 4. Whether a sacrament is always something sensible?

Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament is not always something sensible. Because,

according to the Philosopher (Prior. Anal. ii), every effect is a sign of its cause. But just as

there are some sensible effects, so are there some intelligible effects; thus science is the

effect of a demonstration. Therefore not every sign is sensible. Now all that is required for a

sacrament is something that is a sign of some sacred thing, inasmuch as thereby man is sanc-

tified, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore something sensible is not required for a sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, sacraments belong to the kingdom of God and the Divine worship.

But sensible things do not seem to belong to the Divine worship: for we are told (Jn. 4:24)that God is a spirit; and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth; and

(Rom. 14:17) that the kingdom of God is not meat and drink. Therefore sensible things are

not required for the sacraments.

Objection 3: Further. Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) that sensible things are goods of

least account, since without them man can live aright. But the sacraments are necessary for

mans salvation, as we shall show farther on (Q[61], A[1]): so that man cannot live aright

without them. Therefore sensible things are not required for the sacraments.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx super Joan.): The word is added to the

element and this becomes a sacrament; and he is speaking there of water which is a sensible

element. Therefore sensible things are required for the sacraments.

I answer that, Divine wisdom provides for each thing according to its mode; hence it is

written (Wis. 8:1) that she . . . ordereth all things sweetly: wherefore also we are told (Mat.

25:15) that she gave to everyone according to his proper ability. Now it is part of mans

nature to acquire knowledge of the intelligible from the sensible. But a sign is that by means

of which one attains to the knowledge of something else. Consequently, since the sacredthings which are signified by the sacraments, are the spiritual and intelligible goods by

1 Reading aliudfor Busas aliquid, as is required by the sense.

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means of which man is sanctified, it follows that the sacramental signs consist in sensible

things: just as in the Divine Scriptures spiritual things are set before us under the guise of

things sensible. And hence it is that sensible things are required for the sacraments; as

Dionysius also proves in his book on the heavenly hierarchy (Coel. Hier. i).

Reply to Objection 1: The name and definition of a thing is taken principally from that

which belongs to a thing primarily and essentially: and not from that which belongs to it

through something else. Now a sensible effect being the primary and direct object of mans

knowledge (since all our knowledge springs from the senses) by its very nature leads to theknowledge of something else: whereas intelligible effects are not such as to be able to lead

us to the knowledge of something else, except in so far as they are manifested by some otherthing, i.e. by certain sensibles. It is for this reason that the name sign is given primarily and

principally to things which are offered to the senses; hence Augustine says (De Doctr.

Christ. ii) that a sign is that which conveys something else to the mind, besides the species

which it impresses on the senses. But intelligible effects do not partake of the nature of asign except in so far as they are pointed out by certain signs. And in this way, too, certain

things which are not sensible are termed sacraments as it were, in so far as they are signified

by certain sensible things, of which we shall treat further on (Q[63], A[1], ad 2; A[3], ad 2;

Q[73], A[6]; Q[74], A[1], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 2: Sensible things considered in their own nature do not belong to theworship or kingdom of God: but considered only as signs of spiritual things in which the

kingdom of God consists.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks there of sensible things, considered in their nature;

but not as employed to signify spiritual things, which are the highest goods.

2. A definition equivalent to that ofsign, commonly speaking.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentes, III, cap. 2, n. 7 (tr. B.A.M.):

A medium through the knowledge of which we arrive at knowledge of another thing

[medio per cuius cognitionem devenimus in cognitionem alterius].

3. On priority and posteriority in the character of the sign.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. De Veritate, q. 4, art. 1, obj. 7, ad 7 (tr. B.A.M.):

obj. 7. Further, the more an effect is posterior, the more it has the character of a sign, just

as wine is the final cause of the barrel, and finally of the hoop, which is hung up in order to

designate it [sc. the wine]and so the hoop especially has the character of a sign. But the

word which exists in vocal sound is the latest effect coming from the intellect. Therefore the

character of a sign [ratio signi] belongs to it more than to the concept of the mind, and

likewise the character of a word, which is imposed from manifestation. But everything

which is in bodily things before spiritual things is not properly said of God. Therefore

word is not properly said of God.

ad 7. To the seventh it must be said that the character of a sign belongs to an effect beforeit belongs to a cause when the cause is the cause of the being of the effect, but not of its

signifying, as happens in the example proposed. But when an effect has from a cause not

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only that it is, but that it signify, then, just as the cause is prior to the effect in being, so it is

in signifyingand so the interior word has the character of signification and of manifest-

tation before the exterior word does, the reason being that the exterior word is not estab-

lished in order to signify except through the interior word.

4. On the difference between things signifying naturally and things signifying by insti-tution.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,In I Peri Herm., lect. 2, n. 8 (tr. B.A.M.):

Then when he says, And just as letters are not the same for all, etc., he shows the dif-

ference between the aforesaid things signifying and things signified with respect to this, that

they either are or are not according to nature. And with respect to this he does three things.

First, he puts down a sign by which it is made clear that neither vocal sounds nor letters

signify naturally. For things which signify naturally are the same among all men. But the

signification of letters and of vocal sounds, about which we now treat, are not the same

among all men. But this was never in doubt among men with regard to letters, of which not

only the rationale of signifying is from an imposition, but even their very formation is by art.

But vocal sounds are formed naturally, and so among some men there was a doubt as to

whether they signify naturally. But Aristotle determines here from the similar case of letters,

which are not the same among all men, that so neither are vocal sounds. And so it clearly

remains that just as neither do letters so neither do vocal sounds signify naturally, but by

human institution. But vocal sounds which do signify naturally, like the groans of the sick

and other such things, are the same among all men.

5. That the passions of the soul, insofar as they are likenesses of things, designate themnaturally (that is, they are their natural signs).

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,In I Peri Herm., lect. 2, n. 9 (tr. B.A.M.):

Second, at but [the passions of the soul,] of which, etc., he shows that the passions of the

soul exist naturally, as do things, from the fact that they are the same for all. And so he says,but [the passions of the soul,]of whichthat is, just as the passions of the soul are the same

for all, of which firstthat is, of which passions firstthese, namely vocal sounds, are the

tokensthat is, signs(for the passions of the soul are compared to vocal sounds as first to

second: for vocal sounds are not uttered except in order to express the interior passions of

the soul), so also the thingsare the same, namely, among all, of whichthat is, of which

thingsthese, namely,passions of the soul, are likenesses.

It should be observed here that he called letters tokensthat is, signsof vocal sounds

and similarly vocal sounds [signs] of the passions of the soul; but passions of the soul he

says are likenesses of things: and this is so because things are not known by the soul except

by means of some likeness existing either in the sense or in the intellect. But letters are signs

of vocal sounds, and vocal sounds of passions, which is not taken account of there by anyrationale of likeness, but only by a rationale of institution, as is the case with many other

signs, as the trumpet is a sign of war. But in the passions of the soul account must be taken

of the rationale of likeness for expressing things, since they designate them naturally

[naturaliter eas designant], not by institution.

6. Note on the meaning of first in the foregoing text.

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With respect to St. Thomas understanding of Aristotles meaning of first here,

the reader will note that he rightly takes Aristotle to be describing the passions of the soulas first in comparison to vocal sounds because the latter are not uttered except in order

to express the interior passions of the soul. Consider, in this regard, the following schema:

those that are written those that are in vocal sound the passions of the soul

are tokens of are tokens of

are

things

likenesses of

The order here is as follows: (1) first there are things; then (2), there are thepassions of the

soul, which are likenesses of things; then (3), there are vocal signs signifying things (and

doing so by means of the passions of the soul, of which they are the likeness); and finally(4), there are written signs signifying vocal signs. Now if, by saying but the passions of

the soul, of which these are first the signs, Aristotle has in mind the signification of vocal

sounds in reference to those that are written, it follows that those that are in vocal

sound arefirstthe signs of the passions of the soul, since nothing comes between the two;whereas those that are written can signify the souls passions only insofar as the written

marks or letters are the signs of those which are in vocal sound, and so come second.But if Aristotle has in mind the signification of vocal sounds with regard to things (and this

is the more likely case inasmuch as the relation of the signification of vocal sounds to

things is of greater moment than the relation of that signification to written words); then,

since spoken words signify the passions of the soul immediately, but the things of whichthese passions are the likenesses only by the mediation of our thoughts about them, it

follows that vocal sounds arefirstthe signs of the passions of the soul, as St. Thomas says,

and wouldsecondarily be the signs of things.

7. On an apparent contradiction in the foregoing texts.

According to the text from the Summa Theologiae (IIIa, q. 60, a. 4, ad 1), the ratio

signi, or character of a sign, first belongs to the sensible sign, since

each thing is principally denominated and defined according to that which belongs to it

primarily and through itself [primo et per se], but not by that which belongs to it through

something else [per aliud]. But a sensible effect has through itself [the power] to lead to the

knowledge of another thing as if [quasi] becoming known to man primarily and through

itself, because all our knowledge has its beginning from sense.

But according to the text from theDe Veritate (q. 4, art. 1, ad 7),

the character of a sign first belongs to the interior word because when an effect has from a

cause not only that it is, but that it signify, then, just as the cause is prior to the effect in

being, so it is in signifyingand so the interior word has the character of signification and of

manifestation before the exterior word does, the reason being that the exterior word is not

established in order to signify except through the interior word.

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The first thing to notice here is that in the first text, ratio signi can only mean the

ratio propria of the sign, whereas in the second text, ratio signi, inasmuch as it applies tothe interior word or concept, can only mean the ratio communis, since, properly speaking,

a sign includes the note of being perceptible to the senses, but the concept is imperceptible.

The doctrine of St. Thomas needed to reconcile the competing claims of the fore-

going passages may be gathered from the following text:

[I]t must be understood that bodily things are carried over to the spiritual by a certain like-

ness, which is in fact a likeness of proportionability. And this likeness must be reduced to

some community of univocity or analogy; and this is the case in the point at issue: For that is

called light in spiritual things that stands to intellectual manifestation in the same way as

bodily light stands to sensible manifestation. But manifestation is more truly found in

spiritual things. And with respect to this, what Augustine says is true, that light is more truly

in spiritual things than in the bodily, not according to the proper account of light [propriam

rationem lucis], but according to the account of manifestation, as it is said in the Canonical

Epistle of John,2that all that is made manifest is light.(In II Sent., dist. 13, q. 1, art. 2, c., tr.B.A.M.)

Now just as light is more truly in spiritual things than in the bodily, not accordingto the proper account of light, but according to the account of manifestation (the latter

being common to both spiritual and bodily light), so also sign is more truly in the interior

word, not according to its ratio propria, but according to the ratio communis signi, whichis anything known in which something else is known, and this is so for the reason St.

Thomas gives in theDe Veritate text, namely, that the exterior word is not established in

order to signify except through the interior word, and so the latter must have the characterof a sign before the former, just as any cause must first possess whatever it gives to its

effect. But according to its ratio propria, sign is first found in sensible things, since all

our knowledge has its beginning from sense, and we name things as we know them; and inthis way the character of a sign is in the exterior word, which is something sensible, before

it is in the interior word, which is not.

8. That being prior or posterior in nature is indifferent to the ratio signi.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,De Veritate, q. 9, art. 4, ad 5. (tr. B.A.M.):

To the fifth it must be said that although in natural things, the effects of which are moreknown to us than [their] causes, a sign is that which is posterior in nature; still, that it be

prior or posterior in nature does not belong to the character of the sign properly taken, but

only that it be foreknown to us [nobis praecognitum]. And so sometimes we take effects as

signs of causes, as the pulse is a sign of health; but sometimes causes as signs of effects, asthe dispositions of the heavenly bodies are signs of storms and rains.3

9. Note on the foregoing.

2 In fact, the text is Ephesians 5:13.3 Cf.In IV Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1b, ad 5: And since, as is frequently the case, effects are more manifest to

us than causes, therefore sometimes sign is divided against cause. But sometimes the cause is manifest to

us, as falling under the sense, but the effect is hidden, as if it were expected in the futureand then nothing

prevents a cause from being called a sign of its effect. (tr. B.A.M.)

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In the text just cited, St. Thomas presents a single opposition between effects taken

as signs of causes and causes taken as signs of effects, but he also recognized a third pos-sibility, as may be seen from the following text:

For every bodily sign is either an effect of that of which it is the sign, as smoke signifies fire,

by which it is caused, or it proceeds from the same cause and so, while it signifies the cause,

as a consequence it signifies the effect, as a rainbow sometimes signifies fair weather,

inasmuch as its cause is the cause of fair weather. (Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 95, art. 5, c., tr.

B.A.M.)

In sum, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, some effects are signs of their causes, as

smoke is a sign of fire; but some causes are signs of their effects, as the dispositions of theheavenly bodies are signs of storms and rains; but some effects are signs of other effects,

which happens when they proceed from the same cause, and so while signifying the cause,

as a consequence they signify the effect, as does the rainbow, which at times is taken as thesign of fair weather, inasmuch as the same thing which causes the rainbow causes fair

weather. Another example of this third case is the barometer, which indicates atmospheric

pressure and, as a consequence, gives a sign of the likelihood of precipitation.

10. On the relation of sign to cause.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,In II Sent., dist. 15, q. 1, art. 2, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

To the first it must be said that it sometimes happens that the same thing is a sign and acause: a cause inasmuch as it acts to bring about an effect; a sign inasmuch as the thing

represented to the senses leads to knowledge of the effect.

11. That every sign relation requires a foundation.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 63, art. 2, obj. 3-4, ad 3-4 (tr. English

Dominican Fathers):

Objection 3. Further, character is defined by some thus: A character is a holy sign of thecommunion of faith and of the holy ordination conferred by a hierarch. Now a sign is in the

genus of relation, not of power. Therefore a character is not a spiritual power.

Objection 4. Further, a power is in the nature of a cause and principle (Metaph. v). But a

sign which is set down in the definition of a character is rather in the nature of an effect.

Therefore a character is not a spiritual power.

Reply to Objection 3. The relation signified by the word sign must needs have somefoundation. Now the relation signified by this sign which is a character, cannot be founded

immediately on the essence of the soul: because then it would belong to every soul naturally.Consequently, there must be something in the soul on which such a relation is founded. And

it is in this that a character essentially consists. Therefore it need not be in the genusrelation as some have held.

Reply to Objection 4. A character is in the nature of a sign in comparison to the sensible

sacrament by which it is imprinted. But considered in itself, it is in the nature of a principle,

in the way already explained.

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12. On the two ways in which something signifies.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 9, art. 4, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

But it must be understood that something signifies in two ways: in one way formally, and

in another way materially. Formally, in fact, is signified by the name that for which the name

is principally imposed in order to signify [ad id quod significandum nomen est principaliter

impositum], which is the ratio of [or the account lying behind] the name, just as the name

man signifies something composed of a body and a rational soul. But materially is signifiedby the name that by which such a ratio is preserved [salvatur], just as the name man

signifies something having a heart and a brain and parts of this sort, without which therecannot be a body animated by a rational soul.

13. On the relation of discourse to human and angelic knowledge.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 58, art. 3, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

To the first it must be said that discourse names a certain movement. But every movement

is from one thing coming before to something else coming after. And so discursive

knowledge is observed according as from something known before one arrives at knowledgeof another thing known after, which was previously unknown.4 But if in one thing perceived

[inspecto] something else were perceived, as in a mirror an image of a thing and the thing

are perceived at the same time [simul],5for this reason the knowledge is not discursive. And

in this way angels know things in the Word.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 58, art. 3, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

And so the lower intellects, namely, of men, attain perfection in knowledge of the truth by

means of a certain movement and discourse of intellectual activity, namely, when they

proceed from one known thing to something else known. But if from the knowledge of a

known principle they were at once to perceive as known all the consequent conclusions, in

them discourse would have no place. And this is the case with angels, because in thosethings which they first know naturally they perceive all things whatsoever that can be known

in them.

14. On the ratio signi.

As regards the primary institution and secondary signification ofsignum.

As St. Thomas teaches, sign implies something known to us by which we are ledby the hand to knowledge of another thing. But the things first known to us are things

falling under the senses, from which all our knowledge has its rise, and so a sign as regards

its first institution signifies some sensible thing according as by it we are led by the hand toknowledge of something hidden. But it sometimes happens that something more known to

us, even if it is not a thing falling under the senses, as if by a secondary signification is

called a sign (In IV Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1b, c., tr. B.A.M.).

4Cf. S.Th., Ia, q. 58, art. 3, obj. 1: For a discourse of the intellect is taken into account according to this, that

one thing is known through something else.5Cf. ibid., Ia, q, 12, art. 9, sed contra.: By one species the mirror is seen, and the things which appear in themirror. Cf. also Ia. q. 12, art. 4, obj.1: But each thing is seen when its mirror image (speculum) is seen.

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As regards the proper and common accounts ofsignum.

In human knowledge there is something known in which something else is known,

as in discoursing, which necessarily takes place by means of things perceptible to the

senses, since all our knowledge takes its beginning from sense (= the proper account ofsignum).

In angelic knowledge there is something known in which something else is knownwithout any discourse, as when a thing is seen in a mirror, 6 the thing and its image are seensimultaneously by a single species without any movement from the image to the thing (=

the common account ofsignum).

15. Definitions ofsign according to St. Thomas Aquinas.

COMMONLY SPEAKING. (1) Commonly, we may call a sign anything known inwhich something else is known;7 (2) not first and principally, but as if by a secondary

signification, we may call a sign something more known to us which, as not falling under

the senses, has the power to lead to knowledge of another thing, not primarily and throughitself, but only through something else, such as an intelligible effect, which requires some-

thing sensible in order to be manifested to us; 8 (3) a medium through the knowledge of

which we arrive at knowledge of another thing;9 (4) said with respect to the intelligible

species of an angel, an intelligible effect known primarily and through itself, and so havingthe power to lead to knowledge of something else; such an effect being one in which its

cause is seen, inasmuch as a likeness of the cause results in the effect, 10 and hence not in-

volving discourse;11 (5) said with respect to an image reflected in a mirror, a sensible effectknown primarily and through itself, and so having the power to lead to knowledge of

something else; such an effect being one in which its cause is seen, inasmuch as a likeness

of the cause results in the effect, and hence not involving discourse; what is known beingderived, not immediately from the known thing itself, but from a likeness of the thing re-

sultant in the mirror.12

6 I treat the case of a mirror at length in sec. II below.7Communiter possumus signum dicere quodcumque notum in quo aliud cognoscatur. (idem, Lat. rev.)8 Cf.In IV Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1b, c., but worded by B.A.M. (as are the fourth and fifth definitions).9Medio per cuius cognitionem devenimus in cognitionem alterius. (SCG, III, cap. 2, n. 7. N.B. Though not

applied, this definition is nevertheless applicable to sign, commonly speaking. Cf. the following: signum

autem est per quod aliquis devenit in cognitionem alterius , But a sign is that by means of which someone

arrives at knowledge of another thing (St. Thomas Aquinas, S.Th., III, q. 6, art. 4, c.).10 Cf.De Ver., q. 9, art. 4, ad 4. For this last differentia, cf. SCG, III, cap. 49, n. 3, where St. Thomas goes on

to say that in the effect itself the cause may be seen, as a man is seen in a mirror on account of his likeness;but the way in which a man is seen in a mirror is proportional to the way in which an angel knows things in

the intelligible species, as St. Thomas explains in many places.11 Cf. S.Th., Ia, q. 58, art. 3, ad 1: Discourse names a certain movement. But every movement is from one

thing coming before to something else coming after. And so discursive knowledge is observed according as

from something known before one arrives at knowledge of another thing known after, which was previously

unknown. But if in one thing perceived (inspecto) something else were perceived, as in a mirror an image of

a thing and the thing are perceived at the same time (simul), for this reason the knowledge is not discursive.

And in this way angels know things in the Word. (tr. B.A.M.)12 Cf.De Ver., op. cit. For the last part of the definition, cf. Super I ad Corinthos, cap. 13, lect. 4.

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PROPERLY SPEAKING. (1) A sign is a thing which, besides the species it brings

into the senses, makes something other than itself come into knowledge;13 (2) sign,considered in itself, implies something manifest to us by which we are led by the hand to

knowledge of something hidden;14 (3) sign implies something known to us by which we

are led by the hand to knowledge of another thing;15 (4)sign as regards its first institutionsignifies some sensible thing according as by it we are led by the hand to knowledge of

something hidden;16 (5) something cannot be called a sign, properly speaking, unless from

it one come into knowledge of another thing, as in discoursing.

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SAID QUASI TRANSUMPTIVE. Sign is said as it were transumptively when in its

proper acceptation it is said of anything more known simply (notiora simpliciter) which

leads to knowledge of another thing, such as the speech of the angels.18

16. Notes belonging to the ratio signi.

As regards its first institution.

some sensible thingaccording as by it we are led by the hand to knowledge

of something hidden

As manifesting the proper account ofsignum.

a thing which

besides the species it brings into the sensesmakes come into knowledge

something other than itself

a thing from which

one comes into knowledge

of something else

as in discoursing

As manifesting the common account ofsignum.

13Signum est res praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus, aliquid aliud ex se faciens in cognitionem venire .(In IV Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1b, obj. 1, taken from St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Book II, ch. 1, n.

1). St. Augustine also defines the sign as a thing which shows itself to the senses, and something besides

itself to the mind (signum est quod et se ipsum sensui et praeter se aliquid animo ostendit,De Dialectica,

cap. 5, tr. B.A.M.)14 Signum, quantum est in se, importat aliquid manifestum quoad nos, quo manuducimur in cognitionem

alicujus occulti. (In IV Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1b, ad 5)15Signum importat aliquod notum quoad nos, quo manuducimur in alterius cognitionem. (In IV Sent., dist. 1,

q. 1, art. 1b, c.)16 Signum quantum ad primam sui institutionem significat aliquam rem sensibilem, prout per eam

manuducimur in cognitionem alicujus occulti. (idem)17 Signum, proprie loquendo, non potest dici nisi aliquid ex quo deveniatur in cognitionem alterius quasi

discurrendo. (De Veritate, q. 9, a. 4, ad 4) A related definition of the sign is the following: But a sign is that

by means of which someone arrives at knowledge of another thing (signum autem est per quod aliquis

devenit in cognitionem alterius). (S.Th., III, q. 6, art. 4, c.)18 Cf.In IV Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1b, ad 3, but worded by B.A.M.

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something known

in which something else is knownnot as in discoursing (the intelligible species of an angel being something known in

which everything that can be known through it is immediately known)

As manifesting what is first and principally calledsignum as opposed to what is not.

something known to us (something manifest to us)through itself and primarily (= what is first and principally calledsignum)through something else and secondarily (= what is secondarily calledsignum)

by which we are led by the hand to knowledge

of another thing (of something hidden)

As manifesting the primary signification ofsignum.

something first known to us (something more known to us)

as falling under the senses

As manifesting the secondary signification ofsignum.

something not first known to us (not something more known in itself)

and so not as falling under the senses (such as an intelligible effect)

Said as it were transumptively.

sign said according to its ratio propria of

anything

more known simplywhich leads to knowledge of another thing

17. An outline of alternatives belonging tosign taking into account the case of the mirror.

If something is known:

It is either something known in which something else is known or not.

If it is something known in which something else is known:

It is either known primarily and through itself (primo et per se) or not.

If not, it is known through something else (per aliud).

It is either perceptible to the senses or not.

It either involves discourse or not (discourse being a movement from something known

before to something else known after).

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If not, it is an effect in which its cause is seen.

Sign properly speaking (which pertains to men):

something known

in which something else is knownwhat is foreknown being known primarily and through itself

for which reason it is perceptible to the senses

and hence involving discourse

18. Sign commonly speaking:

In men:

something knownin which something else is known

what is foreknown being known not primarily and through itself but through

something else

being an intelligible effect needing something sensible to be manifested to usand hence involving discourse

In angels:

something known

in which something else is knownwhat is foreknown being known primarily and through itself

being an intelligible effect in which its cause is seen, inasmuch as a likeness of the

cause results in the effect

and hence not involving discourse

In the case of the mirror:

something known

in which something else is known

what is foreknown being known primarily and through itselfbeing a sensible effect in which its cause is seen, inasmuch as a likeness of the

cause results in the effect

and hence not involving discourse

19. Three ways in which something may be said transumptively.

1. As something physical is said of God.

2. As we are wont to say, this is the word I have said, or(this is the word) which theking has commanded, when something done is demonstrated which is signified or

simply enunciated by the word, or even commanded.3. As the generic part of the definition is let fall19

19N.B. On this matter, see my separate discussion ofproperly and commonly speaking inThe Opening of

Genesis. Preliminaries I: The Mode of the Narrative (Exegetical Principles I), sec. II, n. 5.

13
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Cf. William of Occam, Summa Totius Logic, I, i, trans. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M.,

Philosophical Writings of Occam, p. 49:

For the sake of quibblers, however, it should be noted that sign can assume twomeanings. In one sense it means anything which, when apprehended, makes us know

something else; but it does not make us know something for the first time, as has been

shown elsewhere; it only makes us know something actually which we already know

habitually. In this manner, a word is a natural sign, and indeed any effect is a sign at least of

its cause. And in this way also a barrel-hoop signifies the wine in the inn. Here, however, Iam not speaking of sign in such a general meaning. In another sense, sign means that

which makes us know something else, and either is able itself to stand for it, or can be added

in a proposition to what is able to stand for something such are the syncategorematic words

and the verbs and the other parts of a proposition which have no definite signification or is

such as to be composed of things of this sort, e.g., a sentence.

N.B. Note that this is not a true division of sign, since the second member includes thefirst: categorematic words come under the first meaning Occam gives. But the latter di-

vision is helpful, since it brings out the difference between signs and co-signs.

Cf. Notebooks, Semiotics 04 Mar 2004 11:33:

21

A word or two should probably be said here about the distinction between signs like words

or turn signals, and signs in the sense in which black clouds are a sign of rain, or something

large, mean and toothy looking in your direction is a sign of danger. For the sake of

quibblers, however, it should be noted that sign can assume two meanings. In one sense it

means anything which, when apprehended, makes us know something else; but it does not

make us know something for the first time, as has been shown elsewhere; it only makes us

know something actually which we already know habitually. In this manner, a word is a

natural sign, and indeed any effect is a sign at least of its cause. And in this way also a

barrel-hoop signifies the wine in the inn. Here, however, I am not speaking of sign in such

a general meaning. In another sense, sign means that which makes us know something

else, and either is able itself to stand for it, or can be added in a proposition to what is able tostand for something such are the syncategorematic words and the verbs and the other parts

of a proposition which have no definite signification or is such at to be composed of things

of this sort, e.g., a sentence.

William of Occam, Summa Totius Logic, I, i, trans. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M.,

Philosophical Writings of Occam, p. 49.

(Syncategorematic words are, roughly, those which give the sentence its form, or logical

constants but, if, and, every, some, however, etc.).

N.B. On the subject of categorematic and syncategorematic words, see my paper, The

Peripatetic Tradition on the Place of the Conjunction among the Parts of Speech (Papers in Poetics 10)

21 (http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/notebooks/semiotics.html [11/28/05])

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24. Supplement: Msgr. Maurice Dionne on the sign.

Cf. Msgr. Maurice Dionne, The Problem of Analogy, pp. 11-12:22

II. THE ANALOGOUS AND THE ORDER WHICH IT INVOLVES

A. TWO WAYS OF UNDERSTANDINGPER PRIUS

A point however to which it is necessary to pay close attention is that in analogy the per

prius can be understood in two ways: either as regards us, secundum rationem nominis,or quantum ad rem nominis. If one asked us, for example, if the names which are common

to God and to the creature, like science and wisdom, are verified at first of God or of us.Our science involves discourse, as well as involving distinct knowledge of the proper cause,

in the case of demonstration propter quid. If, furthermore, one makes the comparison, one

discovers that what man knows, the separated substance knows still better, and God,

moreover, infinitely better. But if one tries to describe what is found in God, it will be

necessary to let discourse fall, and other things as well. However, quantum ad rem

nominis, science is said of God at first, even if secundum rationem nominis, to wit,

according to the imposition , science is said at first quoad nos.

It is finally the things which we name; to be sure, the name signifies my concept, but my

concept is the likeness of the thing.

St. Thomas next applies this distinction to the problem of fatherhood in God and in

creatures:

He says next that the fatherhood which one finds in the creature, if one compares it to the

divine fatherhood, est quasi nominalis seu vocalis. This does not mean to say that

fatherhood amongst us is not veritable, but that is said in order to manifest the infinite

distance between our fatherhood and the divine fatherhood.

Ordinarily, however, the per prius will be said of the quoad nos. Thus, although

poetry is a more noble art than that of house-building, it will never be called art per prius.

Its that the ratio artis is applied less perfectly there. They are two levels altogetherdifferent: the ratio nominis on the one hand, the res nominis on the other.

2. On the meaning ofsignum and the ratio ofproprie loquendi.

Cf. Msgr. Maurice Dionne, The Problem of Analogy, pp. 18-21:

a) St. Thomas in front of the word sign.

The very strong understanding of St. Thomas knew how to judge about an analogous word.

Thus in the Sentences, with respect to the word sign, St. Thomas faces the following

objection: It seems that sign is badly defined, when it is said that a sign is that which,

beyond the species which it brings into the senses, form itself makes something else come

into knowledge. [Def. of St. Augustine, IIDe Doctrina Christiana, ch. 1, n. 1] According

to the Philosopher, in the Prior Analytics, every effect can be a sign of its cause. But certain

effects are spiritual, which bring no species into the senses. (IV Sent. D. I, q. 1, a. 1, obj. 2

of 2nd grp.) St. Augustines definition would be bad, since one cannot disassociatesensible

fromsign as such according to the definition. Lets see St. Thomas reply:

22 Lectures given in 1977-1978 transcribed by his students.

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sign imports something known to us (quoad nos), by which we are led as by the hand

(manuducimur) to the knowledge of another thing. But the things first known to us are

the things falling under the sense, from which all our knowledge has its origin. And

therefore sign, as regards its first institution, signifies some sensible thing, insofar as

through it we are led (manuducimur) to the knowledge of something hidden.

But it sometimes happens that something more known to us, even if it is not a thing

falling under the sense, may be called a sign, as if by a secondary signification ( quasi

secondaria); as the Philosopher says in Ethics II [1104b 4], that the sign of a habitengendered in us should be taken [to be] the pleasure in the act, which is not sensible

pleasure, since it is of reason. (ibid. ad 2m q.)

Notice this very interesting expression: institution of a word. The word is formed from

an act of understanding which one can call impositio, but also institutio. From the fact

that the word once formed possesses a certain permanence, something like an institution isinvolved. When the word is instituted for the first time, when such a sound of voice is

destined by the practical intelligence to signify such a reality, one will speak of primam sui

institutionem. When the word acquires a second signification, it becomes analogous. Thus

the word sign, when it no longer designates something sensible, it is not employed in its

first sense but in its second sense. For example, when Aristotle says about pleasure that it is

the sign of an engendered habit, the word sign is taken in the second sense.In fact, the pleasure which follows upon the possession of the habit does not fall under the

external sense; one experiences it in oneself. It cannot then be a matter of a first sense, since

the notion of sign is too much bound to the manifest, to that which is first manifest, namely,

the sensible. This does not exclude, however, calling what is not sensible a sign, on

condition, however, that it always involve a praecognitum and a notum. Thus, the

pleasure of which Aristotle speaks is more known than the habitus; otherwise, it absolutely

could not be a sign of it.

One finds the same doctrine again in the Summa Theologiae, IIIa, q. 60, a. 4, ad 1. There,

St. Thomas puts to himself this truly theological question: Is a sacrament always a sensible

thing? Here is the first objection:

According to the Philosopher in the Prior Analytics [70a 8], every effect is a sign of its

cause. But just as there are certain sensible effects, so also there are certain intelligible

effects, just as science in the effect of demonstration. Therefore, not every sign is

sensible.

And here is the reply:

Each thing is principally denominated and defined according to that which belongs to it

primo et per se, but not by that which belongs to it per aliud. But a sensible effect has

per se [the power] to lead to the knowledge of something else as if [ quasi] becoming

known to manprimo et per se, because all our knowledge has its beginning from sense.

But intelligible effects do not have the power [non habent quod possint] to lead toknowledge of something else, except insofar as they are manifested per aliud, that is,

through some sensibles. And thence it is that first and principally are called signs thethings which are offered to the senses, as Augustine says in II De Doctrina Christiana

[ch. 1], that a sign is that which, beyond the species it brings into the senses, makes

something other come into knowledge. But intelligible effects do not have the notion

[rationem] of sign except insofar as they are [themselves] manifested through some signs.And through this mode also, certain things which are not sensible are called sacraments

in some way, insofar as they are signified by some sensibles.

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b) The language to be held in speaking of an analogous word.

Let us add again another text along the same lines, interesting because of the way St.

Thomas names the analogous word. It is important to know, in fact, what language to hold

when we speak of the analogous word. We have already spoken of a certain inequality in the

relationship [rapport] between the common [something] and its inferiors, in opposition to

the relationship of equality one finds in the case of the univocal. Inequality, from which

dicitur per prius et posterius, an expression which constitutes a manifest sign that one is

concerned with [il sagit de] an analogous word. St. Thomas uses this in the De Veritate, q.9, a. 4, ad 4. Let us first see the objection:

Does one angel speak to another? It seems that he does not For all language [locutio]

is through some sign. But sign is only [found] in sensible things Therefore, since the

angels do not receive science through sensible things, they do not receive knowledge

through any signs, and so neither through language.

If there is not any sensible thing involved, neither, it seems, is there any sign.

Here is St. Thomas reply, along with the expression we have mentioned before [ anon-

ce]:

A thing cannot be called a sign, properly speaking [proprie loquendo], unless from it onecome into knowledge of something else, as in discoursing [quasi discurrendo]; and

according to this, there is not any sign among the angels, since their science is not

discursive. And on account of this, also among us signs are sensible, since our

knowledge, which is discursive, arises from sense.

Without seeing what follows in this text, without even knowing the doctrine of analogy, or

that of the sign, what would one say proprie is opposed to, in the expression proprie

loquendo? At first sight, one might say that it is imposed to improprie. One knows that as

regards the sense or signification of the words, one speaks of the proper sense and of the

improper sense. The improper sense will sometimes be called the metaphoricalsense. In

Scripture, one will say parabolical sense; it comes back to the same. So then, proper isopposed to the improper. But proper can in its turn be subdivided. To be sure, if the word is

univocal, there is then no problem; that word will have only a proper sense. But in the case

of the analogous word, one recognizes many proper senses, as opposed to improper. Then

how [will one] signify per prius et posterius? In the case of the per prius, because one is

concerned with the complete, perfect, and proper definition, one will say proprie

loquendo. Proprie then means to say ratio propria.

For example, sanum is said of the animal and also of the medicine. But the definition ofhealth is not verified except of the animal. However, because the medicine ( medicina) is

connected with health, one attributes the same name (healthy) to it. However, the ratio

propria sanitatis is only verified of the animal. Animal is then said to be healthy per prius;

one can also say: sanum proprie loquendo dicitur de animali. One will call healthy per

posterius that which is sign or that which is cause of health. But sometimes, instead ofsaying per prius et posterius, one will make use of this expression, of this division of St.

Thomas: proprie loquendo and communiter loquendo. Communiter is then opposed to

ratio propria; it means that one has to let fall something of the perfect definition. As St.

Thomas says, Si aliquid eorum quae sunt de ratione propria auferatur, jam non erit propria

acceptio [If something of those which are of the ratio propria are taken away, the taking (of

the word) will already not be proper.] (De Veritate, q. 4, a. 2, c.): if one lets fall an element

in the perfect definition, one will no longer have a proper sense. One will then be able to

speak of per posterius and communiter.

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Sometimes, when for example an analogous word has four senses, it is better to reserve the

expression communiter for the very last. Thus logic will be called art communiter

loquendo, because one then lets fall too many things from the first definition of the word

art, in order to keep only the aspect of opus. Logic bears upon the necessary, which art

cannot; it is science, speculative virtue, etc. which art cannot be.

In the case of the sign, signum proprie loquendo, means to say signum quantum ad

rationem propriam, and also, non invenitur nisi in sensibilibus. Although communiter

possumus signum dicere quodcumque notum in quo aliquid cognoscatur. (De Veritate, q. 9,

a. 4, ad 4): we can call sign, communiter, anything known in which something [else] isknown. One then truly has something common, that guides us to something per posterius.

One has something which one can call a sign, but it is not a sign in its ratio propria.One must not understand by communiterthe ratio communis according to which animal,

for example, is said [to be] common with respect to its inferiors. Communiter here

possesses a very particular sense; it is opposed to proprie loquendo, which signifies per

prius. Moreover, one remains always in the proper sense and not in the metaphorical sense.In this regard, St. Albert has some very interesting formulas, and furthermore, he speaks of

the analogous word there where one must speak of it: in logic. And more precisely, since it

concerns the first act of the reason, in regard to the treatise of the Predicaments, though as a

notion required beforehand, since only things signified by a common name, whose definition

is the same, will be able to be arranged under the predicaments. Each predicament is, to be

sure, a genus; the supreme genus and that which follows upon it are of the univocal, pure andsimple. Though if one wishes to go above the ten supreme genera and obtain something

more common, one arrives at once at the analogous.

One knows that often one will reserve the expression nomen multiplex.

3. On metaphor and the metaphorical sense.

Cf. Msgr. Maurice Dionne, The Problem of Analogy, p. 21:

Without seeing what follows in this text, without even knowing the doctrine of analogy, or

that of the sign, what would one say proprie is opposed to, in the expression proprie

loquendo? At first sight, one might say that it is imposed to improprie. One knows that as

regards the sense or signification of the words, one speaks of the proper sense and of theimproper sense. The improper sense will sometimes be called the metaphoricalsense. In

Scripture, one will say parabolical sense; it comes back to the same. So then, proper is

opposed to the improper. But proper can in its turn be subdivided. To be sure, if the word isunivocal, there is then no problem; that word will have only a proper sense. But in the case

of the analogous word, one recognizes many proper senses, as opposed to improper. Then

how [will one] signify per prius et posterius? In the case of the per prius, because one is

concerned with the complete, perfect, and proper definition, one will say proprie

loquendo. Proprie then means to say ratio propria.

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II. ON WHAT IS SEENPER SPECULUM(BY MEANS OF A MIRROR).

1. On the three ways in which something sensible can be seen.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super I ad Corinthos, cap. 13, lect. 4) (tr. B.A.M.):

It must therefore be understood that something sensible can be seen in three ways, namely,

by its own presence in the one seeing, like light itself, which is present in the eye; orby thepresence of its likeness in the sense immediately derived from the thing itself, like whiteness

which is seen in a wall, the whiteness itself not existing as present [praesentialiter] in the

eye, but by its likeness, although the likeness itself is not seen by itorby the presence of a

likeness not immediately derived from the thing itself, but rather derived from a likeness of

the thing in some other thing, just as when some man is seen by means of a mirror. For he is

not immediately in the eye through the likeness of the man, but through the likeness of the

man resultant in [reflected in] the mirror.


To see that this is so, one must consider that something can be known in three ways. In one

way, by the presence of its essence in the knower, just as if light were seen in the eye, and inthis way it is said that an angel understands himself. In another way, by the presence of its

likeness in the knowing power, just as a stone is seen by the eye by the fact the its likeness

results in the eye. In the third way, by the fact that a likeness of the thing known is not

received immediately from the known thing itself, but from another thing in which it results ,

just as when we see a man in a mirror.

2. Comparison of texts:

(Super I ad Corinthos, cap. 13, lect. 4)

(1) a thing is seen by its own presence in the

one seeing

(2) a thing is seen by the presence of its

likeness in the sense immediately derivedfrom the thing itself

(3) a thing is seen by the presence of a likeness

not immediately derived from the thing

itself, but rather derived from a likeness of

the thing in some other thing

(Summa Theol., Ia, q. 53, art. 3, c.)

(1) a thing is known by the presence of its

essence in the knower

(2) a thing is known by the presence of its

likeness in the knowing power

(3) a thing is known by the fact that a likeness

of the thing known is not received im-

mediately from the known thing itself, but

from another thing in which it results

N.B. Just as something is seen by means of a mirror when the form existing in the eye by

which the thing is seen is not derived immediately from the thing itself, but from a likenessof the thing existing in some other thing, namely, the mirror, so, too, God is seen by means

of creatures when the form existing in his mind by which he sees God is not derived im-

mediately from God Himself, but from the likeness of Him existing in creatures.

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3. On the three ways in which something sensible can be seen.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super I ad Corinthos, cap. 13, lect. 4 (tr. B.A.M.):

Here he speaks of the vision which is the knowledge of God. And so all the preceding gifts

found to be deficient are to be understood according as they are ordered to the knowledge of

God.

With respect to this he does two things. First, he proves in general what he intends; second,

in particular of Himself, atNow I know, etc.

So he says that we know in part because now we see as in a mirror, darkly,23 but then,namely, in the fatherland [heaven],we shall seeface to face.

The first thing to be considered here is what it is to see as in a mirror, darkly; second, what

it is to see face to face.

It must therefore be understood that something sensible can be seen in three ways,

namely, by its own presence in the one seeing, like light itself, which is present in the eye; or

by the presence of its likeness in the sense immediately derived from the thing itself, like

whiteness which is seen in a wall, the whiteness itself not existing as present [praesenti-

aliter] in the eye, but by its likeness, although the likeness itself is not seen by it; or by the

presence of a likeness not immediately derived from the thing itself, but rather derived from

a likeness of the thing in some other thing, just as when some man is seen by means of amirror. For he is not immediately in the eye through the likeness of the man, but through the

likeness of the man resultant in [reflected in] the mirror.

So by this way of speaking of the vision of God I maintain that God sees Himself solely by

a natural knowledge, the reason being that in God His essence is the same as Hisunderstanding. And so His essence is present to His understanding. But perhaps the angels

see God by a natural knowledge in the second way, inasmuch as by a likeness of the divine

essence it shines forth [relucet] immediately in them. But we know God in this life in the

third way, inasmuch as we know the invisible things of God through creatures, as is said inRomans (i, 20). And so the whole creation is to us like a kind of mirror, since by the order,

goodness, and greatness which are caused in things by God we shall come into knowledge of

the divine wisdom, goodness, and eminence. And this knowledge is called a vision in a

mirror.Finally, however, it must be understood that a likeness of this sort, which is a likeness

shining forth in another thing, is twofold: since at times it is clear and open, like the things

seen in a mirror; but at times obscure and dark, and then that vision is called dark

[enigmatic], as when I say: My mother begot me, and the same is begotten by me. That is

hidden by a similarity. And it is said of ice, which is begotten from congealed water, and

water begotten from melted ice.24 And thus it is clear that a vision by means of a likeness

of a likeness is in a mirror by a similarity hidden in an enigma [or riddle], but by a clear and

open similarity it produces another species of allegorical vision.

So inasmuch as we know the invisible things of God by means of creatures, we are said tosee by means of a mirror. But inasmuch as those invisible things are hidden from us, we see

in an enigma [or darkly].

23 Literally, we see by means of a mirror, in an enigmatic fashion.24 Cf. Donatus, Ars Grammatica, De Tropis: Aenigma est obscura sententia per occultam similitudinem

rerum, ut mater me genuit, eadem mox gignitur ex me, cum significet aquam in glaciem concrescere et ex

eadem rursus effluere, An enigma [or riddle] is a meaning that is obscure due to a hidden likeness of things,

as the mother that begot me, the same directly is begotten of me, when it means water congealed into ice

and melted in turn from the same. (tr. B.A.M.)

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Or taking it in another way, we see now by means of a mirrorthat is, by means of our

reason, and then the by means of [ ly per] designates just the power, as if one were to say

we see by means of a mirrorthat is, by the power of our soul.

But with respect to the second it must be understood that God, insofar as He is God, does

not have a face, and so when it is said [We shall see] face to face, this is said

metaphorically. For when we see something in a mirror, we do not see the thing itself, but its

likeness; but when we see something with respect to its face [secundum faciem], then we see

the thing itself just as it is. Therefore, when he says in the fatherland we shall see face to

face, the Apostle wishes to say nothing other than that we shall see the very essence of God.We shall see Him just as He is, etc. (John III, 2)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,In II Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

But it must be understood that something can be seen in three ways. In one way by its

essence; in another way by means of some effect of it flowing into the intellect of the one

seeing. In a third way by means of some effect outside the intellect of the one seeing [shining

forth in another thing, from which it results in the one seeing].25

An example of this can be seen in bodily vision. For light is not seen by the eye by somelikeness of it left behind in it, but rather by its essence informing the eye. And the first mode

of divine vision is compared to this, which is by its essence (per essentiam). And this mode

from the condition of its nature is due to no nature except the divine, in which the known andthe thing known are the same.

But a stone is seen by the bodily eye by its likeness left behind in the eye, and the second

mode is compared to this, which is by means of an effect left behind in the intellect of the

one seeing. And this mode of seeing belongs to an angel in accordance with the condition of

his nature, since, as is said in the Book of Causes, every intelligence knows what is above it

by that which is the cause of it; and so knowing the very light of his nature, which is a

likeness of uncreated light, he sees God.

But the face of a man shining forth [reflected] in a mirror is seen by the eye not indeed by

a likeness of it immediately left behind in the eye, but rather by a likeness shining forth

[reflected] in the mirror, from which it results in the pupil; and to this is compared the vision

by which God is seen by means of an effect outside the intellect of the one seeingwhether

by means of a natural effect, as by means of the knowledge of creatures philosophers arriveat God by a natural knowledgeor whether by means of a spiritual effect, just as in the

vision of that faith which adheres to the things which are revealed to others by the influence

of a spiritual lightand so we are said to see now as in a mirror, according to the Apostle.And this mode belongs to man according to the condition of his nature, since our intellect

cannot understand itself except by means of the species of things which it possesses in itself

since by means of objects it comes into knowledge of acts, and by means of acts it comes

into knowledge of powers.


I reply that it must be said that the angels can have some knowledge of God by their own

natural [principles].

To see that this is so, one must consider that something can be known in three ways. In one

way, by the presence of its essence in the knower, just as if light were seen in the eye, and in

this way it is said that an angel understands himself. In another way, by the presence of its

likeness in the knowing power, just as a stone is seen by the eye by the fact that its likeness

25 The Busa text here has, in quo divina similitudo resultat, in which a divine likeness results, which makes

no sense. I have corrected it to bring it in line with St. Thomas argument.

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results in the eye. In the third way, by the fact that a likeness of the thing known is not

received immediately from the known thing itself, but from another thing in which it results,

just as when we see a man in a mirror.

Accordingly, divine knowledge is likened to the first knowledge, by which He is seen by

His essence. And this knowledge of God cannot come to any creature by its own natural

[principles], as has been said above.

But the knowledge by which we know God in this life [ in via] is likened to the third

knowledge, by means of His likeness resultant in creatures, according to the text of Romans

(1:20) The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that aremade. And so we are said to see God in a mirror.

But the knowledge by which an angel knows God by his own natural [principles] isintermediate between these two, and it is likened to the knowledge by which a thing is seen

by means of a species taken from it. For since the image of God is impressed in the very

nature of the angel by his essence, an angel knows God insofar as he is a likeness of God.

Still, he does not see the essence of God, since no created likeness is sufficient forrepresenting the divine essence. And so this knowledge holds itself more on the side of the

specular, since the angelic nature itself is a sort of mirror representing the divine likeness.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentes III, cap. 49, n. 3. (tr. B.A.M.):

For to know a cause from its effect happens in many ways. In one way, according as aneffect is taken as the means for knowing about the cause that it is, and that it is of a certainsort, as happens in the sciences, which demonstrate a cause by means of an effect.

In another way, such that in the effect itself the cause be seen, inasmuch as a likeness of

the cause results in the effect, as a man is seen in a mirror on account of his likeness. And

this differs from the first way. For in the first there are two knowledges, of the effect and of

the cause, one of which is the cause of the other: for knowledge of the effect is the reason

that its cause is known. But in the second way there is one vision of both: for while the effect

is seen, at the same time the cause is seen in it.

In the third way, such that the likeness itself of the cause in the effect is a form by which

the effect knows its own cause: just as if a chest were to have an intellect, and by its own

form were to know the art from which such a form, as from its likeness, proceeds.


But the mind is borne to something in two ways, in one way, directly and immediately;26 inanother way, indirectly and in a mediated fashion [mediate], just as when someone seeing

the image of a man in a mirror is said to be borne to the man himself.

4. On the way in which objects are seen in a mirror.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,In III Sent., dist. 14, q. 1, art 1d, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

To the first it must be said that when things are seen in a mirror, the species of those thingsare not impressed on the senses by the things, but by the mirror. And so all those species are

impressed on the senses as enclosed in one species of the mirror [ut conclusae in una specie

specula], not because there is one species of the mirror and another species of the things seen

in the mirror.

26 Although St. Thomas does not say so here, it is clear from the first text cited above that this first division is

itself divided into two, inasmuch as a thing may be seen by its own presence in the one seeing, as is the

case with light, or by the presence of its likeness in the sense immediately derived from the thing itself, as

is the case with whiteness seen in a wall (cf. Super I ad Corinthos, cap. 13, lect. 4).

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q, 12, art. 9, sed contra (tr. B.A.M.):

By one species a mirror is seen, and the things which appear in the mirror.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 12, art. 8, obj. 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

Again, whoever sees a mirror sees the things reflected in the mirror.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, SummaTheol., Ia, q. 12, art. 4, obj. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

But each thing is seen when its mirror-image [speculum] is seen.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 58, art. 3, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

To the first it must be said that discourse names a certain movement. But every movement

is from one thing coming before to something else coming after. And so discursive

knowledge is observed according as from something known before one arrives at knowledge

of another thing known after, which was previously unknown. But if in one thing perceived

[inspecto] something else were perceived, as in a mirror an image of a thing and the thing

are perceived at the same time [simul], for this reason the knowledge is not discursive. Andin this way angels know things in the Word.


And so the lower intellects, namely, of men, attain perfection in knowledge of the truth by

means of a certain movement and discourse of intellectual activity, namely, when they

proceed from one known thing to something else known. But if from the knowledge of a

known principle they were at once to perceive as known all the consequent conclusions, in

them discourse would have no place. And this is the case with angels, because in those

things which they first know naturally they perceive all things whatsoever that can be known

in them.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. De Ver., q. 20, art. 4, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

In reply it must be said that in order to make sense of this question one must understand

what it means to see something in the Word.

It must therefore be understood that nothing can be seen in something unless in the

manner in which it is in that thing. But many things happen to be in one thing in two ways.

In one way in a divided manner and plurally, just as many forms are reflected in a mirror

each one in a divided manner, and thus many men are in a house. In another way uniformly

and simply, just as many effects exist virtually in a cause, as well as conclusions in aprinciple, and limbs in seed [semine].

Accordingly, whenever something is looked at [aliquid intuetur], it follows that the thingswhich one sees in it exist in a manifold and divided manner, from the fact that each of them

is offered to him as is the one thing in which they are contained, and in exactly the same way

as [pro tanto] one who sees a mirror sees the forms resulting in the mirror.

But he who sees something one need not see everything which is in it uniformly or in a

united manner except when he comprehends the whole power of that one thing, just as one

who sees some principle need not see all the conclusions virtually contained in it, unless

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perhaps he comprehends it.27 But created things are in God not in a manifold but in a united

manner, as Dionysius says.

And so when a thing is said to be in God, it is more like the way in which effects are in a

cause, or conclusions in a principle, than the way in which forms are in a mirror. And so

there is no need that whoever sees the Word see everything which the Word sees in itself, as

some have said, bringing forward the example of forms of things seen which are seen in a

mirror. For the Word itself comprehends itself, and so by seeing itself it knows everything

which is contained in it virtually and in a united manner. But a created intellect, which does

not comprehend the Word, need not by seeing the Word see everything which is in theWord.

5. Comparison of texts.

(Super I ad Corinthos, cap. 13, lect. 4)

It must therefore be understood that something

sensible can be seen in three ways,

namely, by its own presence in the one seeing,

like light itself, which is present in the eye;

or by the presence of its likeness in the senseimmediately derived from the thing itself, like

whiteness which is seen in a wall, the whiteness

itself not existing as present [praesentialiter] in

the eye, but by its like-ness, although the like-

ness itself is not seen by it

or by the presence of a likeness not im-

mediately derived from the thing itself, but

rather derived from a likeness of the thing in

some other thing, just as when some man is seen

by means of a mirror.

For he is not immediately in the eye through the

likeness of the man, but through the likeness ofthe man resultant in [reflected in] the mirror.

So by this way of speaking of the vision of God,

I maintain that God sees Himself solely by anatural knowledge, the reason being that in God

His essence is the same as His understanding.

And so His essence is present to His under-

standing.

(In II Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, art. 1, c.)

But it must be understood that something can be

seen in three ways.

In one way by its essence;

in another way by means of some effect of itflowing into the intellect of the one seeing.

In a third way by means of some effect outside

the intellect of the one seeing [shining forth in

another thing, from which it results in the one

seeing].

An example of this can be seen in bodily vision.

For light is not seen by the eye by some likeness

of it left behind in it, but rather by its essence

informing the eye.

And the first mode of divine vision is compared

to this, which is by its essence.

And this mode from the condition of its nature

is due to no nature except the divine, in whichthe known and the thing known are the same.

27 That is, takes in all of it, leaving out nothing contained in it. Cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 12, art. 8, ad 2: To

the second it must be said that when someone sees a mirror, it is not necessary that he see everything in the

mirror, unless his sight comprehend the mirror. (tr. B.A.M.)

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But perhaps the angels see God by a natural

knowledge in the second way, inasmuch as by alikeness of the divine essence it shines forth

[relucet] immediately in them.

But we know God in this life in the third way,

inasmuch as we know the invisible things of

God through creatures, as is said in Romans (i,

20).

But a stone is seen by the bodily eye by its like-

ness left behind in the eye,

and the second mode is compared to this, which

is by means of an effect left behind in the

intellect of the one seeing.

And this mode of seeing belongs to an angel in

accordance with the condition of his nature,since, as is said in the Book of Causes, every

intelligence knows what is above it by that

which is the cause of it;

and so knowing the very light of his nature,

which is a likeness of uncreated light, he seesGod.

But the face of a man shining forth [reflected] in

a mirror is seen by the eye not indeed by a

likeness of it immediately left behind in the eye,

but rather by a likeness shining forth [reflected]in the mirror, from which it results in the pupil;

and to this is compared the vision by which God

is seen by means of an effect outside the

intellect of the one seeing

whether by means of a natural effect, as by

means of the knowledge of creatures philo-sophers arrive at God by a natural knowledge

or whether by means of a spiritual effect, just as

in the vision of that faith which adheres to thethings which are revealed to others by the

influence of a spiritual light

and so we are said to see now as in a mirror,

according to the Apostle.

And this mode belongs to man according to the

condition of his nature, since our intellect can-

not understand itself except by means of the

species of things which it possesses in itself

since by means of objects it comes into know-ledge of acts, and by means of acts it comes into

knowledge of powers.

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6. On the three means of knowledge.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,In IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 2, art. 1, ad 15 (tr. B.A.M.):

[22738] Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 49 q. 2 a. 1 ad 15

Ad quintumdecimum dicendum, quod medium

in visione corporali et intellectuali invenitur

triplex.

Primum est medium sub quo videtur;

et hoc est quod perficit visum ad videndum in

generali, non determinans visum ad aliquod

speciale objectum, sicut se habet lumen

corporale ad visum corporalem, et lumen

intellectus agentis ad intellectum possibilem.

Secundum est medium quo videtur;

et hoc est forma visibilis qua determinaturuterque visus ad speciale objectum, sicut per

formam lapidis ad cognoscendum lapidem.

Tertium est medium in quo videtur;

et hoc est id per cujus inspectionem ducitur

visus in aliam rem, sicut inspiciendo speculumducitur in ea quae in speculo repraesentantur, et

videndo imaginem ducitur in imaginatum;

et sic etiam intellectus per cognitionem effectus

ducitur in causam, vel e converso.

In visione igitur patriae non erit tertium

medium, ut scilicet Deus per species aliorum

cognoscatur, sicut nunc cognoscitur, ratione

cujus dicimur nunc videre in speculo;

nec erit ibi secundum medium, quia ipsa

essentia divina erit qua intellectus noster videbitDeum, ut ex dictis patet;

sed erit ibi tantum primum medium, quod

elevabit intellectum nostrum ad hoc quod possitconjungi essentiae increatae modo praedicto.

Sed ab hoc medio non dicitur cognitio mediata,

quia non cadit inter cognoscentem et rem

cognitam, sed est illud quod dat cognoscenti

vim cognoscendi.

To the fifteenth is must be said that the medium

found in bodily or in intellectual sight is three-

fold.

The first is the medium under which it is seen,

and this is what perfects sight for seeing in gen-

eral, not determining the sight to some parti-

cular object, as bodily light stands to bodily

sight, and the light of the agent intellect stands

to the possible intellect.

The second is the medium by which it is seen,

and this is the visible form by which each sightis determined to a particular object, as by the

form of a stone [sight is determined] to knowing

the stone.

The third is the medium in which it is seen,

and this that through whose inspection sight is

led to another thing, as by inspecting a mirrorone is led to those things which are represented

in the mirror, and by seeing an image one is led

to the thing imaged,

and in this way the intellect is also led by know-

ledge of an effect to the cause, or vice versa.

But from this medium knowledge is not called

mediated because it does not fall between the

knower and the thing known, but is that which

gives to the knower the power of knowing.

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. De Veritate, q. 18, art. 1, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

[55484] De veritate, q. 18 a. 1 ad 1

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod in aliqua

visione triplex medium considerari potest:

unum est medium sub quo videtur;

aliud quo videtur, quod est species rei visae;

aliud a quo accipitur cognitio rei visae.

Sicut in visione corporali medium sub quo

videtur, est lumen, quo aliquid fit actu visibile,

et visus perficitur ad videndum;

medium vero quo videtur, est ipsa species rei

sensibilis in oculo existens, quae, sicut forma

videntis in quantum est videns, principium est

visivae operationis;

medium autem a quo accipitur cognitio rei

visae, est sicut speculum, a quo interdum

species alicuius visibilis, ut puta lapidis, fit inoculo, non immediate ab ipso lapide.

Et haec tria etiam in visione intellectualiinveniuntur:

ut lumini corporali respondeat lumen intellectus

agentis, quasi medium sub quo intellectus videt;

speciei vero visibili species intelligibilis, qua

intellectus possibilis fit actu intelligens;

medio vero a quo accipitur visi cognitio, sicut a

speculo, comparatur effectus a quo incognitionem causae devenimus; ita enim

similitudo causae nostro intellectui imprimiturnon immediate ex causa, sed ex effectu, in quo

similitudo causae resplendet.

Unde huiusmodi cognitio dicitur specularis

propter similitudinem quam habet ad visionem

To the first, therefore, it must be said that in any

sight a threefold medium may be considered:

one is the medium under which [something] is

seen;

anotherby which it is seen, which is the speciesof the thing seen;

anotherfrom which knowledge of the thing seen

is taken.

Now just as in bodily sight the medium under

which it is seen is a light by which something is

made visible in act, and sight is perfected in

order to see

but the medium by which is the very species of

the sensible thing existing in the eye which, as

the form of the one seeing inasmuch as he is

see

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On the Sign According to St. Thomas Aquinas