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    P&I Renewal 2013/14 - POST RENEWAL REPORT

    One month later......

    INTRODUCTION

    The renewal season is over and owners, their brokers and the clubs are attempting to recover from

    what was generally accepted as being one of the most complex and difficult anniversaries in recent

    memory. Our Report looks to set the scene behind the 2013 renewal, examine the renewal itself and to

    anticipate the key drivers for the 2013/14 year.

    Much of our analysis is based on informal discussions with the P&I clubs, posing to each a set of key

    questions about the 2013 renewal. Where clubs have not been forthcoming on specific questions we

    have used average results. Our conclusions are based on those discussions but it must be stressed thatthe responses are based on unaudited figures. We do not identify individual clubs within this

    document but rather use the information to look at general market results and trends. We have

    limited our thoughts to owned P&I exclusively.

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    BACKGROUND TO THE RENEWAL

    The renewal season begins with the publication of the individual club General Increases. The drivers

    that make up the specific were outlined in last years (2012/13) Post Renewal Report and wereproduce in synopsis the sentiment of the clubs from a year ago:

    Claims

    Generally the outlook was benign with a majority of clubs anticipating a neutral or even positive

    attritional claims pattern for 2012.

    ONE YEAR AGO (P.L. Ferrari Post-Renewal Report, March 2012)

    suggested that claims were, and wouldcontinue to be, neutral year on year.

    suggested that the claims were benign and theoutlook was cautiously positive.

    pointed to significant back year deteriorationand that claims would continue to increase for2012.

    All clubs noted that for major claims (above $2m.) whilst the frequency was stable or even declining

    the values were inflating significantly: a trend that has been evident for at least 4 years and thus no

    surprise and, presumably, controllable through precise reserving and budgetary discipline.

    Investment Income

    Last year we suggested that investment return for 2012, given market volatility and ever more

    conservative club portfolios, would be unlikely to exceed that of 2011s market average of 3.93%.

    As we show later on in the drivers for 2013 our straw poll indicates that, in fact, just over 4% was

    achieved and with a range from 2% to 7.75% the performance spread significantly extended from

    the previous year (0 to 5%).

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    INVESTMENT INCOME

    Churn/new buildings

    We anticipated that the new for old churn would continue to dilute club premium bases during

    2012 (with new tonnage typically attracting a lower rating than the tonnage being replaced) but

    that, again, this phenomenon was a known risk and one that could be controlled with careful

    underwriting management. Indeed, whilst older (higher premium paying) tonnage continued

    (and will continue) to be scrapped the spate of new deliveries was starting to slow and this critical

    factor should be controllable and abating. P.L. Ferraris own analysis of churn for the 2012 year

    confirms that the issue is slowing albeit only to a degree.

    With the tripartite outlook broadly stable it was with bemusement that, in the third quarter of 2012,

    anticipating the General Increase round, most clubs started to indicate that claims were rising. It

    would be egregious to suggest that the market was being talked up but the alternative conclusion was

    the one we drew last year: whilst we recognised that claims would be a significant driver for the year

    any disparity between forecast and reality would be a function of poor reserving and forward

    budgeting (P.L. Ferrari Post Renewal Report, March 2012).

    A quiet silence surrounded the better than expected investment return (for the market as a whole) but

    a lot of noise emanated about the churn and the consequent premium dilution. This noise was clearly

    justified for a number of clubs with visible growth strategies but less understandable from those thathad exhibited generally neutral growth.

    That bemusement turned to concern when the Britannia, the first of the clubs to announce, called for

    large double digit rise and, like mutual vultures to a ship owner carcass, one by one the balance of the

    clubs, with exceptions, followed suit. This at a time when the membership continued to face extremely

    poor trading conditions: a disconnect that we reflected on in our Annual Market Review in

    December 2012. It would be unfair, though, not to comment that a number of clubs did acknowledge

    the hardship of their members and introduced, with the General Increase, more sympathetic premium

    calling systems aimed at spreading or deferring the premium over a longer period to assist members

    cash flow.

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    THE GENERAL INCREASES

    INTERNATIONAL GROUP CLUBS PUBLISHED GENERAL INCREASES:

    2013/14 RENEWAL

    P&I

    Notes

    Clubs highlighted in red have no advertised general increase.*WOE - Increase applies to mutual element only and not to the costs of the Group Excess of Loss contract.

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    Taking the advertised General Increases and applying them to individual club expiring premium

    income the intended result was an average General Increase of 8.54%.

    Averaged Percentage General IncreaseInternational Group 2013/14.

    In real terms, this meant a desired cash uplift of approximately $260,000,000.

    Combined projected premium product over theInternational Group after application of thepublished General Increases for 2013/14.

    In addition to the cash requirement 7 of the 13 clubs required a specific increase in some or all of their

    basic deductible requirements. These increases are difficult to give a monetary value to but, we

    suggest, might have an equivalent cash comparison of a further 0.5% increase.

    For full details on the General Increases please see our Renewal Bulletin No. 15/12 (General

    Increases The Summary) which can be found atwww.plferrari.com.

    http://www.plferrari.com/http://www.plferrari.com/http://www.plferrari.com/http://www.plferrari.com/
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    THE GROUP REINSURANCE PROGRAMME

    RENEWAL

    The other key factor in concluding the renewal background was the renewal of the International

    Group Excess of Loss (GXL) reinsurance contract. There were changes to the structure:

    POOLING AND REINSURANCE THE GROUP STRUCTURE 2013/14

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    As we will comment on below there were major challenges (Rena and Costa Concordia claims)

    facing the programme with reinsuring underwriters looking to make short-term recouping of losses

    and anticipated losses. Clearly the environment was one where cash would be king but the Group did

    implement changes to structure and retention, in part to mitigate premium increases and, in part,

    better to reflect and anticipate the inflation in large value claims.

    It is worth mentioning that a key factor was the placeability of the contract which demands, given

    the huge limits, significant insurer participation. The need to avoid the problems of the 2012/13

    reinsurance renewal (which culminated in a last minute loss AP to ensure the placements

    completion was paramount and the tension between reinsurers needs for cash and the ultimate

    buyers (the ship owner through the tariff mechanism) lack of cash required skilled negotiation.

    Indeed a number of major historic reinsurer participants declined to renew their share citing concern

    over pricing (in their view too low) versus risk (in their view too high). Fortunately new participants

    were introduced and the contract was fully completed.

    The key changes were:

    Individual club retention increased from US$8m. per claim to US$9m. per claim.

    An additional (third) pool layer was introduced to cover an additional US$10m. per claim in

    excess of the 2012/13 pool retention of US$60m. Thus the pool now stands at US$70m. per claim

    (in excess of the US$9m.retention).

    The Hydra (International Group cell captive) co-insurance of the first layer of reinsuranceincreased from 25% to 30%.

    Despite the 16% increase in horizontal retention (club retention plus pool) and 20% increase in

    vertical retention (Hydra co-insurance) the reinsuring market demanded and obtained their pound of

    flesh. The overall increase in the reinsurance cost was about 36% in cash terms. This was widely

    anticipated but the devil is always in the detail of the allocation between vessel types.

    It was anticipated, therefore, that the offending categories (dry cargo and passenger) would face atariff increase in excess of the cash rise and the non-offending categories (dirty and clean tankers) a

    lesser proportion of the rise. There was a suggestion that a new category might be introduced splitting

    container vessels out of the dry cargo grouping. Certainly it was recognised that reinsuring

    underwriters had increasing concerns about the spiralling costs of Removal of Wreck (the major cost

    component in both the Rena and Costa Concordia claims): as groundings/human error and

    consequent Removal of Wreck are risks common to all vessels, whatever their trade type, it was

    assumed, very wrongly as it turned out, that the penalty for the offenders would be considerate and

    that, similarly, the rise for non-offenders would be proportionate.

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    It was thus with incredulity that the passenger sector reacted to the actual tariff increases, with their

    sector increasing by 125%. Similarly non container dry cargo vessel owners reacted badly to an uplift

    of approximately 40% with no differentiation between them and the container community.

    There has been a lot of speculation about how these figures have been arrived at and, in the welter ofinformation and disinformation, concerns have been raised about the transparency of the process.

    Rather than add to the speculation, P.L. Ferrari are reviewing the facts surrounding the drivers behind

    the GXL renewal and the logic for the ultimate tariffs as well as the governance that surrounds the

    decision making process. We will return to this matter in more detail in our mid-year Market Review.

    The 2013/14 GXL rates were published on 10th. January 2013 are reproduced below.

    REINSURANCE RATES

    Tonnage Category 2013 Rate per GT 2012 Rate per GT US$ Change % Change

    Dirty Tankers US$ 0.7565 US$ 0.6515 + 0.1050 + 16.12%

    Clean Tankers US$ 0.3245 US$ 0.2798 + 0.0447 + 15.98%

    Dry Cargo vessels US$ 0.4942 US$ 0.3561 + 0.1381 + 38.78%

    Passenger vessels US$ 3.1493 US$ 1.3992 + 1.7501 +125.08%

    THE RENEWAL

    The renewal was polarised between some clubs (the minority) who, either because of relatively robust

    finances and/or because of a sensitivity (the connective responsibility we have mentioned frequently

    over the last 6 months) towards their memberships economic hardship, re tained a level of humanity

    and those that didnt. It was the toughest renewal in a generation: and the relative inexperience ofmany callow underwriters, not having experienced a hard renewal before, was translated into

    rigidity and inflexibility.

    P.L. Ferrari does not comment on movements between clubs at renewal. We firmly believe this is a

    private matter between the member, his broker and the clubs concerned. We also balk at the popular

    concept that a club that has lost vessels to another club is necessarily a loser and, conversely, that

    the acquiring club is necessarily a winner. There was however a greater than normal level of high

    profile moves, both whole fleets and part, which is an unsurprising by-product of the extreme renewal

    environment (and not, as one particularly overwrought underwriter croaked, the death of

    mutuality). The mutual environment we still consider to be robust, and certainly are ardent

    advocates of, but the world has changed since 2008 and for many members short-term practical

    necessity (to ensure financial survival) has to take precedence.

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    We do, however, conduct an informal poll of the clubs to ascertain their unaudited view of how their

    renewal has gone. That poll suggests that the clubs, en masse, achieved a cash increase of 6.58%

    (against the originally desired 8.54%).

    Estimate of % increase actually achieved

    by the International Group against the

    averaged General Increase, at 2013/14

    renewal.

    And so in cash terms an additional $202m (against the desired $261m.).

    Estimate of premium increase actually

    achieved by the International Group

    against the combined projected premium

    product at 2013/14 renewal.

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    This renewal was notable for the higher than usual incidence of owners trading cash increases for

    term changes. Historically the swap was limited largely to members taking higher deductibles but, at

    this renewal, there was a surge in condition changes e.g. placing primary crew cover in domestic

    markets. The value of this term change trade was over double a normal years average and clear

    empirical evidence of the financial stress many owners are under and looking to make savings

    wherever possible. Our unaudited straw poll gives a percentage value for such terms changes of 1.82%

    which combined with the cash increase gives a value total of 8.40%, a shade below the desired 8.54%.

    Estimate of % increase including an

    allowance for change of

    terms/deductibles actually achieved by

    the International Group against the

    averaged General Increase, at 2013/14

    renewal

    And thus generating an as if premium uplift of $258m., close to the originally desired $262m.

    Estimate of as if premium increase

    including an allowance for change of

    terms/deductibles actually achieved by

    the International Group against the

    combined projected premium product at

    2013/14 renewal

    A veil needs now to be drawn over the renewal to allow for mental and physical recuperation. Yet

    memories are long and lessons do need to be learned. Lessons that require some additional remedial

    tuition; given that a number of clubs immediately on renewal conclusion indicated that they would be

    focusing heavily on credit control, thereby exhibiting a predictable, but depressing, lack of sensitivity

    and connectivity. The logic that ties together the inference that we are worried about your financial

    health Mr. Ship Owner, so we are going to put your premiums up eludes us.

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    DRIVERS FOR2013

    The drivers are generally predictable as they largely reflect those we anticipated in our Post Renewal

    Report last year and our, more recent, Market Review 2012.

    R/I structure and cost (P.L. Ferrari Bulletin No.16 2013)

    The Reinsurance programme will continue to be under cost pressure as the market further seeks to

    recover losses. As we have mentioned, we will be examining in more detail the issues that surround

    the reinsurance programme, in our next Market Review for 2013. However the Reinsurance Sub-

    Committee (which has representatives from each of the clubs) has already met and this early

    convocation is indicative of the seriousness with which the reinsurance programmes integrity and

    cost is being taken.

    Claims

    Our straw poll suggests that, as last year, there are clear differences between clubs regarding

    the claims outlook. Their sense of the state of:

    Pre-2012 claims deterioration,

    Current 2012/13 claims ,

    The forecasted environment for 2013/14

    differed markedly from their generally optimistic view of a year ago. The outlook was more negativethan last year but this possibly could be post-renewal justifying of the increases that have been

    achieved.

    A YEAR AGO

    suggested that claims were, and would

    continue to be, neutral year on year

    suggested that the claims were benign and theoutlook was cautiously positive

    pointed to significant back year deteriorationand that claims would continue to increase for2012

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    TODAY

    suggested that claims were, and wouldcontinue to be, neutral year on year.

    suggested that the claims were benign and theoutlook was cautiously positive.

    suggested that claims would continue toincrease for 2013.

    Investment income

    2012/13 was a challenging year given market volatility but much more stringent investment policies

    have meant that, whilst average returns are lower than in the heady days pre-2008, they are more

    certain.

    We have already mentioned that our straw poll indicated an average investment return across themarket of just over 4% for 2012 and we see no particular reason why this should change for 2013. The

    markets continue to be volatile, though, and certainty is never guaranteed

    It is salutary to remind readers of the power of the investment income. As a rough rule of thumb, 1%

    on investment return is equivalent to a 3% increase in premium. The approximate value, therefore, of

    the investment returns for 2012 is $380m. In other words about 50% MORE than the achieved

    renewal result. To be very simplistic, the product of the achieved premium increases at renewal and

    the investment pot is over $640m. of money into the system.

    This is a hyper naive view and club managers and boards will, rightly, argue that projected investment

    returns are factored into their calculations when setting the General Increase. However we would

    again, and with boring repetitiveness, make the point about disconnection between club expectationsand owners reality.

    Effects of churn

    This was a huge factor for 2012 and a number of clubs clearly needed premium uplifts to recalibrate

    hugely diluted premium bases. Older, higher premium paying, tonnage will continue to be scrapped,

    however the new deliveries are starting to slow and, with the general rate recalibration, this should not

    be as critical a driver as in recent years.

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    CONCLUSION

    The 2013 renewal was one that will live long in the memory. And the recollection will not be a

    pleasant one.

    Ship owners continue to face deeply challenging trading conditions.

    The Group reinsurance programme will be subject to further scrutiny and evaluation and, we

    fear, further increases.

    The reinsurance is stressed by the fact that very large claims, particularly those involving

    Removal of Wreck, are inflating exponentially. However frequency will remain low.

    Otherwise general claims inflation is upward but predictably so and the claims pattern for dayto day claims will be average, neither higher nor lower in value than to be anticipated. This

    statement comes with the caveat that history shows that in times of financial hardship lack of

    cash leads to reduced maintenance. It follows that reduced maintenance leads to more claims.

    Investment returns will be low single digits.

    And finally we repeat two predictions that we made in our Market Review 2012:

    The advent of the Maritime Labour Convention in August will be presaged by a last minute

    patching together of coverage solutions and a predictable panic over the process and executionof certification (as with the debacle that was the Passenger Liability Regime introduction at the

    end of 2012 some clubs will have been proactive but will be dragged down by other clubs

    inertia).

    Solvency 2 will still be shimmering on a distant horizon.

    And, with no apologies, we also repeat our final statement from the Market Review:

    What we cannot predict, but devoutly hope, is that Club Boards and Club Managers

    reconnect with their core membership and reflect better their needs and demands.

    P.L. Ferrari & Co. S.r.l.

    14th March 2013

    www.plferrari.com

    This newsletter is intended solely as an overview of the Marine market and does not constitute any form of advice. It is based on sources believed to be accurate at the

    time of printing and we cannot be held liable for the omission or inaccuracy of any information within the newsletter.

    GENOA MONACO PIRAEUS NAPLES ISTANBUL LONDON NEW YORK (an exclusive cooperation with Crystal and Company)

    http://www.plferrari.com/http://www.plferrari.com/http://www.plferrari.com/