Operation Serval - Finding Victory the French Way

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, R.I.

Contemporary Operational Art Exam

Finding Victory – the French Way

By Ben L. Anderson LCDR USN

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department course in Joint Maritime Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy. Date: 13 MAY 2015 JMO 2015 LCDR Ben L. Anderson [email protected]

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LCDR Ben L. Anderson Contemporary OPART Exam

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Operation Serval provided an insight on how light, fast paced forces coupled with joint

fires capabilities could mount an offensive which would be challenging to resist by unorganized

and poorly equipped forces.

Question 1

The first question of the exam states "[d]escribe Gen Bernard Barrera's Operational

Design for SERVAL and assess how well the design achieved stated objectives." The author will

cover the key aspects of General Barrera's operational design that had the most significant impact

on the effectiveness of the operation.

Operation Serval was moderately successful in achieving its operational goals, as it

completed the first and third, was moderately successful on the second, and failed on the fourth.

The elements of the design which were critical to this success were providing clear objectives,

the utilization of the direct approach, the termination criteria, and the effects achieved through

use of local and regional forces.

The stated objectives of Operation Serval were:

1. “To stop the terrorist aggression;

2. Establish a secure environment in Mali for the thousands of French nationals,

3. Facilitate Mali's recovery of its internationally recognized boundaries;

4. And free the French hostages held by AQIM" (p 24).


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The first objective was essential to address quickly, as the French assessed the rebel forces had

the capital city Bamako as a strategic objective, and that should Bamako fall, recovery for the

Malian government would be substantially more challenging. It was for this reason that the

French government abandoned their previous position of waiting for an international force to

take action (p 8).

The second objective was primarily due to the threat the rebel forces posed to the

thousands of French nationals residing in Mali, but was also due to the rebel forces' practice of

taking Westerners hostage and demanding ransom money for them. The third objective was to

aid in the long term stability of the region through the preventing the establishment of an Islamic

state which was perceived as something which would continue to create chaos in the region. The

implied fourth objective was to rescue the French hostages being held by AQIM. Each of these

objectives were achievable, providing clear direction for the French forces in their efforts.

The first component of the operational design was to "move as fast as possible" in order

to "destroy the enemy before it successfully scattered or slipped out of reach" (p 9). While this

could also be discussed as the operational function of movement and maneuver, the use of the

French military's audacity in direct ground force engagement of the Islamist forces achieved an

element of surprise as the rebel forces were not anticipating the ferocity and speed of the French

response. This method, in keeping with French doctrine, is designed to "preserve 'tactical

initiative'," (p 10) which it certainly did achieve.


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Choosing the termination point for Operation Serval was critical to the operation, as

terminated too early or maintaining the offensive for too long could have presented several major

issues. First, had Operation Serval terminated too early, the Islamist forces would have the

opportunity to regroup and attempt to regain lost ground in the confusion following the French

withdrawal. Second, had the French forces remained for a longer period, they risked the

perception of them changing from being a "benevolent third party" (p 20) to a returning colonial

master, which could have led to gains in support for the rebel groups.

The effects achieved through the use of local and regional forces were substantial for two

reasons. First, the intimate knowledge of the land and people allowed for the French to work

with the local populace in a very efficient manner. Second, through the inclusion and emphasized

importance of both local and regional forces, the French were able to garner local support as they

seized territory. This mitigated the support the rebels received, and may have led to an increase

in reports on the rebel locations from the locals.

Two elements which could have been disastrous had the rebel forces demonstrated a

higher level of organization or resistance was the element of operational reach in its relation to

the operational function of sustainment, and the operational function of protection.

Based on the concept that "[o]ne should, in effect, move as fast as one's vehicles and the

need of discretion permit" may have been taken too literally during Operation Serval. Even with

allied forces providing 75% of the lift capacity as well as 30% of the air-to-air refueling (p 35),

the French forces at times were overextended. This resulted in making it extremely challenging


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to keep the vehicles in an operable condition (p 36). The vehicles were not the only things being

over-extended, as the French forces were compared to "Napoleon's army before the Italian

campaign" (p 37) due to the state of the troops’ weapons, uniforms and boots. Due to the rate at

which the forces advanced, they were unable to maintain troops within the range of medical

facilities to meet the "golden hour standard of medical support" (p 43) required within their own

doctrine. This forced commanders on the ground to assess which operations had the most risk,

and prioritized placement of medical facilities accordingly. It was for these reasons that it was

assessed in the RAND report that the French had "operated at or beyond their limits of their

sustainment capabilities" (p 42).

The operational function of protection was another aspect of the operational design which

was weak and could have resulted in disastrous consequences had the rebel forces realized the

French's weakness in this area. First, despite assessments that the weapon systems of rebel forces

included MANPADS, ATGMs, and other heavy weapons (p 6), the forces the French employed

were primarily light and fast, offering little protection against these weapons. Second, contrary

to the lessons learned regarding the vulnerability to IEDs from Afghanistan, the primary vehicle

used in Mali was the VAB vice the heavily armored and IED resistant VBCI. These risks were

acknowledged by the French and considered acceptable at the time, but upon review by the

French Army's Lessons Learned center, the consequences at times could have drastic

implications to the effort (p 9).

With the use of the direct approach, selection of good termination criteria, and the effects

achieved through the use of local and regional forces, Operation Serval was able to complete


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objectives one and three, partially complete two, and not complete four. These may not have

been achieved had the rebel forces been more organized or provided a higher level of resistance

due to the poor design of operational reach as it relates to sustainment, and the operational

function of protection.

Question 2

The second question states "[e]valuate how well the French Operational Design set

conditions for long-term stability in the region" then asks "[w]hat changes would you have

recommended?" The author will first present an analysis of the actions taken by the French to set

the conditions, then provide the deviations that would be recommended to ensure the long term

stability.

Two key aspects of the Operational Design helped provide the framework for the long-

term stability in the region. These aspects were the employment of local and regional forces and

focus on ground combat forces.

The French were very conscious of the sensitivities of the indigenous populations in the

region, and leveraged the careful employment of both local and regional forces to prevent

causing additional support for the rebel groups. Through their colonial ties to Mali, the French

had maintained sufficient local knowledge that they knew not only with whom they could work,

but how they would need to (p 6).


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With this local knowledge, the French understood that the insurrection was not popular

with the majority of the populace, and that through the careful choices on the employment of

forces they could avoid offending the locals and not incite them to align with the rebel forces (p

20).

One case of this strategic decision making was the liberation of Kidal. The French delayed

entering Kidal to allow for the Chadian forces to be the first to enter. This, along with having the

Tuaregs fighting alongside supported the perception that France was only acting as a "benevolent

third party" (p 20).

The French also understood that the MNLA was more "opportunistic" (p 20) then

altruistic in their intentions. With the MNLA having initiated the insurrection, then being ousted

by the Islamist factions, the French were righteously concerned with both the MNLA's behavior

and trustworthiness (p 20). Despite these concerns, the use of the MNLA and of Gamou's militia

provided a level of credibility to the allied force, leading to "local buy-in and popular support" (p

20).

The use of local and regional forces was instrumental in laying the framework for the

long term stability as it provided for the credibility of the forces as they entered into areas,

gaining the support of the populace, and did not contribute to shifting people to support the

Islamist movement. Through the use of the Malian Army and the MNLA, local faces were seen

as the liberators vice foreign faces, giving them a level of pride and credibility that otherwise

would not exist.


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The second aspect that aided in establishing long term stability was the focus on the

employment of ground forces. The paradigm employed by the French was to first seize the

terrain, then search and destroy the enemy forces located therein, followed by turning over the

area to preferably the Malian Army. In seizing of terrain, the objective was to leverage the

"audacity" of the French troops and pursue the insurgents as aggressively as possible in order to

prevent them from digging in and organizing a coordinated defense. This aggressive pursuit also

aided in preventing the insurgents from "slip[ping] out of reach" (p 9).

Using this paradigm, the French prioritized the liberation of Timbuktu and Gao.

Liberating these cities early was essential to the long term stability, as the two cities contain

"94.8%" (p 16) of the population of northern Mali. This allowed for a quick cutoff of resources

(both human and material) to the rebel groups.

Finally, through the focus on ground combat and the audacious spirit of the French

forces, the French were able to effectively clear an area with more certainty than precision strikes

could provide. Engaging in ground focused campaign allowed for a significant portion of the

rebel forces to be killed, their weapon caches captured and destroyed, and consolidation of

cleared areas.

While the French attempted to provide the frame work for long term stability, they were

also wary of "mission-creep" and the perception that they were acting as if they were still

colonial masters of Mali (p 25). This wariness prevented them for taking additional actions

which would have better positioned the Malian government to leverage the "window of


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opportunity" (p 25) the French had worked hard to create. Three recommended changes that

would have aided in setting the framework for long term stability are the disarmament of the

militia factions, the integration of MNLA forces back into the Malian army, and additional

support for the Malian government for stabilization efforts.

While the inclusion of the MNLA and Gamou's militia was vital to the success of

Operation Serval, at the conclusion of the operation these armed factions still existed, and were

not a positive influence on the state of security as they remained opposed to the Malian

government - just with less vigor than the Islamist groups had been (p 25).

Integration of these militia groups into the Malian Army would have achieved three key

items. First, as they were integrated in, the network of the militias could have been broken up,

making it more challenging to reform if they were distributed to various units. Second,

integration would have aided in giving the Malian Army additional credibility with the inclusion

of different tribe members. Finally, with the inclusion of different tribe members, the Malian

Army should be less likely to commit abuses as were attributed to it during the operation (p 25).

One must question why the French had faith in the Malian government and Army (with

the assistance of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission) to

reestablish peace and security in the region following the French's withdrawal considering it was

distrustful of both the Malian government and army that was part of the problem initially (p 25).

Using principles from JP 3-24 (Counterinsurgency), the leveraging of both diplomatic experience

and economic aid may have helped foster a stronger framework for stability. Through diplomatic


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assistance, the French could have helped the Malian government realize and take action on some

of the causes of distrust between the capital city and northern regions. Through economic

assistance and the French's comprehensive understanding of the communities, specific

improvements in the economy or infrastructure could have been made to provide for a higher

quality of living for the population. This investment, compared to the investment required should

Mali devolve into chaos would be minimal.

The French brilliantly leveraged the use of local and regional forces in Operation Serval.

This, combined with the focus on ground combat, allowed for the framework for a long term

stability to be facilitated at the operation's conclusion. Had the French included a plan to disarm

the various militias and aid in their integration into the Malian Army, the ability for future armed

insurrection would have been mitigated to some extent. Had the French combined these actions

with use of both the diplomatic and economic aspects of national power to better position the

Malian government in establishing a trusting relationship with the Northern provinces, the

prospects for long term stability would have been much higher.

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Operation Serval - Finding Victory the French Way