Opportunities and risks associated in the Caribbean

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Opportunities and risks associated with the advent of digital currency in the Caribbean

Shiva Bissessar

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This document has been prepared by Shiva Bissesar, consultant of the Caribbean Knowledge Management

Centre (CKMC), of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), subregional

headquarters for the Caribbean. Additional contributions were made by Robert Crane Williams, Associate

Information Management Officer of CKMC. The paper was prepared under the supervision of Peter Nicholls,

Chief of CKMC.

The views expressed in this document, which has been reproduced without formal editing, are those of the

authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Organization.

It should be noted that throughout this report several references are made to various businesses with operations

involving digital currency. The use of such references is for illustrative purposes only, to assist the reader in

understanding the various business models and aspects of the digital currency ecosystem. Such references

should not be misconstrued as an endorsement for any particular vendor or the viability of their products

and services.

United Nations publication

ISSN1727-9917

LC/L.4131

LC/CAR/L.482

Copyright © United Nations, January 2016. All rights reserved.

Printed at United Nations, Santiago, Chile

S.15-01234

Member States and their governmental institutions may reproduce this work without prior authorization, but are requested to mention the source and inform the United Nations of such reproduction.

ECLAC – Studies and Perspectives Series – The Caribbean – No. 46 Opportunities and risks...

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Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................................................................... 5

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 7

I. Digital currency explained .......................................................................................................... 11

A. Transactions, mining, and the block chain ............................................................................. 13

B. Platforms for digital currency exchange ................................................................................ 15

C. Anonymity ............................................................................................................................. 15

II. Digital currency policy development in an international context ............................................ 17

A. Regulation and legislation ...................................................................................................... 17

1. United States Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)................................. 17

2. New York State Bit Licenses ......................................................................................... 18

3. Canadian legislation ....................................................................................................... 20

B. Preventing illegal activities .................................................................................................... 20

C. Exploring opportunities and risks .......................................................................................... 21

1. The United Kingdom call for information ..................................................................... 22

2. European Banking Authority (EBA) .............................................................................. 23

D. Classification and taxation ..................................................................................................... 26

III. Digital currency activity in the Caribbean subregion ............................................................... 29

A. Barbados ................................................................................................................................ 29

B. Trinidad and Tobago .............................................................................................................. 30

1. Public awareness from the Central Bank ....................................................................... 30

2. Recognition from the private sector ............................................................................... 30

3. Calls for objective evaluation......................................................................................... 31

4. Opportunities for digital currency mining ...................................................................... 31

C. Saint Kitts and Nevis .............................................................................................................. 32

D. Dominica ................................................................................................................................ 32 1. “Bit Drop” event ............................................................................................................ 32

2. Bitcoin ATMs ................................................................................................................ 33

E. Survey of Caribbean central banks......................................................................................... 34


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1. Guyana ........................................................................................................................... 35

2. The Bahamas .................................................................................................................. 35

3. Comparative analysis ..................................................................................................... 35

IV. Innovating Caribbean payment systems .................................................................................... 37

A. Mobile money ........................................................................................................................ 38

B. Digital Financial Services (DFS) ........................................................................................... 40

C. Remittances ............................................................................................................................ 41

D. Novel payments in perspective .............................................................................................. 42

E. The case for exploring innovation .......................................................................................... 43

V. Recommendations and conclusion .............................................................................................. 45

A. Recommendations .................................................................................................................. 45

B. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 48

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................ 49

Annexes .................................................................................................................................................... 53

Annex 1 ..................................................................................................................................................... 54

Annex 2 ..................................................................................................................................................... 55

Studies and Perspectives Series: issues published ................................................................................ 61

Tables

TABLE 1 CARIBBEAN MOBILE MONEY DEPLOYMENTS .......................................................... 39

TABLE A.1 EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY RISKS .................................................................. 55

Boxes

BOX 1 VIRTUAL CURRENCY, DIGITAL CURRENCY, AND CRYPTOCURRENCY:

THE TERMINOLOGY ......................................................................................................... 12

BOX 2 THE UTILITY AND MISUSE OF ANONYMITY TOOLS ................................................ 16

BOX 3 ISSUES WHICH BITLICENSE ATTEMPT TO COVER PER ORGANIZATION ............ 18

BOX 4 THE EVOLUTION OF MONEY CONTINUES .................................................................. 22

BOX 5 EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY TWENTY RISK DRIVERS OF

VIRTUAL CURRENCIES.................................................................................................... 24

BOX 6 LESSONS FROM MT. GOX, AND THE BROADER CONCERN OF SECURITY .......... 25

BOX 7 CLASSIFICATION AND TAX TREATMENT IN VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS ............. 27

BOX 8 FROM M-PESA TO PAYM ................................................................................................. 38

BOX A.1 UK CALL FOR INFORMATION ON DIGITAL CURRENCIES....................................... 54

Figures

FIGURE 1 DOMESTIC ELECTRICITY TARIFFS ACROSS CARIBBEAN, SEPT 2012 .................. 32

FIGURE 2 COST OF REMITTANCE AS PERCENTAGE FOR EIGHT

CARIBBEAN NATIONS ..................................................................................................... 41

Diagrams

DIAGRAM 1 EXAMPLE DIGITAL CURRENCY PAYMENT TRANSACTION ................................... 13

DIAGRAM 2 SWOT ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL CURRENCY IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO ............. 31

DIAGRAM 3 COMPARISON OF ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS SYSTEMS ............................................ 43


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Abstract

This report examines the usage of digital currency technology in the Caribbean subregion with a view to

drawing attention to the opportunities and risks associated with this new phenomenon. It discusses the

broader context of an emerging activity at the global level and considers how this technology could

address subregional deficiencies in the electronic payment infrastructure.

The report also discusses mobile money solutions, and the relationship of that technology to

digital currency.

This study utilizes three main sources of data collection: a literature review of subregional and

international sources, a solicitation of views from experts in various fields engaged in the sphere of

electronic payments, and a formal survey of the subregion’s Central Banks regarding awareness of

digital currency and mobile money in the evolving landscape of electronic payments.

The report seeks to present Caribbean policy makers with information to begin the process of

performing a balanced evaluation of opportunities and risks associated with digital currency in the

Caribbean. The study finds that the Caribbean could benefit from innovations to payments technology.

While digital currency and mobile money are technologies that could make a contribution in this area,

their development is retarded by a reluctance to engage with them on the part of financial regulators.

There is a need to expand the scope of participation in the regulatory process to include institutions that

advocate for and promote innovation.


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Introduction

Many Caribbean countries have long endeavoured to increase national participation in the digital

economy. In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, for example, formal efforts to improve the legislative and

technological infrastructure to facilitate e-commerce date back to 1999 (National Electronic Commerce

Policy Committee, 2000). In the ensuing fifteen years, however, progress has been slow and the

challenge continues to engage the attention of national authorities. There is need for a more effective

enabling environment that supports the efforts of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to provide e-

commerce services. The sector has therefore yet to grow to its potential. Among the greatest challenges

the e-commerce sector has faced, both in Trinidad and Tobago, and throughout the Caribbean subregion,

are difficulties surrounding banking and the use of electronic payment systems.

New technologies are emerging that have the potential to address this deficit in electronic

payment infrastructure. Digital currency and mobile money solutions are components of new industry

classifications referred to as Financial Technology (FinTech) and Digital Financial Services (DFS).

These technologies are swiftly evolving, and it will be some time yet before they reach maturity and

generate widespread usage. In response, even at this early stage, regulators in financial capitals around

the world, including New York, London and Singapore are all examining ways to enable the

technological innovation offered by digital currency and related technologies, while putting measures in

place to mitigate a number of risks that have been associated with their broader adoption.

Authorities in Caribbean countries would be well-served to follow a similar approach, but many

have limited awareness of these technologies. Others harbour deep concerns about the risks associated

with digital currencies. Some policy makers may be inclined to push for an outright ban on digital

currency technologies, or at least a delay in their adoption for an extended period of time. However, the

global and decentralized nature of digital currencies means that this course of action would be unlikely

to be effective. It could also come at a high cost to Caribbean innovators, foreclosing a potential avenue

for economic growth. Further, as this study will illustrate, the ability of Caribbean regulators to contain

the risks of this new technology will largely be determined by their ability to engage constructively with

the FinTech industry and with the broader digital currency community. Thus, a more proactive

engagement on this issue is needed.


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To that end, in an effort to help establish a Caribbean discussion on the topic of digital currency,

and to gather information needed for this study, ECLAC convened two Expert Group Meetings (EGMs)

on the opportunities and risks associated with the advent of digital currency in the Caribbean1. The

experts at these meetings sought to examine the current state of e-commerce and mobile money solutions

in Caribbean countries, to consider the implications of the introduction of these new technologies, and to

explore options available to Caribbean authorities seeking to construct an appropriate policy response.

The experts at the meetings were selected to be representative of different countries within the

Caribbean subregion, as well of various groups that may have an interest in digital currency. At the

meetings, government experts in the areas of money laundering, policy development and law discussed

their concerns with digital currency and mobile money vendors seeking to develop services for the

Caribbean market. They also considered how improvements to the subregion’s payments infrastructure

could benefit participants in the e-commerce industry, who were also represented at the meeting.

The following issues were notable as among the key concerns discussed at these EGMs:

Challenges exist in e-commerce payment infrastructure in the Caribbean subregion that may

constrain the ability of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to participate in the digital

economy2. Digital currency and mobile money solutions could potentially be used to

overcome these challenges.

Financial authorities are mindful of a number of risks associated with the increased use of

digital currencies, including money laundering, terrorism financing, consumer protection, and

the use of digital currencies to fund trade in illicit goods, such as drugs, weapons, and child

pornography.

The concern over money laundering is especially salient in the Caribbean subregion, due to the

“gray listing” of some Caribbean countries by the Financial Action Task Force on Money

Laundering (FATF), and the continuing efforts on the part of these countries to comply with

the transparency mandates of that international body.

Efforts by digital currency and mobile money service providers to establish operations in the

subregion have been stymied by regulatory uncertainty. For example, several vendors reported

that they have been denied access to financial services —such as checking accounts— by

banks in the subregion, and are operating with a degree of uncertainty as per how their

operations will be categorized by financial authorities.

Another important finding of the EGM process was that there is potential common ground

between the interests of regulators and of the digital currency industry. Industry participants stand to

benefit from the timely establishment of national regulations that enable vendors to gain a clear

understanding of the terms for operation in Caribbean countries. Regulations could also have the effect

of promoting public acceptance of these new payment technologies by enforcing consumer protection

measures that could encourage broader trust in digital currency systems. However, in discussion at these

meetings it was apparent that engagement between Caribbean regulators and digital currency industry

participants has been limited.

1 The meetings were held in December 2014 and March 2015. 2 In light of this finding it is interesting to note that the struggle to find the key to increased participation in the digital economy

stretches back as far as 1999 via work done by a Cabinet appointed National Electronic Commerce Policy Committee to establish

comprehensive policy recommendations via “Preparing Trinidad and Tobago for Doing Business In The Internetworked Global

Digital Economy”.


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It appears that there is a lack of balance in regulatory consideration of digital currency technology

in the Caribbean. The role of international financial compliance bodies ensures that concerns over

money laundering draw heavy consideration in the discussion, but there are no corresponding

institutionally-driven imperatives that give appropriate countervailing weight to the needs of the

subregion’s technology and innovation sector. That is why it is important for regulators to consider all

sides of the issue, weighing both the opportunities and risks that these new technologies may present.

This report attempts to provide some of the background information needed to perform such a balanced

assessment, and to present regulators with resources that can be used in further consideration of the issue.

To that end, this report entails an introduction to digital currency and places it in perspective of

more traditional electronic payment systems and mobile money solutions. It updates the reader on the

activities of digital currency and mobile money vendors who have been seeking entry into Caribbean

markets, and examines the international context of policy development in these areas. Further, it

explores the views of Caribbean Central Bankers with respect to how digital currency and mobile money

can potentially assist the state of electronic payments and participation in the digital economy within

their territory. Finally, it presents recommendations on how Caribbean authorities might proceed in

exploring the issue within their own territories.


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I. Digital currency explained

An objective evaluation of digital currency requires a basic familiarity with the concepts that the

technology is built upon. To start this discussion, consider the question “Where does money come from?”

The current international monetary system took its present form following the dissolution of the

Bretton Woods system in 1972, when the world moved away from reliance on currencies pegged to

intrinsically valuable commodities, such as gold, to fiat money. Fiat money relies on the backing of

Governments to ensure the acceptance of its currency as legal tender. It has value, in part, because

Governments require that taxes be paid in legal tender, and this ensures that there will always be a

demand for it. Money is thus widely considered to be a creation of governments, but the commercial

banks also play an important role in the process of money creation. In its first quarterly bulletin of 2014,

the Bank of England noted that “Whenever a bank makes a loan, it simultaneously creates a matching

deposit in the borrower’s bank account, thereby creating new money”. The bulletin also cites the

economist James Tobin’s 1963 reference to “fountain pen money” in recognition of economists who

have spoken of money as being “created at the stroke of bankers’ pens when they approve loans”.

But this begs another question, what exactly is money? Before something can be considered

money, it must possess three essential characteristics: it must serve as a store of value, a medium of

exchange and as a unit of account. Hence, although fiat money has no intrinsic value, it still represents a

store of value (as a promise to pay) such that its paper or coin representation can be exchanged for items

of equivalent value, at a relatively stable rate of exchange allowing for future date purchases.

Therefore, at its very core, the concept of money is a reflection of popular confidence in the

ability of a currency to support a system of value transactions. This confidence is typically upheld by

nation states and their associated Central Banks. However the question now arises: if a portion of the

population places confidence in an alternate system of currency, can such an alternate currency be

considered as money? The arrival of new payment technologies with decentralized systems for ledger

management, payment verification and currency supply, presents an opportunity to revisit traditional

thinking on electronic payment systems and the fundamental character of money. These decentralized

systems are called digital currency, with Bitcoin being the first and, to date, among the most prominent.

The Bitcoin payment system and currency was proposed in October 2008 by a person or persons

using the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto. It became operational in January 2009. Bitcoin was heralded


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as a revolutionary solution to challenges apparent in previously proposed electronic cash systems. These

challenges centred on preventing the “double spend”3 of electronic tokens, as well as concerns regarding

reliance on a centralized authority for the issuance of currency and verification of transactions within

such a system. In Bitcoin, these challenges were overcome by the use of new “distributed ledger”

technology. This decentralized system was implemented through a peer-to-peer model, similar in design

to earlier networks used for file trading, such as Napster and BitTorrent4. The “peers” in the network

collectively maintain a cryptographically secure public record of all transactions made using Bitcoin,

which is continuously validated by the network and is open to verification by anyone with an

understanding of the protocol. Bitcoin was proposed as “an electronic payment system based on

cryptographic proof, instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact business directly with

each other without the need for a trusted third party” (Nakamoto, 2008).

As Bitcoin was the first digital currency, it will be used as an example to illustrate the workings of such

systems. Throughout this paper the capitalized word Bitcoin will be used in reference to the payment

system while “bitcoins”, written in lower case will be used in reference to units of the currency. This is

in keeping with a commonly used standard within the Bitcoin community. It may be appropriate to begin

with an explanation and clarification of various terms used within this report as presented in Box 1.

3 The risk of double spend is where person A uses the same units of e-money to pay person B and person C. Bitcoin reduces this risk

by allowing for verification of “confirmed” transactions via its secure public ledger of transactions. 4 “Peer-to-peer” systems are computer networks that are characterized by a large number of endpoints that interconnect with each

other. This is as opposed to a system, such as the World Wide Web, in which endpoint computers access information located on a

central server. The peer-to-peer model first gained widespread consumer popularity with the release of the music-file trading service “Napster” in 1999. Bit Torrent, a later iteration of this type of technology, is currently widely used for trading video content.

Box 1 Virtual currency, digital currency, and cryptocurrency: the terminology

The terms virtual currency, cryptocurrency and digital currency have been used interchangeably by some while others have recognized differences. Indeed, digital currency has even been used to describe mobile money solutions, hence some clarity is required.

In a 2012 paper entitled “Virtual Currency Schemes” the European Central Bank (ECB) defined virtual currency as an unregulated digital currency while electronic money and commercial bank deposits (both legal tender) were described as regulated digital currency. Virtual currency schemes which allow for bidirectional flow to and from the real economy, such as Bitcoin, were identified as type III virtual currency.

While the ECB paper does make a clear distinction between electronic money and virtual currency (i.e electronic money is legal tender), it does not mention the term cryptocurrency. Virtual currency schemes are also recognized as being centralized or decentralized.

In their 2014 Q3 quarterly bulletin entitled “Innovations in payment technologies and the emergence of digital currencies”, the Bank of England (BOE) uses the decentralization of a scheme via the presence of a distributed ledger as a key criterion for qualification for classification as a digital currency. When distributed consensus on the ledger payment system is achieved using cryptographic techniques, these digital currencies are called ‘cryptocurrencies’. The bulletin recognises Bitcoin as the first crypto-currency, and cites Ripple as an example of a digital currency that is not a cryptocurrency, because it uses a non-cryptographic consensus method.

In this paper, we shall adopt the BOE terminology as described above and the term digital currency will be used to describe decentralized distributed ledger systems such as Bitcoin, Litecoin, Dodgecoin, etc.

Source: European Central Bank (European Central Bank, 2012) & Bank of England (Ali, Barrdear, Clews, & Southgate, 2014).


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A. Transactions, mining, and the block chain

Traditional monetary systems require the Central Bank to maintain a ledger of transactions within the

commercial banking system that can be used to verify transactions between customers of the commercial

banks. However, a distributed ledger-based digital currency system uses standard cryptographic

techniques to maintain a public record of all transactions ever carried out within that system. Such a

system does not require a central authority to maintain the integrity of the ledger of transactions, instead,

the integrity of the public ledger is ensured through the mathematics of cryptography.

In the Bitcoin protocol, when two parties engage in a payment transaction, a record is created

indicating that value has been transferred out of one or more “addresses” held in the “wallet” of one of

the parties and into an address held in the wallet of another. This process is illustrated in Diagram 1.

Diagram 1 Example digital currency payment transaction

Source: Shiva Bissessar.

Diagram 1 shows a transaction flow in which Bob seeks to transfer 23 bitcoins (BTC) to Alice. In

doing so, Bob’s digital wallet selects Addresses 1, 2, and 3, which together containing enough bitcoins

to facilitate the transaction. Next, 23 bitcoins are digitally signed over to Address 4, which is controlled

by Alice’s wallet. The change from the transaction, in the amount of 6.99 bitcoins, is automatically

returned to Bob’s digital wallet via the newly created Address 5.

The record of this transaction is broadcast to the network, as a means of verifying that the funds

being transferred have not already been transferred elsewhere in the system. This verification role is

performed by special participants on the network called “miners.” Miners are constantly receiving the

broadcasts of transactions on the network and verifying these transactions. However, these verified

transactions do not automatically become part of the ledger of transactions. Instead, mining systems are

required to expend computational power to solve a complex mathematical problem. Only upon the

successful solution of this problem are the transactions which a miner has verified incorporated into a

time-stamped entry on the distributed ledger. In the example from Diagram 1, a transaction fee of 0.01

bitcoin is transferred to the miner that successfully solves the computational problem needed to place the

verified transaction into the distributed ledger.

Each set of verified transactions added to the distributed ledger is known as a “block.” Each block

is cryptographically connected to all the blocks that have been generated before it, and to those which

will be generated after. This sequence of mathematically linked blocks, which together record every

transaction that has ever occurred in the system – are known as the “blockchain.” The cryptographic


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connection between each block on the blockchain is so strong that it is considered to be virtually

impossible to forge, given the limits of current technology and computing power.

The level of computational difficulty to create new blocks on the blockchain is managed so that

all of the mining power on the network will yield one new block roughly every 10 minutes. Hence once

a transaction occurs, the earliest time it can possibly be integrated into a block is the period of time

remaining until the next block is created. So if a transaction occurs at the same point in time when the

last block was created, at a minimum, the transaction can be integrated into a block approximately 10

minutes later. A transaction is considered fully ‘confirmed’ after it has been integrated into the

blockchain at a level six blocks deep —that is, once five blocks have been added to the blockchain,

subsequent to the block that records the transaction. This mechanism is intended to prevent against double-

spend of bitcoins, but result in practical problems in terms of the speed of confirmed payment transactions5.

For the service that miners perform through the verification of transactions, they are compensated

by receiving the previously-mentioned nominal fees attached to the payment transactions being verified.

These fees are accrued to the miner on the network that successfully adds a block that the block chain

that includes the verified transaction. In addition to these fees, they also receive a mining reward for

having a block accepted into the block chain. This reward is a quantity of newly produced or “mined”

BTC, provided via a “coinbase” transaction. Presently, from the miner’s perspective, collecting this

reward is the primary objective of participating in the Bitcoin network.

Additionally, the quantity of the mining reward is reduced by half approximately every four years.

With the initial mining reward quantified at 50 bitcoins per new block in 2009, and currently set at 25

bitcoins, the supply of mined BTCs placed into circulation therefore decreases at an increasing rate over

time. This will taper off until the supply limit of 21 million bitcoins is reached, after which, no more new

bitcoins will be created. Thus, the system is designed so that mining rewards will decrease over time,

which implies that collecting fees will become an increasingly important means of compensation for

Bitcoin miners. This supply limit implies that, if there is continued and expanding demand for the digital

currency, the value of Bitcoin would be expected to increase over time. This deflationary aspect to

Bitcoin has contributed to a widespread tendency among users to hold BTC as a speculative investment,

which has undermined its use as a medium of exchange.

One characteristic of the process of mining digital currency is that it tends to require significant

computational power.

This is due to the fact that, as Bitcoin increased in popularity, more people dedicated computing

resources to getting the mining reward, and that has led to a steep increase in the computational

difficulty required to add new blocks to the block chain. Hence, to successfully mine units of BTC

today, individual miners have grouped themselves into “mining pools” with shared distributed

computing resources and split rewards among all participants.

Some organizations have invested significant amounts of money in building out mining

operations akin to server farms, using specially designed computer chips known as Application-Specific

Integrated Circuits (ASICs), which function as dedicated Bitcoin mining hardware. This has led to the

development of services marketed as cloud-based or digitally hosted Bitcoin mining operations, which

consume significant quantities of electricity. Regions with low cost of electricity —including some in

the Caribbean6— therefore have a competitive advantage which could be used to encourage the

development a digital currency mining sector. However, this advantage must be weighed against the

environmental cost of the high carbon footprint associated with Bitcoin mining.

5 Improving the speed of confirmed transactions is an active research area of digital currency. 6 See chapter III.


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B. Platforms for digital currency exchange

In the early days of Bitcoin, it was feasible for any technology-savvy computer user to obtain a supply of

bitcoins by setting up mining software on their desktop. Over time, as the Bitcoin network grew, so did

the power requirements —both in terms of electricity and in terms of computing capacity. Today, bitcoin

mining is generally performed at an industrial scale, and the investment necessary to mine a substantial

amount of bitcoins has grown to a point well beyond the means of average digital currency enthusiasts.

Thus, the most effective means of obtaining digital currencies is by purchasing them directly.

They may be purchased from individuals, through on-line exchanges, or through ATMs. Digital

currency purchases from an individual are often facilitated through online communities —such as

LocalBitcoins.com— and transactions commonly take place through in-person meetings. In exchange

for cash, or other consideration, the seller of digital currency will initiate a blockchain transaction to

move funds into an address controlled by the buyer. Many users prefer the in-person option as a means

of obtaining digital currency because it is viewed as more difficult to track.

Digital currencies can also be transacted via on-line exchanges, of which there are many. These

exchanges are Internet-based marketplaces that accept traditional means of electronic payment —such as

credit cards or bank transfers— and provide customers with digital currency in exchange. They also

provide a means for holders of digital currency to cash out their holdings into fiat currency. ATMs are

another way of buying and selling digital currency. These are stand-alone machines that provide

exchange services.

Platforms for exchange between fiat money and digital currency —such as online exchanges and

ATMs— provide a natural point for the application of regulatory oversight. They are increasingly being

regulated, especially with regard to ensuring compliance with anti-money laundering and “know your

customer” (AML/KYC) standards, which requires identity verification of users, monitoring of

transactions, and due diligence to reduce the risk of money laundering, terrorist financing, or identity theft.

By comparison, it is relatively difficult to impose this kind of oversight on the transfer of digital

currency from one party to another, in cases where national currencies are not involved. This is due in

part to the somewhat anonymous nature of digital currency transactions. However, because all

transactions on the blockchain are public, the reputed anonymity of digital currency has significant limitations.

C. Anonymity

Bitcoin has a reputation as being able to support untraceable financial transactions, which is one reason

that an early, popular use of it was as a means of supporting online trade in contraband via the “dark

web”. However, the anonymity afforded by Bitcoin is not actually as strong as is widely believed, and

this bears examination because the traceability of transactions is fundamental to many of the most

widespread concerns about digital currency technology.

Though Bitcoin users may not have their name directly attached to their funds and transactions,

the fact that every transaction is publicly visible in the blockchain means that, with some effort, it is

generally possible to trace funds to the entities that control them. By analysing transactions, the various

addresses linked to a particular entity can be discovered and, should a physical person make public any

of their addresses; a link can be established between one’s physical identity and one’s virtual identity.

That person can then be linked to an entity in the ecosystem with links to a multitude of other addresses

they have used (Reid & Harrigan, 2011).

Other prominent research into analysis of transaction flows and anonymity of Bitcoin, based on

these tracing methods and employment of other clustering methods, include works which revealed:

High levels of dormancy of mined Bitcoin over time (i.e. 76 per cent remained unspent at the

point of analysis) and transaction patterns which seem to indicate attempts to mask the origin

of transactions (Ron & Shamir, 2012).


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Identity of major institutions, including the infamous Silk Road7 and Mt. Gox, (see Box 7), in

the Bitcoin ecosystem and interactions between them via initiation of a small number of

transactions (Meiklejohn et al., 2013).

In November 2014, the multinational effort, Operation Onymous, led to the arrest of 17 persons

and the takedown of over 400 dark net websites including Silk Road 2.0. While some aspects pertaining

to the modalities through which authorities were able to identify the hidden nodes and the persons

responsible for them may warrant further research, amongst the various plausible possibilities suggested

was the work of Ivan Pustogarov et al., who examined “ways to link transactions and deanonymize

Bitcoin clients even if they use Tor” (Tor Project, 2014). An explanation of the terms Tor, the dark web

and Silk Road is presented in Box 2.

Within the digital currency community, there has been some effort to develop means of increasing

the anonymity of transactions on the blockchain. For example, users desiring a higher level of anonymity

are encouraged to create a separate new Bitcoin address for every transaction, and Bitcoin wallet

technology is evolving to make this an automated part of the process. There is also extensive use of

“tumblers,” processes designed to pool and mix a large number of transactions together, making

individual transactions more difficult to discern in analyzing the block chain. These techniques do have

the effect of making deanonymization more difficult, but their utility is limited by the fundamentally

public nature of the Bitcoin protocol. There have been some efforts at developing alternate digital

currency implementations —“Alt Coins”— that have stronger forms of anonymity built into the system,

but adoption of these has been extremely limited, as compared to Bitcoin.

7 Silk Road was a controversial dark web website which facilitated the purchase of illicit and illegal goods and services with the

payments method of choice being the digital currency Bitcoin. The site was shut down by U.S. authorities in October 2013. A few months thereafter, Silk Road 2.0 appeared online to fill the void.

Box 2 The utility and misuse of anonymity tools

The Tor Project is the group responsible for maintenance of The Onion Router (Tor) network. Tor was initially developed by the U.S. Navy as a means of providing anonymous communication between parties. It was subsequently released into the public domain and has been used by persons and groups who require anonymity and secrecy in the face of oppressive regimes or the intrusive eye of “big brother”.

Like any technology, it can also be used for nefarious purposes. Tor is the primary means of access to the “dark web”, which is an underground collection of websites, not accessible via traditional means, where participants engage in various anonymous activities including the trade of illicit/illegal godos and services.

The aforementioned Silk Road was one of these dark web sites, and it used Bitcoin as a currency to facilitate trade in drugs, forged identification documents, and other illicit goods and services. The trial of the alleged founder and owner of Silk Road, Ross Ulbricht, who assumed the alias “Dread Pirate Roberts,” has resulted in his conviction in a United States court. It is purported that authorities were able to reveal his real identity by tracing the inadvertent linking of an attribute of his physical identity to an attribute of his anonymous persona.

Source: Author compilation.


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II. Digital currency policy developmentin an international context

A view of the international landscape affords Caribbean nations an opportunity to learn of methods by

which countries are attempting to put controls in place to manage risks associated with digital currency,

while still allowing for innovation of new payment systems to be explored.

A. Regulation and legislation

1. United States Financial Crimes Enforcement Network(FinCEN)

From the perspective of anti-money laundering regulation, the United States-based Financial Crimes

Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has been proactive with their response to digital currency. Their

issuance of guidelines in March 2013 sought to define the various actors in a digital currency ecosystem

(“users”, “administrators”8 and “exchangers”) based on the role they played in the digital currency

ecosystem (FinCEN, 2013). It also sought to clarify the possible regulatory obligations of these different

actors to register as a Money Service Business (MSB) and specifically as a money transmitter9 within its

oversight. Exchangers and administrators were said to be subject to MSB registration while users were

said to be exempt.

This caused some ambiguity regarding whether certain operations of miners would have led to

classification as an MSB (Marco Santori, 2013).

This was treated with via a clarification in January 2014 (FinCEN, 2014) which established that

miners were not engaging in money transmission activities once they acted “solely for the user’s own

purposes and not for the benefit of another”. The Network did go further to warn, however, that acts of

8 In the case of a decentralized ecosystem such as Bitcoin there are no ‘administrators’. 9 FinCEN requires special risk management, risk mitigation, recordkeeping, reporting, and transaction monitoring requirements of

MSBs classed as money transmitters. Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Know Your Customer (KYC) policies are some of the more well-known measures.


18

transfers to third parties should be closely examined to ensure money transmission was not taking place.

FinCEN has issued at least three other clarifications to its initial March 2013 guidance, and continues to

attempt to provide businesses with an understanding of how their operations may be classified.

It has been noted that, while the FinCEN provides a federal designation for an MSB, the treatment

of this designation is different on a state-by-state level, and this has caused difficulty for businesses

wishing to establish themselves across multiple jurisdictions. This is a relevant concern for the

Caribbean, because it parallels the potential difficulty for companies that would be more likely to

prosper under a uniform regulatory regime within the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), but which

will experience costs associated with adjusting to divergent regulatory frameworks at the national level

within the individual countries of the subregion (ECLAC, 2015). These costs may effectively limit

market participation, especially within the Caribbean’s smaller economies. This suggests that regional

bodies, such as CARICOM or the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) should anticipate

the future possible importance of digital currency and move to develop uniform regulation to businesses

transacting in them.

2. New York State Bit Licenses

While FinCEN sought to clarify the obligations of digital currency businesses under existing MSB and

money transmitter categories, the state of New York sought to develop a new regulatory framework that

would lead to digital currency firms having to acquire a license to operate or provide services to persons

within the state.

In August 2013, prompted by Wall Street interests via the development of financial and

investment products based on digital currency, the New York Department of Financial Services

(NYDFS), financial regulator for the state, issued subpoenas to 22 digital currency companies and

investors as part of an information gathering exercise to understand the industry (Hill, 2013). This led to

public hearings in January 2014 (NYDFS, 2014a) and the development of a proposed Bit License

regulatory framework in July 2014 (NYDFS, 2014b) which was structured to address the issues under

headings outlined in Box 3.

Box 3 Issues which BitLicense attempt to cover PER Organization

Compliance Capital requirements Custody and protection of customer assets Material change to business Change of control; mergers and acquisitions Books and records Examinations Reports and financial disclosures Anti-money laundering program Cyber security program Business continuity and disaster recovery Advertising and marketing Consumer protection Complaints Transitional period

Source: New York Department of Financial Services.


19

During the public comment phase of this process, over 3700 comments were received by the

NYDFS from organizations such as:

The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF): U.S. non-profit organization which has been at

the forefront of defending civil liberties in the digital world.

Coinbase Inc.: An organization whose core business involves financial transactions with

digital currency as an exchange and wallet services provider.

Walmart, Amazon: Organizations which carry products that can be potentially classed as

being subject to the BitLicense obligations.

Western Union: U.S. based money transmission services whose existing business model may

be threatened, or alternatively enhanced, by digital currency.

Some of the arguments against the proposed BitLicense, centred around the ambiguity in its

wording in relation to the types of digital currency products and organizations which would be subject to

regulatory oversight. For example, both the EFF and Coinbase Inc. highlighted the fact that digital

currencies utilizing blockchain technology, such as Bitcoin, can be used for purposes other than financial

transactions, which was also a point discussed during the EGM10

.

This would therefore mean that a financial oversight body could potentially be regulating the

activities of organizations that have no real dealings in financial transactions. Walmart and Amazon

made similar arguments noting that their gift card products could potentially make them subject to

BitLicense requirements given the broad definition of “virtual currencies”.

Coinbase Inc. also made arguments which suggest they favour an approach of amending existing

money transmitter license regulations to encompass digital currency products. They opined that there

would now be duplicate compliance obligations on organizations in requiring that they acquire both a

BitLicense and NY money transmitter license.

They also objected to burdensome application requirements, such as fingerprinting of staff which

exceeds the requirements of obtaining a NY money transmitter license, as well as significant capital

requirements, onerous policy statement requirements and excessive record keeping requirements

(Coinbase Inc., 2014).

Via a joint statement with the Internet Archive and Reddit, the EFF also commented on the

excessive compliance requirements; the ambiguity of the broad definitions within the BitLicense

proposal; the fact that digital currency can be used for non-financial transaction purposes; as well as the

privacy concerns in the proposed recording keeping requirements (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2014).

“We believe that, as currently drafted, the “BitLicense” regulatory framework raises

profound civil liberties concerns and stifles innovation. The proposal would infringe the

privacy rights of casual users and digital currency innovators, as well as fundamentally

burden freedom of speech and association. The framework would also create expensive

new obligations for businesses developing new products and services in the digital

currency ecosystem, likely foreclosing many of them from doing business involving New

York and its residents.”11

In response to such concerns, the NYDFS released a second draft of the BitLicense in early 2015,

with another 30 day comment period. In defending the perceived stringency of the BitLicense

regulations for digital currency operators, they sought to clarify that while the proposed licensing model

10 See Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Opportunities and Risks Associated with the Advent of Digital Currency in the

Caribbean, LC/CAR/L.461; paragraph 12. 11 Electronic Frontier Foundation.


20

was introduced to these operators, it was also being considered for use in reviewing the regulation of fiat

operators. Amongst some of the changes announced in the revised version were:

Clarification as to the types of products and organizations which will be subject to BitLicense

requirements.

Reduction of recordkeeping requirements in terms of what information is collected and how

long such information needs to be stored.

The availability of transitional BitLicences to reduce the burden on start-ups.

It is recommended that financial authorities in the Caribbean not only take note of the eventual

output regulations established by FinCEN and NYDFS but also note the process of stakeholder

engagement undertaken in (i) coming up with their proposed regulations and (ii) issuing comment

periods and clarifications to their proposed regulations. Such an approach allows for the achievement of

balance in providing regulatory oversight while not completely stifling innovation.

3. Canadian legislation

Similar to the U.S. attempt to retrofit treatment of digital currency within their existing MSB and money

transmitter classifications under the FinCEN regulatory body, in June 2014 the Canadian government

passed an amending bill C-31 to the existing Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist

Financing Act (PCMLTFA). This bill sought to clarify how digital currencies would be recognized and

treated with by their financial intelligence unit, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre

of Canada (FINTRAC).

Consistent with the FinCEN approach towards regulation of digital currency, the Canadian

legislation sought to address the issue at the control point where digital currency converts into fiat

currency via categorizing such points as Money Service Business (MSB) and stipulating verification and

recordkeeping requirement as per Anti Money Laundering (AML) best practice. This makes such digital

currency businesses subject to registration and compliance requirements expected of an MSB registered

with FINTRAC.

Digital currency businesses “that have a place of business outside Canada but who direct services

at persons or entities in Canada” were also made subject to these requirements. Additionally, banks

were prohibited from opening and maintaining accounts with digital currency MSBs that did not register

with FINTRAC (Duhaime, 2014).

It is significant to note that Caribbean vendors have expressed concern about a developing

regulatory landscape where authorities may seek to regulate user to user transactions, especially in light

of the fact that this may be very difficult —or impossible— for reasons having to do with the

decentralized nature of the technology infrastructure that enables the use of digital currencies12

. Thus,

the two approaches examined so far, in the U.S. and Canada, utilize the control point at which digital

currency converts into fiat as the regulatory point for money laundering and terrorist financing risks

rather than user to user transactions.

B. Preventing illegal activities

During the U.S. Senate hearings into digital currency in November 2013, The President and Chief

Executive Officer of the International Centre for Missing & Exploited Children (ICMEC), Ernie Allen,

stated that his organization had “set out to find a balanced, reasonable response to the problems

associated with the misuse of digital currencies for child sexual exploitation and other criminal activity”.

In his statement, he highlighted the challenges for law enforcement as posed by anonymity tools such as

the Tor client (see Box 2), and the challenges of the mere perception of Bitcoin as facilitating

12 See Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Opportunities and Risks Associated with the Advent of Digital Currency in the Caribbean, LC/CAR/L.461; paragraph 15.


21

anonymous transactions which leads to persons to engaging in undesired behaviours. He also identified

the Tor Project and the Bitcoin Foundation13

as having assisted their mandate via active participation in

the Digital Economy Task Force.

The task force was described as seeking to “offer recommendations and real solutions for the

threats and risks without jeopardizing the promise and potential of the digital economy”. The task force

produced a report in March 2014 which established 15 conclusions and recommendations representing

an initial starting point towards ensuring digital economy technologies are not abused “to the detriment

of our children and our society” (Digital Economy Task Force, 2014).

An examination of the “Regulations” recommendations from this report shows advocacy for an

approach whereby risk based analysis of the various identified risks is performed. If we apply these

recommendations to the topic of digital currency (as a subset of the digital economy), it also calls for the

establishment of a specialised group mandated to research various areas including:

The process flow and control points in digital currency transactions (e.g. fiat to digital

currency conversion)

Whether there is a need for regulation of digital currency (in context of risk based analysis)?

A review of existing rules and regulations (should regulation be deemed necessary) to determine:

If more effective application of rules and regulations needs to take place

If an entirely new regulatory approach needs to be defined

The recommendations state that such a group should “include representatives from across the

digital economy and other affected industries” which implies participants from the vendor side, the

regulatory authority side, academic experts, among others. This is very much in alignment with the

approach taken in seeking the appropriate composition of experts to participate in the EGM.

Finally, the report also calls for further clarification from regulatory bodies like FinCEN and

FINTRAC as well as taxation authorities. This listing can be easily augmented with Central Banks,

given the critical role which they play in the Caribbean countries, regulating the operations of financial

institutions under their purview. However, Central Banks would first need to build up their expertise and

knowledge of the area.

It is recommended that this Digital Economy Task Force report be used to guide any position

when it comes to developing policy options with respect to digital currencies and the digital economy.

C. Exploring opportunities and risks

Many of the sources reviewed seemed skewed towards one end of the debate or the other, that is; does

digital currency provide risk or does it provide opportunity? To counter this, the opportunities and risks

of digital currency are discussed together within this section rather than split out between two different

sections. Box 4 is presented to highlight the fact that digital currency is now part of the debate on

improving payment systems globally.

13 Note that, as of April 2014, the Bitcoin Foundation has restructured to focus on development of the Bitcoin protocol and members of its Board have indicated that the organization is stepping back from engagement in public policy efforts.


22

1. The United Kingdom call for information

As part of a consultative process, towards a wider goal of “making it easier for people to access and use

financial services”, the Government of the United Kingdom, in November 2014, issued a call for

information on the benefits and risks of digital currency. Their rationale for doing so included reasoning

which pointed to a desire for:

A more innovative and competitive banking and payments sector.

Understanding of the benefits as being touted by digital currency businesses and the

community of users of digital currency.

Understanding of the risks posed to various institutions and interest groups.

Evaluation of the need for regulation of digital currency.

The process took the form of online submission of comments in response to thirteen questions as

presented in Annex 1.

The UK Payments Council, in their response to the call for information, cited several possible

benefits of digital currency, with the caveat of appropriate mitigation of their risks14

. These benefits are

preceded by a more obvious benefit whereby the United Kingom can seek to establish itself as a centre

for digital currency expertise and the creation of new channels for tax revenue and investment. Some of

the highlighted benefits such as (i) fewer barriers to cross border trade, (ii) faster settlement time and

(iii) lower transmission charges, speak to the development of products which may support more effective

e-commerce, remittance systems and interbank transfer mechanisms. Another benefit of having

transactions recorded in a public ledger is seen as supporting international financial crime investigations.

They also specifically highlighted the underlying block chain technology of digital currencies or

“distributed ledger technology” as being one of the most innovative aspects of the industry stating that it

had the potential to “fundamentally change the way many value transactions both within and outside of

14 The risks outlined were in alignment with those also highlighted by the NYDFS and European Banking Association.

Box 4 The evolution of money continues

In 2012, The Royal Canadian Mint announced plans to cease production of their penny due to cost of production and relative low purchasing power.

Within a week of this, they announced a “development phase technology”, MintChip, as being available to software developers as part of a challenge to create innovative digital payment applications.

“MintChip brings all the benefits of cash into the digital age. Instant, private and secure, MintChip value can be stored and moved quickly and easily over email, software applications, or by physically tapping devices together”. The MintChip challenge has since come to a close.

In November 2014, Ms Carolyn Wilkins, speaking in her capacity as Senior Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada, stated that they view “Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies as investment products rather than money” however she also stated they were “undertaking research on the potential merits of issuing e-money”.

The possibility of utilizing distributed ledger technology without the creation of a new currency is cited by The Bank of England 2014 Q3 paper entitled “Innovations in payment technologies and the emergence of digital currencies” where they state:

“As emphasised by Haldane and Qvigstad (2014), it would technically be possible for an existing central bank to issue digital-only liabilities in a distributed-ledger payment system equivalent to those deployed by recent digital currencies”.

In January 2015, Ecuador, which banned Bitcoin in 2014, delivered on its promise to establish an alternate currency where people pay cash (Ecuador had been using USD since the banking crisis in 2000) for a new electronic form of money stored in mobile wallets. While it was initially referred to as a digital currency scheme, the new Electronic Money System (EMS) seems more akin to mobile money.


.


23

the payments system are made, including the distribution and communication of assets, company shares,

and securities”. They also called for a light handed approach to any “intervention” on this technology so

as to continue to support innovation in this area.

The UK Payments Council released a report based on this call for information in March, 2015. In

keeping with the approach taken by authorities in the United States and Canada to manage money

laundering risk, the report signals intent for the application of AML regulations to digital currency

transactions. It further calls for collaboration between the industry and the British Standards Institution

for the creation of standards for consumer protection. However, the report also recognizes the

innovation which digital currency represents, stating:

“The government recognises that the technology associated with digital currencies offers

considerable promise, making it possible for users to transfer value (or other information)

quickly, efficiently and securely, providing a permanent record of what has taken place,

and without the need for a trusted third party to oversee the process. In response the

government is launching a new research initiative which will bring together the

Research Councils, Alan Turing Institute and Digital Catapult with industry in order

to address the research opportunities and challenges for digital currency technology,

and will increase research funding in the area by £10 million to support this.” (HM

Treasury, 2015)

Governments of the Caribbean would be well-served to take note of this balanced approach to the

issues surrounding digital currency, which recognizes risk while encouraging innovation. Caribbean

countries have a need to develop new industries in ICT related fields (Williams, 2015), and the area of

Financial Technology (FinTech) is one that is poised for growth in the coming years. However, the

establishment of the Caribbean subregion as a centre of FinTech development will not be possible

without proactive engagement from regulators, and would benefit from broader support from

governments and regional organizations.

Thus, it is recommended that Caribbean financial authorities and regulators take note of the

inclusive approach adopted by the United Kingdom thus far, to ensure they get a broad and

encompassing view of the opportunities and risks of digital currency.

2. European Banking Authority (EBA)

In June 2014, the European Banking Authority (EBA) released the report “EBA Opinion on ‘virtual

currencies’”. The report does make mention that “many potential benefits” exist for regions with lesser

developed payment infrastructure, such as the Caribbean. The benefits listed in the EBA report includes:

Economic benefits

Transaction costs

Transaction processing time

Certainty of payments received

Contributing to economic growth

Financial inclusion outside the European Union

Individual benefits

Security of personal data

Limited interference by public authorities

However, the report also outlines approximately 70 risks posed by the use of virtual currencies in

the European Union, as presented in Annex 2. These risks are further grouped into 20 underlying risk

drivers and the document goes further to establish a regulatory approach to each of the risk driver


24

groupings as presented in Box 6. The EBA-documented risks encompass those mentioned by the

Financial Action Task Force (FATF) report; “Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential

AML/CFL Risks”.

An examination of these drivers reveals similarities in areas of concern which NYDFS attempted

to address via the proposed BitLicence (see Box 3). For example, issues of cyber security, reporting

requirements, consumer protection and consumer recourse are commonly expressed by both sets of

authorities. Some of the issues such as “lack of probity”, “insufficient funds or VC units” and “no

separation of accounts” speak to concerns over the lack of proper audit and verification methods for

individual accounts and overall reserves as held by digital currency service providers. Additionally,

“payer and payee anonymous” or “anonymity in transactions” is cited as a driver for 25 of the

approximately 70 identified risks.

Advocates for digital currency may argue that recent technology advancements in the digital

currency ecosystem and adaptation of existing techniques hold promise to these identified risk drivers:

Multi-signature technology - This minimizes the risk of transactions occurring without the

account holder’s knowledge, which bodes well for consumer protection and accountability

risks. This technology allows for several private keys to be associated with a single public

key. To facilitate a transfer requires that a subset of those private keys (e.g. 3 of 5) be used to

digitally sign any transaction. These extra keys are held by the user on different computing

devices as well as by authorized personnel at the user’s digital currency service provider

(Coinbase Inc., 2014).

Proof of Reserves – In the wake of the Mt. Gox debacle (see Box 7), digital currency

exchanges have sought ways to improve methods of maintaining consumer and financial

authority confidence in their systems. Some digital currency businesses have developed

techniques which allow for verification of Bitcoin balances at the individual customer

(account holder) level and organizational level while maintaining the privacy of their

customers by not having individual account balances disclosed (Kraken, n.d.).

Box 5 European banking authority twenty risk drivers of Virtual Currencies

1. VC schemes can be created (and their functioning subsequently changed) by anyone,anonymously

2. Payer and payee are anonymous3. Global reach4 . Lack of probity 5. Not a legal person6. Opaque price formation7. No refunds or payment guarantee8. Unclear regulation9. Lack of definitions and standards10. Inadequate IT safety11. Information is neither objective nor equally distributed12. Insufficient funds or VC units13. No separation of accounts14. No complaint process15. Lack of access to redress16. Lack of corporate capacity and governance17. No reporting18. Interconnectedness to FC19. Not legal tender20. No stabilising authority

Source: European Banking Authority, (European Banking Authority, 2014).


25

Investigative techniques – The question of anonymity of Bitcoin was introduced in chapter I,

section C, where it was mentioned that the mere perception of anonymity of digital currency

system contributes to illicit/illegal behaviours. One only needs to examine the example of the

takedown of Silk Road (Zetter, 2013) to gain insights into how existing law enforcement

investigative techniques of infiltrating networks and harvesting information from various

sources can be adapted to uncover the identities of bad actors in digital currency ecosystems.

Regulatory checkpoints – Existing Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter Terrorism

Financing (CFT) practices such as Know Your Customer (KYC) information gathering and

Customer Due Diligence (CDD) continuous monitoring can be layered onto digital currency

ecosystems to ensure the anonymity risks minimized. The digital currency industry vendors at

the EGM informed they were already employing such system in anticipation that such

regulations would be put in place in the Caribbean at some point15

.

In November 2014, the director of licensing, authorizations and regulations, of the Autorité de

Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution (French Prudential Supervisory Authority), M. Jean-Claude

Huyssen, is said to have pledged France’s commitment to following the regulatory approaches outlined

in the aforementioned EBA report (Pierre Brondi, 2014). This policy direction could potentially affect

territories under French sovereignty in the Caribbean.

While it is recommended that Caribbean authorities review the EBA Opinion document to inform

their understanding of the risks (as well as Bit License and FATF documentation), they must also seek

appropriate answers to their questions from informed parties who have intimate understanding of the

evolving landscape of digital currency ecosystems.


Box 6 Lessons from Mt. Gox, and the broader concern of security

Mt. Gox, the first Bitcoin exchange, was considered to be the largest exchange in terms of volume traded up to early 2013. They suffered a few significant setbacks later in 2013 causing periods of suspended trading and withdrawals. In February 2014 they inaccurately attributed their Bitcoin withdrawal issue to a “transaction malleability” feature within the Bitcoin protocol which was refuted by the Bitcoin development community. Later that month they filed for bankruptcy after leaked documents surfaced implying they lost significant quantities of customers’ account holdings. Investigations as of December 2014 by Japanese authorities indicate that most of the lost Bitcoin was as a result of actions requiring insider knowledge rather than theorized external bad actors.

The case of Mt. Gox serves as a sobering reminder of the need for consumer protection and proper accountability and governance of organizations holding customers’ digital currency accounts. Another benefits in the aftermath of Mt. Gox included the refinement of financial authorities’ abilities to investigate digital currency transactions and the development of public audit practices.

In January 2015, the issue of digital currency consumer protection and IT security again came into focus withthe news of Bitstamp, a Slovenian digital currency exchange, losing 19,000 BTC due to hacking.

Within the broader Caribbean region, Coinapult, a Panama-based Bitcoin wallet service, has reported that it lost 150 BTC (approximately $42,900 USD) in a hacking incident in March 2015. Customer funds were not affected, but withdrawals were halted for five days, and a new protocol has been put in place that requires Coinapult staff to approve all transactions before a withdrawal can be made. This is a significant improvement to security, but it comes at the expense of customer convenience.



26

D. Classification and taxation

Various authorities in different countries have been struggling with the issue of classification of digital

currency based on their own unique perspectives. For example, in August 2013, in a case brought to trial

by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the presiding judge stated that Bitcoin was a

“currency or form of money” contrary to the defence of Trendon Shavers, who claimed that his alleged

Ponzi scheme could not be classed as such due to the Bitcoin not being a true form of money

(RT, 2013).

Financial authorities, however, have not been so inclined to agree with such a classification and

no nation state has acknowledged digital currency as legal tender. The issue of how digital currency is

classified is important not only because it reflects on how it is treated in legal contexts, but also because

legal classification has significant implicationson how digital currency is treated in the context of taxation.

In classifying digital currency, some countries have shown reluctance to treat digital currency as

they would any other currency. However, a common alternative, treatment of digital currency as an

asset, presents its own range of difficulties. Among these is the implementation problem concerning the

calculation of capital gains tax. Since Bitcoin, for example, is prone to highly volatile price swings,

treating it like an asset, with a corresponding book value in a national currency, may result in a capital

gain or loss every time money is received in a wallet and later spent. In countries where short-term and

long-term capital gains are treated differently, there may be additional complexity in the process of tax

collection and reporting.

Moreover, in cases where long-term capital gains are given beneficial tax treatment, it’s difficult

to make the case that extending lower capital gains tax rates to income generated from speculation in

digital currencies could be justified as being socially beneficial. Rather, there is a danger that financial

capital which might otherwise be invested in the local economy, either directly, or through savings in a

bank, could instead be sidelined as it sits untouched in the digital wallets of Bitcoin speculators.

Countries may not wish their tax policy to favour this practice.

The classification of digital currency for legal and taxation purpose is a complex issue, and the

appropriate solution for a given country may be highly dependent on the pre-existing legal and taxation

context within that country. Thus, from a classification perspective, it is recommended that Caribbean

authorities review the referenced material regarding the decisions taken on classification by a variety of

jurisdictions, as presented in Box 8, and to also consult more updated material in considering how to

classify digital currency.


27

Box 7 Classification and tax treatment in various jurisdictons

The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) declared in March 2014 that digital currency should be treated as property rather than currency making it subject to appropriate taxes for federal tax purposes (IRS, 2014) affecting how various entities viewed their operations including investors, miners payment processor and employees.

Subsequent to the IRS ruling, the state of New York issued a clarification citing that digital currency was classed as “intangible property” and hence the purchase of digital currency was not subject to sales tax, removing concerns of possible double taxation upon spending of same (NY State Department of Taxation and Finance, 2014).

In June 2014 the U.S. State of California had to amend its legislation to allow for the legal use of digital currency by allowing such currencies to be classified as “lawful money”. Legal tender is the official fiat currency of a nation and it can exist in electronic form (e.g. funds available via debit card) or physical form (paper or coin) maintaining its legal status and unit of account in transitioning between these forms. It is also the recognized currency which taxes must be paid in to taxation authorities. Lawful money, in contrast, can be seen as a legal alternate to receive payments but persons are not obliged to accept it as payment.

In August 2013 Germany deemed Bitcoin to have the “unit of account” essential characteristic of money further classified as “private money”.

This seems to carry a similar connotation to the lawful money, as explained below, in that it was deemed that Bitcoin can be legally used for private purposes in payments or transacting with exchanges and others as a substitute currency.

In March 2014 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) of the U.K. issued a policy tax treatment on the income of actors in digital currency ecosystems including miners, traders, payment processors and exchangers.

This clarified Value Added Tax (VAT) exemptions for miner income received from mining activities and currency trading amongst others. It also delved into other tax treatment of activities involving digital currency including corporate, income and corporate gains tax (HMRC, 2014).

Indeed the issue of taxation is one that appears in many nations’ consideration of treatment of digital currency. In a review “Regulation of Bitcoin in Selected Jurisdictions” the issue of taxation appears in the assessment of at least thirteen (13) different nations (Library of Congress, 2014).



29

III. Digital currency activity in the Caribbeansubregion

This chapter summarizes some notable digital currency-related activities that have taken place, to date,

in various Caribbean countries. Additionally, the chapter analyses the responses to an ECLAC survey of

Caribbean Central Banks on the topics of digital currency and mobile money.

Taking a broad view of the Caribbean subregion, it is clear that the use and understanding of

digital currency is still in an early, incipient phase. While there is growing awareness of the technology,

and there is a sense of opportunity in the emergent digital currency industry, mainstream adoption

appears to be a long way off. The industry’s need for a supportive regulatory environment is one of these

challenges, but perhaps an even larger one is the need to win over the public and convince consumers of

the value that digital currencies may offer.

A. Barbados

In February 2014, The Barbados National News reported on the entrepreneurial efforts of two nationals

of the Koblitz Group, who were seeking to establish a digital currency exchange to serve the Caribbean

(Cumberbatch, 2014), starting off in Barbados and thereafter refocusing on Trinidad and Tobago. An

examination of the group’s portfolio via their website reveals the existence of two subsidiaries, a digital

currency exchange, Bitt, and a hosted digital currency mining service\, ASICBLOCK. The website also

reveals stated intentions of providing merchant processing and digital currency Automated Teller

Machines (ATM) with a core focus on “cyptocurrencies in emerging markets”. In August 2014, they

summarized some of the regulatory roadblocks they were experiencing in becoming operational in

certain Caribbean nations (Bissessar, 2014b):

“Regulators are very slow to respond and educate themselves on digital currency

technology. Whilst other small economies around the world respond proactively to this

emerging technology (See Isle of Man) to establish themselves as forerunners in a new age

of finance we have found Caribbean government bodies resistant to change. This is a


30

shame because not only do our economies need stimulation, but our people need help in

entering the age of e-commerce and m-commerce.”16

In participating in the Expert Group Meetings (EGMs), Koblitz Group cofounder Gabriel Abed

echoed these sentiments, encouraging regulators to acquire a better understanding of digital currency and

calling for clarity as to how digital currency operations will be perceived by financial authorities in

various Caribbean jurisdictions17

.

In March 2015, Bitt officially launched its digital currency exchange in Barbados, having

announced that it had secured a US$1.5 million seed round investment from a venture capital group

based in Trinidad and Tobago.

B. Trinidad and Tobago

1. Public awareness from the Central Bank

In March 2014 the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago (CBTT) issued public awareness information

on the phenomenon of digital currency via its Payment Quarterly publication This included a warning

that “potential users of this product must be aware of the risks involved in investing in virtual currencies

as regulators seek to establish appropriate frameworks to ensure the continued safe operation of the

payments system and the smooth conduct of monetary policy.” The document also stated that such

systems are somewhat addressed under the banner of electronic money within the Financial Institution’s

Act, 2008, indicating that “The Act treats with the issuance of virtual currency as stored value, issued on

receipt of funds and accepted as payment by persons other than the issuer.” (Central Bank of Trinidad

and Tobago, 2014). Later clarification appeared to indicate that this existing legislation does not

encompass treatment of digital currency, as distinguished from virtual currency (See Box 1 for

discussion of this nomenclature). However, it was maintained that the only issuer of currency in Trinidad

and Tobago remains CBTT, and that the “law requires organizations to consult with the Central Bank for

approval to launch products related to digital currencies”18

.

2. Recognition from the private sector

During a moderated discussion on local impediments to SMEs enabling their web presence with

e-commerce payment systems, as part of a session focused on “Digital Economy” at the ICT Business

and Innovation Symposium in November 2014, Mazuree Ali, CEO of locally-based e-commerce website

TriniTrolley, stated that money was being redefined at present to encompass things like Bitcoin Ithis

same vein, he later described, the procedural and financial burdens placed upon SMEs to get

e-commercecapabilities enabled on their websites. This contributed to the formulation of one of the main

conclusions within the report of the December 2014 EGM, indicative of the need for better payment

infrastructure in the Caribbean:

“It was noted that there is a need for better payment systems within the Caribbean region, and that

the high costs and red-tape associated with providing electronic payment options, are significant

challenges to those wishing to establish e-commerce businesses in the region. The region also needs to

lower the cost of remittance services. Digital currencies represent a potential option for improving

services and reducing costs, but are challenged in receiving acceptance among consumers and regulators.”19

16 Oliver Gale, co-founder Koblitz group. 17 See Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Opportunities and Risks Associated with the Advent of Digital Currency in the

Caribbean, LC/CAR/L.461; paragraph 22. 18 Ibid., paragraph 21. 19 Ibid., paragraph 1.


31

3. Calls for objective evaluation

In an analysis of new technology and business models in the digital economy, Bissessar (2014a) called

for an objective evaluation of risks and opportunities of digital currency in the Caribbean. All of the

issues outlined in the SWOT diagram in Diagram 2 as pertains to opportunities and risks which digital

currencies may present to Trinidad and Tobago, and by extension the Caribbean, are treated within

this analysis.

DIagram 2 SWOT analysis of digital currency in Trinidad and Tobago

Source: Author (Bissessar, 2014a).

Another article published on ICT Pulse, a Caribbean technology website, also sought to illustrate

the utility of digital currency by showing how it can be utilized to increase Caribbean participation in the

digital economy. This was illustrated with a practical case of the need to provide better payment

infrastructure to Caribbean content creators, thus allowing them to find better opportunities to monetize

their work by receiving payments without the hassles and fees associated with traditional Internet

payment systems (Bissessar, 2014b).

4. Opportunities for digital currency mining

Trinidad and Tobago has the potential to become a hub of digital currency activity, due in part to its

relatively low cost of energy. The low cost of power could make the country an attractive location for

operators engaged in the electricity-intensive process of mining of new digital currency. Figure 1 shows

a September 2012 Caribbean comparative snapshot of typical electricity bills (USD) for 100kWh per

month for domestic customers (CARILEC, 2013). Both Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname are easily

distinguishable as having a significant competitive advantage over the rest of the field in terms of

electricity cost. Trinidad and Tobago’s low cost of electricity is primarily linked to its status as a net

producer of oil and gas, from which it derives its electric power. In the case of Suriname, despite being

the 3rd largest Caribbean producer of oil and gas (behind Trinidad and Tobago and Cuba) its electric

power is primarily derived from hydroelectric plants.


32

Figure 1 Domestic Electricty Tariffs across Caribbean, Sept 2012

(Dollars)

Source: 2012 Annual Report (CARILEC, 2013).

C. Saint Kitts and Nevis

In June 2014, the St Kitts and Nevis Citizenship by Investment Unit (CIU) sought to clarify that they

would not be accepting the popular digital currency Bitcoin as a means by which applicants for

citizenship could participate in their programme (Richards, 2014b).

“We further emphasize that we do not accept Bitcoins, have never accepted Bitcoins, and

will not accept Bitcoins.”20

This was in response to claims on the website http://passportsforbitcoin.com21

that a company

“authorized by the government to submit citizenship applications” was accepting BTCs “for the required

property investment and all fees associated with acquiring St. Kitts citizenship”. The website was being

run by one Roger Ver22

, via his company, International Investments & Consulting, Ltd (Clenfield &

Alpeyev, 2014).

Though the CIU pronouncement on the matter indicated that the Government of St. Kitts and

Nevis will directly accept Bitcoin to facilitate the citizenship process, it has been pointed out that the

transactions between third-party agents of the programme and parties desirous of gaining citizenship

could, in theory, continue to take place. In such an instance, payment of digital currency would first go

to an intermediary, who would then handle the conversion necessary to ensure that the CIU would

receive all monetary payments in the form of recognized foreign currency (Richards, 2014a).

D. Dominica

1. “Bit Drop” event

In August 2014, it was reported that the 70,000 residents of Dominica would be the beneficiary of a

quantity of free Bitcoin via their mobile phones in a “Bit Drop” event planned for March 2015. This

20 St Kitts and Nevis Citizenship by Investment Unit. 21 The original webpage is no longer available online, but is still accessible via Internet archival websites. 22 Ver is recognized as an early investor in Bitcoin who became quite wealthy as a result, one of the cohort of “Bitcoin Millionaires”

that have been active in promoting the technology. Ver himself attained St. Kitts and Nevis citizenship in February 2014, and subsequently renounced his United States citizenship.


33

event was to be sponsored by an association of organizations from the digital currency industry (Marty,

2014). One of the main organizations in this association23

, the Panama-based digital currency exchange

Coinapault, is noted for having developed one of the first digital currency wallets to facilitate

transactions via email and SMS.

This mechanism of transfer was considered particularly suitable for the intention of the Bit Drop

event, that is, to distribute a quantity of BTCs to the portion of the population willing to receive it, via

their mobile phones. Coinapault’s CEO, Ira Miller, reiterated the utility of digital currency transfer via

mobile phones during the EGM in the context of a global population of 7 billion mobile phones24

.

In September 2014, in response to some of the reactions coming out of Dominica around the Bit

Drop event, one national, Adella Toulon-Foerster, who wrote her Master’s Degree thesis on Bitcoin,

published a brief overview of Bitcoin on the website “Dominica News Online.” This explained some of

the possible benefits of digital currency and encouraged people to conduct their own research on the

matter (Toulon-Foerster, 2014)25

. In a response to a post on the popular social networking/community

site “reddit” where a link to Toulon-Foerster’s article was made available, a Reddit user account

(previously linked to Ira Miller) acknowledged that the Bit Drop event faced adoption challenges from

some members of the population itself (Coinapault_btc, 2014):

“Yeah, we could have done a better job. Who knew giving people free money was so

controversial? I think there has been a lot of confusion (including among journalists) that

the government is passing some laws or forcing people. Really, we just got their thumbs up

to hand money and tech out to the people.”26

The Bitdrop event was subsequently cancelled in February 2015. Among the reasons cited by

organizers for the cancellation was the lack of Government support for the project. The reluctance of the

Government to support the project may have come as a result of pushback from a population leery of

embracing a technology that had garnered negative media coverage, such as stories highlighting the

activities of bad actors in the context of episodes such as the Silk Road case and the collapse of the Mt.

Gox Bitcoin exchange. In summarizing discussion on the matter, the report of the second EGM states:

“The experience in Dominica highlighted the need for digital currency vendors to

implement strategies aimed at building confidence with both governments and with the

public. Digital currency technology will not be able to gain broad acceptance until it is

trusted. Hence, there is a need for the industry to create a basis for this trust by proactively

supporting efforts to mitigate any negative impacts associated with its use.”

(ECLAC, 2015)

It is notable that even the perception of risk, rather than actual impacts might be sufficient to limit

uptake of digital currency.

2. Bitcoin ATMs

In October 2014, Toulon-Foerster was appointed Vice President of Special Projects at CoinOutlet, a U.S.

based Bitcoin ATM manufacturer, which was not directly involved in the BitDrop event but which is

seeking to install ATMs in Dominica (Dominica News Online, 2014). During the EGM, Toulon-

Forester indicated that her organization was involved in beta testing of its ATMs in the U.S. and drew

attention to the potential application of these ATMs towards the goal of reducing the cost of remittances

23 Former Prime Minister of Dominica, O.J Seraphim is chairman of the board of Aspen Assurance which is another of the

organizations responsible for the BitDrop event. 24 See Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Opportunities and Risks Associated with the Advent of Digital Currency in the

Caribbean, LC/CAR/L.461; paragraph 11. 25 Some of the comments on this article are very indicative of negative reactions towards the Bit Drop event. 26 Reddit user “Coinapault_btc”.


34

in the Caribbean subregion given the lower transactional costs which Bitcoin offers27

. The topic of

remittance is examined further in Chapter IV, Section C.

E. Survey of Caribbean central banks

A survey instrument was designed to gauge the Central Bank’s awareness and understanding of digital

currency and mobile money solutions within the Caribbean. The questionnaire was designed around the

topics discussed at the EGM in that it sought to explore:

The maturity of e-commerce solutions within the respective countries as gauged by factors

such as the presence of fully proclaimed legislation to support e-commerce and the relative

ease with which an SME can attain a merchant account for e-commerce.

The level of awareness of mobile money and digital currency business activity within the

country as gauged by factors such as knowledge of established or potential vendors in these

spheres operating or seeking to operate in their country.

The perceived significance of opportunities and risks associated with digital currencies.

Potential policy options available to manage the advent of digital currency in the Caribbean.

Thirteen subregional Central Bank representatives were officially invited to contribute to the

study via their responses to questionnaire as listed below.

These included individually addressed members of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB):

Antigua and Barbuda (ECCB)

The Bahamas

Barbados

Belize

Dominica (ECCB)

Grenada (ECCB)

Guyana

Jamaica

St. Kitts and Nevis (ECCB)

St. Lucia (ECCB)

St. Vincent and The Grenadines (ECCB)

Suriname

Trinidad and Tobago

The participants were given sufficient time to complete the survey and an extension to submit

completed questionnaires beyond the initially communicated deadline date was granted to all

participants. This was accompanied by three rounds of subsequent phone calls to various responsible

parties where assurances were received that the survey was assigned to personnel for completion and

some even committing that it will be completed and submitted on time. However, by the close of the

survey period, only two completed questionnaires were received from The Bahamas and

Guyana respectively.



35

The low response rate is revealing in itself, and the reasons for it certainly require exploration. It

would appear that Central Banks are exercising caution in going on record on this topic. For example,

communication with at least one representative - whose Central Bank did not submit the completed

survey - revealed that, while they did complete the survey, they would not be able to submit it due to the

fact that as an institution they were still developing their official position on the matter. In this context,

the emergence of an environment of greater regulatory certainty with regard to digital currencies in

many countries of the subregion will likely benefit from the establishment of official policy positions on

the part of Central Banks.

1. Guyana

The survey revealed difficulties for SMEs to achieve financial and approval requirements to provide e-

commerce services due to a lack of e-commerce legislation. There are mobile money solutions at

present that provide services including airtime top up, bill payment, merchant payment, and domestic

Person to Person (P2P) transfers. International remittance services must be licensed but, no mobile

money solution provider offers this service at present. There was no report of digital currency vendors

or service providers active or seeking to operate and provide any of the services mentioned nor has the

Central Bank reported any research into potential impact of advisory to the public with respect to

digital currencies.

2. The Bahamas

E-commerce legislation in the Bahamas has been fully proclaimed and enacted. It was reported that

there is relatively low difficulty for SMEs to achieve financial and approval requirements to attain an

online merchant account to provide e-commerce services. It is estimated that the reliance on external

payment providers such as PayPal is only five per cent. It was reported that research into mobile money

has taken place and is catered to by legislation, however regulations remain outstanding. Currently, no

mobile money services providers or services are present.

Similar to Guyana, international remittance services must be licensed to provide service and there

is no knowledge of digital currency vendors or service providers active or seeking to operate and provide

any of the services mentioned. While research into potential impact of digital currency has not been

conducted, the survey results indicate the potential impact of digital currency is seen as somewhat significant.

3. Comparative analysis

From the perspective of the Central Banks, e-commerce is better supported in terms of legislation and

ease of use for SMEs in the Bahamas than Guyana. In both countries, while digital currency is seen as

being a factor which can increase participation in the digital economy, proper legislation and ability to

access online merchant accounts and even mobile money are seen as more significant factors which can

lead to increased participation in the digital economy.

With respect to the opportunities enabled through innovative payment systems, the outlook of the

Bahamas appears to be more promising than Guyana’s. New business opportunities, digital economy

participation and mobile money are seen as the more realistic promises of digital currency. Guyana’s

optimism on digital currency picks up with respect to mobile money, where they have more experience

than the Bahamas, and remittances, where, there is a high remittance rate of over 10 per cent of GDP

(See Figure 2 in Section IV). In terms of risks, it would seem that both countries agree that money

laundering is the primary concern while tax evasion, financing terrorism and consumer protection are

also noteworthy.


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IV. Innovating Caribbean payment systems

In 2010, conscious of the success of the M-Pesa mobile money phenomenon out of Kenya, senior-level

officials in Trinidad and Tobago examined the issue of mobile money. Their analysis, as reported in

discussion at the December 2014 Expert Group Meeting, found that these mobile phone-based value

storage and payment solutions are more suitable for countries that are either geographically expansive

and/or faced with constraints in financial infrastructure. In the Caribbean context, examples of mobile

money deployments in Haiti and Guyana were used to illustrate the point28

.

This is in keeping with a World Bank classifications scheme of various types of mobile money

business models, which is championed by Mobile Network Operators (MNO) as a response to poor

financial infrastructure. In this model, mobile money solutions are seen as providing “alternate

infrastructure” and subscribers of such low infrastructure environments have a demand for low-cost,

low-speed, infrequent transactions (Mauree & Kohli, 2013). However there are other types of mobile

money solutions to be explored.

For example, on the other end of the financial infrastructure development continuum, subscribers

have a demand for mobile money solutions that provide high-speed, high-volume transactions. These

solutions are generally provided by multiple partners and are seen as being “collaborative” with the

financial infrastructure. Examples of mobile money business models from this end of the spectrum include:

The UK’s Paym which allows for mobile money transfers to another person using only their

phone number.

Apple’s Near Field Communication (NFC) enabled ApplePay which allows iPhone users to

pay for items using their devices.

There is also a transition phase between these two extremes found in countries where financial

infrastructure development is in the middle ground. In these models, banks are the primary providers of

the mobile money solutions seen as “complementary” to the existing financial infrastructure. Hence



38

there are various types of services which can be offered to customers depending upon their needs as

driven by the surrounding context of financial infrastructure development. Box 9 presents further details

on M-PESA and Paym.

A. Mobile money

In discussing potential for mobile money solutions in the Caribbean during the December 2014 EGM, an

entrepreneur based in the Turks and Caicos described the roadblocks he had faced in bringing a mobile

money service to market in that country. Part of the goal of that effort had been to provide financial

services to the country’s large Haitian migrant population, which was underserved by the existing

banking system. Thus, it was expected that a mobile money system, when integrated with existing

mobile money systems in Haiti, would reduce the remittance fees that the Haitians pay to send money

back to their home country.

However, one of the problems the entrepreneur had run into was difficulty in obtaining a bank

account for his company. His experience indicated that traditional financial institutions in the Caribbean

were very risk averse with respect to business proposals with novel payment systems. It was speculated

that this was due to regulatory imperatives for vigilance on the part of banks to maintain close awareness

of customers’ activities as a means of preventing money laundering. Partly as a result of this, and also as

a result of issues surrounding taxation —see next paragraph— the entrepreneur had not been able to

bring this product to market. This was a setback, not just to the entrepreneur, but also for his potential

customers, who remain unbanked and continue to pay high remittance fees. Thus, this can be seen as a

case where the anti-money laundering regulatory requirements have negatively impacted those at the

lowest rungs of the economic ladder.

Box 8 From M-pesa to Paym

From humble beginnings in 2007, allowing users to transfer airtime between themselves and subsequently trade that airtime in for money via an agent, Safaricom’s M-PESA now has over 12.2 million active customers and 8100 agents in Kenya.

This has contributed to an overall growth of the percentage of adults with access to formal financial services which now stands at 67% up from the 2009 figure of 47%. While mobile money contributes only 6.59% of the value national payments, this represents 66.56% in terms of the volume of transactions.

Customers are required to register with an agent, a free process which links their mobile SIM to an account within which money can be deposited.

Once such a deposit is made, customers can use their mobile phones to transfer value across the M-PESA network to other M-PESA users via SMS paying a flat fee for the transfer.

They can also transfer value to non-registered users, pay bills and purchase mobile airtime. Further arrangement and partnerships have allowed for new services such as supermarket purchases,

the payment of school fees and the receipt of international money transfers. “Safaricom deposits the full value of its customers’ balances on the system in pooled accounts in two

regulated banks. Thus, Safaricom issues and manages the M-PESA accounts, but the value in the accounts is fully backed by highly liquid deposits at commercial banks.”

Paym was launched in April 2014 by the UK’s Payments Council immediately servicing over 400,000 registered users of the service across nine (now 16) different banks and building societies with a way to securely send money to another user via their mobile phone number.

“The key feature is that once users have registered their bank accounts to send or receive money with Paym, payments can by triggered simply by knowing a recipient's phone number. Sort codes and account numbers will not have to be keyed in for each transaction, although passcodes will still be required to open an app”.

Users are not required to have a smart phone to receive a payment; however they are required to register their phone number in advance.

Source: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (McKayRafe & Mazer, 2014), International Telecommunications Union (Mayree & Kohli, 2013), & Other.


39

Another issue discussed in this context was that of taxation of wallet-to-wallet mobile money

transfers. It was suggested that once fiat was converted to the mobile money mechanism of transfer (e.g.

airtime) any subsequent transfer (to another person or to a remittance company) may be taxed29

. While

it is reasonable for payments made in mobile money to face the same level of taxation as payments made

through more traditional means, there is concern that this type of taxation will be detrimental to the

adoption of the technology among poorer members of the community. This is a demographic which

commonly participates in the informal economy, and may prefer to operate on a cash basis. Mobile

money could represent a potential on-ramp to the formal economy for this population, providing them

access to needed financial services and greater social stability, but they may avoid adopting the system if

taxation is built into the process. In the long term, this may be an opportunity for the restructuring of tax

regimes; rather than continuing to impose a single, flat-rate Value Added Tax, the payment tracking

technology inherent to these systems may one day enable the development of mechanisms that allow

individual tax rates to vary progressively, based on the total value of an individual’s consumption.

The above issues notwithstanding, there have been a number of efforts to establish mobile money

systems in the Caribbean. Some products have a narrow focus on a particular sector of the market, such

as Boom and Yooz, which target remittances and utility bill payments, respectively. Others attempt to

cast a wider net. Table 1 shows the landscape of mobile money solutions within the Caribbean which has

been determined from GSMA’s Mobile Money for the Unbanked website and other publicly

available information.

Table 1 Caribbean Mobile Money Deployments

Country Solution Organization

Guyana Mobile Money Guyana Inc., GT&T

Dominican Republic Orange M-Peso Orange

Jamaica

CONEC Mobile Wallet Jamaica Co-operative Credit Union League

M3 Mobile Money for Microfinance Development Bank for Jamaica

Haiti

Boom Haiti Boom Financial

Lajancash HaitiPay and Banque Nationale de Crédit (BNC)

T-Cash Voila and Unibank

Tcho Tcho / Mon Cash Digicel and Scotiabank

Trinidad and Tobago Yooz (utility bill payment) Resonance


The most extensive efforts in the subregion at the implementation of mobile money have taken

place in Haiti. After the 2010 earthquake in that country, it was considered that mobile money systems

would be an effective means to distribute money flowing into the country from various donors, and that

this could be used as an opportunity to help jumpstart consumer uptake of the technology. To that end,

the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation and the United States Agency for International Development

(USAID) funded an initiative to provide US$10 million dollars in prize awards to organizations

establishing mobile money products and to meet certain performance benchmarks. Two mobile money

networks – T-Cash and Tcho Tcho - were established, the benchmarks were met, and the prize money

was collected. However, an initial user base of 840,000 subscribers eventually dwindled to about 60,000

active users as of December 2014 (Evans and Pirchio, 2015).

Potential contributing factors to the lack of growth of mobile money initiatives in Haiti include a

lack of consumer trust in these systems, lack of interoperability between mobile money services run by

different operators, and low regulatory limits on the amount of money that could be stored in a mobile

wallet, which limited the utility of the system for potential early adopters in Haiti’s middle class

(Dalberg, 2012). Moreover, the prize-based incentive structure to mobile network operators may have

29 See Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Opportunities and Risks Associated with the Advent of Digital Currency in the

Caribbean, LC/CAR/L.461; paragraphs 13 and 27.

https://www.bnconline.com/nos-produits-et-services/produits-specifiques/lajancash


40

encouraged them to focus their efforts on maximizing the number of transactions in the system, drawing

resources away from the push to strengthen the network as to ensure its long-term sustainability.

Another notable effort at establishing mobile money in a Caribbean country, the “M3 Mobile

Money for Microfinance” pilot project, was launched in Jamaica in 2014. It is approved by the Bank of

Jamaica for peer to peer transfers and micro financing loans via mobile phones as provided by a Micro

Financing Institution (MFI) (Bank of Jamaica, 2014). It should be noted that M3’s model, in being based

on providing microfinance services via an MFI, is similar to M-PESA.

In the case of M-PESA the mobile network operator building out the service was not classed as a

bank, which possibly assisted in easing the regulatory requirements to get the initiative off the ground.

B. Digital Financial Services (DFS)

In recognizing the utility for mobile money solutions towards the purpose of financial inclusion and

seeking to establish standardization across technologies, the International Telecommunication Union

(ITU) held the initial meeting of its Focus Group (FS) on Digital Financial Service (DFS), on 5

December 2014 (International Telecommunications Union, 2014). Among its mandates, the group lists:

Foster collaborative environment between financial service regulators and telecommunications

authorities.

Address regulatory and policy issues possibly hindering the poor from accessing digital

financial services.

Solicit and utilize the expertise of key actors in various rungs of the digital financial services

industry

Guide policy and decision makers in developing countries along the path of the financial

inclusion agenda.

Some of these points speak to the blurring of the lines between financial institutions and

telecommunications providers with the advent of mobile money solutions designed to transmit value

between parties as discussed in the EGM and noted in the previous section.

Indeed, along this same point, one of the Working Groups (WG) established from the FG DFS

was the DFS Ecosystem, which is expected to take a “cross-sector (e.g. finance and telecom; provider

and regulator) perspective” and “identify the key elements of the ecosystem necessary to make it work in

scale for financial inclusion” for the poor of all countries. Other FG DFS Working Groups, covering the

topics of Technologies, Interoperability and Consumer Experience and Protection30

, also consider

initiatives that will have bearing on the Caribbean Telecommunications and Financial sectors as

authorities grapple with treatment of both mobile money and digital currencies and the concept of

financial inclusion in the near future.

Given the growing population of mobile devices with Internet access, the trend towards increased

participation in the Digital Economy, the benefits of financial inclusion finding methods of reaching the

unbankable and the desire for better payment infrastructure, it is recommended that Caribbean

authorities should take note of the ITU’s FG DFS. This should be done from both a telecom and finance

perspective as this work could assist the development of policies towards mobile money and digital

currency solutions in Caribbean countries.

30 Each of the four working groups have a responsibility to examine Policy, Regulatory and Oversight issues.


41

C. Remittances

Reducing the cost of international money transfers is widely cited as an important potential use case for

digital currencies. This is especially true in the case of remittances from the developed world to poorer

countries, in which the cost of transferring money absorbs a high per centage of the total value

transferred. According to an April 2014 report from the Overseas Development Institute, members of the

African diaspora face an average 12 per cent cost to send a USD $200 remittance to their home nations;

this is almost twice the global average rate. The high cost has been attributed to low competition in the

remittance space with global remittance powerhouses of Western Union and MoneyGram commanding

two thirds of the remittance market in terms of transfers.

Noting this situation, in 2009 the Heads of State of the G8 set a target remittance transfer fee rate

of 5 per cent. If this goal is reached, it will represent an annual increase of USD $1.8 billion in the

amount of money that will actually reach back to home nations (Watkins & Quattri, 2014). The Open

Working Group of the United Nations General Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals has

envisaged an even lower level of remittance costs, setting a target to “by 2030, reduce to less than 3 per

cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher

than 5 per cent.”31

According to the World Bank, and in contrast to the situation being faced by the African diaspora,

remittance rates for the Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) grouping of countries averages at 6.02

per cent as of September 2014 (The World Bank, 2014). While this rate is relatively low, it is still above

the previously stated global target of five per cent. Additionally, there is the possibility that within this

average rate, for such a vast area of disparate and diverse economies with varying levels of competition

between remittance providers, there may be high remittance rates being experienced by individual

nations within the Caribbean.

Based on a 2009 report, Figure 2 shows the cost of remittances as a per centage of the value

transferred for eight Caribbean countries averaging at a rate 9.76 per cent.

In Haiti, Jamaica and Dominican Republic, total remittances value at 27.8 per cent, 17.2 per cent

and 14.1 per cent of GDP respectively, while in Trinidad and Tobago it forms less than one per cent.

Hence for some Caribbean nations, lower remittance rates could have a strong positive impact on the

economy, but for others it is of lesser concern.

Figure 2 Cost of Remitttance as percentage for eight Caribbean Nations

(Percentages)

Source: Inter-American Dialogue (Orozco, 2008).

31 See target 10.c of draft of the Sustainable Development Goals, as listed in the Report of the Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals. (A/68/970).


42

One of the promises of digital currency has been that lower transaction costs could result in lower

remittance rates. Details of two remittance schemes utilizing digital currency (Bitcoin) to facilitate

cheaper and faster transfers are presented below:

BitPesa is a Nairobi based digital currency exchange which accepts Bitcoin and exchanges it

for Kenyan Shillings, which appears in a mobile wallet in Kenya, for a flat fee of three per

cent. After beta testing in May 2014, it was officially launched in the UK in June 2014. The

solution is amenable to ultimate remittances receivers in Kenya, as given the popularity of

mobile money solution M-PESA, there is a high degree of acceptance and understanding

amongst the population of receiving payments via their mobile phone.

Bitspark32

enables Bitcoin remittance between Hong Kong and the Philippines satisfying the

needs of an estimated 140,000 Filipinos working in Hong Kong. This is approximately two

per cent of the population which on average sends HK$3,000 (U.S. $387) and HK$4,000 (U.S.

$515) back to the Philippines per month. While the existing remittance rate for such transfers

is low by international standards at 2.5 per cent, Bitspark is providing their service at rate of

one per cent.

Remittances can also be facilitated via Bitcoin ATMs, which use ATM cards linked to a user’s

Bitcoin address. This means that anyone from around the world can transfer bitcoins to that address and

the user can then go to any participating Bitcoin ATM and retrieve the monetary equivalent of value

from the recently transferred bitcoins to his address and ATM card33

. While, in theory, this could be

achieved at a very low cost, the transfers are exposed to the risk of volatility in the value of Bitcoin

during the period that funds are held in bitcoins, and will also have to pay exchange costs associated

with transferring fiat currency into bitcoins on one end, and then back to fiat currency on the other.

Additionally, as proprietors of Bitcoin ATMs will likely need to shoulder the costs imposed by

regulation, which include, but are not limited to Anti-Money Laundering/Know Your Customer

requirements, these costs will eventually be passed on the customer. Thus, while it certainly appears

possible that the use of digital currencies can bring down the cost of remittances, the magnitude of this

cost reduction is still not clear.

D. Novel payments in perspective

SmarTT, The Trinidad and Tobago National ICT Plan for the period 2014-2018 acknowledges the

significance of SMEs to the local economy, stating “SMEs constitute 91 per cent of business

establishments in Trinidad and Tobago, with 75 per cent of these being Micro Enterprises”. The

document further states the intention to provide three workshops per year over a three-year period

targeted to SMEs to assist in their e-commerce awareness. However, as previously highlighted in the

EGM meeting report, better payment infrastructure may be required to get more SMEs involved in e-

commerce locally in Trinidad and Tobago and the wider Caribbean.

Diagram 3 shows how the definition of e-commerce and indeed payment infrastructure is

changing by bringing together the various payment methods mentioned thus far in this report. It presents

these in the context of familiarity to the Caribbean population, from the perspective of an individual or

an SME. It is meant to assist the reader in understanding how mobile money and digital currency

solutions can be visualized in relation to more traditional payment systems.

The left-hand side of the diagram shows more familiar concepts (e.g. wire transfer of funds via

bank accounts) while the right-hand side shows more novel concepts such as e-commerce solutions that

32 It should be noted that Bitspark is a beneficiary of a Honk Kong business incubator initiative called Cyberport, which is geared

towards assisting ICT start-ups with a Financial Technology or FinTech focus. FinTech is relatively new sector where entrepreneurs,

companies and incubators seek to bring innovation to financial payments. Caribbean nations have been seeking to develop incubator-type environments to foster ICT innovation (Williams, 2014). As a growing sector in the global marketplace, could

FinTech be a possible avenue for exploration as Caribbean nations seek to develop innovation? 33 See Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Opportunities and Risks Associated with the Advent of Digital Currency in the

Caribbean, paragraph 14.


43

are currently offered by payment processors using digital currency as the medium of exchange. While

the extreme right shows an SME as benefiting from theses e-commerce solutions, such as a Caribbean

digital content creator receiving payment for work performed in a territory not supported by external

payment providers such as PayPal, it should be noted that larger organizations, such as technology giants

Microsoft and DELL, are now also accepting Bitcoin payments for products via some of their sales channels.

The first three levels of the diagram show the essential intermediaries in converting money into

various mechanisms of transfer to facilitate payments, while the fourth level illustrates payment and

transfer services made possible using these modes of payment. As previously discussed, there is a

continuum of mobile money services suitable for use by persons within regions with varying levels of

development of payment infrastructure. The diagram illustrates how these mobile money solutions differ

from each other in terms of mechanism of transfer and novelty.

Diagram 3 Comparison of electronic payments systems

Source: Shiva Bissessar.

The last level of the diagram gives some examples of use cases of the various payment systems;

however it is by no means exhaustive. Take, for example, the case of Square’s mobile point of sale

(mPOS) units which allows SMEs to facilitate credit card processing when attached to their mobile

phones. Where would such a service of mobile e-commerce fit in this diagram? Additionally, peer to

peer (P2P) transfer of digital currency via mobile phone short message service (SMS) is shown as a

digital currency service when it could also be thought of as a mobile money solution. Indeed, digital

currency has the potential to increase the efficiency of mobile money in terms of transaction speed and

cost. This level of the diagram also makes clear the differentiation between payment card e-commerce as

facilitated by external payment providers (e.g. PayPal) as opposed to that facilitated by local banks via

merchant accounts and partnership with an entity providing payment gateway services.

E. The case for exploring innovation

Various Caribbean leaders have been impressed by the economic success of Singapore over the past 30

years, and there has been a drive to emulate certain aspects of Singapore’s economic development within

Caribbean countries (Barbados Government Information Service, 2015). However, the uneven level of


44

development in the innovation sector between Singapore and the Caribbean poses challenges to the

subregion’s current ability to emulate said economic growth. The recent Singapore financial budget, read

in February 2015, cites negligible productivity gains over the past three years after a 13 per cent rise

combined over the years 2010 and 2011 (Singapore Ministry of Finance, 2015). This has led to a

renewed focus on innovation in that country. Commentators, such as Professor of Quantitative Finance

David Lee, Vice President of the Economic Society of Singapore, have cited the need to seek out gains

in innovation as a natural next step once productivity has been maximized (SMU News, 2015). This

view encourages a proactive stance on the development of more efficient financial services in terms of

faster transaction speed and lower transaction cost towards the goal of reaching underserved portions of

the population34

.

This position on innovation and digital currency is also reflected in statements attributable to the

Singapore delegation that participated in a Virtual Currencies Round Table event, held in February 2015,

which was hosted by the Commonwealth Secretariat’s, Commonwealth Cybercrime Initiative (CCI).

Advanced publicity for this event described digital currency as “a new and pressing threat to the

successful combating of crime,” and stated that the roundtable would “consider the development of a

Commonwealth strategy and resources to tackle the rise of virtual and non-fiat currencies”35

. Thus, it

appeared that the Commonwealth Secretariat at first approached the topic from a point of view that was

predominantly focused on examining risks associated with digital currency. In contrast, while the

Singapore delegation’s presentation to the roundtable noted these risks, framing them in terms of risk

management, a subsequent summarization of their take on digital currency noted that Singapore can be

characterized as “embracing new technological innovations” (The Commonwealth, 2015). This point

underscores the fact that digital currency innovation can be explored while making provisions for

containing risk, as more developed economies are doing at present.

Interestingly, this position was also supported by a Caribbean participant of the roundtable event,

who subsequently participated in ECLAC’s Second Expert Group Meeting (EGM) that reviewed a draft

of this report in March 2015. The Director of Legal Reform of Jamaica’s Ministry of Justice, Mr.

Maurice Bailey, articulated that one of the conclusions coming out of the meeting was that Small Island

Developing States need to explore the opportunities which digital currency can potentially bring to their

economies. He went further to suggest that this report make explicit overtures to Caribbean policy

makers to consider the opportunities which digital currency could potentially bring to the subregion.

34 Professor Lee is also a director at the Sim Kee Boon Institute (SKBI) of Financial Economics, Singapore Management University

(SMU). This viewpoint was elucidated as part of the author’s discussion with Professor Lee in late February 2015, in conjunction

with a forum hosted by the SKBI that explored the issue of digital currency in the Caribbean. 35 The quoted text was transcribed from a document shared via video output with the public audience at said presentation.


45

V. Recommendations and conclusion

This study provides a high-level overview of issues surrounding the expanding use of digital currency

and related technologies in Caribbean countries. It provides a starting point for investigation of the

issues, and an opportunity for further investigation for policy makers. For example, the question of how

digital currencies should be classified for taxation purposes is a complex decision, which each country in

the Caribbean should approach from a perspective considering its existing laws, tax policies, and social

needs, while also considering the value of harmonization of policies at a subregional level.

The references to documents provided on this topic can provide guidance on this issue, but by

necessity, this paper falls short of providing policy recommendation to be adopted. Thus, this study is

generally limited to recommending processes for the development of such policy. In keeping with that,

the reader will note that, throughout this paper, references have been made to documents and policies

produced by various bodies, and this study does recommend that these resources be used to inform the

investigations of regulatory authorities as they consider both the risks and the opportunities that this

emerging technology entails.

A. Recommendations

Given the deficiencies in subregional payment infrastructure, and the broader need to increase

participation in the digital economy, it is incumbent upon Caribbean authorities responsible for oversight

of investment, innovation and academic research to examine the opportunities for innovation that digital

currency offers.

It is recommended that authorities in Caribbean countries embark on an inclusive approach to the

exploration of digital currency that provides sufficient opportunity for public input and policy review,

similar to the process adopted by the United Kingdom, as outlined in Chapter II, Section C.

That process compiled over 120 responses from a wide range of sources, including digital

currency users, developers, and service providers, banks, payment scheme companies, academics,

consultancies, and other government departments and agencies. The collected information was used to generate a prudent set of suggested policy measures for that country. This was an effective approach,

but, given the vast difference in size between the United Kingdom and Caribbean economies, Caribbean


46

countries that follow this methodology may find it difficult to generate an adequate depth of response in

considering the issue at a national level. Thus, it would benefit the process for any planned or anticipated

national investigations to have some integration with a broader subregional effort that would facilitate

the emergence of networks for knowledge sharing among different countries in the Caribbean. The

countries of the Caribbean share many of the same concerns and limitations, and can expect to be

dealing with many of the same companies wishing to operate in their territories.

Moreover, to the extent that it would be possible to harmonize public policy on digital currency

across the different countries of the Caribbean, such an aligned regulatory environment would help to

reduce the costs of compliance, and enable the development of a competitive subregional marketplace in

this sector. Thus, it would be valuable for Caribbean countries to begin interregional cooperation in

digital currency issues now, at an early stage in the adoption of the technology, by taking part in a shared

policy investigation process. Countries can then develop their own national strategies, which are built to

match their specific needs and priorities, but which also share some alignment in terms of broader

strategic goals and means of implementation.

To that end, it may be prudent to have the issue of digital currency officially recognized as a

component of future “digital economy” initiatives in the subregion, within programmes such as

CARICOM’s effort to create a Caribbean Single ICT Space.

The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), with its shared Central Bank and history

of cross-national collaboration, is also well-positioned to play a leading role in the implementation of a

common institutional framework for managing the regulatory issues surrounding digital currencies and

mobile money solutions. Caribbean authorities should also recognize on-going activity in this area at a

global level. In particular, they should consider becoming active participants in the International

Telecommunications Union’s Focus Group on Digital Financial Services (See Chapter IV, Section B).

Though it is not currently considered within the scope of that body, participation in such an effort – or in

a similar working group – may be considered as a potential step in laying the groundwork for the

development of some type of global convention to manage cross-national issues surrounding digital

currency and blockchain technology.

The ITU’s effort on Digital Financial Services, at present, is especially relevant to examining the

phenomenon of mobile money as a means of increasing financial inclusion. Mobile money, in terms of

its existing deployment in the Caribbean subregion, is currently the more mature of the two main

innovative payment technologies described in this paper. Though use of digital currency is relatively

limited by comparison, that technology is quickly evolving. In the long run, though the current

generation of digital currency implementations may or may not gain a critical mass of consumer

acceptance in the marketplace, the innovation of blockchain-based decentralized ledger technology will

likely find its way into a number of new financial applications.

One can speculate that coming years may see an increased convergence between mobile money

and digital currency-based payment systems. These could potentially make use of mobile carriers’

existing retail “top up” networks as points of exchange between cash holdings and a payment system

managed through decentralized blockchain technology. This type of network would be an example of

Financial Technology —FinTech— which is an emerging sector that seeks to improve cost and

efficiency of payments systems, and which is poised to be a growth area in coming years. Recognizing

this, those charged with formulating industrial policy, as well as researchers, entrepreneurs and

academics, should consider looking at this technology as a potential area in which Caribbean economies

could develop specialized products and services for export. Consumers in the Caribbean could also

benefit from a robust FinTech presence in the subregion, such as through lower costs for remittances and

other international funds transfers (Chapter IV, Section C), through more convenient means of paying

for services online, and through the associated development of a more competitive e-commerce sector in

the subregion. However, if the Caribbean is to become a centre of FinTech development, there will need

to be buy-in at the regulatory level. Building confidence between regulators and this new industry will

necessitate a close examination of how best to manage the risks associated with the technology.


47

Among these risks is that of criminal activity facilitated through the use of digital currency. The

reputedly anonymous nature of digital currency transactions is cited as an exacerbating factor to this

risk, although consideration of the real-world effectiveness of this anonymity is a relatively complex

topic. To understand the usage and limitations of anonymity in digital currency transactions, law

enforcement agencies, financial investigation units and regulators all need to develop a clear

understanding of the Bitcoin protocol, the Tor Project, and techniques used in deanonymization for the

purpose of criminal prosecution. To that end, they may wish to review the research papers outlined

within Chapter I, Section C on the topic of anonymity. Further, those researching considerations on

preventing a range of illegal activities as facilitated by digital currency, such as money laundering, tax

evasion, drug trafficking, and child exploitation may wish to review the report of Digital Economy Task

Force, which is referenced in Chapter II, Section B. They should also consider that existing crime-

fighting tools are likely to exist that can be brought to bear in combating illicit activity that may be

facilitated by digital currency. In some cases, they may need to make use of technical assistance from

more developed countries, through the use of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, or other such

mechanism. However, while some external support may be available, in the long term, it is the

responsibility of Caribbean nations to develop investigational competency in the area of digital currencies.

In considering criminal risk, the potential use of digital currency for money laundering purposes

is among the highest of concerns of regulators. This is because the Caribbean subregion has an

unfortunate history as a centre of money laundering activity, and Central Banks of the subregion have

been working to lift this stigma by coming into alignment with the mandates of the Financial Action

Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). Thus, in the area of digital currencies, regulators in

Caribbean countries can be expected to take careful note of FATF recommendations. In doing so,

however, they must consider how these recommendations may be implemented without causing undue

difficulty to Caribbean innovators. To achieve this balance, they will need to engage proactively with the

companies in the FinTech industry, which are positioned to be the first line of protection in combating

digital currency-based money laundering.

At the first Expert Group Meeting, it was noted that digital currency companies in the Caribbean

subregion are already taking proactive action by voluntarily engaging third-party services for anti-money

laundering/know your customer (AML/KYC) verification. Caribbean regulators can encourage this good

behaviour by accrediting these third-party AML/KYC services (ECLAC, 2014), and by apprising

industry participants as to their obligations with regard to existing anti-money laundering regulations.

Regulators may also consider working with industry representatives to develop a code of conduct to

provide mechanisms for cooperation in areas such as consumer protection, tax reporting, and assistance

to law enforcement investigations. This code of conduct might stand as a voluntary regime until such

time as it becomes clear what more compulsory measures would be appropriate. This approach is similar

to the approach that the Government of the United Kingdom has indicated that it is undertaking; it has

announced that it will apply anti-money laundering regulation to digital currency exchanges, while

working with the industry to develop voluntary standards for consumer protection (HM Treasury, 2015).

It may be that regulators, after balancing consideration of the risks and opportunities posed by

digital currency, ultimately decide to reject a broader role for digital currencies and mobile money in

their respective countries. In taking this decision, however, they should recognize the risk inherent to the

continuation of the current situation with regard to financial services in the Caribbean, in which large

portions of the population are not served or are underserved by the banking industry. These traditional

systems have underperformed in facilitating increased levels of participation in the digital economy, and

opening Caribbean markets to competition from new, innovative payment systems can provide

individuals and small and medium enterprises with much needed alternative services.


48

B. Conclusions

The case has been established that developed economies are embracing the opportunity presented by

digital currency and mobile money, while putting measures in place to mitigate the risks. The case has

also been made that there are specific areas in which Caribbean economies could benefit from these

advancements, and that these warrant further understanding and exploration.

These areas include cheaper remittances systems, improvements to traditional payment systems

and increased participation in the digital economy. The “call for information” approach taken by the

Government of the United Kingdom, by reaching out to the community prior to the establishment of

regulatory controls, is a progressive model for investigating the issue, and one which may prove

appropriate for Caribbean authorities to follow. The approach of Singapore, which displays a willingness

to examine the innovation offered by digital currency while also being mindful of the risks, is another

example of a balanced approach to engaging with new digital currency technology.

However, Caribbean authorities appear to be taking a more cautious approach to issues of digital

currency and mobile money. The reluctance to outwardly engage with these issues may be connected to

the highly publicized instances of illegal or otherwise questionable activities associated with some users

of digital currency. These activities are troubling, but have overshadowed some real potential benefits of

this new technology.

The high level of institutional caution in this area may also be influenced by a preference to avoid

engaging in perceived areas of risk, as denoted by financial compliance bodies such as FATF. It seems

that money laundering is viewed as a dominant concern, and there is little institutional structure that

gives an appropriate counterweight based on concern for the needs of innovators. This is why there is a

need for the process of developing regulations surrounding innovative payment technology to be

broadened to encompass a wider range of institutions, including those which are prepared to advocate

for the needs of technology innovators. To that end, Central Banks, in their role as the primary regulators

of payment technology, should reach out to academic and research institutions, development and

investment initiatives, and Ministries with responsibility for the promotion of trade and industry. This

inclusive approach will help to ensure that voices representing the need for innovation are given due

consideration as part of the decision making process.

As things currently stand, the high level of institutional caution on the part of regulatory

authorities may hinder the prospects for broader adoption of digital currency technology in Caribbean

countries. This does not bode well for the subregion’s overall ability to embrace ongoing technological

change. Consider, from the example given in this paper’s introduction, the problem of how long it has

taken for some countries in the subregion to gain a toe-hold in the e-commerce sector. Institutional

processes will likely need to be set in motion to increasingly cater for the emerging needs of

entrepreneurs in the ICT sector and their prospective customers. There is a danger of a similar scenario

playing out with digital currency, or indeed, with any new technology that may arrive in the Caribbean.

That is why there is a need for broad reconsideration of how Caribbean national regulatory systems can

be more agile in responding to the emergence of new technology. The advent of digital currency

technology represents an opportunity for Caribbean countries to revise this process, and to demonstrate

that innovation has an equal place at the table in the consideration of national priorities.


49

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Annexes


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Annex 1

Box A.1 UK call for information on digital currencies

Question 1

What are the benefits of digital currencies? How significant are these benefits? How do these benefits fall to different groups e.g. consumers, businesses, government, the wider economy? How do these benefits vary according to different digital currencies?

Question 2

Should the government intervene to support the development and usage of digital currencies and related businesses and technologies in the UK, or maintain the status quo? If the government were to intervene, what action should it take?

Question 3

If the government were to regulate digital currencies, which types of digital currency should be covered? Should it create a bespoke regulatory regime, or regulate through an existing national, European or international regime? For each option: what are the advantages and disadvantages? What are the possible unintended consequences (for instance, creating a barrier to entry due to compliance costs)?

Question 4

Are there currently barriers to digital currency businesses setting up in the UK? If so, what are they? Question 5

What are the potential benefits of this distributed ledger technology? How significant are these benefits? Question 6

What risks do digital currencies pose to users? How significant are these risks? How do these risks vary according to different digital currencies?

Question 7

Should the government intervene to address these risks, or maintain the status quo? What are the outcomes of taking no action? Would the market be able to address these risks itself?

Question 8

Should the government regulate digital currencies to protect users? If so, should it create a bespoke regime, or regulate through an existing national, European or international regime? For each option: what are the advantages and disadvantages? What are possible unintended consequences (for instance, creating a barrier to entry due to compliance costs)? What other means could the government use to mitigate user detriment apart from regulation?

Question 9

What are the crime risks associated with digital currencies? How significant are these risks? How do these risks vary according to different digital currencies?

Question 10

Should the government intervene to address these risks, or maintain the status quo? What are the outcomes of taking no action?

Question 11

If the government were to take action to address the risks of financial crime, should it introduce regulation, or use other powers? If the government were to introduce regulation, should it create a bespoke regime, or regulate through an existing national, European or international regime? For each option: what are the advantages and disadvantages? What are possible unintended consequences (for instance, creating a barrier to entry due to compliance costs)? What has been the impact of FinCEN’s decision in the USA on digital currencies?

Question 12

What difficulties could occur with digital currencies and financial sanctions? Question 13

What risks do digital currencies pose to monetary and financial stability? How significant are these risks?

Source: HM Treasury, Government of the United Kingdom.


55

Annex 2

Table A.1 European banking authority risks

A) Risk to Users

Ge

ne

ral risks, ir

resp

ective

of

pu

rpo

se

A01 User suffers loss when an exchange is fraudulent High

A02 User suffers loss when an ostensible exchange is not a genuine exchange High

A03 User experiences drop in value of VCs due to (significant and unexpected) exchange rate fluctuation

High

A04 User who is a member of a VC mining pool does not get fair share of mined VC units from a mining consortium

Med

A05 User suffers loss when buying VCs that do not have the VC features that the user expects

Low

A06 User's computing capacity is abused for the mining benefit of others Med

A07 User suffers loss due to changes made to the VC protocol and other core components

Low

A08 User is not in a position to identify and assess the risks arising from VC High

A09 User is not in a position to identify and assess the risks arising from VCs Low

A10 User is in violation of applicable laws and regulation Med

A11 User loses VC units through e-wallet theft or hacking High

A12 User loses VC units when exchange gets hacked High

A13 User's identity may be stolen when providing identification credentials to access VCs

High

A14 Market participants suffer losses due to unexpected application of law that renders contracts illegal/unenforceable

Med

A15 Market participants suffer losses due to delays in the recovery of VC units or the freezing of positions

High

A16 Market participants suffer losses due to counterparties/ intermediaries failing to meet contractual settlement obligations

High

A18 Market participants suffer losses through information inequality regarding other actors

Med


56

Table A.1 (continued)

Wh

en

used

as a

me

an

s o

f p

aym

en

t

A21 User suffers loss when counterparty fails to meet contractual payment or settlement obligations

High

A22 User experiences fraud or loss of FC when using VC cash machine Med

A23 User has no guarantee that VCs are accepted by merchants as a means of payment on a permanent basis

High

A24 User suffers loss when VC payment they have made to purchase a good is incorrectly debited from their e-wallet

High

A25 User is not able to convert VCs into fiat currency, or not at a reasonable price

High

A26 User is unable to access VCs after losing passwords/keys to their e-wallet

High

A27 User is not able to access VCs on an exchange that is a 'going concern' (i.e. has the resources to operate)

High

A28 User is not able to access VCs on an exchange that has gone out of business (i.e. does no longer have resources to operate)

High

Wh

en

used

as a

n inve

stm

en

t

A41 User suffers loss as a result of VC prices being manipulated High

A42 User investing in regulated financial instruments (e.g. derivatives, SPS, CIS) using unregulated VCs suffers unexpected loss

Med

A43 User suffers loss when investing in fraudulent VC investment schemes

Med

A44 User is exposed to significant price volatility within very short time frame

Med

A45 User is exposed to significant price volatility within very short time frames

Med

A46 User cannot execute the VC exchange at the expected price Med

A47 User is exploited by a VC Ponzi scheme Med


57


B) Risks to non-user market participantsS

pe

cific

to

exch

an

ge

s B11

Exchange is operationally unable to fulfil payment obligations denominated in VCs or FCs

Med

B12 Exchange is not in control of its operation Med

B13 E-wallet provider faces loss should their refund policies be abused to hedge currency transactions

Med

Sp

ecific

to

me

rch

an

ts B21 After accepting VC for payment, merchant is not reimbursed Med

B22 Unlike a FC, the merchant cannot be certain that they can spend the VCs received

Med

B23 The merchant cannot be certain of the FC purchasing power of the VCs they have received

Med

B24 Merchant faces compensation claims from customers if transactions have been wrongly debited

Med

Specific

to s

om

e o

ther

mark

et

part

icip

ants

B31 Wallet provider loses e-wallets provided for individuals High

B32 Scheme governance authority fails to meet payment and other obligations

High

B33 Scheme governance authority is subject to unexpected civil/criminal liability that brings the VC scheme to a halt

Med

B34 E-wallet provider faces compensation claims from customers if functionality of wallet is compromised or fails to provide expected functionality

Med


58


C) Risks to Financial IntegrityM

on

ey L

au

nde

ring

& T

err

orist

Fin

ancin

g R

isk

C01 Criminals are able to launder proceeds of crime because they can deposit/transfer VCs anonymously

High

C02 Criminals are able to launder proceeds of crime because they can deposit/transfer VCs globally, rapidly and irrevocably

High

C03 Criminals/terrorists use the VC remittance systems and accounts for financing purposes

High

C04 Criminals/terrorists disguise the origins of criminal proceeds, undermining the ability of enforcement to obtain evidence and recover criminal assets

High

C05 Market participants are controlled by criminals, terrorists or related organisations

High

Fin

ancia

l cri

me

ris

ks

C11 Criminal uses VC exchanges to trade illegal commodities and abuse regulated financial sector at point of entry

High

C12 Restorative justice of victims of crime is hindered by criminal using VCs to avoid seizure of assets, confiscations & financial sanctions

High

C13 Criminal can use VCs for anonymous extortion High

C14 Criminal organisations can use VCs to settle internal or inter-organisational payments

Med

C15 VCs make it more feasible for individuals to engage in criminal activity

High

C16 Hacking of VC software, wallets or exchanges allows a criminal to implicate others in the criminal activities they commit

Med

C17 Criminals, terrorist financiers and even entire jurisdictions are able to avoid seizure of assets confiscation, embargos and financial sanctions (incl. those imposed by IGOs

Med

C18 Criminals are able to create a VC scheme High

C19 Tax evaders are able to obtain income in VCs, outside monitored FC payment systems

Med


59


D) Risks to payment systems in VCs

D01 Payment service providers (PSPs) that use FC and also provide VC services suffer losses due laws that render VC contracts illegal

Low

D02 PSPs that use FC and also provide VC services fail due to liquidity exposures in their VC operations

Low

D03 PSPs that offer VC payment services suffer loss of reputation when VC payments fail, because they gave the impression that VCs were regulated

Med

D04 Businesses in the real economy suffer losses due to disruptions in financial markets that were caused by VC assets blocked, delayed, etc.

Low

E) Risks to regulatory authorities

Rep

uta

tio

nal R

isk E01

Regulators decide to regulate VCs but the chosen regulatory approach fails

Med

E02 Regulators do not regulate VCs but the viability of regulated financial institutions is compromised as a result of their interaction with VCs

Med

E03 Regulation and supervision of conventional financial activities is circumvented by unregulated 'shadow' activities that incur the same risks

Med

Le

ga

l

E11 Regulator is subject to litigation as a result of introducing regulation that renders pre-existing contracts illegal/unenforceable Low

Ris

ks t

o c

om

pe

titio

n

ob

jective

s

E21 Should the regulator decide to regulate VCs more leniently than FCs, an unequal playing field in the market for payment services will emerge

Med

E22 If an unequal playing field is retained, the intensity of competition in the market for FC payment services diminishes as providers exit FC markets

Med

E23 Regulators prevent potential new entrants to payment services market if the regulatory approach to VCs is excessive

Med


60

Table A.1 (conclusion)

E) Risks to regulatory authoritiesT

o a

uth

ority

issu

ing

FC

(ou

t o

f scop

e)

E31 Should VCs gain widespread acceptance, central bank as issuer of FC can no longer steer the economy, as the impact of its monetary measures become difficult to predict

Low

Source: European Banking Authority.


61

Studies and Perspectives Series – The Caribbean.

Issues published

A complete list as well as pdf files are available at

www.eclac.org/publicaciones

46. Opportunities and risks associated with the advent of digital currency in the Caribbean, LC/L.4131,

LC/CAR/L.482, 2016.

45. Ageing in the Caribbean and the human rights of older persons – Twin imperative for actions, LC/L.4130,

LC/CAR/L.481, 2016.

44. Towards a demand model for maritime passenger transportation in the Caribbean – A regional study of passenger

ferry services, LC/L.4122, LC/CAR/L.477, 2015.

43. The Caribbean and the post-2015 development agenda, LC/L.4098, LC/CAR/L.472, 2015.

42. Caribbean synthesis review and appraisal report on the implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for

Action, LC/L.4087, LC/CAR/L.470, 2015.

41. An assessment of performance of CARICOM extraregional trade agreements – An initial scoping exercise,

LC/L.3944/Rev.1, LC/CAR/L.455/Rev.1, 2015.

40. Caribbean Development Report – Exploring strategies for sustainable growth and development in Caribbean small

island States, LC/L.3918, LC/CAR/L.451, 2014.

39. Economic Survey of the Caribbean 2014 – Reduced downside risks and better prospects for recovery, LC/L.3917,

LC/CAR/L.450, 2014.

38. An assessment of mechanism to improve energy efficiency in the transport sector in Grenada, Saint Lucia,

and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, LC/L.3915, LC/CAR/L.449, 2014.

37. Regional integration in the Caribbean – The role of trade agreements and structural transformation, LC/L.3916,

LC/CAR/L.448, 2014.

36. Strategies to overcome barriers to the implementation of the Barbados Programme of Action and the Mauritius

Strategy in the Caribbean, LC/L. 3831, LC/CAR/L.441, 2014.

35. Foreign direct investment in the Caribbean – Trends, determinants and policies, LC/CAR/L.433, 2014.

34. Situation of unpaid work and gender in the Caribbean: The measurement of unpaid work through time use studies,

LC/L.3763, LC/CAR/L.432, 2014.

33. Progress in implementation of the Mauritius Strategy: Caribbean Regional Synthesis Report, LC/L.3762,

LC/CAR/L.431, 2014.

32. Information and communication technologies for disaster risk management in the Caribbean, LC/L.3759,

LC/CAR/L.430, 2013.