CMD 18-H6.62

File / dossier: 6.01.07 Date: 2018-05-07

Edocs: 5529678

Oral Presentation Submission from Greenpeace In the Matter of Ontario Power Generation Inc., Pickering Nuclear Generating Station

Exposé oral Mémoire de Greenpeace À l’égard de Ontario Power Generation Inc., centrale nucléaire de Pickering

Request for a ten-year renewal of its Nuclear Power Reactor Operating Licence for the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station

Demande de renouvellement, pour une période de dix ans, de son permis d’exploitation d’un réacteur nucléaire de puissance à la centrale nucléaire de Pickering

Commission Public Hearing – Part 2 June 2018

Audience publique de la Commission – Partie 2 Juin 2018

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IntolerableRisk:TimetoClosePickering

PreparedbyShawn-PatrickStensilSeniorEnergyAnalystGreenpeaceCanada

May7,2018

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1.PreparingforPickering’sEndofLife1.1NojustificationforPickering’scontinuedoperation1.1.1TheNeedforcontingencyplanningandaclosureplan1.1.2LearningfromGentilly-2’sclosure1.2NeedforAStrategicEnvironmentalAssessmentonclosureoptions1.2.1ContingencyPlanningforlong-termwasteStorage1.2.2ConsiderationofalternativestoOPG’spreferredclosurestrategy1.2.3StrategicImpactAssessmentunderthenewImpactAssessmentAct2.IntolerableRisk:TimetoClosePickering2.1OPG’sPeriodicSafetyReview–insufficienttransparency2.2Ariskylocation–thePickeringsite&decliningsafetymargins2.3Emergencypreparedness–provincialmalpractice3.Disclaimer

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Recommendations

• GiventhereisnojustificationforPickering’scontinuedoperationfromOPG’sshareholder,theCommissionshouldcategorizeOPG’sapplicationas“anunreasonablerisk”undersection9(i)oftheNuclearSafetyandControlAct.

• IntheeventthattheCommissionapprovestheoperationofPickeringuntil2024,

theCommissionshouldalsoincludearequirementforOPGandCNSCstafftodevelopandpublishcontingencyplanforanearlierclosure,includingworkertransitionplans,beforetheendof2018.

• TheCommissionshouldrequireOPGtopublishplansonhowitwillmitigatethe

negativesocialandcommunityimpactsofPickering’sclosureasrequestedbyDurhamRegion.

• Inlinewithitsmandateundersection9(i)oftheNuclearSafetyandControlAct,

theCommissionshouldrequireOPGtodevelopproposalsformorerobustradioactivewastestoragefacilitiestoensureadequateprovisionismadetoprotectCanadiansandtheenvironmentbeforeitappliesforadecommissioninglicence.PlansformorerobustradioactivewastestoragefacilitiesshouldbeavailableforpublicreviewduringanenvironmentalassessmentbeforeOPGappliesforadecommissioninglicence.

• TheCommissionshouldensureapublicassessmentofalternativestoOPG’s

preferreddelayeddecommissioningstrategy—includingcontingencyplansforlong-termwastemanagementatthesite—takesplacebeforeOPGisallowedtoapplyforadecommissioninglicence.

• TheCommissionshouldrequesttheMinisteroftheEnvironmentandClimate

ChangeconductaStrategicImpactAssessmentofdecommissioningstrategies,includinglong-termwastemanagementstrategies,forthePickeringnuclearstationundersection95oftheproposedImpactAssessmentAct.

• TheCommissionshouldrejectOPG’srequestforanunprecedented10-year

licenceandapproveonlya5-yearlicenceinordertobetteroverseePickering’send-of-operations.

• TheCommissionshouldinstructCNSCstafftostriveforhigherlevelsof

transparencywhilecarryingoutfuturePeriodicSafetyReviews,includingproactivedisclosureofallsafetyimprovementopportunitiesandtheirassociatedcost-benefitanalysis.

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• BeforeapprovingOPG’slicencerenewal,theCommissionshouldrequestalistofallsafetyimprovementopportunitiesconsideredduringOPG’sPeriodicSafetyReviewwithaclearjustificationonwhyspecificsafetyimprovementopportunitieswereacceptedorrejected.

• InresponsetotheOntariogovernment’spolicies,whichpromotepopulation

growthandintensificationandtherebyunderminepublicsafetyaroundthePickeringnuclearstation,theCommissionshouldrejectOPG’sapplicationtooperatethePickeringnuclearstationbeyond2020.

• IntheeventthattheCommissionapprovesthecontinuedoperationofPickering

beyond2020,theCommissionshouldincludeadditionallicenseconditionsrequiringOPGtoworkwithitsshareholdertoestablishlimitsonpopulationgrowthwithinthenewlyestablished20kmContingencyPlanningZone(CPZ).

• Inlightoftheprovince’sconsistentmishandlingofnuclearemergencyresponse

planning,theCommissionshouldrejectOPG’sapplicationtooperatethePickeringnuclearstationbeyond2020.

1.PreparingforPickering’sEnd-of-LifeIn2010,theMinistryofEnergyapprovedOPG’splantoclosethePickeringnuclearstation1in2010duetotheprohibitivecostofreactorlife-extensionandlongterm-safetyconcerns.2Goingonlinein1971,butdesignedandbuiltinthe1960s,PickeringwasOntario’sfirstmulti-unitnuclearstation.Itwillalsobethefirstmulti-unitnuclearstationtobepermanentlyclosedanddismantled.AsPickeringquicklyapproachesitsendofoperations,theCommissionmustensureOPGispreparedtoeasethesocialimpactsofthestation’sclosureandopenlyassesshowthewastesproducedoverthepastfourdecadesaresafelystoredatthesite,potentiallyforever.1.1NojustificationforPickering’scontinuedoperationAfoundationalprincipleofradiationprotection–andriskmanagementmoregenerally-isthatanypotentialexposuretoradiationshouldhaveausefuljustificationbeforebeingpermitted.1ThePickeringnuclearstationwillhenceforthbereferredtoas“Pickering”.2ThereasonsforclosingthePickeringstationaredetailedinabriefingnoteprovidedtotheEnergyMinisterin2010.GreenpeaceacquiredthroughFreedomofInformationrequest.See:BriefingNote,preparedbyCedricJobe,January8,2010.

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InGreenpeace’sview,thereisnojustificationforPickering’scontinuedoperation.Onthesegroundsalone,theCommissionshouldrejectOPG’srequesttoexposemillionsofpeoplewithintheGreaterTorontoArea(GTA)tothepossibilityofanuclearaccident.In2010,OPGandtheMinistryofEnergyannounceditsproposaltooperatePickeringbeyonditsdesignlife.OPGjustifiedtheriskbyclaimingthestationwouldbeneededuntilnewreplacementreactorscameonlinein2020.However,theOntariogovernmentannounceditwasabandoningplanstobuildnewreactorsduetodecliningelectricitydemand.3Inannouncingtheabandonmentofnewreactors,however,thegovernmentunfortunatelydidnotinstructOPGtoclosethePickeringreactors.Asaresult,Pickeringhasbeentheprincipalcauseoftheprovince’selectricitysurplusesoverthepastdecade.Thus,Pickeringhaseffectivelybeenanunnecessarily–andthusunreasonable–risktotheGTA.In2016,thegovernmentannounceditwouldallowOPGtoexplorethepossibilityofoperatingPickeringbeyond2020byseekingoutappropriateapprovalsfromtheOntarioEnergyBoard(OEB)andtheCNSC.However,thegovernment’s2016Long-TermEnergyPlan(LTEP)isclearthatOPGcanonlyseek“finalapproval”fromthegovernmentafterithasreceivedappropriateapprovalsfromtheCNSCandtheOEB.4Thegovernment’sfinalapprovalofthePickeringcontinuedoperationwillalsoconsidertheneedandcost-effectivenessofoperatingPickeringbeyond2020.AsnotedbyOntario’sEnvironmentalCommissionerthere“…hasbeennoindependentreviewofwhetherthePickeringextensionstillmakesenvironmentalandfinancialsenseforOntario.”5InspiteofOPG’sassertionthatthereisastrongcaseforthecontinuedoperationofPickering,theclaimstheymadeinsupportofthisassertionweredisprovenundercross-examinationattheOEB.6AlthoughOPGprovidedinformationtotheOEBtosupportitsbeliefthatthePickeringlife-extensionwasdesirable,theBoarddidnotconsidertheneedordesirabilityofPickering’scontinuedoperation.TheanalysisOPGprovidedtotheOEBshowedthat

3KeithLeslie,“Ontariokillsplanfor2newnuclearplants;willrebuildexistingreactors,”theCanadianPress,October10,2013.4MinistryofEnergy,Ontario’sLong-TermEnergyPlan2017–DeliveringFairnessandChoice,October2017,pg.51.5EnvironmentalCommissionerofOntario,MakingConnections:StraightTalkAboutElectricityinOntario,April2017,pg.222.6See:SubmissionsofEnvironmentalDefence,EB-2016-0152,May29th,2017;FinalArgumentoftheGreenEnergyCoalition,EB-2016-0152,May29th,2017.

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themajorityofPickering’soutputisunneededsurpluspower.7OEBstaffandpublicinterveners,suchasGreenpeace,notedthatsystemmodellingprovidedbyOPGwasout-datedandlikelyoverestimatedelectricitydemandandunderestimatedthesurplusescreatedbyPickering’soperation.Basedontheavailableevidence,theEnvironmentalCommissionerofOntariohasraised“…doubtthatextendedoperationofPickeringisinthebestinterestsofOntarians.”8TheECOhasrecommendedthat“IfPickering’soperatinglicenseisextendedbytheCanadianNuclearSafetyCommission,OntarioshouldreporttothepublicwhetherthePickeringextensionstillmakessense,andifso,why.”9ConsideringriskanduncertaintiesassociatedwithPickering’sageandthestation’slocationwithintheGTA,theCommissionshouldgivesignificantweighttothelackofjustificationforOPG’sapplication.TheCommissionismandatedtoprevent“unreasonablerisk”anditisunreasonabletoallowanunneedednuclearstationtooperateintheGTA.Request:GiventhereisnojustificationforPickering’scontinuedoperationfromOPG’sshareholder,theCommissionshouldcategorizeOPG’sapplicationas“anunreasonablerisk”undersection9(i)oftheNuclearSafetyandControlAct.1.1.1TheNeedforcontingencyplanningandaclosureplanIntheeventthattheCommissionapprovesOPG’sapplicationtooperatePickeringuntil2024,theCommissionshouldimposeadditionallicenceconditionsrequiringOPGandCNSCstaffdevelopandpublishcontingencyplansforthestation’ssafeclosurein2020.GreenpeaceprovidedasubmissiontoCommissionpriortothefirstdayofhearingsconsideringOPG’sapplicationrequestaskingtheCommissionensureOPGprovideadditionalinformationonworkertransitionplanningintheeventthatPickeringclosesin2020,whichiscurrentlyapproved,orin2024,ascurrentlyproposed10.TheCommissionrefusedtoacceptGreenpeace’sinformationrequest.11InGreenpeace’sview,OPGhasnotsufficientlyplannedforsafelyclosingstationdespitehavingannouncedPickering’seventualclosurein2010.However,theeventualclosure7IndependentElectricitySystemOperator,AssessmentofPickeringLifeExtensionOptions–PreparedfordiscussionwithMinistryofEnergy,March9,2015.FiledwiththeOEBonMay5,2016.EB-2016-01-0152,ExhibitF2-2-4,Attachment1,pg.53.8EnvironmentalCommissionerofOntario,MakingConnections:StraightTalkAboutElectricityinOntario,April2017,pg.223.9Ibid,224.10S-PStensil(Greenpeace)totheCNSC,“TransitionplanningforPickering’sworkforce,”letter,April3,2018.11MarcLeblanc(CommissionSecretary)toS-PStensil,“RE:CONFIRMATION:SubmissionforPickeringHearingtomorrow,”email,April5,2018.

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ofthePickeringreactorswillnotbeinsignificant.Approximately3000peopleworkatPickeringandisthelargestemployerinDurhamRegion.12AccordingtoOPG’spreliminarydecommissioningplanstaffingwilldroptoapproximately1200whenitshiftsfromoperationstopreparationstosafestorage.13Howthistransitionismanagedoverthenexteighteenmonths(forclosurein2020)oroverthenextfiveyears(forclosurein2024)shouldbegivenappropriatescrutinybytheCommission.Notably,DurhamRegion,whichisthehostcommunityforthePickeringnuclearstation,isconcernedbythelackofplanningforPickering’sclosure.InApril2018itunanimouslysupportedthefollowingresolution:

ThatDurhamRegionrequestsOPGprepareandpublishplansonhowitwillmitigatenegativeimpactsofthestation’sretirement,includingtransitionplansforaffectedworkers,inadvanceofthestations’closure.14

GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontodirectOPGandCNSCstafftoimplementDurhamRegion’srequestfortransparenttransitionplanning.Unlikepastlicenceapplications,OPGneedstonotonlydemonstratethatitcanmaintainsafestaffinglevelswhilethereactorsareinoperation,butshowthattheproperplanningisinplacetomitigateanynegativesocialimpactscausedbythestation’sclosure.1.1.2LearningfromGentilly-2’sclosureStatementsmadeduringtheDay1hearingsunfortunatelyshowCNSCstaffhaveyettoacceptandlearnlessonsfromtheclosureofQuebec’sGentilly-2nuclearstationin2012.InGreenpeace’sview,CNSCstaffmisleadinglyportrayedQuebec’sclosureoftheGentilly-2nuclearstationin2012asa“sudden”orunexpectedpoliticaldecision.15By2012,thecostofrebuildingtheGentilly-2hadincreaseddramaticallysinceitwasinitiallyapprovedin2008.Aswell,the2011FukushimadisasterhadrenewedconcernsrelatedtothedesirabilityofrebuildingQuebec’sonlynuclearreactorwhentherewerecheaperandlessriskyalternatives.WhatstaffhavefailedtoacknowledgeisthattheclosureofGentilly-2wasreasonablyforeseeableandCNSCshouldhaverequiredcontingencyplanswhenthestationwasre-licencedin2011.Inresponsetostaff’slackofsituationalawareness,Greenpeace12OntarioMinistryofEnergy,“OntarioMovingForwardwithNuclearRefurbishmentatDarlingtonandPursuingContinuedOperationsatPickeringto2024”,PressRelease,January11,2016.13OntarioPowerGeneration,PRELIMINARYDECOMMISSIONINGPLAN-PICKERINGGENERATINGSTATIONSA&B,P-PLAN-00960-00001,December2016,TableC-1,pg.137.14DurhamRegionalCouncil–Minutes,April11,2018,pg.13.15CNSC,PublicHearing,April4,2018,Ottawa,pg.151.

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alertedtheCommissiontothelikelyclosureGentilly-2duringthere-licensingprocess.GreenpeacerequestedthattheCommissionrequireHydro-Quebectodevelopanend-of-lifeplan,includinghowtoaddressjobslostbythestation’sclosure.16Unfortunately,theCommissiondismissedGreenpeace’srequest.AyearlaterthenewlyelectedQuebecgovernmentannounceditwouldclosetheGentilly-2nuclearstation.Thistriggeredawaveofpublicprotestsbyplantworkersandunionswhowererightlyconcernedbylackofworkertransitionplanning.Withoutcleartransitionplanningtheplantclosurewasanunnecessaryandunfairshocktothecommunity.SuchplanningwasexactlywhatGreenpeacehadrequestedduringrelicensinghearingsthepreviousyear.17Inshort,itwouldhavebeenreasonablefortheCNSCtoanticipateandputinplacecontingencyplanswhenGentilly-2wasre-licencedin2011.However,CNSCstaffhadablindspot.NeitherOPGnorCNSCstaffwerepreparedtooverseethesafeclosureofanuclearstationanditstransitiontodecommissioning.Thisisnotsurprising.IthasbeenGreenpeace’sexperiencethattheCNSC’sregulatoryguidanceandrequirementsoftenlagthechallengesfacedbylicencees.18Inlinewiththis,staffacknowledgedtheyonlyrecentlyarticulatedregulatoryexpectationsforPickering’sclosurethrougha“formalletter”19insteadofamoreformallydevelopedregulatoryguide.InGreenpeace’sview,CNSCstaff’sfailuretoproposecontingencyplanningfortheforeseeableclosureofGentilly-2exacerbatedtheimpactsoftheplantsclosure.GreenpeaceurgestheCommissiontolearnfromthispastmistake.OPGdoesnothaveafinalapprovalfromitsshareholdertooperatethestationbeyond2020.TherehasbeennoformalassessmentofwhetherPickering’sextendedoperationisinthepublicinterest.GreenpeaceurgestheCommissionlearnlessonsfromtheclosureofGentilly-2andinstructstaffandOPGtopreparecontingencyplansfortheearlierclosureofPickering.Request:IntheeventthattheCommissionapprovestheoperationofPickeringuntil2024,theCommissionshouldalsoincludearequirementforOPGandCNSCstafftodevelopandpublishcontingencyplanforanearlierclosure,includingworkertransitionplans,beforetheendof2018.16CanadianNuclearSafetyCommission,PublicHearingTranscript,Bécancour,Quebec,April14th,2011,pgs.74–81.17BrigitteTrahan,“ConsultationetGentilly-2:Greenpeaceavaitprévulecoup,”LeNouvelliste,2octobre2012.18AnobviousexampleistheCommission’slateattemptstodeveloparegulatoryframeworkforoverseeingthelife-extensionofreactors.19CNSC,PublicHearing,April4,2018,Ottawa,pg.149.

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Request:TheCommissionshouldrequireOPGtopublishplansonhowitwillmitigatethenegativesocialandcommunityimpactsofPickering’sclosureasrequestedbyDurhamRegion.1.2NeedforaStrategicEnvironmentalAssessmentonclosureoptionsGreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontocorrectahistoricfailureofforesightanddirectOPGtoundertakeastrategicenvironmentalassessmentofoptionsfordismantlingthePickeringnuclearstationandsecuringtheradioactivewasteithascreated.Unfortunately,thePickeringnuclearstationwasapprovedwithoutanenvironmentalassessment.Itwasallowedtooperatebasedonthepromisethattheradioactivewastesproducedbythestationwouldbesenttootherwastemanagementfacilities.Thiswastheantithesisofaprecautionaryapproach.What’smore,thestation’scommunityacceptance–whatwenowcall“sociallicence”-hasbeenbasedonthispromise.Thispromisemayhavemisledthecommunity. Overthepastfourdecades,Pickeringhasproducedover18,000tonnesofhigh-levelnuclearfuelwasteaswellasotherlong-livedradioactivewastes.Thedismantlingofthestationwillalsoproducemorelong-livedradioactivewastes.Thestation’soperationhasalsocausedlandcontamination,althoughthereislimitedinformationinthepublicdomainonthemagnitudeofthispollutionandtowhatextentitcouldberemediated.WithPickeringnowapproachingitsendoflife,itisincumbentongovernmentauthoritiestocompensateforpastineffectiveoversightofOPG’soperations.Specifically,GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontosupportaStrategicImpactAssessment(SIA)oncethegovernment’sproposedImpactAssessmentAct(BillC-69)gainsRoyalAssent. ASIAisneededtoaddresstotwosignificantpolicyissuesoverlookedduetothehistoricfailuretoreviewnuclearpowerprojectsinaprecautionarymanner.Specifically,SIAisneededtoreviewalternativestoOPG’scurrentdecommissioningpolicyandtoassesscontingencyplansforsafelystoringradioactivewasteatthePickeringsite.1.2.1ContingencyPlanningforLong-termwastestorageConsideringOPG’sfailuretodevelopadependableoff-siteplanformanagingPickering’sradioactivewastes,itisreasonableandprudenttopreparelong-termon-sitemanagementoptionsfortheradioactivewastesproducedbyPickeringsince1971.However,therearenosuchoptionsdiscussedinOPG’sdecommissioningstrategy.Ina2017submissiontotheExpertPanelreviewingCanada’senvironmentalassessmentprocess,DurhamRegionlamentedthefactthatenvironmentalreviewsofreactorlife-

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extensionprojects,includingOPG’sabandonedproposaltorebuildthePickeringBreactors,havenotrequiredreactoroperatorstoprovidereliableproposalsforthelong-termstorageofradioactivewaste.DurhamRegionrecommendedthat“Approvalofanuclearprojectshouldrequireaproponenttohaveanuclearwastedisposalsolutionavailablebeforethenew/refurbishednuclearreactorsarepermittedtooperate.”20AlthoughDurhamRegion’srequestisreasonableandinlinewiththeprecautionaryprinciple,theCNSChasneveraskedOPG,BrucePower,Hydro-QuebecorNewBrunswickPowertoprovidereliablelong-termwastemanagementsolutionsduringenvironmentalreviewsofreactorlife-extensionproposals.InGreenpeace’sview,theCNSChasperpetuatedthefailureofpreviousgovernmentauthoritiestorequirecrediblelong-termnuclearwastemanagementfacilitiesasaconditionoflicensing.GreenpeaceurgestheCommissiontoconstructivelyremedythisfailureofforesightnowthatPickeringisreachingitsend-of-life.Notably,theJointReviewPanel(JRP)thatassessedOPG’sproposaltobuildnewreactorsattheDarlingtonnuclearstationfoundthatitwasreasonabletoplanforthepossibilitythatanoff-sitewastestoragefacilityisnotestablished.TheJRPrecommended:

…thatpriortoconstruction,theCanadianNuclearSafetyCommissionrequireOPGtomakeprovisionsforon-sitestorageofallusedfuelforthedurationoftheProject,intheeventthatasuitableoff-sitesolutionforthelong-termmanagementforusedfuelwasteisnotfound.21

TheJRPalsorecommendedthatOPGmakeequivalentprovisionsforthelong-termon-sitestorageforintermediate-levelradioactivewastes.22ThegovernmentofCanadaacceptedtheintentoftheserecommendations,observingthatCanada’s1996RadioactiveWastePolicyFrameworkstatesradioactivewasteownersareresponsiblefordevelopingandimplementingwastemanagementstrategies.23TheJRP’srecommendationshaveturnedouttobeprescient.AfteronlyadecadeofplanningtheNuclearWasteManagementOrganization(NWMO)timelinesfortheopeningofafuel-wasteDGRhavebeendelayedbyadecade.In2005,theNWMO

20GarryCubitt(ChiefAdministrativeOfficer,DurhamRegion)toKevinBlair(MajorProjectsManagementOffice,NaturalResourcesCanada),“EnvironmentalandRegulatoryReviewsDiscussionPaper,”August28,2017.21JointReviewPanel,EnvironmentalAssessmentReport:DarlingtonNewNuclearPowerPlantProject,August2011,pg.118.22Ibid.23GovernmentofCanada’sResponsetotheJointReviewPanelReportfortheProposedDarlingtonNewNuclearPowerPlantProjectinClaringtonOntario,CanadianEnvironmentalAssessmentRegistry:07-05-29525,May2,2014.

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claimedaDGRwouldbeopenin2035.24In2018,theNWMOacknowledgethatitsfuelwasteDGRwouldnotopenuntilapproximately2045.25Itisreasonabletoexpectadditionaldelays. However,thereasoningbehindtheJRP’srecommendationsforthewastesproducedbynewreactorsisalsoapplicabletoPickering’swastes.The“offsitesolutions”OPGclaimswillbeavailableforPickering’swastesarethesameoffsitesolutionsOPGclaimedwouldacceptwastefromnewreactors. However,neitherOPGnortheCNSChasacknowledgedthereasonablyforeseeablepotentialforthefuelwasteDGR(ortheDGRcurrentlyproposedtostoredecommissioningwaste)tobeeithersignificantlydelayedornevercompleted.Inshort,withoutpro-activeattentiontheinterimPickeringWasteStorageFacility(PWSF)could,de-facto,becomealong-termstoragefacility.ThisisproblematicbecausePickering’scurrenttemporarywastestoragestructuresarenotreinforcedordesignedtowithstandaterroristattackorerraticandextremeweatherevents.Otherwiseput,thelikelydelayorabandonmentofplannedDGRswillmeanradioactivewasteposesalong-termthreattotheGreatLakesandsurroundingcommunitythatrequiresalternativesassessmenttobedonetoday.ItisthusreasonablyforeseeablethattheradioactivewastesthathaveaccumulatedatPickeringwillremainatthesiteinthelong-term.ThisraiseslegitimatequestionswhetherOPGhasmadeadequateprovisionstopreventunreasonablerisktoCanadiansocietyundersection9(i)(a)oftheNSCA. IntheUnitedStates,thedevelopmentofaDGRforfuelwastehasalsoundergonesignificantdelays.Inresponse,communityandcivilsocietyorganizationshavebeenadvocatingforHardenedOn-SiteStorage(HOSS).Over150U.S.-basedorganizationshaveendorsedtheprinciplesofHOSS.Theseprinciplesinclude:

• Irradiatedfuelmustbestoredassafelyaspossibleasclosetothesiteofgenerationaspossible.Wastemovedfromfuelpoolsmustbesafeguardedinhardened,on-sitestorage(HOSS)facilities.

• TheoverallobjectiveofHOSSshouldbethattheamountofreleasesprojectedinevensevereattacksshouldbelowenoughthatthestoragesystemwouldbeunattractiveasaterroristtarget.

• HOSSfacilitiesmustnotberegardedasapermanentwastesolution,andthusshouldnotbeconstructeddeepunderground.Thewastemustberetrievable,

24NWMO,ChoosingaWayForward-TheFutureManagementofCanada’sUsedNuclearFuelFinalStudy,2005.25NWMO,Movingtowardspartnership–2017AnnualReport,pg.10.

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andreal-timeradiationandheatmonitoringattheHOSSfacilitymustbeimplementedforearlydetectionofradiationreleasesandoverheating.26

ThepossibleneedtosecurelystoreradioactivewastesatthePickeringshouldbeofparticularconcernduetothestation’slocationontheshoresofLakeOntarioandwithintheGreaterTorontoArea(GTA).WithPickeringnowapproachingitsend-of-life,itisincumbentongovernmentauthoritiestocompensateforpastineffectiveoversightofOPG’soperations.Thisineffectiveoversighthascreatedradioactivewastewithoutconfirmedplansformanaginglong-livedradioactivewastes.ThisrequiresaprecautionaryassessmentofOPG’sdecommissioningstrategy. WemustconsiderthepossibilitythatfuelwasteanddecommissioningwastescreatedbyPickeringmayendupatthesitepermanently-oratleastforaveryextendedperiod.ThisisconcerningbecauseofPickering’sproximitytoTorontoandtheGreatLakes. Request:Inlinewithitsmandateundersection9(i)oftheNuclearSafetyandControlAct,theCommissionshouldrequireOPGtodevelopproposalsformorerobustradioactivewastestoragefacilitiestoensureadequateprovisionismadetoprotectCanadiansandtheenvironmentbeforeitappliesforadecommissioninglicence.PlansformorerobustradioactivewastestoragefacilitiesshouldbeavailableforpublicreviewduringanenvironmentalassessmentbeforeOPGappliesforadecommissioninglicence. 1.2.2ConsiderationofalternativestoOPG’spreferredclosurestrategyTheCommissionshouldensurethattheenvironmental,economicandsocialimpactsofalternativestoOPG’sproposedplanarepubliclyevaluatedbeforethecompanycanapplyforadecommissioninglicence.AStrategicImpactAssessmentwouldbeanappropriatemeanstoopenlyconsidersuchalternatives.OPG’sproposeddecommissioningstrategyproposestodeferthedismantlingandcleanupthePickeringsitedefersfordecades.ItisevidentthatOPG’sproposeddecommissioningapproachprioritizesthecompany’sfinancialinterests–deferringoravoidingcosts-overthepossiblesocialimpactsandenvironmentalrisksofdelayingthecleanupofthesite. OPG’scurrentplanassumesthecompanywillreceivea“decommissioninglicence”in2028.ThreeactivitieswouldbepermittedunderthisdecommissioninglicenceSafeStorage,Dismantling,andSiteRestoration.Undertheplan,theplantwilllaydormantinSafeStoragefortwenty-twoyearsuntil2050beforedismantlingthestationbegins.OPG’sdecommissioningplanassumesonlyfortystaffwillrequiredonsiteduringthis26PrinciplesforSafeguardingNuclearWasteatReactors,availableat:https://bit.ly/2HufE1i

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period.27Suchadramatictransitioncouldhavenegativesocialandeconomicimpactsonthesurroundingcommunity. TherearenoindicationsinOPG’slicenceapplicationthatitplanstocarryoutanenvironmentalassessmenttoevaluatethepotentialenvironmentalandsocialimpactsofitsdecommissioningstrategycomparedtoalternatescenarios.Thus,withoutinstructionfromtheCommission,preferreddecommissioningapproachisacceptedasafaitaccompli.InGreenpeace’sview,thisisimprudent. Asdiscussed,acentralassumptionofOPG’sdecommissioningstrategyisthatradioactivewasteswillbetransferredtooffsitestoragefacilities.However,thisassumptionisunwarrantedandwouldimpactboththetimelinesandtheend-pointspresentedinOPG’sdecommissioningstrategy.Thisshowsaneedtoassessalternativescenarios.Moreover,OPG’sassumptionthatdelayedreactordismantlingisthebestchoiceforthesurroundingcommunityandenvironmentalprotectionshouldbequestioned.Giventheforeseeablesocialimpactsandenvironmentalrisks,thepublicshouldbeconsultedonalternativestoOPG’sfinancialpreferencetodelaydismantlingwork,includingthesocialandcommunityimpactsassociatedwithOPG’spreferreddelayeddecommissioningstrategy.ThereisalsoaneedtogatherandpubliclyreviewinformationontheaccumulatedcontaminationatthePickeringsite.TheextentandnatureofsuchcontaminationmayimpactOPG’sassumptionthatthesitecouldbecompletelyremediated.Again,thismayrequireexaminingalternativedecommissioningstrategies. InGreenpeace’sview,thecurrentplantoproceedwithOPG’sdecommissioningstrategyisimprudentandmayleadtoavoidableadversesocialandenvironmentaleffects.Akeyaspectofanenvironmentalassessmentisinformationgathering.Atpresent,thereisinsufficientinformationonthecontaminationatthePickeringsite.Thereisalsoinsufficientinformationontheimpactsofdeferred,promptorstaged28approachestostationdismantling.AstrategicenvironmentalassessmentofalternativedecommissioningapproachesisanappropriatemechanismforensuringthepublichasaccesstotherisksposedbythePickeringsiteandthepossiblesocialandeconomicimpactsofOPG’sactivities.The

27OntarioPowerGeneration,PRELIMINARYDECOMMISSIONINGPLAN-PICKERINGGENERATINGSTATIONSA&B,P-PLAN-00960-00001,December2016,pg.137. 28DebateondecommissioningtendstofocusonOPG’spreferencefordelayeddecommissioningversusproposalstoimmediatelydismantlethestationuponclosure.Athird“staged”approachcouldalsobeconsideredwherethedismantlingofthestationoccursafterthelastofthefuelwasteistransferredfromfuelpoolstodrystorage.ThiscouldreducethesafestoragephaseofOPG’scurrentplanbyatleastadecade.

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informationgatheringactivitieswillalsoensurethattheCommissionhastheappropriateinformationtoensurethatOPGwillpreventunreasonableriskandprotectboththeenvironmentandhumanhealthunderafuturedecommissioninglicence.Inlightoftheuncertaintiesrelatedtooffsitewastemanagement,GreenpeacedoesnotbelievetheCommissionhasadequateinformationtoproperlyassessafutureapplicationforadecommissioninglicence,whichwilllikelyalsoapprovealong-termwastemanagementstrategyforthesite.Request:TheCommissionshouldensureapublicassessmentofalternativestoOPG’spreferreddelayeddecommissioningstrategy—includingcontingencyplansforlong-termwastemanagementatthesite—takesplacebeforeOPGisallowedtoapplyforadecommissioninglicence.1.2.3StrategicImpactAssessmentunderthenewImpactAssessmentActInlightoftheoutstandinguncertaintiesrelatedtothemanagementofradioactivewastesandtheneedtodevelopasocialacceptanceforadecommissioningapproachforthePickeringsite,GreenpeaceurgestheheCommissiontoasktheandMinisteroftheEnvironmentandClimateChangetoconductaStrategicImpactAssessmentofdecommissioningstrategiesforthePickeringnuclearstation.Tobeclear,GreenpeacedoesnotconsidertheenvironmentalassessmentscarriedoutundertheNuclearSafetyandControlAct(NSCA)asequivalentoranadequatereplacementforEAsthathavebeencarriedoutundertheformerCanadianEnvironmentalAssessmentAct(CEAA).DuetotheirlimitedscopeNSCAEAsarenotwellsuitedforevaluatingthebroaderpolicyissuesrelatedtohowPickeringshouldbedecommissioned.CNSC-ledenvironmentalreviewshavefocusedonmereregulatorycompliance,whileoverlookingwhetheraprojectadvancesorharmsprogresstowardsustainabledevelopment.Thereviewshavealsofailedtoconsiderthepolluter-paysprinciple.CNSCstaffhavevalidatedGreenpeace’sconcern,admittingthattheylacktheexpertiseandknowledgetoassessaproject’ssustainability.29Thustheneedforanimpartialandexpertenvironmentalreviewisclear.EnvironmentalreviewsundertheNSCAarearelativelynewphenomena.ThescopeofNSCAreviewsisdeterminedbyREGDOC-2.9.1:EnvironmentalProtection:Environmental29DuringtheenvironmentalassessmenthearingsonOPG’sproposaltobuildaDeepGeologicalRepository(DGR)fornon-fuelradioactivewastes,CNSCstaffstatedtheyonlyconsiderwhetheraprojectwillmeetexistingregulatoryrequirementstoprotecttheenvironmentandrelyonEnvironmentCanadaorprovincialgovernmentstocarryoutassessmentsofaproject’ssustainability.See:CanadianEnvironmentalAssessmentAgency,DeepGeologicalRepositoryforlowandintermediatelevelradioactivewasteproject,JointReviewPanel,Transcripts,Thursday,October3,2013,Volume15,pgs.182-185.

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Principles,AssessmentsandProtectionMeasures.TheEAproducedforthecurrentlicencerenewalissuchanEA.Althoughthe2017versionofREGDOC-2.9.1liststheprecautionaryprinciple,the“polluterpays”principle,andtheconceptofsustainabledevelopmentasguidingprinciplesofCNSCEAs30,theenvironmentalreviewproducedforthecurrentlicenseapplicationdidnotincorporatesustainabilityconcerns.31InGreenpeace’sview,thisisadditionalevidencetheCNSC’slackofexpertiseinsustainabilityassessment.Forthesereasons,GreenpeaceurgestheCommissiontoasktheMinisteroftheEnvironmenttoconductastrategicimpactassessmentofdecommissioningoptionsforthePickeringnuclearstationunderSection9532oftheproposedImpactAssessmentAct.StrategicImpactAssessmentsareappropriateforinvestigatingbroaderpolicyissues,includingcomparingalternativeapproachestopolicyimplementation.TheExpertPanelthatreviewedthefederalgovernmentsenvironmentalassessmentapproachin2016arguedthatanewSIA“…modelshouldbeputinplacetoprovideguidanceonhowtoimplementexistingfederalpolicies.”Consideringtheoutstandingissuesrelatedtolong-termwastemanagementanddecommissioningapproach,usinganSIAtoreviewOPG’sdecommissioningstrategywouldprovidebetterguidanceonhowtoimplementafederalgovernmentpolicy.Althoughthefederalgovernment’sRadioactiveWastePolicyFrameworkassumesthatwasteproducersareresponsibleforthefundingandmanagingofradioactivewastes,itassignsthefederalgovernmentwillensurewastethatradioactivewastemanagement“iscarriedoutinasafe,environmentallysound,comprehensive,cost-effectiveandintegratedmanner.”33Thefederalgovernmenthasnotclarifiedhowitwillensurethesafemanagementofradioactivewasteintheeventthatoff-siteradioactivewastesolutionsdonotcometofruition.Thus,aStrategicEnvironmentalAssessmentcouldbeanappropriatemeansofdevelopingguidanceonhowthisfederalpolicyshouldbeimplemented.

30CNSC,REGDOC-2.9.1:EnvironmentalProtection:EnvironmentalPrinciples,AssessmentsandProtectionMeasures,Section2.1,April2017,pg.6.31CanadianEnvironmentalLawAssociation(CELA),EvaluatingEmergencyPreparednessandEnvironmentalProtectionforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStationLicenceRenewal(Ref.2018-H-03),PreparedbyKerrieBlaise,RizwanKhanandTanyaMarkvart,May7,2018,CELAPublicationNo:978-1-77189-895-9.32Section95oftheproposedImpactAssessmentActstates“TheMinistermayestablishacommittee — orauthorize theAgency — toconductanassessmentof (a) anyGovernmentofCanadapolicy,planorprogram — proposed or existing — that is relevant to conducting impact assessments; or (b) any issuethat is relevant to conducting impact assessments of designated projects or of a class of designatedprojects.”33MinistryofNaturalResources,RadioactiveWastePolicyFramework

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TheExpertPanelalsonotedthat:“UndertheCabinetDirectiveontheEnvironmentalAssessmentofPolicy,PlanandProgramProposals(“CabinetDirective”),Canadanowimplementsstrategicenvironmentalassessmenttoincorporateenvironmentalconsiderationsearlyinthedevelopmentofaplan,policyorprogram,alongwitheconomicandsocialconsiderations.”ThisCabinetDirectivesupportsanupfrontreviewofOPG’sdecommissioningstrategytoensurelocaleconomicandsocialconcernsinformthefinaldecommissionstrategy. Request:TheCommissionshouldrequesttheMinisteroftheEnvironmentandClimateChangeconductaStrategicImpactAssessmentofdecommissioningstrategies,includinglong-termwastemanagementstrategies,forthePickeringnuclearstationundersection95oftheproposedImpactAssessmentAct.

2.Intolerablerisk:timetoclosePickeringThePickeringnuclearstation’slocation,out-dateddesignandagingcomponentsmakeitanunreasonablerisktoCanadiansocietyandtheenvironment.Initsdeliberations,GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontoconsiderOPG’sshareholder-theOntariogovernment–astheactualproponentofOPG’slicenceapplication.TheprovincewillultimatelyapproveorrejectwhetherOPGcancontinueoperatingthestation.ItappointsOPG’sboardofdirectorsandsetsthescopeofOPG’sbusinessplansthroughaMemorandumofUnderstanding.Aswillbediscussed,theOntariogovernmentdeterminesthelevelofoffsitesafetythroughitsresponsibilityforlanduseplanningandemergencypreparedness.TheCNSCshouldjudgetheprovince’sperformanceinsafeguardingpublicsafetyinthemanneritconsidersOPG’smaintenanceofonsitesafety.TheprovincehaspromotedpoliciesthathaveincreasedtheriskimposedbyPickeringonsurroundingcommunities.Ithasalsomismanageditsresponsibilityforoffsitenuclearemergencyresponse.Consideringtheprovince’strackrecord,itisdoubtfulthattheprovince–andbyextensionOPG–willmakeadequateprovisiontoprotectCanadians.ThesearegroundsforrejectingOPG’slicenceapplicationorimposingadditionallicenceconditions.Asdiscussed,themajorityofPickering’soutputissurplus.ItsoutputisboughtbytheIndependentElectricitySystemOperator(IESO)andsoldatlosstoneighbouringU.S.states.Thecostoftheselossesispaidforbyratepayers.WhileOntarioconsumerspayforPickering’soperations,theOntariogovernmentbenefitsfromaperverseincentive:itreceivesdividendsfromOPGevenifPickering’spowerisunneeded.

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InGreenpeace’sview,theincestuousrelationshipbetweenOPGanditsgovernmentshareholdercallfortheCommissiontobemorescepticalofOPG’slicenceapplication.OPGisrequestinganunprecedented10-yearlicenceaswellaspermissiontocontinueoperatingthePickeringreactorsuntil2024.IthasalsorequestedalicenceconditionthatwouldallowittoextendPickering’soperationagainwithoutthescrutinyofalicencerenewalprocess.OPG’srequestfora10-yearlicenceiseffectivelyaskingtheCommissionforlessregulatoryandpublicoversightastheriskfromthestationisincreasingfrombothagingeffectsandincreasingpopulationdensitiesaroundthestation.Incontrast,GreenpeaceurgestheCommissiontoconsidertheneedformoreoversightinlightofPickering’sageandlocation.Request:TheCommissionshouldrejectOPG’srequestforanunprecedented10-yearlicenceandapproveonlya5-yearlicenceinordertobetteroverseePickering’send-of-operations.2.1OPG’sPeriodicSafetyReview–InsufficienttransparencyThePeriodicSafetyReview(PSR)OPGhasprovidedaspartofitslicenceapplicationlackssufficienttransparencyandintelligibilitytosupportthecontinuedoperationofthePickeringreactors.APSRassessestheexistingnuclearstationagainstmodernstandardstoidentifyenhancementstoreducethegapbetweenthecurrentdesignandmodernstandards.GreenpeaceisconcernedOPG’sapproachtothesesafetyenhancementshasprioritizeditsfinancialinterestsoverthehigherlevelsthatshouldbeexpectedofanuclearstationoperatinginsuchadenselypopulatedarea.In2010,OPGabandonedproposalforextendingPickering’soperationsforanotherthreedecadesduetothehighcostandthelimitedcapacitytoimprovethesafetyofPickering’sout-dateddesign.ThisisverydifferentfromthenarrativeOPGisusinginthecurrentproceedings.InthebriefingnoteprovidedtotheMinisterofEnergyin2010,whichsummarizedwhythePickeringlife-extensionshouldbeabandoned,Ministrystaffnoted:

“Costbenefitanalysisshowedthatlittlesafetyimprovementwouldhavebeenderivedasaresultofinvesting100Mdollarswouldresultinlittlesafetyimprovement.“34

34CedricJobe,BriefingNote,January8,2010.AcquiredthroughFreedomofInformationlegislation.

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ThebriefingalsoacknowledgedthatthePickeringreactors“…donotmeetmodernstandards”andthat“…thereexistshighpotentialfordiscoveryofdefectswhichwouldmakerefurbishmentunfeasible.”35ThebriefingtotheMinisteralsoacknowledgedthattheCNSC’snewrequirementtocarryoutaPSRonceadecade“….resultsinthepotentialneedforsignificantplantupgradesinthefuture.”36Curiously,thePSRthatOPGisusingtojustifyPickering’scontinuedoperationdoesnotproposesignificantupgradestothestationdespitethestation’sout-of-datedesignanddegradingcomponents.GreenpeaceisconcernedthatOPGisusingrepeatedrequestsfortime-limitedserviceextensionstoavoidthemoresignificant-andexpensive–safetyupgradesanticipatedforlonger-termextensions.AlthoughthereisaclearpublicexpectationthatPickeringshouldmeethigherlevelsofsafety,OPGhasafinancialinterestinminimizingcostlysafetyupgrades.In2013,OPGaskedtocontinueoperatingthestationforanadditionalsixyears.Incomparisontothecost-benefitanalysiscarriedoutpreviouslytoevaluatetherefurbishmentandlife-extensionofthePickeringnuclearstation,thecostbenefitanalysiscarriedoutbyOPG’sin2013wouldhaveascribedlessvaluetosafetyimprovementsbecausetheirbenefitswouldbelimitedonlysixyearperiod.Inthecurrentapplication,OPGisaskingtooperatethestationforanadditionalfouryears.Tokeepcostsdown,OPGappearstohaveagainrequestedtheCNSCacceptareducedvaluationofsafetyimprovementsduetotheirlimitedduration.Inits2015TechnicalandEconomicAssessmentofPickeringExtendedOperationsbeyond2020,OPGacknowledgedthattheCNSC’sacceptanceofevaluatingsafetyimprovementsbythelimitedvaluetheywouldprovideoverfouryearsofadditionaloperation.OPGacknowledgeditneededtoestablish“…withcertaintytheregulatoryrequirementsandhowtheseinterrelatetothetimingoftheendofextendedoperations…”37OPGalsostatedthatit“…isconfidentthatalistofreasonableandpracticablesafetyenhancementscanbereachedwiththeCNSCstaffinviewofthe4yearsofadditionaloperationthatissought.”38ConsideringPickering’sout-of-datedesignanditslocation,theCommissionshouldprioritizethepublic’sexpectationforsafetybeforeOPG’sfinancialinterests.Itshouldalsorememberthatin2013OPGtoldtheCommissionandthepublic.itwouldonly

35Ibid.36Ibid.37OPG,TechnicalandEconomicAssessmentofPickeringExtendedOperationsbeyond2020,October2015,pg.10.38Ibid.

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operatePickeringuntil2020.NowOPGclaimingitwillonlyoperatePickeringuntil2024,buthasalicenceconditionthatwouldallowittoextendthelifepast2024.However,itisunclearwhatagreementsCNSCstaffhavemaderelatedtotheevaluationofsafetyupgrades.WithoutsuchinformationGreenpeacedoesnotbelievetheCommissioncanreliablyconcludethatsufficientactionhasbeentaketoensuretheprotectionofthepublicundertheNuclearSafetyandControlAct.In2016,GreenpeacefiledarequestunderAccesstoInformationlegislationforall“…internaldocuments,meetingminutes,andcorrespondencediscussingpotentialsafetyenhancementsinlightofOPG'sdesiretoextendPickering’soperationfor4additionalyears.ThisshouldincludeanythingdiscussionhowCNSCstaffwilldeterminewhatenhancementswillbeconsideredreasonablypracticalinlightofthe4additionalyearsofoperation.”39TheCNSCrefusedtoprovideanyinformationinresponsetothisrequest.Given,OPG’seconomicincentiveinminimizingsafetyupgrades,Greenpeaceisconcernedbystaff’slackofopennessrelatedtowhatconstitutesacosteffectivesafetyupgrade.WithoutsuchtransparencythepublicisdeprivedoftheinformationitneedstomeaningfullyassesstheconclusionsofOPGandCNSCstaff.ItshouldbenotedthatGreenpeacehasobservedasignificantdeclineinCommissiontransparencysince2016.TheCommissionhasrefusedaconsiderablenumber–ifnotthemajority-ofAccesstoInformationrelatedtoOPG’sPSR.Incontrast,CNSCstaffweremuchmoreopenandencouragedproactivedisclosurewhenPickeringunderwentitsfirstPSR40adecadeago.InformationreleasedadecadeagoisnowwithheldbytheCommission.Itisunclearwhy.Insum,theCNSChasloweredthebarontransparencyinrecentyearsandwithitthecredibilityandtrustworthinessofsafetyitssafetyclaims.OPGhasanobviousfinancialincentivetominimizesafetyimprovements.Tobecredible,thecriteriaandanalysisusedtodeterminewhatsafetyimprovementsarecost-effectiveandwhatimprovementsaretoocostlyshouldbeopentopublicscrutiny.Request:TheCommissionshouldinstructCNSCstafftostriveforhigherlevelsoftransparencywhilecarryingoutfuturePeriodicSafetyReviews,includingproactivedisclosureofallsafetyimprovementopportunitiesandtheirassociatedcost-benefitanalysis.Request:BeforeapprovingOPG’slicencerenewal,theCommissionshouldrequestalistofallsafetyimprovementopportunitiesconsideredduringOPG’sPeriodicSafetyReview

39A-2016-0015040Atthetime,theCNSCreferredtoPSRsasIntegratedSafetyReviews(ISR).

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withaclearjustificationonwhyspecificsafetyimprovementopportunitieswereacceptedorrejected.2.2Ariskylocation–thePickeringSite&decliningsafetymarginsTheCommissionshouldrejectOPG’sapplicationtooperatethePickeringnuclearstationbeyond2020inresponsetotheOntariogovernment’spromotionofpoliciesthatincreasetheriskposedbythestation.Asdiscussed,theOntariogovernmentisOPG’ssoleshareholderandtheeffectiveproponentofOPG’sapplicationtocontinueoperatingPickering.InGreenpeace’sview,theCommission’sassessmentofOPG’sapplicationshouldconsiderwhetheritsshareholderhasmadeadequateprovisionfortheprotectionoftheenvironmentandhumanhealthwhereveritspoliciesimpactthesafetyofthePickeringnuclearstation.UndertheCNSC’sdefence-in-depthsafetyapproach,theOntariogovernmenthassignificantresponsibilitiesthatshouldbeconsideredduringtherelicensingofanyOPGfacility.Defence-in-depthisaseriesofdefencelevelsthatseektopreventaccidentsfromoccurring,butensureappropriateprotectionisprovidedtothepublicandtheenvironmentifpreventionfails.41AstheauthorityresponsibleforoffsitepublicsafetyandasOPG’sshareholder,theprovinceshouldbeheldaccountablefortheadequacyofthefifthlevelofdefence-in-depth,whichaimstomitigatetheimpactsofradioactivereleasesoncetheyoccur.Twokeyareasofprovincialoversightdeterminewhetherthefifthlevelofdefence-in-depthisadequateundertheNuclearSafetyandControlAct:landuseplanningandemergencypreparedness.Ontario’slanduseplanningpoliciesencouragepopulationgrowthacrosstheGTAgenerally,includingthePickeringnuclearstation.SuchpolicieshaveincreasedtheriskposedbythePickeringnuclearstationbyincreasingthenumberofpeoplewhomaybedisplacedorexposedtoradiationintheeventofanaccident.Theprovince’sgrowthplanidentifiesdowntownPickeringasurbangrowtharea.42DowntownPickeringislessthan10kmfromthePickeringnuclearstation.ByincreasingpopulationdensityaroundPickering,theOntariogovernmentismakingtheimplementationofemergencymeasuresmorelogisticallychallengingandlesseffective.

41CNSC,REGDOC-2.5.2PhysicalDesignofReactorFacilities:NuclearPowerPlants,May2014,Section4.3.1,pg.7.42MinistryofInfrastructure,GrowthPlanfortheGreaterGoldenHorseshoe,2006,OfficeConsolidationJune2013,pgs.16-17,65.

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Notably,thegovernmentofOntariohasknowinglyerodedsafetymarginsaroundthePickeringsite.InthebriefingnoteprovidedtotheMinisterofEnergyin2010,MinistrystaffadmittedPickering’slocationmadeitriskytoextendthelifeofthePickering.TheMinister’sbriefingstated:

“Theabilitytocontinuetooperatefor30yearsinatargetedpopulationgrowtharea(asdefinedbytheProvinceofOntario)alsocarriesthepotentialforsignificantregulatorysanctioninresponsetopublicintervention.”43

Otherwiseput,theOntariogovernmentisawarethatitspolicyofencouraginggrowtharoundthePickeringnuclearstationisobjectionable.Thus,OPG’sshareholderisintentionallyreducingthesafetyofPickeringnuclearstation.InGreenpeace’sview,theCommissionhasaresponsibilitytopenalizelicenceesifthereisevidencethattheyhaveknowinglyincreasedrisktothepublic.ThiscanbedonebyeitherrejectingOPG’sapplicationorbyaddingadditionallicenceconditions.Theprovincehasalsorefusedtomodifyitspolicies.In2016,GreenpeaceandtheCanadianEnvironmentalLawAssociation(CELA)filedarequestforapolicyreviewunderOntario’sEnvironmentalBillofRights.InourrequestweaskedaskingtheMinistryofMunicipalAffairstoreviseitslandusepoliciestakingintoaccounttheneedtoencouragepublicsafetyinsteadofpopulationgrowthnearnuclearstations.44Theprovincedismissedourrequest.Thus,althoughprovidedanopportunitytoreviseitslanduseplanningpoliciestoencouragenuclearsafety,theprovincehasrefusedtomodifyitspoliciestotakeintoaccountitsresponsibilityasOPG’sshareholdertoensureadequateprotectionandCanadiansundertheNuclearSafetyandControlAct.ItshouldalsobenotedthatCommissionstaffhaverepeatedlydecidedagainstestablishingclearcriteriaforjudgingthesitesuitabilityofanuclearpowerplant.In2018,theCNSCfinallyreleasedanupdatedpost-Fukushimasitesuitabilityguide,REGDOC-1.1.1SiteEvaluationandSitePreparation.GreenpeaceandCELArequestedthisnewsitingguideacknowledgetheneedtoforprovincialauthoritiestodiscouragepopulationgrowthandinappropriatelanduseoverthelifeofanuclearfacility.Unfortunately,Commissionstaffrefused,statingthat:“…landuseisunderprovincial/territorialjurisdiction,andregions/municipalitiesandapplicantsmustadheretoprovincial/territoriallegislationregardinglanduse.”45

43CedricJobe,BriefingNote,January8,2010.ObtainedthroughFreedomofInformationlegislation.44CELA,DurhamNuclearAwarenessandGreenpeace,ApplicationforReviewtotheMinistryofMunicipalAffaires,September26,2016.45DetailedCommentsReportDraftREGDOC-1.1.1,LicencetoPrepareSiteandSiteEvaluationforNewReactorFacilitiesPublicconsultation:August11,2016–November14,2016andFeedbackoncomments:Dec.7to29,2016,Edoc#5117698,pg.70

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InlightofOntario’songoingactionstoundermineoffsitepublicsafety,Greenpeacebelievesstaff’sdeferencetoprovincialpolicyisuntenableundertheNuclearSafetyandControlAct.Inrenderingitsdecision,theCommissionshouldexerciseitsauthorityundertheActtoreduceoreliminatetheunreasonableriskposedbyPickering.TheCommissionshouldalsobeawarethatstaff’sdecisiontonotestablishcriteriaforjudgingsitesuitabilityhasbeenrepeatedlycriticized.Forexample,JohnBeare,whohadbeencommissionedtoreviewtheCNSC’sproposedlicensingbasisfornewreactors,madethefollowingobservations:

19.TherearetwosignificantgapsintheLicensingBasisDocument.…Thesafetygoalsareindependentofthesite,thesizeoftheexclusionarea(ifany)andthedemographicsoftheareaaroundthesite.Iwasadvisedthatsiteconsiderationsdonotaffectthedesignrequirementsforthenuclearpowerplantbutthatexplanationisdifficulttoaccept.20.BeforeissuingthisLicensingBasisDocumenttheCanadianNuclearSafetyCommissionshoulddocumentandpublishitssitingpolicygivingquantitativevaluesforthetolerablerisk(notunreasonabletousethewordingoftheNuclearSafetyandControlAct)toindividualsandthepopulationaroundanuclearpowerplantsite.OneweaknessofthecurrentsitingpolicyinAECB-1059isthatonlyradiologicalrisksareaddressed.InAECB-1059thefrequencyandradiologicalconsequencesofprocessfailuresaloneandincombinationwithsafetysystemfailuresareaddressedforindividualsandthepopulation,butonlytherisktoindividualsfrommoreseriousaccidents.Theseweaknessesinthecurrentsitingpolicyshouldberemedied.46

Mr.Bearealsomadefrankobservationrelevanttothecurrentproceedings.HetoldCNSCstaff:“Dependingonone’sperspective,fromthesafetypointofviewtheapprovalofthePickeringsitewasanactoffaithorhubris.”GiventhePickeringsitewasoriginallyapprovedinthe1960s,eitherourfaithorhubrishasgrownalongwithgrowthofnearbypopulations.Inaddition,areportcommissionedspecificallytoinformupdatedsitingrequirementsin2007found“[i]mportantgapsnotaddressedintheCNSCdocumentsoranywhereinitslicensingframework…[include]…“criteriafortherejectionofaproposedsiteifitisdeemedunsuitable…[and]…thattherearenoinsurmountableobstaclestotheestablishmentofsuitableemergencymeasures.”47Unfortunately,CNSChasfailedtoacknowledgethecriticismoftheseexpertadvisors.46JohnW.Beare,P.Eng.,ReviewofACR-LBD-001,LicensingBasisDocumentforNewNuclearPowerPlantsinCanada,Draftdated2004December47RegulatorySiteRequirementsNeededforNewNuclearPowerPlantsinCanada,FinalReport,June2007,RSP-0223,pg.8.

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Inshort,publicsafetyisbeingunderminedbyfailureofboththeprovincialgovernmentandCNSCstaffrefusaltolimitpopulationgrowtharoundthePickeringnuclearstation.GreenpeacehasattemptedtoalertboththeCNSCandtheprovinceontheneedtoestablishpoliciestoreducetheriskofPickering.Bothhavedeclinedtoact.GreenpeacethusaskstheCommissiontouseitspowerundertheNuclearSafetyandControlActtoregulatetheproductionofnuclearenergyandpreventunreasonablerisktothepublic.Asdiscussed,OPG’sshareholderhasknowinglyincreasedtheriskposedtothepublictounreasonablelevels.Throughitsgrowthpolicies,theOntariogovernmenthasreducedPickering’ssafetymarginsbydiminishingthecapacityofemergencymeasurestoeffectivelyrespondtoaccidentalradiationreleases.ItisreasonabletoassumethattheprovincewillcontinuetopromotepopulationgrowthandunderminePickering’ssafetywithoutsomesortofsanctionbytheCNSC.ThereisprecedentfortheCommissiontomodifylicenceconditionsbasedontheinadequateoversightoftheOntariogovernment.Inresponsetothepublicconcernrelatedtotheprovince’soversightofnuclearemergencyresponse,theCNSCimposednewlicenseconditionsonOntarioreactoroperatorsrequiringthedirectdeliveryofpotassiumiodide(KI)pillswithin10kmofOntarionuclearstations.Notably,theMinistryofCommunitySafetyandCorrectionalServices,whichinappropriatelyreliesonOPGforpolicysupport,opposedtheCommission’snewKIdistributionrequirements.48Theprovince’soppositiontoCNSC’sinterventioninitsjurisdictionhasbeenstubborn.EventhoughtheCNSC’snewKIdistributionrequirementshadbeenimplementedbytheendof2015,theOntario’sgovernment’s2017DiscussionPaperonupdatingemergencyresponserecommendedagainstincludingtheCNSC’sKIdistributioninanupdatedProvincialNuclearEmergencyResponsePlan.Request:InresponsetotheOntariogovernment’spolicies,whichpromotepopulationgrowthandintensificationandtherebyunderminepublicsafetyaroundthePickeringnuclearstation,theCommissionshouldrejectOPG’sapplicationtooperatethePickeringnuclearstationbeyond2020.Request:IntheeventthattheCommissionapprovesthecontinuedoperationofPickeringbeyond2020,theCommissionshouldincludeadditionallicenseconditionsrequiringOPGtoworkwithitsshareholdertoestablishlimitsonpopulationgrowthwithinthenewlyestablished20kmContingencyPlanningZone(CPZ).

48JohnSpears,“Therealquestionaboutnucleardisaster:Federalorprovincialissue?”,TorontoStar,August.23,2014.

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2.3Emergencypreparedness–provincialmalpracticeSincethe2011Fukushimadisaster,theOntariogovernmenthasconsistentlymishandledtheoversightandupkeepofprovincialnuclearemergencyresponseplans.Itbecameapparentduringthe2013Pickeringrelicensinghearingsthatprovince’soversightofnuclearemergencypreparednesswasinadequate.Sincethe2013Pickeringhearings,theCommissionhaslaudablyimposedKIdistributionrequirementsinresponsetoprovincialinactionandrequiredannualreportstotheCommissionontheprovince’soversightofnuclearemergencyresponse.However,theprovince’spooroversightofnuclearemergencymanagementhascontinuedandshouldbefactoredintotheCommission’sdecisiononwhethertoaccept,rejectormodifyOPG’srequesttocontinueoperatingthePickeringnuclearstation.InDecember2017,Ontario’sAuditorGeneralreleasedanauditoftheprovince’snuclearemergencyplanning,detailingacorporatecultureattheMinistryofCommunitySafetyandCorrectionalServicesunabletodeliveronitsobligations.49Forexample,theAuditornotedthattheProvincialNuclearEmergencyResponsePlan(PNERP)hadnotbeenupdatedsince2009eventhoughitwassupposedtoberevisedeveryfouryears.ElementsofthePNERP,suchastrafficcontrolplansneededtofacilitateevacuation,wereincomplete.50IthasbecomeapparentthatthereisaclackoftechnicalcapacityattheMinistryofCommunitySafetyandCorrectionalServices.InlinewiththeincestuousrelationshipthatexistsbetweenOPGandtheprovincialgovernmentthereisalsoalackofindependencefromOPGonemergencyplanningmatters.DuringCNSChearingsinNovember2015,DeputyFireMarshalAlSulemanacknowledgedthatthereareonlysixstaffwitharesponsibilityfornuclearemergencyresponsewithintheprovincialgovernment.”51A2016briefingnotetoCNSCpresidentMichaelBinderalsoraisedconcernsrelatedtoOFMEM’slacktechnicalexpertise.Thebriefingobserved“…thechallengeforOFMEMisthelossofexpertiseandcorporateknowledge.”52TheAuditorGeneralalsoobservedthatin2015thegovernmenthadreliedonstaffborrowedfromreactoroperators.TheAuditorrightlyobservedthatthiscouldcompromisethegovernment’sobjectivity.53ThisrelianceonOPGstaffhascontinued.49SeeChapter3.03,AuditorGeneralofOntario,2017AnnualReport,December2017.50Ibid,239.51CNSC,PublicHearingTranscripts,Courtice,Ontario,November4,2015,pg.45.52INFORMATIONNOTETOTHEPRESIDENT,June30,2016E-Doc:5027898,AcquiredthroughAccesstoInformation.53AuditorGeneralofOntario,pg.253.

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In2017,JimColes,OPG’sDirectorofEmergencyManagementwas“OnloanfromOPGtosupportdevelopmentofthenewProvincialNuclearEmergencyPlan.”54Notably,internaldocumentsobtainedbyGreenpeacethroughFreedomofInformationlegislationshowthatOPGwasconcernedthatdelaysinthegovernment’sreviewofnuclearemergencyresponsecouldundermineitsrequesttorenewPickering’soperatinglicence.Inaninternaldocumentdetailingriskstoitslicenceapplication,OPGobserved:

ThereisatightschedulefortheProvincetohavetheupdatedPNERPapprovedbyCabinetbytheendof2017,beforetheSpring2018electionandPart1Hearing.Thereisariskthat,ifthePNERPisnotupdatedandapprovedintimebythecurrentCabinet,itwillbesignificantlydelayedbeyondthe2018PNGSlicenceexpirydateandwillraisequestionsabouttherobustnessofoff-siteemergencypreparednessaroundPickering.TheseissuescouldthreatenPickeringrelicensingandresultinholdpointsand/orashorterlicenceterm<10years.55

Tomitigatetheserisks,thedocumentstatesthatOPGwas“…engagedatseniorlevelstoprovideappropriatesupportandconsultation.”56ItisunclearwhethertheseengagementactivitiesincludedMr.Coles’secondmenttotheMinistryofCommunitySafetyandCorrectionalServicestoassistwiththePNERPconsultation.ItisobviousthatOPGhasprivilegedaccesstogovernmentofficialsoverseeingthereviewofprovincialnuclearemergencyresponseplans.AccordingtodocumentsobtainedthroughFreedomofInformation,OPGhadreceivedaninvitationinearlyJuly2017topresenttothePNERPadvisorycommitteethethirdweekofAugust.57Incontrast,thegovernmentonlyinformedGreenpeaceoneworkingdaybeforewewereexpectedtopresent.InGreenpeace’sview,thisiseitherevidencebiasorincompetence.Afteryearsofdelay,itappearsthatOPG’sapplicationtocontinueoperatingthePickeringnuclearstationexpeditedtheprovincialgovernment’sreviewofnuclearemergencyresponse.OPG’soperationsappeartohaveahigherprioritywithintheprovincialthanpublicsafety.Nevertheless,althoughCabinetapprovedarevisedPNERPonDecember13th2017,thegovernmentfailedtoreleaseanupdatedImplementingPlanforthePickeringnuclearstationintimefortheseproceedings.ThisisanotherexampleoftheOntariogovernment’sinabilitytocompetentlyoverseeoffsitenuclearemergencyresponse.54SeeJimColesLinkedinPage.See:https://www.linkedin.com/in/jim-coles-97a35442LastaccessedMay7,2018.55OPG,RiskRegistry–PickeringRelicensing2018,May31,2017,FOI#17-048,pg.393.56Ibid.57ScottPreston(OPG–Manager,EmergencyProjects)“VPRelicensingMeeting”,email,July12,2017.FOI#17-048.

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UponreviewoftheupdatedtheupdatedPickeringImplementingPlan,Greenpeacewillprovideadditionalcommentsontheadequacyofoffsitenuclearemergencyresponse.Thatsaid,OPG’sshareholderhasaconsistenttrackrecordofmishandlingitsresponsibilityforoffsitenuclearemergencyresponse.ThisshouldbereflectedintheCommission’sdeliberationsanddecision.Request:Inlightoftheprovince’sconsistentmishandlingofnuclearemergencyresponseplanning,theCommissionshouldrejectOPG’sapplicationtooperatethePickeringnuclearstationbeyond2020.3.Disclaimer

ThissubmissionisnotanendorsementoftheCNSC’shearingprocess,credibilityorindependence.Tothecontrary,Greenpeacefeelstherecentlyelectedfederalgovernmentneedstore-establishtheindependenceoftheCNSCthroughalegislativereviewandbyappointinganewCNSCpresident.InGreenpeace’sview,theformerHarpergovernmentunderminedtheindependenceoftheCNSCwhenitfiredtheCNSCpresidentLindaKeenin2008.GreenpeacehasattemptedtoconstructivelyparticipateinCNSClicensinghearings,buthasfoundthatCNSChearingsareoften“staged”byCNSCmanagementtokeepinconvenientinformationofftherecord.Notably,publicparticipationinCNSCproceedingsincreasedfollowingthe2011Fukushimadisaster.ThisincreasedparticipationarguablyleadtoanincreaseinCommissiondecisionscontrarytotherecommendationsofCNSCstaffandlicencees.Examplesinclude,amongothers,strengthenedpotassiumiodide(KI)distributionrequirements,directiontolicenseestodevelopaprocessforsite-wideriskassessmentandtheissuanceofthe2014“severeaccidentstudy”.Inspiteofthisevidencethatincreasedpubicparticipationmayleadtobetterregulatorydecision-making,theCNSChasoptedtoreducepublicparticipationandtransparencybyshiftingtoten-yearlicences.InGreenpeace’sview,thisisevidencethattheCommission’smindset–theunspokenassumptionsthatinformactions-stillviewspublicinputandscrutinyasanuisanceinsteadofavaluablealternateperspectiveandcheckontheiractivities.UntilsuchatimethattherehavebeenchangesinCNSCseniormanagementandtotheCNSC’srulesofproceduretoallowforcross-examinationandtestingofevidence,Greenpeacedoesn’tbelieveCNSChearingscanbereliedupontoprovidetrustworthyassessmentsofnuclearrisksinCanada.