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AnElectionProvidestheSpark......................... 2APlannedSpontaneousRevolution................. 4MajorCharacters.............................................. 6OtherPlayers....................................................7UkraineThenandNow.....................................8UkraineHistoricalTimeline...............................9NottheFirstTime(OrtheLast).......................10Epilogue...........................................................11AdditionalResources.......................................12QuestionsforFurtherDiscussion.................... 14SuggestedGroupExercises..............................16

Table of Contents

Beforeasinglevotewascast, Ukraine's2004presidentialelectionhadgrabbedaworldwideaudience.TelevisionandprintmediareportedeverydramatictwistbeginninginSeptember,whenViktorYushchenko,areform‐mindedpresidentialcandidate,wasmysteriouslypoisonedandflowntoAustriaforemergency

treatment.Yushchenkosurvivedbutbefore‐and‐afterpicturesofthecandidate'soncehandsomeface,nowseverelyscarred,ledthenewsaroundtheworld.ThedramacontinuedinNovemberwhenthesecondroundofvotingwasmarredbyblatantelectionfraud.MillionsofoutragedcitizenssurgedintothestreetsofKyiv,Ukraine'scapital,andotherUkrainiancities,inamassiveprotestthatparalyzedthecountryforweeks.ItwasthegreatestupheavalinEasternEuropeanpoliticsinnearlytwodecades‐‐themostspectacularofthepost‐communistrebellionsinfavorofdemocracywhichhadalreadyspreadthroughSlovakia,SerbiaandGeorgia.

NamedforViktorYushchenko'scampaigncolor,theOrangeRevolutionof2004wastheculminationofacrisisbegunthreeyearsearlier.In2001, massiveprotestshadbrieflyconvulsedthecountrywhentheUkraineWithoutKuchma(UWK)movementdemandedtheresignationofthedeeplyunpopularpresident,LeonidKuchma.Kuchma'sunresponsiveandcorruptleadershiphadalreadydrivenhispopularityintothesingledigitsbyDecember2000whenrecordingsmadebyKuchma'sbodyguardwerepublicizedbyamemberofparliament.Kuchma'svoiceisheardrecommendingtheabductionofGeorgiyGongadze,aninvestigativejournalistwhohadaccusedKuchmaofcorruption.Theso‐calledcassettescandalsparkedthecreationofUWK.ThemovementwasunprecedentedinmodernUkraine,supportedbygroupsacrossthepoliticalspectrum.

Gongadze hadbeenmissingsinceSeptember2000.HisheadlessbodywasdiscoverednearKyivtwomonthslater.Hearingthetaperecordings,whichnotonlytiedKuchmatoGongadze'smurder,butrevealedKuchmatobeatthecenterofacriminalregime,thepopulationtooktothestreets.UWKdeclareditselftobeastrictlynonviolentmovement,butwasunabletocontrolitsradicalmembers,whoattackedriotpoliceinMarch2001atarallyinKyiv.Whenpoliceresponded,dozensofprotesterswereinjured.MiddleclasssupportersofUWKdesertedthemovementovernight,fearfuloffurtherviolentincidents.

PresidentLeonidKuchma,2003

GeorgiyGongadze

An Election Provides the Spark

Ineligibletoserveathirdterm,Kuchmaanointedthesittingprimeminister,ViktorYanukovych,tosucceed

him.AlthoughYanukovychlackedcharisma,he'dbeenafaithfulservantofthecountry'swealthybusinessinterests,andwasexpectedtomaintainorevenstrengthenUkraine'stiestoRussia.WiththeentiremachineryofthegovernmentsupportingtheYanukovychcandidacy(attaxpayerexpense),Kuchmawasconfidenthismancouldwin.ButtheKuchma/Yanukovychforcesunderestimatedtheopposition.Formonths,everystumpspeechremindedvotersofKuchma'sfailures.ViktorYushchenkospokeoutrepeatedlyagainstcorruption,callingKuchma'sgovernmenta"criminalregime."EvenwhenopinionpollspointedtoadecisiveYushchenkovictory,theOrangecoalitionkeptupthepressure.TheyassumedKuchma'spartywoulddoanything‐‐includingvotefraud‐‐tomaintainpower,sotheyworkedwithcivicgroupstoorganizevotereducationcampaignsandavastelectionmonitoringsystem.TheOrangeforceshopedtopreventvoterfraud,butasabackup,theypreparedtodocument,expose,publicizeandprotestthefraudifitoccurred.

IntheinitialroundofvotingonOctober31,Yushchenkofinishedfirstofthetwenty‐fivecandidates,butsincenocandidatewonover50%,asecondroundofvotingwassetforNovember21.Inthisround,thefraudwasblatantandpervasive.Yushchenko'sOrangecoalitionwasready;popularoutragegavethemthemobilizingtooltheyneeded.At2a.m.onNovember22,OrangeleadersbroadcastanappealtoallcitizenstogatherintheheartofKyivatIndependenceSquare(MaidanNezalezhnosti),knownsimplyasMaidan.

Ukrainians remaineddeeplydissatisfiedwiththeregime,andthe

UWKmovementhadprovidedexperienceforanewgenerationofactivistswhowouldplaykeyrolesin2004. YuriyLutsenko managedstreetactionsinboth2001and2004.HerecalledthatthebloodshedofMarch2001had"repulsedallofUkraine‐itwastheendofthemovement."In2004,heknewthatnonviolentdisciplinewouldbeabsolutelynecessaryforanysuccessfulpopularuprising.

BynoononNovember22,2004,nearly100,000angrydemonstratorshadconvergedonMaidanandinothercitiestoprotestthepreviousday’selectionfraud.Asthecrowdsmushroomed,eventheorganizersweresurprised.Suddenly,Maidanbecameasymboloftherevolution,resistance,andopposition.Theword“maidan”itselftookonseveralmeanings;itwasnotjustaplace,butamovement,andamediumofcommunications.ThiswasexactlywhattheYushchenkocampaignandOrangecoalitionhadintended.Theyhadcorrectlyanticipatedastolenelection‐‐andpreparedforit‐‐withMaidanasthefocalpointoftheirmassaction.

Knowingtheymighthavetooccupythecityformanydaysorweeks, organizersdistributedfood,tents,andblankets.Theyblockedallimportantgovernmentbuildingsandeffectivelyshutdownday‐to‐daygovernmentfunctions.Alltheiractionswereplannedtopreventbloodshed.Knowingtheirsupporterswouldcomeface‐to‐facewithpoliceandsecurityforces,Yushchenkoandhisseniorstaffhadestablishedbackchannelcontactswithcommandersofsecurityforcestokeeptheminformedofoppositionplanningandtoreassurethemtheprotestwouldremainnonviolent.

Duringthefirstdays, asprotestersandsecurityforceslookedeachotherintheeye,somethingremarkablehappened.Asoneprotestleaderobserved,"Theygotacquaintedandtheygotusedtoeachother.Withinafewdays,theybegansharingfoodandteawitheachother."Meanwhile,atnight,Maidanleadersmetwithofficersfromthearmedservicestoshareinformation.

MembersofParliamentconstructedthestage atMaidan withtheirownhands.Becausetheyenjoyedparliamentaryimmunity,thepolicewerenotallowedtoarrestthem.ThestagewastheplatformfromwhichYushchenkoandtheOrangeleaderscouldspeaktothepeople,explaintheirplans,andgiveinstructions.Twenty‐fourhourtelevisioncoverageofthestagekeptallUkrainiansinformedabouteventsoftherevolution.

A Planned Spontaneous Revolution

ProtestersinMaidan,Nov.22,2004

Buildingthetentcity

EveningperformanceonMaidanstage

AwayfromMaidan, alessvisiblebattlewasbeingfought.LawyersforYushchenkoandhispoliticalpartyfiledoverahundredcourtcasescitingelectionirregularities.Threehundredlawyersworkedwithoutpaytopreparethelegalcases.ThekeyactionwasatUkraine’sSupremeCourtwherethepressureofmassactionandtheruleoflawconverged.Intheend,recallsMykolaKaterynchuk,thelawyerwhosupervisedthecases,"Weprovedthattheresultsofthesecondroundwerefalsified,andrevealedthemethodsandparticipantsinthesefalsifications.Thejudgesrealizedthatthepeopleinthestreetsmighttrytoseizepoweratanymoment,andthismayhavepromptedthemtomaketheirdecisionquickly–injustaweek.BecausetheSupremeCourtperformeditshistoricrole,aviolentscenariowasavoided.Ittransformedtherevolutionfromacrisisofillegitimacyintooneoflegality.Itlegitimizedatransitionfromfraudtotheestablishmentofdemocraticelections.Itwasarulingthatfavoredpoliticians,favoredvoters,andfavoredthedemocraticfutureofUkraine.Andthisonecasewashedawayallthedirtymoneyandthepowerofthoseoligarchs."

AmemberofthecampaignstaffwhohelpedorganizetheeventsonMaidanexplained,"Iimaginedthiscampaignasawar.Icouldn’tthinkofitanyotherway,andwecouldn’torganizeitanyotherway.Wewouldhavetoworkinastrictdiscipline,otherwiseitwouldbeimpossibletowin."

Theregimeassumedthatafterafewdaysthefrigidtemperatureswouldforceprotesterstogohome.Butasoneoftheorganizersobserved,"Thesepeoplewerereallypreparedtodoanything,togiveeverything,toberidofthiscriminalgovernment."Nightafterfreezingnight,theystayed.

Tomanagethemassofpeopleinthetentcities, inMaidan,andaroundtheParliamentandPresidentialadministrationbuildings,strictruleswereestablished.MembersofPora!,theyouthresistanceorganization,weretheenforcers.Alcoholicbeveragesanddrugswereprohibitedinthetentcamps.Trashwashauledawaydaily. Poravolunteerscontrolledthecheckpoints,patrolledtheencampments,andkeptorder.

FinalargumentsattheSupremeCourt,Dec.3,2004

AllofUkraine’sseniorpoliticianswereborn,educated,andbegantheircareerswhenUkrainewasaSovietrepublic.

ViktorYushchenko.Born1954,innortheasternUkraine.By1991,whenUkrainebecameindependent,Yushchenkohadearneddegreesineconomicsandfinance,andestablishedhimselfasarespectedeconomist,employedbylocal,regional,andnationalbanks.In1994,hebecamethefirstgovernorofUkraine’scentralbank,whereheearnedhighpraiseforstabilizingthecurrencyandreducinginflation.PresidentKuchmaappointedhimprimeministerin1999,buthisaggressiveanti‐corruptionprogramsmadehimunpopularandhewaspushedoutoftheprimeminister’sofficein2001.Withinayear,hebecameleaderofOurUkraine,areform‐orientedpoliticalcoalition.OurUkrainewonmoreparliamentaryseatsthananypartyorcoalitionin2002.Hisrunforpresidentin2004energizedthemillionswhosawitasachancetobreak,oratleastloosen,theoligarchs’gripontheircountry.Yushchenkohasbeenmarriedsince1998toKaterynaChumachenko,thedaughterofUkrainianimmigrantstotheU.S.

LeonidKuchma.Born1938,innorthcentralUkraine.Educatedasanengineer,KuchmawassuccessfulinSovietindustry,andrecognizedforhisdesignanddevelopmentofrocketandspacetechnology.Heenteredpoliticsin1990,firstasamemberofparliament,thenbrieflyasprimeminister.Hewaselectedpresidentin1994promisingtoreverseaseriouseconomicdeclinethroughclosercooperationwithRussia.Targetedbyaccusationsofcriminalityandcorruptionthroughouthispresidency,hemaintainedclosetiestothewealthyoligarchswhocontrolledmuchofUkraine’seconomy.Ashispopularityplummeted,helashedoutatthemedia,especiallytelevision.TaperecordingsallegedlymadeinhisofficewerewidelyacceptedasevidenceofhisinvolvementinthemurderofjournalistGeorgiyGongadzeandothercrimes.Followingthefraudulentelectionof2004,hewaspressuredtodeclareastateofemergencyandinaugurateViktorYanukovych,butherefusedtodoso.

ViktorYanukovych.Born1950,intheDonetskprovinceineasternUkraine.Aftereightyearsasanelectricianatalocalbuscompany,heearnedanengineeringdegreebycorrespondencecourse.Laterheheldmanagementpositionsinthetransportsector.Hewasvice‐governor,governor,andheadoftheprovincecouncilofDonetskbetween1996and2001.Hispoliticalcareerhasbeenmarredbychargesofcriminalityandcorruption.Hewasconvictedofrobberyin1967andofrapein1970,crimesforwhichheservedatotaloffiveyearsinprison.PresidentLeonidKuchmanamedhimprimeministerin2002,andsupportedhisrunforpresidentin2004.ComingfromaRussian‐speakingregion,YanukovychhasfavoredcloserelationswithRussia.DuringthecampaignheadvocatedmakingRussiananofficiallanguageofUkraine.

YuliaTymoshenko.Born1960,insouth‐centralUkraine.Duringasuccessfulandcontroversialbusinesscareer,shejoinedtheranksofUkraine’soligarchs,doingbusinesswithmanyofthecountry’smostfamous(andinfamous)tycoons.AspresidentofUnitedEnergySystemsofUkraine,themainimporterofRussiannaturalgasatthattime,shewasaccusedofsellinglargevolumesofstolengasandofevadingtaxes;hernicknamebecame“thegasprincess.”Shewaselectedtoparliamentin1996,andservedtwoyearsasDeputyPrimeMinisterforfuelandenergy.Asaleaderinthe2001UkraineWithoutKuchmamovement,Tymoshenkowasknownforherpassionate,sometimesinflammatory,rhetoric.Thatsameyear,sheformedtheYuliaTymoshenkobloc,apoliticalcoalitionwhichjoinedtheOrangeforcesworkingforYushchenko’spresidentialcampaignin2004.ShebecameUkraine’sfirstfemaleprimeministerinearly2005.ManyUkrainiansacceptherasareformer,ignoringorforgivingherproblematichistory.Shespeaksfortheruleoflaw,againstcorruption,andforabalanceofrelationswithRussiaandtheEU.In2009,sheannouncedherintentiontorunforpresidentofUkraine.

Major Characters

Pora!(‘It’sTime!’),appearedinlate2002,asayouthorganizationmodeledlooselyonthestudentgroups

whichplayedvisiblerolesinthedefeatofMilosevicinSerbia(Otpor,1998‐2000)andShevardnadzeinGeorgia(Kmara,2003).Porawasreallytwoseparateorganizations,knowninformallyasBlackPoraandYellowPoraforthecolorsoftheirbanners,stickers,andleaflets.Despitesomerivalry,theyworkedtogetherespeciallyinlate2004.PorawassmallerthanOtpor,notastightlyorganized,andcouldonlyestimateitsmembership–atabout10,000.Manywerestudents,andmanyhadbeenactiveintheUkraineWithoutKuchmamovementof2001.Beginningin2003,Poraactivistsconsultedwith,andreceivedtrainingfrom,veteransoftheOtporandKmaragroups.Poraactivistswerecalledterroristsandcriminalsbytheirgovernment,andtheyweresometimesphysicallyattacked.TheywerethefirsttoerecttentsinMaidan,onthenightofthefraudulentrunoffelection,andtheyplayedakeyroleinorganizingandmaintainingorderforthetentcitiesandcrowdsonMaidanthroughouttherevolution.

ElectronicMediainUkraine TemnykyisthenamegiventosecretemailmessagessentdailybyUkraine’spresidential

administrationtotelevisionstations,tellingthemwhattoreport,howtoreportit,andwhattoignore.Thissystemofmediacensorshipwasinauguratedin2002byRussianpoliticalconsultantsemployedbythen‐PresidentKuchma.Duringthe2004electioncampaign,TVnewsprogramswereorderedtoportraythepresident,thepro‐presidentialparties,andViktorYanukovychinapositivelight,togiveminimalcoveragetotheYushchenkocampaign,andtodiscredithimwheneverpossible.IncoveringYushchenko’sfirstcampaignrally,onetemnykordered:“...donotshowwideshotsoftherallyandshotsofthecrowd;showonlygroupsofdrunkpeoplewithsociallyinappropriate,deviantbehavior.”

Ukraine’sTVstationsUT1isthestatecontrolledbroadcaster.1+1andInterarenetworksownedbyViktorMedvedchuk,anoligarchwhoheadedPresidentKuchma’spresidentialadministrationin2002‐2004.ThreeotherTVchannelsareownedbyKuchma’sson‐in‐law,ViktorPinchuk:STB,ICTV,andNovyKanal.Duringthe2004presidentialcampaign,allthesestationsshowedastrongbiastowardsYanukovych.Onlytwostationsproducedbalancednews.ThefirstwasChannel5,asmallstationwithaweakersignal,coveringonlyabout15%ofthecountry,withnocoverageatallineasternUkraine.Channel5isownedbyPetroPoroshenko,anoligarchfriendlytoYushchenko.ERA‐TVprovidedsimilarcoverage,butwasonlyontheairforportionsoftheday,andnotintheevening.Aftertheelectoralfraudwasrevealed,journalistsandthenewsstaffatUT1and1+1threatenedastriketoprotestcensorship.Theydeclaredtomanagement,"Eitheryouletusbroadcastwhat’shappeninginthecountry,orweallwalkout."Managementgavein,andat9pmtheycarriedthefirstuncensorednewsreports.

Other Players

Russia’sRoleintheElectionRussianleaderssawthe2004electionasaturningpoint:WouldUkrainetakeapro‐Russianorapro‐WesterndirectionafterKuchma?Ayearbeforetheelection,theydecidedtosupportthecandidatepickedbyKuchma.ExpensiveRussianpoliticaladvisorsandspin‐doctorsmanagedtheYanukovychcampaign,whichalsoreceivedcashcontributionsfromtheKremlin.Thetotalsumisnotknown.Fiftymillionisthelowestestimate;theamountmostwidelycitedis$300million.RussianpoliticalconsultantsusedstrategiescommoninRussianelectionsincludingputtingmassivepressuretovoteforYanukovychonstateemployees,pensioners,andotherswhoselivelihooddependsonthestate.Theydevelopedapro‐YanukovychadvertisingblitzwhichranprominentlyinRussia,aimedatthemillioneligibleUkrainianvoterslivingthere.RussianPresidentVladimirPutinpersonallyvisitedUkrainetoendorseYanukovych.Later,PutincongratulatedYanukovychonhisvictorythreetimesbeforethevoteshadevenbeencounted.Altogether,theRussianrolecameoffasheavy‐handed,atransparentattempttore‐imposeRussianinfluenceinUkraine.SomeanalystsbelievetheRussianeffortsactuallyhurtYanukovych.RussianleaderswereshockedandsurprisedbythemassiveprotestsinUkraine.Inresponse,theyhavegivenahighprioritytopreventingsimilar“colorrevolutions”inRussiaorothercountries.

Ukraine Then and Now

UkraineisthesecondlargestcountryinEurope,withanareaslightlysmallerthanTexas.UkrainewasbyfarthemostimportanteconomicunitoftheSovietUnion,afterRussia.Ukraine’sfarmersprovidedmorethanaquarterofSovietagriculturaloutput.EasternUkrainewastheSovietUnion’sindustrialheartland,miningcoalandproducingsteelandmachinery.

UnderSovietrule,Ukraineoftensuffered.EightmillionUkrainiansdiedduringtwofamines(1921‐3and1932‐3)whenSovietauthoritiesseizedUkrainiangrainandtransportedittoRussia.GermanandSovietarmieskilledatleastsevenmillionmoreinWorldWarII.

WhentheSovietUniondisintegratedin1991,Ukrainebecameindependent.Withinayear,formerSovietofficialsandex‐managersofstate‐ownedenterprisesemergedas“oligarchs,”purchasingformerstatecompaniessuchasheavyindustry,coalmines,andmediaoutlets,atbargainprices.Theseovernighttycoons,whoownedhugebusinessesandconglomerates,enjoyedclosetieswiththepresidentandcontrolledlargefactionsinparliament.Theirpoliticalconnectionsallowedthemtowinsuchbenefitsasregionalmonopolies,taxexemptions,subsidies,andtradepreferences.

Despiteoccasionalanti‐corruptionprograms,theoligarchsremainkeypowercentersinUkraine.Asprimeminister(2000‐01),ViktorYushchenkowithdrewmanyofthetaxexemptionsandprivilegesenjoyedbytheoligarchs,whileturningUkraine'sdeficittoasurplusandgrowingtheeconomyforthefirsttimesinceindependence.In2002,PresidentKuchmareplacedhiscabinetwithministersdrawnentirelyfromtheoligarchicfactionsinparliament.Inthepositionofprimeminister,ViktorYushchenkowasout,andViktorYanukovychwasin.

Asthepresidentialelectionapproachedin2004,theoligarchsweredominant–butnotunified.Amongthemorethantwentypresidentialcandidates,onlytwoweretruecontenders:Yushchenko,thereformer,andYanukovych,thecandidateoftheoligarchsandthestatusquo.Tobefair,Yushchenkoenjoyedthesupportofsomeoligarchstoo,butYanukovychhadauniqueadvantage.Hewasendorsedbytheincumbentpresidentandsupportedbytheentireadministrativebranchofgovernment.HewasalsosupportedbyRussia.

Land: Mostly fertile plains and plateaus Arable land 53.8% Agricultural products: Grain, sugar beets, sunflower seeds, vegetables, beef, milk Natural resources: Iron ore, coal, manganese, natural gas, oil, salt, sulfur, graphite, timber Industries: Coal, electric power, metals, machinery, transportation, chemicals Population: 46.5 million Urban population 68% Median age 39.5 Life expectancy 68 years Ethnicity: Ukrainian 77% Russian 17% Others 6% Population below poverty line 37.7% Religion: Orthodox denominations 91% Roman Catholic 2.2% Protestant 2.2% Jewish 0.6% Languages: Ukrainian 67% Russian 24% Other 9% Literacy 99.4% above age 15 GDP: $340 billion Agriculture 9.3%Industry 31.7%Services 58.9% Unemployment: 9% [2009 estimate, tripled from 2008] Inflation 22.3%

[These are the most recent figures available, most from 2008.]

During the 18th and 19th centuries, most of Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire.

1921 Ukraine joins the Soviet Union 1941-45 Ukraine occupied by Nazi Germany 1960s Covert opposition to Soviet rule grows 1986 Nuclear reactor at Chernobyl explodes 1991 Ukraine declares independence 1994 Leonid Kuchma becomes second president of Ukraine 1996 Democratic constitution adopted 1997 Ukraine signs Friendship Treaty with Russia 1999 Leonid Kuchma re-elected president Sept. 2000 Journalist Georgiy Gongadze murdered Dec. 2000 Ukraine Without Kuchma movement demands resignation of President Kuchma and investigation of Gongadze murder Mar. 2001 Violence erupts at protests organized by Ukraine Without Kuchma; the movement dissolves 2002 Viktor Yushchenko becomes leader of political coalition, Our Ukraine 2004

July 1 Presidential election campaign begins Sept. 5 Following dinner with director of Ukrainian Security Service, presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko feels ill Sept. 10 Yushchenko seeks medical treatment in Austria. Rumors of poisoning begin to circulate Oct. 15-16 PORA youth movement offices raided by special police Oct. 20 Government freezes assets of pro-opposition TV Channel 5. Employees of Ch. 5 go on hunger strike Oct. 31 Presidential election - first round. Telephone records indicate fraud by Yanukovych Nov. 1 Central Election Commission [CEC] announces no candidate exceeded 50% and a runoff election will be necessary Nov. 21 Runoff election, marked by fraud and irregularities Nov. 22 Massive protests begin in Kyiv and other major cities International election observers (OSCE) declare election unfair. Russian President Putin congratulates Yanukovych on victory Nov. 24 Election results announced: Yanukovych 49%, Yushchenko 46%. Ukrainian opposition calls for general strike Nov. 25 Supreme Court prohibits publication of election results until Yushchenko's appeal of CEC vote count can be heard Nov. 26 Negotiations begin, mediated by EU, Russia, Poland Nov. 27 Parliament expresses "no-confidence" in CEC, orders Kuchma to disband CEC Nov. 28 [11pm] Ukraine's Interior Minister orders 10,000 armed troops to disperse protesters in Kyiv They begin driving toward Maidan, but Ukraine's Security Service successfully intervenes to stop them Nov. 29 Kuchma proposes a new election Yushchenko demands that Kuchma dismiss Yanukovych as prime minister. The Supreme Court begins hearing Yushchenko's case against the CEC Dec. 2 Kuchma flies to Moscow to consult Russian President Putin They reject a re-run of Nov. 21 election, favoring entirely new elections instead Dec. 3 Supreme Court hears final arguments, begins private deliberations. At 6 pm, the Court invalidates the Nov. 21 election results and orders a repeat election not later than Dec. 26 Dec. 5 Opposition demands electoral law reforms, appointment of new CEC members Dec. 6 Kuchma announces he will accept electoral reforms in exchange for constitutional amendments to limit the power of the president Dec. 8 Parliament passes constitutional changes and electoral reform Dec. 26 Second round of presidential election is repeated. Yushchenko receives 52% of votes; Yanukovych, 44% Jan. 23, 2005 Viktor Yushchenko is sworn in as president

Ukraine Historical Timeline

Otporlogo

TheOrangeRevolutionwasthethirdtimeinjustfouryearsthatanonviolentcivilresistancemovementdefeatedcorruptorauthoritarianregimesincentralEurope.Thefirstwasin2000whenSlobodanMilosevicwastoppledinSerbia.NextwasGeorgia’s“RoseRevolution”in2003whichremovedEduardShevardnadzefrompower.Inallthreecountries,thesparkwasafraudulentelectionfollowedbymassivecivilresistance.

Eachofthesestoriesfeaturedanunpopularleader,alargeandwell‐organizedopposition,andasystemtodetectandrapidlypublicizevotefraudthroughoutthecountry.Studentandyouthresistancegroupsalsoplayedacrucial,althoughnotidentical,role.Allthreeoppositionmovementswereinfluencedandinspiredbysuccessfulnonviolentstrugglesofthe1980s–theSolidaritytradeunionmovementinPoland,theVelvetRevolutioninCzechoslovakia,andthe“PeoplePower”movementwhichdefeatedPhilippinedictatorFerdinandMarcos.

Manypoliticalscientistsconsidertheseepisodestobe“democraticbreakthroughs,”whosecommongoalswerefreeandfairelections,responsiveandtransparentdemocraticinstitutions,adherencetotheruleoflaw,respectforhumanrights,afreemedia,andjudicialindependence.

InSerbia,oppositionpoliticalpartiessquabbledandfoughtamongthemselvesforatleastadecade,finallyunitingbehindasinglecandidatetorunagainstMilosevicin2000.Alongtheway,Serbianyouth,ledbyuniversitystudents,acquiredorganizationalandstrategicskillsoveraperiodofseveralyears,whichledthemtofoundOtpor!(theSerbianwordforresistance),amovementwhichestablishedbranchesinoverseventycitiesandtowns.Knownfortheirclenched‐fistsymbol,spraypaintedonwalls,andprintedont‐shirts,posters,andstickers,thegroup

mobilizednotjustyoungpeople,butthewholepopulation.Relyingonhumor,ridicule,androckmusic,Otpormembershelpedpeopleovercomefear,thekeytobuildingparticipation.Manyyoungpeoplewerearrested,whichmobilizedtheirpreviouslyapatheticparents.Otporwasalsoeffectiveinunderminingpoliceandsecurityforceloyaltytotheregime.ManyofitstechniqueswereadoptedbyyouthresistancegroupsinGeorgia,Ukraine,andothercountries,whereOtporactivistssometimesactedasadvisorsandtrainers.

Otpor’sstrategiesandtacticscouldn’tsimplybecopiedbyothermovements,butthemerefactthatMilosevic,amanwidelybelievedtocontrolallconventionalsourcesofpower,wasremovedbyacivilresistancemovementwithoutresortingtoviolence,inspiredandempoweredothers.InGeorgia,theKmara(“Enough”)movementwasmodeledonOtpor;inUkraine,themovementwascalledPora!(“It’stime!”).Bylate2004,thephrase“colorrevolution”hadenteredthepopularvocabulary,andpotentialforawell‐organizednonviolentmovementtosucceedagainstanentrenchedauthoritarianhadbeenwidelyaccepted.LebanonexperiencedtheCedarRevolution;Kyrgyzstan,theTulipRevolution;Iran,theGreenRevolution.WhilenoneofthesebroughttheconclusiveorsatisfactorybreakthroughachievedinSerbia,GeorgiaorUkraine,nonviolentmovementsareattheforefrontofbringingchangeintheworldtoday.

Not the First (Or the Last!)

OtporOtporactivistsinSerbia

KmaraactivistsinGeorgia

10

Maidan.Spring,2005

Inamatterofmonths,theOrangeRevolutionseemedtohavetransformedUkraineirreversibly.Electoralreformbroughtfreeandfairelections;alivelyandindependentmediaemerged,andconstitutionalreformbroughtahealthierbalancebetweenexecutiveandlegislativepower.Theseachievementsweresoonovershadowedbypersonalpowerstruggles,andthecontinuingdominationofparliamentbytheoligarchs.Bylate2005,theOrangecoalitionhadsplintered.YuliaTymoshenko,whohadbeenaYushchenkoallyduringtherevolution,becamehisrival.HedismissedherasprimeministerinSeptember2005;shewassucceededbyViktorYanukovychfor16months.TheOrangecampreunitedtowinparliamentaryelectionsin2007,whichbroughtTymoshenkobackasprimeminister.

DisappointedbyYushchenko’sweakleadership,Ukrainianshavebecomecynicalaboutpolitics.Adevastatingeconomicdownturnin2008contributedtothedespair.Attheendofhispresidentialterminlate2009,Yushchenko’spopularityslippedbelow5%,leavingTymoshenkoandYanukovychastheonlyviablecandidatestosucceedhimin2010.ItcouldbesaidthatunrealisticexpectationsguaranteedtheOrangeRevolutionwoulddisappointitsfollowers,butweakleadership,apolarizedcountry,persistentcorruption,andRussianeffortstoreassertregionalsupremacyhaveplayedtheirparts.

Ukraine’sdemocratictransitionremainsincomplete,butsincetheOrangeRevolution,noelectionshavebeenstolen,andnojournalistshavebeenkilledbythestate.Whilethegoalsofthosewhoforgedtherevolutionandenduredthecoldandsnowhaveyettobereflectedinpolicy,thepoliticalsystemandtherulesbywhichpoliticaldecisionsaremadehavebeentransformed‐‐toonethat,despiteitsflaws,ismoredemocraticandrespectfuloftheruleoflawthanitwasunderKuchma’srule.

Epilogue: After the Revolution

11

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Koshiw,J.V.Beheaded:TheKillingofaJournalist.Reading(UK):ArtemiaPress,2003.

Subtelny,Orest.Ukraine:AHistory.Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress,2000.

Wilson,Andrew.Ukraine’sOrangeRevolution.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2005.

NonviolentRevolutioninSerbiaandGeorgiaCollin,Matthew.TheTimeoftheRebels:YouthResistanceMovementsand21stCenturyRevolutions.London:Serpent’sTail/ProfileBooks,2007.

Doder,DuskoandLouiseBranson.Milosevic:PortraitofaTyrant.NewYork:TheFreePress,1999.

Glenny,Misha.TheBalkans:Nationalism,War,andtheGreatPowers,1804‐1999.NewYork:VikingPenguin,2000.

Gordy,EricD.TheCultureofPowerinSerbia:NationalismandtheDestructionofAlternatives.UniversityPark:ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,1999.

Judah,Tim.TheSerbs:History,MythandtheDestructionofYugoslavia.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1997.

Karumidze,ZurabandJamesWetsch,eds.Enough!:TheRoseRevolutionintheRepublicofGeorgia2003.Hauppauge,NY:NovaSciencePublishers,2005.

General‐CivilResistanceandSocialMovementsAckerman,PeterandChristopherKruegler.StrategicNonviolentConflict:TheDynamicsofPeoplePowerintheTwentiethCentury.Westport,CT:Praeger,1994.

Ackerman,PeterandJackDuVall.AForceMorePowerful:ACenturyofNonviolentConflict.NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2000.

Arendt,Hannah.CrisesoftheRepublic.NewYork:HarcourtBraceJovanovich,1972.

Helvey,Robert.OnStrategicNonviolentConflict:ThinkingAbouttheFundamentals. Boston:AlbertEinsteinInstitution,2004.Thisbookmaybedownloadedatwww.aeinstein.org. King,Mary.MahatmaGandhiandMartinLutherKing,Jr.ThePowerofNonviolentAction.Paris:UNESCOPublishing,1999.

Meyer,DavidS.andSidneyTarrow,eds.TheSocialMovementSociety:ContentiousPoliticsforaNewCentury.Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield,1998.

Nagler,MichaelN.IsThereNoOtherWay?TheSearchforaNonviolentFuture.Berkeley:BerkeleyHillsBooks,2001.

Roberts,AdamandTimothyGartonAsh,eds.CivilResistanceandPowerPolitics.Oxford(UK):OxfordUniversityPress,2009.

Schock,Kurt.UnarmedInsurrections:PeoplePowerMovementsinNondemocracies.Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,2004.

Sharp,Gene.FromDictatorshiptoDemocracy:AConceptualFrameworkforLiberation.Boston:AlbertEinsteinInstitution,2002.Downloadableinseverallanguagesatwww.aeinstein.org.Sharp,Gene.WagingNonviolentStruggle:20thCenturyPracticeand21stCenturyPotential.Boston:PorterSargentPublishers,2005.

Tarrow,Sidney.PowerinMovement:SocialMovements,CollectiveActionandPolitics.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994.

Zunes,Stephen,LesterR.KurtzandSarahBethAsher,eds.NonviolentSocialMovements:AGeographicalPerspectiveMalden,MA:BlackwellPublishers,1999.

Additional Resources

ResourcesontheInternet

Articles,Papers&StudyGuides

Beehner,Lionel.“OneYearAferUkraine’sOrangeRevolution.”CouncilonForeignRelations,22Nov2005.www.cfr.org http://www.cfr.org/publication/9259/Corwin,JulieA.“FledglingYouthGroupsWorryPost‐SovietAuthorities.”Eurasia.net11Apr2005.http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/pp041105.shtmlCorwin,JulieA.“Rock’sRevolutionaryInfluence,”RadioFreeEuropeRadioLiberty12Jun2005.http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1059220.htmlMeier,Patrick."DigitalResistanceandtheOrangeRevolution,"blogentryatwww.irevolution.wordpress.com18Feb2009.http://irevolution.wordpress.com/2009/02/18/digital-resistance-and-the-orange-revolution

Simpson,JohnandMarcusTanner.“SerbActivistsHelpedInspireUkraineProtests,”InstituteforWarandPeaceReporting.http://www.iwpr.net/index.php?apc_state=hen&s=o&o=p=bcr&l=EN&s=f&o=155269UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace.“StudyGuideSeriesonPeaceandConflict.”Washington,D.C.2009.Forty‐pagestudyguidewhichcanbedownloadedathttp://www.usip.org/files/sg10.pdf.

Weir,Fred.“TheStudentsWhoShookUkraine‐‐Peacefully.”ChristianScienceMonitor9Dec2004.http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1209/p01s04-woeu.html

Websites

TheAForceMorePowerful.orgsitecontainsextensiveinformationonallthefilmsandgamesonnonviolentmovementsproducedbyYorkZimmermanInc,includingdescriptions,studyguides,lessonplans,andsuggestedfurtherreadings.Italsofeaturesexcerptsfromthebook,AForceMorePowerful:ACenturyofNonviolentConflict.www.aForceMorePowerful.org

TheAlbertEinsteinInstitutionisanonprofitorganizationadvancingthestudyanduseofstrategicnonviolentactioninconflictsthroughouttheworld.Thewebsiteincludesdownloadablematerialinfortylanguages.www.aeinstein.org

TheCenterforAppliedNonviolentActionandStrategies(CANVAS)websitecontainsarticlesaboutnonviolentmovementsandstrategiesofthepastdecade.www.canvasopedia.org

TheInternationalCenteronNonviolentConflictisanindependent,non‐profit,educationalfoundationthatdevelopsandencouragesthestudyanduseofcivilian‐based,nonmilitarystrategiestoestablishanddefendhumanrights,democracyandjusticeworldwide.Theirwebsitecontainsnewsaboutnonviolentconflictsaroundtheworld,aswellaslinkstoarticles,podcastsandotherresourcesofrelevance.www.nonviolent-conflict.org

KyivPostisanEnglish‐languagedailypublishedinKyiv.Archivesdatingbackto2004areavailableforsearchatwww.kyivpost.com.

Maidan.orgdescribesitselfas“aninternethubforCitizensActionNetworkinUkraine.”ItwasfoundedinDecember2000tocircumventgovernmentsuppressionofinformationonoppositionactivities,andtoprotestmisinformationonthedisappearance

ofthemurderedjournalist,GeorgiyGongadze.TheEnglishlanguageversioncanbefoundathttp://eng.maidanua.org.

MirrorWeekly(ZerkaloNedeli)isamongUkraine’smostinfluentialprintweeklies,specializinginpoliticalanalysis,interviews,andopinion,inRussianandUkrainian.Foundedin1996,theindependent,non‐partisanpublicationisfundedbyWestern(non‐governmental)sources.TheEnglishlanguagearchivescanbeaccessedatwww.mw.ua.

1. Earlyintheprotests,YuliaTymoshenko,whosepartysupportedYushchenko'scandidacyaspartoftheOrangecoalition,wanteddemonstratorstostormgovernmentbuildingsinanattempttoseizepower.Wasthatagoodidea?Whyorwhynot?Whatdoyouthinkwouldhavehappenedifthedemonstratorshaddonethis?

2. Peoplerefertotheeventsaroundthe2004presidentialelectioninUkraineasthe“OrangeRevolution."Whydoyou

thinktheycallita“revolution”insteadofjustan“election”?Talkaboutyourdefinitionoftheterm“revolution."

3. WhatweresomekeymomentsofdangerorrisktothedemonstratorsintheOrangeRevolution?Howdidthedemonstratorsandleadershipbehaveinthesemoments?Doyouagreewiththechoicestheymade?

4. TheOrangemovementmadeastrategicchoicetotrytomobilizethousandsofpeopleintheMaidan(Independence

Square)inKiev,foraslongasnecessary.Intheenditwasseventeendays.Theirstrategyofmasscivilresistanceworked.However,inothercasesofnonviolentresistance,holdingmassdemonstrationshasnotalwaysbeeneffective.Whatdoyouthinktherisksandbenefitsareofattemptingtomobilizesomanypeoplepublicly?

5. Whatdoyouthinkpropelledthousandsofpeopleoutofthecomfortoftheirhomesandeverydaylives,tostayinthe

coldfordaysandriskpossibleviolencebythegovernment?DidpeopleoccupyMaidansimplytosupportYushchenko,orwerethereotherreasons?HowmightaUkrainianonMaidaninDecemberof2004explainhisorherreasonsforbeingthere?

6. TheOrangeRevolutionwasgalvanizedbyfeelingsofinjusticeandoppression,aswellashopeforabetterfuture.People

tookrisksandsometimesdefiedthelaw.Aretherecircumstancesunderwhichyouwouldconsiderparticipatinginactsofcivildisobedienceinresponsetoinjusticeorstaterepression?

7. Doyouthinkyourgovernmentshouldplayaroleinsupportingandencouragingnonviolentcitizenmovementsstruggling

forhumanrightsordemocracy,suchastheOrangeRevolution?Ifso,whatshouldthatrolebe?Whatactionscouldyourgovernmenttakethatwouldbeconstructive?

8. Thereweretwoactsofviolencediscussedinthefilm:themurderofjournalistGeorgiGongadze,andthepoisoningof

VictorYushchenko.Bothactsappeartohavebeencarriedoutbytheregime.Doyouthinktheseactsofviolencebenefittedtheregime,ordidtheybackfireagainsttheregime?How?

9. DidyounoticeanysimilaritiesbetweentheOrangeRevolutionandotherpoliticalorsocialmovementsofthepast?Can

youthinkofanysimilarmovementsgoingontoday?Inwhatpartsoftheworldorsituationsdoyouthinkcivilresistance,ofthekindseeninUkraine,couldbeappliedeffectivelytoday?

10. DuringtheOrangeRevolution,demonstratorsstayedonMaidanforseventeendays.Whyandhowweretheyableto

sustaintheiractionsonMaidan?Whatpreparationswentintothis?DoyouthinkitwasimportantforthesupporterstoremainonMaidanforthatlong?Whatmessagediditsend?Whatdoyouthinkwouldhavehappenediftheyhadleftafteronlyfourdays?

11. TherewasnoviolentrepressionagainstdemonstratorsduringtheOrangeRevolution.Why?Whatfactorsdoyouthink

theKuchmaregimeconsideredwhenthinkingabouthowtostoptheprotest?Whydoyouthinkmembersofthemilitaryandpolicemayhavebeenunwillingtouseviolentforce?

Questions for Further Discussion Suggestedactivity:Breakintosmallgroups,eachofwhichselects(orisassigned)oneortwoquestionstoanalyzeindepth,andthenreturntolargergroupformatwherethesmallgroupsleadthediscussionontheirquestions.

12. HowmuchcreditforthefinaloutcomeoftheOrangeRevolutionshouldbeextendedtotheSupremeCourt?WhatfactorsdoyouthinkinfluencedtheCourt’sdecision?Whatrole,ifany,didtheMaidandemonstrationsplay?

13. ThroughouttheelectionandtheOrangeRevolution,bothYushchenkoandYanukovychsupportersappealedto

Ukrainians’senseofpatriotismandnationalidentity.Why?Howdideachsidedefinepatriotismandnationalidentity?HowwouldyoudescribeKuchma’sviewofwhatitmeanstobeUkrainian?HowwouldyoudescribeYushchenko’sview?WasthereanyspecialsignificanceinchoosingMaidanasthefocalpointoftheOrangemovement?

14. Nonviolentresistance,suchaswhattookplaceduringtheOrangeRevolution,hassometimesbeenreferredtoaspassive

resistance.DoyouthinkpassiveresistanceisanappropriatetermtodescribetheactionsofthedemonstratorsduringtheOrangeRevolution?Whyorwhynot?

15. Yushchenkoconstantlyremindedpeopletobedisciplinedandnonviolent.Heeventoldhissupportersthathis

“presidencyisnotworthevenoneperson’slife.”WhydoyouthinkYushchenkoandmanyotherleadersoftheOrangeRevolutionfeltstronglyaboutavoidingviolentconfrontationsbetweendemonstratorsandthepolice?Whateffectdoyouthinkthishadontheregimeanditssupporters,aswellasontheOrangemovementitself?

16. Technology—theinternet,mobilephones,andotherformsofcommunication—washelpfulinorganizingpeopleduring

theOrangeRevolution.Inthefuture,doyouthinkthatnewformsofcommunicationsandinformationtechnologieswillbemorelikelytofavorcivilresistancemovementsorrepressiveregimes?

17. WhydidsomanydifferentkindsofpeoplefromdifferentregionsofUkraine‐‐menandwomen,youngandold,

students,laborers,bureaucrats,smallbusinessowners,andothers‐‐participateintheOrangeRevolution?Whatkindsofmessagesdoyouthinkappealedtoandunitedthesepeople?Wouldthemovementhavebeenaseffectiveifitwerelessdiverse,forexampleifdrewitssupportmainlyfromonegroup,suchasstudents,oronegeographicregionsuchasKiev?

18. Whatdoesthisstoryteachusaboutelectionsanddemocracy?Istheactofholdingelectionssufficienttomakea

countryademocracy?Ifso,why?Ifnot,whatothercomponentsarenecessaryforacountrytobeademocracy?

19. WhydidtheOrangemovementappealtoyoungpeople?Howdiditgettheminterestedandmotivated?WhatroledoyouthinkyoungpeopleandyouthcultureplayedintheOrangeRevolution?

20. MusicwasaconsistentpresenceinMaidanandthroughoutthecountryduringtheOrangeRevolution.Whatroledidit

playandhowcanmusicbeusedinpromotingpoliticalaction?

21. WhateffortsdidtheOrangemovementmaketoshifttheloyaltiesofmembersofthepoliceandmilitaryinsupportofthemovement?Inwhatwaysdiditappealtotheirsenseofpatriotism,professionalismandhumanity?

22. Whateffectdoyouthinktheuseofcolor(orange)andtheslogan"Tak!”(“Yes!”)had?Whatdidyounoticeaboutthe

waythesesymbolswereused?Whydoyouthinktheywereselectedtosymbolizethemovement?

23. OppositionmanagersprivatelypredictedthattheregimewouldresorttovotefraudtosecureaYanukovychvictoryinthesecondround,andthatthemarginofvictoryinthecrookedvotecountwouldbe3%.Intheend,thisiswhathappened.Iftheoppositionhadgonepublicwithitsprediction,howmightthingshavechanged?Whateffectdidthemovement'sinsightsintotheiropponenthaveonthemovementinternally?

24. Inmanycountries,electionresultsaremanipulated,butonlyinsomecountriesdowehearaboutmovementslikethe

Orangecoalition.Whydoyouthinkthisis?Doyouthinkpeoplearechoosingnottomobilizeinothercountries,ordoyouthinkthemediaarefailingtoreportit?Whydoyouthinktherewasnotasimilarresponsetothe2000PresidentialelectionresultsintheUnitedStates?

Suggested Group Exercises

1. ForceFieldAnalysis:ThisexercisehelpsparticipantstounderstandthedifferentforcesinconflictduringtheOrangeRevolution.Aforcefieldanalysisidentifiesalloftheforcesforandagainstchangeinasituation,andassessesthestrengthofeach.Thiscanbedrawnonapieceofpaper(seeexample),withallforcesforchangeononesideandallforcesagainstchangeontheother.Themagnitudeoftheforcecanbeshownbydrawingalargearrow(strong)orsmallarrow(weak)and/orassigninganumber(1‐10)toeacharrow.Insmallgroups,participantsdrawtwoforcefieldanalyses.Thefirstfocusesonthesituationoutlinedinthebeginningofthefilm,beforetherevolutionwhentheelectioncampaignhasjuststarted.Thesecondfocusesonthesituationattheendofthefilm,whentherevolutionwassuccessful.Participantsthendiscusshowthesetwoforcefieldanalysesaredifferent,andwhysomeforcesstrengthened,weakened,orshifteddirectionduringthecourseoftherevolution.

2. Oneofthewaysthatmovementsareabletogainsupportersisbylisteningtoordinarypeopletalkaboutwhatisimportantintheirlives,andfocusingontheparticularwordsandphrasestheyuse.Pickalocal,regional,ornationalpoliticalissue,andaskfivepeoplehowtheyfeelaboutthatissue.Listencloselytopeople’sopinionsandtohowtheyexpressthemselvesonthesubject.Then,createaslogan,symbol,andshortstatementabouthowyouwouldaddressthisissueifyouwereattemptingtoorganizeinyourcommunity.

3. ChooseascenariofromPeoplePower:TheGameofCivilResistancethatsharessomeofthespecificobjectivesseenin

OrangeRevolution.Strategizeandapplytacticsdemonstratedinthefilmtothescenario.Whathaveyoulearnedabouthowtoplan,create,anddisseminateamessage,andcarryoutatactic?

4. Askstudentstomakealistofareasofconflictintheworldtoday.Theycanfindthisinformationinthenewspaper,

newsmagazines,oronlinenewsreports.Dividethestudentsintogroupsandaskeachgrouptochooseoneoftheconflictsandanalyzeitintermsofits"readiness"fornonviolentaction.Thestudentsshouldidentifythefollowing:

Thepartiesintheconflict Theconflictinggroupswhichmighttaketheleadinapplyingnonviolenttactics Oneclearobjectiveofthenonviolentconflict Suggestedmethodsofnonviolentactiontheywoulduse

Status Quo

No Change Change

Change Issue Driving Forces Restraining Forces

Strong

Strong

Moderate

Moderate

Weak

Weak

Notes

www.OrangeRevolutionMovie.com