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© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise Environments Carrie McDaniel Emerging Products Lead Imperva

Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

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Page 1: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise Environments

Carrie McDaniel Emerging Products Lead

Imperva

Page 2: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

2

Reconnaissance Lateral Movment Data & Core Access Exfitration

Tool effectiveness over breach lifecycle

Vendor1 Vendor2 Imperva CounterBreach

Data Access & Collection

UBA Solution Network Analysis Solution

Lateral Movement

Imperva UBA Kill Chain Study

Page 3: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Server IP

User domain

Clie

nt p

ort

OS user

Endpoint host name

Server IP

Operation response time File name

Affected rows

SQL operation and type

Table name

Schema

File type

Serv

er re

spon

se ti

me File type

Number of rows

Data sensitivity

Database error code

File operation File path

Table name

Data sensitivity

File

type

Dat

abas

e us

er n

ame

File share IP

OS

user

User identity

Client IP

User department

OS user

Schema

Page 4: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Learning the Data Access Environment

4

OR ?

Enterprise Databases

Application Interactive User

Page 5: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Learning the Data Access Environment

5

OR

OR

?

?

Enterprise Databases

Application Interactive User

Service Account Personal DB Account

Page 6: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Learning the Data Access Environment

6

OR

OR

OR

?

?

?

Enterprise Databases

Application Interactive User

Service Account Personal DB Account

Business Critical Data Metadata

Page 7: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Machine Takeover

Suspicious Application Data Access

Key Indicators of Data Access Abuse

7

Excessive Failed Logins by User

Excessive Failed Logins from App Server

Service Account Abuse

Excessive Database or File Access

Data Access Outside of Working Hours

Page 8: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Machine Takeover

Suspicious Application Data Access

Key Indicators of Data Access Abuse

8

Excessive Failed Logins by User

Excessive Failed Logins from App Server

Service Account Abuse

Excessive Database or File Access

Data Access Outside of Working Hours

Page 9: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Machine Takeover

Suspicious Application Data Access

Key Indicators of Data Access Abuse

9

Excessive Failed Logins by User

Excessive Failed Logins from App Server

Service Account Abuse

Excessive Database or File Access

Data Access Outside of Working Hours

Page 10: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Machine Takeover

Suspicious Application Data Access

Key Indicators of Data Access Abuse

10

Excessive Failed Logins by User

Excessive Failed Logins from App Server

Service Account Abuse

Excessive Database or File Access

Data Access Outside of Working Hours

Page 11: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Example 1: Transportation

11

Page 12: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Transportation

12

Suspicious Application Data Access

Service Account Abuse

Database Used by FBI

Page 13: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Transportation

13

Suspicious Application Data Access

Service Account Abuse

Database Used by FBI

Application FBI Personnel

Page 14: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Transportation

14

Suspicious Application Data Access

Service Account Abuse

Interactive User “Liana” Database Used

by FBI

Application FBI Personnel Query Tool “redgate”

Page 15: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Transportation

15

Suspicious Application Data Access

Service Account Abuse

Interactive User “Liana”

Service Account “CrimeDB” Database Used

by FBI

Application FBI Personnel Query Tool “redgate”

Page 16: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Transportation

16

Suspicious Application Data Access

Service Account Abuse

Interactive User “Liana”

Service Account “CrimeDB” Database Used

by FBI

Application FBI Personnel

• Malicious user access sensitive database using highly privileged account • Bypasses access controls • Activity is untraceable

Query Tool “redgate”

Page 17: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Example 2: Healthcare

17

Page 18: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Healthcare

18

Suspicious Application Data Access

Application “hrP”

Sensitive HR Employee Feedback

Authorized User

Page 19: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Healthcare

19

Suspicious Application Data Access

Interactive User “Tyler”

Application “hrP”

Sensitive HR Employee Feedback

Authorized User Query Tool

“MS SQL Server Mgmt Studio”

Personal DB Account “domain/tyler”

Page 20: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Healthcare

20

Suspicious Application Data Access

Interactive User “Tyler”

Application “hrP”

Sensitive HR Employee Feedback

Authorized User Query Tool

“MS SQL Server Mgmt Studio”

Personal DB Account “domain/tyler”

Page 21: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Healthcare

21

Suspicious Application Data Access

• Unauthorized access to a large quantity of sensitive HR data • Investigation shows that the AD account was locked (contractor) • User retrieved data before leaving the company

Interactive User “Tyler”

Application “hrP”

Sensitive HR Employee Feedback

Authorized User Query Tool

“MS SQL Server Mgmt Studio”

Personal DB Account “domain/tyler”

Page 22: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Example 3: Financial Services

22

Page 23: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Financial Services

23

Excessive Database or File Access

“AuditLog” Database Tables

Application .net sqlclient

Page 24: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Financial Services

24

Excessive Database or File Access

“AuditLog” Database Tables

Interactive User “Rick”

Application .net sqlclient

Personal DB Account “domain/rick”

Query Tool “Aqua Data Studio”

Page 25: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Financial Services

25

Excessive Database or File Access

“AuditLog” Database Tables

Interactive User “Rick”

Application .net sqlclient

Retrieves 9.7M rows

Personal DB Account “domain/rick”

Query Tool “Aqua Data Studio”

Page 26: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

Financial Services

26

Excessive Database or File Access

• Interactive user retrieves 9.7M rows from “auditlog” tables • Direct access using DB query tool, not the app account • Flagged as possible attempt to modify audit log data

“AuditLog” Database Tables

Interactive User “Rick”

Application .net sqlclient

Retrieves 9.7M rows

Personal DB Account “domain/rick”

Query Tool “Aqua Data Studio”

Page 27: Part 3: Surprising Insider Threat Findings in Enterprise ... · Example 2: Healthcare . 17 . Healthcare . 18 Suspicious Application Data Access Application “hrP” ... • Direct

© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.

Q & A