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AID TO LEGISLATION

INTRINSIC

PEOPLE v. PURISIMA (86 SCRA 542; 1978)

November 10, 2010

DESIGNATION OF OFFENSE, SEC. 8, RULE 110

Facts:

Petitioners: City Fiscal of Manila, Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and the

Solicitor General

Public Respondents: CFI of Manila-branches VII & XVIII, CFI of

Samar

Par. 3, PD#9 provides:

It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or bluntweapon such as fan knife, spear, dagger, bolo, balisong,

barong, kris, or club, except where such articles are being used as

necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being

used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof

shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 5 to 10 years as

a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct

Petitioners-fiscals filed before the respective respondent courts

several & separate informations for illegal possession of deadly

weapon in violation of Par. 3 of PD#9. (For illustration, one of the

similarly written infos. alleged: Thataccused did then and therewilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a

bladed and pointed weaponthe same not being used as a

necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in

connection therewith.)

Respondent courts, upon motions to quash filed by the defense

counsels, issued their respective orders quashing the informations on

common ground that the said informations did not allege facts

constituting an offense penalized under PD#9 for failure to state an

essential element of the crime: that the carrying outside of theaccuseds residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in

furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to

subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public

disorder. They said that PD#9 should be read in the context of

Proc.#1081 which seeks to attain the maintenance of law and order

throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all

forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or

rebellion. They added that the non-inclusion of the aforementioned

element of the offense leads to confusion as the same act punished

as an offense under par. 3 of PD#9 is also the subject of another

penal statute and a Manila city ordinance:

Sec. 26, Act#1780: It should be unlawful for any person to carry

concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or

other deadly weapon: x x x. Any person violating the provisions of

this section shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction,

be punished by a fine not exceeding P500, or by imprisonment for a

period not exceeding 6 months, or both

Ordinance#3820penalizes with a fine not more than P200 orimprisonment for not more than one month, or bothanyone who

shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise

its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly

weaponin any public place.

Thus, the 26 petitions for review assailing the respective orders of the

respondent courts. The petitions, having similar issues, were

consolidated by the Supreme Court.

The argument of the petitioners:

1. A perusal of par.3 of PD#9 shows that the prohibited acts need not

be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed isessentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy

2. The City Fiscal of Manila adds that in statutory offenses the

intention of the accused who commits the act is immaterial; it is

enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated

ISSUE: W/N the informations filed are sufficient form and substance

to constitute the offense penalized under PD#9

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HELD: NO.

It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a

criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of

accusation against him.

Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court expressly requires that for a

complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the designation

of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of

as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the

accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense

accordingly. This is especially in the case at bar where the acts being

punished are covered by 2 penal statutes and a city ordinance. The

right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted with

the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged

against him, otherwise such act may be made to fall, at the discretion

of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under any of the 3 punitive

laws and thus expose the accused to oppression and harassment.

The elements of the offense under par. 3, PD#9 are: 1) the carryingoutside ones residence of any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon not

used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and 2) that the

act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or

in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless

violence, criminality, chaos or public disorder. It is the second

element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if

concealed, outside of the scope of Act#1780 and Ord#3820. Thus, a

simple act of carrying any of the weapons described under PD#9 is

not a crime in itself. What makes the act criminal under the decree is

the motivation behind it. Without such motivation, the act falls underthe Act or the Ordinance. Consequently, the informations filed by

petitioner are fatally defective and quashal is proper.

The filing of the petitions were unnecessary because the petitioners

could have availed itself of other remedies based on Rule 117, Sec.7.

(Effect of sustaining the motion to quash); Rule 110, Sec.13

(Amendment of Info or complaint):

1. If the evidence so warranted, the People could have filed an

amended info to include the second element of the offense as defined

in the disputed orders of respondents. The SC has previously ruled

that if the facts alleged in the info do not constitute an offense, the

case should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be given an

opportunity to amend the info.

2. If the facts so justified, the petitioners could have filed a complaint

either under Sec. 26 of Act#1780 or Manila city ordinance#3820,

especially since the dismissal of the cases were made prior to

arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash. Under Sec. 8,

Rule 117, an order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to

another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was

based on extinguishment of criminal liability or double jeopardy.

PETITIONS DENIED.

People vs. Hon. Vicente Echavez, Jr. (G.R. Nos. L-47757-61

January 28, 1980)

FACTS:

Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against

sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by

Presidential Decree No. 0772. Before the accused could be arraigned,

respondent Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order

dismissing the five informations (out of 16 raffled) on the grounds (1)

that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through stealth

and strategy, whereas under the decree the entry should be effected

with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the

absence or tolerance of the landowner, and (2) that under the rule of

ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of agrazing land. From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this

Court under Republic Act No. 5440.

ISSUE:

Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar

acts, (also) apply to agricultural lands.

HELD:

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NO. Appeal was devoid of merit.Trial courts dismissal was affirmed.

RATIO:

[T]he lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to

pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to

apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal

constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The

squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by

the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the

decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban

communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem

generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to

when the legislative intent is uncertain.

Paras v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)

FACTS:

A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent

Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners

opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take

place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to

office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election.Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first

Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.

ISSUE:

W/N the SK election is a local election.

HELD:

No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its

context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to

its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an

elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par.

(a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines

its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local

election to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for

there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In

interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended

to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be avoided under

which a statute or provision being construed is defeated,

meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.

EXTRINSIC

Estrada vs. Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 Estrada

vs. Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001

Sunday, January 25,

Facts:

In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected

President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected

Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner

was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On

October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime

friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of

receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose

immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, HouseSpeaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115

representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of

Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate

formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January

16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the

opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence

showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account

under the name Jose Velarde. The ruling was met by a spontaneous

outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the

Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada

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government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant

secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide

administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the

Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that

he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order

to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the

same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a

declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of

his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-

President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent

to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same

day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioners legal problems appeared

in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office ofthe Ombudsman were set in motion.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President

(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as

President

Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffersfrom a permanent disability.

Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation,

there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by

acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by

any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It

can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear,

it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that

petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving

Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned

has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and

after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and

posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material

relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on the

state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec.

Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of

negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already

about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the

petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation, the

resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The

only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken

by the parties during and after the transition period. The Court held

that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was

confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing

his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the

respondent as President of the Republic, but with the reservation

about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, theseat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the

healing process of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the

Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume

the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed

his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he

assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come

ahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he called on his

supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit

of reconciliation and solidarity.

The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is

merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the

presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is

contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres.

Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of

Representatives passed a resolution supporting the assumption into

office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution

confirming the nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both

houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the

President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the

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inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has

clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. The Court cannot pass

upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties

of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed

solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which

cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of

separation of powers.

Victorias Milling v. Social Security Commission

GR L-16704, 17 March 1962 (4 SCRA 627)

Facts:

On 15 October 1958, the Social Security Commission (SSC) issued

its Circular 22 providing that effective 1 November 1958, all

employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take intoconsideration and include in the Employees remuneration all bonuses

and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of

remuneration. All these will comprise the Employees remuneration or

earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2- 1/2% contributions will be

based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month. Upon receipt of

a copy thereof, Victorias Milling Company, Inc., wrote the SSC in

effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous

Circular 7 (7 October 1957) , and further questioned the validity of the

circular for lack of authority on the part of the SSC to promulgate it

without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in theOfficial Gazette. Overruling these objections, the SSC ruled that

Circular 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the

President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a

mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of

general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. Not

satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to the Supreme Court on

appeal.

Issue: Whether Circular 22 is a rule or regulation.

Held: There is a distinction between an administrative rule or

regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose

enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an

administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it makes a

new law with the force and effect of a valid law,while when it

renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely

interprets a pre-existing law Rules and regulations when

promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority

conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the

nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced

by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because

statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the

policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the

legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are

often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its

enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations

are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal

provisions that have the effect of law. A rule is binding on the courts

so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and itsscope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even

if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its

innate wisdom On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the

law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine

what the law means.

While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance

with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such

term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such

interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it

can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have onemeaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other

purpose. RA 1161 specifically defined what compensation should

mean For the purposes of this Act. RA1792 amended such definition

by deleting some exceptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of

this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law,

whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given

to the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the

new law.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed resolution, with costs

against appellant.

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PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations

GR L-43760, 21 August 1976 (72 SCRA 396)

Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concurring

Facts: In the certification election held on February 27, 1976,

respondent Union obtained 429 votes as against 414 of petitioner

Union. Again, admittedly, under the Rules and Regulations

implementing the present Labor Code, a majority of the valid votes

cast suffices for certification of the victorious labor union as the sole

and exclusive bargaining agent. There were four votes cast by

employees who did not want any union. On its face therefore,

respondent Union ought to have been certified in accordance with the

above applicable rule. Petitioner, undeterred, would seize upon thedoctrine announced in the case of Allied Workers Association of the

Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations that spoiled ballots should

be counted in determining the valid votes cast. Considering there

were seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the submission that there was a

grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Director.

Issue: Whether Director Noriel acted with grave abuse of discretion in

granting NAFLU as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the

employees in the Philippine Blooming Mills

Held: Director Noriel did not act with grave abuse of discretion.

Certiorari does not lie. The conclusion reached by the Court derives

support from the deservedly high repute attached to the construction

placed by the executive officials entrusted with the responsibility of

applying a statute. The Rules and Regulations implementing the

present Labor Code were issued by Secretary Blas Ople of the

Department of Labor and took effect on 3 February 1975, the present

Labor Code having been made known to the public as far back as 1

May 1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed to 1

November 1974,. It would appear then that there was more than

enough time for a really serious and careful study of such suppletory

rules and regulations to avoid any inconsistency with the Code. This

Court certainly cannot ignore the interpretation thereafter embodied in

the Rules. As far back as In re Allen, a 1903 decision, Justice

McDonough, as ponente, cited this excerpt from the leading American

case of Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, decided in 1891: The principle

that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive

officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to

great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the

statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that

no authorities need be cited to support it. There was a paraphrase by

Justice Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina v. Rafferty, a

1918 decision: Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous

construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose

duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is clearly

erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby. Since then, such a

doctrine has been reiterated in numerous decisions. As wasemphasized by Chief Justice Castro, the construction placed by the

office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of a

Code should he given controlling weight.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, with costs against

petitioner PAFLU.

IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong

GR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA 663)

Facts:

On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a complaint against the bank for the

payment of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, National

Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office IV in Manila.

Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both parties, the

case was certified for arbitration on 7 July 1975. On 25 August 1975,

Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in the above-

entitled case, granting petitioners complaint for payment of holiday

pay. Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead,

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it complied with the order of the Labor Arbiter by paying their holiday

pay up to and including January 1976.

On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated

amending, among others, the provisions of the Labor Code on the

right to holiday pay. Accordingly, on 16 February 1976, by authority of

Article 5 of the same Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry of

Labor) promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation

of holidays with pay. The controversial section thereof reads as

Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are

uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working

days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established

minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month

whether worked or not. On 23 April 1976, Policy Instruction 9 was

issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the

above-quoted rule. The bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the

rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and by PolicyInstruction 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to an its employees.

On 30 August 1976, the Union filed a motion for a writ of execution to

enforce the arbiters decision of 25 August 1975, which the bank

opposed. On 18 October 1976, the Labor Arbiter, instead of issuing a

writ of execution, issued an order enjoining the bank to continue

paying its employees their regular holiday pay. On 17 November

1976, the bank appealed from the order of the Labor Arbiter to the

NLRC. On 20 June 1978, the NLRC promulgated its resolution en

banc dismissing the banks appeal, and ordering the issuance of theproper writ of execution. On 21 February 1979, the bank filed with the

Office of the Minister of Labor a motion for reconsideration/appeal

with urgent prayer to stay execution. On 13 August 1979,s the NLRC

issued an order directing the Chief of Research and Information of the

Commission to compute the holiday pay of the IBAA employees from

April 1976 to the present in accordance with the Labor Arbiter dated

25 August 1975. On 10 November 1979, the Office of the Minister of

Labor, through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order

setting aside the resolution en banc of the NLRC dated 20 June 1978,

and dismissing the case for lack of merit. Hence, the petition for

certiorari charging Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack

or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that

monthly paid employees are excluded from the benefits of holiday

pay.

Held:

From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential

Decree 850, and Article 82 of the same Code, it is clear that monthly

paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.

However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the

then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the

said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the implementing

rules, Section 2, which provides that: employees who are uniformly

paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein,with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum

wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether

worked or not. Even if contemporaneous construction placed upon a

statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it is given great

weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the

same must be declared as null and void. So long, as the regulations

relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are

valid. Where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or

repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, the mandate of the Act must

prevail and must be followed. A rule is binding on the Courts so longas the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is

within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the

courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate

wisdom. Further, administrative interpretation of the law is at best

merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law

means.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the

Deputy Minister of Labor, and reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision

of the Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.

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Power to construe

THE CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

vs.

HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as the Incumbent Secretary

of Labor, and THE CHARTERED BANK

.

G.R. No. L-44717 August 28, 1985

Facts:

On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in

representation of its monthly paid employees/members, instituted acomplaint with the Regional Office No. IV, Department of Labor, now

Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against Chartered Bank,

for the payment of ten (10) unworked legal holidays, as well as for

premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from

November 1, 1974. The Minister of Labor dismissed the Chartered

Bank Employees Associations claim for lack of merit basing its

decision on Section 2,Rule IV, Book Ill of the Integrated Rules and

Policy Instruction No. 9,which respectively provide: Sec. 2. Status of

employees paid by the month. Employees who are uniformly paid by

the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with asalary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage

shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked

or not. POLICY INSTRUCTION NO. 9 TO: All Regional Directors

SUBJECT: PAID LEGAL HOLIDAYS The rules implementing PD 850

have clarified the policy in the implementation of the ten (10) paid

legal holidays. Before PD 850, the number of working days a year in a

firm was considered important in determining entitlement to the

benefit. Thus, where an employee was working for at least 313 days,

he was considered definitely already paid .If he was working for less

than 313, there was no certainty whether the ten (10) paid legal

holidays were already paid to him or not. The ten (10) paid legal

holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily

employees. In the case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary

did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are

entitled to the benefit. Under the rules implementing PD 850, this

policy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the

entitlement of monthly paid employees. The new determining rule is

this: 'If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the

maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform

from January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten

(10) paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his

monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur,

then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays. These new

interpretations must be uniformly and consistently upheld.

Issue:

Whether or not the Secretary of Labor erred and acted contrary to law

in promulgating Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and

Policy Instruction No. 9.

Held:

Yes. The Secretary (Minister) of Labor had exceeded his statutory

authority granted by Article 5 of the Labor Code authorizing him to

promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. While

it is true that the Minister has the authority in the performance of hisduty to promulgate rules and regulations to implement, construe and

clarify the Labor Code, such power is limited by provisions of the

statute sought to be implemented, construed or clarified.