PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKNorihito KUBOTA

Visiting Scholar, University of Toronto

National Defense Academy Japan

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Current situation of troop contribution for international peacekeeping

Purpose of study Analytical framework: “who persuade who” Application(Fiji, Canada, and Japan) Conclusion

*The views or analyses shown in this presentation will represent neither those of Japanese government nor the organization which the presenter belongs to.

MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

(Source: CIC NYU, 2009)

TOP TWENTY TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO UN MANDATED OPERATIONS: 31 OCTOBER 2008

Source: CIC NYU, 2009.

PURPOSE OF STUDY

To establish general but meaningful framework of analysis of states’ participation in international peacekeeping Previous research of supply-side of peacekeeping

Country specific explanation->Lack of generality, unable to expand to other cases Theoretical/Large-N statistic analysis->Lack of meaningful implication

Research Strategy Comparative analysis of countries (limited numbers) Using previous country specific analyses(Canada, Ireland, Fiji, India,…)

DEFINITION OF PEACEKEEPING “in-country operations that are authorized by a

multilateral body, that are multinational in their composition, that have a substantial military component, and that are deployed principally in support of a peace process or conflict management objective”(CIC NYU Annual Review of Global Peace Operations)

Including both UN-led and non-UN-led operations(i.e. UNFICYP, ISAF)

Excluding war fighting (i.e. OEF, OIF), small political mission, unilateral intervention.

Although the roles of civilian and civilian police in operation are getting more important due to the evolution of complex operations makes, this study mainly focuses on military.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: THREE ACTORS MODEL “WHO PERSUADE/ENFORCE WHO?”

Second-level analysis, Foreign policy model Government (Prime Minister/Foreign Office, etc) Military Institution(Army, SDF,…) Public (Public Opinion)

Government

(+-)

Military(+)

Public(+)

Preference

Relation

PREFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT (1/2) MOTIVATION IN DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS A Condition to be a member of certain diplomatic group

or status Permanent Membership in SC of UN, member of NATO/EU

Competition with rivaling country over regional hegemony

Linkage of other issue (in relation with the US) BMD for Canada in Afghanistan North Korean issue for Japan in Iraq

Helping allies in trouble

Geostrategic interest (influence over the area in conflict)

Reimbursement from the UN is good source of foreign currency in developing country (troop)

PREFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT (2/2)MOTIVATIONS IN DOMESTIC POLITICS

A tool for “Rally round flag” effect (national unity) and diversionary effect

A method in which government can export unpopular militaries during transition from military regime to democracy (Argentina)

Measure against unemployment (Youths were sent as reserves)

PREFERENCE OF MILITARY

A good rational for size of military in peace time A good rational for maintaining/increasing

defence budget(remodel of weapon system) Occasion for multilateral military exercise Ameliorating image of military which was

damaged in previous history Source of foreign currency (MO in UN operations)

Generally reluctant, because it is not the main job of national defence

Distance matters (logistics, communications)

PREFERENCE OF PUBLIC

Being “do-gooders” in international community

Sense of independence from super powers (support for middle power diplomacy)

Compassion for the people under conflict (“we have to do something”)

Can be casualty sensitive Distance matters (cultural and ethnic

similarity influences on their preference)

APPLICATION: FIJIAN CASE, PROBLEMS

Reimbursement matters? Two problems

In 1979, payment of reimbursement was uncertain

Fiji has sent military not only as Troop (reimbursement is paid through government), but also as Military Observers (salary and allowance are paid to individual). ->MO is not beneficial to government who is motivated

by receiving foreign currencies

APPLICATION: FIJIAN CASE, EXPLANATION

Public(+-)

Government(+)

Military(-)

Public(+-)

Government(+-)

Military(+)

60% were reservesParticipated only as Troops

60% were regular forceParticipated as MO and Troops

APPLICATION: CANADIAN CASE(1/2)

During the Cold War and early 90’s

Military(-)

Public(+)

Government(+-)

APPLICATION: CANADIAN CASE(2/2)

Public(+-)

Government(+-)

Military(-)

Public(+-)

Government(+-)

Military(+)

APPLICATION: JAPANESE CASE(1/2)

Public(-)

Government(+-)

Military(+-)

Public(+-)

Government(+)

Military(+-)

APPLICATION: JAPANESE CASE(2/2)

Public(+-)

Government(+-)

Military(+-)

Public(+-)

Government(+)

Military(+)

CONCLUSION

The three-actor model can be valid to explain behaviour of various types of countries (empirical verification required)

If we need to keep up with demand for peacekeeping, we have to encourage countries to participate in operations with paying attention to whose and what kind of benefit should be presented to them

In this framework, the present patterns of persuasion is similar between Canada and Japan