Path Dependency and International Conferences on Afghanistan

Path Dependency & the International

Conferences

On

Afghanistan From Bonn 2001 To Bonn 2011

Author

Ahmad Javeed Ahwar

THESIS INTRODUCTION:

Thesis Name: Path Dependency

& the International Conferences On

Afghanistan From Bonn 2001 To Bonn 2011

Author Name: Ahmad Javeed Ahwar

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Published by: Fes-Afghanistan

Printed by: Barg Publication

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January 2012

Kabul Afghanistan

©Copyright is reserved for the author

DECLARATION

I declare that I clearly understand the OSCE Academy Essay and Master Thesis Writing and Anti-plagiarism Rules; and that the

submitted dissertation is accepted by the OSCE Academy in Bishkek on the understanding that it is my own effort without

falsification of any kind. I declare that I clearly understand that plagiarism and cheating

are academically fraudulent and a serious offence against OSCE

Academy Rules. I declare that I am aware about the consequences of plagiarism

or/and cheating. Name: Ahmad Javeed

Signature:

Date: September 12, 2011

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First of all, I would like to thank all OSCE Academy staff for being so wonderful in a yearlong journey that we had together. The

writer of this thesis owes a special thanks to Dr. Maxim Ryabkov, Director of OSCE the Academy for his wonderful thoughts that

contributed a lot to this research. Furthermore, GCSP- the Geneva Center for Security Policy has also contributed a lot in facilitation of this research by providing academic support, library facilities;

and especially my Academic Supervisor, Dr. Graeme Herd Co-director of the International Security Program in this center, who

made this work possible by his great advices regarding better outlining, presenting and defending ideas portrayed in the thesis. Furthermore, I specially thank to Dr. Paul Danay – Co-director of

International Security Program in the GCSP and Mr. Payam Foroughi – Lecturer in the OSCE Academy for reviewing my

dissertation. Moreover, I would like to thank Dr. Markus Kaiser and Mr. Afiez Aliyev – lecturers for OSCE Academy to sharing their opinions on betterment of this work.

At last but not the least, I would also like to thank from Friedrich Ebert Foundation for publishing my MA dissertation,

particularly to Mr. Frank Hantke – Resident Representative of FES in Afghanistan for his supports to youth initiatives. I owe a special thanks from my heart to my parents for making me what I am and

believing in me and praying for my success.

ABSTRACT

This thesis presents a picture from Afghanistan in the post 9/11 era. It is focused primarily on the international conferences on

Afghanistan from Bonn 2001 to Bonn 2011. As far as the Conference Diplomacy remains the key politics for inviting

attention of international and regional players to take part in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, its importance goes beyond that in practice, as these conferences have had intensive Afghanistan

focused agenda and mostly concentrated on presentation of the country, development process, fund raising, policy debate on

security, narcotics and economic development among other areas. Simply put, the conferences have given an inclusive image of a decade-long efforts in Afghanistan. To realize this research, the

theory of ‘Path Dependency has been used as the key analytical foundations of this thesis. This theory will show the logic and

analytical connection between the Bonn 2001 as a starting point and the Bonn 2011 as an ultimate ending point.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHPATER 1: INTRODUCTION.................................................1

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.......................6

Path Dependency Theory ....................................................6

CHAPTER 3: INITIAL PHASE: …………………...................

Bonn Conference 2001……….........................................12

Tokyo Conference 2002.....................................................19 Berlin Conference 2004 ………………...…….………….23

CHAPTER 4: INTERMEDIARY PHASE.................................

Afghanistan London Conference 2006……....................28 Paris Conference on Afghanistan 2008 .............................33

Hague Conference on Afghanistan 2009………...…….....36

CHAPTER 5: Lock Ins-Phase.....................................................

London Conference 2010...................................................40 Kabul Conference 2010 .....................................................44 The Kabul Process ………………..…….……………......47

What happened before the Bonn conference 2011?...........49 Bonn Conference 2011………………..………………….53

CONCLUSION.......................................................................57

BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................61

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Composition of the Interim Authority ............................ 69 Table 2: Composition of the Transitional Administration.............71

Table 3: Summary of the International Conferences on Afghanistan……………………………………………………….73 Table 4: The List of Foreign Troops deployed to Afghanistan…..75

Table 5: The Size of Afghan Forces on Duty….…………………76 Table 6: The Assistance Aid Pledged and Disbursed (2002-13)....77

PATH DEPENDENCY &THE INTERNATIO NAL CO NFERENCES O N AFGHANSITAN

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CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

PATH DEPENDENCY &THE INTERNATIO NALCO NFERENCES O N AFGHANSITAN

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INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan owing to its geographical location is proved to be crucial for both regional and international security. The fact that

it connects the three geographical corridors; Middle East, Post-Soviet Central Asia, East Asia and South Asia together

demonstrates the importance of this geography for three reasons: First, living in neighborhood with two nuclear states „Pakistan and China‟; the premier is also called a fragile state in terms of internal

security challenges besides that it has territorial disputes with Afghanistan and India, and the latter is considered an emerging

global power. Second, it shares border with a fundamentalist and suspect nuclear country - Iran, which is under tens of sanctions of the United Nations Security Council, that draw attention of Anti-

Iran countries, particularly the US and Saudi Arabia. Third, the northern part of this country meets the three post-Soviet Central

Asia‟s authoritarian states that also have the potential of future disputes over the management of water and border with Afghanistan. In addition, its mineral resources that in total valued

for US$ 3 trillion draws attention of China, India, Pakistan, Iran and obviously the United States.1 Furthermore, from a security

perspective, Afghanistan is the field for direct War on Terror. The fact that thousands of innocents which are losing their lives by both suicide bombings of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, as well as NATO

operations is evidence of this issue.

1 James Risen, “US Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan,” The New York Times,

June 13, 2010 <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html>

(Accessed June 09, 2011)

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html


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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The year 1747 is considered the starting point of the modern history of Afghanistan which coincides with the takeover of an

Abdali Pushtun who was commander in the army of Nadir Afshar-a Persian emperor. Receiving the news of assassination of his King

Ahmad Shah immediately declared independence of Kandahar and Heart (the two key provinces in the South and West of Khurasan), present day Afghanistan. Very soon later, in a meeting of elders-

Loya Jirga in Kandahar he was appointed as king of this newly independent territory called Afghanistan. It is notable that for the

first time a Pushtun takes lead in power rivalry, whilst previously Turkic population of this land and Tajiks „Persian speakers‟ were in power.

From 1880s, Afghanistan was recognized as a buffer state mainly by Great Britain and the Russian empires. Since then,

protection of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Afghanistan have been the most challenging duty of rulers in the last couple of centuries. The misery did not end there, as internally

the Afghan society, down to the existence of different nationalities like Pushtuns and Tajiks „the two major nationalities‟, Turkic and

Hazara „two minority groups‟, has been witness of devastating ethnic disputes.

After more than two centuries of absolute Pushtun rulership in

Afghanistan without any tangible achievement , an internal change was going to take place. Ingilab e 7th Saur 1357- the Communist

Revolution of April 27th of 1978 took place to bring an intensive social reform. As a substantial consequence of the event, the absolute authority of Pushtuns was challenged in a sense that

having consensus of mainly the Tajiks became compulsory. Power structure changed intensively. Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks which in

total composed a little more than 60% of Afghanistan‟s population entered into a new phase that could not be easily regretted anymore. This not only changed inter-Pushtun previous power

struggle into Pushtun versus non-Pushtuns but also shaked up the Pushtuns classical importance in power. This largely affected

Afghanistan‟s diplomacy in the region and international sphere.


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Pakistan, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the US showed more interest to the situation in Afghanistan.

After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops by 15 of October

1989 the Communist regime was collapsed in 1992. According to the Peshawar Accord 1992 between rebellion leaders first a

Pushtun Jihadist-Sebghatullah Mujadidi had to chair, and then for the next four months up to the next elections Burhanuddin Rabbani chaired the interim Afghan administration. Disagreement of

Hekmatyar on chair distribution particularly presidency of an ethnically Tajik Burhanuddin Rabbani, and his fellow Ahmad Shah

Massoud-Defense Minister created a new tension. This led to composition of military opposition of Dostum and Hekmatyar at the beginning and then adding Hazara fraction against Tajik

leadership which led to the Civil War „1992-1995‟.2 At this very time a Pakistani created movement composited of Pushtun ethnic

fought against the Tajik military called Supervisory Council-Shura-Nizar and finally took over Kabul in September 1996.3 During this period Afghanistan became a discriminatory, abusive, oppressive

and fundamentalist state that hosted terrorists. After the 9/11 attack on the WTO Center, the US administration called the Taliban

government the real responsible for this event and immediately invaded Afghanistan and drove the Taliban and Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan.

It is notable that, hundreds of books, research papers, articles and media reports have been written on Afghanistan. But,

nonetheless no comprehensive work has been done to evaluate the transformation trend from 2001 to 2011. Therefore, the thesis highlights the untouched aspects of Afghanistan‟s topic which were

not discussed or could eventually be integrated in the process from Bonn 2001 to Bonn 2011. Particularly, this thesis discusses

agendas of these conferences in terms of “what they meant on the paper and in practice to both Afghanistan and donor community”, as a principal question.

In regard to the method of this research, primary resources mainly original reports and summaries of the conferences have

been used. Moreover, three interviews with experts were conducted to fill out the absence of information not incorporated in the resources mentioned. In addition, an intensive library work has

been done to review all the fully and semi relevant data available on this issue. It is notable that the thesis has this structure: Chapter

2 Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History, Switzerland: Coppet Voud,

November 2002, pp.141, 142 3 Frank L. Holt, Into the Land of Bones: Alexander the Great in Afghanistan, University

of California Press, 2005, p.6


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Two explains the theoretical framework of my study. From Chapter Three to Chapter Five in chronological order, the paper discusses conferences in three phases. In Chapter Three, the first phase of

construction in Afghanistan from Bonn 2001 to Berlin 2004 has been talked about. Chapter Four discusses the intermediary phase

of development, from London Conference of 2006 and Paris Conference of 2008, particularly the question that how new frameworks were set up for reconstruction of Afghanistan. The

Fifth Chapter will discuss the London Conference of 2010 , Kabul Conference of 2010 and Bonn conference 2011 as the most

important phase which is about changes in the reconstruction direction. The last and final chapter will provide a brief summary of the thesis and a policy recommendation for the future

development works in Afghanistan.


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CHAPTER TWO:

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK


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THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

It is often argued that theories are not part of the practical world that needs immediate response. Theories talk about concepts, definitions, predictions, and estimations which are heavily

influenced by understanding of scholars, the angle they look at issues and most importantly the factor of time which puts an end to

the practice of many theories. At the present, it is argued most of the time that mega theories that suggest universal recommendations do not have any usage in today‟s works. Understanding uniqueness

of each country, each process, and specific time guided scholars and policy makers to think of each case and each country as a

unique one. Despite all the constraints, on the other hand, it cannot be regretted as a fact that theories help us to understand better the cases we will face. In other words, they provide us with an outlook

to evaluate, assess and judge a process or a phenomenon. Bearing in mind the discussion above, this thesis will evaluate the process

from Bonn 2001 to Bonn 2011 in Afghanistan, with the help of universal theory of “Path Dependency”.

PATH DEPEDENCY THEORY

After the 9/11 event many scholarly works were published to answer why(s) and how(s) about Afghanistan. But, as a Pakistani

ex-diplomat for Afghanistan, Iftikhar Murshid argues, “History of Afghanistan overshadows on its future development”4 this fact has been neglected in many recent works. The false answers provided

by so-called experts have added to the collection of previous mistakes that have been made by policy makers and policy

implementers in the last couple of decades. One of the genuine problems of all these policies, papers, and strategies are that they were not based on in-depth understanding of the history of

Afghanistan. Either they were ignorant about the history and uniqueness of Afghanistan or reluctant to considerate this fact.

4 S. Iftikhar Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years (London, England: Newton, 2006),

p.16


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The path dependency theory as Teece argues is based on a famous metaphor that history matters. In his sense, “bygones are rarely bygones”;5 the former realities affect the present and future

choices. In addition, Bo Strath in explanation of his statement “The path is laid down toward the past,” says, “we unavoidably need

historical orientation in order to reflect on why and how we came to where we are.”6 Furthermore, linking path dependency to his idea the author asserts, “The term „path dependency‟ would

function better in a retrospective exercise where the aim is to better understand the developments that led up to the present situation.”7

Furthermore, in regard to the path dependency Jorg Sydow, Georg Scryoug and Jocken Koch argue that it is a dynamic theory, so-called a process with different phases. The idea of process as

initially was introduced by Arthur and David distinguishes three main stages of path dependency:

i. Initial point: in this stage , choices are not limited, or in another interpretation not directly limited. Decisions are evaluated as situational that cannot be

explained by preliminary conditions. Adoption of particular institutions, policies and strategies among

many take place in this stage, which later becomes pattern.

ii. Intermediary phase: options are limited but choices

are still possible among selected options. The increasing returns takes place in this stage, meaning

that by repetitive reference to one option or some certain options a pattern will be built up, or in other words, a path emerges in this phase that makes the

whole process irreversible.

iii. Final phase or Lock-in: once an institution, policy or

decision is made that will affect the future decision-making as well. It is notable that in this stage, reference to the initial choices is very costly and

strategically not possible.8 Critics like Bo Strath reject the idea of process as a chain and raises

the concern that since development means “that old and repetitive factors and circumstances emerge in ever new contexts, each point

5 Jorg Sydow, Georg Scryoug and Jochen Koch, Organizational Paths: Path Dependency

and Beyond, (Berlin, Germany: Free University of Berlin, July 2, 2005), p.6 6 Bo Strath, “Path dependence versus path breaking crises: an alternative view,” in The Evolution of Path Dependence, ed. Lars Magnusson, p.19 (Northampton, USA: Edward

Elgar Publishing Incorporation, 2009). 7 ibid 8 Jorg Sydow, Georg Scryoug and Jochen Koch, Organizational Paths: Path Dependency

and Beyond, p.8,9


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of time is always new, and we cannot talk about pure causes that can be isolated like the links of a chain.”9 Furthermore, he characterizes path dependency in the shape of “four traps”:

a. “Reflection trap: self-reinforcing blind spots (we don‟t see that we don‟t see).

b. Identity trap: self reinforcing escalating commitment (“this commitment is our identity and the more we are committed the stronger is our identity…”).

c. Normative or cultural trap: self-reinforcing norms, standards and basic assumptions (“what we are doing is

right because we are doing it…”). d. Sunk costs trap: self-reinforcing resource allocation (“if

we gave up this investment it would be wasted…”).”10

As explained above, Bo Strath primarily considers path dependence as a dark and closed process. In addition, Margoles claiming

inefficiency of Path Dependency theory distinguishes “three degrees of path dependency”:

I. “First degree path dependence: it shows the situation

that a decision may have unpredicted not negative outcomes.

II. Second degree path dependence: rational actors after calculation based on their accessed information which might not be fully true had to decide and decide

something that brings negative outcomes later; bounded rationality.

III. Third degree path dependence: actually actors are aware of possible outcomes of their decision, but they deliberately select that as they know it is remediable;

deliberate path creation by Garud and Karnøe.”11 It is notable that this thesis relates the „initial phase‟ of the Path

dependency theory to the process from Bonn 2001 to Berlin 2004. The „intermediary phase‟ will be applied to the trend from London 2006 to Hague 2009, and the final „lock-in phase‟ to London 2010

and Bonn 2011. Moreover, the application of path dependency theory to the to the question of whose agendas were discussed and

implemented in Afghanistan during and after these donor conferences and what these conferences meant on paper and practice raise a number of pertaining questions listed below that

will be addressed in the conclusions of this dissertation:

9 Bo Strath, Path dependence versus path breaking crises: an alternative view, p.24 10 Ibid, p.25 11 Stephen E. Margoles, “Can path dependence explain institutional change?” in The

Evolution of Path Dependence, edited by Lars Magnusson, USA: Edward Elgar

Publishing Incorporation, 2009, p.196


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Initial Phase: Did the Bonn Agreement 2002 constitute a new path? Or were options limited? What options left from the Bonn setting that could be taken into

consideration at that moment? Intermediary Phase: Was the London 2006 a missed

opportunity for creating a new path for reconstruction of Afghanistan? Is the process from Bonn 2001 to Bonn 2011 evident of increasing returns to the selected

options or creation of new paths in between? Lock-ins: Is international community in Lock-in phase,

which cannot draw back and have to continue war on Terrorism in Afghanistan even without optimism of winning the war? Or is it in Lock-in that cannot

continue the war and have to leave for survival? Do or can we unlock or break path dependency? If yes, was

diplomacy of negotiation with the Taliban and withdrawal of foreign troops by 2014 a sign of that?


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CHAPTER THREE:

INITIAL PHASE: FROM BONN 2001 TO

BERLIN 2004


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FROM BONN 2002 TO BERLIN 2004

After the establishment of Rabbani‟s presidency based on the Peshawar Agreement of 24 April 1992, the Taliban, according to

Ahmad Rashid, a group whose purpose was “to revive Pushtun‟s Power”12 was receiving “external aid from Pakistan and Saudi

Arabia”13 in a “superficial ISI initiated coalition with Uzbeks and Hazaras”14 fought the Tajik dominated Kabul Government and in April 1996 by firing 866 rockets on Kabul and killing 180 civilians

and injuring an estimated 550 took over the Kabul.15 In the second phase, according to Edward Girardet and Jonathan Walter, in

exception to other Jihadist who chose to leave the ground for the Taliban for bribes or survival, Massoud “Che Guevara and even Tito of Afghanistan”; “Lion of Panjsher” with his team stayed and

resisted against the Taliban.16 But, two days prior to the 11 of September 2001, Ahmad Shah Massoud “A man who would have

led Afghanistan according to Susan T. Martin” 17 was assassinated in a suicide attack by two journalists who possibly had ties with Al-Qaeda.

Soon after that, the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center took place which brought $100 billion loss to the US and US$ 2 trillion

to the global market.18 Prior to that, in October 1999 the UN Security Council demanded handover of Bin Laden „the

12 Ahmad Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia,

second edition, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010, p.35 13 Ibid, 14 Ibid, p.44 15 S. Iftikhar Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, England, London: Bennett and

Bloom, 2006, p.49 16 Edward Girardet and Jonathan Walter, Afghanistan: Essential Field Guides to

Humanitarian and Conflict Zones, Switzerland, Geneva: CROSSLINE communication,

Ltd, 1998, pp.219-220 17 Susan Taylor Martin, “A Man Who Would Have led Afghanistan,” The Petersburg

Time, September 9, 2002,

<http://www.sptimes.com/2002/09/09/news_pf/911/The_man_who_would_hav.shtml>

(Accessed July 1, 2011). 18 International Institute for Global Security, “How much did them September 11 terrorist

attack cost America?” <http://www.iags.org/costof911.html> (Accessed: Apr, 17, 2011).

http://www.sptimes.com/2002/09/09/news_pf/911/The_man_who_would_hav.shtml

http://www.iags.org/costof911.html


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accountable of many deadly attacks‟ from the Taliban.19 Ignoring the demand, the United States in coalition with Great Britain and other nations launched a military operation called “Operation

Enduring Freedom” on the Taliban stations in Afghanistan.20 Soon in November 13, 2001, the Northern Alliance “by receiving the

guidance of Secretary of Defense- Donald Rumsfeld”21 entered Kabul and ended to the rulership of the Taliban.22 Right in the same day, the UN Security Council meets on the agenda for post 9/11

Afghanistan and authorizes UN Secretary General to hold an inter-Afghan talk, which later became popular as UN Talk on

Afghanistan.23

1. BONN CONFERENCE: DECEMBER 2001 On 29 of December 2001 Afghan leaders met in Bonn, as Thomas Barfield describes, “…different ethnic groups… while Pushtuns

grudgingly accepted the reality that they were unlikely to restore their dominance of government institutions…entered into negotiation to create a new Afghan state.”24 The negotiation

between four ethnic factions as Deniss Abrams informs; the multi-ethnic Northern Alliance representing Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks

and the three Pushtun factions including Rome group, Cyprus Process, and Afghan exiles from Pakistan continued for seven days.25 The popular Bonn Agreement known as „Agreement on

Provincial Arrangement in Afghanistan Pending the Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions‟ was signed at the end of the

Conference by participants and was endorsed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1383 (2001).26 This document is perceived to be the most fundamental accord that defined the direction for

Afghanistan in the post 9/11 era. Most importantly, the Agreement authorized participants of

the Conference to “select the Chairman, Vice Chairmen, and other

19 Deniss Abrams, Modern World Leaders: Hamid Karzai, (The United States of America:

Chelsea House Publication, 2007), p.89 20 Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts Middle East, The

United States: New York, 2008, p.390 21 Barnett Rubin, “A Vicious Cycle: Interview with Nermeen Sheikh,”

<http://asiasociety.org/policy/strategic-challenges/us-asia/barnett-rubin-afghanistan-

vicious-cycle> (Aug 22, 2011) 22 Ibid, 97 23 “The Situation in Afghanistan and its implication for International Peace and Security,” The General Assembly Report, 6, December, 2001, (A/56/681–S/2001/1157), p.1,2 24 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, (United Kingdom:

Princeton University Press, 2010), p.279 25 Deniss Abrams, Modern World Leaders: Hamid Karzai, p.101 26 The Security Council Press Release: SC/7234, Meeting 4434th, December 06, 2001


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members of the Interim Administration…on the basis of Professional Competence and Personal Integrity…with due regard to the ethnic, geographic, and religious composition of

Afghanistan.”27 The produced administration structure out of this conference was “composed of 10 Pushtuns, 9 Tajiks, 7 Hazaras and

3 Uzbeks”28. According to The Peninsula Newspaper the Northern Alliance reached an agreement on chairmanship of Abdul Satar Sirat out of four candidates “Hamid Karzai, Sibghatullah

Mojaddedi, Abdul Sattar Sirat, and Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani” while Rome group was lobbying for King Zahir.29‟30 But, Satar

Sirat withdrew the race for Karzai, “Who had support of the US”;31 “known by the Americans”;32 “who was supposed to be representative of the Taliban to the United Nations in 1990s”;33 “a

top adviser to the El Segundo, California-based UNOCAL Corporation”; “a key player in the Bush Oil team.”;34 and of course

the most desirable candidate, Karzai was announced the chairman of the Afghanistan Interim Authority. The same resource adds, “Karzai‟s ties with UNOCAL and the Bush administration are the

main reason why the CIA pushed him for Afghan leadership in the Bonn Conference.”35 Therefore, Jamil Hanifi calls it a gathering

“subsidized and controlled by the United States and allegedly coordinated by the United Nations.”36 The Conference ended while Afghanistan got a new chairman who was supported by

international community to lead Afghanistan for the interim period. Furthermore, referring to the path dependency theory, Bonn

Conference 2001 was the right initial phase to select an inclusive efficient path for the post 9/11 Afghanistan. In other words, many issues had to be decided right there: the type of regime, leadership,

power sharing structure, partnership agreement with foreign allies, and most importantly status of ex-mujahidin leaders and the

27 Ibid, 28 The Bonn Agreement, p.8 (See table 2) 29 The Peninsula Newspaper, “Final Deal on Afghan Government in Sight,” December 4,

2001, <http://archive.thepeninsulaqatar.com/component/content/article/347-pakistan-sub-

continent/117447.html> (Accessed July 1, 2011) 30 Amanullah Nasrat, “Dr Abdul Satar Sirat: Royalist Promotes Unity,” IWPR report,

ARR Issue 139, Sep 1, 2006 <http://iwpr.net/report-news/dr-abdul-satar-sirat-royalist-promotes-unity> (Accessed July 01, 2011) 31 Jamil Hanifi, Editing the Past: Colonial Production of Hegemony Through the ‘Loya

Jirga’ in Afghanistan, Iranian Studies, Volume 37, number 2, June 2004, pp.320,321 32 Ibid, p.97 33 Dennis Abrams, Modern Leaders, p.83 34 Wayne Madsen, “Afghanistan, the Taliban and the Bush Oil Team,” Center for

Research on Globalization, January 23, 2002,

<http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/MAD201A.html> (Accessed July 02, 2011) 35 Ibid, 36 Jamil Hanifi, Editing the Past, p.295

http://archive.thepeninsulaqatar.com/component/content/article/347-pakistan-sub-continent/117447.html

http://archive.thepeninsulaqatar.com/component/content/article/347-pakistan-sub-continent/117447.html

http://iwpr.net/report-news/dr-abdul-satar-sirat-royalist-promotes-unity

http://iwpr.net/report-news/dr-abdul-satar-sirat-royalist-promotes-unity

http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/MAD201A.html


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Taliban. But, as Ali Ahmad Jalali argues, “Bonn was an urgent setting not a peace talk, because the Taliban was not invited as a party”37. Regardless of many disputes between participants of the

Conference, the Agreement was founded on these core principles: “Purpose of the conference: stability, peace, and respect to the

human rights.

Respecting Afghanistan as an independent country.

The right to self-determination of the people of Afghanistan to

establish their future based on principles of Islam, democracy,

pluralism and social justice.

Ensuring broad representation of all segments of the Afghan

society including those who were not participant of this UN talk in

the Interim Administration.

The Interim arrangements are effective to the period of time

mentioned in the agreement not beyond that.

Recognizing the heroic work of Mujahidin in defense of the

independence of Afghanistan and facilitating reintegration of

mujahidin in the new administration.

Expressing the need for new Afghan National Security Forces.

Defining the UN as an impartial internationally recognized

institution.” 38

It is notable that even in the principles there are many incongruities

that had to be addressed clearly there. Islam versus democracy (Killing girl for adultery versus freedom of women), pluralism

versus multi-national values of Afghanistan (domination of Pushtuns versus representation of all nationalities), and social justice versus forgiving war criminals (inclusion in the governance

structure) are proofs of this mismatch. Exclusion of the Taliban as a faction from this talk, besides that of undermining its inclusiveness,

was an opportunity missed.39 In addition, the Agreement did not limit itself to the settlement

of the interim authority‟s structure and it went beyond that to

define the post interim phase by setting an timeline in this manner: “Takeover of office by Interim Authority in 22 of December 2001;

convening Emergency Loya Jirga - Grand Assembly within six months, after December 22, to elect the head of Transitional State, convening Constitutional Grand Assembly, within eighteen

months, after 22 of June of 2002 to adopt a new constitution.”40 For

37 Interview with Ali A. Jalali, Former Minister of Interior Affairs of Afghanistan,

(Bishkek, 3rd Sep, 2011). 38 Bonn Agreement 2001, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f48f4754.html> (Accessed July 01, 2011), p.1 39 Interview with Ali Ahmad Jalali-Former Interior Minister of Afghanistan and Professor

at Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, September 1st

2010 at 03:00 PM) 40 Supra n41, p.2

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f48f4754.html


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instance, the Agreement states, “„The special commission of ‟21 individual‟ for convening emergency Loya Jirga… will have the final authority to determine the procedures and the number of

people who will participate in the Jirga…and will monitor the process of nomination of individuals…to ensure the indirect

election is transparent and fair…”41 Furthermore, Dick Gupwel in regard to the indirect elections states, “Selection was made while complaints on manipulation, intimidation, bribery over the

selection of delegate existed”42. Overall, the Jirga took place on 10 to 12 June 2002 for the purpose of correcting demographic

imbalance made by the Bonn Agreement.43 As consequence of this gathering, as Khalilzad, the US ambassador to Afghanistan, in his remark about the Emergency Loya Jirga stated that “as Americans

liked to see Karzai as head of state,”44 he got elected.45 Six days later, Mr. Karzai announced a list of 14 ministers to the Loya

Jirga.46 In contrary to what David argues that the “Ethnic Pashtuns ended up with about one-third of the posts,”47 the composition, in practice, showed 17 chair for Pushtun, following that 6 chairs for

Hazara, 5 chairs for Uzbek and 5 for Tajiks.48 No fundamental but symbolic change took place that could not meet the expectation of

the people of Afghanistan. Moreover, the ethnic imbalance was intensified in the structure in favor of Pushtuns this time. 49 In addition, the Montreal Gazette in 20 of June 2002 wrote, “Nothing

41 The Bonn Agreement, p.4 42 Dick Gupwel, “Loya Jirga Elects Karzai as New Head of State,” the EIAS Institution,

Vol. 6, May-June 2002,

<http://www.eias.org/publications/bulletin/2002/mayjun02/ebmayjun02.pdf> (Accessed

July 01, 2011), p.36 (The source adds that the Commission, under chairmanship of Ismail

Qasimyar, announced that it would have 1450 „1051 will be elected indirectly 399 will be selected.‟), p35 43 International Crisis Group, “The Loya Jirga one Small Step Forward,” Asia Briefing,

No 17, May 16, 2002, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-

asia/afghanistan/B017-the-loya-jirga-one-small-step-forward.aspx> (accessed June 21,

2011) 44 Jamil Hanifi, Editing the Past, p.320 45 The result of Emergency Loya Jirga was announced on 13 June 2002 and declared Mr.

Hamid Karzai winner of the election by obtaining 1,295 (83% of votes) in rivalry with

Masooda Jalal who got 171 votes and Mr. Mahfoz Nadai who got 89 votes. (Dick

Gupwel: 37) 46 Ibid, p.37 47 Ibid, p.40 48(See Table 2) 49 The population of Afghanistan has been reported 32.7 million composed of 42%

Pushtuns, 27% Tajiks, 9% Hazara, 9% Uzbek, 4% Aimaq (mixed Tajiks), 3% Turkmen, 2% Baloch, 4% Others. (Ian S. Livingston and Michael O‟Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index:

Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan.” July 31,

2011

<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index.pdf>

(Aug 18, 2011), p.21)

http://www.eias.org/publications/bulletin/2002/mayjun02/ebmayjun02.pdf

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/B017-the-loya-jirga-one-small-step-forward.aspx



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good ever came of the Loya Jirgas.”50 Furthermore, Jamil Hanifi criticizing the traditional authority of Jirgas argues, “In contradiction to the Euro-American view of the Loya Jirga as the

highest source of legitimacy for the Afghan government,…the study of 1941, 1955 and 1964 Loya Jirgas… shows that the Loya

Jirga has been the most consent producing, hegemonic prerogative of the post 1919 monarchs and heads of government in Afghanistan.”51

To address the absence of the Afghan constitution, the Agreement saw its possibility through a nationwide inclusive Jirga.

Therefore, according to the Agreement, the Constitutional Loya Jirga assembled in Kabul on 13 December 2003 to meet this goal.52 Prior to that, the preparation for Jirga took nine months, noted by

Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission. The source declared the three key organs that were involved in constitution making

process, “the Drafting Commission, the Constitutional Commission, and the Constitutional Loya Jirga.”53 About credibility of these commissions, the same source reported that

“The President appointed all the nine members of the Drafting Commission on October 5, 2002 and selected his Vice-President

Prof. Naematullah Shahrani to serve as Chair.”54 Besides that the President appointed all the 30 commissioners of the Constitutional Commission.55 Not only did the President have a strong influence

in the constitution making structure as mentioned earlier but also “many Afghans and other observers believed that major decisions

have already been taken behind the scenes,” 56 referring to Karzai‟s team, Barnett R. Rubin notes that “the draft which was published by 3rd November 2003 as a result of nine months‟ work that

supposed to be introduced to the Constitutional Loya Jirga has been amended and changed by the Bureau and Reconciliation

Commission of the Constitutional Loya Jirga.”57 Moreover, CARE

50 Supra footnote 44, p.319 51 Jamil Hanifi, Edited the Past, p.296 52 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: The Constitutional Loya Jirga,” Asia

Briefing, No29, December 12, 2003, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-

asia/afghanistan/B029-afghanistan-the-constitutional-loya-jirga.aspx> (Accessed July 01,

2011). 53 Secretariat of Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan, “The Constitution Making

Process in Afghanistan,” March 10, 2003,

<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN016658.pdf>

(Accessed July 01, 2011), p.3 54 Ibid, 55 Ibid, p.4 56 Supra n43, 57 According to Barnet Rubin, many articles of the constitution have been changed. For

instance, article two has been changed from “The religion of Afghanistan is the sacred

religion of Islam” to “The religion of the people and the state of Afghanistan is the sacred

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/B029-afghanistan-the-constitutional-loya-jirga.aspx

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/B029-afghanistan-the-constitutional-loya-jirga.aspx

http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN016658.pdf


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criticizing the Afghan Constitution argued that “the free-market open democracy that is envisioned may bring its own problems to a country that has had no experience with such situations, especially

when they are supposed to be implemented incredibly fast.”58 Furthermore, Constitutional Loya Jirga and its outcomes received

different feedbacks like: “Controversial Articles in the New Constitutions”;59 “Loya Jirga Dances to Karzai‟s Tune”;60 “Loya Jirga Convened to Rubber Stamp an Anti-Democratic

Constitution”;61 “The Constitution has been signed with some distortions”;62 “Afghan Leaders Accused of Signing Changed

Charter”63 and so on. Moreover, implementation of this Agreement required financial

and personal resources that Afghanistan lacked at that point.

Therefore, the Bonn Agreement initiated the lead nation strategy, according to which “G8 countries had been assigned for lead

nations‟ responsibilities for a particular sector”64 but did not work really well. The source adds that this happened for two reasons. First, the leading nations did not have coordination with each other.

Second, it happened because the assigned nations were reluctant to put enough resources into action to fulfill their functions. Finally

the Afghan government was recognized as the lead actor for reconstruction process and the assigned countries gave consent to

religion of Islam”. Furthermore, Article 10 due to controversial phrase of „market

economy‟ was not put in voting. Similarly, controversies over having national anthem in Pushtu or Persian had to be referred to the plenary, but it did not happen. Many more

changes were brought like altering article 60 from “the president shall have one vice-

president” to “the president shall have first and second vice presidents” and of course

eliminating the condition of not having dual citizenship for ministers. (Barnett R. Rubin,

“Changes in the Draft Constitution of Afghanistan Introduced by the Bureau and Reconciliation Commission of the Constitutional Loya Jirga,” December 31, 2003,

<http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Contributions/Projects/Barnett-R-

Rubin/Changes-in-the-Draft-Constitution-of-Afghanistan.htm> (Accessed July 01,

2011).] 58 Berlin Conference 2004, p.4 59 Khalil Rahman Hamid, “A Look to the most controversial provisions of the

constitution,” (Australia, Melbourne) <http://muqawamat.blogfa.com/post-1583.aspx>

(Accessed July 01, 2011) 60 Financial Times (London) December 23, 2003. Quoted in Jamil Hanifi, pp.320, 321 61 www.wsws.org, December 18, 2003. Quoted in Jamil Hanifi, pp.320,321 62 The Kabul Times, January 28, 2004. Quoted in Jamil Hanifi, pp.320,321 63 www.Afghaniyat-yahoogroup.com, January 8, 2004. Qouted in Jamil Hanifi, p.321 64 “The lead-nation approach assigned the United States to work with the Afghan National

Army (ANA); Germany with the Afghan National Police (ANP); Japan in the project of

DDR-Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of former combatants; Britain to fight against narcotics production and trafficking; and Italy to lead judicial reform and

institution building. Except for some progress in the reform and building of Afghan

National Army, the other leading nations failed to fulfill their promised responsibilities.”

(Tilmann J. Roder, “Little Steps Forward: Rule of Law in Afghanistan,” Max Plank

UNYB 11, 2007, p.2)

http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Contributions/Projects/Barnett-R-Rubin/Changes-in-the-Draft-Constitution-of-Afghanistan.htm

http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/Contributions/Projects/Barnett-R-Rubin/Changes-in-the-Draft-Constitution-of-Afghanistan.htm

http://muqawamat.blogfa.com/post-1583.aspx

http://www.wsws.org/

http://www.afghaniyat-yahoogroup.com/


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continue the journey as lead partners to the government.65 But, this was only on paper, and in reality, the Afghan government was perceived by the international community as a corrupt institution

that could not be trusted. Furthermore, as Afghanistan lacked a National Army and

Police to take the responsibility for the security of Afghanistan at the time of Bonn meeting, the Agreement states, “the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan request the United Nations

Security Council to consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force.”66 As a matter of

the fact, it was clear in the Agreement that the international security forces will provide security for Kabul and train the new Afghan security forces.67 This article was incorporated in the Agreement

while the Northern Alliance‟ troops were estimated around 35,000 versus roughly 70,000 Taliban military on the ground. 68 But

unexpectedly, ISAF started its works with 5,000 troops under the mandate of UNSC Resolution 1386 of December 2001 in areas around Kabul. But, in October 2003 based on UNSC Resolution

1510 ISAF expanded its mandate under the leadership of NATO to the whole Afghanistan.69 But, in anyways, the insufficiency of

personal resources remained as a tangible criticism for a long while. Consequently, the Afghan government remained responsible for its security, but according to the resolutions mentioned the UN

authorized ISAF to temporarily take over this obligation. It is notable that there is no clarification about the time and condition of

their withdrawal there, without the indirect interpretation of building before leaving in the Agreement.

In addition, the Agreement guarantees the importance of

judicial power as one of the elements of the system. “The judicial power of Afghanistan shall be independent and vested in the

Supreme Court of Afghanistan. The Interim Administration, with the assistance of the United Nations, shall rebuild justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule

of law and Afghan legal traditions.”70 The Islamic Law and the international standard noted above is debatable combination. But,

international standard as a phenomenon never existed in

65 Ibid, 66 Bonn Agreement 2001, Annex 1, p.6 67 Ibid, 68 Eckart Schiewek, “Keeping the Peace Without Peacekeepers,” in Afghanistan: The Challenges, p.192 69 Fact Sheet, “The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),” August 06, 2010,

<http://www.defence.gov.au/defencenews/articles/1017/files/1_ISAF%20Fact%20Sheet%

201.pdf> (Aug 12, 2011), p.1 70 Bonn Agreement, p.2


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Afghanistan. Italy hosted a judicial summit in Rome in December 2002 to discuss over all plans for the sector. At this meeting the key Afghan actors including the Supreme Court and Ministry of Justice

of Afghanistan publicly agreed to the leadership of the Judicial Reform Commission-JRC, and donors committed approximately

$30 million to rebuilding the justice sector. It is notable that, on that particular time, the vast majority of funding for the development of justice sector was coming from Italy, the United

State and Germany.71 In conclusion, the Bonn Process till the Berlin Conference has

received large criticism. Starting from the symbolic appointment of Karzai in the Bonn Conference72 this process has been artificial. The controversial Emergency Loya Jirga with artificial

representation of people again appointed Karzai as the head of state and brought few changes to the favor of Pushtuns. Moreover, the

Afghan constitution which was approved by the Grand Assembly never received the respect from people neither government officials as the mother law. It was disputed a lot due to the controversial

elements incorporated in this document. Finally, the Bonn Agreement was featured more by compromise than a social

contract. Moreover, Participants at the Conference were not representatives of the people of Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Bonn Agreement is biased owing to the fact that it neglected the

issue of transitional justice and disarmament of military bonds. Furthermore, the absence of the Taliban left further disapproval to

the inclusiveness of this process. 2. TOKYO CONFERENCE: JANUARY 21-22, 2002

The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, known as Tokyo Conference, was held in 21 to 22

January 2002 (one and a half month after the Bonn Conference). Japan together with the United States, European Union and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia chaired the Conference. 61 countries and

21 organizations attended this meeting on Afghanistan.73 The purpose of this conference as outlined by the same source was

“…to allow a number of different countries from around the world

71 Alexander Their, “A Third Branch: Re-establishing the Judicial System in

Afghanistan,” in Afghanistan: The Challenges, pp.82,83 72 “Karzai was already elected the head of state before the Bonn Conference. Northern

Alliance, Pakistan, Russia, Iran and India had already given their consent to the chairmanship of Karzai. Bonn just symbolically did conduct the election.” Noted Ali

Ahmad Jalali. 73 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “International Conference on Construction

Assistance to Afghanistan,” <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq8.html> (Accessed:

Apr 10, 2011).

http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq8.html


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to come together…to support the reconstruction essential for bringing about true stability to Afghanistan.”74 The prime minister of Japan Mr. Junichiro Koizumi addressing the participants of the

Conference pointed out the strategic importance of Afghanistan after the 9/11 to Japan and international security and mentioned,

“…stability in Afghanistan…contributes to the peace and stability in the entire region that includes Afghanistan…, Middle East and countries of Central Asia where there are deep links to the interests

of Japan and, by extension, to the rest of the world, and ultimately aim to eradicate and prevent terrorism.”75

The Interim Administration‟s chairman, Hamid Karzai announced the six priority areas for development: “including education, roads, water and power, rebuilding of government

buildings nationwide, water and sanitation in the cities, and rural development.”76 It is notable that at the beginning of 2002 the

World Bank in coordination with the Afghan government wrote a report titled „The Preliminary Needs Assessment‟. “The report estimated an over a 10 year period, US$ 11.4 billion for a low case-

scenario to US$ 18.1 billion for a high case scenario, with the base case costing about US$ 14.6 billion.”77 Participants of the

Conference regardless of the high demand of the Afghan government pledged an amount of US$ 4.5 billion (according to the Afghan sources the pledged amount was US$ 5.1 billion78)

including the amount of US$2.8 allocated for the year 2002.79 As a matter of the fact, the weak financial engagement of

participants was criticized later by NGOs.80 Moreover, the Afghan Interim Authority-AIA also criticized Tokyo for channeling only 9% of the total assistance aid through the AIA.81 An Afghan

analyst, Zaman Amin stated that the Tokyo Conference only pledged ten percent of the requested amount.82 In addition, the

Iranian government criticized the Tokyo Conference that “Bearing in mind the scale of damage in Afghanistan, the reconstruction of

74 Ibid, 75 Ibid 76 Peter Marsden, “Afghanistan: the reconstruction process,” The Center for Economic

and Social Rights, International Affairs, Vol.79, No.1,, p.96 77 Denis A. Rondinelli, “International Goals and Strategies for Afghanistan‟s

Development: Reconstruction and Beyond,” p.22 78 Ministry of Finance of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Donor Financial Review

2009,” p.19 79 Ibid, [See Annex 4] 80 Supra n78, p.97 81 Supra n78 82 IRIN-Humanitarian News and Analysis, “AFGHANISTAN: Tokyo conference

welcomed with cautious optimism,”

<http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=17843> (Accessed: Apr 12, 2011).

http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=17843


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which is estimated as costing US$ 15 billion to US$ 45 billion, the Tokyo Conference‟s pledged to pay US$ 4.5 over the next five years”83 Moreover, according to Ahmad Rashid, the negative point

of this meeting was that it “failed to distinguish between money for humanitarian relief and money for rebuilding and construction.”84

It is noteworthy that at the same year, another meeting was held in Tokyo on Afghanistan. The purpose of this meeting was to support the DDR85 project under the leadership of Japan in

Afghanistan. “„The summit…on February 2003 raised US $50 million to consolidate peace in Afghanistan through disarmament,

demobilizing and reintegrating the fighters through creating jobs for them. Japan provided 35 million, the US 10 million, the UK 3.5 million and Canada 2.2 million.”86 Thus, one of the vacuums left

from the Bonn 2001 was filled there. Afterward, in reference to this Conference, the Afghan Transitional Administration announced the

Afghan New Beginning Program-ANBP Plan in early 2003 to disarm and reintegrate an estimated 100,000 members of the illegal armed groups, while at the end of the original DDR program in

July 2005 an estimated 1,800 armed bands consisting of more than 80,000 individuals existed in Afghanistan that demonstrated failure

of this Conference.87 It happened mainly because owners of militias and gangs were holding key chairs in the Transitional

Administration. In conclusion, the lack of a clear long-term plan for the implementation of assistance money characterized this meeting.

From another aspect, the amount pledged by participants met only 10% of the total requested by Afghanistan and out of which only

9% of them was channeled through the Afghan government that did not satisfy this institution. Furthermore, it was not clear in the Conference that how much of this money is in grants and how

much in loans. In final sentence, Tokyo Conference resembled to the case in which the doctor did not want the patient to survive

neither allowed him to die.

83 Radio Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran, “Iranian radio comments on outcomes of

Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan,” (Tehran, in Persian, 11:11 am, 22 Jan 2002). BBC

Summary of the World Broadcasts, <www.lexisnexis.com> (Accessed: May 24, 2011). 84 Ahmad Rashid, Decent into Chaos, p.178 85 Abbreviation for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 86 Amya Chandra, “India and Afghanistan: Renewing Economic Relations,” pp.163-194,

Afghanistan: The Challenges, edited by K. Warikoo, India, New Delhi: Pentagon Press,

2007, p.168 87 Ibid, pp.107-108


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After Tokyo before the Berlin The US invasion of Iraq on 20 May 2003 was of global strategic

significance and turned the attention of the world from the unpopular war in Afghanistan. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber and

Robert P. Finn argue that the US invasion of Iraq not only divided the number of troops and assistance aid between Afghanistan and Iraq with more attention to Iraq, but also the experience of Iraq

War particularly the suicide attacks techniques transferred to

Afghanistan.88 Supporting this view, Thomas Barfield also adds,

“Afghanistan has always been the „other war‟ under the Bush administration, starved of resources, attention, and troops in favor

of Iraq.”89 Furthermore, Lakhdar Ibrahimi in his report of December 2003 harshly criticized the donor community and stated,

“Countries that are committed to supporting Afghanistan cannot kid themselves and cannot go on expecting us to work in

unacceptable security conditions.”90 In reference to this warning,

“Shortly afterwards, the UNSC extended the ISAF‟s mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan (Resolution 1510 of October

2003).”91 This decision was taken while one month prior to that “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed ongoing leadership of ISAF in August 2003.”92 At this stage,

ISAF‟s strategy was based on three issues, “conducting anti insurgency operation jointly with Afghan security forces, training

Afghan security forces, and developing governance and socio-economic conditions through PRTs.”93 In regard to the security sectors development, the number of Afghan security forces reached

to 6,000 at the end of 2003 and simultaneously the number of foreign troops present in Afghanistan was about 5,500.94

88 Wolfgang Danspeckgruber and Robert P. Finn, Building State and Security in

Afghanistan, USA: Princeton University, 2007, p.6 89 Ahmad Rashid, Decent into Chaos, p.333 90 Barbara J. Stapleton, “The Failure to Bridge Security Gap,” pp.167-188, in Building State and Security in Afghanistan, p.173 91 Fact Sheet, “The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),” August 06, 2010,

<http://www.defence.gov.au/defencenews/articles/1017/files/1_ISAF%20Fact%20Sheet%

201.pdf> (Aug 12, 2011), p.1 92Ibid, 93Ibid, 94 Ian S. Livingston and Michael O‟Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of

Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan.” Brookings, July 31, 2011

<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index.pdf>

(Aug 18, 2011), pp.4,6


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3. BERLIN CONFERENCE: MARCH 31-APRIL 01, 2004

The International Afghanistan Conference in Berlin was co-chaired by the United Nations, Afghanistan, Germany and Japan.95 The

conference attracted a large number of participants including 54 countries (G8 countries, Afghanistan‟s Neighbors, all of the NATO

and EU member states) and two organizations (the World Bank and the United Nations).96 It is notable that the Security Council praised the “successful implementation of the Bonn Agreement”97 to the

participants of the Conference, while Presidential and Parliamentary elections were to be held in September 2004 and no

National Census of the population of Afghanistan existed. The primary purpose of the Berlin Conference were to raise reconstruction funds, seek long term commitment of the

international community, presenting the new Afghan work plan, and (the unofficial one) a campaign by Karzai to gain support from

abroad for the upcoming Presidential elections in 2004. As pointed above, the Berlin Conference provided an opportunity for the Afghan Transitional Administration to present the so-called

progresses made from 2002. Adoption of the new Afghan Constitution since January 2004, the summon of two Loya Jirgas in

2002 and 2003, commencement of the new national currency, the re-establishment of the Central Bank of Afghanistan, adoption of the national development plan, creation of the commission of civil

service and human rights, and establishment of the new security institutions were the most remarkable ones.98 However, it practice,

the improvements made were very symbolic and not real. As a result of the two days discussion in the Conference, participants reached an agreement on: building security institutions,

simultaneously increasing the number of foreign troops in Afghanistan, consideration of the Afghan new development plan in

donors‟ future work in Afghanistan, and channeling more of the pledged money through the Afghan government.99

Moreover, in regard to the major purpose of the Conference

to raise enough funds, the Conference produced an amount of US$ 8.2 billion assistance aid for Afghanistan limiting it for three years

including the US$ 4.4 billion for the year 2004.100 The US

95 United Nations Security Council, “Statement by the President of the Security Council:

S/PRST/2004,” April, 6, 2004, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/411391694.pdf>

(Accessed July 01, 2011),pp.1,2 96 Berlin Conference, p.1 97 Ibid, p.1 98 Berlin Conference, p.2 99 Berlin Declaration, April 01, 2004 <http://www.ag-

afghanistan.de/berlindeclaration.pdf> (Accessed July 01, 2011), pp.2,3 100 Berlin Declaration, p.5

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/411391694.pdf

http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/berlindeclaration.pdf

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remained the top donor to Afghanistan by pledging 50% of the total. As a remark, donors in the Berlin Conference rejected the demand for 7 years pledges and continued with 3 to 5 years aid

pattern. CARE by criticizing the insufficiency of aid to Afghanistan warned the donors‟ community about the consequences of weak

engagement in Afghanistan that they will pay the costs for it later.101 However, the Afghan government was expecting an amount of US$ 27 billion for the period of 7 years equivalent to

roughly US$ 4 billion each year or annual allocation of US$100 per Afghan, but the amount pledged did not exceed US$ 1.7 billion per

year.102 In addition, security remained the main challenge so far.

Ahmad Rashid in regard to the status of the US troops in

Afghanistan states, “In mid-2003, the US Commanders were becoming deeply frustrated in Afghanistan. Pakistani border troops

were given order to allow extremists to cross into Afghanistan and then help them return home by giving them covering fire.”103 Realizing the need for personnel resources to addressing the

security challenges President Karzai requested for 3,500 more troops at the NATO Istanbul Summit of 2004 which in turn the

Summit approved half of the resources requested,104 “An increase in the number of NATO forces in Afghanistan from 6,500 to 9000 to boost security in the run up of upcoming elections.”105 As it

follows, the total number of foreign troops was supposed to reach at 16,500 by summer 2004.106 Additional to that, NATO committed

to expand ISAF‟s mission through increasing the number of PRTs to 21 from which five will be led by ISAF. Furthermore, according to the new NATO operational planning, Afghanistan was divided

into several zones; Capital, North, West, East, and South. Based on that, the UK stayed the lead nation in the North, and the US force

in the South and East regions. It is notable that the United States by

101 Ibid, p.3 102 “the allocation included US $7 billion for Human Capital and Social Protection (health

care, education and social security), US $13 billion for Physical capital (infrastructure and

physical services), and US $7.5 billion for security, law, private sector development and

public administration budgeted for 7.5 billion.” Ibid, p.1 103 Ibid, p.229 104 Lieutenant Colonel Tarn D. Warren, “ISAF and Afghanistan: The Impact of Failure on

NATO‟S Future,” U.S. Army War College, USAWC Strategy Research Project, February

23, 2010,

<http://www.defence.gov.au/defencenews/articles/1017/files/1_ISAF%20Fact%20Sheet%201.pdf> (Aug 19, 2011), p.11 105 Marvin G. Weinbaum and Andrew Finkelman, “Rebuilding the Afghan State: The

International Dimension,” in Afghanistan: The Challenges, edited by K. Warikoo, India,

New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2007, pp.10,11 106 See table 4


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having 15,500 soldiers in Afghanistan remained the largest contributor to the stabilization of Afghanistan.107 But, in comparison to Iraq, the commitment to Afghanistan was the least

while simultaneously “140,000 American troops were stationed in Iraq.”108

According to a Japanese source, the uniqueness of this meeting was the “final publication of a document produced by the World Bank, the UN and the Afghan government entitled „Securing

Afghanistan‟s Future‟ (SAF). Secondly, the NGO community used the Conference as an opportunity to put pressure on donor countries

ministers and the Afghan government to be more aware of the issues facing Afghanistan. Thirdly, there have been some developments in the deployments of the international military

forces.”109 But in practice, the Berlin Conference was a chance for correction of the past mistakes and filling the vacuums which was

missed. In reference to another key challenge of Afghanistan which

is narcotics production and trafficking, participants of the

Conference supported the meeting of counter-narcotics experts from the signatory countries and the UK on June 2004 in Kabul to

deal with the technicalities of the issue.110 While, according to Ratmanu Maitra, “In 2004, Afghanistan‟s farmlands supplied an estimated 87 percent of the world opium, the raw material for

heroin.”111 Addressing this problem, “For the year 2004, British invested US$ 100 million, and in a separate project on Anti-drug,

the United States also allocated US$ 220 million for 2004 and US$ 780 million for 2005 which is four times more than the whole Europe combined aid to anti drug efforts.”112

107Ibid, pp.3,4 108 Marvin G. Weinbaum and Andrew Finkelman “Rebuilding the Afghan State: The International Dimension,” Afghanistan: The Challenges, (ed) K. Warikoo, (India, New

Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2007), pp.6 1-25 109 Berlin Conference, April 05, 2004, <http://www.ngo-

jvc.net/jann/Documents/Berlin%20Conference.pdf> (Accessed July 02, 2011), p.1 110 Berlin Conference, p.4 111 Ratmanu Maitra, “Afghan Drugs and European Market,” Afghanistan: The Challenges,

pp.81-95 [82] 112 Marvin G. Weinbaum and Andrew Finkelman “Rebuilding the Afghan State: The

International Dimension,” Afghanistan: The Challenges, (ed) K. Warikoo, (India, New

Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2007), p.19

http://www.ngo-jvc.net/jann/Documents/Berlin%20Conference.pdf

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CONCLUSION:

The “Initial Phase’- from Bonn to Berlin via Tokyo

The journey from the Bonn Conference of 2002 to the Berlin

Conference of 2004 has been a rapid and decisive. As the path dependency theory suggests, in this very stage, an inclusive and efficient path had to be created. But, the created path, in this phase

was neither inclusive nor efficient. The Bonn process integrating the Berlin Conference can be characterized in three elements: First,

the power sharing structure was based on inter-factions‟ compromise in the frame of a unitary state with a strong presidential system. Second, not enough attempts were made on

persecution of war criminals and dismantling their bands, in this process. Third, the Taliban was called nonnegotiable group and

peace talks with them as an option was not given the chance to breathe.

On the other hand, the international community was looking

from a bit different lens to Afghanistan: First, the decision to not channel 85% of assistance aid through the Afghan government

budget was sort of a pattern that remained as a path till Kabul Conference 2010. Second, the weak financial and military commitment to Afghanistan demonstrated that the international

community lacked the vision for serious reconstruction of Afghanistan. Hence, bunches of aid came in for the purpose of

reconstruction, while they were spent in humanitarian assistance that in long term did not bring any saving for Afghanistan. At its worse, some of the donor states and organizations did not fulfill

their commitments as promised. As a source of concern, the nexus of drug production and corruption in Karzai‟s administration

became more profound while no firm counter measures to tackle them was adopted. Finally, Afghanistan at the end of 2004 remained a fragile and corrupt state with the highest rate of drug

production, and divided along the ethnic fault lines.


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CHAPTER FOUR

INTERMEDIARY PHASE: FROM LONDON

2006 TO HAGUE 2009


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FROM LONDON 2006 TO HAGUE 2009

In regard to the situation in Afghanistan, the Asia Foundation‟s Survey 2006 showed that 44% of respondents believed that insecurity, the Taliban and warlords are the biggest threats in

comparison to 30% of respondents who mentioned economic factors like unemployment, poverty and poor economy as the

largest challenges that Afghans were suffering from.113 While, the US had roughly 16,500 troops,114 besides that a number of 9,000 NATO troops were on duty in Afghanistan, in 2006.115 In addition,

the total number of Afghan security forces had reached at 66,000 personal.116

Concerning to the popular events, on 9 October 2004 Presidential Election (with the participation of eight million voters in election)117 took place as a result of which “as the United States

wanted Karzai to win”118 he took the lead over his rival Yonus Qanouni with 54% of overall votes,119 garnering “enough support particularly among Tajiks, while the vote of Hazara and Uzbeks

were confined to their own ethnic groups.”120 Following that on 18 September 2005, in the Election for National Assembly out of

eleven million registered voters some 6.4 million Afghans participated.121 The Lower House elected Yonus Qanouni, a Tajik politician, as speaker of the House, while the Upper House elected

113 Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2006, p.96 114 Nicholas Burns, “Briefing on London Conference on Afghanistan,” Washington, DC,

January 27, 2006, p.7 115 Marvin G. Weinbaum and Andrew Finkelman “Rebuilding the Afghan State: The International Dimension,” Afghanistan: The Challenges, pp.10,11 116 Ian S. Livingston and Michael O‟Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of

Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan.” The Brookings institution, July 31,

2011

<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index.pdf> (Aug 18, 2011), p.6 117 Independent election commission, “Presidential Election 2004,”

<http://www.iec.org.af/Public_html/Election%20Results%20Website/english/english.htm

> (Feb 25, 2011). 118 Ahmad Rashid, Decent into Chaos, p.178 119 Deniss Abrams, Modern World Leaders: Hamid Karzai, p.106 120 Thomas Barifield, Afghanistan History, p.300 121 Independent Election Commission, “Joint Election Management Body Report,”

<http://www.iec.org.af/jemb.org/pdf/JEMBS%20MGT%20Final%20Report%202005-12-

12.pdf> (Feb 25, 2011), p.6

http://www.iec.org.af/Public_html/Election%20Results%20Website/english/english.htm

http://www.iec.org.af/Public_html/Election%20Results%20Website/english/english.htm


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Karzai‟s favorite man, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, as chair.122 As to the quality of selection and election, Ahmad Rashid argues, that “In the absence of a strong institutional base the characteristics of a

leader still played a more critical role in Afghanistan than in other countries.”123 Moreover The two elections happened while the

claims of fraud besides that of technical problem that voters were not very familiar with the voting and counting process remained the leading criticism. Some 5,400 complaints were filed in the

Electoral Complaints Commission alleging wide-ranging fraud in election 2005.124 The presidential elections‟ fraud was not

projected very much due to the absence of the Electoral Dispute body to investigate complaints in 2004.

1. LONDON CONFERENCE: JAN 31 TO FEB 01 OF 2006

The London Conference 2006 which is considered as important as

the Bonn Conference 2001 in terms of establishing the new frameworks and priority lists. 50 countries, 16 organizations including the Afghan Civil Society Forum as participants, and 14

countries and 2 organizations as observers attended the Conference. The Conference was co-chaired by President Karzai, the Prime

Minister Tony Blair and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The two day Conference produced a paper called Afghanistan London Compact or Agreement.125 The Compact identified over 40

measurable and time-bound benchmarks for the reconstruction of Afghanistan,126 and established a results-oriented action plan which

was endorsed by resolution 1659 (2006) of the UN Security Council.127 In addition, Nicholas Burns calls the London Conference not a conventional donors‟ conference owing to the

fact that the Afghan government got the opportunity to present the future plan to participant countries recommending them the

direction.128 At the frontline of the Compact it was noted that the

international community in respect to the previous conferences: the

Bonn, Tokyo and Berlin, will continue “to work toward a stable

122 Ibid, 123 Supra footnote 118, p.305 124 Report of the Secretary General, A/60/712–S/2006/145, 7 March 2006, p.2 125 Rhoda Margesson, “United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background

and Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service, December 27, 2010

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40747.pdf> (Aug 09, 2011), p.8 126 The London Conference on Afghanistan, p.4 127 Ibid, p.12 128 “The Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) presented at the

Conference described a five year length policy founded on four development priorities:

(a) agriculture, pastoralism and rural industry; (b) productive use of State assets; (c)

mining and other extractive industries; and (d) regional transit and trade.” See: Ibid, p.8


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and prosperous Afghanistan, with good governance and human rights protection for all under the rule of law, and to maintain and strengthen that commitment over the term of this Compact and

beyond.”129 Therefore, the London Compact‟s new agenda lied on three main sectors for the next five years: security; governance,

rule of law and human rights; and economic and social development.130

As an outcome of the conference, an amount of US$ 10.5

billion assistance aid was pledged to Afghanistan while the US remained as the top donor by pledging 4 billion followed by the

World Bank, ADB and the UK.131 Furthermore, strong political, security and financial commitment of donor community as well as effective coordination and monitoring of assistance aid were

recognized crucial for the consumption of assistance money and implementation of the Compact. For this end, parties to the

Compact gave their consent to the establishment of a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board composed of representatives from both the Afghan government and the international

community, and co-chaired by a UN representative and a senior Afghan official will be established.132

The Compact identified insecurity as foremost challenge to development in Afghanistan and presented an inclusive definition that “Security cannot be provided by military means alone. It

requires good governance, justice and the rule of law, reinforced by reconstruction and development.”133 From this multi-dimensional

security view, a corrupt and weak state with no economic progress will not be able to bring security unless they tackle these problems in advance. On the other hand, the Compact puts the burden on the

NATO, the US led Operation Enduring Freedom, and partner nations to maintain their commitment for developing the Afghan

security force. In this regard, two issues have been put at the forefront. First, the Afghan Security Force should be fiscally affordable and sustainable by the Afghan government; second, till

it becomes fully functional the International Security Forces have a key role to securing Afghanistan. As mutually expected, the

129 The London Conference on Afghanistan, 31 January – 1 February 2006.

<http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf> (Aug 09, 2011), p.1 130 Ibid, p.2 131 International Crisis Group, Afghanistan’s Endangered Compact, Asia Briefing N°59

Kabul/Brussels, 29 January 2007, p.4 132 The London Compact, p.16 133 Ibid, p.3


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Afghan government and ISAF should cooperate in Operation Enduring Freedom‟s counter-terrorism missions in Afghanistan.134

Moreover, NATO in correspondence with the Compact

completed its fourth phase and expanded its mission to South and East Afghanistan in 2006.135 Furthermore, the Compact talks about

the regional aspects of security and considers it crucial for stabilizing Afghanistan as it states, “Full respect for Afghanistan's sovereignty and strengthening dialogue and cooperation between

Afghanistan and its neighbors constitute an essential guarantee of stability in Afghanistan and the region.”136 Therefore, dialogue plus

military means were together considered two sides of the Compact outlook toward security issue.

In addition, the Compact diagnosed governance, rule of law

and human rights as cross cutting areas. From this view, a democratic government requires rule of law and sustainability;

likewise, the rule of law is in-comprehend without protecting human rights in rotational manner. The Compact still informs that the institution building process is in its intermediary phase to

establish a fiscally sustainable administration with trained staffs to deliver basic services.137 Moreover, signatories of the Compact

supports the Afghan government‟s stand on implementation of the Action Plan on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation.138 The Action Plan (expired in March 2009 without extension) proposed five

procedures: “symbolic measures, institutional reform, truth-seeking, reconciliation, and accountability measures”139.

Alternatively, soon after this the endorsement of this bill (December 2006), parliamentarians passed the Amnesty Law in 2007 to neutralize the effects of this bill.140 Furthermore, to reduce

or eliminate the narcotics production and inhibit its trafficking, the Compact proposed a two-level strategy for this mission. On the

national level it addresses issues like corruption, absence of strong-nationwide counter-narcotics management, weak capacity of law enforcement institutions. But, on the international level and the

most important one, the Compact addresses weak inter-state

134Ibid, 135 Nicholas Burns, “Briefing on London Conference on Afghanistan,” Washington, DC,

January 27, 2006, p.1 136 Ibid, 137 Ibid, 138 Ibid, p.4 139 Emily Winterbotham, The State of Transitional Justice in Afghanistan: Actors,

Approaches and Challenges, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Center, Discussion

Paper, Kabul, Afghanistan, April 2010, p.7 140 Ibid, p.9


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cooperation, and lack of a strong political will to stop poppy trafficking in neighbor countries of Afghanistan.

The compact introduced economic and social development

as the third policy preference for donors. In other words the Compact recognized hunger, poverty and unemployment as key

social challenges. Furthermore, the Compact determined further barriers to economic development in Afghanistan; drug production and trafficking that overshadow legal macro-economy of the

country, lack of a strong self ruled private sector to compete with the government, reintegration or returnees and internally displaced

people and ex-combatants that not yet dealt with, and lack of a strong organized nationwide civil society to bridge people with the government.141 Apprehending the social and economic challenges,

the Compact concentrates the public investment around six following pillars: “infrastructure and natural resources; education;

health; agriculture and rural development; social protection; and economic governance and private sector development.”142 From this view, a developed private sector had to be strengthened to

compete with the government at least in education, health, and economic spheres for providing better services.

Coming to the execution of the Compact, contrary to the Agreement on disbanding and disarming all illegal armed groups prior to 2007143 the projected continued till the end of March

2011.144 Moreover, the promise to relieving Afghanistan from “all unsafe, unserviceable and surplus ammunition”145 has not been met

yet. Furthermore, the promise of bringing an intensive administrative reform to making a meritocratic, representational, and trustworthy administration still remained on paper.

Additionally, the Compact informs about the National Census that had to be completed and published by 2008, while there is no sign

of development in this sphere at the end of 2011. Moreover, the 2010 year was called the completion of National Action Plan for women to ensuring women representation in the government, while

141 The London Conference on Afghanistan, p.4 142 Ibid, 143 Ibid, p.6 144 “DDR-Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration program funded by Japan

started in 2005 simultaneously with DIAG-Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups.

According to the DIAG report, the cumulative total of IAGs disbanded since the start of

the project has reached 759, and weapons collected through the DIAG program currently stands at 54,138. The goal was to disband 809 IAGs by the end of 2010, and 94% of this

target has been reached.” (DIAG Annual Project Report 2010,

<http://www.undp.org.af/Projects/Report2011/diag/2011-03-21-

%20Annual%20Progress%20Report%20of%20DIAG.pdf> (Aug 05, 2011), p.3 145 The London Conference on Afghanistan, p.16).

http://www.undp.org.af/Projects/Report2011/diag/2011-03-21-%20Annual%20Progress%20Report%20of%20DIAG.pdf

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the situation is getting worse and worse against women, and symbolically at the present one lady chairs a department in Karzai‟s cabinet.146 In the area of seizure of drugs trafficked through

Afghanistan borders and destruction of poppy fields in Afghanistan, the London Compact seemed to be remaining on

paper again as it promised to bring considerable decrease in. According to the DIAG Annual reports 2010, Afghanistan supplied 93% of the global market demand in 2007147 and besides that its

market values increased 29% from 2006 to 2007148. “Donor countries left to implement London Compact after the security

situation got worse and individually each country started to implement their own policy to maximize their security and to guarantee their survival” said Ali Ahmad Jalali.149

In conclusion, the London Conference 2006 was an opportunity to create a new path and correct previous mistakes of

the past. But, it referred back to the previous conferences as its foundations. The two tangible outcomes of this conference were approval of the Afghan National Development Strategy by donors

and the pledging made by the participants. In regard to the amount of US$ 10.5 billion in assistance aid to Afghanistan, out of which,

85% was channeled directly through donor countries‟ national NGOs and only around 15% of them were allocated to fill up the Afghan government budget gap.150 Donors in concern to the

Afghan National Development strategy promised to align most of their programs in accordance with. As a notable factor, for the first

time, the external aspects of insecurity (sanctuaries of terrorists in Pakistan) were discussed but not in sufficient manner. Thus, like at previous conferences, it couldn‟t really define what political will

and regional solution for eradication of poppy means. Consequently, many vacuums remained unfilled yet.

Prior to the Paris Conference 2008, Norwegian Kai Eide was appointed by U.N. Secretary General as special representative of UN for Afghanistan as one of the most popular change. Besides

that insecurity was spreading throughout the entire South and East and some areas of the West and slowly to the North that needed a

policy change. For instance, the Oxfam reports that more than 140

146 Ibid, p.7 147 “Afghanistan: Development and Humanitarian priorities”, Oxfam, January 2008, p.11 148 United Nations Officer on Drugs and Crimes, “Annual Report 2008 Covering

Activities in 2007,” <http://www.unodc.org/documents/about -unodc/AR08_WEB.pdf> (Aug 12, 2011), p.10,19 149 Interview with Ali Ahmad Jalali, Former Minister of Interior Affairs of Afghanistan

and Professor at Near East-South Asia Center For Strategic Studies (Bishkek, 3rd Sep,

2011). 150 Ibid


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suicide attacks, 6,000 dead, 1,400 civilian casualties, 900 Afghan and 220 foreign soldiers were killed by the end of 2007.151 Furthermore, the inter Paki-Afghan diplomatic relations reached at

its tragic phase, as President Karzai was openly criticizing Pakistan‟s support of the Taliban and sheltering the most wanted

Taliban in their territory.152 By April 2008, the number of Afghan Security Forces had reached to 125, 000 composing 50,000 army and 75,000 police.153

2. The PARIS CONFERENCE : JUNE 12, 2008

The Paris Conference was co-chaired by President Nicholas Sarkozy, President Hamid Karzai and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. In this one day Conference 80 countries and international

organizations attended.154 The Conference was held for many purposes: reaffirming international commitments to Afghanistan,

reviewing past progresses, and presenting the result of eight yearlong works in Afghanistan. The Paris Conference declaration endorsed by UN Security Council155 starts with the referential

statement that “the Afghanistan Compact will remain the agreed basis for donors‟ works.”156 “The international community brought

few necessary changes in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and readopted it as the construction agenda for the next five years”157 said Ali Ahmad Jalali. Concerning to the agenda of

the Conference, JCMB announced the priorities areas including: rule of law, governance capacity building, private sector, and the

personal security of all Afghan citizens.158 The Paris Conference, as with previous conferences, put

security at the top of its agenda. President Karzai addressing the

source of insecurity in his speech to the Conference said “Terrorists are outside of Afghanistan and is supported there and mentioned

that this is the main security problems. He stressed that fighting

151 Supra n148, p.16 152 Shibil Sidiqi, p.35 153 Ian S. Livingston and Michael O‟Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index,” p.6 154 John Ward Anderson, “International Donors Pledge Additional $21 Billion for

Afghanistan,” Washington Post Foreign Service, June 13, 2008,

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2008/06/12/AR2008061200269.html> (Aug 20, 2011) 155 UN Security Council, S/2008/434, 3 July 2008, p.7 156 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, “Declaration of the International Conference in

Support of Afghanistan: Paris, 12 June 2008”

<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/enghlish.pdf> (Aug 09, 2011), p.1 157 Interview with Ali Ahmad Jalali, Former Interior Minister of Afghanistan, (Bishkek,

3rd Sep, 2011). 158 Ibid,

http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/enghlish.pdf


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terrorism requires political commitment.”159 Prior to the Conference, in the Bucharest NATO Summit 2008, weak coordination between foreign troops of different countries in

Afghanistan was revealed and asserted that “Some allies have proven to be reluctant to send combat forces to engage the Taliban,

and have their forces instead in more secure areas of the country. This reluctance has led to sharp criticism by allies, such as the United States, Canada, Britain, the Netherlands, and Denmark,

which have suffered casualties to their forces that are frequently engaged in combat.”160 In addition, in the Summit it was decided

that the PRTs will remain as a pattern of NATO‟s work in Afghanistan which was welcomed by the Paris Conference. 161

Moreover, participants of the NATO Bucharest summit 2008

recognized the nexus between Afghanistan‟s opium traffickers, the militants they finance, and corruption in the Afghan government.

The report adds that five southern Afghan provinces account for 83% of the country‟s poppy production as well as more than 90 percent of the illegal narcotics trafficking outside the country.162

Boucher argues that local governments‟ officials, and poppy producers and traffickers are closely connected with each other.

According to the author, where the Afghan government has control and placed good administrators, poppy production is down; and vice versa where the government is weak and officials are corrupt

the poppy production is high.163 In terms of financial outcomes of the conference, international

donors led by the United States pledged around US$ 21 billion additional assistance aid to Afghanistan. The United States, as single top donor, committed US$ 10.2 billion closely half of the

total assistance aid pledged by the Conference participants. 164 Furthermore, participants promised “to align their efforts behind

the financing and implementation of the ANDS in order to achieve the objectives agreed in the Afghanistan Compact.”165 In addition, the donor community promised to channel a great portion (not clear

what percentage) of their assistance aid through the Afghan

159 Review of the Paris Conference, www.daikundi.com, (Aug 19, 2011) 160 Paul Gallis, “The NATO Summit at Bucharest, 2008,” CRS Report for Congress, May 2008, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22847.pdf> (Aug 09, 2011), p.2 161 Ibid, 162Afghan Government Charts Challenges Ahead at Paris Conference, 09 June 2008, US

Government Archive, <http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-

english/2008/June/20080609123319idybeekcm0.6119348.html> (Aug 12, 2011) 163 Ibid, 164 “Donors pledge around $27b for Afghanistan,” August 13, 2008,

<http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/487323/Donors-pledge-around-27b-for-Afghanistan>

(Aug 11, 2011) 165 Ibid, p.2

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22847.pdf

http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/June/20080609123319idybeekcm0.6119348.html

http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/June/20080609123319idybeekcm0.6119348.html


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National Budget that according to Ali Ahmad Jalali it was 15%.166 Ana Hozyainova in regard to the Paris conference says, “Channeling more money through the government have meant

spoiling the resource and leaving them into the hands of few power broker in Karzai‟s cabinet.” She adds, “In reality neither donors nor

the Afghan government want result and the Paris Conference was another trash paper”.167

In opposite, critics found the solution not in pledging more

money. Ashraf Haidari criticizing the approach argues that the donors‟ policy to ignoring and discrediting the Afghan government

and channeling their aid money through their foreign non-profit and private-sector institutions which resulted in outflow of anticipated 40% of aid money back to donor countries was a big

mistake. According to the author, some $6 billion out of pledged US$ 21 billion has been spent since 2001 in Afghanistan.168

Amnesty International criticizing absence of a long term outlook argues that “the international community and the Afghan government have focused narrowly on short-term stability and

security.”169 Furthermore, Human Rights Watch invites participants to focus on governance aspects through bringing “systemic reform,

including implementation of transitional justice and exclusion of war-criminals from the government.”170 Moreover, the supply of less than expected amount of US$ 50 billion171 and rejection of the

Afghan government‟s application for 70% ownership over assistance money referring to corruption, 172 accounted for the

additional critics to this Conference.173 At last, the former US Special Envoy to Afghanistan - James Dobbins notes, “mismatches between inputs (personnel and money) and desired outcomes

166 Ibid, p.2,3 167 Interview with Ana Hozyainova, Director of Research, Afghanistan Public Policy

Research Organization, (Bishkek, 3rd Sept, 2011). 168 Ashraf Haideri, “Paris Conference: Aid Effectiveness Key to Addressing Afghanistan‟s Rebuilding Challenges,” June 11, 2008

<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav061208.shtml> (Aug 06,

2011) 169 RAWA Organization, “No more empty promises in Paris conference for Afghanistan,”

<http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2008/06/11/ai-no-more-empty-promises-in-paris-conference-for-afghanistan.html> (Aug 11, 2011) 170 “Afghanistan: Paris donor conference should prioritize human rights,”

<http://reliefweb.int/node/269673> (Aug 09, 2011) 171 Ibid, 172 Paris Conference: The Expectation of People, <www.Kokchapress.com> (Aug 21, 2011) 173 Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier, “Opening statement by Federal Foreign Minister

Frank- at the International Afghanistan Conference in Paris,” June 12, 2008

<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/080612-BM-

Paris.html> (Aug 06, 2011)

http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2008/06/11/ai-no-more-empty-promises-in-paris-conference-for-afghanistan.html

http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2008/06/11/ai-no-more-empty-promises-in-paris-conference-for-afghanistan.html

http://reliefweb.int/node/269673

http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/080612-BM-Paris.html

http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/080612-BM-Paris.html


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(imposed social transformation) are the most common cause for failure.”174 In conclusion, the Paris Conference from one hand supported the

Afghan National Development Strategy by pledging the largest amount of aid that did not have history in previous conferences and

promised to align their programs in respect to this strategy. As a matter of the fact, participants of this Conference did not come up with a more realistic solution to handle the problem of insecurity.

Moreover, no regional solution to inhibit the poppy production and trafficking, and to counter terrorism and insurgency was

recommended that can be considered as an opportunity missed. While, at the London 2006 the door has opened to discuss how to tackle the threat coming from the outside, mainly Pakistan and Iran.

3. THE HAGUE CONFERENCE: 31 MARCH 2009

In the one day conference held in Hague-Netherlands 72 countries were represented.175 The Conference which was co-chaired by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, President Karzai, Minister

Verhagen, the UN Representative to Afghanistan Kai Eide and Foreign Minister Dr. Espanta, was held only in three days after the

release of President B. Obama‟s new strategy.176 As Juurd Eijsvoogel and Mark Kranenburg argue, “Above all, the Conference was meant to demonstrate that America hadn‟t

forgotten Afghanistan, and that the Obama administration still intends to bring the „forgotten war‟ to a good end - with renewed

efforts and with the support of as many partners as possible.”177 Moreover Rhoda Margesson in regard to the agenda of the Conference states, “the meeting generated consensus on several

points, including the civilian capacity and institution building with sustained priority areas: security, governance, economic growth,

and regional cooperation.”178 Security as a record remains the main discussion of this

Conference as well. Ling Jing and Abdul Haleem report that “Over

5,000 people, with some 2,000 of them civilians, had been killed

174 Ibid, 175 UNODC-United Nations Office for Drug and Crimes, “Afghanistan Opium Survey

2010: Winter Rapid Assessment,” February 2010, p.1 176 “Clinton's Remarks at the International Conference on Afghanistan-2009,”

<http://rebecca.cfr.org/afghanistan/clintons-remarks-international-conference-afghanistan-

2009/p18994> (Aug 09, 2011) 177 Juurd Eijsvoogel and Mark Kranenburg, “A new contract with Afghanistan,”

<http://vorige.nrc.nl/article2198834.ece> (Aug 01, 2011) 178 Rhoda Margesson, “United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background

and Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service, December 27, 2010

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40747.pdf> (Aug 09, 2011), p.8


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mostly in erroneous air strikes of the Coalition forces and the Taliban-related violence in 2008.”179 In the opposite, “2008 saw a 30 percent increase of the Taliban attacks against ISAF and the

ANSF, and this trend continued into 2009.”180 While counter-productive measures were strengthened in a way that “ISAF

increased in size from approximately 43,000 troops in February 2008 to 56,000 in February 2009,”181 and in March 2009, the number of Afghan Security forces reached at 162,690 including

82,780 army and 79,910 police.182 According to Tam Warren, “In 27 March 2009, President Obama announced the deployment of

“17,000 additional U.S. combat troops to help secure the restive south and east of Afghanistan and 4,000 additional U.S. military personnel to train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).”183

Besides that, dialogue with disconnected Taliban and conditionality of negotiation was discussed as proper alternatives to military

means.184 In reference to what decided in previous conferences,

regional solution was emphasized in details in this Conference.

Moreover, Secretary Hillary Clinton addressing regional tensions in her speech to the participated countries articulated, “Stabilizing

Afghanistan is impossible without quelling the violence in Pakistan.”185 She added, “We cannot hope to succeed if those who seek haven for extremism operate from sanctuaries just across the

border from Pakistan‟s territory.”186 For this end, participants of the Conference agreed on “rapid increase in actual size and capability

of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police to take the lead on fight against terrorism; eliminate sanctuaries for Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks in the region; develop a comprehensive

security strategy among Afghanistan, Pakistan and NATO/ISAF for

179 Abdul Haleem and Lin Jing, “Security remains top challenge for Afghanistan in 2009,”

China View, January 20, 2009 < http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-

01/20/content_10690937.htm> (Aug 14, 2011) 180 Lieutenant Colonel Tarn D. Warren, “ISAF and Afghanistan: The Impact of Failure on

NATO‟S Future,” p.10 181 James Appathurai and Jean-François Bureau, “Afghanistan Report 2009,” NATO

Release, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/pdf/20090331_090331_afghanistan_report_2009.pdf>

(Aug 14, 2011), p.7 182 Ian S. Livingston and Michael O‟Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of

Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan.”, p.6 183 Ibid, p.5 184 Conor Foley, Statement by Afghan civil society groups at the Hague conference,

March 31, 2009 <http://liberalconspiracy.org/2009/03/31/statement-by-afghan-civil-society-groups-at-the-hague-conference> (Aug 09, 2011) 185 “Clinton's Remarks at the International Conference on Afghanistan-2009,”

<http://rebecca.cfr.org/afghanistan/clintons-remarks-international-conference-afghanistan-

2009/p18994> (Aug 09, 2011) 186 Ibid


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further operational mandates.”187 What is very important about the Hague Conference is that it defined the regional solution very narrowly as an inter Afghan-Pakistan problem and neglected the

role of other neighbors of Afghanistan particularly Iran and India. In other words, Afghanization of the war and further engagement

of Pakistan were considered critical as a move forward. For this end, Secretary Clinton invited all the partner countries that “our collective goal should be standing up an army of at least 134,000

soldiers and a police force of at least 82,000 officers by 2011.”188 The Hague Conference presented a realistic view toward

Afghanistan. Criticizing the previous works done in Afghanistan she mentioned, “Our efforts have been undermanned, under-resourced and under-funded.”189 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-

moon in his alarming statement to the engaged nations said “a betrayal to the progress made in Afghanistan is betrayal to our

commitment to peace, human rights and development for all".190 Adding to him, Secretary Hillary Clinton said, “as President Obama has pointed out, „the world cannot afford the price that will

come due if Afghanistan slides back into chaos.‟”191 The realism used in the Conference showed that repeatedly mistakes have been

made and it was time not to live in lock-in but to break the path and create a new route ahead. For instance, the World Vision Organization argued that “The PRT troop contingent has only

provided self-defense and security for diplomats or selected officials, not for the people of Afghanistan.”192 The source

recommended handover of a serious military role to PRT rather than construction work. But, Ali Ahmad Jalali says “America did not want NATO to be fully engaged in War on Terror and both

agreed to construction function of PRTs as their budget from 15 to 20 million jumped up to 600 million per year to meet this goal.”193

187 Hans de Vreij, “Afghanistan Conference: Final Declaration,” Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of Netherlands, Mar 31st, 2009

<http://blogs.rnw.nl/vredeenveiligheid/2009/03/31/afghanistan-conference-final-

declaration/m> (Aug 11, 2011). 188 Clinton's Remarks at the International Conference on Afghanistan-2009 189 FPA Administrator, “Afghanistan International Conference: Happenings at the

Hague,” Apr 01, 2009 <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/04/01/afghanistan-

international-conference-happenings-at-the-hague> (Aug 13, 2011). 190 Ibid, 191 Ibid, 192 World Vision, “International Afghanistan Hague Donors Conference Statement: A

Comprehensive Approach to Development in Afghanistan,” March 2009,

<http://www.worldvision.org/content.nsf/about/20090331-Afghanistan-conference-

statement> (Aug 12, 2011). 193 Interview with Ali Ahmad Jalali, (Bishkek, 3rd Sep, 2011).

http://blogs.rnw.nl/vredeenveiligheid/2009/03/31/afghanistan-conference-final-declaration/m

http://blogs.rnw.nl/vredeenveiligheid/2009/03/31/afghanistan-conference-final-declaration/m

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In conclusion, the Hague Conference was not a pledging conference. But considering the importance of free and fair elections for 2009, it pledged an additional amount of US $100

million including US$40 million from the US and 5,000 more troops to securitize the election.194 Moreover, for the very first

time, high rank foreign diplomats like Secretary H. Clinton and President Karzai clearly talked about external sources of instability and referred to trilateral Afghan-Pak-NATO or Afghan-Pak-US

diplomacy as an optimal solution. The Hague Conference was perceived a big umbrella that all NATO member countries plus all

Afghanistan‟s neighbors participated in this talk and discussed the security situation in Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION:

The ‘Intermediary Phase’ – from London to Hague via Paris

To summarize the process from London to Hague, the intermediary phase of path dependency, agenda were repeated. Reference to Bonn, Berlin, and finally London projected this issue. But, to get

rid of traps made during creation of the path since Bonn 2001, a signal for unlocking the path was made in Hague by unilateral

declaration of Secretary Clinton on negotiation with the Taliban and its conditionality. The issue of human security and regional solution at the London Conference of 2006, aid efficiency and anti-

corruption debate at the Paris Conference of 2008, and security issues like maximization of security of Afghanistan by enhancing

the number of troops to 134,000 and the deployment of new US troops to back up the War were the core of this phase of path dependency. And by holding three conferences in three years

Karzai made sure to remain the most desirable man for engaged countries and ensured their support for the upcoming Presidential

elections.

194 UNODC-United Nations Office for Drug and Crimes, “Afghanistan Opium Survey

2010: Winter Rapid Assessment,” February 2010, p.1


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CHAPTER FIVE:

THE LOCK-INS PHASE: FROM LONDON 2010

to BONN 2011


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FROM LONDON 2010 to Bonn 2011

In regard to the situation prior to the London Conference 2010, a

survey showed that 62% of people still believe that Afghanistan is going into the right direction that showed faith in the process.195

Pointing out the progress Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin say “In October 2009, the ISAF had an estimated 71,000 troops from 42 countries and the U.S. General Stanley McChrystal took the lead of

NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan, in June 2009.”196 An ISAF resource in regard to this issue added that “Between November

2009 and August 2010, the US increased its troops commitment to ISAF from 31,855 to 78,430; ISAF‟s member countries present in Afghanistan increased from five nations to a total of 47 nations;

and non-US troop numbers increased from 35,845 to 41,390. Between mid-2009 and today, Australia‟s troop strength increased

from 1,090 to an average of around 1,550.”197 On the opposite side, the Taliban made the year-2009 the deadliest year for the allied troops.198 Furthermore, “The government of Afghanistan has made

many progresses including the 22% reduction in poppy cultivation last year and increase in the number of poppy free provinces from 6

in 2006 to 20 in 2009.”199 Concerning the popular events, the controversial Presidential

Election (2009) took place in August with the participation of 4.5

million out of 17 million eligible voters. As a result, Karzai took the lead with 48% of votes composited 2.1 million votes.200 Not

only showed it that Karzai does not have his previous popular support but also the controversy over the elections results intensively damaged the legitimacy of his government outside the

country. In this chapter we are going to analyze the two

195 Ibid, p.38 196 Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, “NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic

Alliance,” Congressional Research Service, December 3, 2009,

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf> (Aug 11, 2011), p.1 197 Fact Sheet: The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), August 06, 2010, p.1 198 Ibid, p.2 199“Afghanistan: The London Conference Communique,” January 28, 2010,

<http://centralcontent.fco.gov.uk/central-content/afghanistan-

hmg/resources/pdf/conference/Communique-final> (Aug 11, 2011), p.8 200 Independent Election Commission, Presidential Election 2009,

<http://www.iec.org.af/eng/content.php?id=3&cnid=15> (accessed Aug 20, 2011)/


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international conferences on Afghanistan that were held in 2010 that demonstrate the entrance into the new stage of partnership between Afghanistan and the international community.

1. LONDON CONFERENCE: JAN 28, 2010

According to Newsahead, the conference was held to organize a political and security timetable for post 2010 Afghanistan and was co-chaired by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, President

Hamid Karzai and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.201 More than 60 countries and organizations attended in this one day

gathering, reported CNN News. The resource added that the central focus of the Conference were withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and negotiation with the Taliban.202 Another big

purpose of this Conference as noted in the Communiqué was calling long term support of international community to

Afghanistan. In addition, Rhoda Margesson very narrowly defines the purposes of this Conference which are transition of security responsibilities from international troops in Afghanistan to Afghan

security forces in connection with the President Obama‟s new strategy toward Afghanistan announced on December 1, 2009.203

Paul Reynolds-BBC correspondent, pointing out to the second part of the agenda „Negotiation with the Taliban‟ says that the main objective of this gathering was to give the Western media the faith

that besides hard measures „War on Terror‟ soft approaches like negotiation and diplomacy are also should be taken into

consideration to get out of the War in Afghanistan.204 Critics have different reflections regarding this gathering. As

Ali Jalali says, “The Conference was supposed to be held in Kabul

but for some political reasons (the General Election in the UK)it did not happen . Therefore, the agenda was divided into two parts

that in London Conference International Community will present its commitment and in Kabul Afghan government will present its work plan to the international community.”205 Paul Reynolds in

regard to the status of host state and general elections in the UK adds, “Governments tend only to call such conferences when things

201 “London: British prime minister hosts conference on Afghanistan,” Newsahead, 28 Jan

2010 <http://www.newsahead.com/preview/2010/01/28/london-28-jan-2010-british-

prime-minister-hosts-conference-on-afghanistan/index.php> (Aug 15, 2011). 202 CNN News, “Afghan conference sets deadlines for NATO handover,”

<http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-28/world/uk.afghanistan_1_taliban-fighters-afghan-national-army-afghan-president-hamid-karzai?_s=PM:WORLD> (Aug 15, 2011). 203 Rhoda Margesson, “United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background

and Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service, December 27, 2010, p.8 204 Paul Reynolds, “Aims of the London conference on Afghanistan” 205 Interview with Ali Ahmad Jalali (Bishkek, 3rd Sep, 2011).

http://www.newsahead.com/preview/2010/01/28/london-28-jan-2010-british-prime-minister-hosts-conference-on-afghanistan/index.php

http://www.newsahead.com/preview/2010/01/28/london-28-jan-2010-british-prime-minister-hosts-conference-on-afghanistan/index.php

http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-28/world/uk.afghanistan_1_taliban-fighters-afghan-national-army-afghan-president-hamid-karzai?_s=PM:WORLD

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are going badly.”206 Moreover, Daniel Korski called the conference a highly politicized empty meeting and „a waste of time and money‟. The author pointed at a critical issue that Karzai‟s

government was not ready for this Conference. Firstly, the disputes over the results of Presidential Elections were not yet solved.

Secondly, Karzai‟s list of proposed cabinet was approved partially by the Representatives‟ House. So that, Karzai had many excuses to get rid of benchmarks and conditions put by international

community while supporting his second term presidency. Consequently, as Thomas Rutting was quoted by Daniel Korski,

“the international community participated in the Conference while they had nothing to measure”.207

a. Withdrawal of Foreign Security Troops from Afghanistan

The decision of engaged nations to pull out their troops was

perceived differently by reviewers. While NATO countries considering it the real time of delivery, the opponents were considering it as leaving the mission incomplete „unlocking the

path created in Bonn 2001‟. Paul Reynolds argues that this unilateral decision was such a strong pressure on Afghan

government to prepare itself for fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.208 Former British ambassador to Moscow, Sir Rodric Braithwaite pointing out the negative impact of this decision on the

negotiation process argues that the Taliban might not negotiate with Karzai and his foreign allies and will wait till the end of

foreign troops‟ withdrawal.209 In regard to reasons for the withdrawal, Myra MacDonald

defines the weak morale and reluctance in the West as key factors

behind this decision.210 In reality, as some says ISAF had three options: To continue the war when there is no progress; to deploy

more troops to increase the possibility of winning; and starting political dialogue and diplomacy.211 Therefore, ISAF voted for the

206 Paul Reynolds, “Aims of the London conference on Afghanistan,” bbc.co.uk, 28

January 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8480368.stm> (Aug 15, 2011). 207 Daniel Korski, “Cancel the London Afghanistan Conference,” Spectator.co.uk January 07, 2010 <http://www.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/5689683/cancel-the-london-

afghanistan-conference.thtml> (Aug 15, 2011) 208 Ibid, 209 Ibid 210 Myra MacDonald, “London meeting marks sea-change in Afghan approach,” London, January 27, 2010

<http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&source=hp&q=london+conference+2010+on+afg

hanistan&aq=f&aqi=g-j1&aql=&oq=> (Aug 15, 2010). 211 IKV Pax Christi, “Afghanistan, Three Scenarios for ISAF: Plea to restore the political

prerogative,” October 28, 2007,

http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=530

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last two options which meant an increase in the number of troops as well as enhancing the number of Afghan National Army to 171,600 and the Afghan National Police to 134,000 by October 2011,

besides opening the door for negotiations.212 Withdrawal did not mean leaving the war, but to approach it

through all the possible ways. President Barack Obama, in first December 2009 announced, “Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and

Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future. We must reverse the Taliban‟s momentum and

deny their ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan‟s security forces and government so that they can take the lead responsibility for

Afghanistan‟s future.”213 According to Subhash Kapila, handover of security responsibilities to Afghan Forces without touching upon

the real source of insecurity „Pakistan‟s Affiliation with the Taliban‟ that needed to be neutralized left a large vacuum.214

b. Negotiation with the Taliban

As the military was not considered the only means to stability in

Afghanistan, Karzai‟s strategy to reintegrate the Taliban was supported strongly and US$ 500 million was pledged to facilitate its implementation.215 Participants welcomed the Afghan

government “plans to convene a Grand Peace Jirga before the Kabul Conference.”216 From Sir Nigel Sheinwald who believes in

conspiracy of the UK and the US behind this diplomacy,217 to Subhash Kapila who has faith in the initial role of „Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and Karzai‟s government‟ this decision received

different reflections.218 Steve Coll articulates that Washington and

<http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/files/Documenten/Afghanistan/Afghanistan%20Report%20

Oct%202007%20Eng.pdf> (Aug 13, 2011), pp.2,5 212 CNN News, “Afghan conference sets deadlines for NATO handover,” 213 President Barack Obama, “Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual

Review,” West Point, December 1, 2009

<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/101216_541.pdf> (Aug 19,

2011), p.1 214 Dr. Subhash Kapila, “Afghanistan: London Conference 2010 A Strategic Failure,” South Asia Analysis Group, Paper no. 3643, Feb 02, 2010

<http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers37%5Cpaper3643.html> (Aug 15, 2011). 215 CNN News, “Afghan conference sets deadlines for NATO handover,” 216 Ibid, p.4 217 Sir Nigel Sheinwald - the British ambassador to the United States, “The London Afghanistan conference: seize the chance,” January 25, 2010

<http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/25/the_london_afghanistan_conference_se

ize_the_chance> (Aug 15, 2011). 218 “Negotiation with the Taliban was the sole dream of Pakistan (to legitimize their

support of the Taliban) was backed by the UK and Saudi Arabia, the up -coming British

http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/25/the_london_afghanistan_conference_seize_the_chance

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its allies were not sharing the ambition of a prosperous democrat Afghanistan anymore as they were considering success in absence of war, not in existence of peace.219 However, Antonio Giustozzi is

positive about negotiation. According to him, both the Taliban and foreign troops are frustrated enough and have realized that this will

not have any winner, so that peace is exactly the equilibrium from which both side can equally benefit. 220

Furthermore, Subhash Kapila argues that „NATO and West‟

were deceived to support for the idea that the Taliban is a solution ,while the Taliban‟s Quetta Council has never broken up with Al

Qaeda. Furthermore, the US started to negotiate with a group, which according to the US Defense Minister-Gates “was a Pakistani imposition… paid by Pakistan‟s Army…not a grass-roots

insurgency that originated from the soil of Afghanistan…”221 In conclusion, very clearly the path was broken in the

London Conference. Withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan meant weakening the commitments to Afghanistan. Negotiation with the Taliban at the cost of justice, democracy,

women rights, and sovereignty of Afghanistan was another element of the new path. Furthermore, the Conference finished while new

questions emerged; who are the disconnected Taliban? Will they be forgiven? Are the Taliban not terrorists? Will this idea help the Taliban to legitimize their movement? Will the withdrawal of

Foreign Troops lead Afghanistan to be surrendered to Pakistan‟s ISI? Was it rational (in the West part) to allow Pakistan to play the

lead in the negotiations with the Taliban and legitimize their support of insurgency? Did the negotiations with the Taliban at this stage mean buying up their leaders and a start of „divide and role

game‟? And so forth.

2. KABUL CONFERENCE: JULY 20, 2010

In the one day conference which was co-chaired by the United Nations and the Afghan government, more than 70 countries and

organizations attended. Secretary Hilary R. Clinton recognizing the Kabul process as a foundational stone for a very difficult journey

General Elections and ineluctability of Karzai due to damaged image of him as a

fraudulent President that needed to be repaired by attending this Conference as legitimate

President were the master plans behind this „political meeting‟.” (Subhash Kapila,

Afghanistan: London Conference 2010 A strategic Failure) 219 Myra MacDonald, “London meeting marks sea-change in Afghan approach,” London, January 27, 2010

<http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&source=hp&q=london+conference+2010+on+afg

hanistan&aq=f&aqi=g-j1&aql=&oq=> (Aug 15, 2010). 220 Ibid, 221 Ibid,




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considered it a new phase in which the Afghan government owns a comprehensive and practical strategy for the future and the international community follow the leadership of Afghanistan.222 In

this concern, the Kabul Conference Declaration states the Kabul Process is featured in Afghan leadership and ownership.223 From

the author‟s perspective, the Conference itself was a symbolic event showing that the Afghan government has the capacity to host a meeting with such a large number of important diplomats; U.N.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton

and delegations from more than 70 nations and organizations.224 According to Ali Ahmad Jalali “It was a duplicate of London 2010 with the difference that the Afghan government had the upper hand

in Kabul Conference.”225 The agenda of the Kabul Conference was focused on a large variety of issues; anti-corruption, anti-narcotics,

gender and children rights, social and economic development, peace-reconciliation and reintegration, security and regional cooperation.226 In regard to the public reaction, it is notable that “In

poll after poll, Afghans put their top three needs which are better security, better economic prospects and less corruption.”227

The Security issue attracted serious attention of participants. In this regard, transition of security responsibility and negotiation with the military opponents were the main focus. Secretary H. R.

Clinton concerning the handover of responsibility to Afghan forces made it clear that withdrawal of troops is not equal to leaving

Afghanistan, and the US has a long-term commitment to Afghanistan. Furthermore, completion of the transition process under joint NATO-Afghan province based evaluation till 2015 and

increasing the number of Afghan security forces to reach the target of an army of 171,600 and police of 134,000 by October 2011 was

222 Press Release, “Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Intervention at Kabul Conference,” July 20, 2010, U.S. Department Of State-Office of the Spokesman,

<http://kabul.usembassy.gov/kabulconferencespeech-clinton-21710.html> (Aug 17,

2011). 223 Kabul Conference Communiqué, July 20, 2010,

<http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/official-texts/Communique%20-%20Kabul%20International%20Conference%20on%20Afghanistan%20-

%2020%20July%202010.pdf> (Aug 16, 2011), p.1 224“76 delegations attended this event.” See: UN Security Council Resolution, A/65/552–

S/2010/463, 14 Sep, 2011, p.2 225 Interview with Ali Ahmad Jalali, (Bishkek, 3rd Sep 2011). 226 Ibid, pp.3-5 227 Royal United Services Institute, “Afghanistan in Transition,” Workshop Report, May

13, 2011

<http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/RUSI_KAS_TI_Afghan_Roundtabl

e_Afghan-Transition-Reshaping-Priorities.pdf> (Aug 14, 2011), p.4

http://kabul.usembassy.gov/kabulconferencespeech-clinton-21710.html

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promised in the Conference.228 Professor Thomas Johnson criticized the premature decision of partner countries in the statement: “almost no Afghan National Army units were currently

able to operate independently of international support.”229 However, Secretary General of the UN-Ban Ki-moon stated in the

Conference, “Let us also be clear - just as Afghans are taking greater responsibility for governance and development, so must they take greater responsibility for security as well.”230 This simply

meant that the donor countries asked Afghanistan that if it can lead the civil part of the construction process, it should lead the military

one as well. But, for people of Afghanistan withdrawal meant “the return of the Taliban to power.”231

Moreover, peace initiative was developed further at this

moment. Karzai requested from the United Nations Security Council Resolution the removal of some senior Taliban‟s name

from the (UNSCR) 1267 Sanctions list as per submitted proposal of the Afghan government.232 While President Obama‟s Administration was against exclusion of Mula Omar from the black

list in disagreement to Karzai‟s list,233 Secretary Clinton, asked Karzai not to give up the rights of women, minority groups, and

civil society as a price for negotiation with the military opposition.234 Additionally, the international community supported the outcomes of Consultative Peace Jirga,235 and appreciated

President Karzai‟s decree on establishment of Peace High Council.236

Concerning to the outcomes of the Conference, international community “restated their strong support for channeling at least

228 Kabul Conference Communiqué, pp.3-7 229 BBC News, “Conference endorses Afghan goal for security handover,” July 20, 2010,

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10687527> (Aug 17, 2011). 230 “In quotes: Afghanistan conference,” bbc.co.uk, July 20, 2010

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10696362> (Aug 17, 2011) 231 Ibid, p.12 232 Ibid, 233 Robert D. Lamb, Mehlaqa Samdani, and Justine Fleischner, “Afghanistan's National

Consultative Peace Jirga,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 27, 2010

<http://csis.org/publication/afghanistans-national-consultative-peace-jirga-0> (Aug 13,

2011). 234 Press Release, “Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Intervention at Kabul

Conference,” 235 “The NCPJ took place in 2-4 June 2010 in Kabul with the participation of 1,600

delegates representing the parliament, Provincial Councils, religious scholars, tribal

leaders, civil society organizations, Afghan refugees residing in Iran and Pakistan” See: World Security Network, “Afghanistan: The National Consultative Peace Jirga

Resolution” June 08, 2010,

<http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=18314> (Aug 12,

2011). 236 Ibid,

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50% of development aid through the Afghan Government‟s core budget,”237 and aligning 80% of their development assistance with Afghan national priority programs within two years.” 238 While,

previously only 15% of aid was channeled through the government.239 Mr. Zakhilwal pointing out the problematic aspects

of previous policy of channeling less money through the government added, “The money spent since 2001 sometimes has financed temporary programs or unsustainable projects that will not

make a long-term difference in the daily lives of Afghan citizens. 77 % of the $29 billion in international aid spent in Afghanistan has

been disbursed on projects with little or no input from Afghan government officials.”240 To ensure the execution of assistance aid, the Afghan counterpart pledged to design Afghan national priority

programs by the end of October 2010.241

THE KABUL PROCESS

The post Kabul Conference debates are laid on the two pattern of transition of security responsibility to Afghan security forces and

negotiation with the Taliban. “The transition itself is coincided with four other transitions. Security Transition by 2014, Political

transition in the frame of presidential elections 2014 in Afghanistan, economic transition as to end of large bulk of money put to back up security forces of Afghanistan, and finally

negotiation with the Taliban and agreement on a settlement.”242 While, NATO Summit in 20 November 2010, from one hand

declared the start of transition in early 2011 and its completion in 2014, in another part defined the transition not as a calendar driven but conditional based process based on the evaluation of each

province and district.243 Furthermore, it was clarified that transition is irreversible.244 Dr. Raja Mohammad Khan states, “The decision

237 Ibid, p.2 238 Alessandro Marrone, “Afghanistan in Transition: The Security Context Post -Bin

Laden,” Institute of International Affairs, IAI Working Papers 11, June 13, 2011,

<http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1113.pdf> (Aug 11, 2011), p.9 239 Interview with Ali Ahmad Jalali, (Bishkek, 3rd Sep 2011). 240 Hossein Fatemi, “Kabul Conference: Afghanistan Wants More Control over Foreign Donations,” Associated Press July 19, 2010

<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/19/kabul-conference-afghanis_n_650749.html>

(Aug 17, 2011). 241 Kabul Conference, pp.3-5 242 Interview with Ali Ahmad Jalali, (Bishkek, 3rd Sep 2011). 243 Press Release, “Lisbon Summit Declaration,” No.155, Nov 20, 2010,

<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease >

(Aug 17, 2011) 244 Claire Taylor, “Afghanistan: The Timetable for Security Transition,” International

Affairs and Defense Secion, SN/IA/5851, May 11, 2011

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made at Lisbon Summit was indeed a compulsion, forced upon their leadership by the people of the European nations.”245

Most importantly, the US case of withdrawal apparently

differs from other partners. While for some meant good bye to Afghanistan, Secretary Hilary Clinton assured that the mistake of

1990s will not be repeated: “We made the mistake of leaving Afghanistan once before, and it became a safe haven for terrorism, a failed state, in the control of the Taliban.”246 Moreover, President

Obama made it clear to the audience of the conference, “One thing I am pretty confident, that we will still be doing after 2014 is

maintaining a counter-terrorism capability.”247 U.S. has clearly told to the regional actors and the Taliban that even 2014 is not the deadline for the withdrawal from Afghanistan. In 22nd March 2011,

President Karzai announced the first phase of transition in which the handover will take place in seven cities: Bamyan, Kabul,

Panjshir, Herat, Helmand, Balkh and Lagman.248

<http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/UKHC-Timetable-Security-

Transition.pdf> (Aug 19, 2011), p.8 245 Dr. Raja Mohammad Khan, “Lisbon Summit: An Endorsement of U.S Role in

Afghanistan,” Opinion Maker, Nov 20, 2010, <http://www.opinion-maker.org/2010/11/lisbon-summit-an-endorsement-of-u-s-role-in-afghanistan> (Aug 18,

2011). 246 Greta van Susteren, “Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton with Fox,” US

Embassy in Kabul, July 20, 2010, <http://kabul.usembassy.gov/clintontalkwithfox.html>

(Aug 16, 2011) 247 Analysts believe that “the U.S has strategic role to play for maintaining its global

domination. To be in Afghanistan, U.S must have some excuses. So far, U.S has kept

alive its own-trained leader of al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban. Nuclear Iran

and Pakistan, besides checking extension of china in the region” See: ibid, 248 Ibid, p.10


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What Happened before the Bonn Conference 2011? In between the Kabul and Bonn conferences, many events took

place. The assassination of the head of High Council for Peace and Reconciliation on 20th of December, Tripartite Meeting in Istanbul

on 04th of October, the Partnership Agreement between India and Afghanistan on 11th of November, and Traditional Loya Jirga from 16th till 20th of November. This process though was complex, but

created a new direction for Afghanistan. From one hand, the Partnership Agreement signed with India and from another hand,

the Afghan-American strategic partnership approved by the Grand Assembly ,these could be considered as big achievements in this particular time. But at the meantime, the assassination of ex-

President Professor Rabbani as a failure and Istanbul meeting without any tangible result affected and broadened the challenges

further. This is true that the peace negotiations was taken serious

more than ever at this time . But, the assassination of ex-President

Burhanuddin Rabbani, by the Taliban which allegedly was planned in Quetta City of Pakistan damaged the optimism on the ground for

peace.249 Besides serious condemnation of this catastrophe, President Hamid Karzai stated that this is time for amending our peace strategy. This declaration bolded three points: admitting the

fact that Pakistan‟s ISI strongly supports the Taliban and Haqqani network. As a result, according to him, if the Taliban are dependent

to ISI then it is logical to negotiate with the mainstream source (ISI) not with their puppets (the Taliban). At last, if the insurgency route is not located in the Afghan soil but in Pakistan‟s territory

then it is rational to transfer the anti-terrorists operations to the other side of the Durand line.250 Furthermore, the fact that Lt Gen

Bucknall stated that “The Taliban has been reduced to a terrorist group, adopting terroristic tactics, he told the Guardian,”251 defining them a nonnegotiable party makes the duty of government

harder ever. Although, Karzai‟s government has always had seasonal strategy toward the Taliban in terms of condemning them

one day and calling them brother another day, but the late improvement in recognition of the right for the Taliban to have an

249 Interview with Lutfullah Mashal, Spokesperson of Directorate for National Security,

Tolo TV, 26th September 2011, International Broadcast. 250 John Simpson, “Karzai accuses Pakistan of 'double game' over militants,” 3 October 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15154497> (Accessed Dec 09,

2011). 251 Jane M ingay, “West 'cannot turn back on Afghanistan' ” December 04, 2011,

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8934588/West -cannot-

turn-back-on-Afghanistan.html> (Accessed December 11, 2011).


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office in Kabul or any other Islamic country received good and bad reflections. While, some believe that having an address for the Taliban is a success and will help us succeed in peace negotiations,

on the other hand, it is a political failure for the Afghan government as this was not an Afghan initiative.252

Furthermore, Turkey as a mediator between Pakistan and Afghanistan hosted a tripartite dialogue in Istanbul with the participation of fourteen countries from the region. Critics said that

this meeting did not create any tangible result.253 Though, a little spark was created as parties agreed on the establishment of a joint

investigation committee to following up the case of ex-President Rabbani‟s assassination.254 According to Ahmad Majidyar, ignoring the assassination of Rabbani, who was called “an Afghan

patriot who sacrificed his life”255 by the President “will increase resentment and anxiety among other Northern Alliance leaders who

oppose political deals with the Taliban and accuse Karzai of cozying up to the terrorists.”256‟257 Moreover, according to the Express Tribune, after the assassination of Rabbani, “Karzai and

his aides decided to shift their efforts on putting pressure on Pakistan, which has allegedly provided aid and sanctuary to Afghan

insurgents.”258 But, the Istanbul meeting was a missed opportunity that did not create the pressure expected on Pakistan. At the present, as Talat Massud says, “Pakistan is not even considered an

ally, but sometimes as an enemy.”259 This will add to the ambiguity

252 Sayed Ishaq Gailani, Member of the Afghan Parliament, Panel Discussion on Peace

Negotiations, Kabul, Afghanistan, December 17, 2011. 253Nukhust Daily, “The Heavy Shadow of Istanbul Tripartite Meeting,” November 02,

2011, <http://www.nukhustdaily.com/index.php/2009-07-08-06-10-15/3705-2011-11-02-

04-15-09.html> (Accessed December 12, 2011) 254 “Tripartite Meeting in Istanbul,” November 02, 2011,

<http://www.trtdari.com/trtworld/en/newsDetail.aspx?HaberKodu=3e817ac2-de3d-4f06-

98fc-5c924469d4e7> (Accessed December 10, 2011) 255 Alissa J. Rubin, “Assassination Deals Blow to Peace Process in Afghanistan,”

September 20, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/world/asia/Burhanuddin-Rabbani-afghan-peace-council-leader-assassinated.html?pagewanted=all> (Accessed:

December 10, 2011). 256 Ahmad Majidyar, “What Does Rabbani‟s Assassination Mean?” the American

Enterprise Institute, September 20, 2011,

<http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/277783/what-does-rabbanis-assassination-mean-ahmad-majidyar> (Accessed December 11, 2011). 257 Jon Boone, “Burhanuddin Rabbani killing p lunges Afghanistan peace effort into

crisis,” Tuesday 20 September 2011,

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/20/burhanuddin-rabbani-killing-afghanistan-

crisis> (Accessed: December 11, 2011). 258 The Express Tribune, “Ruling out negotiations: „Taliban talks futile,‟” October 02,

2011 <http://tribune.com.pk/story/265098/ruling-out-negotiations-taliban-talks-futile/>

(Accessed: December 11, 2011). 259 D Parvaz, “Bonn conference on Afghanistan: Doomed to fail?” December 08, 2011

<http://nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/International/08-


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and complexity of peace negotiations that needs a combination of Afghan, regional and international solutions.

Traditional Loya Jirga was a further step addressing the

post 2014 challenges. Though it was not a constitutional Jirga and illegitimate from a legal perspective, but initially it was a call for

consultation on the future prospects of Afghan-American Strategic Partnership. After several days of discussions in a gathering of nearly 2000 elders from all over Afghanistan in Kabul, in 20th of

November the Jirga approved the bilateral partnership agreement with USA based on a seventy two conditions list. “Ending the night

raids and house searches, closure of American private prisons, conducting trails of American soldiers who committed crimes in Afghan judicial system, limiting the agreement to ten years and that

the military bases should not be placed near to residential areas and natural mines resources,”260 were the fundamental conditions

proposed by the participants of the Jirga. While, on the other hand, the quality of representation and participation in the Jirga was questioned by people calling them puppets and loyalists to

President Karzai.261 Another important event that took place was India-

Afghanistan Partnership agreement signed on 11th of November during an Official visit of President Karzai from New Delhi, while “Pakistan‟s security establishment would worry about potential

security cooperation between India and Afghanistan flowing from the strategic pact.”262 Mr. Gran Hewad says that several days prior

to this event, a partnership agreement was signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan but projected not very well by media.263 Sajjad Ashraf says, “A careful reading of the pact suggests that the

countries involved want to develop Afghanistan as a hub linking South and Central Asia since it sits in both regions.”264

Furthermore, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh “expressed his

Dec-2011/Bonn-conference-on-Afghanistan-Doomed-to-fail> (Accessed December 11, 2011). 260 “An Overview of the Loya Jirga Resolution Concerning Afghan American Strategic

Partnership,” Azadi Radio, November 21, 2011

<http://da.azadiradio.com/content/pressrelease/24396218.html> (Accessed December 11,

2011) 261 Tom A. Peter, “Afghanistan 'loya jirga' endorses lingering US presence, but in what

form?” November 20, 2011, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-

Central/2011/1120/Afghanistan-loya-jirga-endorses-lingering-US-presence-but-in-what-

form> (Accessed December 10, 2011) 262The Reuters, “India-Afghan strategic pact: the beginnings of regional integration,” November 11, 2011 <http://blogs.reuters.com/afghanistan/2011/11/11/india-afghan-

strategic-pactthe-beginnings-of-regional-integration/> (Accessed: December 11, 2011). 263 Mr. Gran Hewad, Analyst for Afghanistan Analysts Network, Panel Discussion on

Peace Negotiations, December 17, 2011, Kabul, Afghanistan. 264 Ibid,


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country's support in the fields of health, electricity, road construction, agriculture, capacity building and education and renovation of some historical sites.”265 However, some analysts like

Aditi Padnis says, “Aside from the strategic partnership agreement, memoranda of understandings were inked on hydrocarbons and

exploration of minerals – one of Afghanistan‟s most coveted and attractive assets.”266 He explained further that “the strategic partnership agreement would cover security cooperation, trade and

economic ties, as well as social and cultural exchanges.”267 Though by joining such an agreement some believes that Afghanistan has

selected a new direction for the future.Moreover the India Afghanistan partnership was highly welcomed by White House, mentioned Victoria Nuland, the US State Department

Spokeswoman.268 To define Afghanistan after many years of Westerners

presence, some criticizes that “the Afghan government‟s understanding from pluralism is to bring corrupt faces from all tribes based on compromise that bolds ethnic tensions.”269 On the

other hand, “A World Bank report has warned of the possible collapse of the Afghan economy, which is currently 90 percent

dependent on foreign aid, unless a potential annual shortfall of $7 billion is met.”270 Critics believe that “President Karzai‟s claim to fame is only for the fact that being listed by Transparency

International second only to Somalia in levels of perceived corruption worldwide in 2009.”271

265 Tolo-News, “No outside Interference in Afghanistan: Indian PM,”

<http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/2677-no-outside-interference-in-afghanistan-

indian-pm-> (Accessed December 11, 2011). 266 Aditi Phadnis, “Regional splash: Amidst discord with Pakistan, an accord with India,” The Express Tribune, October 4th of 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/266772/india-

afghanistan-sign-strategic-partnership-deal/> (Accessed December 9th 2011). 267 Ibid, 268“Recent Strategic Partnership Deal between India and Afghanistan,” October 06, 2011

< http://www.defenceblog.org/2011/10/us-welcomes-afghan-india-strategic.html > (Accessed December 11, 2011) 269 Ibid, 270Alex Spillius, “Hamid Karzai calls on foreign presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014 or

risk return to Taliban,” Bonn, December 11, 2011

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8934130/Hamid-Karzai-calls-on-foreign-presence-in-Afghanistan-beyond-2014-or-risk-return-to-Taliban.html>

(Accessed: December 11, 2011). 271 Fawaz A. Gerges, “Afghanistan is mission impossible,” December 02, 2009,

<http://articles.cnn.com/2009-12-02/opinion/gerges.impossible.mission_1_afghan-army-

afghanistan-president-hamid-karzai?_s=PM:OPINION> (Accessed: December 10, 2011).


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The International Bonn Conference on Afghanistan:

December 05, 2011 In a one day conference in ministerial level, delegates from 100

countries and 15 international NGOs were represented in Bonn.272 “The goal of this conference was to lay the groundwork for a free,

secure and prosperous Afghanistan,” stated Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany – Mr. Guido Westerwelle.273 The Bonn Conference focused mainly on three issues: security transition to

Afghan forces, long-term international aid for Afghanistan, and peace settlement with the Taliban.274 Moreover, the Afghan

government requested from international community that “€ 4.5 billion per year is needed to sustain the development till 2020,”275 but no pledge was made by the West in this conference. However,

Mr. Guido Westerwelle added that “the international community must stand ready for continued practical and financial supports to

Afghanistan.”276 In an analytical view, the Bonn Conference 2011 was different from previous conferences for two reasons: first, in this conference the elected representatives of Civil Society attended

the Conference; second, it was a totally Afghan led process but technically the German Federal cooperated in convening this

conference. While previously civil society was not taken seriously by international forces allegedly for the fact that “civil society is

deeply fragmented and splintered along tribal and sectarian lines with no concept of the collective good”277, but this time, the

272 Yasin Rasuli, “The Bonn 2 Conference and Insuring Afghanistan‟s Future without

Pakistan‟s Participation,” BBC Persian, December 05, 2011

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2011/12/111205_l30_bonn2_afghanistan_without_pakistan.shtml> (Accessed December 10, 2011) 273 “Afghan conference in Bonn opens with pledge for long-term help,” The Telegraph,

05th December 2011,

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8935153/Afghan-

conference-in-Bonn-opens-with-pledge-for-long-term-help.html> (Accessed December 09, 2011). 274 “Bonn conference on Afghanistan fails to achieve much,” December 08, 2011

<http://www.rediff.com/news/column/bonn-conference-on-afghanistan-fails-to-achieve-

much/20111208.htm> (Accessed: December 10, 2011). 275Bilal Sarwary, “Hamid Karzai makes plea at Afghanistan summit in Bonn,” 5 December 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16024332> (Accessed

December 10, 2011). 276 “Afghan conference in Bonn opens with pledge for long-term help,” The Telegraph,

05th December 2011,

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8935153/Afghan-conference-in-Bonn-opens-with-pledge-for-long-term-help.html> (Accessed December

09, 2011). 277 Thomas Ruttig, “Afghan Civil Society Forum in Bonn 1: Occupy the JCMB?” 03,

December 2011 <http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=2297> (Accessed December

9th of 2011)


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participation of civil society was really appreciated by international community. The representatives of Afghan Civil Society in Bonn Ministerial level Conference criticized international community for

investing more on „persons rather than institutions‟ and suggested that „the international community should take into account the

civilian aspects of transition rather than its military ones.278 Concerning the reconciliation, it was suggested by the Civil Society representatives that negotiation should be value based and not at all

costs. In this view, “Renunciation of violence, cutting of ties with al-Qaida and respect for the current constitution, and women

rights” should be considered as primary preconditions for negotiations.279

Though being successful in some aspects, critics argue that

participants of this conference were very conservative about the issue of Pakistan‟s intervention in internal affairs of Afghanistan.

For instance, Ahmad Majidyar said, "I don't think that this conference made any progress or had any achievements when it comes to reconciliation with the Taliban and the issue of Pakistan

as a big spoiler.”280 Moreover Pakistan did not attend the Bonn Conference apparently in reaction to the NATO air strike in

Momand Agency on 26th of November. Furthermore, Pakistan banned the NATO‟s Supply Road and closed down their base in Balochistan.281 Although Miss Hillary Clinton expressed in Bonn

that it unfortunate that Pakistan did not attend the Conference,282

some analysts believe that “by deciding not to participate in the

Bonn conference, whether advertently or inadvertently, Pakistani leadership is giving an impression that it does not want to settle the Afghan issue but might want to take it in another direction

altogether.”283 Furthermore, the daily times suggests that by cutting aids to Pakistan and stop calling Pakistan an ally to the War on

278 Ibid, 279 Ibid, 280 VOA News, “Bonn Conference Offers Few Details for Afghanistan Past 2014,”

December 06, 2011, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/---Bonn-Conference-

Offers-Few-Details-on-Supporting-Afghanistan-Past-2014-135103068.html> (Accessed December 11, 2011) 281 Ibid, 282 “Afghan conference in Bonn opens with pledge for long-term help,” The Telegraph,

05th December 2011,

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8935153/Afghan-conference-in-Bonn-opens-with-pledge-for-long-term-help.html> (Accessed December

09, 2011). 283 “Bonn conference on Afghanistan fails to achieve much,” December 08, 2011

<http://www.rediff.com/news/column/bonn-conference-on-afghanistan-fails-to-achieve-

much/20111208.htm> (Accessed: December 10, 2011).


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Terror it is needed to bring intensive pressure on this country.284 Some other believe that Pakistan‟s intervention affected the inter US-Pak relations negatively as well. For instance, quoted by

Guardian in 29 of November, Pakistan‟s Ambassador in London requested David Cameron-Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

for mediating between Pakistan and USA before it gets too late to be repaired.285

In conclusion, Bonn conference 2011 was a large platform

and great opportunity where the Afghan diplomats and the representatives of civil society could suggest new directions and

bold the mistakes and lessons learnt from the past. In this perspective a layout could have been portrayed for the future. But, some says, we do not learn from our past286, and the Bonn

Conference 2011 is an example of that as this gathering could not answer vague questions which are still without answers.

Representation of civil society though weak was an achievement that notably should be strengthened through more engagement of such institutions in bigger and important issues of Afghanistan.

Concerning negotiations, from one hand President Karzai says “If Pakistan's intelligence service is using the Taliban against

Afghanistan then it is needed to have negotiations with Pakistan, „not the Taliban.‟”287 But on the other hand, the High Council for Peace and Reconciliation, and some other critics believe that even

those Taliban, puppets of ISI should be negotiated.288‟289 The disagreement continues over negotiations as some believes that

there should be a red line not to cross them insisting on non-negotiability of the puppet Taliban and those who do not believe in women rights.290 At last line, Bonn did not bring blank check for

the Afghan government and it was a monologue rather than a mutual dialogue between Afghanistan and international

community.

284 Ibid, 285 Ibid, 286 Mr. Shah Mahmud Miakhel, “Panel Discussion on Peace Negotiation,” Kabul,

Afghanistan, December 17 of 2011 287 Rahim Faiez, Deb Riechmann and Patrick Quinn, “Afghan president says talks with

Taliban useless,” October 01, 2011, <http://www.bso-na.org/2011/Oct/001.html>

(Accessed December 10, 2011) 288 Shafiullah Nuristani, Member of High Council for Peace and Reconciliation, Panel

Discussion on Peace Negotiations, Kabul, Afghanistan, December 17 of 2011. 289 Shah Mahmud Miakhel, Country Director of US Institute for Peace, Panel Discussion

on Peace Negotiations, Kabul, Afghanistan, December 17 of 2011. 290 Sayed Ishaq Gailani, Member of Parliament, Panel Discussion on Peace Negotiations,

Kabul, Afghanistan, December 17 of 2011.


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CONCLUSION:

The ‘Final or Lock-ins Phase’ – from London to Kabul

In conclusion, the process from London 2010 to Bonn 2011 cannot

be featured fully as lock-ins in all aspects. If it still neglects transitional justice and continuous compromise with war criminals,

type of regime, and elections are not changed yet, but from another hand, negotiation with the Taliban and withdrawal of security forces can be considered as break ups in the lock-in phase. In

contrast to other Conferences, decisions were not made fully by donors and the Afghan government shared some of the power to

propose and recommend with more leverage. In comparison, London , Kabul and Bonn 2011 Conferences were not pledging conferences and Withdrawal of foreign troops and negotiations

with the Taliban created a new path that only 2014 can tell about its status.


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CONCLUSIONS

PATH DEPENDENCY AND INTERNATIONAL

CONFERENCES

In post 9/11 Afghanistan, Conference diplomacy has been a major practice. Nine International Conferences on Afghanistan from

Bonn 2001 to Bonn 2011 in a decade have showed how important these events were to Afghanistan. A variety of actors from all over

the world including G8 countries, NATO members, Afghanistan‟s neighbors, Islamic countries, and the UN friends of Afghanistan were participants of these conferences. As we looked through these

conferences from the point of view of a process, some points can be concluded: First, the host state to the Conference, from Germany

to Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Afghanistan, are important as to the actors role in the process. From the organization of a given conference to the setting of the

agenda and to imposing a decision, actors played their initial roles. For instance, the Afghan government as the central agenda of these

conferences and as the recipient state has never been satisfied with the outcomes of the conferences. Furthermore, the UN as a neutral not-profit seeking actor has played the role of balancer in all these

Conferences as discussed during the debates. Most importantly, as to the common proverb „who has money will decide‟ donors were

the decision makers in these conferences and it‟s worth mentioning that Afghanistan after a decade was conditionally authorized to consume only 50% of assistance aid only after 2010.

Starting from Bonn 2001 to Kabul 2010 the process has been top down. If participants of the Bonn Conference 2001 decided who

should lead, it was not a fully Afghan initiative. Who invited whom in this Conference? Were they authorized to decide on behalf of the Afghan people? Were the results in favor of people of Afghanistan?

Unfortunately, answers are not necessarily positive. However, some critics say it was not a peace talk but an emergency

Conference to select the chairperson.291 The Tokyo Conference of 2002, from the point of view of its outcomes, created a financial account of US$ 5.1 billion for Afghanistan, but owing to the

291 Interview with Ali Ahmad Jalali, (Bishkek, 3rd Sept 2011)


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approaches of its execution through foreign NGOs in some humanitarian and not sustainable era, it did not produce considerable long-term positive results for Afghanistan. Moreover,

the Berlin Conference of 2004 was an opportunity to overlook past mistakes and correct them, but again political issues like the

Presidential Elections of 2004 and the US-Iraq war (2003) heavily influenced the outcome of this gathering, as it did not bring considerable financial (not more than US$ 8.2 billion) and

personnel assistance to Afghanistan. Likewise, the London Conference of 2006 was exactly the

entrance to the intermediary phase of reconstruction path. New frameworks and new commitments were laid down, but were too general in terms of recommending a regional solution for inhibiting

drug trade and tackling the insecurity challenges. It is notable that the London Conference confirmed previous agreements and

conferences as its original path. The Paris Conference of 2008, like London, had mostly a fund-raising purpose at the top, and insecurity as well as drug trade remained in second and third

priority areas. The newest thing about this conference was that that it imposed measures to tackle the problem of inefficiency of

expenditure of assistance aid but it did not sort out the main reasons for it. In contrast, the Hague Conference of 2009 gave a hint for changes in the path. It was motivated by the fact that President

Obama, introduced changes in its relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Alternatively, the London Conference of 2010 was exactly the evidence of a clear path break putting an end to some of issues that were decided from Bonn to Paris and creating a new path.

Leaving Afghanistan without completing the mission and negotiation with terrorists or „unhappy brothers of Karzai‟ and

„loyal trainees of Pakistan‟ were the gifts of this meeting. Kabul 2010 was exactly the reflection of Afghanistan on London Conference 2010. It was such an immediate welcoming to the

outcomes of London Conference without consulting with the people of Afghanistan through referendum on the provision of the

new partnership. Replacing democracy, women rights, justice and achievement of ten yearlong efforts with compromise and negotiation with the Taliban is the new path or outcome of it. It will

be not so pessimistic to question the rationality of key actors why they come to Afghanistan if they try to bring back the defeated

forces back to power and the course Bonn conference 2011 is another trash paper.


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Studying the post 9/11 Afghanistan from the outlook of the Conferences the writer may raise some questions and invite the readers, researchers and policy makers to think and reflect on them,

while also providing some recommendations for the future.

1. Sorting good and bad partners

As we repeatedly discussed Pakistan in this thesis, the US administration, the Afghan government, and the regional actors

should understand that Pakistan has been a problem not a solution. More leverages of Pakistan in Afghanistan will not be tolerated

either by India, Iran or Russia and it will escalate the problem. Moreover, history shows that talking with the civil government of Pakistan has never benefited anyone. Therefore, the right solution

will be to call Pakistan‟s ISI as independent entrepreneur for the next Afghan talks. Otherwise and at last stage, the installation of

border between Pakistan and Afghanistan will be the indispensible option for the Kabul government to isolate itself from Pakistan with all the cost that it will bring.

2. The upcoming conferences on Afghanistan

The Chicago Conference to be held in USA should seriously consider these issues: First, any assistance aid pledged to Afghanistan should be channeled through the government to enable

it to solve all budgetary gaps and to invest them in sustainable national programs. Second, the donor states should monitor the

process and disburse money as they found that the previous disbursed amount has been consumed transparently. Third, participants from Afghanistan should cover a variety of actors;

including civil society, academicians, political parties, and most importantly from youth generation (not state sponsored one) and

from females that composite more than 50% of Afghanistan‟s population. Furthermore, the Conference should give the participants enough time to present, defend and lobby for their

recommendations. Most importantly, the top down trend should be replaced or combined with a bottom-up process to sustain

commitments and create a more realistic vision for Afghanistan. Moreover, before any conference agenda should be revealed to the people and in a referendum the vote of people should be collected

as in reality no one presents the interests of all the Afghans.

3. Path reform is a required step

The international community once again should call all afghan parties to Afghanistan problem to debate a number of issues.

Centrality of power, the presidential system with one man at the


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top, non-transferable voting in multiple mandate system, and the existed constitution are all parts of the problem. Intensive work should be done in favor of decentralization of Afghanistan with the

vision to permit the south and the east to have a fundamentalist Islamic regime, as they wish, and for the rest of the country the

secular form of statehood to revive their ancient cultures of Khurasan and Ariana (the present day Afghanistan) when it was considered a relatively enlightened nation. A parliamentary system

to ensure the real representation of all nationalities in government structures in both local and national level is part of the solution. For

that, a transparent national census of Afghanistan „including the factor of ethnicity of the citizen‟s approved by international observers is a necessary step to this end.

4. Afghanistan: a transit nation

The writer of this thesis in defense of Friedrick Star‟s Silk Road Initiative, admits that the issue of centrality of Afghanistan as a transit route in Asia should be given more importance in all

upcoming conferences. The paper recommends that instead of spending 50% of budget on security institutions, the transport field

should be given first priority. Establishing rail road within provinces of Afghanistan to link south to the north and west to east and then to link with its neighbors, is sustainable and profitable for

Afghanistan.

5. A neutral country versus partnership agreement

For Afghanistan it will politically be proficient to keep its neutrality in regard to the Pakistan conflict with India, the Saudi

Arabia and the USA problem with Iran, and Tajikistan versus Uzbekistan. But, on the other hand, a new partnership agreement

with the US administration on the establishment of a permanent US military base should be signed only if it preserve Afghanistan‟s interest against Pakistan and second only if it assures a transit route

to Indian Ocean through Pakistan for Afghanistan in return to installation of border with Pakistan. In other words, Afghanistan

should sign this agreement only if US choose Afghanistan in any case versus Pakistan, otherwise; it is better to remain neutral in the region.


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Interview with Ana Hozyainova, Director of Research, Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization, (Bishkek, 3

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Interview with Dr. Volker Jacoby, Senior Economic and Environmental Officer at OSCE Center in Kyrgyzstan, (Bishkek, 3

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Bankdad, Teerdad. “Afghanistan-Iran Political Relation in Last Six Decades: Afghanistan‟s political relation with Iran from 1979 to 83 with Iran.” <http://www.mardomsalari.com/Template1/News.aspx?NID=21608> (accessed Apr 19, 2011). Bhadrakumar, M K. “Karzai's China-Iran dalliance riles Obama.” Asia Times Online. March 30, 2010. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LC30Df01.html> (accessed Mar 25, 2011). Christi, IKV Pax. “Afghanistan, Three Scenarios for ISAF: Plea to restore the political prerogative.” October 28, 2007. <http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/files/Documenten/Afghanistan/Afghanistan%20Repor t%20Oct%202007%20Eng.pdf> (accessed Aug 13, 2011) Eijsvoogel, Juurd and Mark Kranenburg,. “A new contract with Afghanistan,.” <http://vorige.nrc.nl/article2198834.ece> (accessed Aug 01, 2011). Esfandiari, Golnaz. “Afghanistan/Iran: Relations between Tehran, Kabul Growing Stronger.” Pars Times. <http://www.parstimes.com/news/archive/2005/rfe/afghanistan_iran_relations.html > (accessed Apr 19, 2011). Fatemi, Hossein. “Kabul Conference: Afghanistan Wants More Control over Foreign Donations.” Associated Press, July 19, 2010 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/19/kabul-conference- afghanis_n_650749.html> (accessed Aug 17, 2011). Foley, Conor. “Statement by Afghan civil society groups at the Hague conference.” March 31, 2009. <http://liberalconspiracy.org/2009/03/31/statement-by-afghan-civil- society-groups-at-the-hague-conference> (accessed Aug 09, 2011). Gregory, Shaun. “The Pakistan‟s ISI and the War on Terrorism.” Pakistan Security Research Unit, January 24, 2008, Brief Number 28. <http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/Brief28finalised.pdf> (accessed Aug 16, 2011). Haideri, Ashraf. “Paris Conference: Aid Effectiveness Key to Addressing Afghanistan‟s Rebuilding Challenges.” June 11, 2008. <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav061208.shtml> (accessed Aug 06, 2011).

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http://www.parstimes.com/news/archive/2005/rfe/afghanistan_iran_relations.html


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TABLE 1: COMPOSITION OF THE INTERIM

AUTHORITY BASED ON BONN AGREEMENT

No NAME Department of/Chair

ETHNICI

TY

1 Dr. Sima Samar Vice Chair & Women Affairs

Hazara

2 Haji Moh. Mohaqiq Vice Chair and Planning Hazara

3 Sayed Mustafa

Kazimi Dep. Commerce Hazara

4 Sultan Hamid Sultan Dep. Transport Hazara

5 S. Hussein Anwari Dep. Agriculture Hazara

19 Amin Farhang Dep. Reconstruction Hazara

6 Hamid Karzai Chairman Pushtun

7 Hedayat A. Arsala Vice Chair and Finance Pushtun 8 Dr. A. Abdullah Dep. Foreign Affairs Pushtun

9 Aref Noorzai Dep. Small Industries Pushtun

10 Abdullah Wardak Dep. Martyrs and Disabled

Pushtun

11 Adul Rasoul Amin Dep. Education Pushtun

12 Suhaila Sediqi Dep. Public Health Pushtun

13 Abdul Khaliq Fazal Dep. Public Work Pushtun

14 Haji Abdul Qadir Dep. Urban

Development Pushtun

15 Haji Mangal Hussein Dep. Irrigation Pushtun

16 Amanullah Zadran Dep. Border Affairs Pushtun

17 Dr. Raheen

Makhdom

Dep. Information and

Culture Shiite

18 Moh. Hanif H. Balkhi Dep. Haj and Auqaf Shiite

20 Moh. Qasim Fahim Vice Chair and Defense Tajik

21 M. Yunus Qanooni Dep. Interior Affairs Tajik

22 Eng. Abdul Rahim Dep. Communication Tajik

23 Mirwais Sadiq Dep. Labor and Social Affairs

Tajik

24 Dr. Sharif Fayez Dep. Higher Education Tajik

25 Abdul Malik Anwar Dep. Rural Development Tajik

26 Abdul Rahman Dep. Air Transport and Tourism

Tajik

27 Enayatullah Nazari ? Tajik

28 Shaker Kargar Vice Chair & Water and Electricity

Uzbek


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29 Moh. Alem Razm Dep. of Mines and Industries

Uzbek

30 Abdul Rahim Karimi Dep. Justice Uzbek Source: Bonn Agreement Annex 4, pp.8-9


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TABLE 2: TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION’S

COMPOSITION

No Position Full Name Ethnic Group

1 Vice-President and Nematullah Shahrani Uzbek

2 Light Industries Minister Mohammed Alim Razm Uzbek

3 Justice Minister Abbas Karimi Uzbek

4 Water and Power Minister

Ahmed Shakar Karkar Uzbek

5 Labor and Social Affairs Minister

Noor Mohammad Qarqin

Uzbek

6 Vice-President and Defense Minister

Mohammed Fahim Tajik

7

Special Advisor on Security and Education Minister

Yunus Qanooni Tajik

8 Refugees Minister Intayatullah Nazeri Tajik

9 Higher Education Minister

Sharif Faez Tajik

10 Civil Aviation & Tourism Minister

Mir Wais Saddiq Tajik

11 Commerce Minister Sayed Mustafa Kazemi

Shiite Muslim

12 Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah Pushtun

13 Security Advisor Zalmay Rassoul Pushtun

14

State or Advisor-Minister for Women's Affairs

Mahbooba Hoquqmal Pushtun

15 President Hamid Karzai Pashtun

16 Vice-President Hedayat Amin Arsala Pashtun

17 Vice-President and Abdul Qadir Pashtun

18 Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani Pashtun

19 Interior Minister

Taj Moh. Wardak/ Ali Jalali

Pashtun

20 Communications Minister Masoom Stanakzai Pashtun

21 Borders Minister Arif Nurzai Pashtun

22 Mines Minister

Juma Muhammad Muhammadi

Pashtun

23 Health Minister Sohaila Siddiqi Pashtun

24 Reconstruction Minister

Mohammed Fahim Farhang

Pashtun

25 Haj and Mosques Minister

Mohammed Amin Naziryar

Pashtun

26 Urban Affairs Minister

Yusuf Pashtun/Gul Agha Sherzai

Pashtun


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27 Irrigation & Environment Minister

Ahmed Yusuf Nuristani Pashtun

28 Martyrs and Disabled Minister

Abdullah Wardak Pashtun

29 Rural Development Minister

Hanif Asmar Pashtun

30 Supreme Court Chief Justice

Hadi Shinwari Pashtun

31 Governor of the Afghan Central Bank

Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi Pashtun

32 Vice-President Karim Khalili Hazara

33 Planning Minister Mohammed Mohaqqeq Hazara

34 Agriculture Minister Sayed Hussain Anwari Hazara

35 Information and Culture Minister

Saeed Makhdoom Rahim

Hazara

36 Transportation Minister

Saeed Mohammed Ali Jawad

Hazara

37 Woman's Affairs Minister Habiba Sarabi Hazara

38 Public Works Minister Abdul Ali Hazara

Source: International Crisis Group, “The Loya Jirga one Small Step Forward.” Asia Briefing, No 17, May 16, 2002.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south- asia/afghanistan/B017-the- loya-jirga-one-small-step-forward.aspx> (accessed June 21, 2011)





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TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF INTERNATIONAL

CONFERENCES ON AFGHANISTAN

Bonn Conference 2001

Phase Agenda Security Donation Top Donors

initial

phase

selecting the

composition of

Interim

Authority and

setting an

outlook for post

Interim period

Requesting

immediate

deployment

of ISAF to

secure Kabul

not a

pledging

conferenc

e

not a pledging

conference

Tokyo Conference 2002

initial

phase

a pledging

Conference

general

debate

($ 4.5 b)

aid to

Afghanist

an for

two years

EU ($1.5 b), WB,

ADB, and Japan

each ($500

million), Great

Britain ($288 m),

US ($269m) and

Saudi A($220m).

Berlin Conference 2004

initial

phase

presenting the

progress, raise

fund, request

increase number

of troops

pledging

deployment

of more 1,500

NATO forces

reaching it to

9,000 mainly

the US and

then UK,

Germany,

Spain and

Italy.

($ 8.2 b)

aid for

next three

years

USA ($ 2.9 b), EU

($2.18 b), WB

($900 m), EC ($774

m), UK ($ 569 m),

ADB ($560 m),

Japan ($400 m)

India and Canada.

London Conference 2006

interme

diary

phase

fund raising,

renewing the

complements,

and presenting

the progress

NATO's

completion of

the fourth

phase of its

expansion to

the South and

East

Afghanistan.

Talks about

regional

sources of

instability in

Afghanistan.

($10.5 b)

aid for

next five

years

USA ($ 4 b), WB

($1.2 b), ADB ($1

b), UK (885 m),

Germany ($ 480

m), and Japan ($

450 m).

Paris Conference 2008


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interme

diary

phase

fund raising,

approving the

review of

Afghan National

Development

Strategy

the decision

of NATO

summit on

approving the

PRT pattern

was endorsed

($ 21 b)

aid for

next five

years

USA ($ 10.2 b),

ADB ($ 1.3 b), UK

($ 1.2 b), WB (1.1

b), and EU ($ 770

m).

Hague Conference 2009

interme

diary

phase

Obama's new

policy,

upcoming

election, and

security

situation

deployment

of 17,000 US

combat troops

plus US 4,000

military

trainers, plus

5,000 NATO

troops, talks

about

sanctuaries of

Taliban and

Al Qaeda in

Pakistan,

($100 m)

aid to

back up

the

upcoming

election

USA ($ 40 m).

London Conference 2010

lock-

ins/

new

path

Withdrawal of

foreign troops,

and negotiation

with the

Taliban.

Increasing

number of

Afghan forces

to 171,000

soldiers and

134,000

police.

($ 500 m)

to back

up

reintegrat

ion of the

Taliban.

not a pledging

conference

Kabul Conference 2010

new

path

Anti-corruption,

anti-narcotics,

security, good

governance, rule

of law, regional

dialogue, and

reconciliation.

Announcing

the start of

transition

2011 and its

completion

2014. Talks

about

trilateral US,

Afghan-Pak

solution.

not a

pledging

conferenc

e

not a pledging

conference

*b means billion **m means million


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TABLE 4: NON US/FORIEGN TROOPS DEPLOYED TO

AFGHANISTAN

Month Number Month Number Month Total Number

2-Feb 5,000 June 9,700 9-Jan 31,880

March 5,000 August 15,000 February 31,520

April 5,000 Sept 18,000 March 32,140

May 4,500 October 20,000 April 32,175

June 5,000 Nov 21,000 June 32,280

Sept 4,700 Dec 21,000 July 34,550

3-Apr 5,000 7-Jan 21,460 October 36,230

Sept 5,000 March 21,750 Dec 38,370

4-Apr 5,500 April 21,750 10-Feb 38,710

June 6,000 May 24,000 March 38,890

August 6,500 July 24,250 April 40,139

Sept 8,000 Sept 26,043 June 41,070

October 10,000 October 30,177 July 41,315

Nov 9,400 Dec 26,703 August 41,389

Dec 8,500 8-Feb 28,250 October 40,432

5-Jan 9,000 April 28,000 Nov 40,930

February 8,000 June 29,350 Dec 41,730

June 8,000 Sept 29,810 11-Feb 41,893

August 10,500 October 30,100 March 42,203

Dec 9,000 Nov 31,150 May 42,400

6-May 9,000 Dec 31,400 June 42,381

Source: Ian S. Livingston and Michael O‟Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-

9/11 Afghanistan.” Brookings, July 31, 2011 <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afg

hanistan%20index/inde x.pdf> (Aug 18, 2011), pp.4


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TABLE 5: SIZE OF AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES ON DUTY

Month of the Year

Defense Forces Police Forces Total

End 2003 6,000 0 6,000

End 2004 24,000 33,000 57,000

End 2005 26,000 40,000 66,000

End 2006 36,000 49,700 86,000

End 2007 50,000 75,000 125,000

8-Apr 57,800 79,910 137,710

8-Oct 68,000 79,910 147,910

9-Mar 82,780 79,910 162,690

9-Jul 91,900 81,020 172,920

9-Nov 95,000 95,000 190,000

9-Dec 100,131 94,958 195,089

10-Mar 113,000 102,000 215,000

May-10 119,388 104,459 223,847

10-Aug 134,000 109,000 243,000

10-Sep 138,164 120,504 258,668

10-Oct 144,638 116,367* 261,005

10-Dec 149,533 116,856 266,389

Feb-11 152,000 118,800 270,800

11-Apr 164,003 122,000 286,003

Source: Ian S. Livingston and Michael O‟Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan.” Brookings, July 31, 2011

<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/inde x.pdf> (Aug 18, 2011), pp.6


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TABLE 6: FOREIGN AID TO AFGHANISTAN IN US $

BILLIONS

DONOR Total Pledged from (2002-2013)

AID Disbursed

Percentage of Pledges Disbursed by the end of 2009

US 38 10.9 28.80%

EU Institutions 2 2.1 102.80%

United Kingdom 2.9 1.8 63.30%

Germany 1.2 1.3 108.00%

Canada 1.7 1.2 70.30%

Japan 1.9 1 52.50%

Netherlands 0.8 0.8 102.40%

Norway 0.9 0.7 71.00%

India 1.2 0.4 36.10%

Sweden 1.3 0.4 147.30%

Italy 0.5 0.4 79.60%

Turkey 0.2 0.4 213.70%

Australia 0.4 0.4 98.80%

Iran 0.9 0.3 39.50%

Spain 0.5 0.3 59.80%

Denmark 0.7 0.3 40.20%

France 0.2 0.2 105.90%

Finland 0.2 0.1 97.00%

Russia 0.1 0.1 104.10%

Switzerland 0.1 0.1 102.90%

Multilateral Agencies

5.3 2.7 50.60%

Others 5.9 0.7 12.30%

TOTAL 62 26.7 43.10%

Source: Ian S. Livingston and Michael O‟Hanlon, “Afghanistan

Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan.” Brookings, July 31, 2011

<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/inde x.pdf> (Aug 18, 2011), pp.32