Pervasive Subjectivism

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International Phenomenological Society

Pervasive SubjectivismAuthor(s): Marvin FarberSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Jun., 1965), pp. 527-533Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105439.

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PERVASIVESUBJECTIVISMI

In our time, subjectivism as become the most importantphilosophicalexpressionof the interest n overcoming initude.Its historicalprogenitorsgo back to St. Augustine, Descartes,Berkeley, and Kant. The uncon-cealed,obviousform in whichsubjectivismirst appearedprominently nthe modernperiodwas opposed by equallydirectarguments, ulminatingin the realisticcritiqueof idealism. It is a curiousfact that few of thoseconcernedwere convincedby the other side.New forms of subjectivismhave emerged, in such ways that the old,clearly discerniblealignment of views is no longer in evidence. Whatseemsat firstto be a ratheramorphousmassof materialwithout a direc-tion turnsout to be a kind of centralstreamwithnumerous ributaries ndoutlets. Some basic strandsof unity may be found, highlightedby unityof oppositionto importantculturalforces of the twentiethcentury, andfidelity to the appeal to subjectivity as the starting point and touchstoneof philosophy. Because the latter is not always explicitly acknowledged,one is confrontedwith covertas well as overtformsof subjectivism.Thevariousforms of subjectivismproceed from the Cogito or acknowledgeits primacy,which allows considerablengenuityof operations,while in-suringa basic relatedness n the final outcome.Subjectivisms a title for the type of idealismthat proceedsfrom thenature of knowingto the nature of reality.In its generalmeaning, t in-cludes at least threedifferent ypes:(1) the epistemologicaldoctrinethatin knowingone knowsonly the contentsof the mind;(2) the metaphysicaldoctrinethat all existence s spiritual,or constitutedby the mind,usuallyan absolutemind; (3) a reflectiveprocedure, ntroducedas a peculiarlyphilosophicalmethod for the purposeof examining he nature of knowl-edge and experience,and to contribute o the clarificationof our basicconcepts. The last-namedtype may be viewed as an auxiliary philo-sophicalprocedure,as one amonga number of methods.When overex-tended,however, t turnsout to be a way to a philosophy f immanence.Again,it maybe misusedwhenadopted or the purposesof a philosophyof existence, or of a philosophyof humanexistence. The point is, torecognize he properfunctionof a subjectivistic rocedure n philosophy.

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528 PHILOSOPHYNDPHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHIf methods are devised and instituted to solve problemsor to answerquestions,everythingdependsupon a clearunderstandingf the questionscapableof being answered n terms of subjectivism.The most overt form of subjectivism o emerge - and it presentsasexplicita declaration f its identityas has ever appeared was phenome-nology at the hands of EdmundHusserl.Subjectivismwas projectedasthe only appropriatephilosophy.So long as it remainedmethodologicalin its aims, led by the ideal of the descriptiveanalysisof all modes ofexperience,there was impressiveclarity, and there were rewarding n-sights. When the attentionturnedto ontologicalquestions, and to thecritique of science-orientedphilosophies,however, the methodologicalclaritygave wayto elementsof troubledobscurityandfrustration.t soonbecame apparenthat the Cogito was not equipped o cope withproblemsof the world. Pure phenomenology transcendental onstitutivephe-nomenology could not yield a theory of existence.It founderedon theproblemof existence,which was to be accountedfor in terms of pureconsciousnessandits activities,and whichcould simplynot be accountedfor on that basis. The methogenic roblemof existencewas the chiefsource of embarrassmento a methodthatwas grosslyoverextended.Theknife'thatwas suitedfor cutting was to be used as a paintbrushand todevisemathematical roofs as well. To try to accountfor existence tselfon the basis of pure consciousexperience s just as hopeless an under-taking.Overt subjectivismhas the meritof declaring tself to be what it is. Itdoes not pretend o be what it is not. It can be examinedand appraised,both in its own termsand from anothermethodologicalperspective.Covertforms of subjectivism ften speakof the world andof existenceas though they were the real thing, seeminglyembracingall that is con-veyed by natural experienceabout the naturalworld.But it is not longbefore one encounters he subjectivisticprinciple,referredto briefly asthe Cogito. This is seen in the case of Heidegger,whose talk of beingand existenceled many to supposethat he had emancipatedphilosophyfrom a subjectivisticul de sac intowhichit had eventuatedwith Husserl.

IIThe premiseof subjectivisms also present n Merleau-Ponty'sersion

of phenomenology, s seen in his Phenomenologyof Perception.'It is arathermixed subjectivismhat results,with indebtedness o Husserl andHeidegger. Instead of deliveringthe whole realm of existence to anabsolute subject,the argumentoperateswith mundaneand subjectivistic1 Cf. 'M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, tr. by Colin Smith, TheHumanities Press, New York, 1962.



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PERVASIVEUBJECTIVISM 5'29factors,with an individualsubjectthe point of reference.Time or tem-poralityprovidesthe crucialtest. It is deniedthat time can be regardedas characterizing he field of existence in or by itself, and time isascribed to subjectivity.The reasons given are specious, and recallidealistic enetsof a bygonegeneration.Thus the phenomenologicalworldis said to lay downbeing, ratherthan to bringa preexistingbeing to*expression.Merleau-Ponty maintains (op. cit., p. 410) that existencecannot be anything - spatial, sexual, temporal - without being so inits entirety ... with the result that an analysis of any one of them ...touches upon subjectivitytself. To make sure that time involves sub-jectivity s the primary oncern.Thus if a personsays that a glacierhadrecentlyproduced he waterthat is passingat this moment,he is said tobe, tacitlyassuming he existenceof a witnesstied to a certainspot inthe world (p. 411). Now one must considerwhether his witnessrepre-sents a dogma that must be granted,or whetherthat should not begranted,on simplegroundsof fact. One shouldreexamine he disclosureof the world that is supposedto be effected.In Merleau-Ponty's iew,thereare no events withoutsomeoneto whom they happen. That isfalse for naturalevents.It shouldread, thereare no experiencedeventswithoutsomeone to whom they happen, and then it would be simplyanalytic.The contentionthat time presupposesa view of time couldonly applyto experienced ime.To arguethat time s not a realprocess, andthat itarisesfrom myrelationto things, s to cast the shadowof the Cogitoover the field ofexistence,if not to circumscribexistencetherewith.But one cannotdealso lightlywith time. If I can consider t frommy pointof view, it can beconsidered rom innumerable ther points of view. An egocentricviewof time is not the only one. Neither does it disposeof temporalityas auniversal eatureof eventsin the sense of independentnaturalexistence.One can speak of existence as an unfinishedwhole. But one can alsospeakof the eventsmakingup the processof existence n relationshipovariousframesor standardsof reference, ncludingother physicalevents.In Merleau-Ponty'siew, theobjectiveworldis too muchof a plenumfor thereto be time. If it is made to be a plenum,time can be pushedoff as a secondarykind of featureof existence, as. nvolvinga subject orexperienceand existence. Hence the location of time is so crucial inontology.Existencemay be talked about as such, if not in toto, butnot profitablyfor very long. It occurs piecemeal,with successionsofevents that are distinguishableo observers.That innumerable ventsdonot dependuponor involve observers or theirseparateand distinct raitsandtheirrelationshipso one another, s a matterof fact. Thetigerkillingits prey, withouta witness;the stone rollingdown a hill and crushinga

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530 PHILOSOPHYNDPHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHplant, or moving another stone, or raising dust - such events do notdepend upon a knower.If the questionis asked in turn, as to how oneknows that,one realizesthat the reward hat was once offeredto anyonewho could producean object that is not knownhas not been forgotten.It seems that every peoplemustpass through hat stage of argumentation.It is unavoidable hat there be talk of transcendencerom a subjectivepoint of view. Thatsignifiesa meansof deliverancerom the self-imposedlimitations of one's analysis.Transcendences at once a wheelhorseofsubjectivism,and a majorinstrumentof concealment.That the world isviewed as inseparable rom the subject and the subject as inseparablefrom the world, representsa limitationof existencein accordancewiththe idealistictradition.The only way to sustainsuch a thesis would beto define the world in relationship o a subject.That the world remainssubjective can be maintainedonly with the help of the subject'smovement of transcendence in the words of Merleau-Ponty,p. 430).It is not surprising, herefore, to have the spotlightin many countriesturned on a more or less perplexing or mysterious transcendence.Where there is subjectivism,there must be at least the word tran-scendence.That Merleau-Pontywas well aware of some importantobjectionstohis positionis shownby a crucial questionhe cites (p. 432). What aboutthe world before man's appearanceon it? To his assertion that there isno world without an Existence that sustains its structure, there is theobjection that the world preceded man, that the earth may be the onlyinhabited planet, so that his view may seem to be incompatible with themost firmlyestablished acts. It is evidentthat such objectionsare citedwith the speedy aim to undermine hem. There turn out to be miscon-ceived facts. Merleau-Ponty's ext shows,how he employs a familiartype of argument.He asks what precisely is meant by saying that theworld existed before any human consciousness? Such words as earth,nebula, life, etc., like every equation in physics, are said to presupposeour prescientific xperienceof the world. He adds, in the spirit ofBerkeley,that nothingwill ever bring home to my comprehensionwhata nebulathat no one sees could possibly be ; that Laplace'snebula isnot behind us, at our remote beginnings, but in front of us, in the culturalworld. It would be desirable for the outcome of the issue to adhereunflinchingly o that thesis. The statement hat there s no world withouta being in the world s taken to mean that consciousness lways, indsitself alreadyat work in the world. This mustbe examinedcarefully, odetermine n what sense it is at work. Whatdoes it do? The naturethat is granted is,not that of the sciences. It is a kind of uncontamin-ated nature, whichperceptionpresentsto me.



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PERVASIVEUBJECTIVISM 531The emphasis s on what is presentedto me. In basic conformity oHusserl'sgeneral view, Merleau-Ponty tates that another person willnever exist for us as we exist ourselves (p. 433). As he expressesit,we neverfeel in him as we do in ourselves he thrust of time-creation.It will be asked whether existingfor us is the only conditionofexistencethat has meaning.That questionmust be askedin the contextof establishedknowledgeand experience.Even if egology s recognizedas a specialtype of inquiry,the claim to greatercertaintyof existencefor me can be challengedon groundsof truth.Consider,for example,a workerand his foreman, or a mother and her child. What appearstoone person,or what exists for one person,is just as truly other persons

as anythingpertainingo his own body;and those other personsare notnecessarily imited to existencefor me. It can be arguedwith com-pellingevidencethat otherpersonsand the world of natureare as trulyexistentas I am, with my conscious processes.The latterwould not beat all without other persons and the world of nature. Should not aphilosopheracknowledgeat least that much?III

Special interest attaches to the critical reaction of Eugen Fink toHusserl'sphilosophy,in view of his close associationwith the greatphenomenologistn his last period.2The criticalreaction s by no meansa total one. Thus, he acknowledgeshat all sciencespresupposehe life-world, and arise in it, althoughthey soon pass beyond it. The impas-sioned belief of phenomenologyn the possibilityof a radical new be-ginningof philosophyappearsto Fink to be a rejectionof historyas thoughthe ballast of centuriescould be pushed aside in an attemptto beginanew with the thingsthemselves. He asks whether he method-ological revolutionof phenomenology s based upon a non-historicalnaivete. Thethingitself, as the themeof phenomnenologicalnquiry, snot, he notes, the existentas it is in itself, but ratherthe existentthat isessentiallyan object(Gegenstand),.e., an existentfor us. How the purebeingof an existent s related o the being-an-object f this existent,Finkpointsout, is rejectedas a false problem.But, he argues,this is the mostfundamentalproblemthat is avoidedby Husserlianphenomenology,be-cause of its avoidanceof speculative hought.That is because it decreesthat the existent s equivalent o the phenomenon, nd regardsa thingas an object-polein the structureof intentional ife or experience.A thing is disclosedfor intentionalanalysisas the indexof manifoldselective contributions. As Fink expresses it, it is only due to the

2 Cf. E. Fink, L'analyse ntentionelle, in Problemes Actuels de la Phinomenol-ogie, edited by H. L. Van Breda, Desclee de Brouwer, Paris, 1952, pp. 54-87.

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PERVASIVESUBJECTIVISM 533The emphasisupon radicalism, he sloganthat everythings a ques-tion, made possibleby the universalsuspensionof beliefs, representsastep towardfreeingthe mind for philosophicalpurposes.But since thissuspensionof beliefs eventuates in pure transcendental ubjectivity,with essentialrelationsalone in question, t is not sufficient or the com-pletely unprejudicedmind, free from prejudgments r presuppositions.Even a pure nvestigatorwill find it necessaryto work constantly ninformedcooperationwith naturaland social scientists,and to be awareat all timesof the truthsof everydayexperience.Thereis reallya doublesuspension, nvolvingthe logical challengeof all statements or theirevidenceand justification;and the subjectivistic hallengethat all state-mentsbe tested in the light of direct experienceunderthe conditionsofpure intentionalanalysis.Restrictingthe analysis to essences does notfree one from the order of passingevents, for essencesmay proveto beoutmodedby referenceto the changingworld. In short, subjectivismrepresentsa specializedmode of inquiry.It must howeverbe employedsubject to the requirement hat it be subordinated o a general meth-odology, recognizing hat it has been developedto handle one type ofquestion,but that it is incapableof handlingall types of question,eitherfor philosophyor for science. A good subjectivismcan only be a sub-jectivism hatknowsits limits,- ndits ownpeculiarpotentialities.Whetherits functions can be reformulatedand expressedwithout residuuminnaturalistic ermswill be developedfurther n later discussion.

MARVIN FARBER.STATE UNIVERSITYOF NEw YORKAT BUFFALO.

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