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No.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
RANDY W. TUNDIDOR, PETITIONER
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT.
_____________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
_____________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
CAROL STAFFORD HAUGHWOUT Public Defender GARY LEE CALDWELL Assistant Public Defender Counsel of Record Office of the Public Defender Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida 421 Third Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 (561)355-7600; (561) 624-6560 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
CAPITAL CASE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Did the Supreme Court of Florida err in concluding, contrary to
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), that a jury’s unanimous
“advisory sentence” per se makes harmless the imposition of a sentence
under a statute that violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment?
2. Did the state court, err in affirming Petitioner’s death sentence
even though, contrary to Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341
(1985), the trial court told the jury that its advisory sentence would be a
recommendation not binding on the court?
3. Did it violate the Due Process Clause that there were pending
criminal charges against the trial judge who denied Petitioner’s motion
for new trial and sentenced him, and was Petitioner deprived of his
right to effective assistance of counsel in so far as counsel filed an
untimely motion to disqualify the judge?
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...................................................................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................... iii
OPINION BELOW .................................................................................... 1
JURISDICTION ........................................................................................ 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..................................... 2
STATEMENT ............................................................................................ 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ........................................ 9
I. The Florida Supreme Court erred in applying its rule of finding Hurst error automatically harmless when the jury’s advisory sentence recommendation is unanimous. .............................................. 9
II. The death-sentencing procedure used in this case did not comply with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as the jurors were repeatedly told by the court that their advisory sentence would be a recommendation and not binding. ....................................................... 15
III. Since the trial judge faced criminal prosecution by the State, due process required her removal from the case. So far as counsel botch the motion to disquality the judge, Petitioner was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. ............................................................. 19
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 26
INDEX TO APPENDICES
Appendix A - Decision of Supreme Court of Florida .............................. 1a
Appendix B – Order denying rehearing ................................................ 25a
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) ......................................... 10
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1946) .................................. 18
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) ................................................ 17
Buck v. Davis, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) ..................................... 17
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (I985) .................................. passim
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) ................. 19
Cozzie v. State, 225 So. 3d 717 (Fla. 2017) .......................................... 11
Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 174 (Fla. 2016) ....................................... 10
Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923) ..................................................... 21
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) ........................................ 22, 23
Glover v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S810 (Fla. Sept. 14, 2017) ........... 11
Guardado v. Jones, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S552 (Fla. May 11, 2017) ..... 11
Hall v. State, 212 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 2017) ........................................... 11
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) ........................................... passim
Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) ................................................ 13
Jones v. State, 212 So. 3d 321 (Fla. 2017) ........................................... 11
Kaczmar v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S127 (Fla. Jan. 31, 2017) ........ 11
King v. State, 211 So. 3d 866 (Fla. 2017) ............................................. 11
Knight v. State, 225 So. 3d 661 (Fla. 2017) ......................................... 11
Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002) .......................................................... 23
McCloud v. State, 150 So. 3d 822 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) .......................... 25
Middleton v. State, 220 So. 3d 1157 (Fla. 2017) ................................. 11
Morris v. State, 219 So. 3d 33 (Fla. 2017)............................................ 11
iii
Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 998 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ........ 24, 25
Oliver v. State, 214 So. 3d 606 (Fla. 2017) .......................................... 11
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) ..................................................... 23
Porter v. State, 895 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) ............................ 26
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) ...................................................... 10
Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) ............................................ 8, 17
Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993) ............................................. 4
State v. Oliu, 183 So. 3d 1161 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) ................................. 21
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 276 (1993) ............................................ 13
Tundidor v. State, 221 So. 3d 587 (Fla. 2017) .......................................... 1
Tundidor v. State, SC14-2276, 2017 WL 2794223 (Fla. June 28, 2017) .. 1
Statutes
§ 921.141, Fla. Stat. (2009) ..................................................................... 15
28 U.S.C. 1257(a) ....................................................................................... 2
Rules
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.231 ................................................................................ 5
Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330 ......................................................................... 8
Constitutional Provisions
Amend. VI, U.S. Const. ....................................................................... 2, 9
Amend. VIII, U.S. Const. ...................................................................... 2, 8
Amend. XIV, U.S. Const. ................................................................... 2, 8, 9
iv
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_____________
No.
RANDY W. TUNDIDOR, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT.
_____________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
_____________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
_____________
Petitioner Randy W. Tundidor respectfully petitions for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida in
this case.
OPINION BELOW
The decision of the state supreme court (App. A) is reported as
Tundidor v. State, 221 So. 3d 587 (Fla. 2017). The order denying
rehearing (App. B) is not officially reported, but may be found at
Tundidor v. State, SC14-2276, 2017 WL 2794223 (Fla. June 28, 2017).
1
JURISDICTION
The state supreme court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and
sentences on April 27, 2017. App. A. It denied rehearing on June 28,
2017. App. B. On September 25, 2017, Justice Thomas granted
petitioner’s application to further extend the time to and including
November 25, 2017. Because that day is a Saturday, the petition is due
on Monday, November 27, 2017. This Court has jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. 1257(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed … .
The Eighth Amendment provides:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-ments inflicted.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law … .
2
STATEMENT
Petitioner was convicted of one count of first-degree murder, two
counts of attempted first-degree murder, two counts of armed
kidnapping, one count of armed burglary, two counts of armed robbery,
and one count of arson in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Florida
(Broward County).
1. According to the State’s evidence, the crimes arose from a
dispute between Petitioner and his landlord, the victim of the murder.
The State’s case rested largely on the testimony of Petitioner’s
drug-addicted son, Randy H. Tundidor, referred to as “Junior” in the
proceedings below.
Junior testified that, at Petitioner’s direction, he entered the
landlord’s home, tied up the landlord and his wife and took them to an
ATM to withdraw money. He then took them back to the home, after
which Petitioner entered and killed the landlord and tried to set the
house on fire in an apparent attempt to kill the wife and the couple’s
child. App. 7a-8a.
Various inmates testified that Junior had told them that he
committed the crimes with his brother Shawn and that Petitioner was
3
not involved in the crimes. App. 11a, 15a.
After the jury found Petitioner guilty of first-degree murder, he
waived presentation of mitigation at the proceeding at which the jury
made its advisory sentence recommendation. He did, however, contest
the State’s case for aggravating circumstances.
The jury returned an advisory sentence unanimously recommend-
ing a death sentence.
2. After the jury proceedings, which occurred in 2012, the trial
judge (Judge Imperato) was arrested for drunk driving on November 6,
2013. At the time of her arrest, there was a hearing scheduled for
November 12 for presentation of evidence and argument as to the
sentence pursuant to Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
When court convened on November 12, Judge Backman presided,
saying that Judge Imperato had been relieved of her criminal caseload:
“As you know, Judge Imperato has, on her request, been transferred out
of criminal; and I have been asked to take over the division. What I
can't tell you is if or when she will ever be back. My thought is,
obviously, I can't do a Spencer hearing.” Trial court transcript, 4327.
The Assistant State Attorney argued that “the only way Judge Imperato
4
should be removed” would be if she could not longer proceed due to
death or disability under Florida Criminal Rule 3.231. (Rule 3.231 sets
out the procedures governing a substitute judge who has over a case
mid-trial or during posttrial proceedings.) Judge Backman replied that,
for the case to go back to Judge Imperato, “each and every one of you,
including Mr. Tundidor, would have to waive the issue presented by her
situation.” Id. at 4330. Defense counsel said Petitioner objected to
Judge Imperato returning to the case and that there should be a new
trial or sentencing with a new judge. Id. at 4331-32. The prosecutor said
that the defense needed “to put whatever they are asking for in
writing,” and the judge agreed. Id. at 4332.
Judge Backman continued the case to December 2. On that date,
he said that the case was still Judge Imperato’s. Defense counsel
immediately objected. Id. at 4343-44.
Three days later, on December 5, defense counsel filed the motion
to disqualify Judge Imperato. Trial court record, page 802. Judge
Imperato denied the motion.
During the course of subsequent proceedings, the defense
presented evidence from additional inmates who said that Junior had
5
denied that Petitioner was involved in the crimes.
Eventually, Judge Imperato denied Petitioner’s motion for new
trial, which concerned the credibility of various witnesses who testified
at trial and in post-trial hearings, and sentenced him to death, finding
five aggravating circumstances and seven mitigating circumstances.
3. On appeal, Petitioner argued that his death sentence was
unconstitutional because it was imposed by use of the statute found
unconstitutional in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) (holding
unconstitutional statute providing that judge, rather than jury, was to
make predicate findings to allow death sentence), and that the error
was not harmless.
The Supreme Court of Florida acknowledged that, as stated in
Hurst, a jury’s “mere recommendation is not enough” to satisfy the
Sixth Amendment, App A, 21a, but it then held that the constitutional
error was harmless because the jury’s unanimous advisory sentence
recommendation cured the Hurst error:
The standard for evaluating whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt “is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the [sentence].” Id. at 68 (quoting DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1139) (alteration in original). “As applied to the right to a jury trial with regard to the facts necessary to impose the death penalty, it must be
6
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have unanimously found that there were sufficient aggravating factors that outweighed the mitigating circumstances.” Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 174 (Fla. 2016), petition for cert. filed, No. 16–8569 (U.S. April 3, 2017); accord Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 67–68.
In this case, the penalty phase jury returned a unanimous recommendation for a sentence of death. “[This] recommen-dation[ ] allow[s] us to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have unanimously found that there were sufficient aggravators to outweigh the mitigating factors.” Davis, 207 So. 3d at 174. Further:
Even though the jury was not informed that the finding that sufficient aggravating [factors] outweighed the mitigating circumstances must be unanimous, and even though it was instructed that it was not required to recommend death even if the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, the jury did, in fact, unanimously recommend death. From these instructions, we can conclude that the jury unanimously made the requisite factual findings to impose death before it issued the unanimous recommenda-tions.
Id. at 175 (citation omitted).
Thus, we conclude that the State has sustained its burden of demonstrating that any Hurst error in Tundidor’s penalty phase was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury unanimously found all of the facts necessary for the imposition of the death sentence by virtue of its unanimous recommendation. Accordingly, Tundidor is not entitled to a new penalty phase.
App. 21a-22a.
Petitioner also argued that the death sentence was improperly
7
imposed because the jury was repeatedly instructed that its sentence
determination was advisory and not binding, contrary to Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985) and Romano v. Oklahoma, 512
U.S. 1, 8 (1994) (“We have also held, in Caldwell v. Mississippi, that the
jury must not be misled regarding the role it plays in the sentencing
decision.”). The state supreme court necessarily rejected this argument
in affirming the death sentence.
With respect to the motion for disqualification of the judge,
Petitioner argued that the trial court should have granted the motion
under state law and he was denied his rights under the Due Process
and Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses of the federal
constitutions. Amends. VIII, XIV, U.S. Const.
The State argued in response that counsel had failed to file the
motion within the 10-day time period allowed for such a motion under
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330(e) (“A motion to disqualify
shall be filed within a reasonable time not to exceed 10 days after
discovery of the facts constituting the grounds for the motion.”).
Petitioner replied that, so far as defense counsel failed to file a
proper motion within the required time period, he was deprived of his
8
right to effective assistance of counsel under the Counsel and Due
Process Clauses. Amends. VI and XIV, U.S. Const.
The state supreme court held that counsel did not file the motion
within the rule’s ten-day time period:
Tundidor argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to disqualify the trial judge after the guilt and penalty phases but before the Spencer hearing. Because the motion was untimely, we affirm its denial.
A motion to disqualify must be filed within 10 days after discovery of the facts that are the grounds for the motion. Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(e).
In this case, the trial judge’s DUI arrest on November 5, 2013, was the basis for Tundidor’s motion. The arrest was public knowledge on November 6, 2013, yet Tundidor did not file the motion until December 5, 2013. Because the motion was filed well outside of the 10–day timeframe, it was untimely.
Therefore, the motion was properly denied because it was untimely.
App. 16a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT ERRED IN APPLYING ITS RULE OF FINDING HURST ERROR AUTOMATICALLY HARMLESS WHEN THE JURY’S ADVISORY SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION IS UNANIMOUS.
In Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), the Court held that
Florida’s death penalty scheme violated the Sixth Amendment,
9
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002), because it left to the judge the determination of the
facts required to allow a death sentence—specifically (1) whether there
were sufficient aggravating circumstances to justify a death sentence
and (2) whether they were not outweighed by the mitigation.
In so holding, the Court ruled that the State “cannot now treat the
advisory recommendation by the jury as the necessary factual finding
that Ring requires.” Id., __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. at 622. The Court
remanded for harmless error review.
In the present case, the state supreme court acknowledged that
the unconstitutional statutory scheme was used at bar, but held that
the error was harmless under its case law holding that such error is per
se harmless if the jury’s advisory recommendation for a death sentence
is unanimous. App. 37a-38a.
In this regard, the court cited its prior decision in Davis v. State,
207 So. 3d 142, 174 (Fla. 2016), which held that a unanimous advisory
sentence recommending a death sentence made Hurst error harmless
per se. App. 38a.
Both Davis and the present case are part of a line of cases in
10
which the Florida Supreme Court has applied the unanimity test in
finding Hurst error harmless in every single case where there has been
a unanimous jury recommendation. See Guardado v. Jones, 42 Fla. L.
Weekly S552 (Fla. May 11, 2017); Cozzie v. State, 225 So. 3d 717
(Fla. 2017); Morris v. State, 219 So. 3d 33 (Fla. 2017); Middleton v.
State, 220 So. 3d 1157 (Fla. 2017); Oliver v. State, 214 So. 3d 606
(Fla. 2017); Jones v. State, 212 So. 3d 321 (Fla. 2017); Hall v. State,
212 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 2017); Kaczmar v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly
S127 (Fla. Jan. 31, 2017); Knight v. State, 225 So. 3d 661 (Fla. 2017);
King v. State, 211 So. 3d 866 (Fla. 2017).
Likewise, the Florida court has “consistently held that Hurst
error is not harmless in cases where the jury makes a non-
unanimous recommendation of death.” Glover v. State, 42 Fla. L.
Weekly S810, 816 (Fla. Sept. 14, 2017).
The effect of the state supreme court’s ruling was that,
contrary to Hurst, it treated the jury’s advisory sentence
recommendation “as the necessary factual finding that Ring requires.”
Hurst, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. at 622. Thus the court’s harmless error
analysis is an end run around Hurst, establishing a per se rule of
11
affirmance.
The Florida Supreme Court’s use of this per se unanimity test to
determine harmless error is improper and unconstitutional.
First, as Hurst stated, an advisory sentence recommendation is
not a substitute for the necessary fact finding.
An advisory sentence recommendation does not amount to fact
finding such as to warrant the automatic conclusion that the failure to
make the required fact finding is harmless. Where a jury is informed
that its advisory sentence is merely a recommendation and not binding
there is an unconstitutional diminution of the jurors’ responsibility.
There is a danger jurors will make symbolic gestures (sending a
message against killing) rather than diligently weighing in on the
circumstances of the case and the defendant’s background—that
responsibility would fall on the actual sentencer. Using a jury’s advisory
recommendation as a determinative litmus test for harmless error is
improper.
Even where the error of diminishing responsibility was by
argument, rather than by instruction in a related Eighth Amendment
context in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (I985), the error was
12
not harmless although the jury’s verdict for death was, as required by
Mississippi law, unanimous.
The Florida Supreme Court seems to have fashioned its per se
rule of harmless to conform with its holding in Hurst v. State, 202 So.
3d 40 (Fla. 2016), that the jury’s advisory sentence recommendation
must be unanimous. But unanimity does not magically convert a
recommendation into the necessary factual finding that Ring requires.
The court may also have created its per se rule to avoid trying to
read the jurors’ minds. But such reasoning conflicts with Hurst, under
which trial judges may not substitute their findings for jury findings
even though they are present at the trial. It would be strange indeed to
say that an appellate court, even more removed than the trial judge,
may fill in the gap left by the absence of a jury verdict.
Second, the Florida Supreme Court’s application of harmless error
in this case was invalid because there was no valid jury verdict upon
which such an analysis could be based. As the Court explained in the
context of a defective reasonable doubt instruction in Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 276 (1993):
Once the proper role of an appellate court engaged in the Chapman inquiry is understood, the illogic of harmless-
13
error review in the present case becomes evident. Since, for the reasons described above, there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, the entire premise of Chapman review is simply absent. ... The most an appellate court can conclude is that a jury would surely have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt...[t]hat is not enough. The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury’s action...it requires an actual jury finding of guilty.
Id. at 279-80 (internal citations and punctuation omitted)
Justice Scalia explained for the Court: “A reviewing court can only
engage in pure speculation—its view of what a reasonable jury would
have done. And when it does that, the wrong entity judges the
defendant guilty.” Id. at 281 (internal citations and punctuation
omitted).
Because there should not be an automatic test in order to
determine harmless error and because there was no valid jury verdict
upon which a harmless error analysis could be based, this Court should
accept this case for review, and reverse the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision affirming petitioner’s death sentence.
14
II. THE DEATH-SENTENCING PROCEDURE USED IN THIS CASE DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS AS THE JURORS WERE REPEATEDLY TOLD BY THE COURT THAT THEIR ADVISORY SENTENCE WOULD BE A RECOMMENDA-TION AND NOT BINDING.
Petitioner was tried under a statute that made the judge the
finder of the ultimate facts authorizing a death sentence. See Hurst; §
921.141(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. (2009).
Pursuant to the statute, and to standard jury instructions adopted
by the state supreme court, the trial judge told Petitioner’s jury again
and again that punishment was the court’s responsibility and the jury’s
advisory sentence was a recommendation and was not binding. For
instance, the judge instructed the jurors: “It is now your duty to advise
the court as to the punishment that should be imposed upon the
defendant for the crime of First Degree Murder. … . As you have been
told, the final decision as to which punishment shall be imposed is the
responsibility of the judge. … . However, the law requires you to render
an advisory sentence as to which punishment should be imposed; life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or the death penalty.”
In Caldwell, the Court discussed the problems with informing the
jurors of the limits of their role in the death penalty context. In that
15
case, the jury heard through argument by the prosecutor that its capital
sentencing decision would be reviewed by the state supreme court.
This Court reversed the death sentence writing, “[i]n the capital
sentencing context there are specific reasons to fear substantial
unreliability as well as bias in favor of death sentences where there are
state-induced suggestions that the sentencing jury may shift its
responsibility to an appellate court.” Id., 472 U.S. at 330.
Because the jury’s sense of responsibility was improperly
diminished, the Court held that the jury’s unanimous verdict imposing
a death sentence in that case violated the Eighth Amendment and
required the death sentence to be vacated. Id. at 341 (“Because we
cannot say that this effort had no effect on the sentencing decision, that
decision does not meet the standard of reliability that the Eighth
Amendment requires”). The Court wrote that “it is constitutionally
impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a
sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for
determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests
elsewhere.” Id. at 328-29. Three dissenting Justices agreed in principle,
taking exception only to the majority’s characterization of the
16
prosecutor’s argument. Id. at 343-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
To establish error under Caldwell, a defendant “must show that
the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the
jury.” Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
In our case, the jury was repeatedly told that it was the court that
would ultimately determine the propriety of the death sentence and
that the jury’s role was merely advisory. This instruction improperly
described the role assigned to the jury under Hurst. Petitioner’s death
sentence violates the Eighth Amendment under Caldwell.
The fact that the jury heard about its diminished role from the
judge, rather than counsel, weighs even more heavily in favor of a new
sentencing proceeding. The argument of counsel is “likely viewed as the
statements of advocates,” as distinct from jury instructions, which are
“viewed as definitive and binding statements of the law.” Boyde v.
California, 494 U.S. 370, 384 (1990). See also Buck v. Davis, __ U.S. __,
137 S. Ct. 759, 777 (2017) (“A prosecutor is seeking a conviction. Jurors
understand this and may reasonably be expected to evaluate the
government’s evidence and arguments in light of its motivations.”).
17
“The influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and
properly of great weight, and jurors are ever watchful of the words that
fall from him. Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge’s last word is
apt to be the decisive word.” Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607,
612 (1946).
Unanimity does not cure an instruction which diminishes jury
responsibility. In Caldwell the diminishment of the jury’s responsibility
was not made harmless by the jury’s unanimous vote for death. In other
words, unless the jury is fully and adequately instructed as to its
responsibility, the jury’s unanimity will not decide the validity of the
death sentence.
Any reviewing court can do no more than speculate that all the
jurors would have voted for the prosecution, as to all necessary factors
and as to the final recommendation, had it been conveyed to them that
those decisions were theirs and theirs alone.
The instructions minimized the jury’s role and relieved them of
the weight that sentencing another human being to death would place
on one’s conscience. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 333 (“the uncorrected
suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate determination of
18
death will rest on others presents an intolerable danger that the jury
will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its role”).
The jury may have decided to “ ‘send a message’ of extreme
disapproval for the defendant’s acts” even if it was unconvinced that
death was the appropriate punishment, with the belief that if they were
wrong and advised death when the sentence should be life, the judge
would correct their mistake and spare his life. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at
331.
In these circumstances, the death sentence must be set aside
under Caldwell.
III. SINCE THE TRIAL JUDGE FACED CRIMINAL PROSECUTION BY THE STATE, DUE PROCESS REQUIRED HER REMOVAL FROM THE CASE. SO FAR AS COUNSEL BOTCH THE MOTION TO DISQUALITY THE JUDGE, PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
A. Although most issues concerning disqualification of a judge do
not rise “to a constitutional level,” it is still true that a “fair trial in a
fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
The question involves an “objective” inquiry to determine whether
19
the case involves a circumstance “in which experience teaches that the
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is
too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Id. at 877 (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
“The difficulties of inquiring into actual bias, and the fact that the
inquiry is often a private one, simply underscore the need for objective
rules.” Id. at 883. This objective inquiry considers “whether, under a
realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, the
interest poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the
practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
adequately implemented.” Id. at 883-84 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
In the present case, the judge’s arrest involved substance abuse
and she had to decide issues about the credibility of substance abusers.
She also had to evaluate evidence concerning Petitioner’s substance
abuse. Further, while facing her own criminal charges, she had to
assess the credibility of persons charged with crimes.
A realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human
weakness in these circumstances necessarily leads to the conclusion
20
that the judge’s disqualification was constitutionally mandated. And of
course she had a unique relationship with one of the parties—the State
was prosecuting her. Someone subject to prosecution by the State has a
strong incentive to curry the State’s favor.
B. The state supreme court did not dispute the foregoing, but
ruled that the defense attorney botched the filing of the motion by
missing the ten-day deadline.
But Petitioner’s claim was presented to the state court, and the
judge abused her discretion by not removing herself from the case. See
State v. Oliu, 183 So. 3d 1161, 1163 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (“Although we
have denied the petition, we note that rule 2.330(i) permits a judge to
enter an order of disqualification on his own initiative. Fla. R. Jud.
Adm. 2.330(i) (‘Judge’s Initiative. Nothing in this rule limits the judge’s
authority to enter an order of disqualification on the judge’s own
initiative.’).”).
On these facts, Petitioner fairly presented his federal issue to the
state court, so that there should be no bar to federal review.
In Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923), Wechsler brought suit in
state court for injuries on a railroad. The defendant “pleaded a general
21
denial and also that the Court was without jurisdiction” on federal law
grounds. Id. at 24. The complaint was later amended to name a
substituted defendant, who entered an appearance and adopted his
predecessor’s answer. On appeal from judgment for Wechsler, the
appellate court held that the successor defendant had waived the
federal jurisdictional argument by entering an appearance.
This Court determined that there was no bar to federal review,
with Justice Holmes writing for the Court: “Whatever springes the
State may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the
State confers, the assertion of Federal rights, when plainly and
reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice.
… . The state courts may deal with that as they think proper in local
matters but they cannot treat it as defeating a plain assertion of
Federal right.” Ibid.
This rule applies to criminal cases. In Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415 (1965), counsel objected and moved for a mistrial regarding the
State’s use of a co-defendant’s confession, saying that it was hearsay
and not subject to cross-examination. The state appellate court applied
a procedural default because he did not continue to object to the
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testimony about the confession. This Court ruled that Douglas had
fairly presented the ground for the objection to the judge, and wrote
that “an objection which is ample and timely to bring the alleged federal
error to the attention of the trial court and enable it to take appropriate
corrective action is sufficient to serve legitimate state interests, and
therefore sufficient to preserve the claim for review here.” Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. at 422. See also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)
(rejecting, on the basis of Douglas, claim that criminal defendant
procedurally defaulted federal claim in state court trial); Lee v. Kemna,
534 U.S. 362 (2002) (holding, pursuant to Douglas and Osbourne, that
criminal defendant did not default federal claim despite state court
ruling of procedural default).
C. Regardless, so far as there was a procedural default, Petitioner
was denied effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
A criminal defense attorney is the fiduciary of the defendant’s
liberty, and holds in trust the client’s rights. Petitioner had a strong
interest in having the judge removed and had the absolute right to
pursue that interest within the law. There can be no dispute about the
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fact that everyone knew below that Petitioner and counsel did not want
Judge Imperato to preside after her arrest. Petitioner had the
constitutional right to have counsel pursue this goal competently.
The standards for an ineffective assistance claim are well-settled.
Defendants must show first that counsel’s error was “so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed ... by the Sixth
Amendment.” Buck, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. at 775 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Second, they must show “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id., __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. at 776
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
In our case, there was no strategic reason not to file the motion
and in fact counsel did undertake to do so, although the state court
ruled that he made a hash of it. On these facts, counsel was not
functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Constitution.
Further, the prejudice to the client is obvious. Under Florida law,
the trial court would have been obliged to grant the motion. See
Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 998 So. 2d 660, 662 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)
(holding that judge’s arrest for misdemeanor possession of marijuana
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required disqualification from civil case and noting that it “hardly
generates a … supposition that litigants in cases over which he presides
while his own criminal charges are unresolved need have no reason to
fear his impartiality has been impaired.”)
Notably, Moskowitz arose from the same trial court circuit as the
present case, and the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
that case was binding on the trial court in the present case.
Under the circumstances of this case, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the result would have been different but for counsel’s
blunder. Once the judge was removed from the case under Moskowitz, a
new trial would have to be ordered under Florida law.
This is because, after denial of the recusal motion, the trial court
ruled on Petitioner’s motion for new trial which argued, among other
things, that the evidence was contrary to the weight of the evidence. A
successor judge cannot rule on such a motion because he or she was not
present at the trial, so that a new trial was necessary. See McCloud v.
State, 150 So. 3d 822, 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“a successor judge, who
was not present at trial, could not competently assess the weight of the
evidence as required to resolve Petitioner’s motion for new trial.
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Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.”); Porter v. State,
895 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted, CAROL STAFFORD HAUGHWOUT
Public Defender
____________________________ GARY LEE CALDWELL
Assistant Public Defender Counsel of Record
NOVEMBER 2017
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