Philosophies and History

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Philosophy of Education - HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, CURRENT TRENDS

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The word education is used sometimes to signify the activity, process, or enterprise

of educating or being educated and sometimes to signify the discipline or field of

study taught in schools of education that concerns itself with this activity, process,or enterprise. As an activity or process, education may be formal or informal,

private or public, individual or social, but it always consists in cultivating

dispositions (abilities, skills, knowledges, beliefs, attitudes, values, and character

traits) by certain methods. As a discipline, education studies or reflects on the

activity or enterprise by asking questions about its aims, methods, effects, forms,

history, costs, value, and relations to society.

Definition

The philosophy of education may be either the philosophy of the process of

education or the philosophy of the discipline of education. That is, it may be part of

the discipline in the sense of being concerned with the aims, forms, methods, or

results of the process of educating or being educated; or it may be metadisciplinary

in the sense of being concerned with the concepts, aims, and methods of the

discipline. However, even in the latter case it may be thought of as part of the

discipline, just as metaphilosophy is thought of as a part of philosophy, although

the philosophy of science is not regarded as a part of science. Historically,

philosophies of education have usually taken the first form, but under the influence

of analytical philosophy, they have sometimes taken the second.

In the first form, philosophy of education was traditionally developed by

philosophersfor example, Aristotle, Augustine, and John Lockeas part of theirphilosophical systems, in the context of their ethical theories. However, in the

twentieth century philosophy of education tended to be developed in schools of

education in the context of what is calledfoundations of education, thus linking it

with other parts of the discipline of educationeducational history, psychology, and

sociologyrather than with other parts of philosophy. It was also developed by

writers such as Paul Goodman and Robert M. Hutchins who were neither

professional philosophers nor members of schools of education.Types

As there are many kinds of philosophy, many philosophies, and many ways ofphilosophizing, so there are many kinds of educational philosophy and ways of

doing it. In a sense there is no such thing as the philosophy of education; there are

only philosophies of education that can be classified in many different ways.

Philosophy of education as such does not describe, compare, or explain any

enterprises to systems of education, past or present; except insofar as it is

concerned with the tracing of its own history, it leaves such inquiries to the history

and sociology of education. Analytical philosophy of education is meta to the

discipline of educationto all the inquiries and thinking about educationin the

sense that it does not seek to propound substantive propositions, either factual ornormative, about education. It conceives of its task as that of analysis: the

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definition or elucidation of educational concepts like teaching, indoctrination,

ability, and trait, including the concept of education itself; the clarification and

criticism of educational slogans like "Teach children, not subjects"; the exploration

of models used in thinking about education (e.g., growth); and the analysis and

evaluation of arguments and methods used in reaching conclusions abouteducation, whether by teachers, administrators, philosophers, scientists, or laymen.

To accomplish this task, analytical philosophy uses the tools of logic and

linguistics as well as techniques of analysis that vary from philosopher to

philosopher. Its results may be valued for their own sake, but they may also be

helpful to those who seek more substantive empirical of normative conclusions

about education and who try to be careful about how they reach them. This entry is

itself an exercise in analytical philosophy of education.

Normative philosophies or theories of education may make use of the results of

such analytical work and of factual inquiries about human beings and thepsychology of learning, but in any case they propound views about what education

should be, what dispositions it should cultivate, why it ought to cultivate them, how

and in whom it should do so, and what forms it should take. Some such normative

theory of education is implied in every instance of educational endeavor, for

whatever education is purposely engaged in, it explicitly or implicitly assumed that

certain dispositions are desirable and that certain methods are to be used in

acquiring or fostering them, and any view on such matters is a normative theory of

philosophy of education. But not all such theories may be regarded as properly

philosophical. They may, in fact, be of several sorts. Some simply seek to foster the

dispositions regarded as desirable by a society using methods laid down by its

culture. Here both the ends and the means of education are defined by the cultural

tradition. Others also look to the prevailing culture for the dispositions to be

fostered but appeal as well to experience, possibly even to science, for the methods

to be used. In a more pluralistic society, an educational theory of a sort may arise as

a compromise between conflicting views about the aids, if not the methods, of

education, especially in the case of public schools. Then, individuals or groups

within the society may have conflicting full-fledged philosophies of education, but

the public philosophy of education is a working accommodation between them.

More comprehensive theories of education rest their views about the aims andmethods of education neither on the prevailing culture nor on compromise but on

basic factual premises about humans and their world and on basic normative

premises about what is good or right for individuals to seek or do. Proponents of

such theories may reach their premises either by reason (including science) and

philosophy or by faith and divine authority. Both types of theories are called

philosophies of education, but only those based on reason and philosophy are

properly philosophical in character; the others might better be called theologies of

education. Even those that are purely philosophical may vary in complexity and

sophistication.

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In such a full-fledged philosophical normative theory of education, besides analysis

of the sorts described, there will normally be propositions of the following kinds:

1. Basic normative premises about what is good or right;

2. Basic factual premises about humanity and the world;

3. Conclusions, based on these two kinds of premises, about thedispositions education should foster;

4. Further factual premises about such things as the psychology of

learning and methods of teaching; and

5. Further conclusions about such things as the methods that education

should use.

For example, Aristotle argued that the Good equals happiness equals excellent

activity; that for a individual there are two kinds of excellent activity, one

intellectual (e.g., doing geometry) and one moral (e.g., doing just actions); that

therefore everyone who is capable of these types of excellent activity shouldacquire a knowledge of geometry and a disposition to be just; that a knowledge of

geometry can be acquired by instruction and a disposition to be just by practice, by

doing just actions; and that the young should be given instruction in geometry and

practice in doing just actions. In general, the more properly philosophical part of

such a full normative theory of education will be the proposition it asserts in (1),

(2), and (3); for the propositions in (4) and hence (5) it will, given those in (3),

most appropriately appeal to experience and science. Different philosophers will

hold different views about the propositions they use in (1) and (2) and the ways in

which these propositions may be established.

Although some normative premises are required in (1) as a basis for any line of

reasoning leading to conclusions in (3) or (5) about what education should foster or

how it should do this, the premises appearing in (2) may be of various sorts

empirical, scientific, historical, metaphysical, theological, or epistemological. No

one kind of premise is always necessary in (2) in every educational context.

Different philosophers of education will, in any case, have different views about

what sorts of premises it is permissible to appeal to in (2). All must agree, however,

that normative premises of the kind indicated in (1) must be appealed to. Thus,

what is central and crucial in any normative philosophy of education is not

epistemology, metaphysics, or theology, as is sometimes thought, but ethics, valuetheory, and social philosophy.

Role

Let us assume, as we have been doing, that philosophy may be analytical,

speculative, or narrative and remember that it is normally going on in a society in

which there already is an educational system. Then, in the first place, philosophy

may turn its attention to education, thus generating philosophy of education proper

and becoming part of the discipline of education.

Second, general philosophy may be one of the subjects in the curriculum of higher

education and philosophy of education may be, and presumably should be, part of

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the curriculum of teacher education, if teachers are to think clearly and carefully

about what they are doing.

Third, in a society in which there is a single system of education governed by a

single prevailing theory of education, a philosopher may do any of four things with

respect to education: he may analyze the concepts and reasoning used in connectionwith education in order to make people's thinking about it as clear, explicit, and

logical as possible; he may seek to support the prevailing system by providing

more philosophical arguments for the dispositions aimed at and the methods used;

he may criticize the system and seek to reform it in the light of some more

philosophical theory of education he has arrived at; or he may simply teach logic

and philosophy to future educators and parents in the hope that they will apply

them to educational matters.

Fourth, in a pluralistic society like the United States, in which the existing

educational enterprise or a large segment of it is based on a working compromisebetween conflicting views, a philosopher may again do several sorts of things. He

may do any of the things just mentioned. In the United States in the first half of the

twentieth century professional philosophers tended to do only the last, but at the

end of the twentieth century they began to try to do more. Indeed, there will be

more occasions for all of these activities in a pluralistic society, for debate about

education will always be going on or threatening to be resumed. A philosopher may

even take the lead in formulating and improving a compromise theory of education.

He might then be a mere eclectic, but he need not be, since he might defend his

compromise plan on the basis of a whole social philosophy. In particular, he might

propound a whole public philosophy for public school education, making clear

which dispositions it can and should seek to promote, how it should promote them,

and which ones should be left for the home, the church, and other private means of

education to cultivate. In any case, he might advocate appealing to scientific

inquiry and experiment whenever possible. A philosopher may also work out a

fully developed educational philosophy of his own and start an experimental school

in which to put it into practice, as John Dewey did; like Dewey, too, he may even

try to persuade his entire society to adopt it. Then he would argue for the

desirability of fostering certain dispositions by certain methods, partly on the basis

of experience and science and partly on the basis of premises taken from other partsof his philosophyfrom his ethics and value theory, from his political and social

philosophy, or from his epistemology, metaphysics, or philosophy of mind.

It seems plausible to maintain that in a pluralistic society philosophers should do all

of these things, some one and some another. In such a society a philosopher may at

least seek to help educators concerned about moral, scientific, historical, aesthetic,

or religious education by presenting them, respectively, with a philosophy of

morality, science, history, art, or religion from which they may draw conclusions

about their aims and methods. He may also philosophize about the discipline of

education, asking whether it is a discipline, what its subject matter is, and what itsmethods, including the methods of the philosophy of education, should be. Insofar

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as the discipline of education is a science (and one question here would be whether

it is a science) this would be a job for the philosopher of science in addition to one

just mentioned. Logicians, linguistic philosophers, and philosophers of science may

also be able to contribute to the technology of education, as it has come to be

called, for example, to the theory of testing or of language instruction.Finally, in a society that has been broken down by some kind of revolution or has

newly emerged from colonialism, a philosopher may even supply a new full-

fledged normative philosophy for its educational system, as Karl Marx did for

Russia and China. In fact, as in the case of Marx, he may provide the ideology that

guided the revolution in the first place. Plato tried to do this for Syracuse, and the

philosophes did it for France in the eighteenth century. Something like this may be

done wherever the schools "dare to build a new society," as many ask schools to

do.

Dewey once said that since education is the process of forming fundamentaldispositions toward nature and our fellow human beings, philosophy may even be

defined as the most general theory of education. Here Dewey was thinking that

philosophy is the most general normative theory of education, and what he said is

true if it means that philosophy, understood in its widest sense as including

theology and poetry as well as philosophy proper, is what tells us what to believe

and how to feel about humanity and the universe. It is, however, not necessarily

true if it refers to philosophy in the narrower sense or means that all philosophy is

philosophy of education in the sense of having the guidance of education as its end.

This is not the whole end of classical philosophy or even of philosophy as

reconstructed by Dewey; the former aimed at the truth rather than at the guidance

of practice, and the latter has other practical ends besides that of guiding the

educational enterprise. Certainly, analytical philosophy has other ends. However,

although Dewey did not have analytical philosophy in mind, there is nevertheless a

sense in which analytical philosophy can also be said to be the most general theory

of education. Although it does not seek to tell us what dispositions we should form,

it does analyze and criticize the concepts, arguments, and methods employed in any

study of or reflection upon education. Again it does not follow that this is all

analytical philosophy is concerned with doing. Even if the other things it doesfor

example, the philosophy of mind or of scienceare useful to educators andnormative theorists of education, as, it is hoped, is the case, they are not all

developed with this use in mind.

Philosophy of education is a field characterized not only by broadtheoretical eclecticism but also by a perennial dispute, which started inthe mid-twentieth century, over what the scope and purposes of thediscipline even ought to be. In the "Philosophy of Education" article that

was included in the previous edition of this encyclopedia, WilliamFrankena wrote, "In a sense there is no such thing as the philosophy ofeducation" (p. 101). During certain periods of the history of the

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philosophy of education, there have been dominant perspectives, to besure: At one time, the field was defined around canonical works oneducation by great philosophers (Plato of ancient Greece, the eighteenth-century Swiss-born Frenchman Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and others); at

other times, the field was dominated, in the United States at least, by thefigure of John Dewey (18591952) and educational Progressivism; atother times, the field was characterized by an austere analytical approachthat explicitly rejected much of what had come before in the field as noteven being proper "philosophy" at all. But even during these periods ofdominance there were sharp internal disputes within the field (such asfeminist criticisms of the "Great Man" approach to philosophy ofeducation and vigorous critiques of the analytical method). Such disputescan be read off the history of the professional societies, journals, andgraduate programs that institutionalize the field, and they can be

documented through a succession of previous encyclopedia articles, whichby definition attempt to define and delimit their subject matter.

These sorts of struggles over the maintenance of the disciplinaryboundary, and the attempt to define and enforce certain methods asparamount, are hardly unique to philosophy of education. But suchconcerns have so preoccupied its practitioners that at times these veryquestions seem to become the substance of the discipline, nearly to theexclusion of thinking about actual educational problems. And so it is not

very surprising to find, for example, a book such asPhilosophers on

Education. Consisting of a series of essays written by professionalphilosophers entirely outside the discipline of philosophy of education,the collection cites almost none of the work published within thediscipline; because the philosophers have no doubts about the status ofthe discipline of philosophy of education, they have few qualms aboutspeaking authoritatively about what philosophy has to say to educators.On the other hand, a fruitful topic for reflection is whether a more self-critical approach to philosophy of education, even if at times it seems to

be pulling up its own roots for examination, might prove more productivefor thinking about education, because this very tendency toward self-criticism keeps fundamental questions alive and open to reexamination.

WILLIAM K. FRANKENA

Philosophy of education is a field characterized not only by broadtheoretical eclecticism but also by a perennial dispute, which started inthe mid-twentieth century, over what the scope and purposes of thediscipline even ought to be. In the "Philosophy of Education" article that

was included in the previous edition of this encyclopedia, William

Frankena wrote, "In a sense there is no such thing as the philosophy ofeducation" (p. 101). During certain periods of the history of the

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philosophy of education, there have been dominant perspectives, to besure: At one time, the field was defined around canonical works oneducation by great philosophers (Plato of ancient Greece, the eighteenth-century Swiss-born Frenchman Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and others); at

other times, the field was dominated, in the United States at least, by thefigure of John Dewey (18591952) and educational Progressivism; atother times, the field was characterized by an austere analytical approachthat explicitly rejected much of what had come before in the field as noteven being proper "philosophy" at all. But even during these periods ofdominance there were sharp internal disputes within the field (such asfeminist criticisms of the "Great Man" approach to philosophy ofeducation and vigorous critiques of the analytical method). Such disputescan be read off the history of the professional societies, journals, andgraduate programs that institutionalize the field, and they can be

documented through a succession of previous encyclopedia articles, whichby definition attempt to define and delimit their subject matter.

These sorts of struggles over the maintenance of the disciplinaryboundary, and the attempt to define and enforce certain methods asparamount, are hardly unique to philosophy of education. But suchconcerns have so preoccupied its practitioners that at times these veryquestions seem to become the substance of the discipline, nearly to theexclusion of thinking about actual educational problems. And so it is not

very surprising to find, for example, a book such asPhilosophers on

Education. Consisting of a series of essays written by professionalphilosophers entirely outside the discipline of philosophy of education,the collection cites almost none of the work published within thediscipline; because the philosophers have no doubts about the status ofthe discipline of philosophy of education, they have few qualms aboutspeaking authoritatively about what philosophy has to say to educators.On the other hand, a fruitful topic for reflection is whether a more self-critical approach to philosophy of education, even if at times it seems to

be pulling up its own roots for examination, might prove more productivefor thinking about education, because this very tendency toward self-criticism keeps fundamental questions alive and open to reexamination.

Any encyclopedia article must take a stance in relation to such disputes.However much one attempts to be comprehensive and dispassionate indescribing the scope and purpose of a field, it is impossible to writeanything about it without imagining some argument, somewhere, that

would put such claims to challenge. This is especially true of "categorical"approaches, that is, those built around a list of types of philosophy ofeducation, or of discrete schools of thought, or of specific disciplinary

methods. During the period of particular diversity and interdisciplinarityin the field that has continued into the twenty-first century, such

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characterizations seem especially artificialbut even worse than this,potentially imperial and exclusionary. And so the challenge is to find a

way of characterizing the field that is true to its eclecticism but that alsolooks back reflexively at the effects of such characterizations, including

itself, in the dynamics of disciplinary boundary maintenance andmethodological rule-setting that are continually under dispute.

One way to begin such an examination is by thinking aboutthe impulses that draw one into this activity at all: What is philosophy ofeducation for? Perhaps these impulses can be more easily generalizedabout the field than any particular set of categories, schools of thought, ordisciplinary methods. Moreover, these impulses cut across and interrelateapproaches that might otherwise look quite different. And they coexist asimpulses within broad philosophical movements, and even within the

thought of individual philosophers themselves, sometimes conflicting in away that might help explain the tendency toward reflexive self-examination and uncertainty that so exercises philosophy of education asa field.

The Prescriptive Impulse

The first impulse is prescriptive. In many respects this is the oldest andmost pervasive inclination: to offer a philosophically defended conceptionof what the aims and activities of teaching ought to be. In some instances,

as in Plato'sRepublic, these prescriptions derive from an overall utopianvision; in other instances, such as seventeenth-century Englishphilosopher John Locke'sSome Thoughts Concerning Education orRousseau'smile, they derive from a fairly detailed reconception of whatthe day-to-day activities of teaching should look like; in still otherinstances, such prescriptions are derived from other social or moralprinciples, as in various Kantian views of education (even thougheighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant himself had verylittle to say on the subject). These prescriptive inclinations are in manyrespects what people expect from philosophy of education: a wiser

perspective, a more encompassing social vision, a sense of inspiration andhigher purpose. It is what people usually mean when they talk abouthaving a "philosophy of education."

A broad range of perspectives in the field share this prescriptive impulse:many of these perspectives can be comprised in what was once called the"isms" approach (perennialism, idealism, realism, Thomism, and so on)the idea that a set of philosophical premises could generate acomprehensive and consistent educational program. For many years,

working out the details of these "philosophies of education" wasconsidered the main substance of the field, and the debates among the

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"isms" were typically at the very basic level debates among fundamentallydifferent philosophical premises. An implication of this approach was thatdisagreements tended to be broadly "paradigmatic" in the sense that they

were based on all-or-none commitments; one could not, of course, talk

about a synthesis of realist and idealist worldviews.One wag has suggested that the "isms" have more recently been replaced

by the "ists"less purely philosophical and more social/political theoriesthat now typify many scholars working in philosophy of education(Marxists, feminists, multiculturalists, postmodernists, and so on). These

will be characterized as critically oriented philosophies below, but at thisstage it is important to see that these perspectives can be equally driven

by the prescriptive impulse: many writers (for example, neo-Marxistadvocates of Paulo Freire's "critical pedagogy") offer quite explicit

accounts of how education ought to proceed, what it is for, and whoseinterests it ought to serve.

The Analytical Impulse

The second impulse that drives much of philosophy of education isanalytical. In a broad sense this includes not only philosophicalapproaches specifically termed "analytical philosophy" (such asconceptual analysis or ordinary language analysis), but also a broaderorientation that approaches the philosophical task as spelling out a set of

rational conditions that educational aims and practices ought to satisfy,while leaving it up to other public deliberative processes to work out whatthey might be in specific. In this enlarged sense, the analytical impulsecan be seen not only in analytical philosophy per se but also in studiesthat focus on the logical and epistemological criteria of critical thinking;in the diagnosis of informal fallacies in reasoning; in certain kinds ofliberal theory that spell out broad principles of rights and justice but thatremain silent on the specific ends that education ought to serve; and evenin some versions of German philosopher Jrgen Habermas's theory,

which proposes a structure of communicative deliberation in which

conversations must satisfy what he calls a set of general "validity" claims,but which does not specify or constrain in advance what that process ofdeliberation might yield.

The analytical impulse is often seen as expressing a certain philosophicalmodesty: that philosophers do not prescribe to others what theireducational choices ought to be, but simply try to clarify the rationalprocedures by which those choices should be arrived at. Here metaphorssuch as referees who try to adjudicate an ongoing activity but remainnonpartisan within it, or groundskeepers who pull up weeds and preparethe soil but do not decide what to plant, tend to predominate in how this

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version of philosophy of education is presented and justified to others.The idea that philosophy provides a set oftools, and that "doingphilosophy of education" (as opposed to "having a philosophy ofeducation") offers a more workmanlike self-conception of the

philosopher, stands in sharp contrast with the idea of philosophy as asystem-building endeavor.

Of course, it must be said that this impulse is not entirely free of theprescriptive inclination, either. For one thing, there is a prescriptivenessabout the very tools, criteria, principles, and analytical distinctions thatget imported into how problems are framed. These are implicitly (andoften explicitly) presented as educational ideals themselves: promotingcritical thinking or fostering the conditions for Habermasiancommunication in the classroom, for example. However rationally

defended these might be, they will undoubtedly appear to some asimposed from "on high." Moreover, at a deeper level, theanalytic/prescriptive distinction is less than clear-cut: a theory of logic, ora theory of communication, however purely "procedural" it aspires to be,always expresses conceptions of human nature, of society, of knowledge,of language, that contains social and cultural elements that might appear"natural" or "neutral" to the advocates of those procedures, but that will

be regarded as foreign and particularistic by others ("why must I justifymy educational choices byyour criteria?"). This is not meant as acriticism of the analytical orientation, but it just shows how these

impulses can and do coexist, even within accounts that regard themselvesas primarily one or the other.

The Critical Impulse

Similarly, the third impulse, a critical orientation, can coexist with eitheror both of the others. The critical impulse, like the analytical one, sharesthe characteristic of trying to clear the ground of misconceptions andideologies, where these misrepresent the needs and interests ofdisadvantaged groups; like the prescriptive impulse, the critical impulse is

driven by a positive conception of a better, more just and equitable,society. Where the critical impulse differs from the others is in itsconception of the contribution philosophy can play in serving these ends.From this orientation, philosophy is not just a set of tools or an abstract,programmatic theory; it is itself a substantive personal and politicalcommitment, and it grows out of deeper inclinations to protect and servethe interests of specific groups. Hence the key philosophical ideas stressedin critically oriented philosophies of education (reflection,counterhegemony, a critique of power, an emphasis upon difference, and

so on) derive their force from their capacity to challenge a presumablyoppressive dominant society and enable put-upon individuals and groups

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to recognize and question their circumstances and to be moved to changethem.

As there are prescriptive and analytical elements in critically orientedphilosophies of education, so there can be critical elements in the others.Philosophers of education more driven by a prescriptive or analyticalimpulse can and do share many of the same social and politicalcommitments as critically oriented philosophers of education; and someof them may see their work as ultimately serving many of the same goalsof criticizing hegemonic ideologies and promoting human emancipation.This is why these three impulses or orientations must not be seen assimple categories to which particular philosophies (or philosophers) can

be assigned. Stressing their character as impulses highlights themotivational qualities that underlie, and frequently drive, the adoption of

particular philosophical views. While philosophers tend to stress the forceof argument in driving their adoption of such views, and while they docertainly change their minds because of argument and evidence, at somedeeper level they are less prone to changing the very impulses that driveand give vigor to their philosophical investigations. By stressing the waysin which all three impulses can coexist within different philosophicalschools of thought, and even within the inclinations of a givenphilosopher, this account highlights the complex and sometimes evencontradictory character of the philosophical spirit. When philosophers ofeducation teach or speak about their views, although they certainly put

forth arguments, quotations of and references to literature, and so forth,at a deeper level they are appealing to a shared impulse in their audience,one that is more difficult to argue for directly, and without which thearguments themselves are unlikely to take hold.

Implications of the Impulses for Philosophy of Education

Given the existence of these three impulses, how can they help inproviding an overview of the field of philosophy of education that does notfall into arguments about disciplinary boundary maintenance? First, these

very broad orientations are in many respects easier to generalize withinthe field than would be any specific set of disciplinary criteria; manydifferent kinds of philosophy of education can manifest these sorts ofinclinations. Indeed, it makes for strange bedfellows when peopleconsider that despite their vigorous paradigmatic differences they areactually motivated by very similar underlying philosophicalcommitments. Perhaps this recognition might create a stronger incentivefor them to engage one another respectfully across those differences.

Second, it is beneficial for philosophers to consider that the validity theyattribute to certain kinds of arguments may not be driven simply by the

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objective force of those arguments, but also by a particular appeal thosekinds of arguments havefor them. This sort of reflectiveness might befruitful for various reasons, but a significant benefit could be in raising aperson's appreciation for why others may not be moved by the arguments

that seem so patently obvious to that person; and why the force ofargument alone may not be sufficient to generate philosophical agreementor reconcile disagreement. Given the pervasively eclectic andinterdisciplinary nature of the field of philosophy of education, such aspirit of tolerance and inclusiveness, while not needing to be unboundedentirely, would be a valuable corrective to the historical tendency toestablish the methodsor the philosophical school that will separate properphilosophy of education from the imposters.

Advocates of more prescriptive approaches typically buttress their case for

dominance by reference to canonical Great Works (Plato, ancient Greekphilosopher Aristotle, Locke, Rousseau, Dewey). This sort of system-building across epistemological, ethical, and social/political issues is whatthe great philosophers do, and it is revealing that for them philosophy ofeducation was rarely seen as a distinct area of inquiry but merely the

working out in practice of implications for teaching and learning thatwere derived from their larger positions about truth, value, justice, and soon.

Advocates of more analytical approaches, as noted, tend to put more

reliance upon the tools of philosophical investigation, and less onparticular authors or sources. In the twentieth century, versions of theseapproaches tended to dominate philosophy of education, especially in theEnglish-speaking world, as they have many departments of philosophyitself. Indeed, when one surveys accounts of the field of philosophy ofeducation from the 1990s forward, they nearly all chart the history as oneof the rise to dominance of an analytical approach and then a successionof critiques and attacks upon it.

Advocates of more critical approaches suffer from a particular difficulty

carrying out their philosophical work in a way that is consistent with theirbroader commitments. Naturally, any philosophical approach aspires toconsistency of some sort; but to the extent that critically orientedphilosophers are concerned with challenging power structures,hegemonic belief systems, and universalisms that obscure, not to saysquelch, the particular beliefs, values, and experiences of those whomthey seem to empower, such philosophers must also endeavor to avoidthese potentially oppressive tendencies in their own writing and teaching.This tension is perhaps felt most acutely by contemporary post-modern

philosophers of education, but it can be seen in much of the work of neo-Marxists, critical theorists, feminists, and Foucauldians as well: how to

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argue for and promote an emancipatory approach to education that doesnot itself fall into the habits of exclusionary language, authoritative (if notauthoritarian) postures, and universalizing generalizations that areexcoriated when detected in the work of others.

Summary

This entry has tried to provide an overview of how the field of philosophyof education has seen itself, and it has recounted major elements in thenarratives by which the history of the field has been traced by others. Atthe same time it has tried to reveal problems with the ways in which thesedifferent accounts have been driven in part by various agendas to define ascope and boundary for the field, and often to privilege one or anotherapproach to philosophy of education, even when they have endeavored to

be comprehensive and fair to all views. This entry has taken a differentapproach, first, by resisting the temptation to provide a single definitionor characterization of the field; and, second, by stressing not schools ofthought or methodological divisions as the categories for thinking aboutthe field, but rather the underlying inclinations, or impulses, that animatephilosophical inquiry. As noted, for a field that tends to resist and argueover every attempt to define it, such caution is probably prudent, but ithas an added benefit as well. When philosophers think about the impulsesthat motivate their areas of inquiry and ways of thinking about them, theyrelate their philosophical work not solely to an abstract order of truth but

to themselves; and it is a short step from that recognition to extendingthat way of thinking to others as well. The generosity of outlook thatresults might be the one thing that all philosophers of education canshare.

Aristotle B.C.) (384322) - Education for a Common End

Aristotle, the Greek philosopher and scientist, was born in Stagira, a town in

Chalcidice. At the age of seventeen he became a member of the Greek

philosopher Plato's school, where he stayed for twenty years. After Plato's

death in 348 B.C.E. Aristotle taught philosophy, first at Atarneus in Asia

Minor, then in Mytilene on the island of Lesbos. Then he became tutor of

Alexander the Great at the court of Macedonia. In 335 or 334 B.C.E. he

returned to Athens and founded a school called the Lyceum.

Aristotle's first writings were dialogues modeled on Plato's examples; a few

have survived in fragmentary form. The main body of writings that have comedown to us consists of treatises on a wide range of subjects; these were

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probably presented as lectures, and some may be notes on lectures taken by

students. These treatises lay unused in Western Europe after the collapse of

the Roman Empire in the sixth century C.E., until they were recovered in the

Middle Ages and studied by Muslim, Jewish, and Christian thinkers. The large

scope of the treatises, together with the extraordinary intellect of their author,gained for Aristotle the title, "the master of those who know."

The treatises are investigative reports, describing a method of inquiry and the

results reached. Each treatise includes: (1) a statement of the aim of the

subject matter; (2) a consideration of other thinkers' ideas; (3) an examination

of proposed principles with the aim of determining the one that has the best

prospect of explaining the subject matter; (4) a search for the facts that

illustrate the proposed principle; and (5) an explanation of the subject matter

by showing how the proposed principle explains the observed facts. The

treatises were essential to the work of the Lyceum, which was a school, a

research institution, a library, and a museum. Aristotle and his students

compiled aList of Pythian Winners; researched the records of dramatic

performances at Athens; collected 158 constitutions, of which only The

Constitution of Athens has survived; prepared a literary and philological study

calledHomeric Problems; and put together a collection of maps and a

museum of objects to serve as illustrations for lectures.

Aristotle's writings on logic worked out an art of discourse, a tool for finding

out the structure of the world. The other subject matters of Aristotle's treatisesare of three kinds: (1) the theoretical sciencesmetaphysics, mathematics, and

physicsaim to know for the sake of knowing; (2) the productive sciences

such as poetics and rhetoricaim to know for the sake of making useful or

beautiful things; and (3) the practical sciencesethics and politicsaim to

know for the sake of doing, or for conduct. Aristotle said that the theoretical

sciences are capable of being understood by principles which are certain and

cannot be other than they are; as objects of study their subject matters are

necessary and eternal. The productive sciences and the practical sciences are

capable of being understood by principles that are less than certain; as objectsof study their subject matters are contingent.

Thus Aristotle's idea was that distinct sciences exist, the nature of each to be

determined by principles found in the midst of the subject matter that is

peculiarly its own. A plurality of subject matters exists, and there is a

corresponding plurality of principles explaining sets of facts belonging to each

subject matter. What is learned in any subject matter may be useful in

studying others; yet there is no hierarchy of subject matters in which the

principles of the highest in the order of Being explain the principles of all the

others.

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Education for a Common End

Unlike Plato'sRepublic andLaws, Aristotle's treatises do not containlengthy discussions of education. His most explicit discussion ofeducation, in Books 7 and 8 of thePolitics, ends without being completed.

Yet, like Plato, Aristotle's educational thinking was inseparable from hisaccount of pursuing the highest good for human beings in the life of acommunity. The science of politics takes into account the conduct of theindividual as inseparable from the conduct of the community. Thus

Aristotle holds that ethics is a part of politics; and equally, politics is apart of ethics. This leads him to argue that the end of individuals andstates is the same. Inasmuch as human beings cannot realize theirpotentiality apart from the social life that is necessary for shaping theirmind and character, an investigation into the nature of society is a

necessary companion to an investigation into the nature of ethics. Thegood life is inescapably a social lifea life of conduct in a community. For

Aristotle, "the Good of man must be the end of the science of Politics"(1975,1.2.1094b 78). In community life, the activity of doing cannot

bring into existence something apart from doing; it can only "end" infurther doing. And education, as one of the activities of doing, does not"produce" anything apart from education, but must be a continuingprocess that has no end except further education.

In Aristotle's explicit remarks about the aims of education, it is clear that,

like all activities in pursuit of the good life, education is "practical" in thatit is a way of conduct, of taking action. At the same time, in pursuing thegood life, the aim is to know the nature of the best state and the highest

virtues of which human beings are capable. Such knowledge enables us tohave a sense of what is possible in education. Educational activity is also a"craft" in the sense that determining the means appropriate for pursuingthat which we think is possible is a kind of making as well as a kind ofdoing. It is commonplace to say that, in doing, we try to "make thingshappen." Education is an attempt to find the kind of unity of doing andmaking that enables individuals to grow, ethically and socially.

ThePolitics ends by citing three aims of education: the possible, theappropriate, and the "happy mean." The idea of a happy mean isdeveloped in theNicomachean Ethics. There human conduct is held toconsist of two kinds of virtues, moral and intellectual; moral virtues arelearned by habit, while intellectual virtues are learned through teaching.

As examples, while humans are not temperate or courageous by nature,they have the potentiality to become temperate and courageous. By takingon appropriate habits, their potentialities can be actualized; by

conducting themselves appropriately they can learn to actualize theirmoral virtues. Thus children learn the moral virtues before they know

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what they are doing or why they are doing it. Just because young childrencannot control their conduct by intellectual principles, Aristotleemphasizes habit in training them. First, children must learn the moral

virtues; later, when their intellectual powers have matured, they may

learn to conduct themselves according to reason by exercising theintellectual virtues.

Arguing that the state is a plurality that should be made into a communityby education, Aristotle insisted that states should be responsible foreducating their citizens. In thePolitics, Book 8, he makes four argumentsfor public education: (1) from constitutional requirements; (2) from theorigins of virtue; (3) from a common end to be sought by all citizens; and(4) from the inseparability of the individual and the community. In moststates in the Greek world before Aristotle's time, private education had

prevailed.

Finally, Aristotle's enduring legacy in education may be characterized asthreefold. First is his conception of distinct subject matters, the particularnature and conclusions reached in each to be determined as the facts of itssubject matter take their places in the thinking and conduct of theinvestigator. Second is his insistence on the conjoint activities of ethicsand politics, aiming to gain the practical wisdom that can be realized onlyinsofar as citizens strive for the highest good in the context of acommunity of shared ends. This means that the end of ethics and politics

is an educational end. And, third, the education that states need is publiceducation.

Although thinkers may know in a preliminary way what the highest goodisthat which is required by reasonthey will not actually find out what itis until they learn to live in cooperation with the highest principles ofreason. The highest good is never completely known because the pursuitof it leads to further action, which has no end but more and more action.The contingent nature of social existence makes it necessary to find out

what is good for us in what we do; we cannot truly learn what it is apart

from conduct. While reason is a part of conduct, alone it is not sufficientfor realizing the highest good. Only by our conduct can we find out whatour possibilities are; and only by further conduct can we strive to makethose possibilities actual.

TOPIC 4: THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

FOR TEACHERS (MIDSEM TEST)

4.1 Introduction

The philosophy of education will be discussed first, since we need to understand the philosophy of education, before we

can discuss about its significance for teachers. The lecture will cover seven philosophies of education (idealism,

realism, pragmatism, existentialism, essentialism, progressivism, and social reconstructionism); followed by the

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significance of four of these philosophies (pragmatism, existentialism, essentialism, and social reconstructionism) for

teachers.

4.2 The Philosophy of Education

Philosophy of education, as we know,focuses on the values, beliefs and attitudes in relation to the process of growth

of individuals and society. These values, beliefs and attitudes determine the direction of our education, particularly theaims, goals, objectives, contents, delivery and assessment of education. Now, we will look some educational

philosophies which will help us to understand better the goals of education.

Idealism: Ideal means a conception of objects as something that are perfect, having noble character, visionary,

and existing only in imagination. Idealism views that education should focus on moral, spiritual and mental aspects

of human being; and that the truth and values are absolute, timeless, and universal. Education should concern with

ideas and concepts and their relationship, with the final outcomes of education are the most general and abstract

subjects. Mathematics is important to develop abstract thinking; while history and literature are important to develop

moral and culture.

Realism: Real means a conception of objects as something that are actual, existence, and authentic, rather than

imaginary. Realism views the world in terms of objects and matter; and everything is derived from nature and is

subjected to its laws. Realism suggests that education should focus on objects and matter; and views that people can

learn about the world through their senses and reasons. However, just like idealist, realist views that the ultimate goals

of education are the most general and abstract subjects. Realist stresses that the subjects such as ethical, political and

economics are important in life; while reading, writing and arithmetic are necessary as basic education.

Pragmatism: Pragmatic means a conception of objects as something that are real, and having cause-effect

relationship and practical values. Pragmatism views the world as not fixed, but constantly changing; and views

knowledge as process and not as product. Education, therefore, should focus on experiencing the process, for

example, learning occurs as pupil engages in problem solving. Knowing is an interaction between the learner and

environment (both are undergoing constant changes). Teaching is not focused on what to think, but on how to

think critically; and hence, it should be more exploratory than explanatory. The ultimate goal of education is for the

learner to acquire the process of solving problems in an intelligent manner.

Existentialism: Existential means a conception of objects as actual being, existing, occurring, appearing, or

emerging. Existentialism views the world as subjective, depending upon ones perception; and that knowledge is a

personal choice. Education should focus on emotional, aesthetic and philosophical subjects; such as literature, drama

and arts. Learners are allowed to choose the subject(s) for their self-fulfillment. Curriculum should stress on self-

expressive and experimentation activities that will create emotions, feelings and insights. The ultimate goal of

education is to develop consciousness about freedom to choose, and the meaning ones choices and responsibility in

relation to these choices.

Essentialism: Essential means a conception of objects as something that are absolutely necessary,

indispensable, or vital. Essentialism views that education should focus on the fundamental and essential subjects,

such as the 3 Rs (reading, writing, arithmetic) as the fundamental subjects at primary school level; and five academic

subjects at secondary school level (English, mathematics, science, history & foreign language). Essentialism rejects

the subjects such as arts, music, physical education, homemaking and vocational education. The ultimate goal of

education is the acquisition of culture and mastery of essential skills, facts, concepts, and thinking skills.

Progressivism: Progressive means a conception of objects as something that are moving forward toward specific

goal, further stage, or cumulative improvement. Progressivism views that education should promote democratic

society in which students could learn and practice the skills and tools necessary for democratic living; which include

problem-solving methods and scientific inquiry; and learning experiences that include cooperative behaviors and self-

discipline; which are important for democratic living. Since reality constantly keeps changing (similar to

pragmatism), progressivism believes that there is little need to focus on fixed body of knowledge.

Social Reconstructionism: Social reconstruction means a conception that the social problems; such as poverty

and lack of educational and employment opportunities; can be solved through education. Social reconstructionism

believes that people are responsible for creating social conditions, whether they are good or bad. It views thateducation should prepare people to create new good and just society and to bring the have-nots into a better society.

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Other than those who are fortunate helping out those who are unfortunate, education can play its role by preparing

students to meet their intellectual, emotional, personal, and social needs, to solve their social problems.

4.3 Significance of Philosophy of Education for Teachers

The significance of the philosophy of education for teachers can be discussed by looking at the goals of education,

role of students, role of teachers and teaching methods for various philosophies of education (Figure 6.3, p 151). Weare going to look at four philosophies of education as examples, i.e. the Existentialism, Pragmatism, Essentialism, and

Social Reconstructionism.

Pragmatism: The goalof education under this philosophy is developing and applying practical knowledge and skills

for life in a progressive democratic society. The role of students is to show active learning and participation.

Hence, teachers need to plan teaching and learning activities that encourage students to actively participate in

learning. The role of teachers is to teach inductive and deductive reasoning, scientific method, and the power of

observation and practice, which can be achieved through the teaching methods of hands-on curricula, group work,

and experimentation.

Existentialism: The goal of education under this philosophy is developing authentic individuals who exercise

freedom of choice and take responsibility for their actions. The role of students is to develop independence, self-discipline, set challenges, and solve problems. Teachers should know this goal to decide what to teach, how to teach,

how students learn and how to assess learning outcomes. The role of teachers is to encourage students to

philosophize about life and to recognize and fulfill personal freedom, which can be done through the teaching

methods of discussion and analysis, examination of choice-making in own and others live.

Essentialism: The goalof education under this philosophy is acquisition of culture and cultural literacy for personal

benefit. The role of students is to receive knowledge and demonstrate minimum competencies. The role of

teachers under this philosophy is to deliver a standard curriculum, which can be done through teaching methods of

subject-centered direct instruction. Teachers need to know this role in order to plan teaching and learning activities

that are subject-centered and can deliver the standard content through direct instruction. An example of a subject with

standard curriculum is history. A teacher can prepare the content of a lesson and delivers the content through direct

instruction.

Social Reconstructionism: The goal of education under this philosophy is solving social problems and create a

better world. The role of students is to inquire, apply critical thinking skills, and take action. The role of teachers

under this philosophy is to ask questions, present social issues and problem solving challenges, and serve as

organizer and information resource, which can be done through the teaching methods of stimulating divergent

thinking and group discussion. Teachers should give emphasis on social studies, social problems, global education,

and environmental issues.

4.4 Tutorial Activity

Read Chapter 6 of the textbook from page 152 to 156. Explain in your own words of your understanding about the

philosophies of Marxism, Behaviorism, Cognitivism, Perennialism and Essentialism.

TOPIC 5: THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION

(MIDSEM TEST)

5.1 Introduction

In Topic 1, we defined education as the growth process of the individuals and

society; and in Topic 2, we defined sociology as the branch of knowledge that dealswith the origin, development, organization and functioning of human society. Since,

sociology of education is a branch of sociology that focuses on education, it can be defined as

the origin, development, organization and functioning of human society that are associatedwith the growth process of the individuals and society.

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Some argued that education is a valued-based activity in which individuals experiencing and

accepting what is valued by our society. Few argued that education is the transmission of

culture. As we all know, a society is made up of people with different customs, beliefs,

values, languages, religions and social institutions. Beside all these local cultures, our

society is exposed to global cultures brought to us by foreign visitors and various

technologies, such as internet, CDs, magazines, films, etc. Ask ourselves, Which of thesecultures should we transfer to children/youths?

5.2 Social Foundations of Education

Transmitting and Improving Society: John Dewey (an American educator) believed that

aims of education were of both transmitting and improving society. To do this, educators

must be very selective in determining and organizing the experiences for the children and

society. Hence, educators, together with others in the society, are responsible in determining

the content and activities (experiences) that can help individuals to grow and finally to

improve their society. The aims of transmitting and improving society were carried out by the

schools which educate and socialize the younger members of the society.

Modal Personality comprises of a set of characteristics that differentiate citizens of one

country to those of other countries (mod means distinguished attributes). For example,

there are certain behaviours, attitudes and feelings that distinguish the Americans from

Europeans, which are believed to be the outcomes of schooling. American schools, among

other things, focus on the national civic culture to inculcate modal personality. How do

Malaysians differ from citizens of other countries? Is it due to their schooling (formal

education) or other institutions, such as homes or religious institutions (informal education)?

Though each country has cultural pluralism, there still exist a modal personality for all

citizens of that country. They gain this modal personality through schooling, which offers

standard curriculum that develops the modal personality. Do Malaysians have modal

characteristics? Can we list some of them? We in Malaysia have a large number of foreign

workers that came from many countries. Do you think they have the Malaysian modal

personality? If we have a modal personality, regardless of religion, national origin, race, class

or gender; we will still have commonpoints of likeness.

The Americans, for example, despite of having different economic level, education, manners,

taste, ethnic group, origin and tradition; they have many points of likeness, such as language,

diet, hygiene, dress, basic skills, land use, community settlement and recreation. They are

closer together in their moral outlook, political beliefs and social attitudes; compared to other

nationals. Do we have any points of likeness in Malaysia? What are they? Most of these

points of likeness are society behaviours, which are actually the sociology of a community.

This is in fact an example of the social foundations of education.

Belief in the possible is perhaps another point of likeness that the Americans have, i.e. belief

that anything is possible. Slogans such as Work hard and you will succeed, Just do it,

Anyone can grow up to be president and What counts is not where you came from butwhat you do are just some examples of this belief. US schools are promoting this message

throughout the country. What can these slogans promote for the American people? Perhaps

right attitudes and the belief that The measure of a person is his or her achievements.

Belief in moral bases for right action is another point of likeness for the Americans. When

American educators discuss about the rights of individuals to an education, they belief that

people have a moral right to further their humanness (to be good people). The belief also will

guide the Americans in their individual and collective (group) conduct (behaviour). The

slogan such as Just say no to either sex or drugs indicates the influence of this belief. This

is another social phenomenon that influences education.

5.3 A Dynamic, Changing Society

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The social foundations become very important in education because of the rapid change in

our society. The appropriate education for various groups cannot be determined accurately,

since the groups are changing, ethnic demands are emerging, information is exploding,

behaviours are being modified, and values are being altered. What are the changes that we see

in Malaysia? May be food preferences, entertainments, etc. How do these affect education?

Thus, we have difficulty to set education for the present, and even more complex for thefuture.

As the society changes rapidly, the education should also change accordingly. For example,

as most mothers are now working, they have problems taking care of their young children. In

response to this change, the schools now have the provisions of taking children as young as

four years old. Parents can send their younger children to nurseries either at private place or at

place of work. The idea of literacy is no longer confined to reading and writing, but must be

expanded to cultural, scientific, computer, technological, electronic and research literacy.

The number of Asian immigrants in US increases from 13% to 38% in 1981-1990. In

California, people of colour are already majority. In Seattle schools, over 34 languages are

spoken. English as second language is a must for the students. Education must be responsive

to the needs of the diversity of students, while at the same time, transferring the civic culturethat serves as the binding for the American nation. Schools need different learning outcomes,

pedagogical approaches, flexible curricula, and different teaching environments.


National Philosophy of Malaysian Education (NPME): Education in Malaysia is an on-going

effort towards further developing the potential of individuals in a holistic and integrated

manner so as to produce individuals who are intellectually, spiritually, emotionally and

physically balanced and harmonic, based on a firm belief in and devotion to God. Such an

effort is designed to produce Malaysian citizens who are knowledgeable and competent, who

possess high moral standards and who are responsible and capable of achieving high level of

personal well-being as well as being able to contribute to the harmony and betterment of the

family, society and nation at large (CDC, MOE, 1988).

Discuss the Malaysian philosophy of education from the perspectives of the philosophy of

education and the sociology of education. Which philosophy(s) matches the NPME? What are

the social aspects of human relations that are covered by NPME?

TOPIC 6: HISTORY OF EDUCATION

(FINAL EXAM)

6.1 History of Education: Introduction

History, in Topic 2 is defined as: the branch of knowledge that deals with past events. Therefore,

history of education can be defined as: the branch of knowledge that deals with past events that were

related to education. The events that took place during a particular period of time in a country had

influenced the education of that country, that is, the history of particular country becomes the

foundations of education of that country. Think of Malaysia, can you recall an event that had changed

our goals of education?

Curricula are prepared or created within political, social, economic and cultural contexts. The people

who created the curricula have firm belief in appropriate social action, views of knowledge, acceptanceof political ideologies, allegiances to class value systems, incorporation of economic motives, and even

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adherence to religious convictions. These values are sometimes being challenged by various sectors of

community. Can you think of one curriculum that was not yet accepted in Malaysia? We are going to

look at American history of education as an example.

6.2 The Colonial Period: 1642-1776

In the northern (New England) colonies, the history of American education started with the education

in the earliest colony of Massachusetts, a settlement of the Puritans (members of a sect of Protestant

from England) who hold strictly to religious discipline. The earlier schools in Massachusetts were

concerned with the doctrines of Puritan church. The major purpose of schooling was to teach children to

read scriptures (passages) from the Bibleand the notices of civil affairs department. The major goal of

education then was to enable children to read and understand the principles of religion and the laws of

the Commonwealth. The basic education in Massachusetts at that time was reading and writing; and

Latin in addition was taught mainly to prepare students to go to Harvard College.

In the middle colonies, unlike in Massachusetts (everyone used English language), there were no

common language or religion existed. Due to the differences in the language used and religious believes,

no single school system could be established in the middle colonies. These differences motivated the

settlers of different ethnic and religious groups to established parochial (provincial/ local) and

independent schools, rather than the central or district-wide school system as in New England. The

present concept of cultural pluralism in fact already existed 200 years ago in the middle colonies. Think

of Malaysia, are there similarities to what had happened in the North America with respect to school

system or cultural pluralism?

In the southern colonies, the education decisions were left to the family. There was no formal

education here and the focus of education was only on vocational skills. Why vocational skills? The

legislative provision was instituted only to the guardians of poor children, orphans, and illegitimate

children, that is for them to provide private education or vocational skills to the children. The privileged

class of white children (children of plantation owners) received their education through private tutors.

The poor white children (children of the farm workers) did not have any formal education, with most of

them could not read or write. They continued to become farmers just like their parents. The children of

Black slaves were forbidden to learn to read or write.

The curriculum of colonial schools in the northern, middle and southern colonies; despite the

differences in language, religion, and economic system; was influenced by the English political ideas.

The religious commitment had high priority in all schools and society, and the family played a major

role in socialization and education of all children. The curriculum of colonial schools consisted of

reading, writing, arithmetic, and some religious faith, and lessons to develop manners and morals. The

curriculum stressed on basic skills, social and religious conformity, faith in authority, knowledge for the

sake of knowledge, rote learning and memorization. There were various types of schools existed duringthis period, such as the town schools (one-room primary schools), private schools (established by

missionary, ethnic and religious groups), Latin grammar schools (for sons of upper class), academy

(secondary school) and college (Harvard or Yale).

6.3 The National Period: 1776-1850

School curricula during Colonial Period were mostly based on religious needs. However, during the

National Period, secular forces had changed American education from religious based primary and

secondary education to more function based education. The secular forces argued that the time spent on

studying the two dead languages (Latin & Greek), for example, should be better used to study science,

to help the new America to explore and develop its natural resources. The secular forces also hadinfluenced the development of democracy, strong federal government, an emerging cultural nationalism,

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the idea of religious freedom, and new discoveries in natural sciences. As a result of this movement, the

federal government became more committed to education and had allocated 154 million acres of land

for schools. The government even decided to give free primary, secondary, college and university

education,

The school curriculum during the National Period (Rushs curriculum) stressed on reading, writing,arithmetic and history in elementary school; English, German, the arts and especially sciences at

secondary school and college level; and good manners and moral principles for all levels. Education was

seen more for the development of natural resources, and to promote democracy. During this period also,

grammar schools were built for gifted students and scholarships were given to gifted students who could

not pay tuition fees. Half of the scholarship students were later assigned positions as primary school

teachers. Educational policy makers (e.g. Rush, Jefferson, Franklin) were all concerned with equality of

educational opportunity; and had proposed nationwide education for all children and youth. Students of

superior ability were identified and given free secondary and college education.

During this period also, the Americans were thinking of having their own national cultures, for example

having a national language and literature, which should be different from the English language andliterature used in Britain. This language (spelling, pronunciation & reading) should be taught

deliberately and systematically to the children and youth in the nations schools. The selection of

literature was focused on portraying patriotism, heroism, hard work, diligence, and virtuous living; with

the tone of moral, religion, capitalistic, and pro-American. Other than the cultures, the Americans also

aspired to expand the moral and political ideas as their contributions to humankind. For example, they

had shown to Europe the proof that institutions founded on equality and representation principles

(democracy) were capable of maintaining good governments.


Read Chapter 4 of the textbook from page 90 to 102. Explain in your own words, your understanding

about the influence of religion, politics, industry or others in each of the education described (Education

in Southern Colonies, Middle Atlantic Colonies, New England Colonies, Education for the Slaves,

Education for Native Americans, Education in Spains Colonies, Education for Women).

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Philosophies and History