Pinder v. Bahamasair Objection to R&R

SARELSON LAW FIRM, P.A., 1401 Brickell Avenue, Suite 510, Miami, Florida 33131, 305-379-0305, 800-421-9954 (fax) www.sarelson.com

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Miami Division

Case No.: 08-22548-CIV-KING/BANDSTRA DEBORAH PINDER, Plaintiff, v. BAHAMASAIR HOLDINGS LIMITED, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant. _______________________________________/

PINDER’S OBJECTIONS TO THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(c), Plaintiff, Deborah Pinder, files her Objections to

Judge Bandstra’s Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”) dated September 1, 2009. [D.E. 63].

Pinder incorporates by reference her Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety and this

Objection is limited to those portions of the R&R that Pinder disagrees with. For the reasons

stated below, the R&R should be overruled in part and summary judgment should be entered in

favor of the Plaintiff.1

Introduction

In the R&R, Judge Bandstra properly concluded that Pinder has satisfied every element

of the Florida Whistleblower’s Act, Fla. Stat. § 448.102, and that the great majority of facts

(including Bahamasair’s admission that it retaliated against Pinder for her letter to management)

were actually conceded by Bahamasair. The R&R ruled against Pinder in only one aspect –

1 The R&R is reviewed de novo by this Court. See § 636(b)(1)(c).

Case 1:08-cv-22548-JLK Document 64 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2009 Page 1 of 14


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namely, that Pinder complained about the conduct of a co-worker, not the conduct of her

employer. This conclusion is wrong for two reasons.

First, in Pinder’s written complaint, she objected to Bahamasair’s failure to comply with

the federal APIS regulations, codified at 19 C.F.R. § 122.75a. See D.E. 33-4. Bahamasair

concedes that it actually violated the APIS regulations, See D.E. 33-2 (Fowler Dep. 27-28; 30),

and that it had been cited numerous times both before and after the incident in question for

violating various homeland security regulations. See D.E. 33-2 (Fowler Dep. 85-86; 89-90; 101-

105); D.E. 33-3 (Kerr-Teele Dep. 21-26; 30-49). Bahamasair also concedes that the written

complaint, which was sent to the appropriate government agency that investigates these

violations, exposed the company to large fines and penalties. Id. As far as Pinder and

Bahamasair were concerned at the time of her termination, Pinder was complaining about a

company-wide violation of the APIS regulations. Id.

Second, the co-worker most responsible for Bahamasair’s admitted violation of 19 C.F.R.

§ 122.75a was acting in the course and scope of her employment for the benefit of the airline.

See D.E. 33-2 (Fowler Dep. 28, 30). Sharon Jones, Bahamasair’s Assistant Station Manager,

knowingly secured an international departure without first transmitting a passenger manifest to

customs to keep the flight on-time. Id. Moreover, Bahamasair’s corporate designee testified that

Jones was not disciplined for her admittedly inappropriate conduct, id. at 60, and the Bahamasair

employee who investigated the incident testified that airline management was only concerned

about punishing Pinder, not the employee whose conduct exposed the airline to substantial fines

and penalties. See D.E. 33-3 (Kerr-Teele Dep. 87-89; 99-100).2

2 Kerr-Teele initially testified that she was not disciplined in any way, see D.E. 33-3 (Kerr-Teele Dep. 74-85), but she later testified that Jones received some sort of “letter of discipline.” Id. Bahamasair has never produced the supposed “letter of discipline” and there is no reason to



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Pinder’s written complaint fits squarely within the scope of the Florida Whistleblower

Act and is exactly the type of conduct that the Act was created to protect.

I. Pinder was Terminated in Retaliation for Objecting to Bahamasair’s Violation of Federal APIS Regulations

Bahamasair admits that it terminated Pinder because of her written letter detailing the

airline’s violation of the APIS regulations, and for no other reason. See D.E. 33-2 (Fowler Dep.

17-19; 117); D.E. 33-3 (Kerr-Teele Dep. 18; 114-115). Bahamasair also admits that the

underlying rationale behind the retaliatory termination was that the airline was exposed to

significant “fines and penalties”, see D.E. 33-2 (Fowler Dep. 85-86; 89-90; 101-105); D.E. 33-3

(Kerr-Teele Dep. 87-89; 99-100), because the airline was in fact, as alleged by Pinder, violating

the APIS regulations. See D.E. 33-2 (Fowler Dep. 28; 30). Despite these concessions, the airline

has taken the position that Pinder’s written complaint was nothing more than her complaining

about a co-worker. The irony is that Bahamasair took her complaint to be a widespread criticism

of airline policy and law violations that could do significant harm to the company – so much so

that it terminated her and that it made clear to the investigating officer that nothing short of

Pinder’s immediate termination would satisfy upper management – but when sued for unlawful

retaliatory discharge, it has taken the position that Pinder was merely voicing her concerns about

a co-worker. Bahamasair cannot have it both ways.

The whistle blowing that Pinder engaged in here was far more serious and direct than the

whistle blowing that this very Court ruled was “protected activity” in Padron v. Bellsouth

Telecomm., Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (King, J.) affirmed 62 Fed. Appx. 317

believe it actually exists. Despite Bahamasair’s corporate designee’s testimony that Jones was not disciplined, the R&R erroneously concluded that she was. (Ms. Kerr-Teele’s highly suspect testimony is at times outright perjurious and she was not testifying on behalf of the corporate defendant pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). See D.E. 46, p. 7, n.9).



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(11th Cir. 2003). There, this Court held that, “[t]he signing and sending of [a] letter detailing

legal abuses by [Defendant] satisfies this [engaging in statutorily protected activity] prong.” Id.

at 1255-56. This Court held in Padron that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity when she

mailed a letter detailing abusive and illegal sales practices at her employer, Bellsouth. Id. at

1254. But the Padron letter was relatively benign and made only a single passing reference to

illegal activity when it stated “this is a formal complaint of illegal and unethical activities

occurring at the Bellsouth Corporation…[.]” See D.E. 46-4. To the contrary, Pinder’s letter

pulled no punches and stated:

I am writing to provide you with a detailed account of an Incident which occurred on the 15th of April, 2008, which was a clear breach of both Homeland Security, specifically Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Bahamasair security operations protocols. Bahamasair Manager, Ms. Sharon Jones, processed Mr. Randolph McClain for travel on Bahamasair flight #230, on the aforementioned date. Once Mr. McClain had been checked In, and had gone through TSA security screening, Bahamasair Gate Agent, Mr. Ken Gittens discovered a red flag upon realizing that Mr. McClain had presented at gate G-4 for boarding on flight #230, with only a boarding pass, but without an e-ticket. There was no information entered on the flight's manifest pertaining to Mr, McClain. This prompted Mr. Gittens to look further into the matter. His inquiries revealed that Ms. Jones had checked in Mr. McClain using the name and passport number of a Mr. Marvin Musgrove, but no one by the name of Marvin Musgrove had presented for boarding, or check-in for that matter, for flight #230. After realizing the obvious violation of U.S. federal and commercial airline procedural protocols, Ms. Linda Burrows went into the system to delete Mr. Musgrove's name, and replace it with the actual traveler, Mr. Randolph McClain. This correction was only made after the departure of flight #230. I am aware of the negative impact that such breaches of security can have on the welfare of our airline, especially when it is revealed that employees of the airline are found to be intentionally engaging in actions which undermine the airline's efforts to operate within TSA's guidelines.

* * * It will be difficult, however, for such a culture to develop if it is realized that some of this company's employees and their livelihood can be callously disregarded, while others are allowed to intentionally undermine both Bahamasair and U.S. border security with impunity.



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* * *

The company's response to this matter will send a clear signal as to whether Bahamasair's management is serious about operating the national flag carrier within the parameters of the rules and regulations of the U.S. Jurisdiction and the Homeland Security Department….

D.E. 46-2 (emphasis added).

The last sentence is perhaps most significant because Pinder is expressly requesting that

the airline take corrective action to ensure compliance with federal law; Bahamasair’s response

was equally expressive and direct – it fired her.3

Bahamasair’s gut reaction to Pinder’s complaint was correct – she was complaining about

the airline’s violation of federal law and it could have been (and still could be) fined

substantially. Its purposeful downplaying of Pinder’s complaint in order to escape liability in

this litigation is a transparent and complete reversal of its admitted and illegal rationale for firing

Pinder.

II. Even Assuming the R&R’s Conclusion that Pinder was Complaining about a Co-Worker is Correct, the Airline is Still Liable to Pinder

Bahamasair has taken the novel defense that Pinder was “merely” complaining about the

misconduct of a co-worker, Sharon Jones. See D.E. 42, ¶ 5. Even if Pinder accepted

Bahamasair’s argument as correct, it remains undisputed that Jones was acting in the course and

scope of her employment for the benefit of her employer and was not disciplined for her

3 Perhaps most troubling is that, unlike most employers defending a retaliation lawsuit, Bahamasair is not denying that it retaliated – it is eagerly acknowledging and embracing the fact that it terminated Pinder in retaliation for the letter. See D.E. 33-2 (Fowler Dep. 17-19; 117); D.E. 33-3 (Kerr-Teele Dep. 18; 114-115). Protecting employees from just this type of adverse conduct stemming from a proper objection to unlawful activity by the employer is the precise reason the Act exists and why it is liberally interpreted to protect employees.



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misconduct. Under these undisputed facts, Pinder’s written complaint still constitutes “protected

activity” within the meaning of the Act.

This case is governed by a Florida statute, and thus this Court must look to the decisions

of the Florida Supreme Court to guide its legal analysis. See Veale v. Citibank, 85 F.3d 577, 580

(11th Cir. 1996) (“In matters of state law, federal courts are bound by the rulings of the state's

highest court.”). Neither the parties nor the Magistrate Judge cited any Florida Supreme Court

case concerning the distinction, if any, between misconduct by an employee and misconduct by

an employer. Pinder’s position is and has been that there is no distinction, and to the extent there

is a distinction, it is a distinction without a difference because employers act only through their

employees. If Bahamasair’s unreasonably narrow and restrictive interpretation of the Act is

correct, then only the most significant decisions – if any at all – of upper-management could

qualify as “protected activity.”

The most relevant case on point is Taylor v. Memorial Health Systems, Inc., 770 So. 2d

752 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (reversing summary judgment). In Taylor, the plaintiff/employee

alleged that a hospital staff physician “was conducting physical examinations of female patients

in an inappropriate manner and without following [hospital] procedure of having a third person

present during the examination.” Id. at 753. The allegation was that the staff physician – i.e. a

co-worker, not the hospital itself – violated various Florida statutes concerning sexual

misconduct in the practice of medicine. Id. at 754. The appellate court agreed that the

plaintiff/employee’s allegations constituted protected activity within the meaning of the Act. (If

Bahamasair’s interpretation of the Act is correct, then Taylor was wrongly decided – they are not

reconcilable).



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To the contrary, the airline’s position flies in the face of this Court’s mandate to liberally

construe the Act in favor of the employee, see Golf Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla.

2000) (the purpose of the Act is “to protect private employees who report or refuse to assist

employers who violate laws enacted to protect the public,”); Molenda v. Hoechst Celanese

Corp., 60 F.Supp. 2d 1294, 1299 (S.D.Fla.1999) (Seitz, J.) (the Act is “to be construed liberally

in favor of granting access to the remedy.”); Schultz v. Tampa Elec. Co., 704 So. 2d 605, 606

(Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (courts are “required to construe the whistle blower act liberally because it

is a remedial statute.”), and Bahamasair failed to identify a single case that it believes properly

found protected activity. (Bahamasair’s failure to identify a case that it agrees with strongly

undermines the intellectual strength behind its argument).

In the absence of a Florida Supreme Court case on point, the parties have found only a

single Florida intermediate appellate court decision that analyzes, albeit briefly, this issue –

Sussan v. Nova Southeastern Univ., 723 So.2d 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). For purposes of her

Motion and this Objection, Pinder accepts Sussan’s analytical approach to the issue. Under

Sussan, an employee engages in protected activity when she:

(i) objects to illegal activity of her employer (ii) objects to illegal activity of anyone acting within the legitimate scope of

their employment, or (iii) objects to illegal activity of an employee where the employer ratifies the

employee’s illegal actions.

See 723 So. 2d at 934 (emphasis added).4 Although Pinder needs to satisfy only one of the three,

the undisputed facts prove beyond peradventure that she actually satisfies all three.

4 Several federal courts in Florida have relied upon Sussan in unreported decisions. See, e.g. McIntyre v. Delhaize America, Inc., 2009 WL 1039557 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2009); Douberley v. Burger King Corp., 2007 WL 1175757 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2007); Kelleher v. Pall Aeropower Corp., 2001 WL 485119 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2001).



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First, as indicated in Part I, above, Pinder objected in writing to the illegal activity of her

employer, i.e., Pinder objected to Bahamasair’s admitted violation of 19 C.F.R. § 122.75a,

known as the APIS regulations. See D.E. 33-4; D.E. 33-2 (Fowler Dep. 27-28; 30). This alone

is sufficient to grant summary judgment in favor of Pinder.

Second, Pinder, and according to Bahamasair’s unreasonably narrow interpretation of the

Act, objected in writing to the illegal activity of Assistant Station Manager Sharon Jones, who

was acting in the legitimate course and scope of her employment with Bahamasair. Id. Under

Florida law, an employee acts within the scope of employment "if his act is of the kind he is

employed to perform, it occurs substantially within the time and space limits of employment and

it is activated at least in part by a purpose to serve the master.” Nadler v. Mann, 951 F.2d 301

(11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Kane Furniture Corp. v. Miranda, 506 So.2d 1061, 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA

1987)); see also Reece v. Ebersbach, 9 So. 2d 805, 806 (Fla. 1942) (noting that an employee’s

misconduct inured to the employer if it is “incident to the master's business and while acting

within the range of employment….”). The airline admits that it violated the APIS regulations,

see D.E. 33-2 (Fowler Dep. 27-28; 30), and that Jones was the airline manager most responsible

for the violation. Id. Bahamasair’s station managers knew that they could not secure Flight 230

for departure because of the problem with its manifest. See D.E. 46-7 (April 25, 2008 email to

Glenda Pletscher).5 Despite this, several employees made a calculated decision to secure the

aircraft and to resolve the manifest problem after Flight 230’s departure. Id. Clearly,

Bahamasair employees acted within the course and scope of their employment when they

5 The email specifically stated: “As I [Karen Sherman-Johnson] was putting in the flight [230] info, Mrs. Jones called and told me not to close the flight . . . She then called back and said o.k. I found M. McClaine ticket you can close the flight. I then said no Mr. Musgrove ticket, she again said no, Mr. McClaine, I then said so the manifest on the board is incorrect, she [Ms. Jones] then in a very stern voice said ‘Karen I will fax the manifest, close the flight.’ so I did.”



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prematurely secured Flight 230 to avoid a delay. This concession by Bahamasair is alone

sufficient to grant summary judgment in favor of Pinder.

Bahamasair is unable to cite a single case that supports its unreasonably narrow and

intellectually dishonest interpretation of the Act. During oral argument before Judge Bandstra,

Bahamasair directed the court to only a single case – McIntyre v. Delhaize America, Inc., 2009

WL 1039557 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2009). See Exhibit A (Transcript of July 2, 2009 hearing, p.

20). But McIntyre is not binding, unreported and highly unpersuasive because it concerned an

employee who allegedly reported that her boss, a pharmacist, was providing narcotics to drug

addicts. Id. at *1. In granting summary judgment for the employer, the district court noted that

“Plaintiff complained that [his supervisor] was acting outside the legitimate scope of her

employment.” Id. at *3 (emphasis added). Here, Pinder is not suggesting that Jones was

engaged in criminal activity or that she was straying from her course and scope of employment.

To the contrary, Pinder complained (and Bahamasair conceded) that Jones, in the course and

scope of her employment, and for the benefit of her employer, violated the APIS regulations by

permitting and encouraging an international flight to be secured without first transmitting a

passenger manifest to Customs.6

The remaining cases cited by Bahamasair in its Cross-Motion are equally unavailing:

• Ruiz v. Aerorep Group Corp., 941 So. 2d. 505 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006): The

plaintiff/employee in Ruiz sued her employer under the Act because a co-worker

assaulted her. Her purported complaint to her employer concerned an intentional tort by

a rogue (and arguably) criminal co-worker and there was no allegation that the employer

6 Moreover, neither the employer or the supervisor in McIntryre violated the law – it was an unsubstantiated allegation that a pharmacist was secretly a criminal. Bahamasair actually did exactly what Pinder is accusing it of doing – the APIS regulations were actually violated and the co-worker most responsible for the violation did so to benefit the airline.



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violated the law. Ruiz stands for the unremarkable position that an employee’s complaint

to her employer that a fellow employee battered her is not “protected activity” within the

meaning of the whistleblower statute. See 941 So. 2d at 507. Moreover, and quite

helpful to Pinder, Ruiz also noted that “[a]n employer is responsible for an intentional tort

committed by an employee if the employee committed the tort while acting within the

course and scope of his employment, with the purpose of benefiting the interests of the

employer.” Id. at 507 (emphasis added). Here, Pinder complained that the airline

violated the APIS regulations and the airline has admitted that her allegations were true

and that is why it fired her. And the airline does not dispute that Manager Jones was

“acting within the course and scope of her employment” and for “the purpose of

benefitting the interests of” the airline when the flight in question was secured without

first transmitting a proper manifest.

• Sussan v. Nova Southeastern University, 723 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999): In

Sussan¸ the plaintiff/employee alleged that she engaged in protected activity when she

reported that co-workers were stealing funds from the employer. Unlike Pinder, the

plaintiff in Sussan did not allege any illegal wrongdoing by the employer or that the

felonious co-workers were acting in the course and scope of their employment for the

benefit of the employer. Sussan, like Ruiz, is unremarkable and wholly distinguishable

from the undisputed facts here.

• Kelleher v. Pall Aeropower Corp., 2001 WL 485119 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2001)

(unreported): In Kelleher, the district court concluded that the plaintiff/employee, like

the plaintiff/employee in Sussan, had alleged only that his co-workers harassed him

outside the scope of their employment because the purportedly illegal activity “not only



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happened outside the workplace but involve activities totally unrelated to work….” Id. at

*7. Kelleher could not be more irrelevant to Pinder’s substantiated allegations that

Bahamasair violated the APIS regulations.

• Douberley v. Burger King Corp., 2007 WL 1175757 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2007)

(unreported): In Douberley, the district court denied a motion to add a count under the

Act where the plaintiff/employee, riding exclusively under subsection (2), not subsection

(3) as Pinder is, accused her employer of terminating her in retaliation for filing a police

report on a co-worker. I.e., the “illegal activity” that formed the basis of her claim was

assault and battery by a co-worker – she did not accuse the employer of violating the law.

Here, the airline admits that it terminated Pinder in retaliation for writing a letter to senior

management that concerned Bahamasair’s conceded violation of the APIS regulations.

The bottom line is that there is no case – not from the Florida courts and not from the

federal district courts applying Florida law – that support the airline’s interpretation of the Act,

and neither Bahamasair nor the R&R cited to any.

Third, and again even according to Bahamasair’s unreasonably narrow interpretation of

the Act, the airline ratified the illegal activity of Assistant Station Manager Sharon Jones when it

decided not to discipline her, but instead to terminate only Pinder. See D.E. 33-2 (Fowler Dep.

60); D.E. 33-3 (Kerr-Teele Dep. 75-85). “The law is settled in this jurisdiction that when one

person acts for another who accepts the fruits of his efforts, the latter is deemed to have accepted

the methods employed, and he may not, even though innocent, receive such benefits and at the

same time disclaim responsibility for the means by which they were acquired.” Meyer v. Nator

Holding Co., 136 So. 636, 638 (Fla. 1931). See also Reece, 9 So. 2d at 806 (noting that an

employer is responsible for an employee’s conduct when it subsequently ratifies it); Peace River



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Phosphate Mining Co. v. Thomas A. Green, Inc., 135 So. 828 (Fla. 1931) (noting that a principal

cannot ratify act of agent in part, and reject it in part.); Mercury Ins. Co. of Florida v. Sherwin,

982 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (noting that an employer which accepts the fruits of a

transaction by one who acts within the apparent scope of the principal's authority as agent,

cannot be heard to deny the authority of the apparent agent).

The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly stated that the “failure to take action that constitutes

acquiescence for purposes of respondeat superior liability . . . is also sufficient to constitute

ratification.” Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F. 3d 1386, 1409 (11th Cir. 1994)

(“A principal can ratify the unauthorized act of an agent purportedly done on behalf of the

principal either expressly or by implication through conduct that is inconsistent with an intention

to repudiate the unauthorized act.”); see also McDonald v. Hamilton Elec. Inc. of Fla., 666 F.2d

509, 514 (11th Cir. 1982) (same).

Federal decisions outside this jurisdiction further undermine the airline’s unreasonably

narrow interpretation of the Act on a ratification theory. See, e.g., Haugen v. Brosseau, 351 F.3d

372, 393 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a failure to discipline an employee may constitute a

ratification of the employee’s conduct); Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983)

(same).

Foreign state court decisions also support Pinder. See, e.g., Mason v. Nibel, 263 P. 121

(Ok. 1928) (noting than an employer with knowledge of the wrongful act that accepts its benefits

is liable on the basis of ratification); Jones v. B.L. Development Corp., 940 So. 2d 961, 966

(Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (“Where an employer learns of the past intentional conduct and does

nothing to reprimand the employee, this acts as a ratification.”); Werdann v. Mel Hambelton

Ford, Inc., 79 P.3d 1081, 1091 (Kan. App. 2003) (“Failure to discipline an employee for



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wrongful conduct can be considered evidence of ratification by the employer.”); Wirig v. Kinney

Shoe Corp., 448 N.W.2d 526, 534 (Minn.Ct.App.1989), rev'd in part on other grounds, 461

N.W.2d 374 (Minn.1990) (employer may ratify or approve acts of employee by failing to

discharge or reprimand agent for sexual harassment); Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262

Cal. Rptr. 842, 860 (Cal. App. 1989) (“ratification may be inferred from the fact that the

employer, after being informed of the employee's actions, does not fully investigate and fails to

repudiate the employee's conduct by redressing the harm done and punishing or discharging the

employee.”).

The facts are undisputed – Assistant Station Manager Sharon Jones, acting on behalf of

and for the benefit of Bahamasair, was responsible for the airline’s violation of the APIS

regulations, see D.E. 33-2 (Fowler Dep. 28; 30), while Pinder simply witnessed this event and

reported it to senior management. Id. at 39 & 83. Jones was not disciplined at all and still works

at the airline, id. at 60, while Pinder was fired because she reported the incident and complained

to senior management. Id. at 17-19; 117. Any fair reading of the airline’s conduct shows

beyond peradventure that Bahamasair ratified Jones’ actions by giving her a pass while firing

Pinder.

Conclusion

The only legitimate dispute between the parties is whether Pinder’s written complaint of

the admitted APIS violation constitutes “protected activity” within the meaning of the Act. In

light of this Court’s decision in Padron, the Fifth District Court of Appeals’ decision in Taylor,

and this Court’s mandate to liberally construe the Act in favor of the employee, the only

reasonable conclusion is that Pinder’s written complaint constitutes “protected activity.”



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For the reasons stated above, this Court should sustain Plaintiff’s objections to the Report

and Recommendation and enter summary judgment in her favor on liability.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Matthew Seth Sarelson Matthew Seth. Sarelson, Esq. Fla. Bar No. 888281 SARELSON LAW FIRM P.A. 1401 Brickell Avenue, Suite 510 Miami, Florida 33131 305-379-0305 800-421-9954 (fax) [email protected]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 20, 2009, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the forgoing document is being served this day on all counsel of record or pro se parties identified on the attached Service List in the manner specified, either via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those counsel or parties who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic Filing. _/s/ Matthew Seth Sarelson_____________ Matthew Seth Sarelson, Esq.

Service List Case No.: 08-22548-CIV-KING/BANDSTRA

Stuart A. Goldstein, Esq. Fla. Bar 223735 Law Offices of Goldstein and Sordo 9350 S. Dixie Highyway, 10th Floor Miami, Florida 33156 (305) 670-1222 (305) 670-7065 (fax) [email protected] Counsel for Bahamasair


Documents

Pinder v. Bahamasair Objection to R&R