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http://jpe.sagepub.com/ Journal of Planning Education and Research http://jpe.sagepub.com/content/3/1/35 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/0739456X8300300105 1983 3: 35 Journal of Planning Education and Research Judith Innes de Neufville Planning Theory and Practice: Bridging the Gap Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning can be found at: Journal of Planning Education and Research Additional services and information for http://jpe.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Email Alerts: http://jpe.sagepub.com/subscriptions Subscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Permissions: http://jpe.sagepub.com/content/3/1/35.refs.html Citations: What is This? - Jul 1, 1983 Version of Record >> at UNIV OF MICHIGAN on October 17, 2014 jpe.sagepub.com Downloaded from at UNIV OF MICHIGAN on October 17, 2014 jpe.sagepub.com Downloaded from

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Page 1: Planning Theory and Practice: Bridging the Gap

http://jpe.sagepub.com/Journal of Planning Education and Research

http://jpe.sagepub.com/content/3/1/35The online version of this article can be found at:

 DOI: 10.1177/0739456X8300300105

1983 3: 35Journal of Planning Education and ResearchJudith Innes de Neufville

Planning Theory and Practice: Bridging the Gap  

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

On behalf of: 

  Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning

can be found at:Journal of Planning Education and ResearchAdditional services and information for    

  http://jpe.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts:

 

http://jpe.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:  

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints:  

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions:  

http://jpe.sagepub.com/content/3/1/35.refs.htmlCitations:  

What is This? 

- Jul 1, 1983Version of Record >>

at UNIV OF MICHIGAN on October 17, 2014jpe.sagepub.comDownloaded from at UNIV OF MICHIGAN on October 17, 2014jpe.sagepub.comDownloaded from

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35

Planning Theory and Practice:Bridging the Gap

Judith Innes de Neufville

University of California, BerkeleyAcknowledgements: The author ap-preciates comments on earlier versions ofthis paper by Peter Marris, Michael Teitz,Melvin Webber, Carol Rief, Fred Collignon,Richard Meier, Bill Alonso, the membersof a seminar on the Intellectual Origins ofPlanning, and an anonymous reviewer forthis journal.

Abstract

There is increasing evidence that plan-ning theory has been inadequate in recentyears. Not only does it fail to guide prac-tice, it contributes to cognitive dissonanceand alienation among practitioners. Plan-ning schools agree on no body of litera-ture and ideas to count as planningtheory. Planning is like a paradigm "incrisis," in that theory does not mesh withexperience. Moreover, neither of the twomain candidates for the prime exemplarfor planning practice—the master planmodel or the policy analysis model — is

acceptable enough to provide coherenceto the field

To remedy this situation, the paper pro-poses an agenda for planning theory toconfront many of the dilemmas that have

emerged, such as the conflict of technicaland political roles and deciding who is theclient. New theorizing should be groundedin empirical research on the practice andcontexts of planning, and much of it

should be holistic and interpretive, ratherthan quantitative and hypothesis testing.A prime goal should be to create a newimagery of what planning is and whatplanners do. Research should draw onsuch fields as political economy, anthro-pology, history, organizational behavior,and political science for methods andtheories, and grow from phenomenologi-cal thought and critical theory more thanfrom positivist analysis Topics whichdemand particular attention include prob-lem defining, language and symbols,values analysis, knowledge for interactiveplanning and unique settings, communi-cator roles, and planning ethics.

The Doldrums of Planning Theory

Despite some recent signs of life, planningtheory remains in the doldrums, where it

has been for over a decade. Few newideas have been generated from within thefield, yet the old ones are not supportedby consensus. Most significantly, docu-mentation is growing that planning theorynot only provides little guidance to thepractitioner, but that it also contributes toa sense of frustration and can hinder prac-tice. It is a matter of considerable urgencyto develop theories of planning that willboth mesh with the realities of practice andbe useful and inspiring to the practitioner.The theories must also be richer, moreevocative, and more intellectually produc-tive than those now in currency if the fieldis to mature The question is how canthese goals be achieved?

Dilemmas and Conundrums

Evidence of the inadequacy of planningtheory comes from many directions.Klosterman’s survey of planning theorycourses (1981) showed few contributionsby planners in recent years, with the mostpopular being mainly review articles Therewas little commonality among course bibli-ographies, with few items appearing inmore than a quarter of them, and appar-ently no common structure to courses. Notext, or even collection of writings, hasgained general acceptance.

Not only is there no agreement on whatbody of ideas constitutes planning theory,much of the literature raises insolubledilemmas and endless conundrums. Howcan the planner choose between being avalue-neutral analyst or a committed,effective political actor? If there is no

single public interest, how can plannersknow what interest or value to serve? Howcan they do long-term, comprehensive,and systematic planning in a world inwhich action is undertaken incrementallyand there are no centers of power? Howcan they solve problems when there isneither agreement on goals nor technol-ogy for solutions? Should a plan be avision of the future, a contract, or a firststep in a process?

Such questions have no answers They arethe stuff of stale philosophical debate, theproduct of logical -deductive argumenta-tion, m which the implications of variousextremes are drawn in relief and the con-tradictions exposed. They are armchairarguments. In short, there is little inplanning theory which offers a view ofplanning with which professionals oracademics can be comfortable

Planners’ education generally provideslittle guidance in thinking about how toachieve the diverse and contradictorygoals in practice or to resolve the dilem-mas planning theory poses for them. Eachplanner must individually invent a rationaleand a strategy. This gap of theory andpractice is well recognized in planning cur-ricula, which are normally well larded withstudios, internships, and experiential learn-ing. Something must fill the void betweenthe world of practice and most of what isformally taught. Yet the void will not befilled until planning theory can make muchmore explicit what it is that practice isreally about.

Cognitive Dissonance in the Profession

Empirical studies document increasinglythat planning education and thoughtabout planning do not provide a mindsetwhich guides planners effectively in theirbehavior or makes them comfortable withthe roles they play. Vasu, for example,(1979), after interviewing a large sample,concluded that planners suffer from cogni-tive dissonance. They are caught, forexample, between their acute awarenessof a pluralist, political reality and their faiththat they should do rational, comprehen-sive planning while remaining aloof fromthis political process. At the same time, asindividuals, they are politically involved.Conflict among the roles planners haveand the lack of congruence between their

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36

goals and their achievements are impor-tant sources of job dissatisfaction (Mayo1982). Marcuse (1976) documented confu-sion among planners about the nature ofethical behavior, while Howe and Kauf-man’s later study (1979) linked planners’differences on ethics to whether they sawthemselves as primarily technicians or pol-iticians. These authors also have identifieda substantial group, close to fifty percentof their sample, rather ambiguouslylabeled &dquo;hybrids,&dquo; who do not choosebetween technical excellence and valuecommrtment, but try to achieve both.Planning theory, however, gives littleimage of the content or logic of this latterstance, but rather suggests the role is logi-cally and psychologically untenable.

Other kinds of dissonance also exist be-tween planners’ expectations and whatthey actually do. Baum (1980a) argues thatplanners are often ineffective and frus-trated because they expect to be analystsand plan makers, but are instead requiredto operate as bureaucrats and negotiators,for which roles they have not been pre-pared. In a study of the role of informationin the planning of local Block Grant pro-grams (de Neufville 1981a), planners sub-scribed to a rhetoric that information andanalysis are important components ofplanning. In reality, however, they did notactually use data themselves in any signifi-cant way. Benveniste (1982) and Baum(1980b) both contend that planners areconfused about behavioral norms andethics because of their anomalous rolesas partially bureaucrats and partiallyprofessionals.

Defining Planning

At this point the logical mind will demanda definition of planning. It is my conten-

tion, however, that defining what plannersdo or should do is a task for research todlscover, rather than simply the a prionbasis for argumentation Of course, this

position presumes that the readers sharewith me some tacit conceptions whichallow us to recognize certain activities as

&dquo;planning.&dquo; But while most might agreethat some activities constitute planning,we undoubtedly would not agree aboutmany others

To discover through research what onecannot define seems paradoxical. &dquo;Plan-

ning&dquo; is an open concept, in Kaplan’s ter-mmology (1964), not fully articulated andwith fuzzy boundaries, yet in use and gen-erally understood. We have to be cautiousto avoid &dquo;premature closure ;’ narrowlydefining such ideas too quickly, becausethe meaning of open concepts variesaccording to context, purpose, and theunderstanding of the overall situation. Forexample, to a child a book is a bound setof pages with words and pictures; to alibrarian bound &dquo;books&dquo; may be shelvedas periodicals, to a tenure committee abound volume made up of reprinted arti-cles does not count as a book, while astack of loose manuscript pages may bequite acceptable.

We can use research simultaneously toanalyze and define planning in the sameway that we learn the meaning of lan-

guage. A phenomenon is identified andlabeled for us; we observe it and exper-ience it in various contexts and forms; wegeneralize from our observations; we con-sider explanations from others; we modifythe original definitions and develop prin-ciples which allow us to recognize evenpeculiar variations of a phenomenon. Theprinciples may be tacit, but so long asthey are more or less shared, we can com-municate and analyze. The exercise ofelaborating understanding is one whichhas both objective and subjective com-ponents, as we go back and forth betweenexperiencing and analyzing.

Academics and researchers help make thislink between experience and interpretation(Berger and Luckmann 1966), which is anecessity for credible research On theother hand, those who do planning mustalso provide their own perspective in thisdefinition process, must evaluate theresearchers’ conceptions, and even testthe idea m their practice. And theresearcher’s own engagement in practicecan provide experiential understanding.The result of developing and negotiatingthese perceptions can be a concept withwhich both those who plan and thosewho analyze planning can be comfortable

At the start of this definition process onemay look at the formal planning profes-sion, represented in the U.S. in part by theAPA and served by planning schools. Butmany others belong in this first cut-national planners operating in plannedeconomies, people working in state plan-ning agencies, social planners, policyanalysts, program planners, budgetaryanalysts, and policy advisors. Their con-tinued inclusion in planning theoryresearch depends on its purposes and thedegree of commonality among the groups.

My premise is that planning is a set ofactivities intended to improve the qualityof decisions for a Community, to help it be

prepared for its future. While those inpower must be planners by definition, thechallenging and relevant problem for us isto define and prescribe the roles and activ-ities for those who try to guide those inpower. Other precepts I would begin withare: planning is comprehensive in attempt-ing to deal with many factors, it makessome systematic use of information; and it

involves creation of images of the futureand strategies to reach them. All of theseare preliminary definitions, open to evolu-tion and even rejection as part of the fur-ther specification process.

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37

Planning as a Field in Crisis

As a field, planning is in a state of cnsis,in a sense which parallels Kuhn’s discus-sions of progress and paradigm change inscience (1970). The theories of planningare increasingly perceived to be at oddswith the experience m research and prac-tice. The theoretical precepts are nothelpful to many attempting to use themThe anomalies, observations unexplainedby the theory, are severe enough to createsignificant malaise among both academicsand practitioners It is time, if we followout the implications of the analogy toKuhn’s argument, for a revolution in plan-ning thought. It is time to develop a newway of seeing the problems and task ofplanning-to make a gestalt switch to aview which will provide a more satisfactorymesh with reality, a more usable set ofgoals for practice, and a more fruitfuldirection for theoretical inquiry

A useful way to understand the nature ofa scientific paradigm is to look at theexemplar, that is, the principal model forresearch, complete with ideas, theories,techniques, and model problem solutionswhich are seen to work effectively Thisexemplar becomes the basis for education,which, in turn, defines and perpetuatesthe paradigm. An analogy for a professionis a model of practice well enough elabor-ated and widely enough accepted and usedto shape education and provide a stablebasis for defining and doing research onpractice. Such an exemplar would have toresolve many of the anomalies.

The strongest and best-developed can-didate for planning’s exemplar has beenthe Master Plan approach, complete withplanning commission, long-range, com-prehensive and visionary plan, planningtasks such as goal-setting, informationgathering, alternative generation and solu-tion design, a nonpolitical professional role

for planners as staff to planning commis-sions ; and clients (the commissions or the

city council) that could be viewed as rep-resenting the public interest. Plannerswere to be insulated from bureaucracy andfrom the messy tasks of getting politicalsupport for plans, managing or evendesigning implementation activities Theapproach represented a valiant effort toavoid many dilemmas, such as the issue ofwhose values to promote. The model con-tained a workable set of institutional and

political arrangements and, under theStandard City Planning Enabling Act, it

became the framework for much local

planning across the U.S A kind of text-book even appeared in Kent’s UrbanGeneral Plan (1964).

The Master Plan approach never quiteachieved the status of exemplar, howeverSome part of the profession saw it at theoutset as relatively too oriented to physicalplanning. Certainly it was directed primar-ily to U.S. city planners, though it couldhave been adapted to other types of plan-ning. After some experience, many plan-ners and planning theorists were toconclude it did not work as intended. Itwas hard to develop a plan that would beinfluential and long-term, as well aspragmatic and implementable, withoutturning the planning process into some-thing quite different from the image origi-nally pro~ected-something that was partand parcel of daily politics. The wholeapproach could simply mask a politicalprocess, allowing planners to serve class-and power-based interests, while acting asdisinterested servants of the &dquo;public inter-est&dquo; (Weiss 1983)

Whatever the reasons, however, for thefailure of the Master Plan approach to gainfull support from planners-it is not thepurpose of this paper to reiterate the manyarguments on this subject -the modelbecame the straw man for much of plan-ning theory. Attempts were made to mod-ify the model, for example, by talkingabout the middle-range bridge (Meyerson1956), to justify planning through publicfinance theory about intervention inmarkets (Moore 1978), and to outline alter-native planning roles like advocate, facilita-tor or analyst. Countless diatribes werelaunched against the logic, the practicality,and the rationality of the Master Plan

The next strongest recent contender forplanning’s exemplar has been best articu-lated and most often practiced by thosetrained in public policy (which, as a field,has parallel difficulties to planning inagreeing on a paradigm and exemplar) Inthis approach, the planner is analyst/advi-sor to a chief executive or agency head,applying economic and systems analysisframeworks to produce recommendationsMeltsner’s book on policy analysts (1976)documented the practices, and manymethods textbooks appeared. Some plan-ning schools have begun to identify morewith this model, as they loosen ties toarchitecture and link themselves with

policy or public administration

As yet, however, no clear trend movesplanning practice and education clearlyinto a policy analysis mode. Despite thelimitations of the Master Plan approach,the latter did express several ideals impor-tant to many planners, which are notembodied in other approaches. These are,most notably: (1) comprehensiveness inthe sense of developing a plan for thewhole, rather than working on only a partof the problem; (2) a concern with out-comes rather than simply a focus on proc-ess (like the advocate or the policy analystas &dquo;hired -gun&dquo;); and (3) a design perspec-tive, which is synthesizing and creative,visionary, rather than merely critical andreactive to political pressures or narrowlyspecified problem formulations’

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An Agenda for Planning Theory

The predicament of planning-the cnsis,the malaise, the disjunction between whatwe teach and claim planners do and whatthey actually do, the sharp divergences ofopinion within the field-all this is, Ibelieve, the responsibility of planningfaculty. It is the job of those of us whoteach planning to explain the profession toitself, to make explicit the nature of prac-tice, to develop theories about how andwhy certain modes of practice tend to pro-duce one or another type of result. Ourtheories should provide a framework tounderstand the logic of planning actionand discourse, and to create a new exem-plar for practice.

Dilemmas to be Resolved

Planning theory must first deal with thedilemmas it confronts. To summarize.

Planner as Technician. On the one hand,planners must be objective and valueneutral if they are to be credible orlegitimate in their technical roles. On theother hand, they choose problem defini-tions, methods and indicators; they shapequestions and point to answers, each ofwhich embodies values.

Planning as the Application of Knowledge.While planners and others pay lip serviceto the importance of information for publicdecisions, such decisions often seem tomake little use of formal knowledge. Is theconcern with information a hollow one, oris it simply that its form is poorly matchedto the applications?

The Ilalues Problem. Is there a publicinterest and, if so, how do we recognizeit? If not, which values should we repre-sent if we cannot resolve conflicts? Evenmore basic, how does one find out whatsocial values are? And what does one dowith one’s own values-acknowledgethem, ignore them, or work for them?

Stance Toward the Political Process. Is the

political process good, reflecting the willof the people, or bad, reflecting the inter-ests of the few? Even if it does reflect the

popular will, is there any assurance theresults will be desirable on other counts?

Comprehensive versus Incremental. Howcan one reconcile the desirability of com-prehensive, long-term plans with the prac-tical reality that decisions are made inpiecemeal, incremental fashion, that infor-mation about the future is inadequate, andthat even effective centers of power sel-dom carry out even the best-made plans?

Synthesis versus AnalysIs. Should theplanner pnmanly expect to analyze andsolve problems or create new ideas? Whilethe temptation is to say yes to both, thetasks are not clearly reconcilable. Analysisinvolves taking things apart; it is reactive

to problems. Design is creative and put-ting together (Teitz 1974).

ProfessionalDilemmas. Who is the client-the immediate boss, the one who pays,the agency, the segment of the publicbeing served, or the public as a whole?What is a planner’s special expertise? Howshould the planner interact with clients-on the model of the lawyer, the doctor,the social worker, or in some unique way?Where within government should plannersserve-as advisors to executive, staff to

legislative bodies, working for citizen-based commissions, as staff of line agenciesor some other place, and why and when isone approach more desirable than another?

Context /ssues. How is planning affectedby the political and economic forces in asociety? Is it possible to assume an auto-nomous role for planning? Is there anygeneral model for practice or should it beconducted differently in different organiza-tional environments or degrees of techno-logical and political uncertainty?

Uniqueness. How can planners use knowl-edge of general laws to deal with practicesituations, which are invariably unique inimportant ways?

Implementation. Is planning simplydesigning outcomes or does it includedesigning and following through on imple-mentation strategies? Can the planner beaccepted as impartial advisor, while simul-taneously being involved in action?

The Interactiveness of Practice. If practiceinvolves give and take between plannersand others, can the planner also hold tosome visions for the future? Should the

planner be subject to the decision pro-cess, design decision processes, or simplymake recommendations without regard forsuch processes?

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39

Theoretical and Analytical Perspectives

Much of the research on practice is nowvirtually atheoretical, but progress m plan-ning theory will depend on strong concep-tual frameworks to illuminate rather than

simply describe. Several theoretical anddisciplinary perspectives currently offer themost promising structures for planningtheory research.

History. One obvious strategy is to studywhat planners have done, or thought, andwhy and under what circumstances plan-ning has come into being, developed inone form or another, or had one oranother set of consequences. A historical

approach allows looking holistically atboth practice and context and at outcomeand action. It permits tracing the influenceof ideas and identifying the sources ofchange. But history will not be particularlyuseful unless it is informed by some viewof causal relationships.

Political Economy. Planning plays a role inmaintaining the state and the economy.Political economists tend to look at plan-ning as a result rather than a cause, withat most, the ability to effect marginalchange. They rely heavily on historicalstudy and try to understand the forcescreating, constraining, and directing theactivity of planning. One important contri-bution to planning theory in this genre isCohen’s classic work (1977), in which theform and logic of French &dquo;indicative&dquo; plan-ning is defined in terms of the characteris-tics of the state, the educational system,the bureaucracy, and the economy. Asecond contribution to theory is Boyer’s(1983 forthcoming) book on the history ofcity planning in the U.S., which accountsfor changes in the activities of planningon the basis of the needs of capital forwidened investment opportunities or forregulation to limit superspeculation (seealso Boyer 1981).

Political Theory. Planning theory and plan-ners are vulnerable m their limited abilityto link ideas about practice with an under-standing of power and political process.The value of looking at planning throughthe political science lens is amply demon-strated by Altshuler’s important contribu-tion to the understanding of planningpractice, The City Planning Process (1965).

Organizational Behavior. Planners operatewithin organizations, which in turn, existwithin a set of complex interrelationshipsof governmental and private groups. Plan-ning theory generally fails to incorporatethe necessary understandings of this en-vironment. Theory and research need todeal with how practice vanes according toorganizational setting, how professionaland organizational roles come into conflictor merge, and with ways to design strate-gies for change within organizations. Con-tributions thus far include particularly thework of Christensen (1983 forthcoming)and Bryson and Delbecq (1979), who drawheavily on organizational theorists to pre-dict and prescribe planning strategy fortypes of problems in various organizationalsituations. Work of political scientists andpublic policy analysts on policy-makingand implementation is also useful as amodel as it combines political and organ-izational perspectives (see for example,Allison 1971; Bardach 1977, Mazmanianand Sabatier 1981).

Anthropology. Planning theorists can drawon the analytic and research style of an-thropologists to identify cultural systemswhich ascribe meaning to events andattach labels, values, and norms to behav-iors. Anthropology offers a strategy touncover expectations that are so muchtaken for granted that participants nolonger are conscious of them. The mostnotable planning study in this genre isPenn’s (1977) documenting the meaningsascribed to residential land uses by localofficials and ordinary citizens Her theorylinks these meanings to the social order ofcommunities in the U.S. While her find-

ings are not surprising (for example, multi-family housing signals a lower statusfamily and less responsible life style thansingle family), her work is a model forplanning research in the way it identifies,interprets, and analyzes a structure ofvalues which influence planning.

Epistemology. A field such as planning, socentered around informing and communi-cating, attempting to know and create thefuture, must have a firm basis in philoso-phical thought about the nature of knowl-edge. Moreover this epistemology must beappropriate to the task of planning, provid-ing a consistent, workable and intuitivelysatisfactory way to link knowledge to action.

The Limits of Positivism. The epistemol-ogy which has most influenced planningtheory, as it has social sciences in the lasttwo decades, is positivist thought. Theinfluence has led to advances in system-atic analysis and to much empiricalresearch, but it has also contributed tothe dilemmas of planning theory. Theresearcher (read also planner) must bethe disinterested observer in the positivistview. Facts are considered to exist &dquo;outthere,&dquo; to be discovered through researchmodeled on the methods of science. Thesearch for knowledge involves the hypo-thesizing of general laws, and proceeds vialogical deduction and empirical tests usingdata that can be measured.

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Since the knower and doer must be sep-arate, if a planner is not a value-neutraltechnician, there is no comfortable alter-native. Knowledge and action are virtuallyunlinked. Decision makers supposedly setgoals and ask questions, to which plan-ners respond and present information, onthe basis of which decision makers actThis view, however, neither describespractice nor offers an adequate normativemodel (Scott and Shore 1979) Knowledgewhich has an impact seldom follows thisthree-step process (de Neufville 1981a).

The positivist view has given credibility toquantifiable data, and, in the process, dis-couraged the study of meanings, inten-tions, and values. The search for laws

encourages the use of limited hypotheses,rather than efforts to understand whole

systems in their full complexity. Positivismprovides little way to understand how con-text relates to action or how to deal with

planning problems in specific places andtimes The effect of these limitations canbe observed in planning theory in its

search for simple principles, and m thequantitative and hypothesis-testing natureof much research on practice Such re-search cannot generate new categoriesand images for planning theory. For plan-ning practitioners the effect has been todrain legitimacy from many of the ways ofknowing they depend on which are intui-tive and holistic

Phenomenology. An alternative to pos-itivism has been gaining acceptabilityin the social sciences along with applica-tion to the research process (Patton 1980)and to the understanding of society. Aphenomenological view of knowledge pro-vides a path through some of the para-doxes of planning theory and practice.While phenomenology takes many formsin the literature (Bernstein 1976), severalthemes recur. The basic idea is that theknower tries to understand a phenomenonin its own terms and in its own unique-ness. Subjective and unmeasurable data,such as meanings and intentions, are not

only accepted, but are central. Facts, in

the phenomenological view are, in anycase, socially constructed within a com-munity (Berger and Luckmann 1966) Onecan learn by bracketing one’s own feelingsand values and by trying to put oneself inthe place of the other Since there is acommonality across people, an intersub-jectivity, one can interpret the reasons forother’s actions when one knows enoughof the circumstances and meanings ofevents to those people. One learnsthrough the technique of verstehen, orinterpretation - making sense of a complexset of circumstances.

From a phenomenological view, someplanning dilemmas do not exist For exam-

ple, it is not an issue whether the planneris a technician/problem solver or someoneimposing a personal view in defining prob-lems and choosing methods. Instead theplanner can be both, without being indichotomous roles To be a technician isto impose one’s own understandings; yetthose understandings are not merely per-sonal. The planner can develop skill inidentifying and formulating the socialmeanings of facts-meamngs that canbe shared and that will produce actionswhich are also accepted. They can drawthe actors mto the knowing and learningprocess and develop ways to legitimizeand institutionalize information productionand use.

There is less difficulty with using knowl-edge in real world applications for thephenomenologist. A general law is ofassistance in specific situations only to asmall degree. The method of proceedingby hypothesis testing is impossible in thehaste of real world decisions, many uniqueand idiosyncratic features of a situationfrequently determine final recommenda-tions. Phenomenological, holistic andspecific knowledge, however, is of usein daily decisions

Thus phenomenology offers a view of thelearning process which links knowledge toaction far better than the positivist view.Moreover m looking to the actors for themeanings of planning and in attemptingto make new sense of complex stories ofwhat planners do, it provides the oppor-tunity to search for new images as a basisfor planning theory

Some recent contributions to planningtheory demonstrate ways to use the phe-nomenological view to study and analyzepractice. Schon (1983) watched and lis-tened to practitioners solving client prob-lems in an effort to understand the

thought processes and analytic strategiesthey employ. He concluded that, whilethey do use scientific knowledge in somelimited way, their primary effort is to for-mulate the client’s problem in a way anal-ogous to one they know how to solve.They use generalizations from previousexperience, but they remain open to theidea that the particular case is unique.They work interactively until both clientand practitioner are satisfied they havereached a solution. Bolan (1980) tries tounderstand the &dquo;theories&dquo; of planningthat are constructed in the minds of prac-titioners and explores the relationshipbetween these and the more formal or&dquo;institutional&dquo; professional theory. Hisanalysis emphasizes !language, the meanings participants bring to the action, andthe uniqueness of each planning episodeMy own research on the development anduse of social indicators m public policy(1975) concludes that to be politically sig-nificant and socially meaningful, suchmeasures have to be developed throughcarefully constructed and lengthy socialprocesses and integrated with the publicand expert understandings.

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Critical Theory. The critical theorists, par-ticularly Jurgen Habermas, offer the poten-tially richest and most useful set of ideasfor future planning theory. The work ofthese theorists is still relatively inaccess-ible, however, and remains to be devel-oped into an operational and widelyusable set of concepts. 2,3 This work may,however, deal with even more theory/ /practice dilemmas than the phenomeno-logical approach. For one thing, Haber-mas, at least, is seeking more than merelyan epistemological view, but an all-encom-passing perspective linking action, knowl-edge, ethics, and politics. Moreover, hisview accepts the necessity of employingmany ways of knowing and learning-thepositivist, empirically-based method, thephenomenological, holistic and interpretivemethod and the method of critique

The notion of &dquo;cntique;’ basic to criticaltheory, demands that the knower questionall assumptions and be aware of how for-mal knowledge reinforces the status quo.The relativity of facts and methods to per-sonal or social values and understandingsbecomes, rather than a dilemma, thefoundation for further thought. Moreover,the knowing process is dialectical anddoes not require the observer to be disin-terested or value-bracketed. The knowertakes a position and learning proceedsthrough discourse and disagreement. Cer-tainly taking such a view could help legiti-mize the interactive planning roles whichnow are so problematic and could providean intellectual framework to evaluate and

improve these roles.

From the perspective of critical theorythere is no truth &dquo;out there,&dquo; independentof those who think and argue about it.

There is, instead, a set of &dquo;claims to truth&dquo;which allow us to decide what to take asvalid. These include the comprehensibilityof what is said, the logical truth of a prop-osition, the legitimacy and expertise of theperson making the truth claim, and theveracity of the speaker. These conceptshave already provided a useful analyticframework to some planning theorists forconceptualizing and evaluating what plan-ners do (Forester 1980, 1982, Krieger1981 ) .

The dialectical approach accepts the shift-mg and self contradictory nature of truth-the notion that every truth impliesits opposite. Faith m the dialectic wouldmake it easier for planners to live with theuneasy contradictions which seem inevit-able m their work. For planning theoriststhe dialectical model implies that researchmust be, at least in part historical, andtake into account competing forces andframeworks for explanation This approachis illustrated in two works of Ann Markusen(1983a, 1983b), which trace U S regionalplanning and development historically andexplain them simultaneously from micro-economic, geographical, political, andpolitical economy perspectives

Critical theory offers the strongest linkagebetween knowledge and action of thethree epistemologies. Knowledge is anevolving set of understandings rather thana snapshot in time, and thus it approxi-mates better the realities of practice Inaddition the knower must act in order toknow While the disinterested observer is

necessary to some forms of knowledge, it

is only through &dquo;praxis&dquo; that many ideascan take shape. Some critical theoristsargue that change will be a result of cri-tique and discourse. Finally, the theorysuggests an ethical stance-that theknower should oppose the status quoand thus advocate for the powerless.

While those of us whose minds have been

shaped by positivist thought and the ideaof the disinterested search for truth mayhave difficulty with some of this argu-ment, as a mindset for planners it offersattractions. It suggests that plannersshould take a more active role than manydo, but it also spares them the difficultchoice between political involvement anddetached analysis. For planning theoristsone message is that practice is part ofresearch. Another is that communications

activities of planning can be conceptu-alized and critiqued m new ways Planningtheorists begin to be aware of criticaltheory and a few have begun a seriouseffort to use it in their work. There is stillmuch to be done to elaborate and applycritical theory to planning. Many pointswill be challenged and argued-how candiscourse lead to change, how can prac-tice be transformed into knowledge, doescritical theory really offer a normativemodel for planners?4 Critical theory willgenerate its own dilemmas. But, m themeantime, it is a source to enrich andrevitalize planning thought.

Research Strategies

Planning theoreticians will have to gettheir hands dirty with data, with firsthandstudy of planning and of the meaning sys-tems in which it takes place. Studies suchas Howe’s (1980) or Howe and Kaufman’s(1979) and Vasu’s (1979) provide a valuablebeginning. These authors surveyed plan-ners’ attitudes and understandings of theirroles, through formal questionnaires. Thisresearch is valuable in addressing thesesubjective questions, but the next step isto go beyond these basically positivist,quantitative studies to a more holistic formof research. Surveys have to be designedon the basis of a priori ideas about whatplanners think and do. They can demon-strate when the ideas are wrong, but can-not provide alternative explanations. If the

right question is not asked at the outset,the survey gives no answer. Moreover a

survey is limited to finding out what peo-ple say they do and say they believe, andcannot uncover what is hidden or unrec-

ognized. Finally while responses can becorrelated with measurable variables likeage, sex, or education, if the causal sys-tem is more complex, a survey will notdiscover it.

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The new research that is needed involves

using many types of knowledge simulta-neously and examining many types ofvariables, ranging from the actions andbehaviors of participants to their resultsThe work should rely on a range of meth-ods-surveys, open-ended interviewing,direct observation, historical study,language, and content analysis and in-depth case studies

An important output of such research willbe complex stories, &dquo;thick descriptions&dquo;as Geertz (1973) calls them, rather thanlaws linking a few variables or offeringconclusions generalizable to well-specifiedcategories of planners or situationsCausality is established rather by persuad-ing the reader that the researcher’s inter-

pretation of the meaning and logic of aseries of observations makes sense, thatthe actors behaved as they did for the rea-sons given. The story enlightens by itsinsights, by its ability to deepen under-standings as well as its ability to raisetheoretical questions for further empiricaltest. Well done, these descriptions havethe truth of literature They speak, not ofmen, but of man. Learning from them is,in part, at a tacit level, as it is from exper-ience, though a well-interpreted casecan be more focused and offer a clearer

message than experience as it highlightsand links the most critical details. Someresearch on planning has been done inthis style (e.g., Forester 1980; de Neufville1981a), but Schon’s Reflective Practitioner(1983) provides the clearest example

Topics Demanding Research

A number of topics demand the attentionof planning theorists, as they are criticalelements of planning which are poorlyunderstood.

Problem Definition A few analysts havebegun to study how problems are defined,exploring for example, the routinized waysproblems are found m bureaucratic pro-cess (Pounds 1969), or the role of quan-titative measures m identifyng problems(de Neufville 1981c) One can identify thevalues associated with elements of the

problem definition along with the accom-panying implications for policy (Moore1976), or one can try to link stakeholdersand assumptions to different problemdefinitions (Mitroff et al 1979). Thepossibilities are many, but goals are tooutline the problem identification process,to link it to other planning tasks, and todevelop criteria to define problems intechnically adequate or ethically accep-table ways.

Language, Symbols, and Indicators Publicdebates focus on &dquo;signifiers&dquo; - language,numbers, and shorthand labels for policieswhich are layered with meanings andmythologies (de Neufville 1983) Rallyingcries - &dquo;a decent home for allAmericans,&dquo; the rising unemployment rate,closing tax &dquo;loopholes&dquo; - link into deep-ly held emotions (Edelman 1977) andvalues, but a common meaning of thesenever fully exists. Planning theory shouldgive attention to how to uncover mean-

ings, to the process by which meaningsare ascribed, and to the implications ofthe fact that complex and ambiguousstories underly explicit debates.5,s Plannersmust not only work with the elusive toolsof language and mdicator, but must bethemselves symbol makers.

Communication. This broad term covers

many tasks of planning which are poorlyintegrated into planning thoughtLanguage is the foundation of com-munication tasks, but there is a need tofocus on such specific tasks as advising(Krieger 1981), attention-shaping (Forester1980), and negotiation and mediation(Susskind and Ozawa 1983), and todevelop further the implications of thetransactive and social learning models ofplanning (Michael 1973, Friedmann 1973)

Forms of Knowledge and Ways of Pro-viding It. If the traditional model of infor-mation provision and use is inadequate,theorists need to search for a more effec-tive model, by identifying what works inpractice and why or why not. For example,formal research often has more role in

defining than in solving problems, more insetting targets and standards than in com-paring alternatives, more in education ofdecision makers than in policy choice,more in program design, management,and monitoring than in evaluation, andmore in stopping the unwanted programthan in creating new policy concepts (Reinand White 1977; de Neufville 1981).

The institutional process of creating infor-mation, moreover, is as important as itscontent in assuring it will be meaningful,legitimate, and used (de Neufville1978-79) The link of power to the processof informing decisions also requires study(Forester 1982), as does the nature of deci-sion processes which do or do not useone or another form of information.

Finally, information design for dialectical,interactive planning needs to be exploredin a way informed by a phenomenologicalor critical theory view of knowledge.

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Ilalues. The concept of a social value iselusive, as it is never expressed except inrelation to a specific situation Planningtheorists need to understand the contentof public values and the processes and in-fluences which transform them into publicpreferences, as well as the processes bywhich they are negotiated and modified

Ethics An equally elusive issue, linking tothe meaning of professionalism for plan-ners, is planning ethics. Planning theoristsshould study how the ethics planners usework to support or undermine theircredibility and self-image and how ethicscan help or hinder their relations withclients and correspond to bureaucraticnorms. Planning theory should generate adebate over issues the profession needs todecide - such as who its clients are andwhat values it represents.

Scenes and Settings Attention must be

paid to the settings in which planning isdone, to how these can and should in-fluence the way the planner thinks andacts, and to how strategies for practice de-pend on different environmental condi-tions. The task involves both organiza-tional and political theory and work com-parable to Schon’s (1983) and Bolan’s(1980) on how planners deal with thepredictability and uniqueness of the situa-tions they face.

A Concluding Note

Planning theory cannot seek simpleanswers, but will have to develop accountsdealing with the full complexity of plan-ning and its many contexts. It will have to

give close attention to the interactivenessof planning and the communication rolesof planners It will have to be about mean-

ings and embrace rather than deny am-biguity The theorizing must be groundedin empirical study and the perceptions ofactors It should account for structural andhistorical forces and delineate plannerswho are immersed m interaction - com-municators, and simultaneously actors,researchers, and facilitators. It will have todefine ethical planning, and establishtypologies of the settings in which plan-ning takes place, along with strategies ef-fective m each. A new exemplar, or seriesof them, should emerge. But, most impor-tantly, the result should be a rich set of in-sights and theories on which to found theintellectual growth of planning

Notes

1 Alterman and MacRae (1983), makeuseful systematic comparisons betweengraduates of planning and of public policyschools in terms of their assumptions andpractice.

2. McCarthy (1978) offers a good inter-pretation and overview of Habermas’work

3 Bernstein (1976) interprets, compares,and links the positivists, languagetheorists, phenomenologists and criticaltheorists to one another and to

developments in social and politicaltheory.

4. See the book review article byMandelbaum in this journal.

5 One exception to this complaint aboutthe lack of work on language in planningtheory is Seymour Mandelbaum’s work(1982a, 1982b).

6 The book The Land Use Policy DebateIn the U.S. (de Neufville 1981b) was

designed to uncover conflicting meaningsof arguments over land use policy comingfrom different ideological and disciplinaryperspectives

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