POLICIES WITHOUT PEOPLE: ON DECIPHERING THE OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF AN NAS REPORT

John D. Montgomery

In their professional work, scientists think of themselves as political neutrals. Both political parties want that, too, and presidents and legislators frequently call on the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and similar bodies to study controversial issues, whether to resolve or defer them.’ Neutrality is some- thing less than a virtue for public policy, however, if it leads NAS, and therefore its followers, to ignore the political and administrative problems that might influence the outcomes of its recommendations. Since its reports are addressed to everybody, nobody has to take charge after the publication date. One result is that the operational decisions will have to be made by others, often in haste and without the clarity of the original scientific analysis. What begins as politically bloodless recommendations has to be converted into action-ready form, as recommendations are turned into laws or adminis- trative decrees, based on little more than casual consultation with end-of- the-line administrators.

This article will propose a “politically neutral” procedure for converting abstract recommendations into operational decisions. It will introduce repli- cable standards and definitions and suggest, crudely but systematically, how they might be applied in planning the implementation of a typical NAS report.2 It will suggest as well some areas of uncertainty or incompleteness that might impede its acceptance, and provisionally identify the kinds of agencies and organizations that might be expected to take responsibility for further actions.

Deciphering the policy implications of abstract recommendations like those of the NAS report will require a coding procedure to perform two distinct functions: (1) to separate the kinds of recommended actions according to the body of knowledge or experience on which they will draw; and (2) to identify the actors whose participation will be necessary if the implied operations are to succeed.

’ The NAS publishes 250-300 studies a year, about 60 of which incorporate major policy issues. The subjects range from greenhouse warming to managing wild goats and burros, the nutritional requirements of farm animals, and standards. The reports are written by members of NAS and other distinguished volunteers, who work without compensation as a public duty.

This report, Policy Implications ofGreenhouse Warming [ 19911, was written by a Synthesis panel of 14 volunteers, including three engineers, three government officials, two economists, one anthropologist, two mathematicians, two biologists, a zoologist, and an agricultural scientist. Its final report was based on studies by an Effects panel of nine (two engineers, a statistician, a geologist, and five other unspecified scientists and officials). The panel on Mitigation consisted of 18 members (three engineers, a biologist, a mathematician, two economists, a lawyer, two political scientists, a physicist, and seven others). The panel on Adaptation, 14 members (an agricultural scientist, a forestry specialist, an engineer, an economist, a management specialist, two zoologists, and seven others).

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 11, No. 4, 702-708 (1992) 0 1992 b the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management Publishedrby John Wiley & Sons, Inc. CCC 0276-8739l92lO40702-07

The Operational Implications of a NAS Repori 1 703

Categories of Decision

Most policies rely on one or more of three distinct elements or “decision orders,” that is, decisions that will have to be taken to serve the needs of a given policy? In the most generic sense, these categories may be thought of as technological, organizational, and behavioral. To simplify the presenta- tion, they will be discussed here as first-order, second-order, and third-order decisions.

0 First-order decisions are based on identified technologies, usually thought of as an application of a biological, physical, engineering, or social sci- ence. Their purpose is to improve the organic, physical (or, less fre- quently, social) condition that the policy is intended to address.

0 Second-order decisions require the creation or use of organizations that are to be made responsible for accumulating and using resources (usually financial or human), to bring about a change in the conditions being addressed.

0 Third-order decisions address behavior. They focus on the motivation of human individuals or publics, encouraging them to perform actions that will improve the condition being addressed.

These decision orders do not necessarily appear in that sequence or order of importance. First-order decisions (IODs) do not always precede second- or third-order decisions (IIODs or IIIODs), and they do not necessarily demand the greatest investments or bring about the greatest change. In most situa- tions, IODs will be less self-sufficient than IIODs or IIIODs, but there are exceptions: sometimes a problem can be completely solved by a policy involv- ing only a technological change, leaving the other elements intact. Similarly, various organizational reforms can bring about the desired results even if there is no change in technology or public behavior. And changed incentives can produce a desired behavior without changing either the technologies involved or the organizations that use them. Examples of single decision- order policies will illustrate their unique qualities:

0 A tax on gasoline (IIIOD) would reduce carbon dioxide production with- out changing automobile design (IOD) or the responsibilities of the state police or other enforcement body (IIOD).

0 Giving an international body the responsibility for monitoring fishing practices (IIOD) would probably reduce the threat to endangered por- poises more than would merely designing better fishnets (IOD) or impos- ing fines on those who turn up in port with the wrong kind of species in their fishing boats (IIIOD).

0 Improving the performance of nuclear power generating equipment (IOD) would do more for the environment than transferring its ownership to public hands (IIOD) or increasing the penalties for violating safety standards (IIIOD).

The “decision orders” approach is explored more fully in an early book [Montgomery, 1974b]. For applications of the idea, see Montgomery [1974a], [1976], and [1977].

704 1 The Operational Implications of a NAS Report

Actors

Although in each of these cases, a policy based on a single decision-order would perhaps suffice to bring about desired improvements, some combina- tion of them might be required to achieve a synergistic or cumulative effect. Policymakers who intend to proceed along several lines a t once will quickly find that they are expected to deal with different actors as well as different bodies of knowledge when they mix DOs. The IOD suggested in the first example would probably involve the engineering sections of the automobile industry, which might be hard to mobilize, given the competitive nature of the designs already in use. In that example, a IIOD would require agreement among the states about speed limits, penalties, and monitoring practices. The IIIOD-the gas tax-sounds simple, but appeals more to economists than to politicians. Policymakers do not always choose the most efficient DO if it is more hazardous to their political health than less-efficient ones. The United States has no national gasoline tax, which would be the most efficient choice, but it has improved automobile emission performance nevertheless. Similar advantages and difficulties attend the DOs mentioned in the two other exam- ples. Indeed, most policy settings require combinations of DOs to bring about major improvements, especially in a complex field like environmental quality.

The linkages between DOs and actors are more complex than they appear. IODs involve scientists, engineers, and technicians of various sorts, but they may be located in the public or private sector or in various combinations or levels of responsibility. Administrators are required in IIODs, but they are not the only groups needed to make them effective. Political leaders and market incentives are often required to achieve IIIODs, through motivating public responses to policy-driven opportunities. Analytically separate deci- sions are required in choosing among government agencies, industrial or commercial sectors, and in defining alternative public behavior desiderata. Monitoring progress is a function that has to be discharged whenever stan- dards of performance have to be maintained in the interests of policy com- pliance.

Applying the Model

Examining the recommendations of the NAS Greenhouse Warning report will illustrate the network of policy implications involved in all three decision orders. The report presents 42 recommendations (see Appendix). Twenty of them were based on IODs and one more implied their necessity; seven started with IIODs, and 1 1 more seemed to call for them. Only one of the recommenda- tions directly urged the adoption of IIIODs as the basis of action, thoggh two others implied their necessity (see Appendix, Table Al).4

True to their calling, the scientists concentrated on IODs, deriving most of their hopes for solutions to greenhouse warming from recommended techno- logical change. These recommendations would ask very little of the public

Because of the uncertainties in the format and style of the recommendations, the coding is somewhat arbitrary. To compensate for possible coding errors based on any bias of my own, I asked eight independent readers to code them on their own. The variations that appeared were minor and did not produce different overall findings.

The Operational Implications of a NAS Report / 705

(which, by implication, would have to accept the consequences of technological change without having to be motivated to do so). The Environmental Protection Agency, which supported the study, was not expected to do much about the problem-at least to judge by the recommendations, which did not mention the EPA at all. The government was not ignored, of course; various agencies were expected to take charge of implementing two of the IOD recommendations, and indirectly or by implication were involved in 15 more. The private sector was assigned the role of primary actor in only one of these recommendations, but by implication would have to be involved in another 30. As to action by the public, major responsibility was not assigned to it in any of the recommenda- tions, though its involvement was hinted or implied to 21 cases.

There were seven recommended IIODs (organizational changes or newly assigned responsibilities) among the 42 recommendations, plus an additional 11 in which organizational action was implied. All of those 18 recommenda- tions would involve public agencies, ten the private sector (some requiring action by both). Among the total of 18 recommendations in which organiza- tional solutions were directly or indirectly called for, only five would require changed public behavior of one kind or another. Greenhouse warming is a problem to be dealt with by government action more than by the private sector or the general public, according to these recommendations.

The fact that changes in public behavior would be required to carry out half of the NAS recommendations does not loom large in the specific assignment of responsibilities: Apparently NAS does not want to alarm the public. The government is to take some role in 39 of the 42 recommendations, though only seven implied or indicated which agency was to take charge. Unspecified public agencies were to take a leading role, apparently. No recommendation started with a IIIOD or treated changes in public behavior as the major source of the desired environmental effect. The private sector would be expected to tag along behind. Concrete leadership in dealing with the greenhouse effect was really not called for.

Some of the recommendations appeared to be self-enforcing (in the sense of being complete in themselves, examples being an increase in support of specified research activities). The report indicated the need for a mechanism to monitor and enforce compliance in only one, and implied such a course in 21 of the 42 recommendations. It might be disingenuous to imply that the scientists involved in this study thought the wisdom of half of their recommen- dations would make it unnecessary to worry about compliance, but it is clear that they thought someone else should assume that burden.

In short, the balance of responsibility for action, where indicated at all, was left to the government. Most of the recommendations, at least, implied as much, of which seven clearly indicated, and 32 implied, actual responsibilities or assignments to public agencies. Private industry and commercial enter- prises were expected to take the lead in executing only one of the recommenda- tions, though presumably the private sector would be involved in 30 more. The primary burden was not placed on the public in any case, but it would clearly have to respond in 2 1 others. The monitoring/enforcing procedures (suggested in one of the recommendations, and implied in 21) were addressed to organizations rather than the public.

Conclusions

There is no reason why a single organization like NAS, when called upon to sum up the state of the art on a given controversial question, should supply

706 I The Operational Implications of a NAS Report

all the answers that policymakers might need, and this brief note is not intended as a criticism of NAS for not doing so. But policies are as important as problems, and defining approaches to the latter is a function that should no more be left to chance than defining the dimensions of the former.

This exercise is intended to illustrate the degree of care with which the implementation questions should be addressed. Choices about pricing, regu- lation, monitoring, and enforcing issues are complex enough to deserve pro- fessional attention in themselves. A professional group within NAS, or under a presidential science advisor’s office, or in the Office of Management and Budget or the Congressional Budget Office could perform these functions automatically; alternatively, an operational advisory committee could be assigned to follow up on all NAS (and similar) reports, especially those whose action implications are urgent.

This review also suggests one reason for the low response rate to much of NAS’s work. NAS rarely links scientific probabilities and certainties in its reports to policy actors and actions except by implication. Since no one is assigned to work out these implications, the recommendations remain purely horatory, rather like the ten commandments-unexceptionable, but irrele- vant as a policy instrument (even the sharia states have imams to make decisions).

On the other hand, the action implications are not hard to spell out if a systematic approach is used for the purpose. Even if no organization is re- quired to address this problem, the mere restatement and regrouping of the recommendations by NAS itself might lead an industry or a special public to take an initiative and run with it. The scientific community should not be the burial ground of public action, but rather its birthplace.

APPENDIX

The coding procedures used in this analysis required some editorial discretion to augment the specificity and clarity of the recommendations without strain- ing the original judgments. In some of the recommendations, the NAS com- mittee seemed to be carefully fudging the actions intended; it displayed some uncertainties by injecting slippery suggestions (e.g., to postpone hard decisions, or merely to consider an action favored by some, or to study some- thing about which no agreement is currently possible). Recommendations appearing in the passive voice, or its equivalent, are also incomplete from the DO point of view, and had to be converted to more direct language in order to become operational. Some recommendations were compound, in the sense of containing many elements and actions subsumed under a general rubric, and they had to be disaggregated; what appeared as one recommendation sometimes involved three or four different actions and actors. The recornmen- dations are not numbered in the report; for convenience, that oversight has been corrected here. These numbered recommendations are identified by their pagination.

To make the results compact enough to be studied, this appendix and the accompanying table will use the following abbreviations and rhetorical devices in coding the recommendations:

IOD, IIOD, or IIIOD = recommended first-, second-, or third-order decision iod, iiod, or iiiod = implied first-, second-, or third-order decision

The Operational Implications of a NAS Report / 707

A = action assigned to a government agency (or strongly implied as-

a = action or responsibility implied as public, agency unspecified B = action assigned to a specific industry b = action implied as industrial responsibility C = public response to be ordered by law or administrative decree c = public response hoped, or to be encouraged D = monitoring or regulation prescribed d = oversight and compliance instruments ignored

signment)

Since the recommendations are sometimes lengthy and accompanied by sev- eral explanatory paragraphs, their highlights are picked up in the summariz- ing words below:

Page Recommendation

p. 73 1. Continue aggressive phaseout of CFCs. IOD. b. c. d. 2 . Develop substitutes. IOD. b. c. d. 3. Gradually introduce full social cost pricing in energy use. iiod. a.

4. Adopt a national building code. iiod. a. b. c. d. 5. Improve efficiency of automobile fleets. IOD. a. B. c. d. 6 . Offer federal and state support of mass transit. IIOD. a. c. d. 7. Improve appliance efficiency standards. IOD. A. b. c. d. 8. Encourage conservation, recycling. IIIOD. A. b. c. d. 9. Step up state regulation of utilities for conservation. IIOD. a. b.

c . d. p. 74

d. 10. Increase federal R&D budget for energy efficiency. IIOD. A. 1 1. Make federal demonstration through procurement practices.

12. Develop 60 percent efficient coal and gas systems. IOD. a. b. d. 13. Improve gas distribution system. iiod. a. b. c. d. 14. Develop and test safe N-power. iod. a. b. c. d. 15. Get public to accept improved N-power. iiiod. a. b. c. d. 16. Increase R&D budget for solar and other power. iiod. a. b. c. 17. Assess feasibility of CO, separation in fossil fuel. IOD. b. d. 18. Undertake international program in deforestation. iiod. a. 19. Offer technical assistance to other countries. iiod. A . 20. Remove subsidies for deforestation. IIOD. a. b. c. d. 21. Consider domestic reforestation research. IOD. a. b. c. d. 22. Support international reforestation research. IOD. a. b. c. d. 23. Support agricultural research for adaptation. IOD. a. b. c. 24. Stabilize domestic water supply management. iiod. a. b. c. d. 25. Stabilize water demand. iiod. a. b. c. d. 26. Adapt capital public works infrastructure design. IOD. a. b. D. 27. Establish biodiversity habitat areas. iiod. a. b. c. d. 28. Inventory rare species. IOD. a. 29. Establish rare species banks. IOD. a . b. 30. Conduct research on plant life compounds. IOD. a. b. 31. Conserve and manage wild species. iiod. a. b. c. d. 32. Breed rare species. IOD. a . b .

IIOD. a.

p. 75

p. 76

p. 77

p. 78

708 The Operational Implications of a NAS Report

33. Eliminate species-destroying laws. iiod. a. 34. Consider land purchase for species migration. iiod. a. 35. Gather climate data. IOD. a. 36. Improve weather forecasts. IOD. A. 37. Quantify GHG mechanisms. IOD. a. b. 38. Analyze changing species mix. IOD. a. b. 39. Study economic, social aspects of climate change. IOD. a. b. 40. Study engineering options. IOD. a. b. 41. Resume international population programs. IIOD. A . b. c. 42. Participate in international agreements, conventions. IIOD. A. b.

p. 79

p. 80

p. 81 p. 82

Table A l . Decision orders and actors in an NAS report.

IOD iod IIOD iiod IIIOD iiiod Tot a 1 -“

Total A a B b C

D d

C

20 2

15 1

16 0 7 1 8

11 1

10 0 6 0 7 0 6

1 2 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 2

42 7

32 1

30 0

21 1

21

* Some items were double-coded; totals are correct for rows but not columns.

JOHN D. MONTGOMERY is Ford Foundation Professor of International Stud- ies, Emeritus, at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and Director o f the Pacific Basin Research Center, Soko University of America.

REFERENCES Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy of the National Academy of

Science, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine (1991), Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming (Washington, DC: National Academy Press).

Montgomery, John D. (1974a), “Science Policy and Development Programs: Organiz- ing Science for Government Action,” World Development 2 (April-May), pp. 4-5.

Montgomery, John D. (1974b), Technology and Civic Life: Making and Implementing Development Decisions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

Montgomery, John D. (1977), “Food for Thought: On Appraising Nutrition Programs,” Policy Sciences 8.