A Political Science Project on

Power and Authority

A collective attempt to understand the Fundamental Principles and Dynamics of one of the most important political phenomenon of the Human Society.

Sachin SatyarajSoumya NairAnupama SubramaniamPriyadarshini Srinivas Atreya

Power and Authority

Contents

Introduction

What is Power?

o The Emergence of Power

o The Division of Power

What is Authority?

o The Emergence of Authority

o Political Authority

The Democratic Conception of Political Authority

The Relationship and Distinction between Power and Authority

Weber's Analysis of Authority

The Consent Theory of Political Authority

The Elite Theory

Acknowledgment

This Project couldn’t have been successfully completed without the support and guidance of our Political Science Professor, Sudeesh Sir and we would like to express our immense gratitude to him for his constant support and motivation that has encouraged us to come up with this project. We are also thankful for our librarian for the support rendered during the course of the research.

Lastly, we would like to thank our classmates for their whole hearted support at all times during the course of the Project.

Introduction

Of the various phenomenon in nature that exist among living organisms, the most enabling factors which are seen throughout most structured organizations of the countless living beings are the phenomenon of power and authority. Man in particular has evolved from a tree dwelling ……. to a complex and social animal. The hierarchal mechanisms and the instinctual dominance exhibitions displayed by animals during mating or hunting have been developed into sophisticated and structured institutions by man and which are used to control and influence other men. The display of strength and show of power and the subsequent classification as an authoritative figure of an individual or a group form the basis of any political institution in the modern society. In fact, close parallels can be seen in the dominating alpha male in a pack of lions and an aggressive human leader leading his men to battle.

However, to understand the concepts of power and authority, a close examination of the principles and fundamental factors which form each of these concepts, the relationship between them and the various theories formulated about them must be made. This study is vital as these phenomenons are embedded deep into the cells of living beings. With each addition of complexity in society, a balance has to be maintained and it has to still progress ahead.

The definitions, the contextual meanings, the factors and the influence it has upon the social institutions of the concepts of power and authority will be studied in detail and in context with contemporary social and political institutions.

Power

The concept of power can simply be put up as an entity's ability to control the environment around itself, including the behavior of other entities. Yet the society we live and the multitude of things which we surround ourselves with require constant grooming and maintenance for we live in an almost precarious balance of social and individual see-saws. There is no need to justify the need as to why we need to understand the fundamental concepts and multifarious dimensions of power.

What is Power?

The concept of power for a better understanding has been divided into three main subtopics the factors and characteristics related to the phenomenon have been given due emphasis.

Before that however, a clarification is required that the use of power need not involve coercion (force or the threat of force). At one extreme, it more closely resembles what everyday English-speakers call "influence", although some authors make a distinction between power and influence - the means by which power is used

There is a need to understand the various types of power through which it can be held. They include

Delegated authority (for example in the democratic process) Social class (material wealth can equal power)

Personal or group charisma

Ascribed power (acting on perceived or assumed abilities)

Expertise (Ability, Skills) Persuasion (direct, indirect, or subliminal)

Knowledge (granted or withheld, shared or kept secret)

Money (financial influence, control of labour, control through ownership, etc)

Fame

Force (violence, military might, coercion).

Moral persuasion (including religion)

Operation of group dynamics (such as public relations)

Social influence of tradition (compare ascribed power)

In relationships; domination/submissiveness

The first subtopic deals with how and why power plays an important role in human organizations.

Power Invariably Fills Any Vacuum in Human Organization

The phenomenon that a power vacuum is always filled by a power holder is constant throughout the history of society. The reasons are not as obvious as the fact. Two of the reasons are as follows:

The need for order at any level of society

Peace is a social necessity. Lacking peace, individuals or larger elements in a situation will fly apart to seek a place in some order of things where they can live, work, or enjoy themselves without being despoiled or interrupted. Professor George Catlin stated the proposition concisely in The Story of the Political Philosophers: "To maintain peace has been the justifying function of coercive government, despite all its tyrannies, since the days of the Pharaohs." The human need of peace leads to acceptance of such government at any level.

Emotional make up of men

Instinct for power exists to some degree in every human. Often individuals will encounter others on the same search; then they must either conquer them or secure their adherence, usually by offering hope of a share of power in the structure he proposes to create. The process may be rational and studied. This occurs when the organizer of a party recruits adherents from among possible rivals by promising them positions in the government he hopes to establish.

As power is essentially personal, the underlying social reasons can never be divorced from the factor of personality. Drive for power instinctive aggression or desire to put into effect some principle of idealism or of order. It may proceed from selfishness and ambition or from altruism or inspiration. The dominant motive will reflect itself later as the power holder announces the idea system or philosophy by which his power is justified and accepts the institutions by which power is exercised.

When a vacuum occurs at any level of a power structure, the immediate result is to throw power downward to the next lower institutional echelon. When imperial power is destroyed by conquest or revolution, its component parts go on functioning. Compulsion to fill a power vacuum occurs at any level of so-cial organization. The phenomenon is not limited to international affairs, as in the case of the Dominican Republic in 1965, or to breakdown of organization, as in Yugoslavia in the closing days of World War II and in New York City when the lights went out. It occurs in any form of organization.

In each a power holder ceased to exist, leaving a vacuum. In the Dominican Republic, this occurred through an army rebellion. Vacuum in the republic created chaos likely to be filled by outside power. It was in fact filled momentarily by the paramount power of the United States as President Johnson acted, fearing lest a Russian-Cuban combination would fill it instead. In the case of the commercial empire, vacuum was brought about by the disability of its chief and the absence of settled succession. Had the situation been allowed to continue, anarchy would have resulted. The void was filled by agreement between two rapidly organized forces, one an ambitious man dominating a fraction of the organization and seeking to take over, the other a group of directors finding a natural leader and negotiating a working arrangement.

When normal processes of distribution of power break down, someone steps in, gives directions, and takes charge until the police or other established authority arrives to take over. The individual may do so because he is that kind of person who has an instinct for power or he rises to the situation because he feels an obligation to the people suffering from danger and

confusion around him. Momentary anarchy induces assumption of power, whether in high politics or local circumstances.

The most habitually orderly and law-abiding population has within it some elements whose conduct is kept within bounds only by external restraint, by the presence of power. They emerge when power no longer is there. They subside only when it returns, unless they or one fragment of them sets up a tiny power system and takes over. If not immediately filled by the power institutions and institutions of the community, some boss gangster, usurper, or vigilante committee will occupy the field. It is the genius of power to find and fill the vacuum whenever it occurs in human organization.

The Emergence of Power

Power is brought into existence by the coalescence of three elements: men, a philosophy, and a group capable of organization into institutions.

Birth may occur with implosive speed. Most of us have seen small organizations come into being less sublimely, whether insignificant, as in the founding of a club or the launching of a political movement. Review of any such experience will show the three elements always present. A few men, including some with an instinct for power meet in agreement on a common idea. Purpose becomes evident to attempt its realization. At the behest of the man with the strongest instinct for power, the group organizes. The process frequently occurs on battlefields after a military formation has been shattered and the strongest remaining individual remakes an organization out of the survivors. The government about to be formed had not merely to take over existing traditional institutions, but also to extend them and improvise new ones in vast fields of economic organization traditionally considered no function of the federal government. President Roosevelt achieved added organization and power structure before the Congress of the "hundred days" recessed. The substance of that structure remains intact to this day.

Swiftly or gradually, a power structure comes into existence as men with an idea system set up new or take over existing institutions. Normally, power is allocated through operation of the existing institutions—a president is

elected, cabinet ministers appointed, key posts in Congress or Parliament are filled. Institutional processes place individuals "in power." They must establish their personal grip and control over the institutions they head. Until he organizes his personal position, he is impotent. Connecting the power position with the idea structure and with his subordinate officers and perhaps with outside allies is his first task. When the combination is made, a power structure exists and he is able to use it.

The "Power Form"

Power in the simplest terms is the coalescence of three elements namely assertive men, an idea system, and a group capable of organization which generates power, be the measure small or great. It thereupon attains reality and assumes form. The Gestalt of power establishes itself in many ways, tangible and intangible. Preponderantly, it must exist in the minds of men affected by it at the time. Any subject of the Roman Empire in its great days knew that Roman power existed; he sensed what it was, though he might have little knowledge of its boundaries, its institutions, or the men at its head. It had a center in Rome, or perhaps at the habitual place of administration chosen by the emperor. Some notion existed of the Pax Romana, an overriding force that limited or extinguished the independent use of local force. Sense also existed of its institutions. Probably foremost among these were the Roman armies, but there were also governors, judges, questors and tax gatherers. Roman power impact would be heavy or light depending on the level of organization amid complexity of the local country and the tenacity of its own power structure.

Power Is Invariably Personal

The Power Instinct

Bertrand Russell in Power: A New Social Analysis mentioned "Of the infinite desires of man, the chief are the desires for power and glory." He considered that the fundamental concept in social science is power. Further, he believed that power was the same whatever tools it used or forms it took. It might ex-press itself through wealth, armament, civil authority, and influence on

opinion, military command, or top position in an economic pyramid. Like energy, it continually passes from one form to another; it is useless to isolate it. Power has recently been defined as "the capacity or ability of an individual or a group of individuals to determine the behavior of other individuals or groups in accordance with his own wishes." Endless methods attempt to accomplish this—naked force, use of faiths, loyalties, and interest, and the probability that a great many people will usually act as anyone having the power position wishes. Power is the capacity to mobilize the resources of a group or a society to attain statist goals.

Power is an attribute of man. It does not exist without a holder. Power in the abstract does not exist. It becomes fact only when a man or woman following his inborn instinct takes and uses it. This is why power is invariably individual. Limitations are always present—else the world would be worse off than it is, and its condition in all conscience is troublesome enough. Where a power holder has no internal restraints i.e., any intellectual or moral system stopping him, his power is limited only by the circumstances in which he is placed.

Normal individuals have a high content of internal restraint based on the system of ideas and morals in which they were brought up or to which they agree. To foster a situation in which the people within scope of their power act predictably, will follow instructions, will maintain a degree of order. If need be order can in limited measure be produced by force.

Power as a Personal Attribute

Power is invariably personal. However attained, it can be exercised only by the decision and act of an individual. Attribution of power is often made to an institution— the power of a nation-state, of a corporation, of a church, of a bank, of a professional association, of a newspaper, of a political party. Or power is attributed to an unorganized group—to a "class" of some kind, upper or lower, to the "proletariat," to the "intellectuals," the "press," the "masses," the "people," the "Blacks."

Sociologists discover "elites," and speculate on their power. By taking various blocs of statistics, they discover a relatively small group who has higher positions, greater education, or greater wealth. These are then entitled a "class" or an "elite group." To them, power is ascribed.

No collective category, no class, no group of any kind in and of itself wields power or can use it. Another factor must be present: that of organization. The collective group must put itself together, must develop formal or informal structure, and must establish stated or unstated rules by and through which power to decide and act is assigned to someone and, as a rule, distributed through a hierarchy of subordinates. Without this organization, whatever its common interest or background, no collective group can or ever does act. History and contemporary politics are littered with illustrations of unor-ganized groups, whose members have had much in common, ignored or ridden over roughshod or sometimes destroyed by individuals having power derived from groups that did have organization. Lacking it, there is no effective exercise of power, quite simply because there is no individual or hierarchy of individuals who can exercise it.

In feudal times, noble birth or military capacity, and sometimes both, were required. From the group of men possessing the needed qualifications, power holders are usually drawn, or made, or make themselves. It may have been the tenth century when Karl Marx wrote Das Kapital that wealth was an essential qualification for power holding. But it is one thing to say that and quite another to suggest that a group or class having certain attributes exercised power. More often than not, though their members have parallel or similar attitudes or interests, they are fiercely competitive, fight among each other, are unable to organize and unwilling to designate power holders. Rulers may predominately be drawn from classes. Classes do not rule. Power holders may be drawn from elites. Elites do not exercise power. Elites and classes may have influence. This is an entirely different affair. The sentiments or opinions of a particular category of people may and often do affect the decisions and actions of the men who have power. Their conceptions, their value judgments, their desires, their emotions about the world in which they would like to live may be and often are extremely persuasive. But they can be blocked by a

simple decision of the power holder not to act along these lines—to do nothing, or to do something different. The group, whatever it is, if seriously offended, may be stimulated to organize and oppose—to become a power structure. Consequently, views that may represent its body of sentiment are taken into account. But this is far removed from power to decide and cause others to concur.

The Effects of Power on Personality

The personal quality of power introduces an element baffling scientific analysis. The power process itself follows definite laws. But since power is made effective through individuals, the personality of the power holder is always a factor—and the content of personality is a vast unknown.

Power holding is itself an emotional experience. The greater the power, greater the impact made. One of the first impacts is realization that the obligation of power takes precedence over other obligations formerly held nearest and dearest. The effect of power on its holder is unpredictable. Men who have ascended to power gradually, or have been vaccinated by previous experience, are in a safer position than those suddenly thrust into it. Power forcefully introduces itself into personal development. Yet the rules of power are the same in all cases, as is the fact that it affects the personality and that its impact on the power holder can rarely be foretold.

A man in power can cause events to happen—at short range. He commonly does so to execute a longer-range plan, aiming to bring about a series of events leading to a result he has in mind. Short-range events do occur as directed. The long-range result may be entirely different. This led Tolstoy to the conclusion that while historical forces do not control immediate events, they implacably dictate results quite apart from the power holder's will. Intelligent power holders learn this almost at once. Failure to do so would, and frequently does, lead them to live in a world of illusion, in which realities ultimately impose themselves, often in a manner quite contrary to the conception of the power holder. I remember President Franklin Roosevelt's stubborn desire not to allow his country to be involved in World War II if he could help it. My journal quotes his explanation of his aversion. Once involved,

he said, we start on a course "whose end results none of us can foresee." One impact of power holding on the holder is his discovery that the power act, the direction of an event, causes surprisingly unpredictable consequences.

The Fallacy of "Class Power"

Denial of the existence of class or elite power cuts into an immense body of political dogma which has dominated affairs at least since the Communist Manifesto of 1848. It requires revision of some nascent theories of modern sociology. It is not a proposition to be advanced lightly, or to be ignored. Classes are real but ill-defined. In any society, there are groups, large and small, whose members have a high common factor of common experience. The factor of common experience is sufficiently great that on the basis of that experience they can communicate with each other. The group can develop a sense of identity. It can distinguish itself from the population around it.

The factor of common experience is higher as the group is smaller and as it is based on a recognizable common interest. The members of the group must realize that their interest is common and they must be willing to accept, maintain, and defend that common interest. Analysts point to a clear common interest in maintaining and defending their property or position. Assume that the common factor of experience and common interest are present, and also that each member of the group knows consciously or vaguely that his interests are the same as those of the other members of the group. With that, psychologically he does feel himself a member of an aristocracy, or of an educated class, or of a minority group, or of a working class, as the case may be. At that point, the needed elements are present. Given a common medium of communication, a "class" exists.

No group, no class, comes into recognizable existence automatically. Elements in common are likely to bring about common experience. Common experience does bring about the possibility of wide communication. From that communication may develop a body of common feeling. From this there can emerge a psychological acceptance of the desirability of defending the common interest—this is, "class consciousness."

Every group is not a "class". The theory of "class" is always arbitrary in making divisions; quite frequently the divisions are artificial. Assumption that any individual is in one class as distinct from another has little behind it. He may be in several classes at once—as a college graduate may be an impecunious white-collar clerk. Whether he considers himself a member of the lower middle class defending lower-middle-class interests or considers himself one of the educated elite, of which he is also a member, depends on what he himself thinks. Classes, however delimited or defined, are important in this study not because classes have power, but because they are potential fields of organization. By sheer organization, power can perhaps be lodged in or obtained by specific individuals. Potentially, power can be developed, though there is no certainty that this will occur.

The fact of class does, to be sure, exert influence. Power can be developed or expanded only on the basis of a system of ideas. When endeavor is made to bring an organization out of a class, the system of ideas must be one that appeals to its members. Their common experience, their common interest, will dispose them to accept this system of ideas in place of that. Aspirants for power have this in mind. The idea system they profess will not be acceptable if it threatens the common interest of the group in question, though even that is not wholly certain.

The End of Power

The power of any man invariably ends in time. Death may end it, as where a man holds hereditary office during his life or when he dies in office. The United States is accustomed to federal Supreme Court justices and judges to whom life tenure is granted to guarantee their judicial independence. Even in such office, custom, convenience, and legal institutions often cause and assist retirement—that is, encourage voluntary renunciation of power before death as strength ebbs.

Death aside, men leave power in one of three ways: they voluntarily resign or abdicate it, their term of office expires, or they are expelled by means not contemplated in the institutional structure—by revolution, usurpation, or foreign conquest.

Intentional renunciation of power commonly occurs in one or two situations. It may be contemplated by the institution conferring power. Practically all governmental institutions face the possibility that a man may leave office and they provide for the choice of a successor. In lesser institutions such provision may not exist. One of the established American institutions is the family. A separation agreement or divorce decree may place authority and responsibility of the children in the hands of the husband or the wife. Leaving power voluntarily, especially where there is no ready means of providing a successor may produce a chaotic condition. Consequently, resignation or renunciation is itself a dangerous act.

Voluntary abandonment of power creating chaos is properly considered a major offense. Achievement of power by whatever means sets up a relationship between the power holder and those affected. That relationship cannot be ignored, humanly or politically. In 1967, there was wide demand that, having assumed wide measure of power in Vietnam, the United States should forthwith and unconditionally withdraw. One result would have been to surrender the South Vietnamese to the uncontrolled and far from tender mercies of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese government of Hanoi. This included considerable probability, judging by past tactics, that many thou-sands would promptly be killed or exiled. Neighboring states whose policy had been based in part on the existence of nearby American power might well have suffered.

Power holders are expected to defend their power and to defend the institutions that vested power in them. They are allowed to retire if the institution vesting power in them requires it. When expelled by operation of their institutions, they may, having lost the political battle, retire and more or less gracefully accept their successors. This happens when a British cabinet is defeated in Parliament. It resigns, recommending to the monarch that another government be formed, or that Parliament be dissolved and the country proceed to a general election. An institutional expulsion from power has occurred—but institutional provision is made for succession, and quiet retirement is no act of political wrongdoing.

The case is quite different when a power holder is attacked, by a revolution, rebellion, or foreign force. Then he must defend to the limit of his capacity. He may be defeated, but he must not leave. His attackers may, and ordinarily do, have a successor power holder in view who will take power if they win. In winning, they have damaged the institution by which power was vested—and the new power holder necessarily has less capacity to govern. He is, in the modern phrase, "illegitimate."

When a power holder is illegitimately expelled, two offenses take place. One is the inability of the power holder to defend his position. The other is the crime involved when an opponent endeavors to seek power outside the accepted institutions. He may be more moral than the legitimate power holder. His attack may be wholly justified by the defaults, omissions, or abuses.

The "Post-Power Syndrome"

Except in rare cases, power leaves men before their lives are over. Men are chosen for office; their term expires. They are heads of universities or other institutions; the day arrives when they must give way to younger successors. They are executive officers of great corporations; the time comes for retirement, compulsory or dictated by circumstances. They may be heads of families; their children grow up and assume independence. In all cases, the moment of voluntary or involuntary separation occurs. Consequence to the personality of the power holder is emotional and immediate.

Power Is Invariably Based on a System of Ideas or Philosophy

A Precondition of Lasting Power

Two ingredients of power are inseparable. One is an idea system, a philosophy. The other is an institutional structure transmitting the will of the power holder. Without an idea system, institutions cannot be constructed and certainly cannot endure. Without institutions, power cannot be generated, used, or expanded.

Of great interest is the philosophy developed over more than half a century on which Communist power was successfully organized in 1917. One of its

primary appeals unquestionably was negative: the doctrine of the class war. Fear, hatred of, and revenge upon groups supposed to be or to have been op-pressors was an operative part of it. Greater drawing power lies in its conception that under Communism all property and economic operations are to be administered for the benefit of the "people"—proletariat, workers, and peasants. Small institutions as well as large require an idea system and o power holder heading any of these institutions could hold it together without such a core of ideas.

Limits Imposed by the Philosophy

The constituting philosophy of a power system necessarily limits the exercise of power by the head of the organization based on it. Action known to be contrary to it at once weakens and may destroy the organization on which the power is based and by which it is transmitted. A measure of opportunism in applying the philosophy may get by—if the power holder is strong enough.

Tension in some measure always exists between the power holder heading the institution and the men loyal to the idea system holding his institution together. Invariably, situations arise where the opportune thing to do does not correspond with the idea system. Invariably, the men in power consider that the interests of the organization as a power apparatus—and, incidentally, their own positions—must be the overriding consideration. Given the choice between conforming to the philosophy at sacrifice to the effectiveness of their apparatus or their own prestige and strengthening their machine and their position, pressure is strong to do the latter.

Thus the philosophy underlying power institutions is ultimately determinative. A power holder must conform to its general lines, making only limited sacrifices to expediency, else his institutions become useless to him, they break down or he becomes their prisoner and is eventually displaced. To change the philosophy itself it requires intellectual as well as organizational leadership.

The Separation and Division of Power

Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu claimed that without following a principle of containing and balancing legislative, executive and judiciary powers, there is no freedom and no protection against abuse of power. Separation of power must be in such grade, that any of the branches can operate without excessive limitations from the others; but interdependency between them must also be in such grade, that one single branch cannot rule out the other's decisions. This is the separation of powers principle.

A similar concept, termed "division of power", also consists of differentiated legislative, executive, and judicial powers. However, while separation of powers prohibits one branch from interfering with another, division of power permits such interference. For example, in Indonesia, the President (who wields executive power) can introduce a new bill, but the People's Consultative Assembly (holding legislative power) chooses to either legalize or reject the bill.

Authority

What is Authority?

There are some things in nature which exist universally in every living organism that influence every act they perform and every reaction they experience. Structure, for instance is found even in the most fundamental units of nature and is considered to be one of the most important factors in the existence and survival of a living being.

Man, through his evolution has remained the most intelligent living being and he has built complex mechanisms around himself to help himself exist and progress ahead. The formulation of a mechanism to possess the ability to influence and control other men forms the central pillar of politics and the phenomenon of power and authority. Authority can thus briefly be defined as the act or the ability to influence someone with power or position. It is important to observe in the context of the definition that the show of power and authority is a seminal and significant occurrence and every organism with some kind of structured organization shows traits of authority and

dominance, The Human being and the modern man in particular has built a whole institution on the concepts of power and authority on which he subsists. The show of authority has a history which is as deep rooted as man and his society itself and this is observed by the social thinker Bertrand de Jouvenel who says in his work “The phenomenon called authority is at once more ancient and more fundamental than the phenomenon called state; the natural ascendancy of some men over others is the principle of all human organizations and all human advances”.

Authority can be understood as the derived form of power and a position in a sociological institution is acquired as a result of the power a person wields and exercises. Authority is today recognized most readily with political institutions and bodies of administration and governance. Man has become heavily dependent on political or authoritative control mechanisms for order in society and therefore in the study of political science, authority directly corresponds to political authority and is generally referred in the political context. Many an attempt has been made to understand the meaning, the factors and ultimately the legitimacy of political authority.

Legitimate Authority, de facto Authority and Political Power

For most contemporary theorists to say that the state has authority in the descriptive sense is to say that the state maintains public order and that it issues commands and makes rules that are generally obeyed by subjects because many of them think of it as having authority in the normative sense. We should note here that the attitudinal component of de facto authority is not accepted by everyone. For both Thomas Hobbes and John Austin, political authority in the de facto sense simply amounts to the capacity of a person or group of persons to maintain public order and secure the obedience of most people by issuing commands backed by sanctions. Subjects need not think of the authority as a legitimate authority, on this account.

Also, the distinction between de facto and morally legitimate authority is not universally accepted or at least it is not accepted that the distinction makes a

difference. Hobbes insists that any entity capable of performing the function of de facto authority is necessarily justified and deserves the obedience of the de facto subjects (Hobbes 1668). But most have argued that there is an important distinction between de facto authority and legitimate authority. We will explore in what follows the conceptions political and legal philosophers have had of legitimate political authority.

De facto authority, on anyone's account, is distinct from political power. The latter is concerned with the state's or any agent's ability to get others to act in ways that they desire even when the subject does not want to do what the agent wants him to do. Political power does not require any kind of pro attitude toward the agent on the part of the subject, nor does it require that the state is actually successful at securing public order. It operates completely in the realm of threats and offers. No doubt for the state to have de facto authority or legitimate authority requires that the state have the power to compel those subjects who do not wish to go along. This is necessary for the state's ability to maintain public order and to assure those who do see it as an authority that it will be able to do what it is supposed to do.

Political Authority: Some Conceptual Distinctions

The rubric under which the normative notion of political authority is normally known is the idea of legitimate political authority. It is important here to note the distinction between theoretical and practical authority. A theoretical authority in some area of intellectual inquiry is one that is an expert in that area. Theoretical authorities operate primarily by giving advice to the layman, which advice the layman is free to take or not. The judgments of theoretical authorities give people reasons for belief while the judgments of political authorities are normally thought to give people reasons for action. Theoretical authorities do not normally impose duties on others, although they might give advice on what a person's duty is.

Most theorists of political authority view it as a species of practical authority rather than theoretical authority, though this view is not held by all. Those who hold that political authority is a species of practical authority maintain

that political authorities issue directives that give people reasons for action and not reason for belief. The thought is that political authorities impose duties on their subjects and thereby give them reasons for action. These theorists argue that it is the function of political authorities to get people to act in certain ways so as to solve various collective action problems such as a variety of different types of coordination problems, assurance problems and free rider problems. There have been some dissenting views on this of late. Some have argued that the account of practical reason required by the idea that political authority is a practical authority is incoherent and so they have opted for the idea that political authorities, when legitimate, are theoretical authorities regarding the existence and nature of the duties and reasons for action that people have (Hurd 2001). Since this view is unusual this entry will concentrate on conceptions of political authority that treat it as a species of practical authority.

The rest of this section will discuss a number of different analyses of political authority. There are three basic types of conceptual account of legitimate political authority: legitimate political authority as justified coercion, legitimate political authority as the capacity to impose duties, and legitimate political authority as the right to rule. First, many people have understood legitimate political authority as a political authority that is justified in coercing the subjects of its authority. The notion of justification here is a moral one. The thought is that a political authority might have moral justification in coercing those who come under its authority. This is a particularly thin conception of legitimate authority. For instance, a state can have this kind of authority when it legitimately occupies a territory as a result of a just war. It is morally justified in coercing the inhabitants of the occupied territory.

The moral justification of a group of people in coercing others may be more or less systematic. For instance, a group of people may be morally justified in engaging in just a few actions of coercing others. Or a group may be morally justified in engaging in coercion more generally as in the case of a morally justified military occupation.

This notion of authority need not involve duties on the part of the population that is being coerced. Indeed, they may be justified in trying to escape coercion. This could be the case in a military occupation of a country that is justified on the grounds that it is necessary to stop a third country from engaging in morally indefensible aggression. This conception of morally justified coercion therefore involves no conception of a moral community among persons. In this first conception of authority as justified coercion, the authority may not even issue commands let alone make laws. It may simply justifiably issue threats and offers. The difference between legitimate and illegitimate political authority on this account is that the actions of the illegitimate political authority are not morally justified while the coercive actions of the legitimate authority are justified.

A second conceptual account of legitimate political authority implies that those over whom authority is exercised have some kind of duty with regard to the authority. Or the authority has the capacity to impose duties on the subjects. This duty can be merely a duty not to interfere with the activities of the political authority. Or it can involve the more significant duty to obey the authority. This conception of authority involves the authority and the subjects in a weak kind of moral relationship. The authority is justified in issuing the commands and attempting to force people to comply with the commands while the subjects have some kind of duty not to interfere with these activities or comply with the commands.

The duty of the subjects need not be owed to the authority. It may merely be that the subjects have a duty to obey where that duty is not owed to anyone in particular or where that duty is owed ultimately to people who are not the authority. For instance, if one thinks that one is likely better to respect others' rights by complying with the authority's directives, the action is ultimately owed to those others.

Some have stressed the idea that the holding of justified political authority may only involve a duty on the part of others not to interfere with the political authority and they argue that the duty of non-interference is much weaker than a duty to obey. It is not clear how great the difference between these two

duties is in practice at least as far as citizens are concerned. For many cases of failing to obey an authority are cases of interference with the authority. An analogy may be helpful here. If one is playing a game of baseball with an umpire and one refuses to comply with the directives of the umpire, one is in effect interfering with the umpire's carrying out of his duties by not complying with the directives of the umpire.

While a duty to obey seems to imply a duty not to interfere, there are cases of duties of non interference that are not duties to obey, such as the duties of foreign powers not to interfere in the activities of a legitimate state. Furthermore, the duty to obey is clearly the more contentious issue in the question of authority since it requires that one make one's actions conform to the specific directives of the authority.

A third conceptual account of authority or set of conceptions of legitimate authority involves the idea that the authority has a right to rule. Strictly speaking, an authority can have a right to rule without the subjects having a duty to comply. The authority may have a “justification” right to rule. This means that the authority has a permission to issue commands and make rules and coerce others to comply and its possession of this right is justified on moral grounds. This “justification right” is not much more than the first notion we discussed above.

A more robust right to rule includes a duty owed to the authority on the part of the subjects not to interfere with the activities of the authority. The subjects owe it to the authority not to interfere with it. This is connected with the right of the authority to rule. Finally, an authority can have a right to rule in the sense that it may issue commands and make rules and require subjects to comply with these rules and commands and the subjects have duties, which they owe to the authority, to comply with the rules and commands.

The distinction between a right to rule that is correlated with a duty not to interfere and one that is correlated with a duty to comply comes in handy when we consider the difference between the duties owed to a legitimate political authority by the subjects of that authority and the duties owed to it

by other states and persons who are not subject to that authority. A state with a right to rule in the strongest sense may be owed obedience by its subjects but it is usually owed only a duty of non interference by those who are not a part of the state such as other states and persons in other states. It is worthwhile drawing a distinction here between internal legitimacy and external legitimacy.

It is not a useful aim of philosophers or political thinkers to determine which one of these conceptual accounts of political authority is the right one. Each one of them grasps a kind of legitimacy of political authority that is worth taking into account and distinguishing from the others. The idea of legitimate authority as justified coercive power is a suitable way of getting at the authority of hostile but justified occupation powers. And the idea of legitimate authority as an authority that has a right to rule over subjects who owe obedience to the authority and that has a right not to be interfered with by foreigners is surely an importantly distinct and perhaps ideal type of authority, which is rarely implemented. The kind of legitimacy that is merely correlated with duties to obey or not to interfere is a useful intermediate category between those two.

What is worth noting is that the idea of legitimate authority as a right to rule in the strong sense described above does describe a kind of ideal of political community. The idea of legitimate authority as a right to rule to which citizens owe obedience gives each citizen a moral duty to obey, which it owes to the authority. So this form of legitimacy is grounded in a moral relationship between the parties that goes beyond the fact that they are fellow human beings. The establishment of a robust right to rule depends on the fact that each citizen rightly takes as a reason for obedience that it has a moral duty owed to the authority. Since a legitimate political authority with a right to rule is predicated on the fact that citizens have moral reasons grounded in the right to rule to obey it, the right to rule engages citizens at a deep moral level. The exercise of political power is founded in a moral relationship between moral persons that recognizes and affirms the moral personality of each citizen.

By contrast, a society in which it is merely the case that coercion is justified is one in which the subjects are permissibly treated as means to morally defensible purposes. The subjects do not owe anything to the authority or have any duties to obey it. So, in the case of an authority as merely justified coercion, the subjects' reasons for obedience are merely their desires to avoid punishment. And that is the level at which the authority deals with them. Such a society does not engage the subjects as moral persons; it merely attempts to administer the activities of persons so as to bring about in a morally justified way a desirable outcome. At the extreme, a prisoner of war camp or even a hostile but justified military occupation gives the authorities justification for coercion. The people who are subjected to that treatment often have no duties to obey and they do not regard each other or the authorities as members of a unified political community. They are merely fellow human beings. To the extent that a political society is best when it involves the mutual recognition and affirmation of the moral status of each person, the kind of society that involves merely justified coercion of some by others is a pale shadow.

And the intermediate form of political authority is incomplete in the respect in which the exercise of political power involves the mutual recognition and affirmation of the status of each person. It is the case that subjects have duties but those duties are not essentially connected to anything in the authority. The subjects instead act more in accordance with reasons that are independent of the authority when they obey the authority. So to the extent that a society ruled by an authority that has the right to rule is an ideal of a moral community, the other types of authority are lesser forms of a morally ideal political community.

Conceptions of the Legitimacy of Political Authority

Few theorists after Thomas Hobbes and David Hume have argued that there is a general duty to obey the law or that political authority is generally legitimate (Hobbes 1668; Hume 1965). Most theorists have argued that the legitimacy of political authority is one that holds only when the political authority satisfies certain normatively important conditions. What we will

review here are some of the main theories that attempt to explain when a political authority has legitimacy.

General theories are theories that identify general properties that virtually any kind of political regime can have that give them legitimacy. Special theories are ones that mark off particular classes of regimes that have legitimacy or that have a particularly high level of legitimacy. There are really four types of general theory of political authority and then there are a variety of special theories of political authority. The four types of general theory of legitimacy are consent theories, reasonable consensus theories, associative obligation theories and instrumentalist theories. The two historically important forms of special theory in the West have been the Divine Right of Kings theories and democratic theories.

Concerning the incompatibility of moral autonomy and political authority the problem is really only connected with the kinds of political authority that imply content independent duties to comply with authoritative commands. The basic idea is that it is incompatible for a subject to comply with the commands of an authority merely because it is the command of the authority and for the subject to be acting morally autonomously. Wolff thinks that each person has a duty to act on the basis of his own moral assessment of right and wrong and has the duty to reflect on what is right and wrong in each particular instance of action. Such a person would be violating his duty to act autonomously if he complies with authoritative commands on grounds that are independent of the content of the commands. So the duty of autonomy is incompatible with the duty of obeying political authority. This is the challenge of philosophical anarchism (Wolff 1970).

The worry is that authority is never legitimate because the kind of obedience associated with authority is inconsistent with the autonomy of the subject. We can see, however, that this worry applies only to certain accounts of authority, which imply duties to obey on the part of the subjects. The account of authority as justified coercion is not affected by this argument nor is the account of legitimate authority consisting of a justification right affected by this worry. Still, most accounts of the nature of authority do imply content

independent duties on the part of the subjects. We can see that any content independent duty, whether it is a duty not to interfere with the authority's command or it is a duty to obey the authority, is called into question by this argument.

Reasonable Consensus Conceptions of Legitimate Political Authority

Reasonable consensus views of political authority attempt to find a kind of mean between the extreme individualism of consent theory and the lack of respect for people's opinions of the instrumentalist views. John Rawls argues that the liberal principle of political legitimacy requires that coercive institutions be so structured that they accord with the reasonable views of the members of the society. As long as they do so they have the right to impose duties on their members. The members may not demur on the basis of unreasonable views. Furthermore, it is not necessary on this view that the persons over whom authority is wielded have voluntarily acted or given any sign of agreement. All that need be the case is that the basic principles that regulate the coercive institutions be ones that the reasonable members can agree to.

This view seems to be a kind of middle position between consent theory and the instrumentalist views. It does not allow individuals to divest themselves of obligations on spurious or merely self-interested bases because it specifies what is and is not a reasonable basis for agreement to the basic principles of the society. At the same time it evinces a respect for the opinions of the members of society since it requires that the basic principles that regulate the society accord with the reasonable views of the members.

This account of legitimacy is based on an adherence to a principle of reasonableness. The basic principle asserts that reasonable persons will propose fair terms of cooperation with other reasonable persons only on condition that the terms can be justified to those others on the basis of premises that they can reasonably accept. There has been much discussion of this principle and its underpinnings but this entry will focus on a central worry concerning this idea.

A Democratic Conception of Legitimate Political Authority

The basic idea behind the democratic conception of legitimate authority is that when there are disagreements among persons about how to structure their shared world together and it is important to structure that world together, the way to choose the shared aspects of society is by means of a decision making process that is fair to the interests and opinions of each of the members. When there is disagreement about how to organize the shared system of law, property, public education and the provision of public goods, no one can have his way entirely in this context without someone else not getting her way. Each person thinks that the ideas about justice and the common good with which the others wish to organize their shared world are mistaken in some way. Yet there is a need for collective action. The only way to do this that is reasonably fair to all the members is to make the decision democratically.

The thought is that when an outcome is democratically chosen and some people disagree with the outcome, as some inevitably will, they still have a duty to go along with the decision because otherwise they would be treating the others unfairly. If they refuse to go along and disrupt the democratically chosen arrangements, they are assuming for themselves a right to determine how things should go that overrides the equal rights of all the others. They are, in Peter Singer's words, assuming the positions of dictators in relation to the others. For if they turned out to be in the majority, they would demand the compliance of the others.

The idea of fairness that underpins the democratic process is grounded in different ways in different theories. The basic idea of equality is shared by most democratic theorists. Some argue that there is a fundamental duty of equal respect for the opinions of others that grounds democratic decision

making in the context of pervasive disagreement. Others wish to ground this duty of respect for the opinions of others in a deeper principle of equal concern for the interests of each member of society.

On this kind of view the democratic assembly has a right to rule and to the obedience of its members. This right of the democratic assembly is grounded in the right of each member of the assembly to be accorded equal respect. The duty of equal respect requires that the collective decision process gives each a vote in a broadly majoritarian process and a robustly equal opportunity to participate in the deliberations and negotiations leading to decisions. The equal rights of each of the members are in effect pooled in the democratic assembly so that because one owes each person equal respect, and the democratic way of making decisions embodies this equal respect, one owes the democratic assembly respect.

The democratic assembly can be understood as the assembly of all adult citizens or better as the assembly of all the democratically chosen representatives of citizens. A conception of a democratic assembly requires, on this view, an account of the appropriate form of democratic representation. In addition, the democratic assembly is only one part of the complete system of government. It is concerned with legislation only. In addition to this a government requires executive and judicial functions whose legitimacy may depend in part on other factors better grasped by the instrumentalist view.

The duties that are owed the democratic assembly are content independent and preemptive duties. They are content independent duties because each member has the duty, with a class of exceptions we will review in a moment, just because the assembly has made a decision. The duties are preemptive because the citizen must put aside the considerations she initially planned on acting on in order to treat the rest of her fellow citizens with proper respect. The idea of equal respect requires, on this account, deference to the decision of the majority and not acting on one's own judgment when the majority disagrees. So the decision of the majority gives a reason to obey that preempts or replaces the considerations one might act on were there no majority decision.

It is important to note that this conception of authority is what was described as a special conception above. The fact that democratic assemblies have authority does not imply that all other forms of regime never have authority. One might go along with a regime on the basis of the instrumentalist conception of authority or even the consent approach even if it is not democratic. It is clear nevertheless that democratic assemblies have a special kind of authority.

Limits to Democratic Authority

The question that arises for a democratic theory of authority is when do the considerations of the justice or injustice of the outcome override the considerations connected with the fairness of the process of decision making?

The claim that a democratic assembly has a right to rule is not incompatible with the idea that there are limits to that right. Indeed, theorists have argued that the very same principle that grounds democratic authority also ground limits to that authority. The principle of public equality on which the argument for democracy is founded also grounds a set of liberal rights (freedom of conscience, association, speech and private pursuits). The reason for this is that democratic assembly that fundamentally denied these liberal rights to individuals would publicly violate the duty of equal respect to those individuals. Those who violate the basic liberal rights of others are publicly treating them as inferiors. To the extent that the democratic assembly's claim of authority is grounded in the public realization of the principle of equal respect, the authority would run out when the democratic assembly makes law that undermines equal respect. This establishes, at least for one conception of democratic authority, a substantive set of limits to that authority.

The Distinction between Power and Authority

While understanding the concepts of power and authority is vital in the smooth running of social and political institutions, there must also be an understanding that they are both seminally different at their cores. While

being interdependent on each other at a higher level, these concepts rely on completely different factors at their organic level.

As mentioned earlier, Power is the ability to get things done by others. The principle of power is to punish and reward. Power can exist with or without authority. For instance an armed robber has power but no authority. Authority, on the other hand is the power to enforce law and take command, and to expect obedience from those without authority. Authority can exist with or without power, for example a teacher has authority over the pupils but no real power. Steven Lukes states that there are three dimensions of power namely decision, non decision making and manipulating desires. For instance, In parliament when a law is being discussed by MP's and any other form of political group there must be a body which has power so that they can actually come to a decision. The significant differences in the most objective form include the nature of the terms and the differing types of each concept. The first of these differences being the nature of the concepts of power and authority as illustrated in the earlier case. Other distinctions include the sources from which each derives the power or authority, and finally, the many types of each concept.

A clear distinction can be derived from between the types of power to be addressed such as social power, cultural power, economic power, political power and legal power while the different types of authority include customary authority, statutory authority, common law authority and delegated authority. As mentioned earlier, the concepts of power and authority and the need to form a distinction between are formed in the context of political institutions and political rule.

At the root of our ideal-types, however, no separation exists between society and politics. The Indo-European king, to whom some people trace back the concept of authority, is at once a social and a political leader. But we are dealing with what one might flippantly call post-Hegelian society, where a division between “political domain” and “civil society” is considered a relatively consolidated fact.

There seem exist three ideal types that can be discerned linking political power to social authority: a) the ideal type of a notables system (waxing strong in nineteenth-century society but not only there); b) what I would call the ‘ecclesial’ or ‘church’ ideal type which I suggest is not so much a fruit of transposing institutional fidelity to religious systems onto a socio-political plane as of organizing the political authority vested in an institution for salvation; c) the bureaucratic-distributional ideal type where power descends from the ability to create equilibrium (or re-equilibrium) in the social realm by distributing the resources produced by the political realm.

To begin, the first ideal type is a system in which power stems from the ability of the political decision-makers to auger the position of the subjects under them and doing so via the mediation of the “notable”. In this case the subject relating to public power lacks the resources to be sure of being taken seriously. That obviously means the public power system is failing to supply distributional justice. I note that this may happen for opposite reasons: public power may lack the organization to field the “non-accredited” subject’s requests, or it may have too much bureaucratic organization, designed to guarantee access for all, but actually a self-defeating labyrinth. In either case a priority pathway is needed to obtain a hearing, creating the demand for a “mediator” to activate it. The problem here is that “discretionary power” lies more or less in the hands of political power itself. The mechanism gets activated on behalf of someone either when prompted by the need to find supporting covers from someone with enough social clout to trigger it or when it serves to strengthen the hold on political power over part of society.

Both such aims can be secured through the “notable”, thanks to his investiture with “authority” as a “social representative”. He (traditionally he, of course,) is not just the “advocate” of whoever he represents but an “interpreter” filtering certain claims and thereby changing the response by political power into “legitimating” where it would otherwise remain a mere ex-officio duty of the public domain.

In the modern society with all its complex functioning’s, it is vitally important to locate the thin line which separates the phenomenon of power and authority. There exists a need to study and assimilate the various factors and the influences exerted upon and by them and the interdependence and distinction for the better progress of society and its social beings.

Weber on Authority

Max Weber, in his sociological work, identified and distinguished three types of legitimate domination (Herrschaft in German, which generally means 'domination' or 'rule'), that have sometimes been rendered in English translation as types of authority, because domination isn't seen as a political concept in the first place. Weber defined domination (authority) as the chance of commands being obeyed by a specifiable group of people. Legitimate authority is that which is recognized as legitimate and justified by both the ruler and the ruled.

Weber divided legitimate authority into three types.

The first type discussed by Weber is Rational-legal authority. It is that form of authority which depends for its legitimacy on formal rules and established laws of the state, which are usually written down and are often very complex. The power of the rational legal authority is mentioned in the constitution. Modern societies depend on legal-rational authority. Government officials are the best example of this form of authority, which is prevalent all over the world.

The second type of authority is Traditional authority, which derives from long-established customs, habits and social structures. When power passes from one generation to another, then it is known as traditional authority. The right of hereditary monarchs to rule furnishes an obvious example. The Tudor dynasty in England and the ruling families of Mewar, in Rajasthan (India) are some examples of traditional authority.

The third form of authority is Charismatic authority. Here, the charisma of the individual or the leader plays an important role. Charismatic authority is that authority which is derived from "the gift of grace" or when the leader claims that his authority is derived from a "higher power" (e.g. God or natural law or rights) or "inspiration", that is superior to both the validity of traditional and rational-legal authority and followers accept this and are willing to follow this higher or inspired authority, in the place of the authority that they have hitherto been following. Some of the most prominent examples of charismatic authority can be politicians or leaders, who come from a movie or entertainment background. These people become successful, because they use their grace and charm to get more votes during elections. Examples in this regard can be NT Rama Rao, a matinee idol, who went on to become one of the most powerful Chief Ministers of Andhra Pradesh.

History has witnessed several social movements or revolutions, against a system of traditional or legal-rational authority, which are usually started by Charismatic authorities. What distinguishes authority, from coercion, force and power on the one hand and leadership, persuasion and influence on the other hand, is legitimacy. Superiors feel that they have a right to issue commands; subordinates perceive an obligation to obey. Social scientists agree that authority is but one of several resources available, to incumbents in formal positions. For example, a Head of State is dependent upon a similar nesting of authority. His legitimacy must be acknowledged, not just by citizens, but by those who control other valued resources: his immediate staff, his cabinet, military leaders and in the long run, the administration and political apparatus of the entire society.

The Consent Theory of Political Authority

The consent theory of political authority states only a necessary condition of the legitimacy of political authority. It states that a political authority is legitimate only if it has the consent of those who are subject to its commands. Many have argued that in addition to consent, a state must be minimally just for it to be legitimate (Locke 1990).

A number of arguments have been presented in favor of this view. Locke's argument is that each person has an equal natural right to freedom and that this implies that at the age of maturity no one may be subordinated to anyone else's commands by nature (Locke 1990). Let us call this the natural right argument. Such subordination would violate the equal freedom of the subordinated person. To the extent that political authority involves issuing commands and requiring others to follow the commands, it seems to involve subordinating one person to the commands of another and thus violates the natural right to freedom of the subordinated person.

The Instrumentalist Critique of the Natural Right Argument

A natural objection to this line of reasoning is to state that political authority is actually necessary to protecting each person's equal freedom. Locke himself argued that the state of nature would be quite threatening to each person's ability to live freely because there are likely to be many disagreements about what rights each person has and so people are likely to trespass on each other's rights. Furthermore he argued that when there is such disagreement, we need an impartial judge to determine when rights have been violated. And against criminals we need a police power to enforce the rights that people have. Locke argues that only by establishing political society with a legislature that makes known and settled laws and establishing a judiciary that resolves remaining controversies between people and having an executive power that enforces the laws can people's rights and freedoms be protected.

Once we have the above argument in mind, it is hard to see the force of the natural right argument for no political authority without consent. We might think that the very liberty that is being invoked to support the case for the necessity of consent is better protected by a reasonably just political authority. The instrumentalist can then argue that one protects the liberty of each and every person better by instituting political authority and by treating its commands as authoritative. And so the instrumentalist could argue that insofar as liberty is a fundamental value, it would be immoral not to support a reasonably just political authority and treat its commands as authoritative.

The natural right theorist might argue in response that the above argument seems to involve a kind of utilitarianism of rights. Such a view says that it is justified to violate one person's right in order to protect the rights of others. But, such a theorist might say, the natural rights of persons are side constraints against actions; they are not to be violated even if others' rights are better protected as a consequence. This entry will not go into the many issues that arise in the discussion of deontology and consequentialism here. We will return to the issue of side constraints after the discussion of the next argument.

The Consent Theory: The Options Argument

Some have proposed what this entry will call the options argument against the kind of considerations the instrumentalist adduces. The instrumentalist argues that I have natural duties of justice to promote just institutions and that these duties are best satisfied by complying with the authority of a reasonably just state. But the philosophical anarchist could argue that though I may have a duty of justice, it does not entail that I must obey any particular institution for promoting justice. The idea here is that just as Amnesty International may not require me to pay dues to it regardless of my membership even though these dues would clearly advance the protection of human rights throughout the world, so the state may not require me to comply with its commands even though such compliance would advance the purposes of justice in the world. Let us suppose that the reasons clearly favor my support of Amnesty International. Intuitively, it still may not require me to lend it support. Only if I have voluntarily joined and voluntarily remain in Amnesty do I have a duty to do what the conditions of membership require. And I am under no obligation to join Amnesty; I may join other organizations to fulfill whatever duties of aid that I have. So whether I ought to join Amnesty and be subject to membership dues is up to me. The consent theorist seems to think that, in the same way, only if I voluntarily transact to obligate myself to comply with the state's commands can I be said to have a duty to comply with the state. I must somehow enlist myself in the project of promoting the good causes that the state promotes.

Elite theory

The study of concentrations and distributions power and authority and the dynamics of political institutions has come a long way from the early Greek and roman civilizations to the largely democratic and republic governments of today. There exist many theories concerning the state and relationships of power in the modern society. The elite theory is one such theory which attempts to explain the power relationships of individuals and groups in the modern society.

The elite theory’s main argument holds that it is a small minority, consisting of members of the economic elite and policy-planning networks, that hold the most power, all this while being independent of a state's democratic elections process. Through positions in corporations or on corporate boards, and influence over the policy-planning networks through financial support of foundations or positions with think tanks or policy-discussion groups, members of the "elite" are able to exert significant power over policy decisions of corporations and governments.

The main opposition to this theory is the pluralism theory which suggests that democracy is a utopian ideal and the state autonomy theory.

The Elite theory was suggested many centuries ago and there have been several social scientists who have conceived many forms of the elite theory. These theories are applicable even today from the very fact that while the forms of governance have undergone changes, the essence of power and authority over society and as a political instrument have long remained through the ages.

Classical Elite theory

The aristocratic version of modern elite theory is the Classic Elite Theory and it is based on two fundamental ideas:

1. Power lies in position of authority in key economic and political institutions

2. The psychological difference that sets Elites apart is that they have personal resources, for instance intelligence and skills, and a vested interest in the government; while the rest are incompetent and do not have the capabilities of governing themselves; the elite are resourceful and will strive to make the government to work. For in reality, the elite have the most to lose in a failed government.

There were many important political thinkers who formulated many theories based upon the elitist thought but some of them including Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels and Gaetano Mosca are considered to be an authority on the classical version of the elitist theory.

While Pareto emphasized the psychological and intellectual superiority that the Elites obtained, he believed that the elites were the highest accomplishers in any field and he discussed how there were two types of Elites namely governing elites and non-governing elites. He also extended on the idea that a whole elite can be replaced by a new one and how one can circulate from being elite to non elite.

Mosca emphasized on the sociological and personal characteristics of elites, he said they were an organized minority and how masses are the unorganized majority. The ruling class is composed of the ruling Elite and the sub-Elites. He divided the world into two groups, the ruling class and class that is ruled. Elites, he said had intellectual, moral, and material superiority that is highly esteemed and influential.

On the other hand Michels developed the Iron Law of Oligarchy where social and political organizations are run by few individuals; he said that social organization is key as well as the division of labor so elites were the ones that ruled. He believed that all organizations were elitist and that elites have three

basic principles that help in the bureaucratic structure of political organization

1. The Need for leaders, specialized staff and facilities; 2. The Utilization of facilities by leaders within their organization;

3. The importance of the psychological attributes of the leaders.

Contemporary Elite theorists

Shifting focus to the contemporary scenario, the elite theory has gained more significance in today’s world and there are a several more factors that influence and control the elite theory which is applicable in today’s society. Some of the important elite theorists of today include James Burnham, Floyd Hunter, C. Wright Mills and Robert D. Putnam

Mills published his book The Power Elite in 1956 claiming a new perspective on systems of power in the United States. He identified a triumvirate of power groups – political, economic and military – which form a distinguishable, although not unified, power wielding body in the American state.

He proposed that this group had been generated through a process of rationalization at work in all advanced industrial societies whereby the mechanisms of power became concentrated funneling overall control into the hands of a limited, somewhat corrupt group. This reflected a decline in politics as an arena for debate and relegation to a merely formal level of discourse.]

This macro-scale analysis sought to point out the degradation of democracy in "advanced" societies and the fact that power generally lies outside the boundaries of elected representatives. A main influence for the study was Franz Leopold Neumann’s book, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism in 1942, a study how Nazism come in position of power in a democratic state as Germany. It had given him the tools to grasp and analyze the entire total structure and as a warning what could happen in a modern capitalistic democracy.

The elite theory analysis of power was also applied on the micro scale in community power studies such as that by Floyd Hunter (1953). Hunter examined in detail the power relationships evident in his "Regional City" looking for the "real" holders of power rather than those in obvious official positions. He posited a structural-functional approach which mapped the hierarchies and webs of interconnection operating within the city – mapping relationships of power between businessmen, politicians, clergy etc. The study was promoted to debunk current concepts of any ‘democracy’ present within urban politics and reaffirm the arguments for a true representative democracy. This type of analysis was also used in later, larger scale, studies such as that carried out by M. Schwartz examining the power structures within the sphere of the corporate elite in the USA.

Burnham’s early work The Managerial Revolution sought to express the movement of all functional power into the hands of managers rather than politicians or businessmen – separating ownership and control. Many of these ideas were adapted by paleo-conservatives Samuel T. Francis and Paul Gottfried in their theories of the managerial state.

Putnam saw the development of technical and exclusive knowledge among administrators and other specialist groups as a mechanism by which power is stripped from the democratic process and slipped sideways to the advisors and specialists influencing the decision making process. He has condensed the essence of his theory into the quote, "If the dominant figures of the past hundred years have been the entrepreneur, the businessman, and the industrial executive, the ‘new men’ are the scientists, the mathematicians, the economists, and the engineers of the new intellectual technology.”

Conclusion

We can conclude the study of power and authority by stating that they are phenomenon deeply embedded into the fabric of human existence. The destruction of that intellectual and moral consensus which has restrained the struggle for power for almost three centuries deprived the balance of power of the vital energy that has made it a living principle of international politics.

Battle for power started many millennia back and civilizations have fallen and grown through the pages of history. In the post-industrialized world battle between the European juggernauts for territorial and political power and sovereignty gave way to colonization of the rest of the world. European hegemony and aristocratic imperialism gave way to the bipolar world after the World wars and the cold war ended with the supremacy of United States and the breakup of the USSR. Pursuit of power and authority has dictated the winds of growth of man and his society.

There is no need to repeat the fact that power and authority play one the most influential and important roles in maintaining the balance and progress in society and ultimately in nature. These concepts are powerful beyond the imagination of the human mind and can never be ignored or forgotten and we can only strive to channel the potential of theses phenomenon into a positive and progressive building force.

Bibliography

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Political Philosophy

The Founder’s Constitution of University of Chicago Press

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Introduction to Political Thought

On Max Weber, the Encyclopedia Britannica

The Cambridge Companion to Weber: Cambridge University Press

Essays in Economic Sociology, Princeton University Press

The Concept of Law, H.L.A.Hart

Articles

Power and Knowledge by Foucalt

Social Authority and Political Power by Paolo Pombeni

History of Economic Analysis by Joseph Schumpeter, Oxford University Press

On John Austin, the Province of Jurisprudence Determined by. H. L. A. Hart

The Authority of the State by Green Leslie, Oxford University Press