Power System Reliability Report (.pdf)

Direction de l'audit et des risques Mission Audit Sûreté Tour Initiale 1 terrasse Bellini-TSA 41000 92919 La défense CEDEX TEL: 01 02 26 48 FAX: 01 41 02 24 04

www.rte-france.com

Anne-Marie DENIS 24th June 2014

2013 Reliability Report

54 Pages

RTE publishes a yearly reliability report based on a standard model to facilitate comparisons and highlight long-term trends. The 2013 report is not only stating the facts of the Significant System Events (ESS), but it moreover underlines the main elements dealing with the reliability of the electrical power system. It highlights the various elements which contribute to present and future reliability and provides an overview of the interaction between the various stakeholders of the Electrical Power System on the scale of the European Interconnected Network.

R-SG-DAR-MAS-2014 - 000016 Indice : 1.0


Page: 2/53

Copyright RTE. This document is property of RTE. No communication, reproduction, publication of all or part of this document without express written authorisation granted by the Electricity Transmission Grid Operator (RTE).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary ...................................................................................................................................... 3 1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................10 2. Operating situations encountered .................................................................................11

2.1 Climatic conditions ........................................................................................................11 2.2 Supply / demand balance management .........................................................................11 2.3 Voltage stability ............................................................................................................16 2.4 Management of interconnections ...................................................................................18 2.5 Management of internal congestion ...............................................................................18 2.6 Contingencies affecting the transmission facilities ...........................................................19

3. Evolution of the reliability reference guide .....................................................................19 3.1 External references: directives, laws, decrees, etc. .........................................................19 3.2 Inter-TSO reference guide ............................................................................................21 3.3 Contracting contributing to reliability .............................................................................21 3.4 Internal References ......................................................................................................22

4. Measures contributing to reliability in the equipment field .............................................22 4.1 Behaviour of the equipment making up the electrical system ..........................................22 4.2 Structure of the system and its design rules ...................................................................33

5. Contributions to organisational, human and computer reliability ...................................35 5.1 Methods and organization .............................................................................................35 5.2 Steering, general organization .......................................................................................38 5.3 Feedback: organisation - ESSGlos scale............................................................................38 5.4 Performance MonitoringGlos ............................................................................................39 5.5 Crisis managementGlos and exercises ..............................................................................39 5.6 IT System security ........................................................................................................40

6. Lessons drawn from the year’s events ..........................................................................40 6.1 Lessons drawn from the ESS and their analysis ..............................................................40 6.2 Experience feedback excluding ESS ...............................................................................42 6.3 A few key figures for other electricity systems ................................................................43

7. Progress actions ...........................................................................................................44 7.1 Actions undertaken within the framework of the ENTSO-EGlos ..........................................44 7.2 Other cooperative ventures (TSOs, users, etc.) ..............................................................46 7.3 Reliability-related R&D actions .......................................................................................47

8. Reliability audits ............................................................................................................49 9. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................49 Glossary



Page: 3/53


Summary of the 2013 reliability report

Each year, RTE publishes a reliability report using a standard model helping to provide year to year comparisons and highlighting long-term trends. This document provides the main information regarding the operating reliability1

of the electrical network for the year 2013, as well as the actions in progress to prepare for future reliability.

A- Operating conditions encountered

Whilst 2012 started with an intense cold spell in February, there was no such extreme event in 2013. Peak consumption, 92,600 MW, was 9,500 MW below the 2012 peak, thus causing no particular problems to operation. The temperature gradient during the winter months, 2,400 MW/°C, showed that the sensitivity of electricity consumption to temperature increased slightly over a previous comparable year (2011). With little sunshine and a large quantity of snow and precipitation, the year was highly favourable to hydraulic power generation, which reached its highest level since 2001. France was a net exporter of electricity during every single month of the year. High import levels, above 5,000 MW, were only encountered during brief periods, of about one hour, whereas export levels over 10,000 MW were noted during 727 hours, principally during the summer periods and without ever exceeding France's capacity for export. The growing variability of import and export situations at any period of the year, and therefore that of the physical flows through the grid, is confirmed from year to year with the growth of renewable energies and the possibilities for market optimisation, specifically intra-daily markets.

A-1 Supply/demand balance management

In terms of operational margins, the management of the supply & demand balance was more complicated than in 2012, for increasing generation (17 x Level 0 Significant System Events (ESS 0) for insufficient upper margins) and for decreasing generation as well (7 ESS 0 for insufficient lower margins). During a year which was not particularly cold, and with a good level of availability of French generation plants, these shortfalls in margins show that, under certain circumstances, there may be a lack of flexibility in supply & demand management. This statement underlines the necessity for RTE to strengthen its contractual requirements and to continue to monitor the parties involved and make sure they are aware of the necessity of declaring generation technical limitations and actual availability via the Balancing Mechanism.

The quality of the national consumption forecasts, which impacts the operating margins, was marked by more frequent meteorological events, notably during the inter-season periods, at temperatures close to the threshold levels for starting electric heating, and historical data which has become less pertinent by the changes in economic conditions, especially for atypical days which are the days following public holiday. This was highlighted by 5 ESS A events (against 2 in 2012). The use of processes for intra-day declaration of exchanges on interconnectors continued to grow, resulting in increasingly near real-time grid analyses and decision-making.

After a particularly chaotic year 2012 in terms of European frequency management, 2013 was rather smoother. The annual cumulative duration of the most risky situations during which the European grid has consumed a large part of its primary reserves totalled 1 hour 34 min. (as opposed to 2 hours 27 during 2012). 2013 did not see any bias over 150 mHz (1 case during 2012). In terms of high level frequencies, an increase up to 50.145 Hz was logged (50.13 Hz in 2012), which was very close to the trigger level of 50.2 Hz for photovoltaic production. Finally, three ESS A (against 2 in 2012) were logged for major frequency bias: RTE contributed to two of these events, the third was caused by a major balance problem in Germany resulting from the move to Winter Time. As in the past, RTE was highly reactive, using available reserves to limit the depth and duration of these frequency biases. In addition to that, during the autumn of 2013 RTE rolled out a tool to improve anticipation of situations during which the French regulations might contribute to damage the European frequency. 1 Minor or major events affecting grid reliability are classified according to an SSE scale of 7 levels (0, then A to F, in increasing severity).



Page: 4/53


The operators can thus create adjustment strategies according to the resources available and the time taken to bring them into service in order to master RTE's potential contribution to frequency bias during peak hours. Within ENTSO-E, a common methodology was defined to analyse frequency biases, validated by all TSOs, and a shared database was put together to monitor major biases across the European grid and to analyse the causes and the behaviour of the regulating areas under concern. The next step, more complex, will be to propose suitable solutions depending on the contractual and technical links between TSOs and producers, which differ from one country to another, from the point of view of installed generation mixes and laws., The implementation of an efficient operational coordination process is even more critical as exchanges between TSOs are increasingly volatile and Renewable Energy plays an increasing role in the European power system.. The grid codes being prepared should help to introduce progress actions.

A-2 Flow and voltage profile management

With neither extremely cold periods during the year, nor particularly constraining border transits, the risk of a voltage collapse was lower than in 2012 and controlled in a satisfactory manner. Generally, there were no situation with very low voltage profiles and no ESS A events were logged for this kind of problem (6 during 2012 with the sending out of warning or safeguard messages during the cold period in February). No safeguard orders were issued during the year. In terms of voltage drops management, RTE continued its work, commissioning new compensators, optimising command & control systems, using sophisticated analysis tools and continuing exchanges with producers:

- installation of new capacitor banks (2500 Mvar); - installation of two new 225 kV Static Var Compensators providing adjustments in the range of

-250 & +250 Mvar for the Brittany and Vendée regions; - acquisition of industrial copies of the control & command of these Static Var Compensators for

study & maintenance purposes ; - introduction of “SMACC” systems (Advanced Compensation Command Systems)for all 400 kV

batteries, providing the operator with the ability to configure various operating modes; - continuation of work with producers on production limitations and reactive power absorption

by generators; - improvements in the voltage profile study process, based upon a dynamic analysis tool

facilitating on D-1 the elaboration of graduated strategies for the operation of compensation means and imposed generation, in a more accurate and safer way, with

- an improved real-time decision on the need to send out or not safeguard orders.

The occurrence of too-high voltages, less directly critical for reliability purposes, required for their management to switch on inductive reactors, to disconnect overhead lines or cables, to make reactive power be absorbed by the generating units, potentially weakening the electrical grid. The occurrence of these situations is reinforced by the development of underground networks and the increase of distributed renewable sources. A specific study methodology has been proposed and tried out across several regions in 2013. This year, the availability of the link between France and the United Kingdom was reduced due to a number of problems, on both the English & the French sides. The limitations in the capacity for exchanges between France and Germany were reached nearly half of the time due to major congestions occurring on the grids because of wind farm generation in the north of Germany. Cross-border exchanges had a direct impact on some internal links, forcing RTE to handle a larger intra-day variability across its grid, principally in the North-east and Eastern regions. Studies coordinated between regions, along with the regional vision provided by CORESO, facilitated the process of drawing up solutions. The decisions to shut down or mothball several Combined Cycle Gas plants made the management of some congestions more difficult to handle Finally, with the continuation and increasing speed of the modification program on transitory limit currents on lines, the management of congestions will continue to improve in terms of flexibility.



Page: 5/53


A-3 Contingencies affecting transmission facilities

The number of short-circuits having an impact on transmission systems has been increasing this year due to exceptional numbers of lightning strikes in 2013, with record thunderstorm levels being recorded nationally over the last decade. On a nationwide scale, the proven causes of short-circuits are: atmospheric, with 49% due to storms (reaching 78% in the South-eastern region), 5.3% due to wind and 3.9% due to snow. Hardware damage accounts for 2.3% of the proven causes. We also noted in 2013 a proven cause rate of 70%, an improvement over 2012. Amongst the 'presumed' causes, a major part relies to bird activity. Faults involving the 400 kV network are mainly, single-phased; only 10% are poly-phased. Under specific operating conditions, an incorrectly handled poly-phased fault may have an impact on the machines transient stability. With this in mind, the fault elimination time, noted for the 400kV system, shows that the vast majority of faults were dealt with within their critical elimination period. The risk of a loss of stability was therefore very low. Fault elimination times on the 225 kV network closely interacting with the 400 kV network, were improved when compared with 2012. However, this must be further consolidated over time as it may have a significant impact on the risk of loss of synchronism of machines connected on the 400 kV grid. There was no permanent after fault tripping of double 400kV lines in 2013. However, a problem with an instrumentation transformer in a 400kV substation did lead to a double busbar fault, classed as an ESS B event.

B- Evolution of the reliability reference guide

The European Parliament published a regulation in April designed to harmonise the regulatory framework for the development of infrastructure for trans-European energy exchanges within the framework of a single European energy market. A French Ministerial decree from January 2013 details the methods for carrying out independent technical testing of RTE assets. In April, the government published the 'Brottes' law. Article 14 of which allows extensions to curtailment capacities until the new capacity mechanism is brought into play. In application of this article, RTE had the CRE approve and implement, towards the end of last year, the NEBEF1 mechanism (Notification of the Exchange of Withdrawal Blocks), which can be used to adjust the withdrawal valorisation rules for the electricity market. These innovative measures for the electricity markets are a response to public policies introduced in France & across Europe to promote energy savings and prepare for energy transitions, whilst guaranteeing the operational reliability of the power system. The DTR (Technical Reference Documentation) produced by RTE has been subjected to several modifications : publication of a new model for the conformity reports for generating installations, notably covering U/Q & f/P services, which are important to safety; changes to the RST (Secondary Voltage Control) covering new installations connected to the RPT (Public Transmission Network), with the replacement of a reactive command setting by a voltage command setting ; after validation of the conditions for processing connection for a private merchant link as requested by the CRE, RTE published the transitional technical regulations for the design & functioning of DC links, with, in terms of conversion stations, similar technical performances to those requested from generators ; indeed, the behaviour of these links, can have a significant impact on overall safety, as generating units do. Finally, in terms of the inter TSO reference, a workshop into the re-writing of the 8 policies was launched in 2013, with the aim of applying at the Continental Europe scale the network codes currently awaiting approval. . As per current practices, RTE undertook, during 2013, a self-evaluation of its own conformity to Policy 3 (Operational Security) which returned the results of being in conformity. C- Security-related measures: hardware & tools

Since 2010, the EDF programme aiming at reducing the limitations in supply / absorption capacity of reactive power for NPPs, shared jointly with RTE, has been committed to reaching values similar to those of normal industrial events, with a mainly satisfactory dynamic. 2013 saw the total differences regarding absorption drop below the permissible limits for this standard event. The total differences regarding supply is however still higher than this value, justifying the continuation of up-grading



Page: 6/53


efforts by EDF. Over the next few years, RTE must therefore handle these temporary limitations by integrating them precisely into its dynamic voltage studies. As far as the NPP CP1 design is concerned, a long-term reduction in its absorption capacity due to overheating problems has been noted. New Q/U diagrams for the CP1 plants, supplied by EDF at the end of 2013, reflect a decrease in the plant's total reactive reserves, from 1500 Mvar supplied and 2400 Mvar absorbed; these limits are taken into account in the new agreements for the participation in the Ancillary Services as of January 2014. Differential protection relays on the 400kV busbars returned a cumulative downtime which was worse than in 2012. One isolated protection was responsible for 43% of the outages noted. The renewal policy for the busbar differential protection devices is consistent with the outages observed as the two types of protection devices with the least good results are undergoing a programmed replacement.

The most notable changes to the transmission network, in relation with reliability, are: (i) The commissioning, in April 2013, of the Cotentin-Maine 400 kV line, which will, in the

future, allow the energy produced by Flamanville, as well as off-shore wind and tidal power, to be transferred to the national grid; it already plays an important role in securing the electrical supplies of the West of the country;

(ii) The creation of a substation in Fruges (Pas-de-Calais) designed to collect wind generation;

(iii) The commissioning of a phase transformer in Logis-Neuf, used to improve supply safety in the PACA region (in addition to the PT in Campo Rosso, fitted by TERNA in 2012 and used to mesh the two 225 kV grids, French & Italian).

Within the framework of the project 'Ampacité', several experiments concerning the dynamic monitoring of the facilities transmission limit were carried out in several regions, and the values of Ampacité were used in the Regional Control Systems (SRC) as an experimental trial, to facilitate monitoring and use of the lines by dispatchers. On completion of the European project TWENTIES, during which two Dynamic Line Rating systems were investigated, -ELIA & RTE, jointly undertook an examination of the opportunities to experiment this principle on an interconnecting line between France & Belgium.

The availability of the control system to national dispatching was correct, with only two incidents in May. With regard to the Regional Control Systems, we note a decrease, since 2012, in the cumulative total loss of observability, but an increase in the total duration of loss of operability, with four ESS A events for loss of remote control functions without prior warning. After the successful experiment in 2011 on the live switching of operation of part of a regional control centre to another one, the SIDRE project (Support Inter-Dispatching REgionaux or Regional Inter-Control Centre Support) was launched, with its definitive specifications drawn up in 2013. Its purpose is to safeguard one region by switching with a second one. The Safeguard Alarm System (SAS), essential in controlling high risk or downgraded situations, and thus having a direct impact on reliability, returned a global downtime rate of 0.25% (0.29% in 2012). Its replacement, SACIS (Security Data Control & Warning Safeguard System), was accepted by RTE on its test platform in October. Its roll-out on a pilot site is planned for early 2015.

Regarding to software planning tools, the IPES new version is helping forecast photovoltaic generation as well as wind power, which is a significant advance for short-term studies, given the growth of renewable energy in the French power system. Thus, since October 2013, photovoltaic forecasts have been produced by IPES, improving estimates of PV generation for the Supply - Demand balance (EOD). R&D work has, in 2013, led to improved handling of the multitude of dispersed plants in terms of wind farm and PV generation planning on a regional basis. The Convergence platform is the reference in terms of software tools used for D-1 & real-time grid studies. Its theoretical global availability has been excellent, as, at all times, the central site or the 8 local servers were available. A weekly procedure aimed at ensuring that the backup servers were working correctly was set up during the second half of 2013. During March, an Operational hotline was opened, available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. As with previous years, notable slowdowns were noted, requiring an improvement in the tool's operational performances.



Page: 7/53


For the winter of 2013-14, RTE renewed its experiment in Brittany, designed to mobilise, for the Balancing Mechanism, local load curtailment and generation offers, in order to secure the supply of the Brittany Region. Following this call for tenders, five parties were chosen, for some 70MW. This innovative approach favours the participation of smaller capacity plants of 1 MW and over. Moreover, with the aim of better defining the behaviour of the active/reactive load depending on voltage variations, RTE and eRDF continued their cooperative project to estimate the dynamic load parameters.

D- Contributions to organisational, human and computer reliability

In 2013 human factors were involved, to various degrees, in 9 ESS A, representing an increase over previous years. This statement corroborates the need to actively continue the renewed 'Improved Performance through Professionalism' (APGP) approach, mainly dedicated to the Operations & Maintenance fields, but also to be extended to the Development-Engineering & Clients/Markets fields. The aim is to collect in a manner as comprehensive as possible the explanatory factors when the human factor intervenes in an event, in order to better identify its root causes and erect the right barriers. November 2013, to support this approach and its management, RTE published a guide, analysing human factors and, in December, signed a trust entitled 'Transparency for Progress', aimed at facilitating self-declarations by each employee. In 2013 we noted a re-bound in the number of self-declared events and improved implication of each branch of activity in the APGP approach. However, these results can only be used if based upon a sufficient statistical sample, which requires active involvement in the approach and the support of appropriate training and organisation, which already is in place in several regions. As for each year, some training programs have been changed to adapt to new requirements. For example, the setting up of regional training plans to follow the roll-out of the new command & control systems for reactive power compensation. On a national scale, 2013 saw the two telecommunications and control business lines start to blend, facilitating the osmosis of a reliability culture between the two branches. The ESS B declared during the modifications to telecoms network routers, is a reminder of the necessity of this mutual understanding and its increasing importance for the future. RTE has revised its own, more detailed, ESS scale, partially to make sure it is coherent with ENTSO-E's ICS (Incident Classification Scale), a four-level classification scale which has been in use since 2011. In terms of crisis management, several exercises have been organised during autumn for preparing system operation for the upcoming winter over the Western region. The 'Cold Spell' organisational note proposed after the cold snap in February 2012 was also validated. Additional exercises have been used to fine tune the crisis team functions after the structural changes to RTE in October. Regarding the safety of its own Industrial IT systems, RTE undertook in 2013 an evaluation review according to the standard NERC CIP (North American Electric Reliability Corporation - Critical Infrastructure Protection). This evaluation has positioned RTE's Industrial IT system as being sufficiently mature whilst still highlighting areas of improvement for 2014. Additional actions have been undertaken to monitor and provide real time analysis of safety related events, in addition to the installation of a suitable anti-virus solution covering the industrial IT equipment.

E- Other lessons drawn from the year’s events

In 2013, 38 ESS A & 2 ESS B events were logged, representing a satisfactory result in terms of safety, with a slight increase in ESS A events since 2011. It is the 'grid' and 'generation ' items which have seen the largest rise in ESS A events. The 2 ESS B events in 2013 involved the 'grid' and 'operation means ' items:



Page: 8/53


(i) The destruction of an instrumentation transformer in a 400kV substation caused damage to the busbars, with, as a consequence, a double busbar fault and the tripping of five outgoing feeders from the substation. Repairs to the station lasted 4 days ;

(ii) A software intervention on the multi-service network which carries remote command data caused the suspension of certain feedback circuits to dispatching, which in turn, reduced visibility of the settings of several units, depriving the dispatcher of some of the information vital to his work.

Amongst the ESS A events were 5 gaps between forecast and actual consumption of over 3000 MW at peak, and four remote control outages (without notification by alarm) during operations. In terms of malfunctions of switch disconnectors, which were highlighted in previous reports, we noted 107 ESS 0 events (against 166 in 2012). This improving result shows the efficiency of the actions undertaken but still underway. The grid is, in effect, still highly vulnerable to failures of this type of equipment when they occur in safety-critical substations. F- Progress actions

The continuation of the preparation of the future European "network codes", which are to become European law, formed the core activity undertaken by ENTSO-E in 2013. As in the past, RTE remained actively involved. ACER (Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators) produced, in 2013, a favourable report on the four codes ('Capacity Allocation & Congestion Management', 'Load Frequency Control & Reserves', 'Operational Security' and 'Operational Planning and Scheduling'). Work on the preparation of the 'High Voltage Direct Current Connection' code has progressed well during 2013 and a public consultation project has been undertaken. Still within the ENTSO-E framework, other safety-related actions have been undertaken, notably the roll-out of a unified real-time alarm system (EAS) ENTSO-E Awareness System across all TSOs, and the publication and open consultation on a CBA (Cost Benefit Analysis) methodology, transmitted to ACER in November.

The coordination centres of some TSOs, like CORESO, confirmed their roles in terms of operational security by drawing up trans-border actions. An organisation of the different TSOs and the main regional coordination centres, CORESO and TSE, was defined in 2013, helping them to implement a unified file service in order to offer their partners a representation of the quality of the interconnected grid for D-1 studies. The implementation of this new service will have an impact on the safety of European System operations by opening up the field of capacity calculation and harmonised, more accurate, studies. RTE Dispatchers, both regional and national, took part in communications with their European counterparts and in joint exercises covering the management of downgraded situations, based on simulations of the actual networks. These operations took place with TERNA, NG, REE, Transnet NB & Amprion. To share the 'flow-based' method and promote its implementation beyond the CWE zone, RTE played host to a delegation of the four Scandinavian TSOs for 2 days (Fingrid, Stattnet, Energinet and Svenske Krafnet).

In terms of R&D activity and key European projects with which RTE is involved, 2013 saw the completion of the TWENTIES project, which overcame a decisive technological block : the completion of final testing for a prototype DC circuit breaker produced by ALSTOM GRID, partner to the project. The feasibility of this high speed breaking component is from now on confirmed, opening up new opportunities for its future industrialisation and for the development of multi-terminal DC networks. The Itesla project, led by RTE as part of a consortium of 21 parties, looked into the next generation of probabilistic study platforms; the first building blocks of this platform were developed during 2013. Amongst the other R&D activities, we note the SMARTe real-time simulator, enriched with new control and command simulators for reactive power synchronous compensation. Studies with Georgia Tech were started, looking at the electro-technical behaviour of the networks with numerous electronic power components and the start of the SmartLab project, which simulates the ageing of components, with the aim of optimising asset management.



Page: 9/53


G- Management, control, audits

The Reliability Audit Mission regularly conducts in-depth audits. One audit was carried out in 2013, covering the theme: interactions between the Development / Engineering & Operations branches in terms of operational safety of the electricity system. A flash audit, covering the progress of a training exercise covering Environmental Emergency Situations, was also started in December. Three audits have been programmed for 2014.

In conclusion,

The results from 2013 highlight RTE’s satisfactory levels of reliability in terms of operational control. This overall result is the outcome of work in progress for the past few years, emphasizing that the guarantee of system reliability is the result of planned and durably sustained actions. The areas of vigilance highlighted in this report focus on:

• The need to progress, both on a French and a European standpoint, towards the reduction of the risk of a massive, widespread generation trip and the increased control of frequency bias.

• The need to evaluate the efficiency of actions undertaken to limit or eliminate malfunction situations involving 400kV busbar switch disconnectors.

• The need to continue, throughout 2014, with the improvements to the Convergence Network Study Tool.

• The need to analyse supply-demand balance risks, notably those caused by D-1 and Intra-day consumption forecasts.

• The need to carry out, with eRDF, further in-depth studies of the data covering the behaviour of reactives at the RPT/RPD interface.



Page: 10/53


1. Introduction As for each year, the aim of this Reliability Report is to provide a summary of the main events of the year (2013), along with the reliability of the electrical system managed by RTE, integrated into the European Electricity System. Its aim is to provide those outside Rte with an understanding of reliability management levels by covering a multitude of facets of the subject. It is not only drawn up to relate the facts about the incidents which affected the electricity network, but also to give an account of the actions undertaken by RTE to prepare the conditions for future reliable operation, from a few months to a few years perspective, both within RTE and in coordination with the other stakeholders such as the European Transmission System Operators (TSO) and the Technical Coordination Centre CORESO (common to the TSOs Elia, National Grid, 50Hertz, Terna and RTE), and also the network users – generators, distributors and market stakeholders. It is, furthermore, a tool for in-house use, providing all employees with a global view of reliability control, one of RTE’s fundamental missions, and hence to better understand the importance of their basic actions. The compiling of this report is based on the information available in the regional reliability reports, the national operating reports, the experience feedback and more generally the information available throughout the year. 2013 was a continuation of 2012, with the outlook of serious changes to the European electricity network: the decommissioning of 8 German NPPs after the Fukushima catastrophe and another 9 German reactors closing by 2022, the shutdown of the Fessenheim plant scheduled for 2017, the decrease in coal prices across Europe, resulting from the decreased demand from the US, triggered by gas fracking operations, the decrease in the competitiveness of Gas fired Plants, the continued, sustained development of Renewables across Europe, with generation peaks able to occasionally collapse spot market prices, a very low CO2 cost per tonne, with the ensuing influence on the European generation mix and on the risk of not reaching the 20/20/20 targets laid out by the European Commission, a debate on the transition of energy supplies, the completion of work to set-up a mechanism to cover an obligation to produce capacity in France, notable technical progress in the field of HVDC multi-terminals, with a demonstration, by ALSTOM Grid, of the feasibility of an ultra-rapid DC circuit breaker in the framework of the European TWENTIES project. These evolutions have, or will have, a noteworthy impact on the structure of the electricity system, the load flow profiles and the levels of reserves required to assure the supply-demand balance. The forthcoming European codes, whose development aims to establish rules ensuring the efficient run of the markets and a homogeneous reliability level, are likely to help to control these far-reaching changes. 2013 also saw the continuation of the work by ENTSO-E to complete these codes and to have them approved by ACER. The first three codes, finalised in 2012 and for which ACER, in early 2013, issued recommendations for approval to the Commission, are still awaiting approval by the latter. Significant changes in the structure of the European network, supporting these environmental changes, have been detailed in the Ten Year Network Development Plan, published every two years by ENTSO-E (3rd Edition in 2014). However, the implementation of these infrastructure changes across Europe has met increasing difficulties due to the complexity of the authorisation procedures. With this in mind we must underline the continuing work being undertaken by the European Commission aimed at producing a Directive, designed to reduce this complexity and therefore the total time taken to commission infrastructure which is of interest to the whole community. A significant event for the networks was the commissioning, in April 2013, of the 400kV Cotentin-Maine overhead line, a circuit length of 340 km over a 170 km route. This line will permit, in the future, to transmit energy produced by the EPR on the Flamanville site into the network, as well as by off-shore renewables (wind and tidal). It already plays an important role in securing the electricity supply of the French Western regions. In 2013, RTE took an active role in the development of the European network, with a total investment of 1.45 billion Euros, slightly higher than that of 2012 (1.36 billion Euros). NB: Explanations of the main concepts used in this report can be found in a Glossary in the Appendix. They are identified during their first appearance in the text by the symbol 'Glos' as an exponent (e.g.: ReliabiltyGlos).



Page: 11/53


2. Operating situations encountered

2.1 Climatic conditions According to reports by Météo France, 2013 was particularly wet with low levels of sunshine. Over the whole year, temperatures were, on average, 0.8°C lower than normal, a little cooler than 2012. The month of May was particularly cold, the months of July and October being on the contrary particularly hot. Lower than normal value during the first six months of the year, the mean monthly temperature then climbed up to a level higher than normal, with the exception of November. The cumulative rainfall over the whole country was 10% higher than average, with a 30% increase in the south of the Champagne region, along the Cote d'Azur and in the central Pyrenees. This level of rainfall resulted in a high level of hydraulic generation, the highest since 2001. The total sunshine levels were slightly down over almost the whole country. Several remarkable events during the year had an impact on the electricity network and its operation:

• Heavy snowfall over all mountain ranges, with cumulative totals close to record levels in the Pyrenees.

• A late winter spell in mid-March, remarkable due to the quantities of snow in the North West. • A very rainy month of May, cold with little sunshine. • Heavy rain and historic levels of flooding on the 17th - 19th June in the south west of the

country. • A heat wave over France between the 15th and the 27th July. • Two storms: 'Christian' - 27-28 October and 'Dirk' - 23-25 December. • Early, laying snow in November across the south west and in the region around Lyon.

Beyond these specific meteorological events, the year was, in general, favourable to the operation of the system regarding the sensitivity of consumption to temperature changes (heating or air-conditioning) and the impact on the cooling of Nuclear Power Plants.

2.2 Supply / demand balance management Detailed statistics, accompanied by explanatory notes, are available in the "2013 Electrical Report" published by RTE on its website. The items of particular importance for reliability are discussed here. Peak consumption level was logged at 19:00 on the 17th January (92.6 GW) (Historic peak - 102.1 GW on the 8th February 2012) at a temperature 6.8°C cooler (12.6°C in 2012) than the reference level. The sensitivity of consumption to temperature was slightly accentuated with a winter gradient of 2400 MW increase in consumption per °C . The temperature gradient during the summer was equal to 500 MW per °C. During the summer, the consumed power fell to its minimum on the morning of the 11th August (26.63 GW), representing the lowest level of consumption during the last five years. The annual export balance stood at 47.2 TWh (44.2 TWh in 2012), with an export volume (contractual and inter-daily) of 79.4 TWh (+5.9 TWh) and an import volume (contractual and inter-daily) of 32.2 TWh (+2.9 TWh). France was a net exporter every month of the year, which is contrary to 2012, when the month of February was actually identified as being a net import month due to the cold spell. There were 22 days logged with a net energy import balance, spread across the seven coldest months (as opposed to 20 in 2012, 19 of which were during the cold snap in February). The importation of high power levels, greater than 5,000 MW, was only noted during a period of one hour on the 27th November (104 hours in 2012, 0 hour in 2011). Inversely, a high level of exports were noted, mainly over the summer period, with 727 hours at more than 10,000 MW (8.3% of the year), including 203 hours during the time period between 08:00 and 20:00. The high level of availability from the nuclear production facilities during the summer of 2013 helped these figures.



Page: 12/53


Cross border energy exchanges

The intra-daily share of cross-border exchanges reached 13.4% of contractual cross-border exchanges (13.1% in 2012). This significant share is a reflection of the increasing possibilities in terms of optimising intra-daily markets, notably through the increase in intermittent generation capacity. This has led RTE to improve its close to real-time analyses and decision making processes.

Progression of intra-day exchanges and exports over 10,000 MW

Gross consumption was 495 TWh, an increase of 1.1% over 2012, due to thermal sensitivity characteristics. Total generation was 550.9 TWh (+1.7%).Classical thermal generation decreased by 7.1% to 44.7 TWh due to the de-commissioning of fuel-oil and coal fired stations, the falling generation levels from gas plants and the increased hydraulic generation. The decreased cost of coal and the low CO2 cost per tonne favoured coal-based generation (+14%) over fuel oil (-19%) and gas (-19%). Energy produced by CCGs dropped for the fifth year in a row, due to their lack of economic profitability. One CCG plant has been mothballed for several years. These outages render the natural localisation of generation less favourable in terms of flow and voltage control in those zones which rely on CCG plants (E.g.: the South east and Brittany regions). Wind and photovoltaic power generation, whose safe injection into the grid requires good forecasting, continued to make progress, rising to 15.9 TWh (+6.4%) and 4.6 TWh (+16.2%). Generation from renewable fuel plants (household waste, paper, biomass, biogas, etc.) increased by 7% - reaching 6.3 TWh. Finally, the heavy snowfalls during the winter and the high levels of rainfall throughout the year resulted in an

Intra-daily share of exchanges (%).



Page: 13/53


increase in hydraulic generation of 18.7%, reaching the decade's highest figure of 75.7 TWh. The share of hydraulic energy and other renewable sources represent, respectively, 13.8% and 4.8% of the total annual generation. Daily consumption forecasts have an important role to play in reliability issues. Whilst national forecasts principally involve suitable calculations of required operational marginsGlos, regional forecasts involve the accurate estimation of flow profiles. The following graphics represent the SQALP operating indicator, giving the mean forecast error at peak periods during the evening at D-1 and for intra-day forecasts. The objectives laid down are gaps less than 2.3% for D-1 and 1% for intra-day forecasts. During April and May, the 1% threshold was exceeded for intra-day forecasts of peak evening periods.

Quality of D-1 evening forecasts Quality of ID evening forecasts In general, the inter-season months give rise to a higher frequency bias, explainable by the changeable weather making forecasts more difficult and the impact that electric heating may have at temperatures in the range of 15°C, or by historical data being less pertinent due to a changing economic context or atypical days (particularly long weekends and the days after public holidays). Five Significant System EventsGlos (ESS) against 2 in 2012, were declared at Level A, for gaps of more than 3000 MW between actual figures and D-1 forecasts. A learning process on the forecasting difficulties for these atypical days was launched as an input to the forecaster skill development exercises. 2.2.1 Operating MarginsGlos

RTE monitors in real time, the margins available to balance supply and demand to deal with peak periods at a few hours’ notice. In the event that the volume is below the margins set by the reference, the margin is re-established via normal adjustment offers available through the Balancing MechanismGlos (MA). If this is insufficient, RTE calls upon additional offers received following the sending of a degraded mode message to the Balancing Mechanism, and then uses help contracts agreed with other TSOs. Should the margin become negative, RTE can turn to exceptional and then emergency means2

2013 saw an increase in the number of insufficient margin situations, both in terms of upper and lower margins. 17 ESS 0 were logged for insufficient upper margin (with three 'S' critical situation orders) and 7 ESS 0 for insufficient lower margin. As a comparison, in 2012 we logged 10 ESS 0 for insufficient margins, triggering 4 'S' orders.

.

2 Non-contracted emergency feeds from other TSOs, 5% drop in HVA voltage, load-shedding, reduction in exporting physical exchanges, etc.

-0,1%0,1%0,3%0,5%0,7%0,9%1,1%1,3%1,5%1,7%

Janv

Fév

Mars

Avril

Mai

Juin

Juil

Août

Sept

Oct

Nov

Déc

0,0%

0,5%

1,0%

1,5%

2,0%

2,5%Janv

Fév

Mars

Avril

Mai

Juin

Juil

Août

Sept

Oct

Nov

Déc



Page: 14/53


More generally, the management of the supply-demand balance (excluding network congestion problems caused by regional imbalances) was more complex than in 2012, as shown in the graphic below, which gives the numbers of ESS by type and year.

Over a year which was not particularly cold, these insufficient margin situations, which, due to their duration and the time of day, could pose a significant risk to security, highlight the need for RTE to strengthen its contractual requirements and to launch further monitoring actions to assure that producers declare any technical restrictions applicable to power plants, as well as actual availability, via the Balance Mechanism. In a more general outlook, it would appear beneficial to look into other fields, such as longer term structures and rules around contracts or even operations, in order to improve flexibility.

To illustrate this increasing trend for variability in terms of supply-demand balance, we can quote one exceptional episode, the negative spot prices on Sunday 16th June 2013, where, for the first time since the coupling of the CWE market zone, the mean daily price in France was actually negative (-41€/MWh), with the price actually falling to -200€/MWh between 05:00 and 08:00. This exceptionally low price is explained by a low demand and a surplus of inflexible generation, either difficult (nuclear) or impossible (renewables - run-of-the river hydraulic generation) to modulate. The same day, between 13:00 and 17:00, the negative prices caused by the high levels of renewable energy being produced in Germany whilst the demand was low, both within Germany and elsewhere in Europe. Over this period 60% of Germany's total generation was from solar and wind energy and the German TSOs were lacking downward reserves to deal with this amount of generation. Beyond the negative prices on the spot market, these types of situation, even though they are rare, are capable of causing increased frequency deviations, if the European network does not have the flexibility required to manage the excess generation. 2.2.2 Primary and secondary power/frequency control (f/P) No ESS were logged during 2013 due to shortfalls in the availability or reserves required for primary and secondary frequency controlGlos, needed to assure France's contribution to European frequency control. For information, one ESS A was logged in 2012 for a human error. 2.2.3 Frequency stability

The frequency stability of the Interconnected European system, common to all TSOs and other parties involved, returned fewer biases than in 2012, with a significant decrease in the number of upward biases. The frequency deviations noted are quantified in the table below. This table indicates the number of frequency deviations greater than 100 and 150 mHz from the reference frequency (50 Hz±1 mHz).

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 F-Fref < - 100 mHz 91 89 151 114 232 153 F-Fref < - 150 mHz 0 0 0 0 1 0 F-Fref > +100 mHz 191 302 270 193 236 105 F-Fref > +150 mHz 0 0 0 1 0 0

The first two lines show the number of downward frequency deviations, the most critical point for the European grid. After a particularly bad 2012, 2013 reversed the trend, which however in no way proves that these results are satisfactory. It should be recalled that when the frequency is in the



Page: 15/53


range of Fref - 100 mHz, the European grid consumes most of its primary reserves and cannot therefore cope with a serious loss of generation. The risk of an automatic frequency-related load-shedding event is thus increased if case of a loss of generation. . The cumulative annual exposure to this risk was 1 hour 34 min. (against 2 hours 27 min. in 2012 & 59 min. in 2011). The average duration of these events remains limited at 37 s (38 s in 2012, 50 s in 2011); the longest lasting however reached 10 min. 30 s (4 min. in 2012, 3 min. in 2011). It should also be noted that with the minimum at 49.859 Hz, there was no deviation greater than 150 mHz during 2013; beyond this limit there is the fear of a frequency-related load shedding operation being triggered for the loss of 1000 MW of generation within Europe. Frequency-related problems are also measured by the number of downward deviations greater than 80 mHz, which was equal to 842 (868 in 2012, 585 in 2011), for a cumulative duration of 9 hours 51 min. (12 hours 5 min. in 2012 and 7 hours 30 in 2011); for increased frequencies, the number of deviations logged decreased markedly (lowest number over the last six years), with, however, a maximum deviation of 50.145 Hz (50.13 Hz in 2012), which is once again getting close to the risk limit for tripping photovoltaic generation at 50.2 Hz (See Section 3.2) The quality of control in the French zone and its contribution to controlling European frequency deviations, can be evaluated by an indicator which measures the number of times that the frequency-power control deviation in the French zone is not corrected within 15 minutes: this figure was 60 in 2013, 41 in 2012 and 35 in 2011. The increase in this indicator reflects an increase in the number of situations where adjustments and the resources available were insufficient to allow operators the required flexibility to rapidly correct major power fluctuations (peak hours with parallel change to several GW). Even if the number of this type of situations has increased in 2013, the total time spent in this situation has remained stable with regard to 2012 and 2011 (4.8% in 2013; 4.7% in 2012; 5.6% in 2011). Three ESS A events were logged (two in 2012), two downward deviations greater than 100 mHz (-117 & -130 mHz) and an upward deviation of +104 mHz). RTE was contributing in two of the deviations, but not to the -130 mHz event, which was caused by a unbalance problem of 1700 MW in Germany on the 28th October, the day of the change to winter time, coupled with a lack of coordination between TSOs to collectively support the frequency. Generally speaking, RTE is probably one of the most proactive TSO during a frequency deviation using the available reserves. As an illustration, RTE triggered 2500 MW of adjustment on the 28th October to support the frequency during the -130mHzdeviation. Later analysis estimated that without the intervention of RTE, the frequency would have probably dropped below 49.8 Hz during a period of more than 5 minutes. Despite the fact that during the year a procedure was updated to define the roles of the Coordination Centres and the TSOs with regard to the gravity of the situation, this was not applied on the 28th October: improved European coordination therefore remains yet to be implemented. In addition, to improve anticipation of situations where French regulation could have an impact on frequency, RTE has rolled out a prototype of the MARTI tool (Intra-day Real-time setting forecast model) in the autumn of 2013 and its operators were trained in how to put together the best adjustment strategies according to the available resources and the delays required to bring them on-line. This should help RTE to control its potential contribution to frequency deviations during peak hours. This tool, or similar approaches, must be promoted to our European counterparts via, notably, the European Frequency Working Group (Sub Group System Frequency). Within the ENTSO-E we can note the introduction of a joint method for the analysis of frequency variations, validated by all TSOs. This meant that in 2013 we could start work on building a database to monitor, using a single format, all major frequency deviations across Europe, their causes and the behaviour of the settings for the regulating areas under concern. The following step will be to think upon a manner in which to use this data to propose remedies, which will, in turn, differ from one country to another according to the contractual and technical relationships between producers and TSOs and with the characteristics of the various generation mixes. One certainty is that the introduction of improvements is becoming increasingly necessary as the role of renewables in the energy mix continues to grow as does the number of exchanges between TSOs. Progress factors are potentially found in the provisions planned in the European network codes currently being prepared.



Page: 16/53


2.3 Voltage stability There were no extremely cold periods during the year, nor were there any particularly severe border transits, therefore the risk of a voltage collapse was lower than in 2012 and controlled in a satisfactory manner. In general, there was no significant damage to the voltage profile and no ESS A events were logged for low voltage problems (6 during 2012, during the cold period in February). The ADO voltage protecting relay, an essential element of the Voltage Defence Plan, was not armed in 2013 (armed 4 times in 2012), and no safeguard orders were issued (-5% Un, tap changers blocked). RTE did however continue to work on several directions to control voltage drops:

• By installing new capacitor banks with a volume of 2500 Mvar, and, for the first time, banks connected to the 400kV network (150 Mvar),

• By installing two new Reactive Power Static Var Compensators in the 225kV substations in Domloup (Brittany) and La Merlatière (Vendée), opening up new possibilities to provide DC adjustments in the range of [-250 Mvar, +250 Mvar],

• Through the commissioning, in June 2013, of copies of the Control & Command blocks of these Static Var Compensators (supplier: ALSTOM) for the purpose of study and maintenance, making it possible to carry out detailed dynamic studies and train operators in the maintenance of this complex equipment,

• Through the commissioning, in October 2013 in Argoeuves, of the first Advanced System for Compensation Control, and its wider fitting to all 400 kV capacitor banks. This system is designed to let the operator configure various operating modes and choose the voltage to be monitored,

• By continuing to work with producers on the limits of generation and absorption of reactive power from the plants (See Section 4.1.1),

• By improving the dynamic simulation study process to further develop anticipation of delicate situations and to ensure that any decisions to trigger safeguard orders are as accurate as possible,

• By carrying out additional analyses to define the operating principles for the future voltage protection relay, designed to handle potential voltage collapses over the Northern part of France, with commissioning scheduled prior to winter 2015-16.

The dynamic voltage behaviour studies, carried out at D-1 and intra-day periods, make it possible to analyse the “slow-dynamics” voltage plan changes, and, if necessary, to characterise the need to implement control resources, potentially going as far as imposing generation units or triggering safeguard orders if these resources appear to be insufficient. The aim is to accurately locate the zones at risk of voltage collapse using a number of different parameters: consumption level, available compensation resources, network and generation availabilities, limitations in the reactive capacities, etc. Only near-real time simulations are able to provide accurate forecasts, so that safeguard measures are implemented only when and where strictly necessary, and sized properly. Therefore, the availability of computing capability and the corresponding data is a critical factor in getting through these stretched periods by allowing suitable resources to be activated. No "-5% Un" safeguard orders were transmitted during 2013 for drops in set point voltages of the transformers supplying distribution clients or for on-load tap changers blocking. Another emerging phenomenon, not only on the RTE network, but also on those of other European TSOs (notably in Spain, Belgium and Germany), is that of high voltages. This occurs when overhead lines are lightly loaded and produce reactive energy, mainly in Summer, during low consumption periods; however, other periods of the year may also be concerned. It is made worse by the presence of MV & HV cables, which have notable capacitive behaviour; by the development of generation sites spread widely across the distribution grid, meaning these sites consume less and less or are even injecting power into the grid; and, by the decreased capacity of generation plants to absorb reactive power. High voltages have a direct impact on the operational life expectancy of the equipment operated by RTE and its clients. They must therefore be controlled and the actual risks precisely identified. From a reliability point of view, they are less dangerous than voltage drops, but harder to forecast as they are dependent on data which is not only much more complex but also much harder to handle: anticipated and coordinated lowering of the voltage profile under National Control Centre (CNES) control, starting



Page: 17/53


synchronous compensators, connecting inductance coils, opening 400 kV lines, opening cables (studies are currently underway to evaluate the potential impact on the dielectric withstand of cables when they are subjected to these repeated manoeuvres). These actions, which involve taking equipment out of service (sometimes up to 15 lines simultaneously), while generation units are absorbing reactive power, can result in a weaker meshed grid and have an impact on the dynamic stability of some plants. The following graphic shows how are managed high voltage situations in the PACA East region (South East of France), involving the de-energizing of 225kV cables, limiting their generation of reactive power during low load periods. In 2013 it was noted that there was an increase in the frequency of occurrence of high voltage problems, despite the installation of an inductance coil in-series with the 225 kV Lavera-Septèmes line, with an annual cumulative figure of 48 days (39 days in 2012), during which, the solution mainly consisted in de-energizing the cables. This voltage increase can be explained by a downward trend in reactive consumption from ACRs (Regional Consumption Centres) during low load periods, related to the burying of the MV network and the commissioning of new HV cables. Studies carried out during 2013 justified the installation of an additional 4 inductance coils to support those already planned in the 'safety net', providing operators with additional levers to be used in handling high voltage situations.

Deconnection of cables in the PACA region due to high voltages.

To improve control of these situations, often affecting the grid on a regional level, the use of ECCT study scenarios (See Section 5.1) facilitates coordinated action involving multiple regions, controlled by the CNES3

A method for studying high voltages was proposed in 2013 and trialled by a number of regions. These trials were an opportunity to cooperate on studies over various periods, depending on the quality of the data available and the decisions to be taken. This work should give rise to the publication of a doctrine in 2014.

and helps optimise levers by expanding their geographical coverage.

Beyond methods, the idea of contracting distributors for a minimum "tangent phi" value (i.e. avoiding overcompensation of the networks), should limit the phenomenon of high voltages, in the same way as the maximum "tangent phi" helped to control low voltages. Work has started in this field in order to improve control of the future evolution of reactive power at the RPT/RPD interface.

3 National System Operations Centre, specifically responsible for operating the 400 kV network and for market services (adjustment, access to interconnections)



Page: 18/53


2.4 Management of interconnections Globally, the management of the flows through the French grid has been well managed in 2013, with no particular problems on the North-South transits. This can be explained by a number of simultaneous factors (good weather, stable consumption), structural factors (limitations in transmission capacity across the German grid) and organisational factors (efficiency of the management of regional grids through CORESO, and more specifically of the German & Belgian phase shifting transformers, and the impact of the new maximum transitional currents, mainly for sensitive lines). The limitations in the capacity for exchanges between France and Germany were reached nearly half of the time, due to congestions occurring on the grids for high amounts of wind generation in the north of Germany. The maximum export capacity from France was not reached (26 hourly periods during 2012, as opposed to 11 in 2011). The introduction, in 2014, of a 'Flow-Based' market coupling process should optimise the use of the capacities available for exchanges and reduce the saturation frequency on interconnections. As already noticed in previous years, cross-border exchanges and their impact on the flows on interconnecting lines and on some internal grid lines (400 kV or, on a regional level, 225 kV beneath ) have seen an increase in intra-daily variations. Thus, as with previous years, the impact on the variability of physical flows was particularly marked in the North-east and East regions. The diagram below illustrates the variability of exchanges on the 18th December (reversal of the hourly trade flows in MW for the 3 borders - Germany, Belgium and the UK).

The France-England connection had reduced availability all over the year due to a number of leaks from the terrestrial cables on the French side and a long-duration outage on the English side caused by a problem with a smoothing coil. The IFA2000 trend was also volatile due to the increased use of infra-daily tickets.

2.5 Management of internal congestion The Balancing Market contracted congestion costs during 2013 were five times less than during 2012 and involved, in the main, D-1 or D-1 (during storms) management of the double line along the Tavel-Realtor 400kV route, feeding the PACA region. D-1 was not covered for a period of 48 hours (190 hours during 2012), 36 hours of which was caused by the tripping of the Provence 5 generating plant. Control over the Tavel-Realtor line was worsened by decisions to implement seasonal shutdowns or mothball a number of CCG units, along with work undertaken on the Durance hydraulic power plant. In summary, two commissioning operations took place in 2013, which alleviated the problems of congestion management in this area: that of the CCG G6 in Martigues Ponteau and that of the PST in Logis Neuf, increasing the PACA import capacity by 50 MW. Despite this, the reliability of the zone in question will remain fragile until the 'safety net' is set up in 2015. Moreover, 400kV works being undertaken in the Rhone Valley have increased the number of transits via the 225 kV Pratclaux zone. Efficient coordination between the Operating Centres in Lyon, Toulouse and Marseille has resulted in a satisfactory management of the 225 kV power flows. . This zone is often crossed by large-scale transits, which activate over-load protection relays with 20 minutes delay. Finally, with the increasing speed of the modification programme of transitional limit currents, the congestion management process should continue to be improved through a better flexibility.



Page: 19/53


2.6 Contingencies affecting the transmission facilities The number of short-circuits (9351) affecting transmission equipment has increased this year (8111 in 2012). This increase can be explained by an exceptional number of lightning strikes in 2013, notably during July, with a record number of storms at a national level over the last ten years. Thus, storms are the cause of 78% of short-circuits in the South-eastern region, 57% in the Rhone-Alps region, 55% in the Normandy-Paris region and 47% in the North-eastern region. On a nationwide scale, the principal causes of short-circuits are atmospheric, with 49% due to storms, 5.3% due to wind and 3.9% due to snow. For 5 years, the percentage of short-circuits caused by lightning strikes has remained at around 1%, which shows how well equipment is protected against lightning. Hardware damage accounts for 2.3% of proven causes. We also noted in 2013 a proven cause rate of 70%, an improvement over 2012 (60%). Among the "assumed" causes, i.e. those not positively identified, the majority is assumed to be due to bird activity. Again, in 2013 we can underline encouraging results in terms of contact with vegetation, highlighting the efficiency of the maintenance work being undertaken (pruning, conductor tightening, etc.). The process of burying cables, even if it has consequences in terms of reactive power, should, over time, limit the number of short-circuits. With a total of 4.3 %, the share of permanent faults is slightly on the increase (2.6% in 2012). These permanent faults lead to the loss of one or more facilities whereas transient short-circuits do not affect the availability of the facilities when the protecting relays are working correctly. With the strongest potential impact on reliability, most of the 382 faults affecting the 400 kV network were single-phase faults, although 38 of them were multi-phase and therefore liable to compromise the transient stability of the generating units, if they were incorrectly eliminated (the actual occurrence of an instability phenomenon with this assumption would be dependent on local generation conditions, topology, fault characteristics, etc.). In Section 4.1.2 it is shown that this risk, in terms of the time taken to eliminate the short-circuit, is very slight because of the satisfactory behaviour of the 400 kV protection systems. From the reliability standpoint, analyses need to be focussed on the contingencies which led to the loss of 400 kV double lines or 400 kV busbar sections, which are the types of incident liable to cause large-scale incidents . During 2013 there were no definitive double 400kV line tripping (16 simultaneous transient faults) and one double busbar fault in the 400kV substation in Cubnezais - classified as ESS B. There were also 8 busbar outages of a lower importance - classified as ESS A. Finally, the use of Météorage dispatching software means that the location of lightning strikes can be used in case lines in the immediate vicinity are tripped. An experiment is currently underway, in the Lyon region, to increase the speed of a return to service if equipment is tripped definitively.

3. Evolution of the reliability reference guide This chapter describes the changes to the reliability reference guide, established outside from RTE or internally. It concerns all types of requirement documents from all sources, contracts established by RTE with any type of party that may have an impact on reliability and also reference documents (studies, etc.) that concern this field.

3.1 External references: directives, laws, decrees, etc. 3.1.1 Europe

On the 17th April 2013 the European Parliament published Regulation 347/2013 (See Official Journal of the European Union – 25th April 2013) which modified the regulatory framework for the development of infrastructure for trans-European energy exchanges. In order to comply with this regulation, in November 2013 ENTSOE submitted, to the Member States, the European Commission and ACER, a 'Cost Benefit Analysis' method, defining the process to be used across Europe when developing grid infrastructure for the electricity market. Once this methodology is approved by the EC, ENTSO-E will apply it in preparation for TYNDP 2014.



Page: 20/53


3.1.2 France

A ministerial decree of the 14 January 2013 (See JORF - 29 January 2013) states the methods for an independent technical inspection of RTE equipment, both new and existing. The inspections cover earthing connections, magnetic fields, mechanical condition, verification of minimum safe distances between conductors and the distances between conductors and trees. On the 15 April 2013 the government published the 'Brottes' Law 2013-312 – (See JORF 16 April 2013), article 14 of which extends the contracts for withdrawal capacities for one year, until the effective implementation of the balance mechanism. This allows RTE to continue to send out Tender Calls and to improve the contracting of withdrawal offers (with the aim of securing the supply/demand balance) until the publication of a decree on the balance mechanism (as per NOME law of 2011). In application of this article, in October 2013 RTE asked the regulator (CRE) to approve experimental valorisation rules for withdrawals on the electricity market 'NEBEF 1' (Notification of Exchanges of Withdrawal Blocks). The CRE validated these rules on the 28 November 2013. The model in question regulates the financial relationship between the withdrawal operator and the supplier. Tests associated with the successful achievement of the withdrawal of a consumer, an essential part of the supply-demand balance, are carried out by RTE using methods approved by the CRE. The management of the withdrawal mechanism perimeter is set up jointly with the distributors. . These measures, which are highly innovative for electricity markets, are a response to public policies introduced in France & across Europe to promote energy savings and prepare for energy transition, whilst guaranteeing the operational reliability of the power system. RTE has published or updated several new articles for the Reference Technical Documentation (RTD). A new reporting framework for testing the conformity of generating units was drawn up by RTE on the 18th November: this means that each producer connected to the grid, regardless of the size of his installation, is invited to confirm the performance levels as initially declared in the connecting performance commitment agreement . Tests on installations over 120 MW will be used to confirm the U/Q & f/P Operational Characteristics, which have an important role to play in reliability issues. These measures should give RTE improved visibility of the actual performance levels of all generating units connected to the grid. In terms of Secondary Voltage Regulation (RST), RTE has decided to replace reactive power control with voltage control (more suitable for downgraded modes), which will send out directly to generating units or installations with power electronics (HVDC converter substations) individualised set-point values. This change is documented by Version 3 of the article in the RTD dealing with voltage settings and the constructive reactive power capacities for installations, applicable as of January 2014. It is applicable to all new plants requesting connection to the grid . The same article provides a framework for all producers (covering all sources, including wind and photovoltaic), to be used as of January 2014, to provide RTE with U/Q diagrams of their installations. A detailed description of these diagrams will allow RTE to better prepare the operation of the power system, by using a more effective model, improving thus the . reliability approach. The definitive version, validated by the CRE, covering the conditions under which connection requests should be processed for private merchant connectors within the European derogatory framework, was published on the 25th February (Article 1.3). It is supported by Temporary Article 1.4, which was also published on the 25th February, defining the transitional technical rules applicable to the design and operation of private DC merchant connectors, which is currently the most probable case. These connectors must be harmoniously integrated into the existing European Electricity System, by offering, at the conversion station level, technical performance levels similar to those expected from generating plants, notably in terms of frequency/power and voltage regulations, and must be compatible with the operational reliability of the grid under normal and disturbed operating modes.



Page: 21/53


3.2 Inter-TSO reference guide The current inter-TSO reference guide, ensuring coordinated control over the interconnected continental European system, and whose enforcement is set out in a contract between all the TSOs, consists of a set of 8 policies: A workshop for re-writing the 8 policies was launched in 2013, with the aim of integrating the network codes, currently awaiting approval, into the Continental European network (See Section 7.1). This workshop was also the perfect opportunity to review the structure of several polices and to reformulate any requirements which may be difficult for certain TSOs to respect (in 2013, 6 standards from policy 3 contained the 13 non-conformities logged over all 28 TSOs). RTE plays a role in all these workshops and chairs the workshop for Policy 4 'Coordinated Operational Planning'. A new, updated version of Policy 5 'Emergency Operations' is expected for the summer of 2014. It should be noted that the examination of the conformity of TSOs to this reference has been covered by a regular process, implemented since 2006, in the form of self-evaluations by all TSOs, and reinforced since 2010 by external audits of some TSOs. The CME Group (Compliance, Monitoring & Enforcement) breaks down and analyses the results, and reports conclusions by the RGCE Committee (Regional Group Continental Europe). In 2013, RTE carried out an internal audit of its own compliance with Policy 3 (Operational Security) and declared itself in conformity with all the standards laid out in this policy. In addition to these self-audits, 6 TSOs (Bulgaria, Poland, Macedonia, Belgium & the 2 Germany TSOs - Tennet Germany & TransnetBW) were audited by the CME Group in 2013. This audit covered Policy 4 (Coordinated Operational Planning). In terms of risk of major incidents which might have an impact on the whole European Continental System, triggered by the behaviour on frequency variations (massive trip: caused by high frequencies (50.2 Hz) or low frequencies) of numerous photovoltaic or wind generation plants, and, awaiting the complete implementation (expected by end 2014) of an ad-hoc retrofit programme across those countries where the ‘at-risk’ installations are most common – mainly Germany and Italy- surveys have been initiated by ENTSO-E to jointly evaluate the equipment “at risk” with distributors. An ENTSO-E study, published in March 2013, evaluated the risk on the reliability of the European System caused by a massive tripping of renewable generation. The study lists the volumes installed for the various tripping levels (over a range of 49.5 to 50.5 Hz by steps of 100 mHz) after the current retrofitting operations have been completed. The objective is to prevent simultaneous tripping of 3 GW due to low frequencies (Size of European Reserves) and 6 GW due to high frequencies (frequency adjustment via the first step of load shedding ). RTE and eRDF examined this problem together. This resulted in a change to the eRDF Technical Documentation, started in 2013, with the aim of raising the low-frequency tripping level of photovoltaic equipment. In terms of lower frequencies, an initial estimate by eRDF fixed the volume of photovoltaic power liable to trip at 49.5 Hz at 2.3 GW. In general, only those actions taken within the relevant countries, to correct existing equipment problems, and the introduction of more suitable correction rules for new plants, are likely to address the problem.

3.3 Contracting contributing to reliability Following a request from the CRE, a work was initiated in 2013 to define the new rules covering the producers’ participation to Ancillary Services (primary or secondary frequency and voltage controls). In terms of frequency, these rules should produce notable changes in the way they are paid for providing Ancillary Services, notably through the implementation of a secondary market, organised in order to take into account the mandatory contribution of producers to both primary and secondary controls, replacing thus the current contracts. In terms of voltage, the work is more modest and involves simply revising current rules (zones, prices, etc.). This work should continue up to 2016, with the new rules being approved by the CRE prior to their application. The contractual Balance Mechanism agreements provide RTE with rapid and complementary reserves in order to manage frequency deviations, in addition to the existing automatically activated primary and secondary reserves. This contract states that 1000 MW of rapid reserves should be capable of being activated within 13 minutes, as well as 500 MW of complementary reserves within 30 minutes. The call for tenders, opened in December 2010, was divided into 4 lots. The last of these lots covered the period April 2013 - March 2014 and was subject of a call for tenders in 2013, which resulted in



Page: 22/53


providing the Balance Mechanism with 750 MW of generation and 250 MW of withdrawal facilities as rapid reserve, in addition to 500 MW of generation as complementary reserve, from six suppliers. As these reserves are called upon during difficult situations, they are essential to reliability and must be available when requested by RTE, which was not always the case in the past (See the Events of 5th April 2012). To prevent these delicate situations, the new contract, which entered force on the 1st April 2014, included the setting up of a test campaign aimed at qualifying all Balance Mechanism resources. This contract is a translation of RTE’s commitment to promote the development of all possible resources in order to control the supply-demand balance and to support the implementation of these resources to guarantee the global reliability of the system.

3.4 Internal References The major evolutions in terms of the references to reliability cover the following points:

• Updating the Significant System Event classification table, selected by RTE from, its Feedback processes.

• Defining the operating principles for the capacitor banks controlled by the SMACC protective relays (Advanced System for Compensation Control) in order to limit the risks of VHV voltage collapse.

• Updating the reference for the tuning of HV network remote coupling devices.

• Defining the requirements for the design and operation of Compensation voltage protection relays used for transit control and the return to service of substations configured in the regional control system tool.

• Drawing up of requirements for the N-k rule, updated in 2012, bringing them into line with the Operational Reliability doctrine for voltage collapse before winter of 2013-14.

• Defining the policy for the handling of temporary safeguard and transitional currents in order to control and coordinate currents transiting in the Public Grid equipment.

• Defining RTE's current objectives and requirements in terms of the control of active power and frequency-power control – close to real time.

• Definition of the operational measures to be set in place in order to manage low voltages during the winter 2012-13 (new threshold levels for arming the Western Region protecting relay; optimised management of -5% Un orders, new decision-making criteria based upon a voltage collapse for dynamic simulations).

4. Measures contributing to reliability in the equipment field

4.1 Behaviour of the equipment making up the electrical system 4.1.1 Generating units Overview of the generating fleet The decommissioning of the classic thermal power plants (-1570 MW coal, -610 MW fuel oil) and the mothballing of the CCGs, along with the commissioning of a new CCG (gas balance: -70 MW), partially compensated for by an increase in renewable generation, meant that, during 2013, there was a drop in generation, from the French systems, of 795 MW. Renewables continued to grow, albeit at a slower rate, mainly in MV, with some in HV. It should be noted that, in 2013, two new very large photovoltaic plants, operated by EDF-EN, were connected to the network in the Eastern region of France: the Toul-Rosière plant (96MW) and the Massangis plant



Page: 23/53


(46 MW). The installed wind generation capacity4

Compared with Spain or Germany, who were committed to voluntary wind farm programmes from an early date, the maximum and mean coverage provided by wind generation remains modest in France. The mean coverage of consumption by wind farm generation at the end of 2013 was 3.3% (against 3.1% in 2012), the figures vary greatly over the various time periods, with obvious repercussions on the management of the supply-demand balance; the mean load factor for 2013 was 23.2% (24% in 2012), with mean monthly values lower than the annual mean during the summer months (May to September), peak production was reached on the 23rd December at 21:00 - with a power of 6441 MW. (6198 MW on the 27th December 2012). The highest mean wind farm generation figures were also logged in December, with 2680 MW, giving a mean monthly load factor of 33.4%.

at the end of 2013 was approximately 8100 MW, an increase of 8.4% over the figures for the end of 2012; however, the annual rate of growth has progressively decreased, 1000 MW in 2010, 900 MW in 2011, 750 MW in 2012 & 680 MW in 2013. This decrease in the rate of expansion can be explained by economic and regulatory incertitudes (adverse economic conditions, financing, purchasing costs).

The photovoltaic generation facilities, with 820 MW installed during 2013, grew up to 21% reaching a total capacity of 4300 MW towards the end of 2013. As for wind generation, its growth has slowed (+1600 MW in 2011, +1000 MW in 2012, +800 MW in 2013).

Photovoltaic Wind farms

As an average, over 2013, photovoltaic generation covered 1% of consumption (0.8% in 2012) with a mean load factor of 13.1% (13.9% in 2012). The peak for photovoltaic generation was on the 21st August at 14:00, with a power of 2997 MW. The above figures summarise the changes to wind farm and photovoltaic generation over the last six years. Hydraulic capacity (25.4 GW) and nuclear power (63.1 GW) remained stable during 2013. The nuclear plants had a higher level of availability in 2013 than in 2012, notably during the summer months. Contributions to reactive power control and limitations eDF and RTE hold twice yearly meetings on the multi-year programme related to the reduction of the limitations in reactive power capacity of generation units, both in terms of supply and absorption. These limits can be penalising in terms of the management of low voltages (risk of collapse) or high voltages (risk to hardware). These meetings provide a clear vision of the effective reactive power reserves available in order to be able to carry out essential reliability studies and appreciate changes over the years to come (passage from winter to summer, sizing of compensation resources). Since 2010, the decrease in discrepancies has been globally satisfactory, approaching normal industrial variation values. 2013 saw the total absorption discrepancies drop below the permissible limits for this standard problem (estimated at 7% of total reserves). The total of supply discrepancies is still higher than this value, justifying the continuation of these corrective actions by EDF. RTE must therefore closely monitor temporary limitations of supply over the next few years, integrating them into their dynamic voltage studies. Since 2012, all monitoring work has been carried out using the individual Q/U diagrams for equipment, along with the limitations taken into account by the dynamic models used to calculate the voltage plan.

4 Estimates by the French General Commission for Sustainable Development - February 2013 for the French mainland, excluding Corsica.



Page: 24/53


Concerning the CP1 NPP, eDF informed RTE, in early 2013, of a long-term reduction in its absorption capacity due to overheating problems. This reduction in absorption capacity is in addition to the supply limits from the same NPP, noted in 2011, giving rise to standardised reductions awaiting new Q/U diagrams. All of the new diagrams for the CP1 NPP, delivered in December 2013, reflect these limitations both in terms of supply and absorption. These new diagrams decrease the total reactive reserves from the plant by 1500 MVar (supply) and 2400 MVar (absorption). These new ranges were integrated into the System Service participation agreements applicable since the 1st January 2014. Within the framework of the renovation of the RSCT and the changes to the RST (as per Technical Reference Documents), the Cordemais 4 & 5 plants, essential to the voltage control of the Western region, were, during an outage in June 2013, fitted with a standardised interface capable of accepting RST or RSCT set points (reactive level, set point voltage, voltage differential between controlled points). The controlled use of these two plants has made it possible to check the compatibility of the RST participation modes and to proceed with any adjustments needed. The system was qualified in October, a key point in the RSCT-NA project. The new architecture should be rolled out during 2014 to the three other plants in Cordemais, then, in 2015, to the experimental NPP site in Saint-Laurent. Islanding and voltage feedback tests

In the event of the collapse of an important part of the region, caused by a widespread or large scale incident, the success rate for the islanding of NPPs is an important part in the reconstruction of the network. In 2013, 17 islanding trials (from full power) were carried out on NPPs, including 2 which were not planned: 16 islanding operations were successful, giving a success rate of 94% (80% during 2012) and the sliding rate covering four years was 88%, which is satisfactory in terms of the multi-year objective of a minimum of 60%. The success rates over the last five years are given in the graph overleaf.

In the event of a large scale incident, voltage recovery via the network are complementary to the autonomous resources of the generation plants, to be used to provide a supply to the NPP auxiliary systems; it is therefore of the utmost importance that the physical behaviour of the network equipment be checked periodically and that operators (both EDF & RTE) be trained in handling these rare occurrences. The contract signed between RTE and eDF in this area stipulates a yearly test for each site, and a test on each scenario once every 3 years. (3 scenarios per site, including 2 external scenarios). Among the 27 scenarios scheduled for testing in 2013, 18 tests were run, 16 of them successfully (89% success rate against 81% in 2012). As in 2012, 11 voltage recovery scenarios could not be run or failed in 2013, bringing their operational status into question. For 5 of them, given their operational characteristics and dispensations, the deviations logged were considered minimal and with no consequence on the effectiveness of the scenario. The continuing effort to decrease cancelled voltage recovery tests must therefore carry over into 2014 and beyond, as per the corrective actions requested by the Mixed RTE/EDF Steering Committee at the end of 2012. 4.1.2 Protection systems, operating VOLTAGE PROTECTION RELAYs, instrumentation & control

Analysing the 382 short-circuits sustained by the 400 kV network, eliminated by the production systems and circuit breakers (against 416 in 2012), 344 of these events were single-phase and supplied information about the suitability of the protection, the efficiency and maintenance plan for protection equipment and circuit breakers. 97.5% of short-circuits were eliminated in less than 100 ms (including 6 in less than 45 ms involving single phased faults), representing progress over the 2012 figures (90%) and decreasing globally the probability of a loss of synchronism from a plant in the event of a short-circuit which is not rapidly eliminated. Certain sensitive locations must however be highlighted, where there is a requirement for three-phase faults to be eliminated in less than 85 ms (line fault) or even 75 ms (busbar fault). For the most critical cases, 'fast' circuit breakers have

0

20

40

60

80

100

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013



Page: 25/53


been installed in order to eliminate these 3-P line faults in just 70 ms and busbar faults in just 67 ms. The figure below shows the progress made over the last decade in terms of fault elimination, all types included. The global figures should never mask the fact that a multi-phase fault, eliminated in over the critical period (specific to its location), may give rise to a loss of synchronisation from nearby plants.

Fault elimination time for 400 kV network

The Gaudière-Rueyres line was impacted by 6 line trippings, caused by the running of the complementary protection, resulting in a long-term elimination of the fault without the primary protection having failed. This particularly sensitive line should, in 2016, be fitted with a better line differential protection system to deal with these resistive faults during planned technical upgrades to the substation command and control systems. Of the 382 faults logged during 2013, 25 returned anomalies in their elimination, making the figure for the availability of protection systems and voltage protection relays, during an electrical fault, 93.5%. A slight drop from 2011 & 2012 where the figure was 95%. The impact of a malfunction of the protection systems has generated, in terms of the Reliability Plan, 20 ESS 0 (24 ESS 0 in 2012 and 2 ESS A, both of which were caused by human factors. The ESS A on the 9th October was caused by a trip of a differential busbar protection, in turn caused by a mistake in the identification of a terminal block during tests, affecting a section of the busbar in the 400 kV substation in Plessis-Gassot. The ESS A on the 6th November concerned the trip of a differential busbar protection caused by a plant isolation error during trials on the 400 kV substation in Marmagne. It is also necessary to monitor the short-circuit elimination performance for the "225 kV close" links, in that the faults on these lines are liable to compromise the stability of units important for the system, especially in 400 kV or some units connected in 225 kV. The aim of the corresponding plan is to eliminate the faults in 200 ms or even in 85 ms in some "high generating density" zones. In 2013, 17% of the faults on the lines equipped according to this plan were eliminated in less than 50 ms, 90% in less than 110 ms and 100% in less than 180 ms. These results were a step up from 2012 and have been consolidated over time, particularly in terms of the roll-out of the new plan, as underlined by a reliability audit carried out in 2011. The total number of low voltage operational anomalies (fault or no-fault) involving 400kV protection systems was slightly higher: 43 anomalies against 39 in 2012 and 37 in 2011. 50% were caused by technical malfunctions, 25% by human error and 25% are still being studied (6) or are of an unknown cause (5). Human errors (settings, wiring, interventions) numbered 11 (2 electrical faults, 9 non-faults), a figure which has continually increased since 2010. 18 anomalies did not involve electrical faults (17 in 2012), translated by unexpected trips. 25 anomalies were logged during the elimination of faults (22 in 2012). This increase is mainly due to Plan 83. The digital systems return, as in 2012, an overall reliability level (fault & no-fault mixed) close to average, all technical platforms included.



Page: 26/53


The 400 kV renewal policy being implemented by RTE is in keeping with the anomaly rate according to the various protection systems; thus, the behaviour of plan 86 does not affect the milestone of its renewal beyond 2020, whereas the oldest plans 75/83 maintain performance levels consistent with the rate of renewal of the plant units (planned to reach completion in 2019). Regarding the 400 kV busbar differential protection devices, which play a major role in the fast and selective elimination of the busbar faults, which are rare but involve a potentially high reliability risk, the cumulative downtime considerably worsened when compared with 2012: 4471 hours against 396 hours. These outages had no consequences on operations as the failing protection systems were not used during a short-circuit. Long-term outages only concerned a single substation in Logelbach, with a cumulative duration of 1908 hours over 5 outages. All 33 outages involved just 20 substations. Cumulative durations of greater than 100 hours for 5 outages were logged from 4 substation other than Logelbach. The renewal policy for the busbar differential protection devices is consistent with the outages observed for the equipment items, since the two types of protection device with the least good results in terms of availability are being replaced within the shortest times. The analogic synchronisation protection systems (DRS) were not the source of any unexpected trip in 2013. However, the digital version of this protection (DRSN) returned a number of equipment fault displays due to changes in supplier by the manufacturer. A modification to the DRSN software corrected this malfunction. The corrective action currently being prepared will update the 275 DRSN units over the next 2 years. The DRS are part of a Defence Plan, playing an essential role in isolating, in the event of a large scale incident, the network zones which have lost synchronisation, from the 'healthy' zones, thus preventing propagation. Required very rarely, they must, nevertheless, respond reliably on demand. In terms of the ADO voltage protection relay Western load-shedding automate), this was the subject of an annual voltage protection relay review, carried out specifically over the Western region in October 2013. 4.1.3 Automatic frequency and voltage controls If the mean RSFP value is around - 0.082 during 2013, regular and long-lasting excursions to -1 value, were noted during September and October, leading to monthly averages of around -0.18, lower than the contractual maximum of -0.12. This phenomenon can be explained by a relatively mild autumn without rapid changes to consumption resulting in large differences between the D-1 forecasts and reality. In the absence of strong signals about consumption trends, the players involved tend to be very careful, leading to positive bias between generation and demand of up to 1000 MW over the period. The reduction of these biases is the responsibility of the available withdrawal reserves, the dynamics of which vary according to the resource contributing to the margins: quick for hydraulic, subject to mechanical limitations for thermal and nuclear power plants, variable over interconnections as reliant on the operational constraints of the neighbouring systems (Renewable Production). If the withdrawal margins are insufficient or not flexible enough, the level may remain at -1 for tens of minutes, until the adjustments kick in or the consumption levels change. This situation has already been experienced during the warm spell in August 2003, during water shortages in 2008 and during the cold snap in February 2012. Even if reliability was not directly impacted, there were however several potentially hazardous operating situations which might have led to long-lasting high frequencies, caused by a lack of available levers for control. 2013 was marked by several failsafe modes due to a lack of margins for reducing generation, translated as an 'overflow' of 'non-adjustable' MW flowing through the network (See Section 2.2.1).



Page: 27/53


4.1.4 Transmission facilities Unplanned outages of all types, having an impact on the 400kV equipment over the last three years, have been summarised by the graph below. They differ greatly from one region to another, with a number of particularly long-lasting outages, particularly in the Normandy-Paris region.

As opposed to 2012, the year was not effected by any high intensity atmospheric phenomena which had any serious consequences vis-a-vis the RTE network (with the exception of the adhesive snow in March and November). In short, there were numerous hardware failures leading to destruction of equipment (EJ33, TCT, the fire of the 762 autotransformer in Tabarderie, etc.), creating a great deal of repair work and extended equipment outages, which in some cases where underground work is required, may last more than 150 days. As was the case in 2012, the capacity available via the various France-England DC line poles suffered a high number of reductions, caused by a number of different problems involving various equipment on both sides of the Channel, in particular, the earthing cable connection to the conversion station on the French side, which was the cause of a number of leaks. During 2013, 12 ESS 0 events were logged which were due to the tripping of the IFA 2000 line, mainly on the Sellindge site. Work on the command & control systems in Mandarins did have the effect of reducing the number of trips on the French side. In terms of sub-station equipment, as in previous years, warm spells during the summer period caused problems with the metering transformers. One of these problems was the origin of two ESS B events logged in 2013, causing a double busbar fault in the Cubnezais sub-station on the 4th August. Due to the large number of failures involving the EJ33 combined metering transformer, it was decided that, in July, the replacement process for these EJ33 units should be speeded up, installing 3000 new devices before the start of summer 2014. It was also decided that work on the replacement of other types of these combined transformers should also be speeded up. In general, malfunctions involving HV sub-station equipment are a major contributor to network ESS events: busbar differential protection faults, a manoeuvring failure of breaking components (either potential or actual) plays a major part in the risk to operational reliability: if a required manoeuvre is not possible there is a risk of a double busbar fault. During 2013, diagnostics varied between regions. In some, we noted a downturn, with the numbers of ESS 0 events due to 'sub-station equipment' greater than during 2012, notably the case for the North-eastern region, with repeated failures to manoeuvre from the 400kV substation in Chevalet related to a technical upgrade to the sub-station's command and control systems, as well as equipment blockages during periodic manoeuvres. On the other hand, some other regions showed a net improvement: for example, the manoeuvrability of the busbar disconnectors in the Tavel & Tricastin sub-stations has improved, with 13 fewer failures than in 2012. On a nationwide scale, in terms of busbar -disconnectors, there were 107 ESS 0 (against 166 ESS 0, 1 ESS A & 1 ESS B in 2012). Of these events, 54% involved HV equipment (74% in 2012); these figures show the efficiency of the actions currently being undertaken (curative work on fault, replacement of control cabinets), as well as underlining the need to continue this work into the future (implementation of specific maintenance programs, improved reliability of mechanical assemblies, for example, the tightening of plates).



Page: 28/53


In terms of the changes in the 400 & 225 kV networks, the most significant structural modifications involved:

• The commissioning, in April 2013, of the 400 kV line between Contentin & Maine, which should, in the future, allow energy generated by the EPR on the Flamanville site, as well as renewable off-shore energy (off-shore wind farms and tidal), to be connected to the national grid. The line already plays a lead role in assuring the reliability of the electricity supply to the Western region as a whole.

• The installation of a 225/90 kV transformer in the Morihan sub-station (Ille-et-Vilaine). • The creation of a 400/90 kV sub-station in Fruges (Pas-de-Calais) designed to collect wind

farm generation. • The commissioning of the Phase shift Transformer in Logis-Neuf, switchable to the 225 kV

busbar (in addition to the 225 kV PST in Campo Rosso, commissioned by TERNA in 2012 and used to interconnect operations of both networks) improves the reliability of the supply to the PACA zone.

The upgrade programme for the new emergency ampacities (IST/IT), initiated in mid-2010 and broken down into two lots over several years, continued its progress. The launch of the policy, IST represents an improvement over IMAP (Maximum Permissible Permanent Current), was applied as a high priority, major improvements in terms of transits were being logged from 2011 (fewer overloads, easier maintenance scheduling, improved operations and maintenance costs). Towards the end of 2013 the majority of Lot 1 lines had been completed (completion scheduled for the end of 2014), with, regarding certain installations, a drop in capacity with respect to their IMAP, which however created no operational problems. This programme (IST/IT) is supported by the 'Ampacité' project (a contraction of the French 'Ampère' & 'Capacité') which is designed to test out a more flexible operating approach, making it possible to adapt 5

Finally, the completion of the European TWENTIES project, during which, two lots were handled using Dynamic Line Rating (DLR), the first using existing equipment instrumentation, the second using an optical fibre network installed within the conductor bundles of new equipment. RTE was asked, by Elia, to examine the opportunities to apply this principle to a frequently high-loaded interconnecting line between France & Belgium. Thus study will be carried out jointly with Elia in 2014.

transmission capacities to match external conditions (temperature, crosswinds, sunlight exposure), to improve the responses to actual network requirements with the aim of freeing up additional margins to eliminate certain congestions or to handle them differently, optimising the available resources. Tests are under way in a number of regions: dynamic adjustment to initial transits, real-time monitoring of line bending, integration of available resources and the time taken for them to be implemented, disconnection of overload protection and monitoring of transits by dispatching, dynamic IST adjustment to match 24 hour weather forecasts. The results of some of these experiments, carried out during 2013, were conclusive, both in terms of the implementation and the improvements to flexibility (increased transit capacity, fewer overloads and fewer tree like operation schemes); these will be repeated in 2014. With regard to the line monitoring device, the values from the Ampacité project, has been integrated into the Regional Scada in order to facilitate the monitoring and operations by the control centres of the line under test.

The use of DLR seems a particularly interesting possibility to be explored in order to deal with wind farm generation via loaded lines, which, when cooled by the wind, may see their own capacity increase.

5 RTE’s overhead links are equipped with operating PLCs called "overload protection devices" whose aim is to make the facility trip at the end of a time delay which varies with the flow when it passes different thresholds to ensure compliance with height clearances.



Page: 29/53


4.1.5 Control systems 4.1.5.1 National and regional control systems

The mean monthly unavailability of the National Control System (SNC) used by the CNES was 21 minutes in 2013 (0 min. in 2012), due to two incidents in May, the first lasting 54 minutes, the second 3 hours 20 minutes. The loss of transmission from the RSFP lasted 12 minutes during the first incident and 5 minutes during the second, times which corresponded, in both cases, to the time taken to switch-over to the back-up National Control System. Observability was saved from the control room thanks to the CNES backup Operator Control Stations. The causes, identified and corrected, are on a one hand due to the corruption of a parameters file due to operating maintenance error during a previous intervention and on the other due to an anomaly with the software trigged by a specific sequence of actions. As far as the Regional Control Systems (SRC) are concerned, across the seven operating centres in 2013, following unforeseen events, we logged 10 non-availabilities with a total loss of observability and/or control and 36 non-availabilities with a partial loss of certain functions. For all these events, we logged a cumulative loss of observability of 4 hours 47 minutes (5 hours 09 min. in 2012), a slight decrease with 41 minutes/year/SRC as opposed to 2012 (44 minutes). In terms of scheduled actions, the loss of observability was 1 hour 17 min. / year / SRC (as opposed to 1 hour 42 min in 2012). As with network observability, the availability of the remote control function (TC) was essential, notably within the framework of the new risk control directive, for the development of the use of corrective actions during loss of equipment, to be applied from the SRC within minutes. For information, the monthly mean for remote commands issued (all types) is 8700, with amplitude varying from centre to centre, between 5800 and 14700. In 2013, total loss of operability following unexpected events, covering all 7 regional SRCs, increased, with a cumulative total of 13 hours 10 min. against 8 hours 50 min. during 2012, an average of 1 hour 53 min. per year per SRC (as opposed to 1 hour 15 during 2012). Scheduled actions were the root cause of 2 hours 11 min./year/SRC of non-availabilities (as opposed to 3 hours 52 min. in 2013). Amongst the most significant events there were four ESS A events connected to the loss of an SRC remote command function without prior warning: (i) Following a changeover from the shift control station to the backup control station in the North-eastern Operating Centre; (ii, iii, iv) following manoeuvres in the 400kV substation in Braud and the 225kV substations in Verlhaguet and Le Marquis. During 2013 versions V4 & V5 were released: The first corrected a software fault which was the cause of the loss of remote control for the South western Operations Centre (ESS B in 2012 and ESS A in 2013), and in the Normandy-Paris Operations Centre in 2011; The second was to correct the lagging and freezing of Control Stations displays and to meet the configuration requirements for new equipment (SMACC, HVDC, etc.). The annual mean rate of success, for all remote controls, was 97.67% (98.19% in 2012), with a bias, which had already been identified in 2012, for inter-seasonal periods, which will, in turn give rise to modifications. In terms of quality of teleindication, the changes, during the year, of the tools being used meant no data was available for the full year. This situation will be rectified in 2014. The SIDRE project (Regional Inter-Dispatching Support), which had its technical specifications finalised during 2013, will assure the continuity of control following an incident, permitting one dispatching centre to be virtually instantaneously replaced by the dispatching centre of another geographic zone in the event it would be unable to control its own network, with the new centre benefiting from all normal operating modes. This represents an improvement in terms of reliability over the Regional Fall-back Dispatching, which today provides much more limited functions. Three zones have been identified for an operational implementation of this system in 2015: Nantes-Saint-Quentin, Lille-Nancy & Lyon-Marseille-Toulouse.



Page: 30/53


4.1.5.2 Safeguard and Alert System

The Safeguard and Alert System (SAS) is a crucial tool in the control of high-risk (alert commands) or fail-soft (safeguard commands) situations, whose availability and reliability must be excellent. The overall outage rate amounted to 0.25% (0.29% in 2012); this corresponds to an outage of about 22 hours per year. The number of ESS0 events increased slightly, 20 as opposed to 18 in 2012. In most cases, these are losses of "remote" SAS mainly affecting the generating plants, and a few distribution control centres ("ACR" for eRDF). Their large number can be, in the main, explained by the duration of SAS losses in generation plants, with access to the sites being long and difficult for RTE maintenance teams. In 2013 we noted two significant incidents characterised as ESS A:

(i) 8th July, SAS unavailable for over six hours, outside of working hours for the Eastern Control Centre following an equipment malfunction;

(ii) 22nd September, loss of all the ACR SAS in the South-western region due to a loss of the IP VPN link (flooding in the central telecommunications control room) providing communications with dispatching (DRP & DRR).

The latter (to which should be added the other TCM-related ESS 0 events) is a reminder of the need to improve the reliability of the architecture (notably to prevent the occurrence of common modes) and the operational coordination between the telecommunications operators and RTE in order to protect services important to reliability. The General Operating Rules of the SAS stipulate to carry out periodic tests (generally monthly) for testing the proper routing of the commands to the receivers and also other, less frequent, tests on the three safeguard commands to the ACRs (tap changer blocking, -5% Un and remote load shedding), despite the risks of impacting the customers. An analysis of the regional reports shows that periodic tests highlighted, in several regions, a lack of training of ACR operators, following the migration of the SAS function to a new platform (SIT-R). In addition, for certain tests carried out with generating plants, problems relating to acknowledgement or understanding show that the generation plant operators have a lack of practical experience in the matter. These points confirm the need to schedule these tests sufficiently frequently to maintain the skills of all those working on the SAS, both within RTE, for generators and within distributors. This requirement is accentuated when there are modifications to the standard environment (migration of the SAS function from ACR, re-zoning, changes to the database, etc.). Finally, the SAS, which has been in operation for over twenty years now, is currently being renovated, its successor, the SACIS system (Sauvegarde Alerte Conduite Information de Sûreté - Reliability Data Instructions during Safeguard and Alert Situations), accepted via the RTE test platform in October 2013 and to be implemented on a pilot site towards the end of 2014, and at a national scale for early 2015. During 2013, the regions migrated to ACR, with the removal of the SAS. A SACIS user training tool will be produced during 2014. 4.1.5.3 Forecasting tools

The IPES system is used for short-term studies from D-1 to real-time it provides estimated values for wind farm and photovoltaic generation on a local, regional and national scale. By the end of 2013 79 % of the wind farm generated power and 17% of the photovoltaic generated power across France could be observed, either directly via RTE's remote control systems for installations connected to the National Public Grid or via resources installed by agreement with partners. Since October 2013, MV photovoltaic forecasts have been produced by IPES in the regional and national ETR, improving estimates of PV production for the Supply - Demand balance (EOD). Additional improvements to the reliability of the Measurement Transformers will be made during 2014. R&D work, carried out during 2013, has led to improved handling of the multitude of plants in terms of wind farm and dispersed PV generation planning on a regional basis. This work is extremely sensitive given the 11.5 GW of renewable generation (excluding Corsica) operating as of 2013 and favours the correct operational insertion of renewable sources with the aim of improving visibility in near real-time studies and during operations. The following figures illustrate the advantages of the IPES tool: a presentation of the zone, sub-station or installation selected, showing wind and/or photovoltaic generation parameters (installed power, generation, forecasts, etc.), a graphic illustration of the wind and/or photovoltaic generation for the element in question over a configurable period (from D-4 (actual) to D+2 (forecast)).



Page: 31/53


IPES display of wind farm and photovoltaic generation

The short-term provisional analyses are more generally supported by consumption forecasts and also by the set of input forecasts (generator programs, IPES, cross-border exchanges). Applications in this area have experienced several malfunctions, which have, several times, impacted the calculation of margins or the real time estimate of demand. Major biases, or lack of forward vision of significant duration, may affect the reliability analyses for the supply-demand balance or the management of voltage crises. Accordingly, improvements in managing outages of these applications, by improved fail-soft modes, must be the subject of permanent work. 4.1.5.4 Study tool

The CONVERGENCE study platform is the reference tool for conducting preparatory studies for day-ahead and infra-day operation, along with real time studies. It is also the platform used for Development Engineering studies; with the aim of assuring a coherent and continuous approach for the various forecast horizons so as to ensure an harmonised integration of reliability into the various s study cycles. The theoretical full-scale availability of CONVERGENCE was 100% since, at all times either the central platform or the 8 local servers were available. In the event of a back-up to a local server, each Operating Centre can still link to the local CNES server to recover the Daily Regional Situations from the ECCT chain (Coordinated Short Term Studies), giving a provisional national vision, before carrying out any analyses on its own zone, preserving a framework of national coherence. A weekly procedure aimed at ensuring that the backup servers were working correctly was set up during the second half of 2013. In March 2013, an operational support centre (hotline), available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, was introduced, supporting users in the event of malfunctions involving processes supported by CONVERGENCE, notably during out-of-hours periods. The workload of this hotline during the year, including 48 calls during non-working hours, confirm the requirement, expressed by an ever increasing number of users, both from Operations and Development Engineering, requiring real-time support whilst they are carrying out their studies. During 2013, the majority of the new strategic functions requested by the various users for the efficient development of their activities were delivered. 2014 should see the operational commissioning of new functions to improve understanding of reliability, like, for example, static and dynamic cyclic chains, both provisional (forecast) and in real-time, the automatic generation of short-term forecast and real-time exchange files for other TSOs (DACF - Day Ahead D-1 -, D2CF Day Ahead D-2- and IDCF Infra-Day Congestion Forecast), which are more pertinent from the ECCT chain. Changes to the Flow Based project or CORESO, need to improve European coordination, are also under way, for example, the introduction of the TOPAZE optimiser for the future HVDC France-Spain connection.



Page: 32/53


As in 2012, the year was marked by a number of incidents, some of them repetitive in nature: major slowing-down, mainly due to the carrying-out of backups, a lack of availability from the principal platform for 1 hour 30 min on the 15th January, with local servers remaining operational, exchange files for TSOs locked up on the 21st January, untimely transmission of a principal platform shut-down on the 22nd January with a reboot after 10 minutes. These incidents must be assessed in the light of the requirement for availability of the tool at the heart of the reliable operation of the system and show the need to reinforce the operating performance of the tool. An Expression of Requirements covering performance and availability was drawn up by the various professions in 2013, allowing the IS to optimise the platform, notably within the framework of the CONVERGENCE project, migrating to new Data Centres, which is an excellent opportunity to improve the performance from the application, including overnight backups. 4.1.5.5 Safety telecommunications systems

The optical fibre ROSE network, the infrastructure which is owned by RTE, has a total of 13,000 km of optical fibre cables and has, since 2011, been providing telecommunications services to assure system reliability: 'high-level' remote controls, data exchange between electrical fault protection equipment, emergency telephone system. The ROSE network underwent a number of architectural upgrades during 2013, the result of Development Engineering projects, one of which involved the connection of the conversion stations for the future HVDC France-Spain link to the Baixas sub-station. The network has however suffered a number of incidents, requiring the replacement of printed circuit boards and repairs of cables which had been cut or damaged by third parties. The number of incident-based interventions during 2013 reached 264, against 198 in 2012. During the year a single ESS 0 event was logged for the ROSE Network, involving the loss of a remote protection transmission line on a 400 kV liaison in the Terrier sub-station. Beyond these incidents, the smooth operation of ROSE in 2013 confirms the choices made by RTE on both the engineering and organization fields. In coherence with the specifications drawn up for the STS-V2 project in 2012, the Safety Telephone System (STS) started, in October 2013, work on the migration of its original STS-1 configuration to the new STS-2 configuration, guaranteeing improved reliability in terms of operational communications, which is a benefit to the operational reliability of the electricity system as a whole. The Operating Centre in Saint-Quentin - Yvelines, was upgraded to STS-2 in December; the withdrawal of all STS-1 systems from all Dispatching is planned for the end of 2014. The use of the STS during 2013 was subject to similar incidents to those logged during previous years, to which were added incidents relating to the changing configuration. All were classified as ESS 0 and were in the main due to a loss of communications between regional dispatching and groups of sub-stations or national dispatching. The longest lasting incident took place on the 8th October, with a loss of the call-up functionality from dispatching lasting 6 hours.

4.1.5.6 Loads / consumption Considering RTE actions aiming to reduce very tense operating situations through demand management, particularly at peak load, it is worth noting the continuation of the Ecowatt scheme in the most electrically fragile regions... I.e.: Brittany and the PACA region. For Brittany there were 48,500 subscribers during the winter of 2013-14 and approximately 15,000 in the PACA region. The ECOWATT approach is based on the ability of RTE to detect situations which may be sensitive in terms of supply of the Brittany and PACA regions, notably including consumption forecasts. This is undertaken jointly with Météo France. Ecowatt was not activated during the winter of 2013-14, which proved particularly mild. For information, the scheme was used during the February 2012 cold spell, with 7 orange alerts. By the same token, in view of the critical importance of controlling the voltage in Brittany during high winter peak loads and pending the 'safety net', RTE repeated, during the winter of 2013-14, its experiment in Brittany designed to mobilise, for the Balance Mechanism, local load-shedding and generation offers in order to overcome points of peak consumption. Following a new Call for Tenders, five electricity market actors were chosen, for a total power of approximately 70 MW, with changes, notably, to the mobilisation lead times (2 hours or even 30 minutes). For the second winter in a row, RTE has therefore proposed experiments in the Brittany region in order to de-stress the network



Page: 33/53


during high consumption periods. This innovative approach is designed to favour the involvement of small capacities (1 MW and over) in the Brittany region, which can be mobilised between the 1st November 2013 and the 31st March 2014. This experiment has led to the preparation of structural improvements, laid out as part of the 'Brittany Electrical Pact (pacte électrique breton). These lessons learnt continue to serve for strategic thinking related to load-sheddings at a national scale, in the context of energy transition. Considering the use of dynamic models for calculating voltages and in order to become more familiar with the active/reactive load behaviour with varying voltages, RTE and eRDF are continuing to cooperate in the dynamic consumption parameters in pilot sub-stations, notably in the Western region.

4.2 Structure of the system and its design rules In accordance with the missions assigned to it by law, RTE completes and publishes, via its own institutional website, a provisional electricity supply-demand balance report for France. This report is the first link in the reliability chain, as it is the starting point for the building of a complete set of potential generation-load adequacy scenarios, which can then be broken down into 'network hypotheses' in order to provide a basis for national and regional network development studies looking forward to 2030 and beyond. Ensuring the accuracy of the scenarios and hypotheses is an extremely delicate operation given that the future seems full of increasing incertitudes and even complete unknowns. This accuracy is however essential in the decision-making process, leading to the development of a network on sound economic bases and meeting the operational reliability requirements of the future. Work is currently being undertaken by RTE, drawing up and testing new methods to provide a geographic breakdown of the changes to the supply-demand balance, dividing the French system into 'energy coherence zones' which are easier to understand. In addition to the complete analysis, published in September 2012, covering the medium term (5 year) supply-demand balance and its 15-20 years outlook, the July 2013 update of this balance has provided a better diagnostic of the 5 year horizon. Involving a wide range of stakeholders, the result of this update would seem to confirm that under the effect of the continuing economic crisis in France, national demand, corrected for climatic events, is trending towards stagnation. Consumption by the industrial sector seems more impacted by the crisis than noted during previous forecasts. Simultaneously, the sensitivity of the French electricity system to unexpected temperature changes continues to grow, with peak consumption increasing by 33% over 10 years (for a consumption level which increased by 15% over the same decade). This means that more effort must be dedicated to the development phase, minimising the risks of failure due to extreme climate events. The new doctrine for preventing voltage collapses, which passed shared by long term planning studies and operation has been applicable from January 2013, is aimed to support this idea. Under the influence of new European environmental standards, fuel and coal generation capacities will decrease sharply over the 2013-15 period (-7700 MW expected from France alone). In addition, the development and use of Combined Gas Cycle plants is suffering because of their lack of competitiveness. The development of wind and photovoltaic generation systems is expected to continue at a pace until 2018. Under these circumstances, simulations have shown that reliability margins will reduce from year to year as of 2016. This forecast decrease in margins must be compensated for by the creation of new generation or load-shedding capabilities to deal with intense cold periods like those of February 2012. In order to rise to this challenge, RTE is continuing its work on the creation of a capacity mechanism (defined by the French Governmental Decree of December 2012); the open consultation, involving a number of parties in the electricity market, reached its conclusion in October 2013; the rules of this mechanism are aimed at creating economic incentives to develop new, or maintain existing, generation or withdrawal capacity, and to implement actions aimed at securing the off-grid supply-demand balance during peak consumption periods from the winter of 2016-17 onwards. Beyond the needs identified for the horizon of 2016, the report underlines, for the 2030 horizon, the probable impacts of the major changes to energy mixes, in terms of the types of generation resources and their locations, with a strong growth in renewables and the indispensable development of the



Page: 34/53


transmission and interconnection network, making this evolution possible whilst maintaining reliability. These elements form a major contribution by RTE to the energy transition debate. In 2013, RTE published the third edition of its ten-year network development plan (TYNDP). In coherence with the European TYNDP of July 2012, published every two years by ENTSO-E, the ten year plan is produced annually by RTE, listing all the network development projects which should be undertaken and commissioned into service within the next three years; it also presents the electricity transmission infrastructure to be developed over the next ten years and beyond. This provisional forecast plan is based upon several energy mixes, developed using analyses of the generation-demand adequacy over the medium and long term. It integrates the objectives of both regional climate, air & energy plans and the related regional renewable energy connection plans. The 2013 version includes suggestions made during the open consultation (November-December 2012) on the previous edition, as well as the recommendations and requirements laid down by the Regional Operating Centres in July 2013 Consultations on the ten year plan for 2014 were opened in late 2013. The production of these ten year plans meets four major challenges: To facilitate international and inter-regional flows – this challenge is related to optimizing the use of the generating plants at a European or French scale with the context of ever more increasingly volatile and important flows from the North to the South of both Europe and France, and to cope with peak periods, host new generation capacity and ensure system reliability. Of the 170 projects over the three year period we note that the completion of the PACA and Brittany 'Safety Net' installations are on schedule; on the other hand, the project to carry-out an underground DC line running between France and Spain is likely to see its commissioning put back a couple of months to the Spring of 2015, with construction and testing of the conversion stations being more complicated than expected. Within 10 years there will be several large scale projects to safeguard electricity supplies, strengthening mutual and complementary back-ups between countries. Thus, by 2020, RTE is planning the commissioning of 225kV installations to improve the reliability of the south of the Pays de Loire and Vendée regions, as well as the Mediterranean and Atlantic coastlines, with their dynamic demographics. In order to allow the 400 kV network to undertake its role of assuring energy exchanges and links between regions, as well as responding efficiently to its numerous solicitations, RTE is reinforcing its capacity wherever there are potential congestions, and is making a number of investments in new sub-stations or for existing connections, with the aim of creating new connectivity possibilities for its clients and to improve control over the voltages and flows through the network, in order to maintain the level of reliability of the electricity system regardless of the energy mix solutions and the choice of energy transitions selected by the public authorities. In January 2013 RTE published a prospective study dealing with the connection of tidal generation to the network. This study is part of the strategic plan which the public authorities is attempting to implement in order to support the development of marine energies industry, still new to France. Given that the tidal generation potential of the French coast (estimated as between 3 & 5 GW, depending on the sources) is the second most important source in Europe. This study concentrates on the Cotentin and Northern Brittany regions, where the tides are amplified by the configuration of the coastline. The study highlights that zones suitable for the mooring of cables are rare and are a critical factor in the sizing strategy for marine power generation. The existing terrestrial network itself has a current capacity to accept around 1.5 GW. Finally, the interactions with the France-Alderney connection project (FAB) is to be analysed in detail, with the flow of exchanges and marine energy generation being added to imports, which could then cause congestion. RTE is supporting the French government's initiative, launched on the 30th September 2013, with the publication of a call for a show of interest in the installation of pilot offshore generating facilities in the two zones in question, the Raz Blanchard off the coast of Cotentin and the Fromveur passage between Molène and Ouessant. Concerning the first off-shore wind generation lot, with a total production of 1928 MW, the project entered a new phase in Aprils 2013 with the preparation of the functional specifications expected for the first half of 2014. The Call for Tender put out to cable manufacturing companies was opened in February 2014. It should also be noted that the project is extremely complex, including long stretches of submarine and underground cables (38 to 61 km), unusual equipment such as 'booster transformers' (to match the voltages from the cable connection busbars to those of the 225 kV



Page: 35/53


substation), a major voltage problem requiring specifically designed compensators and dedicated voltage protection relays for cable closure and emergency voltage disconnect lock-out. 5. Contributions to organisational, human and computer reliability

5.1 Methods and organization With firstly, the doctrine aimed at countering 400 kV voltage collapses, specifying the methods to be used in analysing these risks during long (10-30 year) and medium (2-5 year) term network studies, in order to be able make appropriate decisions as the structure reinforcement or installation of compensation means within the appropriate time scales, and, secondly, the low voltage management doctrine, based upon a dynamic modelling of the voltage profile, which can be used to overcome uncertainties on the minimum voltage thresholds to be used in static studies by implicitly covering the 'over-compensation', RTE has a consolidated set of tools aimed at efficiently fighting against the risks of low voltages or voltage collapses. In order to achieve a fully operational status, these analyses must be based upon reliable reactive power data: including not only the reactive capacities of the French plants, but also those of cross-border plants (with the help of CORESO) and the reactive behaviour of the load at the interface between the Public Transmission & Distribution Grids. As this data is extremely complex, it must be covered by a constant improvement initiative, aiming for ever more increasing levels of precision. Finally, this chain of studies, which is still relatively young, must be subjected to systematic feedback, firstly to improve its acceptance by users and secondly to adapt doctrines and methods to the changing context of the network, which may in turn have an impact on the locations of weak areas in the network or even contribute to create new weak areas. The network safety studies, mainly on a day-ahead and intra-day basis, have, since 2010, relied on a new process for the coordinated compilation of a unified data set shared between regional units and the CNES, gradually developed within the "ECCT" project. In 2013, operational use will be consolidated across the various units by a D-1 to D vision of the network in hour-by-hour steps. Operators therefore reap the benefit of an efficient, fluid study process which covers both planning and real-time management. The major advantages of the ECCT project are the coordinated and optimised processing of two or even three regions using a joint approach and support in the selection of the most significant hourly points for studying local congestions beyond the traditional study points (morning or evening peak hours, night-time off-peak periods). The regional units appreciate the benefits, providing opportunities for better estimating the intra-day network reliability, integrating highly variable injections from wind power generation or coordinating the actions for controlling high voltage situations where the most efficient actions are not always located within the region concerned. Using the ECCT process, a great deal of data is made available to the Operation & Studies Manager (CCE), giving him a clear vision of the network for the next 36 hours. A supervisory system is needed to make the most of this information: this is one of the objectives of the SISTER project, which, based upon the data collected from the Daily Network Situation Reports (SRJ), can provide a summarised view of the changing hypotheses used for the studies and steer the CCE towards any situations which might develop into a risk to system operations. The prototype of the tool, which underwent user testing in 2013, validated the principles and returned some encouraging results. Thus, on the 18th September, the prototype allowed operators to anticipate the detection of congestions in the Pratclaux 225 kV area at the interface between the networks controlled by Marseille, Toulouse and Lyon. The CCE were able to quantify the volume of transits between the regions in question over the upcoming day, verify the efficiency of the solutions envisaged and ensure that the conclusions drawn were sufficiently robust. Efficient adaptation of network topology, coordinated between the three Control Centres, could therefore be used to assure safe operation, further confirming the interest of an industrial development of the tool. A second SISTER test is under way, involving the Control Centres in Nantes, Lyon & Toulouse, to facilitate identification of periods when the Eguzon-Montluçon 225 kV line is likely to be congested in N situations and to optimise the measures to remove this congestion whilst avoiding ring openings. The specifications for the industrial tool itself were drawn up in September 2013. Awaiting its industrial version, scheduled for 2014, the prototype is being used by all regions as well as by the CNES.



Page: 36/53


5.1.1 Human factor As with previous years, human factors were involved, to a varying degree, in a significant portion of the ESS A events logged during 2013: 9 in 2013, 4 in 2012. These factors had a number of different origins: insufficient knowledge of the fundamentals of operations & maintenance (transmission of an inappropriate order during SAS testing on the 8th July, 27th July & 23rd August), the non-application of regulatory documents (loss of RST for more than 30 minutes on the 22nd January), procedural errors (functioning of the busbar differential in a 225 kV and a 400 kV substation during interventions on these sub-stations on the 19th April & 6th November), equipment incorrectly identified during an intervention (tripping of all outgoing lines from a busbar section within a 400 kV sub-station on the 9th October), an incorrect diagram when refitting the substation for Digital Control (Unexpected functioning of a voltage protection relay on the 28th March), a handling error during dispatching training (involuntary transmission of a 'tap changer blocking ' safeguard order to an ACR on the 26th May). Although the observed improper operations did not have direct consequences to reliability, in other circumstances they could have helped to degrade an already-critical operating situation. We must therefore remain vigilant to this type of error and improve the barriers against them (training, awareness, organisation, adapting instructions, tests, validation, etc.) to limit as much as possible the number and consequences of such events in the future. Since 2012, RTE has progressively introduced a renewed initiative entitled 'Improvements to Performance through Professionalism', mainly for Operations & Maintenance staff, with the wider objective of logging and analysing incidents across all operational fields (including the fields of 'Development Engineering' & 'Customer Markets'). This initiative involves logging the factors behind each incident according to a well-defined grid featuring thirty or so items and using a dedicated analytical approach for the most significant incidents which aims to better identify the basic causes of the human factor. The objective is to make use of the collected material in a more comprehensive and more effective manner than before, in order to build additional preventive barriers. To support this initiative and its management, in November 2013, RTE published a guide to the analysis of human factors, which is designed to help improve understanding of the behaviour of employees in their day-to-day tasks. More generally, in December 2013 the Executive Board signed a Charter of Confidence, entitled 'Transparency for Progress', and aimed at facilitating self-declaration by all professions, removing the fear of sanctions. 2013 also saw the continuing deployment of the APGP (Permanent Improvement of Professional Behaviour) method across all regions. For the majority of them there was a clear improvement in the number of self-declared events. The initiative started with Operations, before involving Maintenance personnel and then, to a lesser degree, Development and Engineering. In 2013 the Customer Markets department became involved with the initiative for the first time. Tangible results already achieved include errors in the application of the doctrine, errors relating to shift plans and voltage protection relays, incomplete documentation for the preparation and monitoring of work, forgotten confirmations for intervention dates, unsuitable handling forms, equipment confusion, etc. Corrective measures have been applied locally to rapidly deal with a number of these failures. However, a sufficient volume of events is required for the preparation of efficient corrective actions on a wider scale (new instructions, improved training, integration of actual incidents into training programmes, etc.). The exercise is therefore to be continued. To improve the dynamics of the initiative, several regions have designated one or more APGP representatives, responsible for spreading the initiative across all trades, making new employees aware of the approach, handling the day-to-day feedback and sharing information across the regions, based upon the terms of the charter described above. Even if the process had not reached its full speed by the end of 2013 we can expect increasing levels of involvement in 2014, notably by the improvements to methods acquired over time by all trades and by the training of analysts to deal with Human Factor events.



Page: 37/53


5.1.2 Training and competencies The definition, steering and completion of training actions within the Operations & Maintenance fields are traditionally strong, with the acquisition and maintenance of skills over time being an essential part in assuring operational reliability and performance. As happens each year, some training courses have been adapted to keep them consistent with the many rapid changes in the methods and tools or for network control. Local training courses, which supplement centralized courses, play an important role in acquiring and maintaining skills for operating activities. A training programme for on-call operations personnel was trialled during 2013. The contents of this training programme will be finalised during 2014. In 2013 we also noted the preparation and implementation of regional SMACC training to provide monitoring of these new command & control systems for reactive power compensation means . The training shared by the staff in charge of the operation in the substation groups and the dispatchers, deployed in 2011, with very good experience feedback, is now systematically based upon the use of the SIMAC (Control Systems Simulator) for operators, with the deployment of a simulator in each region (The Eastern region being the last to be equipped, in August 2013), promoting a better simulation of real-life situations during the jointly acted scenarios. A number of joint training sessions were scheduled during 2013 and further training scenarios have been drawn up for 2014, based upon genuine incidents during 2013. During 2013, several regions worked on MRS (Methods for Return to Service), with SIDERAL dispatchers using the training simulator. This rarely used skill must be maintained regularly in order that it is available when needed. Work in this field should continue into 2014. Additional CONVERGENCE training has been set up by several regions as part of the ECCT process, with the integration of infra-day training and 'Remote Control Training' courses. As in 2012, two regions used a quiz as a light-hearted method of self-evaluating these skills on the new operational reference and the Transmission Network Control Code (CCRT). Finally, as a continuation of the new organisation introduced in October, the new 'Performance' departments were assigned a number of diverse missions, such as regional control of feedback from events, the production of the Daily Regional Report (RRJ), the management of operator training, etc. Training programmes were implemented in order to improve the skills of the personnel in these new departments. 5.1.3 Reliability culture RTE’s customers, including producers and distributors, are major contributors to reliability. Although their contributions are, first and foremost, governed by regulatory and contractual texts, whose proper enforcement RTE attempts to verify for the main cases, it is nonetheless still the case that their operators must also be aware of the impact of their practices on reliability; this calls for common actions (e.g.: SAS tests, meetings organised by some regions) and training courses. As each year, RTE organized regional training sessions "Ensuring reliability together". As in 2012, the regions all carried out at least one session, generally involving a CNPE – Team from a Nuclear Generating Plant - (on the themes of reliability, system services, generalised incidents, voltage return, etc.). Reliability awareness training must also be a regular concern of the RTE teams during their institutionalized or more informal contacts with producers or distributors. Examples show that this seems to be a regional concern, especially with the distributors; the permanence of such contacts in all the regions must be watched. 2013 was also rich in external contacts on the subject of reliability. Below are several examples:

• Feedback shared with the SNCF following an unplanned voltage return on a line in the South western region.

• A meeting with the French governmental department for Energy & the Climate, on the subject of the renewal of hydraulic concessions in the South-western region and RTEs need to guarantee its missions.

• Open days covering the functioning of the electricity system and energy transition for the Investigating Commissioners in the Western regions.



Page: 38/53


• An initial System Reliability awareness session for the 'Electricité de Strasbourg' network • The organisation of two joint training sessions (RTE-REE) in Toulouse. • 'System Services & Reliability' presentations to the STEP Grand-Maison and for Schneider

Electric. • Two days sharing experience on reliability with the operators of the hydroelectric plants in the

South-eastern region. • Two 2-day seminars in the Lyon region for EDF & CEA Cadarache generating personnel,

presenting, to around 30 participants, the theme of reliability and making them aware of their contribution to the subject within the scope of their own profession.

• Conferences held with Engineering Colleges, spreading the culture of network functioning and reliability among future engineers.

5.2 Steering, general organization In October 2013 RTE introduced, at a regional level, the 'Operations', 'Maintenance' and 'Development and Engineering' activity organisations, as already defined for central functions. The historic separation between the regional units "Transmission" and "System" will therefore come to an end. Operational activities within the regions now come under the authority of the Director of the Regional Control Centre. The Network Maintenance Groups, typically about 4 per region, fulfil maintenance activities, in liaison with the regional structures for maintenance activities, under the responsibility of the Director of the Regional Maintenance Centre. In addition to a common organization at national and regional level for all three activities, this change should enable greater efficiency and better reactivity, provided there is a good cooperation between them. The introduction of the new directive for the putting into operation of new installations (MEC) and the creation of the 'planning' service should further help strengthen this cooperative bond. 2013 also saw the attachment to the CNES (National System Operating Centre) of the CASTEN (National Administrative Centre for the Supervision of Operational Telecommunications). In the same manner, within the regions, mergers took place between CASTER (Regional Administrative Centre for the Supervision of Operational Telecommunications) and Regional Control. This new organisation brings the operations professions of the electricity network closer to those of the telecommunications network. It thus consolidates the enterprise's internal reliability culture.

5.3 Feedback: organisation - ESSGlos scale The Operations Steering Committee examines all operation-related questions, notably any changes to methods and references. It is also responsible for the national tracking of feedback processes. The committee met 11 times in 2013, during which they examined, in-depth, feedback from the year's events. The ESS B were systematically analysed, along with their associated plans of action: during 2013 these involved a double busbar fault in the Cubnezais 400kV sub station and the RMS incident (See Descriptions - Section 6.1). Several ESS A events were also subjected to detailed presentation, covering a range of problems: loss of visibility and control from regional dispatching, return to service following an incident, malfunctions involving control tools & overly high voltages. General feedback, such as the passage into winter (2012-13), the ECCT coordination, consumption forecasts for the Western region and operational video system tests were also included in the agenda. In general, the committee is the perfect opportunity to exchange and validate the new ESS Classification grid, integrating the ENTSO-E Incident Classification Scale (4 levels, defined in 2011) and the stability section of the new 'risk management' directive based upon ISO risk management principles. As in the past, the committee paid close attention to the work undertaken on frequency and voltage control by the appropriate Working Groups. Finally, the impact of the mothballing of several Combined Gas Cycle plants was studied, using detailed presentations. Since the end of 2012, all events feedback analyses, whether they be 'Reliability' or 'Events' related, are accessible via a single tool, facilitating distribution to a wide audience and thus the take-up and sharing of information. This practice however needs further improvement and strengthening (quality of the method of capitalising on events and information, organisation by referral designation and profession), in order to make the most of the feedback, led by the regions rather than pushed by the national organisation.



Page: 39/53


Within the framework of its contribution to the steering of strategic orientations for the maintenance of HV systems, electrical control, telecommunications and remote control installations, the 'Network Maintenance' committee examined the following themes, specifically in terms of their relationship to electricity system reliability:

- The Requirements Reference to be adopted for the use, preventive maintenance and operation of high-risk voltage capacitor transformers and the plan for their replacement.

- The opening up of the RTE IT Systems application (SIRTEC) to the transmission network infrastructure in the event of a crisis (storm, snow, etc.).

- Additional mechanical support for 400 kV installations and new solutions for the re-establishment of power supplies to 400kV sub-stations over five days or more within the framework of the mechanical reliability policy.

- The directions to be taken by a preventive action policy to counter earthing faults, with an optimisation of the number of loops to be repaired within the 'busbar' zone and the integration of dissuasive devices.

5.4 Performance MonitoringGlos RTE regularly monitors the performance of the generating units, in the area of adjustments and contracted system services (frequency and voltage control) in terms of both capacity and dynamic performance. This monitoring is mainly done by software tools, which formulate a diagnostic on the basis of spot readings from the plant: 1) CdPProd, to check subsequent compliance with the primary and secondary frequency and voltage controls and compliance with the required adjustments, 2) Scorpion, to check, in real time, the compliance of the units to their generation program and their participation in frequency controls. The regions systematically organize annual meetings with the generating sites to analyse the deviations observed in their performance, accompanied by the causes and the considered remedies for correcting them. These meetings are also the opportunity to learn more about any new regulators the generating company may have fitted to his equipment. These meetings are also the opportunity for RTE to make a link between the performance of the generating sites and the operating availability and a means of promoting the distribution and maintenance of the reliability culture. All of them met the sites dependent on their zone of responsibility, enabling exchanges seen as constructive. Apart from the particular case involving the reactive power limitations of plants, which has generally been handled on a national level, (See Section 4.1.1), few significant deviations were found. Those that were involved, in the main, a lack of respect for adjustment application deadlines and a few anomalies currently being investigated or dealt with which have no direct impact on reliability.

5.5 Crisis managementGlos and exercises On the first of October a Crisis Cell activation exercise was carried out, uniting the CNES, the Western region and the National Strategy Cell. The scenario, lighter than classic activation exercises, was used to train those involved in specific applications (load shedding, SIRTEC, EAS, etc.) as listed in the Crisis Note, as well as to verify that the cells and communications links worked correctly. The scenario implemented involved a cold front, along with a fall of adhesive snow, across the Brittany region, leading to problems and voltage constraints which in turn led to the need for load shedding. Faced with these problems, the teams handled the situation well, whilst using the appropriate activation mechanics and tools. The CNES could therefore validate the 'Cold Spell' organisational note proposed after the cold snap in February 2012. On the 23rd October the Western region also held a 'Passage into Winter' exercise. The aim was to test operational instructions in preparation for winter and to test inter-unit coordination as well as coordination with two eRDF ACRs. On the 14th November the North-eastern region organised an exercise to test the implementation of the ORTEC plan, which provided a great deal of feedback covering organisation, the introduction of crisis circuits and the use of appropriate tools. The Priority Intervention Group for the Rhone-Alps-Auvergne region took part in the installation of Lindsey connections as well as in the installation of a back-up optical link to all GMRs.



Page: 40/53


In June & November the Eastern region held two crisis cell activation exercises, one across the Operations & Maintenance Centres across the SIRTEC, the other involving the new Rte2 and SDIS structure. 5.6 IT System security

The security of the RTE Industrial IT system is central to the operational reliability of the electricity system as a whole, notably in terms of the control & command systems and remote control activities. RTE is committed to an active approach to the evaluation and monitoring of the security of its own IT systems, the implementation of plans of action to consolidate the systems and the implementation of major upgrades to the control & command systems used in its electricity sub-stations. An evaluation review, looking at the NERC CIP Standard (North American Electric Reliability Corporation – Critical Infrastructure Protection) was carried out in 2013. It positioned RTE's Industrial IT system as being sufficiently mature, whilst highlighting two areas for improvement:

(i) Formalisation of a hierarchical list of critical elements; (ii) Cybersecurity awareness and training, specifically for operators using our Industrial IT

system 'on the ground'. Amongst the other actions undertaken during 2013 we can list: the completion and implementation of a real-time analysis and monitoring system for security events from the remote control systems; the qualification and roll-out, over all Industrial IT equipment, of a suitable anti-virus solution. One of the objectives for 2014 is to adapt protection of RTE's Industrial IT System to constant and rapidly updating cyber threats.

6. Lessons drawn from the year’s events

6.1 Lessons drawn from the ESS and their analysis With a total of 40 level A & B incidents, the most significant in terms of system reliability, the 2013 report (38 A & 2 B) follows the same lines as the 2012 report (32 A & 3 B), that is to say, a slight increase over 2011 (See graph below).

0

20

40

60

80

100

0

4

8

12

16

20

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

ESS AESS B à F

Nombre d'ESS >= A

B

C

D à F

A

It is the 'grid' and 'generation' fields which have seen the largest rise in ESS A & B events in 2013. The following table gives the breakdown of the ESS events per field over the last six years.



Page: 41/53


ESS ≥ A 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Network 13 9 8 5 4 8 (1B) System

operation 17 37 43 17 17 14

Control means

7 15 7 4 8 9 (1B)

Generation 1 4 1 3 3 7 Distribution 2 2 1 0 3 0

Total ≥ A 40 67 60 29 35 40 Of the 2 ESS B events, which were the most serious in terms of reliability during 2013, one was in the 'Network' domain, the other one in the 'Control Means' domain:

• ESS B 'Network': During the night of the 4th August, the destruction of an instrumentation transformer in the 400 kV Cubnezais sub-station, caused by the projection of debris, damaged a second instrumentation transformer and the sub-station busbars, leading to a double busbar fault: three busbar sections out of four were de-energized within the sub-station and five lines and one auto-transformer were cut off. A partial re-establishment of the voltage took place on the same day; the return to normal operating conditions needed the replacement of the defective equipment and took place four days later. Amongst the lessons learnt, we note the need to improve the warning and monitoring system for the remote voltage measuring shunt, which can be a preliminary sign of defective equipment, even if it is seen as being reliable itself, as well as the need to make operators aware of the detection and management of this type of problem in order to avoid damage to equipment and the repercussions on other components within the sub-station, thus having an impact on reliability. National and regional actions were undertaken as a result of this event in order to detail the operating modes to be used during potential remote voltage measurement problems.

• ESS B 'Control Means': On the 21st November, for approximately 2 hours, the Secondary

Voltage Control, Secondary Frequency/Power Control, Warning and Backup Systems remote control signal flows were interrupted, breaking off communications with the dispatching centres and triggering alarms as a consequence. This incident occurred during the installation of a new RMS (Multi-Service Network) application version, an operation undertaken with insufficient risk analysis. The loss of this remote control data, limited in quantity over the country, reduced the operators' visibility of the settings of some plants, but had no impact on the operational reliability of the system as a whole. A plan of action was immediately implemented in order to improve the stability and reliability of intervention on the telecommunications network for the electrical power system, improving the operational reference for telecommunications networks and implementing additional measures impacting the organisation, training tools and test platforms.

The 38 ESS A events, some of which have already been explained in this document, are broken down into sections as follows: Network:

• 7 ESS A for unscheduled outage of 2 to 3 400kV lines, • 1 ESS A for the de-energizing of a substation linked to a generator intervention,

System operations: • 5 ESS A for differences between forecasts and actual consumption over 3000 MW at peak, • 1 ESS A for an attempt to operate a busbar disconnector in the Mery sur Seine sub-station

whilst it was energised, • 3 ESS A for safeguard actions which did not conform to operational criteria, • 1 ESS A due to the potential consequences of a loss of 600 MW of consumption for a duration

of 20 minutes, • 2 ESS A for the transmission of a load shedding order, • 2 ESS A for a frequency deviation greater than 100 mHz,

Control means: • 4 ESS A for the detection of a remote control unavailability without prior alarm notification

during a manoeuvre,



Page: 42/53


• 2 ESS A for the loss or malfunction of the RST across a whole region for more than 30 minutes,

• 2 ESS A for the loss or malfunction of the Safeguard and Alert function of a Control Centre for more than 4 hours,

• 1 ESS A for a voltage protection relay specific to a de-phasing transformer in La Praz, which was used outside of its specified operating conditions.

Generation: • 6 ESS A due to failures in re-energizing files to NPPs, including one case which was later

judged to be acceptable (Aigle-Dampierre), given dispensation by the Joint Steering Committee for Voltage Returns (CPRR),

• 1 ESS A for a frequency deviation greater than 100 mHz (-117 mHz). All these ESS A & B, major events in the sense of their potential consequences on system reliability, were analysed in depth, including human factors, and gave rise to appropriate plans of actions for the implementation of any corrective actions or improvements needed. The successful completion of these actions by all parties involved with the ESS events is naturally of the utmost importance in maintaining system reliability. These plans of actions, triggered by events, are complementary to the background actions undertaken to improve reliability, which must continue to be carefully monitored. We could notably list here the monitoring of contractual agreements and regular actions aimed at improving the awareness of generating or distributing operators and companies to the principles of reliability; the periodic testing of safeguard orders; the awareness of maintenance teams to the principles of reliability; training and introduction of attitudes favourable to reliability (risk analyses, cross-referenced validations, questioning attitudes). 879 Level 0 ESS were logged during the year (978 during 2012), divided into the following headings: Network (309), System Operations (93), Control Means (51), Generation (422) & Distribution (4). Some of these ESS events were repetitive in nature, and could therefore, in time, cause threats to system reliability. They must therefore be carefully monitored and dealt with by corrective actions. Among the generation-related ESS 0 events, the graph below shows the number of ESS 0 for losses of secondary voltage control of the generating units lasting more than 2 hours (RST-N and RSCT), as well as secondary frequency-power control (RSFP) or primary frequency control (RPF). There has been confirmation of the reduction in these events, notably in terms of secondary voltage control, which seems to illustrate the usefulness of the dialogue between RTE and the producers on performance monitoring (see graph below).

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013Nb ESS 0 RST Nb ESS 0 RSFP Nb ESS 0 RPF

6.2 Experience feedback excluding ESS The majority of regions reported an increased rate of unscheduled unavailability from their 400 kV systems.



Page: 43/53


Four isolated installations played a major part in these non-availabilities: The 765 autotransformer in Cergy was unavailable for 155 days, due to various problems with the cable ends; the 400kV Argoeuvres Penly 2 line was unavailable for 49 days due to a problem with a gas-insulated sub-station compartment in Penly; the 761 autotransformer in the Blayet sub-station was unavailable for 77 days due to a problem with the cable end and the 400 kV Mery-Seine-Vielmoulin line was unavailable for 42 days due to the destruction of its HV & LV cubicles. During 2013, 34 unscheduled unavailabilities concerned the 200 400 kV lines classified as 'sensitive' by RTE (I.e.: their unscheduled real-time tripping leads to a significant problem for the electrical power system); these represented a cumulative unavailability of 70 days (including one of 40 days). During 2013, various levels of earthing cable theft were logged across the regions, leading to Emergency Withdrawals of Sub-stations to recover their conformity. For example, in the South-eastern region alone, 22 sites were 'visited', leading to a cumulative repair time of 22 days (10 sites and 13 days in 2012). To these thefts of earthing cable should be added theft of LV cables supplying sub-station auxiliaries, representing a whole new problem for the GMRs Maintenance Centres (Normandy-Paris, West). Actions have progressively been introduced: a request for increased vigilance by operators and those carrying out interventions, security rounds by police and work on securing earthing cables within sub-stations. The efficiency of these measures can be measured, for example, in the West, which logged, during 2013, a drop in the number of thefts of earthing cables. In terms of system reliability, pending repairs, these substation degradations, which may mean outgoing feeders are unavailable, may require operation restrictions, or even impair the performance of the protection devices. Contractual agreements between RTE and the producer, eDF, in terms of reliability, are monitored by two joint commissions: “CPRR” (the Network Reconstitution Steering and the Re-energizing Committee) and the “REX-SFS” (Operational System Reliability Committee). Concerning the first CPRR Committee,, four meetings were held, in January, June, September and December 2013. In addition to the analysis and qualification of the success or failure of periodic re-energizing tests, the meetings looked closely into launching a workshop aimed at updating the constraints applicable to NPPs in terms of network reconstitution, studies on a new re-energizing scenario during the Rhone Valley work site phase, and examined changes to the remote-coupling settings used by RTE. Possible improvements concerning the contract discrepancies were also analysed. Concerning the REX SFS Committee, two meetings were held in February and October. In addition to the recurrent examination of Generation or Network ESS events with an impact on generation, analyses were carried out on the behaviour of specific plants to the loss of the RST on the 22nd January, the tripping of the plant following two successive transitory short-circuits, normally eliminated on a 400kV line and the successful islanding of 2 plants due to a double busbar fault in a neighbouring 400kV sub-station.

6.3 A few key figures for other electricity systems Renewables in Europe now have major impacts on cross-border exchanges, market prices and induced flows across the networks. These impacts have characteristics which are difficult to forecast. In addition to the equipment in France, the network managed by RTE is also influenced by installations in Germany, Spain and, more recently, in Italy. With this in mind, it is worthwhile listing some figures for 20136

Germany: concerning our neighbours:

Solar generation reached 30 TWh for 36.9 GW (+15%) installed. Wind farm generation reached 53.2 TWh (+15.6%) for 34 GW (+13%) installed. For information, it should be underlined that German fossil fuel-based generation was 351 TWh, against 45 TWh in France. Italy: Solar generation reached 22 TWh for 16.4 GW installed. Wind farm generation reached 14.8 TWh for 8 GW installed. Spain:

6 Source: www.entsoe.eu, www.ewea.org



Page: 44/53


Solar generation reached 13 TWh for 6.9 GW installed. Wind farm generation reached 55.4 TWh for 22.8 GW installed, making Spain the leader in Europe for 2013 for wind generation. The comparison of these figures with those of Germany and Italy shows that conditions in Spain were much more favourable to these two types of generation than in Germany or even Italy. In addition, in terms of off-shore wind farm generation, 1567 MW (+34%) was connected across the European network in 2013, including: 733 MW for the UK (212 turbines), 350 MW in Denmark (97 turbines), 240 MW in Germany (48 turbines) and 192 MW in Belgium (44 turbines). The North Sea is home to 72% of off-shore capacity installed during the year, the Baltic Sea is home to 22% and the Atlantic Ocean just 6%. By the end of 2013 the total off-shore capacity across Europe totalled 6562 MW, divided into 69 wind farms (2080 turbines), connected to 11 countries, including: 3681 MW for the UK (56%), 1271 MW for Denmark (19%), 571 MW for Belgium (8.7%), 520 MW for Germany and 247 MW for the Netherlands. The geographic breakdown is: 66% North Sea, 17% Baltic Sea & 16% Atlantic Ocean. 7. Progress actions

7.1 Actions undertaken within the framework of the ENTSO-EGlos Electrical system reliability control is closely linked to actions in favour of European electrical system reliability within ENTSO-E work. RTE is heavily involved, notably in terms of the control of frequency deviations and potential concern with photovoltaic generation disconnection thresholds. The continuation of the preparation of the future European "network codes", which are to become European law, formed the core activity undertaken by ENTSO-E in 2013. These codes define the main rules to be enforced by all the stakeholders, in all matters relating to the interconnected operation of the networks in the fields of connection, forecast management, electrical system operation and the working of the electricity markets. They are complex and involve many different parties and the process used in their production is spread across a number of separate steps: production and validation within ENTSO-E based upon public consultation; forwarding to ACER (Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators) for comments; an European Community 'committee' stage for the preparation of the final version; approval by the European Parliament prior to official publication as European legislation. It is to be regretted that this complex process has led to a few delays during 2013, mainly during the EC 'committee' phase, and that the codes which were started in 2012 had not made much progress in 2013. In early 2014 the situation of the various network codes relating to reliability can be summarised as follows:

• The 'Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management' code: relating to the rules covering access to interconnection, received favourable comments from ACER in March 2013; it entered the EC committee stage in December 2013. This code, key to the completion of the integrated electricity market, contains reliability-related data in that it defines the methods coordinated between the TSOs for calculating the capacity that can be allocated to the market.

• The 'Load Frequency Control & Reserves' code received favourable comments from ACER in September 2013. This code deals with the adjustment of the supply-demand balance in real-time, from a technical stand point. It is thus closely linked to the reliability of the interconnected system.

• The 'Electricity Balancing' code was submitted to ACER in December 2013. It is currently being modified by ENTSO-E following requests from ACER. This code is designed to help set up a real-time cross-border balancing market, based upon reliability, supply quality and cost reductions. It will therefore have a major impact on reliability.



Page: 45/53


• Two of the principal reliability-related codes, 'Operational Security' (general security and coordination rules) and 'Operational Planning and Scheduling' (specific rules for preparation and operations), received favourable comments from ACER in November 2013. Although mainly based upon existing codes, these new codes will facilitate the way information is exchanged among TSO,s and with the network users, whereas the national provisions do not provide all TSOs with access to the data they need, the regional coordination requirements and a unified view of the security rules to be applied, therefore tightening overall reliability. These two codes will be complemented, in 2014, by the 'Emergency and Restoration' code, which will detail the common practices to be adopted in case of a major disturbance on the network, in order to limit the propagation of the phenomena and re-build the network as efficiently as possible following a large-scale incident.

• The 'Requirements for Generators' code, covering the conditions for the connection of generation means, from LV to EHV, entered the EC committee phase in January 2014. The proposed arrangements include tightened requirements on the behaviour of the units in the presence of frequency and voltage excursions or voltage dips, including for renewables-based generation; as they concern only future connection requests, these arrangements should mainly impact the conditions for later development of renewables, including LV or MV installations, photovoltaic or wind plants.

• The 'Demand Connection Code', covering the conditions for connecting consumers at all voltage levels, entered the EC committee phase in March 2014. This code integrates measures to facilitate the development and active participation of consumers in the supply-demand balance.

• Work on the preparation of the 'High Voltage Direct Current Connection' code has progressed well during 2013 and public consultations have been undertaken. The code was submitted to ACER in April 2014. As opposed to the other codes, this one covers an innovative technical field, that of long distance HVDC transmission systems, DC connections to off-shore wind farms and asynchronous interconnectors between separate synchronous zones. This code creates the basics of reliable operations across the European Network for future decades, during which this type of installation is expected to multiply.

Among the other reliability-related actions taken within ENTSO-E, the following are noteworthy:

• The full roll-out, to all TSOs, during 2013, of the Unified Real Time Alert System (EAS: ENTSO-E Awareness System). The tool is now operational across all TSOs and operators have been trained to it. It is used to monitor and display the flow of power across continental Europe, the Baltic States, Scandinavia and the British Isles, in order to facilitate unified diagnostic and improved coordination of TSOs in the event of an incident, thanks to a common platform. It should be capable of preventing a repetition of the situation of the 4th November 2006, during which the establishment of a joint diagnostic proved to be extremely difficult, causing considerable delays in the return to a normal operating condition.

• The continuation of the ENTSO-E Academy ‘workshops’, designed to reinforce experience sharing between TSOs; topics covered the operational integration of renewables, protection systems and network restoration schemes after a general incident. In October RTE hosted a workshop on 'Operator Training Simulators', with 41 participants from 20 TSOs: the various presentations gave a guided tour of the various control simulators in use across Europe.

• The TYNDP, Ten-Year Network Development Program, updated every two years, is a key

reference tool on a European, but also French scale for the shared vision of all the network developments needed for a future reliable European electricity system enabling optimisation of the use of generating sources. The next edition will be published in 2014.



Page: 46/53


• The publication of the analytical forecasts of adequate supply-demand balance for the summer and winter -Summer/Winter Outlooks-, whose methodology and quality progress over these exercises, helping progressively to supply alert tools at European level and harmonize the TSOs’ approaches to these analyses.

• In conformity with European Regulation 347/2013, ENTSO-E published, and submitted for

consultation, a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) methodology, which was forwarded to ACER in November 2013. This methodology allows an evaluation to be carried out on Projects of Common Interest (PCI) for the development of the European Network, using a harmonised economic approach, and will be integrated into the TYNDP.

7.2 Other cooperative ventures (TSOs, users, etc.) The task of effectively managing the potential of interconnections is dependent on coordinating the operations of our own infrastructure with those of other European TSOs. This coordination is provided by the Regional Coordination Centre CORESO (see previous reports), providing those TSOs working as partners with a wider view of the electricity network, beyond their own borders. At the heart of a European electricity market, where cross-border exchanges are becoming decisive and where renewable energies are increasing, the services provided by CORESO have been greatly developed during the six years since its creation. The CORESO operators, from the 5 partner TSOs (Elia, RTE, TERNA, 50 Hz, NG) provide regional expertise, allowing them to monitor flows and provide pertinent

propositions. Communications sessions and joint training sessions are regularly organised to develop this expertise and strengthen operational links between CORESO and national dispatching. Every year, CORESO helps detect and resolve problems relating to highly contrasting and difficult operational situations: the north-south flow from Germany/Netherlands to France, more common during colder periods with high levels of wind farm generation throughout Northern Europe, as well as the reverse flow, as noted during the week of the 15th August 2013. Throughout the week in question, the study work undertaken by CORESO highlighted repeating restrictions

on the Belgian network during the morning and across the France-Germany border during the evening. The regional operating status is characterised by high levels of south-east and north-east flows. The CORESO teams, working with Elia and RTE, as well as with the SSC Coordination Centres in Amprion & Tennet NL were capable of providing a solution involving several separate but coordinated preventive actions, inaccessible to a TSO working alone or in a bilateral agreement: in fact, the solution involved combining modifications to phase shifting transformer plugs7

The added value provided by these regional coordination centres (see map) is therefore already well integrated and is constantly being improved over time, with a strengthening of the coordinating links between the various centres (CORESO, SSC, TSC), thus improving the reliability of the whole of the European network.

, on Amprion, Tennet and Elia networks, along with the cancellation of two planned outages in Germany and Belgium. In the event of an incident, the potential solutions also involved changes to the topology of substations within France. These solutions allowed the TSO to remove restrictions and to prevent some very expensive redispatching operations.

To facilitate coordinated studies over a variety of time scales, notably for the D-1 period, European TSOs have, for several years now, exchanged 24 forecast files per day, with integration of this data giving a unified view of the expected network conditions. The quality of this overview is of course

7 By changing the tap changer of these de-phasing transformers, the flow passing through a connection can be limited to a value less than the natural flow resulting from both its own impedance and that of the rest of the network, thus avoiding overloads. When there are several phase shift transformers, it is clear that the coordination of these tap changers is essential for avoiding uncontrolled congestion through the carryover of the flows to other connections.



Page: 47/53


highly dependent on the data being exchanged and the integration procedure itself. An organisation of the different TSOs and the main regional coordination centres (CORESO and TSE) was defined in 2013, allowing them to implement a unified file integration service in order to offer their partners a better overview of the interconnected grid. The implementation of this new service will have an impact on the reliability of European System operations by allowing more harmonised and accurate capacity calculations and studies. 2013 also saw the continuation of preliminary work to use of a 'flow-based' market coupling method for the Central & Western European zone, with the start of operational service scheduled for mid-2014. Based upon appropriate modelling of the links between commercial exchanges and physical flows, the method optimises the use of interconnection capacities and thus maximises cross-border exchanges. It is also a vector for the coordination and harmonisation of the reliability regulations implemented by the various TSOs. To share this method, the challenges to be overcome before it can be implemented, and promote its implementation beyond the Central & Western European zone, RTE played host to a delegation of the four Scandinavian TSOs for 2 days (Fingrid, Stattnet, Energinet and Svenske Krafnet). Opportunities to cooperate on the tooling, prototypes and operational coordination work were identified during this conference. The current inter-TSO contractual framework stipulates that a convention covering all the operational relationships (coordinated reliability management, fixed data exchanges and remote information, operating conditions of the interconnection links, etc.) will be carried out between each interconnected neighbouring TSO. This type of contract is needed, even if it has limits for the reliability of the interconnected system as the latter must also be managed, on a coordinated basis, at regional level, which is required by the future network codes. Once these contracts were finalised with Elia & REE, Amprion & TransNetBW over the last few years, a 'countertrading' contract was signed on the 4th October with SwissGrid: meaning that in the future, the CNES operators will be able to ask SwissGrid (or can be asked by SwissGrid) in real time to undertake countertrading operations if network constraints are noted and all other possible actions have been undertaken to remove this constraint, respecting the exchange programme in force (modification of topology, redispatching). As in the past, regional and national RTE dispatchers played a role in the exchanges with their colleague in neighbouring TSOs (common exchange), facilitating a mutual understanding of the cultures, regulations and tools used, as well as joint exercises designed to improve the management of downgraded situations (common training), based upon simulations of existing networks. These operations took place with TERNA, NG, REE, (2 training sessions in Madrid), Transnet BW & Amprion. These exchanges are considered rich and highly instructive by all those taking part. They provide a fresh vision of an electricity system operating under a regulatory and organisational context which differs from our own, with extremely high quality technical results. In the same field, RTE has produced a cooperative agreement (signed in January 2014) with a training service provider used jointly be several TSOs and CORESO. Their first training sessions have been scheduled for the second quarter of 2014.

7.3 Reliability-related R&D actions Reliability control calls for identification of the future risks which RTE wishes to protect against, identifying technological ruptures and anticipating future operating conditions. With this in mind, RTE is steering a variety of research and development actions, both jointly in partnership or within the scope of international cooperative ventures. In 2013 we can pick out the following major advances relating to reliability. DC networks: 2013 stood out due to the completion of the European 'TWENTIES' project (26 partners with REE leading the consortium), which started back in 2010. At the heart of this project, RTE was responsible for an operational demonstrator of the DC networks. The actions steered by RTE provided a plan to provide protection against DC network faults, to specify the performance levels required for several classes of DC circuit breakers and to develop, on the basis of these specifications, an industrial demonstrator for a DC circuit breaker, the performance levels of which were successfully tested and validated in the presence of a representative of the European Commission. The development and construction of a prototype DC circuit breaker was undertaken by ALSTOM Grid, a



Page: 48/53


partner in the consortium. The feasibility of this high speed breaking component was rapidly confirmed, opening up new opportunities for its future industrialisation and for the development of multi-terminal DC networks, on or off-shore, notably for the large scale integration of renewable energy sources. Network studies platforms: 2013 was the second year of the European iTesla project (21 partners), led by RTE. iTesla foreshadows the next generation of study platform (Convergence - Assess type), making it possible to implement a probabilistic analysis of the risks inherent in the network, taking into account the possibilities for corrective actions and dynamic phenomena. The general specification work on the platform reached its conclusion in January 2013. The first functional platform units were developed throughout the year, in accordance with the initial schedule. This work will continue throughout 2014, with delivery of all modules and the completion of the first test campaign. It should be noted that iTesla was selected by the PRACE committee (Partnership for Advanced Computing in Europe) for the preparatory phase to use the French 'Curie' supercomputer. Real time simulator - SMARTe: New models of the CSPR (Reactive Power Synchronous Compensator) have been set up in the real-time simulation laboratory (using the Hypersim tool developed by the Canadian electronics firm 'HydroQuebec'). They will, in 2014, be followed by models of the DC conversion stations, notably those used on the HVDC France-Spain connection. The real-time simulator will be used to carry out detailed studies of the integration of new, complex power-electronics components into the electrical network, to validate models using all calculation codes and to update the best methods to be used in controlling these installations. It therefore plays an important role in operational reliability. During 2013, work mainly focused on the complex modelling of VSC multi-level converters and cables. Insertion of renewable energy into the network: On this subject, electro-technical behaviour, a study, started in 2013, was carried out jointly with Georgia Tech, covering the functioning of networks which, in the main, involved generation sources coupled by electronic power components with a small percentage of the equipment synchronised traditionally. The aim of this work was to determine the control modes for this type of network, for which there is no current operational experience. Simulation tools covering the ageing of components and the optimisation of asset management (project SmartLab): A team of researchers was put together towards the end of 2013, with their initial work covering the simulation of the mechanical resistance of the framework of a sub-station to short-circuit currents, the resistance of the overhead connections to wind and the implementation of data mining technologies to improve understanding of instrumentation transformers and to forecast failures of the latter. This work should eventually lead to an improved forecast of the occurrence of certain problems having an impact on reliability, as well as providing propositions for preventive actions. Project GARPUR: The European GARPUR project, financed by the European Commission's FP7 programme, was launched in September 2013. The part of the project under the control of RTE covers the impact of a probabilistic approach to operational risks on asset management. The initial work covered the modelling of the reliability of the various network functions.

The points covered above are all part of the new four-yearly R&D 2013-2016 project (see diagram overleaf), attached to the TURPE4 pricing period and broken down into five strategic areas. The 2013-2016 road map is available from the RTE Institutional website.



Page: 49/53


8. Reliability audits As part of the internal auditing measures set up within RTE, audits in the specific area of reliability are conducted on behalf of RTE Board, on a periodic basis, which may be supplemented by Management requests outside this plan ("flash" audits). The themes of the audits are built up in such a way as to cover, over a period of approximately 2 years, the major reliability factors, specifically monitoring risks highlighted by feedback from the past year. Recommendations are formulated within these audits, so as to improve control over the identified risks. The actions initiated on the basis of the recommendations are tracked twice-yearly by the Reliability Audit Mission, which reports to the RTE Board. A scheduled Reliability Audit was carried out in 2013 with a flash audit started at the end of the year. The scheduled audit focussed on the management of reliability from the viewpoint of Development/Engineering & Operations. The aim of this audit was to assure efficient coordination between those involved in Development/Engineering and those involved in Operations, contributing to the management and control of the reliability of the interconnected system, preventing situations where a fragile network might lead to a drop in the quality of the electricity supply or put at risk either French or European systems. The analyses covered:

(1) Doctrines and their evolution, (2) Methods, including management of incertitudes during development and study tools, (3) Interactions between network studies and decision-making processes, (4) The need for temporary solutions and programmable controllers, (5) Training and skills required by those responsible for studies.

A set of seven recommendations, designed to strengthen feedback covering network development doctrine, improve the handling of incertitudes, strengthen development studies, improve high voltage situation handling, improve traceability of those programmable controllers playing an important role in reliability within the Public Network, were all included in this audit. The aim of the flash audit was to complete, jointly with two Maintenance & Operations Centres, an in-depth analysis, integrating human factors, of an Environmental Emergency Exercise (Fire in a 400kV substation AT transformer). The aim was to identify, for all involved, any points to be corrected in order to improve the defensive barriers and the response to any similar scenario during future exercises. Three audits have been programmed for 2014:

• The impact of recent reactive energy compensation installations on the control of the electricity system.

• The reliability of RTE optical fibre telecoms services (ROSE). • Preparation for the management of tomorrow's network.

9. Conclusion Power system operations during 2013 were facilitated by favourable climatic conditions, with no major cold spells or heatwaves during the summer months. This helped managing successfully winter peaks with values lower than in 2012. Thus, as opposed to 2012, the activation of safeguard orders during operations, in order to limit the demand on the North-west / Paris regions or the PACA (south-east) region was not needed. Low voltages were also handled in a globally satisfactory manner. In summary, the more complex phenomenon of high voltages, harder to forecast and deal with, has had the tendency to increase due to the development of distributed energy supply and cables. The management of the Supply & Demand Balance throughout the year was in general more complex than during 2012. There were several occasions where there were 'too many' MW available, which were difficult to re-absorb, as well as the reverse situation with insufficient upper margins. Frequency deviations were less than 150 mHz both upwards and downwards. The highest frequency reached was 50.145 Hz, close to the 50.2 Hz trigger point for photovoltaic generation. The number of Significant System Events (40) with a rating greater than or equal to 'A' was slightly higher than during 2012 (35) and 2011 (29) but remained acceptable.



Page: 50/53


These results highlight the permanent effort being put in by RTE in order to assure operational management and take fitted decisions during forecasting phase or network development phase. This progress is the fruit of work ongoing for the past few years, emphasizing that guaranteed system reliability is the result of planned and sustained actions. We can notably list:

• The decisions to reinforce the network, such as the decisions taken in 3 years to install nearly 8000 Mvar of compensation between 2011 and 2015 to strengthen voltage stability during peak-load periods;

• The improvement in the processes for positioning major planned outages, on a multi-annual basis;

• The actions to optimize the transport capacities of the existing facilities; • The regular improvement in the methods and tools used to predict the system status, ensure

its operation in accordance with the operating rules and implement the appropriate safeguard commands, where necessary;

• The progress of operational coordination in real time and in the short term with neighbouring TSOs, particularly by means of the services provided by CORESO;

• The technical and contractual relationship with eDF to gradually reduce the shortfall in reactive power generation capacity, observed since 2009.

The areas of vigilance highlighted in this 2013 report focus on:

• The need for progress, at French and European levels, in reducing the risks of massive generation (mainly photovoltaic) tripping during relatively small European frequency excursions (200 mHz deviation);

• The need to improve forecasting of frequency deviations at French and European levels, notably at peak hours, in order to reduce their number and amplitude;

• The need to evaluate the effectiveness of the actions taken to limit or eliminate malfunctions with 400 kV busbar disconnectors , as these situations may cause severe incidents such as the simultaneous tripping of a set of facilities, outside of the design basis criteria applied by the safety rules;

• The need to continue, throughout 2014, with the improvements to the Convergence study tool;

• The risks raised in short-term supply-demand balance control by the relatively high level of errors in forecast consumption (5 errors greater than 3000 MW logged during 2013);

• The need to cooperate deeper, with eRDF, reaching a better understanding of the reactive data at the RPT/RPD interface to be able to perform more detailed and accurate voltages studies.



Page: 51/53


APPENDIX: Glossary by theme

Identifier § Concept

The operational reliability of the electrical system

2 System Reliability is defined as the ability to: - Assure normal electricity system operations; - Restrict the total number of incidents and stop the occurrence of major

incidents; - Limit the consequences of major incidents when they do occur. Reliability is at the heart of RTE's responsibilities as defined by the French Law of the 10th February 2000 in their role as the French Transport Systems Operator. Should you wish to learn more or clarify any terms, see the Reliability Memo available via: www.rte-france.com (Accueil > Médiathèque> Documents > L'électricité en France : données et analyses > Publications annuelles ou saisonnières)

Operating margins and reliability rules

2.2 The reliability rules require: - A minimum generation margin, which can be called upon in under 15 minutes,

of greater than 1,500 MW; this figure is calculated to be sufficient to compensate for the instantaneous loss of the largest unit coupled to the network;

- A minimum generation margin, requiring more notice, for a gradual increase in volume from the 15 minute threshold to several hours.

If these conditions are not met, RTE must transmit, depending on the individual situation, either an alert message via the Balancing Mechanism or a 'Critical Situation' S message.

Balancing Mechanism (MA)

2.2 French law states that producers must make available, to RTE, the technically possible power levels required to balance supply and demand. This is carried out using a Balancing Mechanism, used by RTE to make the most of the means held by the market companies in a permanent, open manner and by the market companies to valorise their withdrawal capacities and production flexibility. RTE will make the necessary adjustments, based on price-volume offers, accepting offers in price order until the demand is fulfilled. Certain measures are implemented to deal with shortfalls: - With over 8 hours’ notice, RTE will request additional offers by warning

message; - After the 8 hour deadline, a 'downgraded mode' message allows RTE to

mobilise, beyond any additional offers, exceptional offers and other means not covered by the balancing mechanism.

Primary and Secondary Control of Reserves of Power Frequency

2.2 Primary control is automatic, triggered by any deviations between production and consumption and by the commitment of those involved in the synchronised interconnections, and assures virtually instantaneous restoration of the balance. The regulations are laid down by ENTSO-E's regional 'Continental Europe' group to ensure that frequencies are held within pre-defined limits. Following on from this, secondary control by the company responsible for the problem will automatically cancel out any residual deviations from the reference frequency, as well as any deviations from the programmed exchanges between the various control zones.

http://www.rte-france.com/�

http://www.rte-france.com/fr/�

http://www.rte-france.com/fr/mediatheque�

http://www.rte-france.com/fr/mediatheque/documents�

http://www.rte-france.com/fr/mediatheque/documents/l-electricite-en-france-donnees-et-analyses-16-fr�

http://www.rte-france.com/fr/mediatheque/documents/l-electricite-en-france-donnees-et-analyses-16-fr�

http://www.rte-france.com/fr/mediatheque/documents/l-electricite-en-france-donnees-et-analyses-16-fr/publications-annuelles-ou-saisonnieres-98-fr�



Page: 52/53



ENTSO-E 3.2 ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity), founded at the end of 2008, has since 1st July 2009, been the single body responsible for the European TSOs. ENTSO-E is tasked to improve cooperation between TSOs in key areas, including the drawing up of network codes for technical and operational aspects, operational coordination and development of the European Transport Network as well as for research activities. According to its statutes, all major decisions are taken by a General Assembly. An executive board is responsible for the general steering of the organisation and the preparation of strategic objectives. Operational work is overseen by three main committees and their sub-structures: The Markets Committee (MC), the Systems Development Committee (SDC) and the Systems Operations Committee (SOC), supported by a legal analysis group. To assure technical coordination of those TSOs connected on mainland Europe and to provide an evaluation of reliability-related commitments, defined in 8 polices and agreed upon as part of the Multi-Lateral Agreement signed by the members of the old ECTE, the SOC created a regional ad-hoc sub-group - The Regional Group Continental Europe (RGCE). See: www.entsoe.eu.

Reliability Communications Network

4.1.5 The aim is to put together a secure network built around a dedicated telecommunications infrastructure for all types of traffic (data, voice, etc.) required for remote operations. These systems will provide the following functions: - 'Low level' transmission of control data for all remotely controlled substations

and a limited number of telephone connections between major transport substations and substation groups;

- 'High level' transmission of remote control data and telephone connections between Substation groups and dispatching centres;

- Remote control data transmission and telephone conversations between power plants and dispatching centres;

- Remote control data transmission and telephone conversations between power plants and dispatching centres.

Significant System Events (SSE)

2.2

5.3

The detection of events impacting on the reliability of the system is based upon pre-established criteria, grouped into a Significant System Events Classification Grid. The grid is used to assign an event an accurate indication of the effect on reliability, using a 7-level scale. Level 0 assigned to the lowest risk events to be logged; Levels A to F correspond to increasing severity of events, all the way up to a generalised, widespread nationwide incident. The classification method is based on an assessment of the seriousness of the event using two types of input: - One input logs the incidence of elementary events impacting on an

operational function in a certain number of fields (transmission network, generation, systems ops, control systems, distribution);

- One input logs the level to which system functionalities are downgraded.



Page: 53/53



Verifying the performance of Production Installations

5.4 Taking into account the criticality of the services provided by production plants when connected to the grid, these should be subjected to performance monitoring. This monitoring, implemented in such a way as to limit the quantity of work and expenditure incurred by both RTE and the users, is aimed at ensuring that the grid remains operational for all and assuring system reliability. The principal is that the levels of performance are checked at the point of delivery from the installation, meaning a single test is sufficient to assure that performance levels are being met. The test checks the behaviour of the production units with respect to primary and secondary frequency-power controls (static gains, programmed reserves, response times, etc.) as well as for primary and secondary voltage controls (availability of the contractual domain in U/Q diagram, response dynamics).

Crisis management

5.5 The ORTEC system (RTE Crisis Organisation) was set up in response to the storm at the end of December 1999. It defines the measures to be taken and the organisation to be implemented both at regional and national levels once a serious crisis situation has been declared by RTE. In addition to the provision of human resources and technical resources, it also covers the introduction of communications associated with crisis management. Concretely, Crisis Units are rapidly mobilised in all Units and in RTE Headquarters. In addition, Priority Intervention Groups (GIP) were created for each of the DTE units. Their main objective being to assure the restoration of any seriously damaged lines of particular importance to system reliability in less than 5 days.