Preparing Melbourne’s Electrical Supply For The 2006 Commonwealth Games

AMEU Convention 2007

Preparing Melbourne’s Electrical Supply For The 2006 Commonwealth Games

Presented by Michael Farr

Manager Networks – Queensland

Sinclair Knight Merz


Commonwealth Games 2006

Biggest event ever staged in Victoria

Held over 11 days in March 2006

71 nations

7,200 athletes

3,100 media representatives

1.6m tickets sold

90,000 visitors


Melbourne Statistics

Category CBD daily population

Employed in CBD **

180,000

National and International Visitors ##

90-95,000

Metropolitan and Country Victorian Visitors ##

161,000 – 200,000

Residential ## 20,000 Total Daily Population of CBD 451,000 – 495,000

Sources ** Bureau of Statistics ## Sustainable City Research Department, City of Melbourne



All major venues in the inner suburbs of Melbourne (Citipower)

Venues supplied at 11kV

First time all venues operated at full capacity simultaneously

CBD was very busy at this time


Orientation


Orientation


1998_Auckland multiple cable failure – 3 out of 4 cables ultimately failed causing extended disruption (~A$75M)

1998_New York incident approximately A$75M. 2001_Cost of the two Melbourne CBD incidents

estimated at $10M and $3M based on commercial VCR. In both events initial planned plant outages were followed

by secondary faults a number of days later that resulted in loss of supply to areas of the CBD.

2003_SKM commissioned to conduct security of supply analysis

2004_Somerville enquiry (Qld) Transmission and sub-transmission feeders: N-2 Transformers: N-1

2005/06_NSW Government mandates N-2 reliability down to the zone substations (132kV and 66kV)

Historical CBD Reliability Incidents


The review findings were:

Although the network was designed and operated to an “N-1” security standard, there was little flexibility to reconfigure the 66kV network after a prior outage.

This lack of flexibility was one of the major reasons behind the two outages.

To provide improved network flexibility would require the network to be designed to a higher security standard.

Historical Melbourne CBD Development


In addition, the review found thatMelbourne’s CBD security of supply was ranked very low in a comparison of equivalent major cities worldwide.

Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Auckland, Wellington, Glasgow, Johannesburg, Capetown

(Based on Planning Criteria and Energy at Risk)

Historical Melbourne CBD Development


What security standard should apply for the Melbourne CBD?

Term Description

N-1 The network can withstand the loss of any element and maintain supply to all customers. The network may not be in a secure state.

N-1 Secure

The network can withstand the loss of any element and maintain supply to all customers.

In addition, the network can be subsequently re-configured to withstand a further outage. During the time taken to re-configure, the network is at risk.

Modified N-2

The network can withstand the loss of a critical element together with the further loss of a non-critical element. This security standard has been applied to the Sydney CBD.

N-2 The network can withstand the loss of any 2 network elements and maintain supply to all customers. Very few networks have true N-2 security.


What security standard should apply for the Melbourne CBD?

Recommended security standard is

“N-1 Secure”

Consistent with Transmission security standard;

Considers the nature and impact of the customers affected.

Cost effectiveness;

Captures most of the security benefits associated with “N-2” standard.

Accepted by ESC ESC allocates A$250M for refurbishment and

security of supply works



Key Risk Areaso Opening and closing ceremonies

• Greatest loads, crowd volumes, dignitaries, media attention

o Damage to underground assets• Pegs from temporary facilities eg tents

o Overall system load• Co-incident with previous years system peak load period

• All loads continuously monitored

o Asset failure• All venue feeder maintenance and vegetation management brought

forward

o Access to assets • Accreditation for staff and vehicles

• Most challenging


Risks and Assessment

Key Focus Areaso Assetso Imageo Incident managemento Peopleo Serviceo Stakeholders


Commonwealth Games Specific Infrastructure Impact

Augmentation projectso Increase security of supply to major venues

o Increase available capacity at the main venues


Infrastructure Impact

Citipower HV CBD networko Cables are run to maximum capacityo Feeders arranged into groupso Each group can consist of up to 10 feederso Each group has a dedicated standby feeder


Infrastructure Impact

Standby arrangements reviewedo Second standby feeder to the MCG from a separate zone substation

Load projections provided by games officials did not consider harmonic componentso Significant amount of extra lighting and computers/laptops would add

min 10% additional load due to harmonics

Installation of 2 x 1.5MVA kiosk substations along the bank of the Yarra River


MCG Supply Arrangements

Figure 2a. Existing MCG lights arrangement

Figure 2b. . Altered MCG lights arrangement

L1

L2

L3

L4

L5

L6

Zone Sub station 1

Zone Sub station 2

Standby Feeder 1

L1

L2

L3

L4

L5

L6

Zone Sub station 1

Zone Sub station 2

Standby Feeder 1 Standby Feeder 2


Infrastructure Impact Cont’d

Inspection and Maintenanceo High priorityo Confirmed inspections policyo Additional substation, public lighting and reliability patrols – dailyo Corona (UV) and infrared surveys of all key assets o All planned maintenance of key assets undertaken early incl zone

substation equipment, HV insulator washing and vegetation management

o Distribution substation audit regime• RMU types• HV and LV switchgear installed• Fuse condition, ventilation• Mobile phone reception

o Confirmed each venue substation had suitable alternate LV inter-connector



Work Restrictionso Many Games venues were “locked down” 1 month before the start of

the Games

o Self imposed restrictions• Rescheduling works outside of the Games period

• Not working on feeders or zone substations supplying key venues

• Restricting all planned work near major venues or the CBD

• Work on sub-transmission and transmission lines supplying zone substations supplying Games events restricted (H&S excluded)



Enhanced Field Responseo Roster of site field technicians

• Additional to system normal • Minimise switching times • Avoid access issues• Reported current, voltage, transformer temperatures – hourly to control

room– Load monitoring model– Self updating graph – load profile

o Additional (dedicated) fault response units (flying squads)o Ensure spare equipment placed at strategic siteso Standby generators

• Quicker response than immediate repairs (access constraints)• Strategically located

o Daily patrols of public lighting and general assets



Other Considerationso Ban on changes to systems

• IT

• Telecommunications

• Call centre

o Protection operating points recorded• Fuse size, condition, stocks

o System stress tests undertaken twice before the Games period

o Incident management• Network contingency and escalation plans enacted (min level 3 of 5)


Outcome

Demand – 116.8 MW more than same period last year

Energy – 13,000 MWHr more than same period last year

Capacity – 16.4 MVA installed and 10MVA portable

Assets – 140 maintenance activities brought forward

Reliability (fortnight) customers off supply 4,451 (average 7011)

Staff 68 directly involved (fortnight) + additional 115 indirectly involved in the lead up

No outages at any of the Commonwealth Games Venues


Legacy

Enhanced infrastructure to the major venues and open space areas

Minimal outages

Significantly enhanced reputation with stakeholders

Whole of business support

Increased revenue for the period


Thank you for your time

Documents

Preparing Melbourne’s Electrical Supply For The 2006 Commonwealth Games