Proceedings - dco.uscg.mil

P r o c e e d i n g sP r o c e e d i n g sVol. 63, Number 1Spring 2006

AAwarenesswareness6 Global Maritime Security

CDR John Caplis

10 Innovations for Port SecurityDr. Marc B. Mandler

13 The Deepwater ProgramRADM Patrick M. Stillman

19 Safely Securing U.S. PortsLCDR Brady Downs

23 HOMEPORTLCDR Mark Hammond, LCDR Karrie Trebbe

26 America’s Waterway WatchChief Petty Officer Penny Collins, LT Kenneth Washington

29 Three-Dimensional AwarenessENS Joseph Azzata

32 On WatchMr. William R. Cairns

36 Maritime Domain AwarenessMr. Guy Thomas

PreventionPrevention

39 Keeping U.S. Waters Safe and SecureLCDR Mark Willis, LCDR Malcolm McLellan

42 Maritime Security TrainingLCDR Derek A. D'Orazio

45 International Port Security ProgramMr. Mike Brown

On the CoverOn the Cover

Petty Officer Jason Miele, a member of the Coast Guard MaritimeSafety and Security Teams (MSST), stands guard in the East River nearthe Brooklyn Bridge. The MSSTs were created in direct response to theterrorist acts of Sept. 11, 2001. U.S. Coast Guard photograph by PA1 Tom Sperduto.

AWARENESS

PREVENTION

Cover Photo Courtesy ofPA1 Tom Sperduto.

Back Cover Photos: Courtesy ofPA1 Daniel Tremper,PA3 Donnie Brzuska,PA3 Christopher Grisafe, and PA3 Kelly Newlin.

Icon Credits:All are USCG illustrations.

Copyright 2006 USCG and itslicensors.

ProtectionProtection

76 Airborne Use of Force LCDR Melissa Rivera, CDR Aaron C. Davenport

79 Safeguarding the United StatesLCDR Brad Kieserman, LCDR Christopher F. Murray, LCDR Mike Cunningham

83 Maritime Safety and Security Teams CDR Aaron C. Davenport

84 Port SecurityMr. Kenneth McDaniel

On DeckOn Deck4 Assistant Commandant’s Perspective

RADM R. Dennis Sirois and RADM T. H. Gilmour

5 Champion’s Point of ViewRDML Craig Bone

Nautical Queries92 Engineering94 Deck

49 Cargo Security Mr. Basil Maher, LCDR Mike Dolan

52 Central California Area Maritime Security CommitteeLCDR Anthony C. Curry, Mr. Robert T. Spaulding

55 Port Coordination in the Largest U.S. Petrochemical Complex LCDR D. Hauser

60 Asymmetric MigrationLCDR Mike Cunningham

63 The Evolution of TWICLCDR Jonathan Maiorine

66 Port State Control ExaminationLT Ryan Allain, LT Craig Toomey

69 Increased Port SecurityMr. Chris Austen

73 National Maritime Security Advisory CouncilMr. John Bastek

Response and RecoveryResponse and Recovery87 National Response Options Matrix

CAPT Wayne C. Dumas

89 Counterterrorism ForceLCDR Jose L. Rodriguez, LTC Michael Kichman, U.S. Army (ret)

PREVENTION

PROTECTION

RESPONSE &RECOVERY

by RADM R. DENNIS SIROISAssistant Commandant for Response

AAssistantssistantCommandantCommandant’’ssPPerspectiveerspective

by RADM T. H. GILMOURAssistant Commandant for Prevention

ADM Thomas H. CollinsCommandant

U.S. Coast Guard

The Marine Safety & Security Council

of theUnited States Coast Guard

RDML John E. Crowley Jr.Judge Advocate General

ChairmanU.S. Coast Guard

RADM T. H. GilmourAssistant Commandant

for PreventionMember

U.S. Coast Guard

RADM Dennis SiroisAssistant Commandant

for ResponseMember

U.S. Coast Guard

CDR David L. NicholsExecutive SecretaryU.S. Coast Guard

Steven Venckus Legal Advisor

U.S. Coast Guard

View Proceedings Online atwww.uscg.mil/proceedings

Throughout our nation’s history, the oceans, lakes, and rivers have been vital to ourprosperity and to our security. Today, we continue to depend on these maritime high-ways for a Global Transportation System that delivers goods and materials to facto-ries and stores across our country. The oceans and waterways are also favorite areasfor recreation. For most of our history, warfare and perils such as piracy were first onour minds when we thought of threats to maritime security. Today, however, we alsoface a determined and resourceful terrorist enemy who would turn the vehicles ofpeaceful transportation—including ships, as well as planes, trains, and trucks—intodeadly instruments of destruction.

A government has no higher duty than to protect its citizens. The president has calledfor a fully coordinated government effort to safeguard our interests in the GlobalMaritime Domain. Because a robust international effort is essential to achieving thisobjective, the president required that international outreach be an integral part of thestrategy. We are committed to building and sustaining alliances within the commu-nity of nations to help achieve the goal of a more secure world. At a time when globalterrorism, rogue states, international crime, and weapons of mass destructionthreaten the world’s oceans and waterways, no one nation can accomplish this goalalone. Success will come through the hard work of a powerful coalition of nations,focused on protecting the world’s maritime interests.

To safeguard the maritime domain, the United States must forge cooperative partner-ships and alliances with other nations, as well as with public and private stakehold-ers in the international community. We cannot and should not attempt to patrol everycoastline, inspect every ship, screen every passenger, or peer into every containercrossing the world’s oceans. To foster stronger partnerships within the internationalcommunity, the United States must have a coordinated and consistent approach tobuilding international support and cooperation to reinforce global maritime security.We will propose ideas, and encourage others to do the same. We will speak frankly.We will also listen carefully. We will work together. Security must be a team effort.

The United States Coast Guard takes a layered and cooperative approach to maritimesecurity, utilizing the expertise of federal, state, and local authorities as well as that ofthe private sector and of international partners to create a system of security measuresto protect one end of a sea-based journey to the other. The goal is to harmonize security measures and economic growth. The layered, often interlocked or interre-lated, security measures are designed to make it harder for terrorists or transnationalcriminal groups to attack the United States or harm our interests. These layered meas-ures seek to protect the American public and the maritime commerce chain.

What follows in this issue of Proceedings is an overview of our current maritime secu-rity programs and initiatives.

by RDML CRAIG E. BONEU.S. Coast Guard Director of Inspection & Compliance Directorate

ChChampion’ampion’ssPPoint of oint of

VViewiew

Editorial Team

Lisa H. BastinExecutive Editor

Albert G. Kirchner Jr.Acting Executive Editor

Barbara ChiariziaManaging Editor

Ann AikenArt Director

Proceedings (ISSN 1547-9676) ispublished quarterly by the CoastGuard’s Marine Safety, Security& Environmental Protection Directorate,in the interest of safety at sea underthe auspices of the Marine Safety &Security Council. Special permissionfor republication, either in whole orin part, except for copyrightedmaterial, is not required, providedcredit is given to Proceedings. Theviews expressed are those of theauthors and do not represent officialCoast Guard policy.

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email: [email protected]

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Subscriptions, Proceedings MagazineU.S. Coast GuardNational Maritime Center4200 Wilson Blvd., Suite 730Arlington, VA 22203-1804

Nationally and internationally there has been a substantial increase in the securityof the Global Maritime Transportation System since the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001. The implementation of the International Port and FacilitySecurity (ISPS) Code in July 2004 and the Maritime Transportation Security Act(MTSA) of 2002 has established a sound foundation of preparedness throughout allsegments of the maritime transportation system.

While much has been done, there is no room for complacency. This Proceedings issueis meant to acknowledge efforts and challenges to work systematically to addressinnumerable potential threats. We need to also consider the lessons learned fromnatural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, and modify our planning to accountfor previously unforeseen obstacles in preventing, responding to, and recoveringfrom devastating incidents.

Many of the articles covered in this issue represent the first public description of theCoast Guard’s new capabilities and capacities in port security. There are more than70 current initiatives that have either been completed, or are in the process of com-pletion, which will strengthen the foundation of MTSA and ISPS. There are signifi-cant challenges to solidify security in the global maritime transportation system.Government agencies and industry will need to continually address and share bestpractices concerning threat and risk models, utilization of new technologies, devel-opment of needed standards for identification cards, vessel tracking systems, andtraining.

In this issue, we solicited a variety of topics and viewpoints from the project leaders in the Coast Guard and other partner stakeholders. I would like to sincerelythank the authors for their time and talent putting together contributions for thisedition. We have no choice but to move forward and institutionalize port securitypractices worldwide, the threat is real and the risk and consequences severe.Terrorists will continue to look for ways to exploit the gaps and vulnerabilitieswithin the Global Marine Transportation System and parts of our critical infra-structure. We must remain vigilant and tenacious in our efforts, if we are to thwartterrorism.

Global Maritime

SecurityAn overview of the National Strategy

for Maritime Security.

by CDR JOHN CAPLISU.S. Coast Guard Office of Strategic Analysis

Proceedings Spring 20066 www.uscg.mil/proceedings

On December 21, 2004, President George W. Bushsigned Maritime Security Policy National SecurityPresidential Directive 41/Homeland SecurityPresidential Directive 13 (NSPD-41/HSPD-13) withthe goal of establishing U.S. policy, guidelines, andimplementation actions to enhance homeland secu-rity by protecting U.S. maritime interests. It directsthat all U.S. government maritime security programsand initiatives be coordinated to achieve a compre-hensive and cohesive national effort involving appro-priate federal, state, local, and private sector entities.

The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Securitywere jointly charged with leading a collaborativeinteragency effort to craft a National Strategy forMaritime Security (NSMS) and eight supportingplans.

To successfully achieve their objectives, the NationalStrategy for Maritime Security and supporting plansmust consider the following statements:

· The safety and economic security of theUnited States depend in substantial partupon the secure use of the world’s oceans.Maritime security harmonizes the need forprotection against terrorist, hostile, criminal,and dangerous acts with the need for vibrant,secure maritime commerce that underpinseconomic security. Therefore, the UnitedStates has a vital national interest in maritimesecurity.

· The security of the Maritime Domain is aglobal issue. Since all nations benefit fromthis collective security, all nations must share

in the responsibility for maintaining mar-itime security.

· Security in the Maritime Domain is a sharedresponsibility between the public and the pri-vate sectors.

· Maritime security encompasses threats fromall criminal or hostile acts, such as the smug-gling of contraband, illegal immigration,piracy, illegal harvesting of natural resources,and terrorist activities.

The National Strategy for Maritime Security strivesfor a holistic approach in dealing with the broad arrayof threats to security within the maritime domain,addressing activities that span from prevention topost-incident recovery. The NSMS strives to achieveits objectives through five cross-cutting strategicactions:

· Enhancing international cooperation toensure lawful and timely actions againstmaritime threats. New initiatives are neededto ensure that all nations fulfill their responsi-bilities to prevent and respond to terrorist orcriminal actions with timely and effectiveenforcement. The United States will continueto promote the development of cooperativemechanisms for coordinating regional meas-ures against maritime threats that spannational boundaries and jurisdictions. TheUnited States will also work closely withother governments and international andregional organizations to enhance the mar-itime security capabilities of other keynations.

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7www.uscg.mil/proceedings Proceedings Spring 2006

· Maximizing Domain Awareness to supporteffective decision making. A key nationalsecurity requirement is gaining an effectiveunderstanding of all activities, events, andtrends within the Maritime Domain thatcould threaten the safety, security, economy,or environment of the United States and itspeople. Domain awareness enables the earlyidentification of potential threats andenhances appropriate responses, includinginterdiction at an optimal distance with capa-ble prevention forces.

· Embedding security into commercial prac-tices to reduce vulnerabilities. Private own-ers and operators of infrastructure, facilities,and resources are their own first line ofdefense and should embed into their businesspractices scalable security measures thatreduce systemic or physical vulnerabilities.Embedding security practices rests upon theimplementation and continual improvementof key legislation, such as the MaritimeTransportation Security Act of 2002, andInternational Maritime Organization require-ments, such as the International Ship andPort Facility Security Code.

· Deploying layered security to unify publicand private security measures. Achievingmaritime security is contingent upon execut-ing a layered security system that integratesthe capabilities of governments and commer-cial interests. The public and private sectors,acting in concert, can only prevent terroristattacks and criminal acts by using diverseand complementary measures, rather thanrelying upon a single solution.

· Assuring continuity of the marine trans-portation system to maintain vital com-merce. The United States must be prepared tomaintain vital commerce in the aftermath ofany terrorist attack or other similarly disrup-tive incidents that occur within the MaritimeDomain. The response to such events shouldnot default to an automatic shutdown of themarine transportation system; instead, theUnited States will be prepared to disengageselectively only designated portions andimmediately implement contingency meas-ures to ensure the public's safety and continu-ity of commerce.

The National Strategy for Maritime Securityfocuses on four main objectives:

· preventing successful terroristattacks and criminal or hostile acts;

· protecting maritime-related popu-lation centers and critical infrastruc-ture;

· minimizing damage and expeditingrecovery; and

· safeguarding the ocean and itsresources.

The National Strategy for Maritime Securityis further guided by the following principles:

· freedom of the seas must be pre-served for legitimate military andcommercial navigation;

· maritime security efforts shouldseek to facilitate global commerceand prosperity; and

· individual civil liberties and rightsguaranteed by the U.S. Constitution,as well as the international rule oflaw, must be preserved.

The eight supporting plans of the NationalStrategy for Maritime Security cover theareas of:

· Nat ional Mar i t ime DomainAwareness (MDA);

· Global Maritime IntelligenceIntegration;

· Domestic Outreach Engagement;· Coordination of International Efforts

and International Outreach;· National Maritime Operational

Threat Response;· National Maritime Infrastructure

Recovery;· Maritime Transportation System

Security; and

· Maritime Commerce Security.


Coast Guard’s Role in ImplementingNational StrategyNSPD-41/HSPD-13 created an interagency MaritimeSecurity Policy Coordinating Committee (MSPCC) toserve as the primary forum for coordinating U.S. gov-ernment maritime security policies. The MSPCC coor-dinated the development of the National Strategy forMaritime Security and its supporting plans and isnow actively working on assigning responsibilitiesand tasks to agencies within the government forimplementation. The Coast Guard, as a lead federalagency responsible for maritime homeland security,will take an active role in executing the NationalStrategy for Maritime Security and its eight support-ing plans.

While an implementation strategy for the NSMS andits supporting plans is currently being developed, theCoast Guard should expect to play an active leader-ship role in several areas.

Integrating the Layers of Security The concept of layers of security is complex andinvolves multiple types of activities to create a net-work of interdependent, overlapping, and purposelyredundant checkpoints in the system, which aredesigned to reduce vulnerabilities and detect, deter,and defeat threats. It entails developing securitymeasures that cover the various components of themaritime transportation system, including people,infrastructure, conveyances, and information sys-tems. These security measures span distances geo-graphically from foreign ports of embarkation,through transit zones, to U.S. ports of entry andbeyond; involve the different modes of transportationthat feed the global supply chain; and are imple-mented by various commercial, regulatory, lawenforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, and militaryentities.

A significant challenge to constructing integrated lay-ers of security is the fact that many of the layers arethe responsibility of different agencies. Integratingthese disparate maritime security layers will be nearlyimpossible to achieve through ad hoc cooperation.The solution to this dilemma involves unity of effort,shared responsibility, partnership, and mutual sup-port, but requires an agency with significant maritimesecurity responsibilities to step up and act as a coordi-nator for the purposes of integrating the govern-ment’s efforts to provide layered security. This will bean important function, as coordinating the layers ofsecurity requires working with agencies, private sec-tor interests, and international partners to integrate

efforts and eliminate seams between different modesof transport, agency jurisdictions, and internationalboundaries, so as to deny their exploitation by crimi-nal or hostile actors.

Coordinating Maritime Security Operations Deploying a system of effective, layered securityrequires extensive operational coordination and unityof effort among the involved agencies and the privatesector. Mission coordination is essential to integratethe maritime security operations of numerous agen-cies at the operational and tactical levels to achieveoperational effectiveness. A need exists to identify anagency with organizational capacities to championthe development of coordination protocols for operat-ing jointly to prevent and respond to threats, such asthose contained within the national MaritimeOperational Threat Response Plan. This agencywould also facilitate command and control duringspecific incidents and provide a forum for interagencymission planning when a multi-agency response mustbe seamlessly coordinated.

The Coast Guard possesses the authorities, capabili-ties, competencies, and partnerships to fulfill this roleand should expect to be called upon to act as a mis-sion coordinator. The Coast Guard maintains a robustcommand, control, and communications (C3) net-work of local, regional, area, and national level, mili-tary-style command and control centers, supportedby extensive communications systems. To meet theexpanding requirements of the maritime security mis-sion, the Coast Guard is transforming its C3 networkinto integrated, multifunction command centers andis also enhancing the capabilities of the supportingcommunications systems. The Coast Guard must pre-pare to leverage its C3 network capabilities to supportintegrated maritime security operations.

Preparing for Maritime Recovery OperationsThe private sector has traditionally demonstrated anability to adjust activities in response to disruptions inthe maritime transportation system, so much so that ithas often been said to be self-healing in nature.Widespread disruptions, however, caused by a secu-rity-related incident of national significance, couldthreaten to bring large portions of the maritime trans-portation system to a virtual standstill, and contin-gencies must be prepared.

Assuring continuity of commerce is likely to requireextensive coordination between the public and pri-vate sectors to restart or keep the flow of commercemoving during such an event. The National Strategyfor Maritime Security identifies the Coast Guard as


the executive agent for the Department of HomelandSecurity for coordinating mitigation measures toexpedite the recovery of infrastructure and trans-portation systems in the Maritime Domain. As such,the U.S. Coast Guard should expect to play a leader-ship role in coordinating maritime recovery opera-tions in consultation with federal, state, and localagency partners and the private sector.

On the national level, recovery policies and proce-dures that emphasize assuring continuity of com-merce in the Maritime Domain, such as the MaritimeInfrastructure Recovery Plan and the Plan to Re-establish Cargo Flow, as contained within theNational Maritime Transportation Security Plan,must be developed and closely coordinated with the

other federal agencies and the private sector. Withinthe ports, the Coast Guard Captain of the Ports, asFederal Maritime Security Coordinators, can antici-pate that they will be required to coordinate withfederal, state, local, and private sector stakeholdersthrough the Area Maritime Security Committees toprepare contingency plans for conducting maritimerecovery operations.

Partnering for International Maritime Diplomacy The Coast Guard, now more than ever, should expectto play a vital role as an instrument of national secu-rity in protecting, promoting, and defending themaritime interests of the United States and our inter-national partners. It is a unique agency through

which the United States can assist other nations inachieving maritime security throughout the domain.The Coast Guard is ideally suited to conduct interna-tional maritime diplomacy activities on behalf of theDepartment of State and the CombatantCommanders, as well as on its own behalf, to achievethe objectives of the NSMS.

In its international maritime diplomacy role, theCoast Guard can assist other nations in the:

· development of national maritime policies,strategies, standards, and legislation;

· professional and material development ofnational maritime security, maritime safety,and naval forces; and

· development of other maritime manage-ment and regulatory agencies.

The Coast Guard has traditionally been the chiefadvocate for the United States in internationalissues involving maritime safety. Similarly, theCoast Guard should expect to be called upon tobe the driving force in moving maritime secu-rity issues to the forefront at internationalforums such as the International MaritimeOrganization.

Conclusion As stated in the National Strategy for MaritimeSecurity, it is only through an integrated approachamong all maritime partners—domestic and interna-tional, public and private—that the security of theMaritime Domain can successfully be improved.Such collaboration is fundamental to implementingthis national strategy and is vital to protecting theinterests of the United States.

About the author: CDR John Caplis currently works in the Office ofStrategic Analysis for the Coast Guard Chief of Staff. He was detailed tothe HSPD-13 project team as the Deputy Action Officer for theDepartment of Homeland Security, where he was a member of the corewriting team that drafted the National Strategy for Maritime Securityand coordinated with the interagency working groups that developed theeight supporting plans.

The Coast Guard, as a lead federalagency responsible for maritimehomeland security, will take an activerole in executing the NationalStrategy for Maritime Security.


Innovations for Port Security

Technologists and users must partner for success.

by DR. MARC B. MANDLERTechnical Director, U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development Center

Many of us have pondered the riddle about the treethat falls in the forest with nobody in earshot. Doesthe tree make a sound? In the spirit of this classic rid-dle, here is another puzzle: If an inventor creates asolution to a problem, but no one ever adopts thesolution, is it considered an innovation?

Some argue that creativity is the mother of innova-tion. Therefore, a solution that is not embraced by endusers should still be considered an innovation if it isnovel and creative. In the corporate world, where gen-erating profits is paramount, chief executive officerswill say that products that do not generate or have thepotential to generate profits, no matter how creative,should not be called innovations.

Acquirers of port security technologies view theworld a little differently when it comes to innovations.They are inundated with information on hundreds,perhaps thousands, of technologies that are promotedas improving port security. Are all of these innova-tions? The acquirers of port security technologies—federal, state, and local officials—view innovations asnot simply those products that have the promise ofimproving the security of a port, but products that areproven to improve security and do it in an affordableand cost-effective manner.

How does one create a better environment for innova-tion in port security? Significant funding has beenmade available through a variety of sources toaddress security needs. Sometimes, the funding isprovided to technology developers to create productsthat can improve security posture. Other funds areprovided to federal, state, or local authorities toacquire the best technology for a specific application.

Technology developers are poised to provide thequick, off-the-shelf solution. Their customers searchfor the off-the-shelf system that will address their per-ceived vulnerability. The U.S. taxpayer trusts that offi-cials will be good stewards of their tax dollars andprotect them from many of the security risks that theycurrently face.

Dr. Robert Frosch, a former administrator of theNational Aeronautics and Space Administration andformer vice president of General Motors, providessome caution to developers and acquirers alike in anarticle, “The Customer for R&D is Always Wrong.”1

He writes:

“After 40-odd years of working in application- and mis-sion-oriented research, I have come to believe pro-foundly that the customer for technology is alwayswrong. Now, the technologists are usually wrong, too;they tend to be wrong in complementary ways. I haveseldom, if ever, met a customer for an application whocorrectly stated the problem to be solved. The normalstatement of the problem is either too shallow andshort-term, or, even more likely, is a formula for thewidget that the customer thinks is required to solvewhat the customer thinks is the problem. The technolo-gist is usually peddling ‘that wonderful thing we did inthe laboratory yesterday,’ and if it happens to be squareand the hole is round, a little force-fitting may help.”

To overcome the wrongness that Dr. Frosh says perme-ates discussions between technologists and customers,there needs to be a robust and active collaborationbetween technology developers and technology con-sumers. Technology developers will be more success-ful if they walk in the shoes of the customer to gain a

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full appreciation of the environment in which the useroperates. Those constraints can prevent a technologysolution from becoming an innovation.

Similarly, technology users must be willing to invitedevelopers to work alongside them and teach themabout their world and then be willing to have theiroperations serve as the testing ground for evaluatingnew technology concepts. Innovation is intimatelyrelated to the degree to which the technologist and userwork together to clearly define the problem, the desiredoutcome, and the characteristics of a successful solution.

Modeling and Simulation as Innovation ToolsModeling and simulation are tools that can help pro-mote the innovation process and facilitate dialogbetween technologist and acquirer. Models or simula-tions provide an environment to test out technologyconcepts, in a relatively low-cost way before develop-ment funds are expended, to evaluate the effective-ness of potential technology solutions.

The Coast Guard Research and Development Center(RDC), the Coast Guard’s sole research facility, usesmany tools to assist in technology evaluations to sup-port port security decisions. Simulation models areused to examine, for example, the relationshipbetween surveillance system coverage and resolutionand the likelihood of detecting a target of interest.Models are also used to evaluate the effectiveness andcosts of employing, for example, small unmannedaerial vehicles in support of Coast Guard port securitymissions. In recent work, RDC used models to exam-ine the effectiveness of waterside barriers for protect-ing vessels and facilities and different screeningstrategies for reducing the risk to ferries and passen-gers of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device.

Consider a facility operator who wants to protect afacility, cruise ship, or a liquefied natural gas (LNG)tanker from attack by a small boat carrying explosives.Physical barriers, devices placed in the water to stop orslow down a small boat, offer promise for protection.

Figure 1: The new Hawkeye port surveillance system at Sector Command Center Miami.


security to articulate their operational requirements.Sectors Miami and San Francisco served as test bedsfor rapid prototyping of a variety of technologies,such as port surveillance systems, port partner col-laboration tools, trip wires, and blue force trackingtools (technologies that tell units where friendlyforces are).

RDC developed a robust collaborative relationshipwith other Coast Guard and port partners in Miamiand San Francisco and worked closely with thesepartners to improve and refine the understanding ofoperational requirements. A significant accomplish-ment from this rapid prototyping effort was thedevelopment of rudimentary surveillance technolo-gies, blue force tracking tools, and port partner col-laboration tools that were demonstrated to improvethe productivity and effectiveness at the sector.

The success of the CATS-I rapid prototyping processspurred the Department of Homeland Security Officeof Science and Technology to make significant invest-ments in the development of a full-scale, operationalport-level surveillance and command and controlsystem in Miami. This system, called Hawkeye(Figure 1), being developed by the Coast Guard’sCommand and Control Engineering Center, contin-ues to serve as a test bed for experimentation for sec-tor-level technology improvements. Sector Miamistaff play a key role in providing feedback to develop-ers on the capabilities and the effectiveness of the sys-tem design. Further, Hawkeye is serving as a basis forthe Coast Guard’s Command 2010 program, to refinerequirements and evaluate new technology conceptsfor the Coast Guard acquisition of sector commandcenter capabilities.

A partnership between technologist and technologyacquirer/user is essential for improving port secu-rity. While some funding is flowing to ports toimprove their security posture, ports are large, thevulnerabilities are significant, and the funding is lim-ited. Everyone involved in securing ports has aresponsibility to participate in the process of innova-tion, so that the best and most economical technolo-gies can be found to secure U.S. ports. Trueinnovation is realized when technologists and userswork together to achieve common goals.

About the author: Dr. Marc Mandler is technical director of the CoastGuard Research and Development Center in Groton, Conn. He receiveda B.A. in psychology from Clark University and a Ph.D. in psychologyfrom University of Rochester. He has been a civilian employee of theCoast Guard for more than 22 years.Endnote

1 Research Technology Management, November-December 1996, pp 22-27.

RDC completed a study in partnership with theCaptain of the Port in Boston, the city of Boston, andothers to select the best commercial, off-the-shelf bar-rier to protect LNG ships moored in downtownBoston and cruise ships that make ports of call inBoston. The city of Boston was looking for stoppingcapability but was also concerned about mobility inits ports, the ease with which a barrier can be put inplace and removed, and how much deterrence to anattack a barrier would provide without incurringexcessive maintenance and support costs. A layer ofprotection analysis, which is a risk-based model, wasused to evaluate the range of factors important to theport and to aid in selecting the barrier that fit theneeds of the port. The result of this collaborativeanalysis was consensus among a number of disparategroups on the best set of technologies and operationsto protect LNG vessels and cruise ships. The processof using a model to educate the consumer helpsimprove the likelihood that the technology selectedwill actually improve security.

Similarly, RDC worked closely with the ferry industryand federal, state, and local authorities to examine therange of alternatives that could be used to protect fer-ries from attack by a vehicle-borne improvised explo-sive device. A range of commercial vehicle screeningtechnologies was examined, and a simulation modelwas developed to illustrate the trade-offs amongscreening effectiveness, cost, and efficiency of ferryoperations. This effort, done in conjunction withauthorities and ferry operators, resulted in recom-mendations that are being implemented to reduce therisk to the ferry system.

Rapid Prototyping Promotes Dialog with UsersAnother powerful tool to promote the innovationprocess and facilitate a robust partnership betweentechnologist and user is rapid prototyping. Rapid proto-typing is an iterative process whereby a technology con-cept is matured through a spiral cycle of technologyimprovements that evolve from user feedback duringthe technology development process. Rapid prototyp-ing is especially useful as a tool to help refine opera-tional requirements in situations where users mustadapt to a new mission or a new way of doing business.

Shortly after September 11, 2001, the Coast GuardResearch and Development Center began a programcalled CATS-I that used this rapid prototypingprocess to improve the capabilities at the port level toprevent and respond to terrorist incidents. At the portlevel, operators understood their need to maintain sit-uation awareness of the activities in and around theport, but they did not have enough experience in port


The DeepwaterProgram

Reducing risk in the Maritime Domain.

by RADM PATRICK M. STILLMANProgram Executive Officer, U.S. Coast Guard Integrated Deepwater System

With his approval of the National Strategy forMaritime Security in 2004, President George W. Bushreaffirmed that the safety and economic security ofthe United States depends upon the secure use of theworld’s oceans. “The United States has a vital nationalinterest in maritime security,” the new strategy states.“We must be prepared to stop terrorists and roguestates before they can threaten or use weapons of

mass destruction or engage in other attacks againstthe United States and our allies and friends.”

The U.S. marine transportation system’s ports andwaterways are at once both a vulnerable and valuabledimension of the global war on terrorism. As a result,ADM Thomas H. Collins, the Commandant of theCoast Guard, has placed a high priority on bolstering

Figure 1: The Deepwater Program's network-centric system for command and control will link all of the CoastGuard's operational assets with a common operating picture and improve connectivity with the U.S. Navy, otherfederal agencies, and local first responders. Rich Doyle, USCG.

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maritime security through vigorous implementationof the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002;the development of an enhanced maritime securityregime; improved Maritime Domain Awareness; andthe modernization and recapitalization of the CoastGuard’s aging legacy assets and systems for com-mand, control, communications, computers, intelli-gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). It isfor this reason that the Integrated Deepwater Systemplays such an important role in reducing risk in theMaritime Domain—beginning with the U.S. ports,waterways, and coastal areas that are so vital to thesecurity and economic well-being of the United Statesand the safety of our citizens.

A Centerpiece for Transformation“Recapitalizing the Coast Guard is the foundation ofour ability to continue improving maritime securitywhile facilitating the flow of commerce,” ADM Collinstestified to Congress in 2005. “The IntegratedDeepwater System is the centerpiece for the CoastGuard’s transformation and my top capital priority.”Deepwater’s three new classes of more capable cuttersand associated small boats, manned and unmannedaircraft, integrated logistics, and improved C4ISR allwill lead to a Coast Guard able to perform its multiplemissions substantially more effectively well into the21st century.

Last year, the Department of Homeland Securityapproved a revised post-September 11, 2001, imple-mentation plan that aligns the Deepwater Programwith the department’s strategic goals of threat aware-ness, prevention, and protection against terroristattacks; and response and recovery, should they occur.The revised plan, based on a comprehensive perform-ance-gap analysis, updated the original pre-9/11Deepwater Program by requiring improved capabili-ties on all assets; retaining, upgrading, and convertingaviation legacy assets as part of the final asset mix;and adjusting the program’s overall asset deliveryschedule to improve operational effectiveness at anaffordable cost.

The revised plan ensures Deepwater cutters and air-craft will be equipped with the right systems andcapabilities to operate successfully in our more chal-lenging post-9/11 threat environment. TheDeepwater Program, projected to be a progressive $24billion, 25-year modernization, conversion, and recap-italization effort, now incorporates requirements forsuch improved functional capabilities as:

· A network-centric system for C4ISR improve-ments to harness the power of an interopera-

ble network that will improve MaritimeDomain Awareness and provide a commonoperating picture. This is key to the CoastGuard’s ability to lead the interagency effortto know and respond to maritime conditions,anomalies, vulnerabilities, and threats.Improvements to C4ISR enable earlier aware-ness of events through the more effectivegathering and fusing of terrorism-relatedinformation, analysis, coordination, andresponse—all critical to detecting, deterring,and defeating terrorist attacks. Upgrades toDeepwater surface assets, for example, con-tribute directly to improved intelligence col-lection and fusion through sophisticatedShipboard Sensitive CompartmentalizedInformation Facility sensors and increaseddata-exchange bandwidth.

· Improved maritime-security capabilities, suchas increased speed and integrated weaponssystems on selected Deepwater cutters, essen-tial to higher levels of maritime homelandsecurity during a terrorist attack, opposedboardings, and other high-risk operations.

· Helicopter airborne use of force and verticalinsertion and delivery capabilities to allowhelicopters to provide warning and/or dis-abling fire and to deploy, deliver, and recoverboarding teams safely and more effectively.

· Upgraded fixed-wing aircraft for long-rangesurveillance to increase Maritime DomainAwareness and reduce maritime patrol air-craft shortfalls in operating hours; organicCoast Guard air transport will be able todeploy Maritime Safety and Security Teamsand National Strike Force teams faster forresponse with their equipment.

· Improved capabilities for anti-terrorist/forceprotection on select Deepwater assets withall-weather self-defense and the ability toprotect high-value assets; assets will have thecapability to engage terrorists with higherassurance of survivability and continued mis-sion capability.

· Improved capabilities for detection anddefense for chemical-biological-radiological(CBR) threats—essential to survival and con-tinued operations during a CBR attackinvolving a weapon of mass destruction.

It is not difficult to envision how these more-capableDeepwater platforms will enable the Coast Guard tomaintain a more vigilant and responsive maritimepresence along the U.S. maritime border, starting at


foreign-flagged ships. Deepwater’s more capablecutters will be important players in the screening andtargeting of vessels before they arrive in U.S. waters,onboard verification through boardings, and, if nec-essary, enforcement-control actions—more quickly,safely, and reliably.

The Deepwater Program’s manned and unmannedaircraft will deliver substantially more flight hoursthan today’s legacy systems and provide improvedairborne use of force and vertical-insertion capabili-ties. These improvements will be of inestimablevalue to operational commanders in addressingtoday’s tremendous burden of balancing the mis-

match between inadequate resources to growingmission requirements.

The Coast Guard’s existing inventory of HH-60J andHH-65 helicopters will be converted to multimissionplatforms outfitted with more-capable systems.Deepwater’s new CASA CN235-300M maritime patrolaircraft, upgraded HC-130 long-range search aircraft,and the Eagle Eye HV-911 vertical takeoff-and-landingunmanned aerial vehicle also will significantly increasesearch and surveillance areas from today’s levels.

Making a Difference NowTurning from the future, the Deepwater Program isalso about sustaining and modernizing today’s Coast

U.S. ports, waterways, and coastlines and extendingseaward to wherever the Coast Guard needs to bepresent or to take appropriate maritime action. This isthe layered maritime defense mandated by theNational Strategy for Maritime Security.

As the new strategy states, “Ports in particular haveinherent security vulnerabilities: They are sprawling,easily accessible by water and land, close to crowdedmetropolitan areas, and interwoven with complextransportation networks. Port facilities, along with theships and barges that transit port waterways, areespecially vulnerable to tampering, theft, and unau-thorized persons gaining entry to collect informationand commit unlawful or hos-tile acts.”

The Deepwater Program willposture the Coast Guard tooperate far more effectively inthis complex environment.When Deepwater is complete,cutters and aircraft will nolonger operate as relativelyindependent platforms withonly limited awareness of whatsurrounds them in theMaritime Domain. Instead,they will have the benefit ofreceiving information from awide array of mission-capableplatforms and sensors,enabling them to share a com-mon operating picture as partof a network-centric force oper-ating in tandem with other cut-ters, boats, and both mannedaircraft and unmanned aerialvehicles (Figure 1).

Although originally conceived with deepwater mis-sions in mind—those extending more than 50 nauticalmiles from U.S. coastlines—the Deepwater Program’smobile multimission platforms are ideally suited forthe wide range of homeland security operationsencountered in U.S. ports, waterways, and coastalareas. Improved ship designs for Deepwater’s threeclasses of new cutters, for example, will provide bet-ter sea keeping and higher sustained transit speeds;greater endurance and range; and the ability forlaunch and recovery, in higher sea states, of improvedsmall boats, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehi-cles. These key attributes will enable the Coast Guardto implement more stringent maritime homelandsecurity responsibilities, including jurisdiction over

Figure 2: The cutter USCGC Vigilant, homeported at Cape Canaveral, Fla., received theDeepwater Program's final installation of its first increment of C4ISR system upgrades inNovember 2005. All 210-, 270-, and 378-class cutters are now outfitted with a classified localarea network and have access to the Department of Defense's Secret Internet ProtocolNetwork—a key enabler for more effective maritime security patrols. USCG photo.


Guard. Recent upgrades to legacy platforms aremaking a difference now in improving operationalperformance until the transition to converted ornew-construction platforms occurs.

In autumn 2005, for example, the final installation ofDeepwater’s initial increment of C4ISR upgrades wascompleted on the medium endurance cutter USCGCVigilant (Figure 2). All 210-, 270-, and 378-class cuttersare now outfitted with a classified local area networkand have access to the Department of Defense's SecretInternet Protocol Network (SIPRNET), both under-way and in port. This Deepwater modernization

effort began with the first installation on the USCGCNorthland in 2003 and corresponding installationsashore at the Communications Area Master StationsAtlantic and Pacific.

Deepwater C4ISR upgrades have already led to moresuccessful mission performance at sea by increasingMaritime Domain Awareness and enabling moreeffective joint operations. Commanding officers onlegacy cutters say Deepwater C4ISR upgrades haverevolutionized their work—helping the Coast Guardto interdict and seize record levels of illegal drugs atsea during the past two years. Cutters outfitted withmore capable Deepwater command-and-controlupgrades also served with distinction during theCoast Guard’s response to Hurricanes Katrina andRita in 2005. They demonstrated their effectivenessenabling on-scene coordination of operations withlocal first responders and other federal agencies inports like New Orleans, La., and Gulfport, Miss.

Deepwater also is funding other sustainment projectsfor older surface assets. Last May, the mediumendurance cutter USCGC Tampa (Figure 3) was the first270-ft. cutter to enter a nine-month major systemsrefurbishment at the Coast Guard Yard in Baltimore,Md., as part of the Mission Effectiveness Project (MEP).

MEP is a key part of the Deepwater strategy to allowthe Coast Guard to bridge the gap until new cuttersare delivered. This multi-year project for 210-foot and270-foot cutters will replace obsolete and increasinglyunsupportable systems, to improve reliability andreduce maintenance costs. Up to 27 of the 270-footBear Class cutters and 210-foot Reliance Class cutterswill be phased into the yard’s workload over the nextseveral years to extend their service lives for an addi-tional 10 to 15 years.

The Coast Guard’s top aviation priority, Deepwater’saccelerated re-engining of the workhorse HH-65 hel-icopters, also is progressing well. Three modernizedHH-65C helicopters deployed during the CoastGuard’s response to Hurricane Katrina; their aircrewssaved 305 lives during 85 sorties. Compared to olderand less reliable Bravo models, the more powerfuland efficient HH-65C has twice the endurance on sta-tion (two hours and 30 minutes) and can hoist twiceas many people (six).

With a recent contract award, the first of the six HC-130J long-range search aircraft will soon begin its“missionization” modifications, following final sys-tem design and engineering. Modifications will resultin 90-percent C4ISR commonality with the CASAMPA. The J model of the venerable Hercules boasts

Figure 3: The medium endurance cutter USCGC Tampa sits high anddry at the Coast Guard Yard, Baltimore, Md., during a major systemsrefurbishment as part of the Mission Effectiveness Project for 210-ft. and 270-ft medium endurance cutters. Gordon I. Peterson, USCG.

for its post-9/11 missions; progressive modernizationand recapitalization are a marathon, not a sprint. Monthby month and year by year, however, more capableDeepwater assets, linked by a network-centric systemfor C4ISR, will strengthen smart borders and protect thenation’s ports, waterways, and coastal areas.

The Deepwater Program will progressively enable theCoast Guard’s implementation of a layered, defense-in-depth maritime security strategy for what has been rec-ognized as the nation’s most valuable and vulnerablesector, the Maritime Domain. In this sense, theDeepwater Program is a critical investment in achievinga more secure American homeland and building a 21st-century Coast Guard.About the author: RADM Patrick M. Stillman, the Integrated DeepwaterSystem’s first Program Executive Officer, leads the largest modernizationand recapitalization program in Coast Guard history.


improved power and performance over its predeces-sor and will easily convert for cargo and personneltransport missions, including the handling of over-sized equipment.

Sustaining MomentumDeepwater is postured to move forward with anappropriate sense of urgency. A fiscal year (FY) 2006appropriation of $933.1 million (later reduced by a 1percent recision to $923.8 million) allows the CoastGuard to sustain and modernize legacy cutters andaircraft to increase their useful service life while theacquisition of new assets advances (Figure 4).

Current Deepwater funding is expected to sustainour momentum in providing the Coast Guard withthe more capable assets it needs to improve maritimehomeland security, to implement the NationalStrategy for Maritime Security, and to perform allenduring core missions.

Deepwater’s FY-2006 budget provides for:· continuation of the production line for the

National Security Cutter;· continuation of design work for the first

Offshore Patrol Cutter; · completing the design and acquiring long-

lead materials for the first Fast ResponseCutter, now scheduled for delivery in 2008, 10years ahead of its original schedule;

· the next phase of the Eagle Eye VUAV fortesting;

· completion of re-engining of operational HH-65 helicopters (Figure 5) using two produc-tion lines;

· service-life extension and conversion of HH-60 helicopters and HC-130H LRS aircraft intoDeepwater end-state aircraft and continuedmissionization of the Coast Guard’s six HC-130J aircraft;

· service-life extension and electronicsupgrades for legacy medium endurance cut-ters; and

· continued development of Deepwater’s inter-operable C4ISR system to improve MaritimeDomain Awareness and provide a commonoperating picture.

The President’s FY-2007 budget request for the CoastGuard includes $934.4 million for the DeepwaterProgram—a major investment to enable the CoastGuard to be ready, aware, and responsive in the future,wherever and whenever it is needed. The DeepwaterProgram will not transform the Coast Guard overnight

Figure 4: President George W. Bush is joined by legislators, cab-inet members, and law enforcement officials in the East Room ofthe White House as he signs the Homeland SecurityAppropriations Act for fiscal year 2006. The appropriation willsustain the Deepwater Program's momentum in modernizing andrecapitalizing the Coast Guard's aging legacy assets. CourtesyPaul Morse, White House.

Figure 5: The Deepwater Program's re-engining of HH-65 helicop-ters has been accelerated as the Coast Guard's top aviation prior-ity. Three re-engined HH-65C helicopters performed superblyduring Hurricane Katrina rescue operations, saving 305 lives dur-ing 85 missions. As depicted here, older model helicoptersundergo a comprehensive modernization during the re-enginingprocess. PAC Jeff Murphy, USCG.


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Safely Securing U.S. Ports

The port security assessment program.

by LCDR BRADY DOWNSDeputy, Domestic Assessment Division, U. S. Coast Guard Inspections and Compliance Directorate

Shortly after September 11, 2001, the U.S. Coast Guardcreated the Port Security Directorate to enhance secu-rity in U.S. seaports. A crucial part of this organizationis the Port Security Assessment Team at Coast GuardHeadquarters, which has the responsibility of assess-ing port vulnerabilities and potential consequences ofmaritime-related terrorist acts and implementingtools to help ports reduce the risk of terrorism. Thedirectorate immediately made an impact by conduct-ing port security assessments in the nation’s militarilyand economically strategic ports, completing studiesof the consequences of terrorist acts on specific typesof vessels and infrastructure, developing a risk-basedtool to help ports identify maritime critical infrastruc-ture and reduce their risk of terrorism, and assistingthe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) inadministering grants to improve port security.

Security AssessmentThe Port Security Assessment Team took a very closelook at the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure andkey assets in ports supporting the marine transporta-tion system. The current assessment approach wasunique, in that it looked at port infrastructure fromthe perspective of the terrorist and used Coast Guard-led teams with former U.S. Navy Seals to identifypotential targets within the port. The teams identifiedpotential targets, including high-consequence water-front facilities, passenger vessels and terminals,bridges, and crucial waterways. These teams focusedon the vulnerabilities of these targets and developedscenarios for attacking them, then followed on withrecommendations to improve security, including howto detect, deter, and disrupt potential attacks.

To raise security awareness within the port, theassessment identifies methods and locations whereterrorists might conduct surveillance of targets, gainaccess to the target, stage equipment near the target,and outlines activities that may indicate that securityis being probed prior to an attack. Using the uniqueterrorist operations perspective enhances the vulnera-bility assessments required by the MaritimeTransportation Safety Act and prevents duplicatingthe security assessments being widely conducted byindustry and government agencies. Assessments havebeen conducted over the past three years in 72 of thenation’s most strategic port systems.

Risk Assessment and AnalysisBesides the vulnerability assessments, another keyissue within each port is the assessment of risk. Riskincorporates the elements of threat, vulnerability, andconsequence. As Department of Homeland SecuritySecretary Chertoff said, “What should drive our intel-ligence, policies, operations, and preparedness plansand the way we are organized is the strategic matrixof threat, vulnerability, and consequence. And so,we'll be looking at everything through that prism andadjusting structure, operations, and policies to exe-cute this strategy.”

Considering the uncertain nature of security threats,and given that resources to counter them are limited, itis very important to apply risk analysis to tackle thegreatest vulnerabilities with the worst consequences.The Coast Guard has used a tool called the port secu-rity risk assessment tool (PSRAT) for the past four yearsto assess risk in the various ports across the nation.

AWARENESS


Currently, the Domestic Assessment Division withinthe Directorate of Inspections and Compliance hascreated an enhanced risk calculation tool, which iscalled the maritime security risk assessment model(MSRAM). MSRAM substantially improves the detailof the risk model and gives a more accurate prioritiza-tion of risk at the port and national levels to providestakeholders with the information they need to makerisk-based decisions and best apply their limitedresources.

The maritime security risk assessment model:· improves the threat component, by applying

threat data from the Coast Guard’sIntelligence Coordination Center as to theintent and capability of the adversary;

· involves Coast Guard District and AreaCommands in review of data to provide con-sistency across ports nationally;

· requires assessing the capability ofowners/operators of critical infrastructure,local law enforcement, and Coast Guardsecurity assets to protect targets and deterand interdict attacks;

· requires estimating the secondary economicimpacts with the loss of the target, consideringrecoverability and redundancy of the target;

· addresses response capability as a primaryconsequence mitigation factor forowner/operators, local first responders, andthe Coast Guard;

· incorporates revised attack scenarios toensure alignment of the Coast Guard’s port,waterways, and coastal security missionswith Department of Homeland Securityefforts;

· features improved consistency of conse-quence and vulnerability scores betweenports by having subject matter experts assignacceptable ranges, based on experience andfield data;

· integrates an asset screening step that willallow users to determine if the consequenceratings rank high enough to require a moredetailed review of the most critical assets inthe port;

· includes a “change-case” capability, wheremitigation strategies can be applied to thescenario/asset combination, to evaluate theresulting risk reduction/risk buy-down;

· brings training to field units, with the deploy-ment of the tool to ensure a consistentapproach nationally;

· supports strategic and operational decisionsby rolling up of field-level risk assessments toportray risk density of targets;

· produces standard reports and the ability toquery data by various means; and

· provides data to support local and nationalrisk-based decision making.

Special Technical AssessmentsIn addition to the vulnerability assessments and therisk analysis tool developed via the PSRAT/MSRAM,the Port Security Assessment Team conducts specialtechnical assessments to gather accurate informationon vulnerabilities and determine the possible conse-quences of terrorist attacks on various vessel typesand other critical port infrastructure. These assess-ments assist all levels of the Coast Guard, especiallythe Captains of the Port in their role as the federalmaritime security coordinators, and asset owners andoperators in making risk-based policy decisions basedon factual data.

Special assessments typically include a technicalreview of the vessel or port infrastructure, mission,location, known vulnerabilities, cargo, areas of transit,terrorist modes of attack, and historical review ofrelated incidents. Technical experts then use computermodels to determine blast effects of various explo-sions for a range of attack scenarios, providing a con-sequence assessment. The information gained bythese assessments provides a better understanding ofwhat may actually happen during a terrorist attack, sothat the most appropriate measures may be imple-mented to protect U.S. ports and waterways.

Special technical assessment projects are nominatedby Coast Guard Headquarters, areas, districts, sectors,and field units. Examples of special technical assess-ments conducted include blast and consequenceanalysis of:

· liquefied petroleum gas ships;· passenger ferries; · barges carrying certain dangerous cargoes;· tunnels;· liquefied petroleum gas barges;· cruise ships;· single skin tank vessels; and· ammonium nitrate commodities flow study.

Due to the sensitive information contained in thesereports, they are classified but can be accessed byauthorized personnel via the Port SecurityDirectorate’s secure Website. Also, key stakeholders


About the author: LCDR Brady Downs was commissioned in the U.S.Marine Corps in 1986, where he served in the 7th Marine Amphibious/Expeditionary Brigade. In 1990, he transferred into the U.S. Coast Guard.His tours include Officer Candidate Instructor in Yorktown, Va.; Officerin Charge of the Presidential Honor Guard in Washington, D.C.; andAssistant Operations Officer aboard the Coast Guard Cutter Dallas. Hehas served as Search and Rescue coordinator for Coast Guard Group N.Y.,Pollution Investigator for Captain of the Port N.Y., and Senior MarineInspector and Marine Casualty Investigator for Activities New York. Hecurrently serves in the Directorate of Inspections and Compliance.

with appropriateclearances have beenbriefed on the resultsof these reports

FundingWhen vulnerabilitiesare identified, conse-quences are known,and risks are priori-tized, it is importantto then take steps toreduce risk in theport. This takesresources. One of themechanisms in placeto address the needs,vulnerabilities, anddocumented gaps isthe port securitygrant program. Thefederal governmentadministers this pro-gram, which fundsprojects that reducesecurity risks in ports.In 2004, the Office ofGrants and Trainingwas designated asthe lead agency tocentralize state andlocal terrorism pre-paredness and grantadministration withother emergency pre-paredness grant pro-grams. The CoastGuard plays a signifi-cant role by assistingDHS in the grantprocess, which hasawarded over $560million since 9/11.

Port security assess-ments, the maritimesecurity risk assessment model, special technicalassessments, and port security grants combine to pro-vide some of the tools and capability critical to a lay-ered security regime. This regime will mitigate risksin U.S. ports and within the marine transportationsystem.

Port security assessments, the maritime security risk assessment model, special technicalassessments, and port security grants combine to provide some of the tools and capabilitycritical to a layered security regime.

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HOMEPORTThis secure Internet portal provides critical information and service to thepublic, maritime security partners, and Team Coast Guard.

by LCDR MARK HAMMONDU.S. Coast Guard Office of Port and Facility Activities

by LCDR KARRIE TREBBEHomeport Project Officer, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Resources and Information for Prevention

Homeport (http://homeport.uscg.mil) is a publiclyaccessible, secure Internet portal that supports uniqueU.S. Coast Guard business requirements by providingpersonalized information delivery and critical serv-ices to the public, maritime industry, and Team CoastGuard. Version 1.0, which primarily supports portsecurity functionality, was deployed October 3, 2005.It serves as the Coast Guard’s primary communica-tion tool to support the sharing, collection, and dis-semination of sensitive but unclassified (SBU)information, including sensitive security information(SSI). Homeport delivers an unprecedented level ofcollaboration and information sharing capability and

has the potential to revolutionize the way the CoastGuard communicates with the public and maritimesecurity partners.

Background/HistoryThe Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002(MTSA) mandated increased information sharing andthe development of a suite of maritime security plans.In light of these requirements, in the spring of 2004,the U.S. Coast Guard Office of Port, Vessel, andFacility Security (G-PCP) sought to develop an elec-tronic plans (e-plans) management system to establishan SSI-level database and Web-based portal access to

Consider these scenarios: An urgent message arrivesat the local Captain of the Port office. It requires theimmediate dissemination of a Department of HomelandSecurity threat bulletin containing sensitive securityinformation to all Maritime Transportation Security Act-regulated bulk-liquid facilities in that port. How is thiscurrently accomplished? Multiple phone calls, faxes,hand delivery?

Prior to the next meeting of your Area MaritimeSecurity (AMS) committee, you wish to communicatewith committee members, exchange ideas, and solicitcomments/feedback regarding a sensitive portion ofthe AMS plan. However, there is currently no easilyaccessible, secure method of doing this without meet-ing face to face.

What about changes in the Maritime Security (MAR-SEC) level for your port? What is the process by whichyou ensure appropriate entities are notified in a timelymanner, and how do you track MARSEC level attain-ment for each entity?

GGoott HHoommeeppoorrtt?? TThheenn nnoo pprroobblleemm!!

AWARENESS


the vessel, facility, and area maritime security plansrequired by the MTSA. The proposed concept was todesign a system that would afford instant access,within a secure environment, for information sharingand collaboration among critical decision makerswithin federal, state, local, and industry for routinemaritime security and crisis situation management.

The U.S. Coast Guard Office of Information Resourcesfor Prevention collaborated with the Office of Port,Vessel, and Facility Security to develop the proposedsystem. The Office of Information Resources, in closecoordination with the Coast Guard’s InfrastructureManagement Division and the technical staff at theCoast Guard’s Operational Systems Command(OSC), developed a robust, Coast Guard-wideInternet portal. This system also has the potential toreplace every Captain of the Port /Federal MaritimeSecurity Coordinator Internet Website and otherCoast Guard Websites with one consistent Internetpresence.

The capabilities of Homeport also enable the CoastGuard to align with Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS) goals and support two key points ofSecretary Chertoff’s six-point agenda:

· increasing overall preparedness, particularlyfor catastrophic events by enabling wide dis-semination of threat/MARSEC informationto our maritime stakeholders, and

· enhancing information sharing with our part-ners.

Further, Homeport serves to support the NationalStrategy for Homeland Security, released September2005. This strategy specifies that the federal govern-ment will build a national environment that enablesthe sharing of essential homeland security informa-tion horizontally across each agency of the federalgovernment and vertically among federal, state, andlocal governments; private industry; and citizens.This strategy calls on DHS to lead the effort to definesharing requirements; establish processes for provid-ing and receiving information; and develop technicalsystems to share sensitive information with public-private stakeholders.

System DevelopmentDuring the summer of 2004, Homeport was developedand successfully completed DHS vulnerability testing.In November 2004 a prototype of Homeport was ini-tially deployed to eight Coast Guard units for opera-tional testing and evaluation. Development continuedand enhancements were made based on user feedback.Operational testing and evaluation was completed in

March 2005. Between March 2005 and the officialdeployment on October 3, 2005, policy and guidanceregarding the use of Homeport were developed.

The full capabilities and potential of Homeport wererealized during Hurricane Katrina response andrecovery operations. Coast Guard operation centerswere inundated with phone calls and requests forassistance. In coordination with OSC; the Office ofInformation Resources; Coast Guard’s InfrastructureManagement Division; Coast Guard HeadquartersCommand Center; and the Eighth District CommandCenter, Homeport developers delivered the capabilityof allowing the public to complete amissing/stranded person request form online. CoastGuard Headquarters and District Eight operation cen-ters were able to log into Homeport to view therequests. Within 24 hours of making the onlinerequest form available, over 6,000 requests were sub-mitted. In the end, Homeport received over 16,000requests for help.

System DeploymentMultiple training sessions were conducted in July andAugust 2005 at OSC Martinsburg, W.Va., to establisha pool of qualified Homeport registration approvers.Approvers are responsible for the review, proper vet-ting, and approval of Homeport user accounts. Thetraining included basic system operations, specificfunctionality, and key features enabling members toreturn to their units to begin generating port-wideusage and populating local content areas.

Post-deployment training is planned during fiscalyear 2006, consisting of several train-the-trainer ses-sions. Additionally, on-demand training will be madeavailable to each sector desiring specific, focusedtraining. G-PCP is also in the process of developing aseries of training videos that will be available to thefield in the near future. These videos will highlight themany useful tools and functionality within the systemthat are designed to enhance coordination among var-ious port security partners.

G-PCP hosted a series of workshops comprised ofCoast Guard personnel, representing a cross section ofvarious field units and program offices. This groupwas brought together to represent the diversity ofpotential Homeport users and to address concernsregarding the implementation of Homeport. The end-product of these workshops was G-MPS (now G-PCP)Policy Letter 01-05, which provides detailed guidanceon the proper use of the port security functions withinHomeport, including review/approval of user regis-trations, use of SBU communities, publishing threat


· manage the security plan review and approvalprocess;

· publish and disseminate local security alerts;review national security alerts and threat prod-ucts; and collaborate with their Area MaritimeSecurity Committee, Harbor SafetyCommittees, and Safety AdvisoryCommittees;

· easily publish and maintain enterprise marinesafety, security, and environmental protectionInternet information;

· publish and disseminate national securityalerts;

· publish and disseminate threat products, withthe ability to target distribution to specific portusers;

· view security plans for any vessel or facility;· see MARSEC levels of any vessel or facility;· collaborate with any Area Maritime Security

Committee, Harbor Safety Committees, andSafety Advisory Committees or other estab-lished communities.

The collaboration feature is one of the most valuabletools of Homeport. Homeport collaboration spaces,known as communities, are where a designatedgroup of users can work together on projects, setmeetings, generate tasking, and exchange informa-tion about topics of interest within a secure or non-secure environment.

Short-term enhancement plans for Homeportinclude the incorporation of an enterprise solutionfor an Alert Notification System (ANS) wherebyCaptains of the Port and Federal Maritime SecurityCoordinators can broadcast alerts through multiplemeans of communication. Further, the office ofInformation Resources continues to work with DHSon building appropriate connections betweenHomeport and DHS’ Homeland SecurityInformation Network, which provides the maincommunication, analysis, and collaboration tool forconnectivity to state and local agencies.

For more information regarding Homeport, visithttp://Homeport.uscg.mil. About the authors: LCDR Mark Hammond is stationed at the U.S.Coast Guard Office of Port and Facility Activities.

LCDR Karrie Trebbe is the Homeport Project Officer, U.S. Coast GuardOffice of Resources and Information for Prevention.

products, and setting MARSEC levels. A core aspectof the policy that is central to the registration processis the proper vetting of registrants by accountapprovers, since registered users have access to a vari-ety of sensitive security information.

Access to Homeport user accounts is currently limitedto the following user groups:

· owners and operators, vessel security offi-cers, and company security officers of vesselsthat are required to submit a vessel securityplan under MTSA;

· owners, operators, and facility security offi-cers of waterfront facilities required to submita facility security plan under MTSA;

· members of an Area Maritime SecurityCommittee;

· members of national-level committees, suchas the Safety Advisory Committee, HarborSafety Advisory Committee, NationalIndustry Security Partner, Port ReadinessCommittee, and National Maritime SecurityAdvisory Committee; and

· Coast Guard members who deal with AreaMaritime Security Committees.

User access is approved based on a registrant’s eligibil-ity and need to know. The general public has the abil-ity to view a wide range of information, much of whichis currently found on the existing Coast Guard Website.

System Capabilities and FeaturesHomeport Version 1.0 offers many useful capabilitiesand features for information sharing and collabora-tion. Anyone can access general information withoutan account. However, depending on their profile, reg-istered users have access to the following capabilitiesin Homeport:

· publish and update unit Internet information(such as statistics, safety and security zones,and inspection schedules);

· notify any maritime industry Homeport user(via e-mail);

· change MARSEC levels for the entire COTPzone or an individual port component;

· see MARSEC attainment levels of individualvessels and facilities in their COTP zone;

· view the security plan for any vessel or facility;· manage Homeport registration for maritime

industry users and industry partners;


America’s Waterway Watch

This homeland security outreach program is preventing terrorism

through awareness.

by CHIEF PETTY OFFICER PENNY COLLINSProgram Coordinator, America’s Waterway Watch, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Port and Facility Activities

by LT KENNETH WASHINGTONProgram Manager, America’s Waterway Watch, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Port and Facility Activities

America’s Waterway Watch (AWW), www.americas-waterwaywatch.org, is a maritime homeland securityoutreach program created to encourage members ofthe recreational boating public, as well as the maritimeindustry, to recognize and report suspicious activity.AWW educates the public by describing:

· what to look for; · where to look; and · how to respond when you see something sus-

picious.

What, Where, and How For what should the public look? Suspicious activitiescan include:

· people appearing to be engaged in surveil-lance of any kind;

· people attempting to buy or rent fishing orrecreational vessels with cash for short-term,undefined use; and

· unusual night operations.

Where should you look? Sensitive locations include:· under and around bridges, tunnels, or over-

passes;· near industrial facilities such as power plants

and oil, chemical, or water intake facilities;and

· near military bases and vessels or other gov-ernment facilities or security zones.

Finally, how should you respond? Recommendationsinclude:

· Secure and lock your boat when not aboard.· Disable the engine on stored or trailered

boats.· Do not approach or challenge anyone acting

in a suspicious manner.· Call the National Response Center at 800-824-

8802 or 877-24WATCH when you see some-thing suspicious.

· Call 911 if you see an immediate danger tolife or property.

The homeland security mission has become more of apriority since September 11, 2001. For large commer-cial waterfront facilities and vessels, new security reg-ulations have been promulgated under the MaritimeTransportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) and havebeen in force for a few years. While these regulatoryrequirements are a major step in the right direction, nosingle effort can address all security concerns for theentire maritime transportation system, or for the mar-itime environment as a whole. It has been estimatedthat there are over 95,000 miles of shoreline, 6,000bridges, thousands of marinas, and approximately 70million recreational boats in the United States. Giventhis extensive area of responsibility, it is not possibleto maintain a high level of security over all these areasthat may be vulnerable to potential terrorist or illegalactivity, without help from a vigilant public.

Given these recent events, the Commandant of theCoast Guard encouraged the maritime industry toreport suspicious activity to help prevent future

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the recreational boating community. This volunteergroup has once again proven its merit by developingbrochures and other educational materials, creating aWebsite, and conducting numerous outreach activi-ties with the recreational boating public across thecountry (Figure 1). The auxiliary program, WaterwayWatch, has now been incorporated into AWW, so thatthere will be no conflict in names. The auxiliary hasbeen charged to take the lead in the promulgation ofAWW within the recreational boating community.

As U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Commodore Gene M.Seibert said in a recent press release, “The active dutyCoast Guard can’t be everywhere, all the time. There are70 million recreational boaters. Through America’sWaterway Watch, the Coast Guard Auxiliary is addingeyes and ears to the nation’s efforts to prevent terrorism.”

events of terrorism in the maritimearea. Many local Coast GuardCaptains of the Port developed out-reach programs, staffing them withdedicated Coast Guard Active Duty,Reserve, and Auxiliary personnel toaddress this call in their local areas.

Local ProgramsLocal outreach programs began toorganize in their areas of responsibilityto meet this request for greater vigi-lance and reporting of suspiciousactivity. Local programs such as “OnGuard” in Miami, Fla., and“Community Coastal Watch” inMobile, Ala., prepared pamphlets andother materials to inform the recreational boatingpublic and maritime stakeholders that their assistancewas needed to help protect U.S. waterways. The mes-sage was well received by the maritime industry andrecreational boaters in each Captain of the Port zoneacross the country.

Because all of these local programs were homegrown,some problems came to light because of inconsisten-cies. For example, each program had its own criteriafor spotting suspicious activity and even its own con-tact numbers for making reports. Essentially, theselocal programs needed to be connected nationally,and there was no central place to obtain informationabout all of them. While the local programs were verysuccessful, they did not share a common link withother programs and materials. In early 2005, theAmerica’s Waterway Watch program was created.A key objective of AWW is to bring together alllocal programs under one initiative that is nation-ally connected, but locally focused.

The AWW program provides national recognitionfor all programs and unites them under oneumbrella, without losing local focus. AWW hascreated brochures, stickers, posters, and othereducational materials to be used by all local pro-grams to support their missions. The aforemen-tioned toll-free numbers have been created foruse by all AWW program participants to reportsuspicious activity.

U.S. Coast Guard AuxiliaryThe program could not have succeeded withoutthe help and close partnership of other organiza-tions. The Coast Guard Auxiliary had taken a lead-ing role in security-related outreach programs withits Waterway Watch program, which is focused on

Figure 1: Two Coast Guard Reservists and two Auxiliarists from theAmerica's Waterway Watch team conduct public outreach at the Ft.Lauderdale boat show. From left: PS1 Glenn Moffett (Reservist); Mr.Kenneth Deonarine (Auxiliarist); Mr. Irving Goldman (Auxiliarist); LTPedro Mesa (Reservist).


could impact the security,safety, economy, or environ-ment of the United States.”America’s Waterway Watch isa vital part of the CoastGuard’s overall MaritimeDomain Awareness picture,since a more vigilant andaware public will greatlyincrease deterrence to futureterrorist activities.

The public’s participation inthe program provides valu-able information about suspi-cious activity. AWW’spartnership with the NationalResponse Center ensures thatthe suspicious activity reportsreceived are shared with theDepartment of HomelandSecurity, Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, CentralIntelligence Agency, and manyother government agencies

that require this information to plan and prepare forany potential terrorist attack in the maritime sector.

Continued support of the America’s WaterwayWatch program will ensure that the agencies need-ing the information will receive it on a timely basis.AWW is unique, in that it offers the average citizenan opportunity to actively contribute to the protec-tion of our way of life.

The future of America’s Waterway Watch is bright.As new partnerships are established and fostered,the message will continue to reach the people whowill be the eyes and ears in helping to protect theUnited States from those who would do harm. Themaritime area is huge and, subsequently, vulnerable.The Coast Guard alone cannot protect all U.S. mar-itime interests. It will require educational materials,the continued support of the public through theseoutreach programs, and continued funding fromleaders in government to move this effort forward. About the authors: Chief Petty Officer Penny Collins has 32 years ofservice with the U.S. Coast Guard as a reservist. On active duty sinceOctober 15, 2001, CPO Collins serves as the Program Coordinator forAmerica’s Waterway Watch. Her responsibilities include developingtraining procedures, coordinating partnerships, and interacting with theCoast Guard commands for reserve participation as well as the CoastGuard Auxiliary for augmentation. LT Kenneth Washington, former Program Manager for America’sWaterway Watch, had 14 years of active duty service with the U.S. CoastGuard; seven of those years were spent as a boarding Officer. As programmanager, his responsibilities included acquiring funding for the programand managing program activities. He served as the Assistant BranchChief for the U.S. Coast Guard Coordination and Awareness Branch.

Both the Auxiliary and regular Coast Guard have addedadditional partnerships to the America’s WaterwayWatch effort. Organizations now participating includethe U.S. Power Squadrons, National Association of StateBoating Law Administratiors, Boat U.S., the U.S. ArmyCorps of Engineers, the National Sheriff’s Association,the states of Michigan and Connecticut, Association ofMarina Industries, Navy Sea Cadets, Association ofShire Yacht Clubs, and International Association ofChiefs of Police. How the Public Can HelpAside from partnerships, AWW is being marketed inother ways. For instance, National Association for StockCar Auto Racing (NASCAR) fans are the target audi-ence for an AWW public service announcement featur-ing the Labonte racing family. Marketing to thissegment of the population makes sense, because amajority of NASCAR fans are also recreational boaters(Figure 2).

AWW directly supports two elements of the U.S.Coast Guard Commandant’s Maritime Strategy forHomeland Security:

· increasing Maritime Domain Awareness; and · leveraging partnerships to mitigate security

risks.The Coast Guard defines Maritime Domain Awareness(MDA) as “the effective understanding of anythingassociated with the global maritime environment that

Figure 2: Coast Guard Commandant ADM Thomas H. Collins is flanked by reservists from theAmerica's Waterway Watch program team and active duty personnel from the Coast GuardRecruiting Command (CGRC). All are participating in an outreach effort at Lowe's MotorSpeedway, Charlotte, N.C. From left: FN Michael Cajagas (CGRC), AMT1 Rickey Allen(Recruiting Office, Charlotte, NC); SK1 Chris Morere (Recruiting Office, Raleigh, N.C.); PACRenee Gordon (Officer-in-Charge, Recruiting Office, Charlotte, N.C.); ADM Thomas H.Collins; AMT1 Charles Kramer (CGRC, Raleigh, N.C.); CAPT Bruce Viekman (CommandingOfficer, Coast Guard Recruiting Command); and PS1 Terry Waterfield (LANTAREA - CGD5,Portmouth, Va.)


Imagine this scenario: On the dawn of the 11th day atsea, the crewmembers of the fictional product tankerNeptune rise in preparation for their first port call in theUnited States. The Neptune is struggling to make itsnotice of arrival (NOA) time, after taking some heavyseas during its transatlantic trip. The bar pilots are keep-ing an eye on the vessel’s progress, so they can positiontheir pilot boat accordingly. However, the pilots and thelocal U.S. Coast Guard units are not the only groupstracking the tanker’s progress and preparing for itsarrival.

Secretly, a four-man crew is approaching the pilotboarding area from the south, in a 100-foot, power-driven supply ship. Their mission is to ram the tankerand deliver a deadly cargo ofammonium nitrate fuel oil. Asthe supply ship comes up tospeed, the captain on the bridgeof the tanker notices the smallership on what looks to be a colli-sion course. The tanker is practi-cally helpless, with steeringcapabilities reduced at slowspeed, so the captain can onlyhope this unknown vessel isgoing to alter course as he givesa few perfunctory pulls on hisship’s whistle. Onboard thesmaller supply vessel, the crew has no intention ofstopping as they jam the throttle to full ahead…

Maritime Domain Awareness Such a doomsday scenario may seem a bit extreme. Itis hard for the general public to imagine such a threatand, therefore, may assume a threat like this does not

exist. But naivety is not a defense against attacks onU.S. ports and infrastructures. As the lead federalagency for maritime security, the U.S. Coast Guard isactively working to minimize the possibility of successof such a scenario by enhancing and expandingMaritime Domain Awareness (MDA).

One dimension of MDA is the notice of arrival regula-tion (33CFR160.2), which, generally speaking, requiresvessels to report their arrival data, date, time, location,crew, cargo, and passengers to the Coast Guard for vet-ting. It is a static tool, in that information is only avail-able when submitted by the user. However, it is vital,because so much information is received that is not cur-rently captured in other MDA initiatives. The informa-

tion captured in the NOA allowsthe Captain of the Port (COTP)to preposition the properresources, such as armed board-ing teams (Figure 1) and boatcrews, to maximize effective-ness. Or, in the case of a producttanker arriving, the COTP mayimplement a moving securityzone, based on available intelli-gence, for the date of arrival.

However, the NOA is only onedimension of Maritime Domain

Awareness. Three-dimensional coverage requires real-time information feeds, such as vessel tracking systems(VTS) and automatic identification system data, cou-pled with credible intelligence. This provides moreinsight into what the vessel is actually doing and whatinformation may have been purposely omitted fromthe NOA.

Three-Dimensional

AwarenessThe notice of arrival and its role inMaritime Domain Awareness.

by ENS JOSEPH AZZATAAssistant Project Officer, Notice of Arrival, U.S. Coast Guard

The MDA Puzzle

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Although a significanthurdle has been createdfor would-be terrorists,there is still much to bedone. The Coast Guard iscontinually looking forways to improve its cur-rent NOA regulation.Currently, the NOA regu-lation only requiresreporting data on U.S.and foreign-flagged com-mercial vessels greaterthan 300 gross tons. Theregulation also requiresinformation from for-eign-flagged recreationalvessels greater than 300gross tons and for any

vessel, either U.S. or foreign, carrying any certain dan-gerous cargo. This equates to roughly 600 NOAsprocessed daily, which is a sizable population of thetotal arrivals. However, nearly any ship is capable ofcreating a threat to homeland security, includingsmaller commercial and recreational vessels.

Closing the GapTo enhance domain awareness, it is necessary toincrease the scope of the current NOA applicability toinclude all foreign commercial vessels, regardless oftonnage, and any U.S. commercial vessel arriving froma foreign port. All inbound vessels need to bescreened, particularly those arriving from foreignports or places, to vet their crew and cargo. The secu-rity screening process can only begin when the noticeof arrival is submitted.

Let’s go back to the tanker from the scenario, which isabout to encounter a deadly threat in the form of a 100-foot supply vessel. Response is limited to the timefrom the first acknowledgement of the threat untilimpact. This could be hours or, in some cases, just afew minutes. Probability favors the attacker. However,the missing piece from our tanker scenario is intelli-gence. The story is now changed to include credibleintelligence that informs the Coast Guard of a plan todestroy the tanker. This intelligence may be nauticalcharts and an operation outline found in a hotel roomor data from an informant. With this information, thetanker is determined to be the target. The COTP canthen order the tanker to divert from the port, while theCoast Guard leads a law enforcement team to thesmaller threat vessel and intercepts the four would-beterrorists before they come within visual contact of the

Take the tanker scenario above, and assume that one ofthe unlicensed crewmembers is a known terrorist. Thecaptain enters the person’s alias and sends the com-pleted NOA off to the Coast Guard as required. Thestaff at the Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC)Coast Watch processes the NOA and finds thiscrewmember’s alias matches one on a terrorist data-base. The ICC then informs the Captain of the Port andlocal law enforcement of this crewmember’s presence,as well as the vessel’s noncompliance. The vesseltracking system and automatic identification systemdata cannot provide a crewmember’s name, so it isvital to integrate the current systems to provide thislayered defense.

Integration of IntelligenceThe integration of the various data feeds and informa-tion sources will make it far easier to track vessels inU.S. ports and waterways. Currently, the Coast Guarduses what is known as the COP, or common operatingpicture. It provides exactly that—a computer-gener-ated picture of all surface operations in the MaritimeDomain. Using the NOA, AIS, and other trackingfeeds, this system is able to categorize and track a ves-sel based on NOA data, intelligence data, and otherexternal sources. The scope is far greater than that ofthe current vessel tracking system and automatic iden-tification system coverage. This overarching viewallows a vessel to be tracked point to point, with nolimited shadow areas. The COP centralizes the effortof many systems, which not only saves time in thescreening process, but reduces the number of person-nel needed behind a desk when they can be betterused on the dock or underway on patrol.

Figure 1: A boarding team positions itself to board a Bahamian flagged cargo ship. PA3 DonnieBrzuska, USCG.


Awareness, the scope of applicability for the notice ofarrival and other tracking initiatives such as AISneeds to be expanded. The Coast Guard cannot trackwhat it does not require, so the first step is includingmore vessels. Will this be a waste of time because themajority of those vessels are compliant and cause lit-tle concern to the COTP? Yes, the vast majority will bevetted and cleared without incident, but, for thatsmall population of vessels that cause concern, theCoast Guard can direct its response in a coordinatedmanner.

For example, more time can be spent researching whythe AIS feed indicates a port call at Berth A, while theNOA indicates a port call at Berth B. Maybe thisanomaly is operator error; however, it might be some-thing else more devious. This layered approach toMDAcan only be successful if the Coast Guard contin-ues to utilize the proper tools as well as enhance them.The notice of arrival is but one piece of the MaritimeDomain Awareness puzzle, but, without it, the puzzleis incomplete.

About the author: ENS Joseph Azzata works as the Assistant ProjectOfficer for the Notice of Arrival Regulation. Prior to this assignment, hewas sailing as Third Mate in the U.S. Merchant Marine. He received hislicense from the United States Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point,N.Y.

tanker. That’s having Maritime Domain Awareness.

So, with the notice of arrival, the Coast Guard knowswhen and where the tanker is arriving. We know thecrew, we know the cargo, and we know all of the harddata. AIS and VTS tell where the vessel is, its speed,and what course it is on. At this point, the Coast Guardhas two-dimensional coverage. Intelligence can bringall this information together and give it some purpose.Not every ship is a product tanker and receives asmuch scrutiny. But add some credible threat, and nowthis actionable information can be used to allocate theproper response (Figure 2). This intelligence may comein the form of high-level knowledge passed betweenagencies, or it may come from the average boater con-cerned about suspicious activity.

The Coast Guard has developed a program to help thegeneral public assist in protecting U.S. waterways.America’s Waterway Watch (www.americaswater-waywatch.org) provides the proper channels for thepublic to contact the Coast Guard in the event theywitness unusual activity in and around U.S. maritimeinfrastructure. Many eyes on the water are needed,and who better to be aware of the intricacies of a har-bor or coastal area then the boaters and workers whospend their days on and around it?

So what is the answer? Simply put, if the United Stateswants to have more comprehensive Maritime Domain

Figure 2: The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Adak holds position alongside a cargo dhow.PA1 John Gaffney, USCG.


On WatchVessel tracking technologies

for maritime security.

by Mr. WILLIAM R. CAIRNSPrincipal Engineer for Long-Range Identification and Tracking

U.S. Coast Guard Office of Navigation Systems

The United States’ 96-hour notice of arrival data indi-cate that, on an average day, 1,040 vessels over 300gross tons approach the United States from foreignports, while another 350 ships are present in U.S. ports.An additional unknown number of vessels approachthe United States and transit the exclusive economiczone on coastwise routes, bound for non-U.S. ports.These vessels are not required to send a notice ofarrival, since they are not bound for U.S. ports and arenot generally tracked. An estimated 5,000 of theselarge vessels are within 2,000 nautical miles of theUnited States at any time.

The Case for Vessel TrackingThe U.S. Coast Guard is faced with the responsibility ofmaintaining surveillance of maritime approaches to theUnited States for safety, security, and environmental

protection. The economic impact resulting from just an11-day loss of the use of a West Coast port has been esti-mated to be $140 million to $2 billion. Ongoing migrantand drug law enforcement efforts demonstrate the lim-ited ability of U.S. civil government and military entitiesto see what is happening near the maritime borders.

The Coast Guard is pursuing vessel tracking technolo-gies to assist in the detection, classification, identifica-tion, and targeting of vessels. Among thesetechnologies, automatic position reporting is beingconsidered for tracking ships along the U.S. coastline,out to 2,000 nautical miles.

Long-Range Identification and Tracking Long-range identification and tracking (LRIT) is acooperative surveillance capability. In the LRIT con-cept (Figure 1), a ship carries radio communicationsequipment that reports identification, position, andtime to authorities tracking that ship.

To improve maritime security in the near term, theCoast Guard may pursue voluntary LRIT. Ships sub-ject to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS)and fitted with Global Maritime Distress and SafetyInmarsat-C equipment should have the capability toreport position information. Many already use thiscapability or other satellite communications, such asfleet management systems, to report position andother information to shoreside agents and owners.Ship owners may be asked to voluntarily make theirposition information available to the Coast Guard elec-tronically and permit polling. Figure 1: Long-range identification and tracking concept.

Courtesy Inmarsat.

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Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI); and Pole StarSpace Applications Ltd., an LRIT application serviceprovider; conducted an LRIT feasibility study. RMIsubmitted its results to the IMO Maritime Safety

Committee 80th session (MSC 80). 6

The United States acted as both port state and coastalstate in this study. When the Coast Guard received anotice of arrival for a Marshall Islands ship, a request totrack was sent to Pole Star. RMI ships that participatedin this study were voluntarily tracked, even when not

bound for a U.S. port. Pole Star provided RMI ship rawdata feeds, including IMO number, position, course,and speed reported, over Inmarsat-C. The Coast GuardOperations Systems Center processed this data andsent it to Coast Guard Command and ControlEngineering Center to be integrated into the commonoperational picture. The position reports allowed theUnited States to track RMI vessels on the commonoperational picture and also via Pole Star’s

LRIT and International Regulations LegislationThe Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of2002 authorized long-range tracking to assist in mar-itime security: “The Secretary may develop and imple-ment a long-range automated vessel tracking system forall vessels in United States waters that are equippedwith the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System orequivalent satellite technology....”1

The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of2004 amended this section of MTSA 2002 by requiringthe implementation of long-range tracking, consistentwith international treaties, conventions, and agree-ments to which the United States is a party.2 Morerecently, pending legislation may call upon the CoastGuard to conduct a pilot project for long-range track-ing using satellite systems to aid maritime security. 3

With legislation as the underlying authority to implementLRIT, the Coast Guard is pursuing several regulatory ini-tiatives at both the international and domestic levels.

Proposed Mandatory Participation for SOLAS ShipsThe United States is leading the effort at theInternational Maritime Organization (IMO) for adop-tion of an LRIT SOLAS amendment that includes flag,port, and coastal state access to long-range identifica-tion and tracking information. The United States seeksto have SOLAS ships carry LRIT equipment capable ofautomatically transmitting ship identity, position, andtime of position.

A U.S.-proposed draft amendment4 to SOLAS ChapterXI-2 (Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security)states that contracting governments, subject to certainrestrictions, can receive LRIT information transmittedby ships as follows:

· Flag states: All flag ships worldwide.· Port states: All ships indicating an intention to

enter, at a distance or time set by the port state.· Coastal states: All ships, regardless of flag, within

a distance of 2,000 nautical miles of the coast.

The U.S. proposal was submitted to the IMOMaritime Safety Committee 78th session (MSC 78) inMay 2004 but was not adopted. In December 2004,MSC 79 broadened the scope of LRIT beyond security,to include safety and environmental protection.5 TheIMO Radiocommunications and Search & RescueSubcommittee (COMSAR) is developing LRIT per-formance standards and functional requirements andresolving other technical issues.

LRIT StudyDuring April and May 2005, the Coast Guard; the

Figure 2: PurpleFinder Web-based display from the Marshall IslandsLRIT Feasibility Study. Courtesy Pole Star Space Applications Ltd.

Figure 3: The 2,000 nautical mile and 300 nautical milethresholds from the U.S. coasts.


PurpleFinder Web-based tracking tool (Figure 2). Thefeasibility study demonstrated to MSC 80 that long-range identification and tracking is achievable in thenear term, from both technical and policy perspectives.

LRIT RegulationsAt the conclusion of the IMO Maritime SafetyCommittee 80th session, officials agreed on the LRITsystem architecture and minimum informationrequirements. It was agreed that the transmission ofLRIT information should not require any interventionby shipboard personnel, will be at no cost to the ship,and will be available free of charge to contracting gov-ernments for search and rescue purposes. Only con-tracting governments that request and obtain LRITinformation would be required to pay for the service.

MSC 80 officials also agreed that an independent long-range identification and tracking coordinator shouldperform oversight of the LRIT data center, applicationservice providers, and elements of the communica-tions systems. The LRIT coordinator should verify thatall LRIT participants adhere to long-range identifica-tion and tracking information security requirements.The IMO Maritime Safety Committeerequested the International MobileSatellite Organization to advise the com-mittee whether it was willing and able toundertake this oversight role. 7

MSC 80 identified a number of LRIT keypoints:

· nothing in the regulation shallprejudice the rights or obligationsof states under international law;

· the purpose of the regulation is forsecurity, search, and rescue, andany other purpose as determined

by IMO; · the regulation applies to ships 500 gross tons

and above; · flag states can receive LRIT information from

all their ships globally;· flag states can name contracting governments

that shall not receive LRIT information on theirships;

· port states can set either a time or distance forthe mandatory receipt of LRIT information forships bound for their ports;

· the distance at which a coastal state can receiveLRIT information remains under discussion. 8

An MSC intersessional working group meeting washeld in October 2005 to develop draft SOLAS amend-ments on LRIT. Because an agreement could not bereached on coastal state access to LRIT information,the draft amendment only includes flag and port stateaccess. The proposed amendment, submitted by theUnited Kingdom as Circular Letter No. 2681, datedNovember 8, 2005, is being circulated in advance ofMSC 81 so that it might be adopted there. 9 At presstime, COMSAR 10 is expected to complete work onlong-range identification and tracking performancestandards and functional requirements and forwardthese to MSC 81 for approval.

The deliberations at COMSAR 10 and MSC 81 onlong-range identification and tracking performancestandards and the draft amendment will have a sig-nificant positive impact on international maritimesecurity. Figure 3 indicates the vast tracking area towhich the United States will have access at the 2,000nautical mile threshold (black line). This distanceroughly equates to the 96-hour notice of arrival (at aship speed of 20 knots.) The green line indicates the300 nautical mile threshold.

Figure 4: Potential AIS coverage from NOAA data buoys.

Figure 5: Satellite-based automatic identification system. CourtesyORBCOMM.


reception range was 220 nautical miles. These dis-tances are only achieved intermittently, but that maybe good enough for security applications.

Although tower-mounted AIS may reach these dis-tances, it is still limited in range. By placing AISreceivers at heights not achievable with towers, thecapability expands to a significantly larger footprint.

Satellite-Based AIS Coast Guard contracted with Johns Hopkins UniversityApplied Physics Lab to determine if automatic identifi-cation system signals could be captured over a widearea, from a low-earth-orbit satellite. Because AIS trans-missions are self-organizing, time division multipleaccess, vessels within the same horizon can broadcasttheir information in specific time slots, without steppingon each other’s signals. This study examined the feasi-bility of receiving and deciphering a large number ofsimultaneous signals, with due regard to satellitereceiver saturation. It showed that receiving automaticidentification system signals at a satellite is feasible anda significant number of signals could be received simul-taneously, without loss of message content. A contractwas issued with ORBCOMM, a satellite data communi-cations company, to put an AIS receiver on one of theirsatellites for testing. Figure 5 shows the satellite-basedAIS concept. At this writing, the test satellite was due tobe launched in 2006.

After validating the concept with a successful test, theCoast Guard plans to deploy a follow-on constellation.If testing of a satellite with an AIS receiver is success-ful, deployment could begin for a five-year phase inperiod to launch up to 26 satellites.

Through the use of technologies such as long-rangeidentification and tracking and automatic identifica-tion systems, coupled with international regulations,the Coast Guard is striving to improve its maritimesecurity stance.

About the author: Mr. William R. Cairns is Principal Engineer for Long-Range Identification and Tracking in the Waterways ManagementDirectorate at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters. He has served on U.S. del-egations to the IMO Maritime Safety Committee and NAV and COMSARSub-Committees and is coordinator of the COMSAR CorrespondenceGroup on LRIT. He is a Fellow, Royal Institute of Navigation, and memberof the White House Military Aides Association.

Endnotes1 46 USC 70115. 8 IMO MSC 80/24 para 5.108.2 Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 9 IMO Circular letter No.2681Act of 2004, P.L.108-293, 118 Stat.1080. dated November 8, 2005.3 Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 10 SOLAS V/Regulation 19.Act of 2005, H.R. 889 section 404. 11 Current Status of AIS Class B 4 IMO MSC 80/3/3. Development and Findings on5 IMO MSC 79/23 para 5.72. AIS Signal Reception Range, 6 IMO MSC 80/5/9. David Pietraszewski and 7 IMO MSC 80/24 para 5.98.3. Joseph Spalding,

29 September 2004.

Automatic Identification SystemsIn addition to long-range identification and trackingfor maritime security, automatic identification sys-tems are also taking a role in the near-shore environ-ment. An automatic identification system (AIS) isequipment required to be installed on SOLAS-classvessels effective July 2004.10 AIS messages include ahost of information such as ship identification, posi-tion, time, cargo, speed, and rate of turn. Althoughthis system was designed for collision avoidance, bycommunicating information directly between shipswithin VHF range, AIS is now being used as a tool formaritime security.

Nationwide AIS The Coast Guard is pursuing a major acquisition todeploy AIS receivers nationwide. In the short term,smaller scale efforts are being made in the Gulf ofMexico; in waters near Hawaii, California, andAlaska; and on offshore National Oceanographic andAtmospheric Administration (NOAA) data buoys.Figure 4 indicates the additional coverage that maybe attained from these buoys.

Range of AIS SystemsAIS is a line-of-sight system, operating in the VHFband. A good rule of thumb for line-of-sight coverageis:

where d is the line-of-sight distance (in miles) and hrepresents respective heights of shore and ship anten-nas (in feet). An AIS antenna on a tower at 300 feetshould receive signals from a ship automatic identifi-cation system 30 feet above the waterline out to 32miles. However, research has shown that AIS mayreach much greater distances.

More comprehensive propagation models indicate abroader coverage area than the rule of thumb. Usingthe Engineer’s Refractive Effects Prediction System-PROPR model, two ships with class A AIS antennas at100 feet, 12.5 watt transmit power, 2.5 dB antenna gain,and receiver sensitivity of –107 dBm ought to receiveeach other at 40 nautical miles. From a similarlyequipped ship to a shore station with 100-foot, 9.5 dBantenna gain and –119 dBm sensitivity, the shore sta-tion ought to “see” the Class A at 97 nautical miles. 11

The Coast Guard Research and Development Centerhas established a network to study methods toimprove AIS reception. Personnel conducted meas-urements on AIS shore site reception to determineapparent coverage area. At one typical site, 50 percentof the time, the maximum reception range was 140nautical miles; 10 percent of the time the maximum

d=√2hantenna +√2hship


(CIE). The challenge is to provide this common opera-tional picture to all necessary entities in as completeand accurate manner as near to real time as possible. Todo this, the envisioned collaborative virtual databasemust be equipped with the latest automated datamanipulation tools, capable of data mining, patternrecognition, anomaly detection and other planner, ana-lyst, and operator automated assistance tools.

The strategy and plans workgroup, one of sevenformed after the multi-agency May 7, 2004, MDAsummit, developed seven essential tasks that, whenaccomplished, are expected to achieve comprehensiveMaritime Domain Awareness. These tasks includemonitoring of vessels, people, cargo, and designatedareas of interest in the global maritime environment;accessing all relevant databases; collecting, analyzing,disseminating relevant information; and developingappropriate metrics to measure performance towardaccomplishment of the MDA related missions.

The other workgroups included ones for technology,legal, intelligence, common operational picture, out-reach and budget. The intelligence workgroupdefined the potential threats and the technology workgroup initiated a survey of what assets were availablewithin the government to assist in the detection ofthose threats. Once it was understood what theagreed tasks were versus those threats, and a roughidea of what concept of operations was feasible andlikely to be enacted, the technology workgroup per-formed a gap analysis on the entire MDA system andproposed a range of initiatives to improve the capabil-ity to detect, track, classify, and identify vessels, thecargo in them and the people on them, including theirintentions, in the Technology Roadmap.

Technological SolutionsSince a core requirement of the MDA collaborativeinformation environment is accurate vessel detection

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) has always beena focus for the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard, but,since September 11, 2001, the term has taken on newmeaning as the sea services have worked to close secu-rity gaps in U.S. maritime frontiers. In the multi-frontwar against global terrorism, those who would exploitthe maritime environment and transportation systemsfor unlawful or hostile means must be denied. U.S.national interests lie well beyond territorial waters andcannot be constrained by geographic boundaries. TheUnited States is the world’s leading maritime nation,whether measured by the sheer number of vessels ply-ing its waters, the volume of goods transported byship, or the economic value of its maritime commerce.With such reliance on an efficient and effective globalmaritime transportation system, the United Statesmust be firmly committed to its security.

From the U.S. perspective, the sooner illegitimateactivity in the global maritime environment can beidentified and halted, the more secure the homelandwill be. This means becoming aware of illegal orpotentially threatening activities as distant from U.S.shores as possible to determine the optimal response.Taking that a step further, then, critical areas such ascargo loading facilities, embarkation/debarkationpoints, shipping lanes, choke points, as well as ourown maritime approaches and facilities, must bemonitored to establish a layered security regime.Additionally, layers of awareness must also be estab-lished that are centered upon traditional areas ofinterest, such as an environmental pollution andrecovery, resource poaching, humanitarian efforts, orsearch and rescue operations.

Senior government officials, tasked with creating anational plan to improve Maritime Domain Awareness(see sidebar), recognized the need for the developmentof a common operational picture, with a user definableinterface to a collaborative information environment

Maritime Domain Awareness

Technology is the easy part.

by MR. GUY THOMASScience & Technology Advisor, U.S. Coast Guard

AWARENESS


and location data, the technology workgroup examina-tion focused on ways to enhance the ability to detectvessels and craft both on the high seas and in the lit-torals. They looked at both sensors and likely platforms.

RadarThe first area of examination was, not surprisingly,long range radar systems upgrades. The utility ofthree types of long range (beyond line of sight) highfrequency radars is being studied:

· The buoy-mounted HF surface wave radar,currently used for ocean current and waveheight observation, appears to have promise.This is especially true if several are usedtogether in a multi-static mode.

· The very large array relocatable over thehorizon radar (ROTHR) appears the mostpromising in many ways, with demonstrateddetection ranges of 1500+ miles.

· The large array shore or barge-based HF sur-

face way radar, which may have some lim-ited utility in unpopulated areas.

Other sensorsTo screen shipments before they depart foreign coun-tries destined for the United States, Customs andBorder Protection (CBP) uses non-intrusive technol-ogy to quickly inspect cargo containers. Enhancedcapability to detect a wider variety of potentiallythreatening substances is under development.Additionally, smart boxes, which are shipping con-tainers with built-in sensors that can detect tempera-ture changes or unauthorized entry and someprohibited items, now in use to protect valuable orperishable contents, are currently being evaluated.

New sensors— both active, such as upgraded radars,and passive, such as the exploitation of the reflectionof radio, TV, cell tower and satellite downlink sig-nals, and acoustics—are being examined.

Today, a major paradigm shift is occurring with regard to MaritimeDomain Awareness, as the Coast Guard, in active partnership witha broad range of governmental agencies, seeks to protect U.S.ports and waterways from those who would do them harm.

Indeed, since September 11, 2001, numerous war games, semi-nars, and forums have been held to discuss needed improvementsin the maritime security of the United States. Those discussionsranged from the search for technological silver bullets to legal andpolicy issues, to resources required gathering and analyzing allforms of intelligence and information. In August 2003, the U.S.Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for security in the MaritimeDomain, recognized its lead responsibility and created theMaritime Domain Program Integration Office (MDA PIO).

It was immediately recognized that there needed to be a summitof all federal agencies involved in the Maritime Domain, and,beginning in January 2004, planning was initiated. The MDA sum-mit concept plan was quickly approved by the Secretaries ofDefense and of Homeland Security. Over the next four months,numerous planning meetings were held with almost 30 federalgovernment organizations. The culmination was the MDA Summit,held at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory onMay 7, 2004, co-hosted by the Honorable James Loy, DeputySecretary for Homeland Security, and the Honorable Paul McHale,Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. In atten-dance were senior members of every federal agency with a stakein the U.S. Maritime Domain.

Due to meticulous pre-planning, the senior members of those 25+agencies were able to agree on just what MDA is, establish itsguiding principles, achieve a baseline understanding of the issuesinvolved, and set a course for the way ahead. One of the main find-ings was that the efforts to provide the maritime security of theUnited States was heretofore disjointed and lacked clear authorityand chain of command. To address this challenge, a senior steer-ing group, made up of deputy cabinet level members, was created,

and a team, co-led by the Navy and the Coast Guard, was formedto develop an implementation plan and draft a presidential direc-tive.

An accepted definition of MDA was agreed upon: “The effectiveunderstanding of anything associated with the global MaritimeDomain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environ-ment of the United States.” This is an extremely broad and ambi-tious definition, which by its breadth requires unprecedentedlevels of cooperation among U.S. government agencies, civilauthorities, foreign government agencies, and private industry.That cooperative effort is reflected in the broad composition andsubject matter of the seven workgroups that were established toaddress various aspects of MDA. Those workgroups included strat-egy and plans, legal, outreach, budget and resources, intelligence,common operational picture, and technology.

On December 21, 2004, President George W. Bush signed theNational Security Presidential Directive-41/Homeland SecurityPresidential Directive-13. This dual-titled directive established U.S.maritime security policy and directed the development of a wide-ranging National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) thatincludes eight policy actions. The NSMS was subsequently signedon September 20, 2005. The eight supporting plans followed suitover the next several months.

The purpose of the directives is to enhance U.S. national securityby focusing the disparate maritime security-related efforts occur-ring across a wide range of government agencies into a cohesiveand comprehensive national effort. The first, and most fundamen-tal, of the policy actions is Maritime Domain Awareness. Each pol-icy action has a deliverable due to the president, and, in the caseof MDA, this deliverable is a national plan to achieve MaritimeDomain Awareness.

To that end the MDA Implementation Team has been created andis now at work.

Formation of the National Strategy for Maritime Security


ing of MDA’s environment is data fusion including,data-mining, pattern recognition and anomaly detec-tion of information in existing databases, owned by awide range of organizations, including many govern-mental organizations, international organizations, andcooperative private companies such as insurance, trad-ing, shipping, and ship building and operating compa-nies who fully understand it is in everyone’s bestinterest to participate in the CIE. Analytical softwarethat can either run alone, or in conjunction with data-mining and anomaly detection software, is being devel-oped.

A Look to the FutureGlobal information system display and decision toolsfor analysis and decision makers at all levels are alsobeing investigated, as are the means to tie all of thesefunctions together and build a true, real-time, com-mon operational picture. One of the major initiativesin this area is composable FORCENet, which allowsthe user to define his/her relevant community ofinterest on the fly. Composable FORCENet, a Navyinitiative to build its own service-oriented architec-ture (SOA), is developing the tools to allow a user toquickly define his own rules for his own informationdomain, using smart push and pull tools to makeoptimum use of all information available and relevantto the particular system/console operator. It willbuild the user defined operational picture.

Great strides can be made toward improvingMaritime Domain Awareness through efforts toenable and enhance information sharing among gov-ernmental agencies and by incentivizing privateindustry participation. However, there are significantpolicy as well as technological challenges to be over-come. Notable synergies will be realized, as variousoperational pictures are integrated and databasesfrom participating agencies are made available.

Beyond establishing communication pathways, policy,as well as technical, solutions are also being sought tosolve issues concerning restricted data accessibilityand protection of civil liberties and proprietary infor-mation. If anything, the policy issue is actually largerthan the technology issues. Much has been done, butmore remains to be done. The Navy /Coast Guardteam, working together, is fully engaged in developingnew ways to safeguard the United States from a widerange of possible maritime threats.About the author: Mr. George Guy Thomas is Science & TechnologyAdvisor, Maritime Domain Awareness, U.S. Coast Guard. A retired Navycommander, he has published several articles on technical intelligence, recon-naissance and surveillance systems, and electronic warfare. Mr. Thomas is adistinguished graduate of the Naval War College, he holds a Master’s Degreein Computer Information Systems from Bryant College. He is a member ofDelta Mu Delta, national graduate school honor society.

PlatformsCommercial satellites, and high and medium alti-tude, long endurance craft, both lighter-than-air andmore conventional unmanned aircraft such as theGlobal Hawk, have the potential to localize and iden-tify vessels on the high seas. Unconventional plat-forms, such as lighter-than-air vehicles (free-floatingand tethered), oceanic surveillance buoys, and newbuoys built for ship surveillance, are being consid-ered for surveillance of our approaches. Employingexisting oil rigs or even building new, free-floatingplatforms for surveillance purposes are also underconsideration. Nothing is off the table.

Transponders/BeaconsLarge commercial vessels now carry a collision avoid-ance and harbor traffic control device called the auto-matic identification system (AIS). It containsinformation similar to the transponders carried onairliners, and work is underway to convert this sys-tem to a system similar to air traffic control, to betteridentify all vessels near U.S. shores. Eventually, AISmay have space-based relays on commercial satel-lites. These same ships are also required to carry thesatellite communication-based Global MaritimeDistress and Safety System (GMDSS) which can bepolled to determine the ship’s location. Additionally,several companies now sell commercial satellite-based asset tracking systems which could also beused as a vessel tracking system at a nominal cost.Both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army are usingcommercial satellite-based systems for asset and“blue force tracking” to good effect. Expansion ofeither, or both, for use as an MDA tool is under con-sideration.

Operational ConceptCoupling long range sensors with cooperative report-ing devices, such as AIS, and satellite-based trackingdevices, with the mandated advanced notice ofarrival—which requires all large commercial vesselsto report their intention of entering a U.S. port 96hours in advance—appears to best establish a baselineas to what is approaching the U.S. coast. Sensors, asdescribed above, coupled with the transponder/bea-con systems, could determine which contacts are notreporting, thereby allowing watchstanders and ana-lysts could focus special attention of those few tracks.One of the first things they would do is query databases to understand known potential problems. Adescription of some of the tools under consideration isbelow.

Data FusionAnother rich area for the development of understand-


Keeping U.S. Waters Safe and SecureIndustry leadership in port security.by LCDR MARK WILLISWaterfront Facility Security Branch Chief, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Port and Facility Activities

by LCDR MALCOLM MCLELLANVessel Security Branch Chief, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Port and Facility Activities

The maritime industry has always played an integralpart in the development and implementation of regu-lations. Without this support and leadership, the reg-ulatory process would be contentious and potentiallydamage the staunch relationship that the U.S. CoastGuard has developed with maritime industry part-ners. Their assistance in developing the provisions ofthe Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of2002 was invaluable. During this process, the alterna-tive security program (ASP) was developed to pro-vide industry partners greater flexibility in meetingMTSA requirements.

The Coast Guard was commended by the maritimeindustry for establishing the ASP provisions thatprompted security programs compatible with a largesegment of the regulated U.S. merchant maritimefleet. Several organizations, including the AmericanWaterways Operators, Passenger Vessel Association,Lake Carriers Association, and the Offshore MarineService Association, rose to the challenge and devel-oped ASPs for their specific industry segments. Todate, there are nine approved alternative security pro-grams, which include thousands of vessels and facili-ties throughout the nation.

American Waterways OperatorsThe American Waterways Operators (AWO) is anational association representing the owners andoperators of towing vessels and barges serving inlandand coastal waters of the United States. The towingindustry accounts for 79 percent of all domesticwaterborne freight (Figure 1). Of the 31,449 towingvessels and barges in the towing industry, AWO

Figure 1: A crane barge manuevers near other barges on theHouston ship channel. PA2 James Dillard, USCG.

PREVENTION


member companies account for 80 percent of them.Since September 11, 2001, AWO took a very proactiveapproach toward development of an ASP for the tow-ing industry.

According to Ms. Amy K. Hewett, AWO’s manager,government affairs, “AWO brought together a diversecross section of members to develop their alternativesecurity program.” Their efforts resulted in a practicalalternative security program that significantlyenhanced the security of the towboat industry.

“The AWO ASP has enabled AWO members to focuson implementing security measures to reduce the vul-nerability of their vessels and operations, rather thanspending time developing individual vessel plansand obtaining Coast Guard approval,” Hewett said.

When asked about changes the AWO would like tosee in the ASP portion of the rule, Hewett com-mended the Coast Guard for allowing trade associa-tions and other industry groups to develop ASPs thataddress the particular needs of specific segments ofthe maritime industry. However, she recommendedthe use of the same compliance checklist by membercompanies when verifying a vessel’s implementationof the AWO ASP.

The Lake Carriers AssociationThe Lake Carriers Association (LCA) represents U.S.-flagged vessel operators on the Great Lakes. The asso-ciation has 12 member companies, which operate 55vessels, including self-propelled vessels and inte-grated tug/barge units that range in length from 383to 1,013.5 feet. In fact, 13 of LCA’s vessels are morethan 1,000 feet long. Cargo carried by these vesselsincludes coal, iron ore, stone, cement, salt, grain, andliquid bulk products (Figure 2).

An LCA-developed alternative security program forGreat Lakes carriers was approved by the CoastGuard in December 2004. For its efforts, the LCA wascommended by RADM Ron Silva, Commander ofthe 9th Coast Guard District: “Your foresight will notonly assist the Great Lakes community in complyingwith MTSA requirements but, more importantly, willgreatly enhance the security of your vessels and thepeople of the Great Lakes.”

According to Mr. Glen Nekvasil, LCA’s vice presi-dent, corporate communications, “the primary suc-cess of the ASP is that it is tailored to the Great Lakesenvironment. Also, everyone has a clear understand-ing of what is required and how best to achieve itsgoals. What will be most important in the future willbe to ensure that any changes in the security regimeare based on risk and recognize the difference inoperating conditions throughout the U.S. MerchantMarine.”

The Offshore Marine Service AssociationThe Offshore Marine Service Association (OMSA) isa national trade organization of offshore marineoperators that addresses and pursues issues relevantto vessels engaged in various offshore activities,including crew boats for oil rigs, offshore supply andutility service vessels, lift boats, cargo and derrickbarges, offshore construction and other specializedoffshore support vessels. After 9/11, OMSA pro-vided the leadership needed to prevent exploitationof offshore marine industry assets by terrorists.

“OMSA immediately recognized that one of the cor-nerstones of security for America's vital offshore oiland gas infrastructure was the people and vesselsthat support that infrastructure,” commented Mr.

Ken Parris, OMSA vice president. “With off-shore sources of oil and gas supplying morethan 25 percent of America's energy needs, itwas vital to prepare a unified program thatwould quickly ramp up the offshore industry'ssecurity posture.”

OMSA took responsibility to develop a unifiedsecurity plan that could be used across the entireindustry and formed a working group of com-pany security officers to develop responses tosecurity scenarios for various threat levels.These recommendations were developed intoan industry-relevant ASP and submitted toCoast Guard for approval.

Figure 2: The Columbia Star navigates a lock.


When asked about OMSA’s experience indeveloping and implementing its ASP,Parris said, “Our experience was one ofconsultation and cooperation. By involv-ing the Coast Guard staff early, andthrough regular contact, we were able toproduce a product that required minimalediting prior to final approval.Deployment and implementation of theplan was facilitated by the use of anindustry-wide ASP.”

The Passenger Vessel Association The Passenger Vessel Association (PVA)is a trade organization that focuses on theissues and concerns relevant to ownersand operators of small passenger vessels.PVA members own or operate passengerferries, small dinner cruise ships, chartervessels, gaming vessels, excursion ves-sels, and other small passenger vesselsthat carry an estimated 200 million pas-sengers each year. The limited resourcesavailable and competitiveness of thesmall passenger vessel industry has made compli-ance with the MTSA security regulations more chal-lenging. To ensure the security of the passengers,crews, and cargo, it was imperative that this chal-lenge be met and overcome. By partnering with theCoast Guard, PVA was able to develop industry stan-dards for security of passenger vessels that led to thedevelopment of an approved PVA alternative secu-rity program (Figure 3).

Ms. Beth Gedney, director of safety, security, and riskmanagement for PVA, said, “Developing the ASPwas a very positive experience. We believe that theend result is always much better when Coast Guardand PVA develop the document together, to addressconcerns on both sides; the result is a better productthat requires less adjusting afterwards.”

PVA president Mr. Gary Frommelt commented,“This is a significant achievement for the passengervessel industry and a major benefit for PVA mem-bers. It means that PVA members will have directaccess to a security program that has already beenthought through for them. They will have a viableand effective tool that will allow them to efficientlyenhance their organization's security, while helpingto meet the security needs of our nation.”

The Maritime Transportation Security Act has beenvery successful in enhancing the security posture ofthe maritime industry and community. A key elementof this success has been the leadership provided bythe maritime industry’s professional organizations.The strong partnership, leadership, and collectiveprofessional experience of the marine industryensured the development of new countermeasures totraditional areas of vulnerability along the waterfrontand in the coastal domain. This permitted theMaritime Transportation Security Act to be developedand implemented rapidly following the tragic eventsof 9/11. Programs such as the ASP continue to ensurethat security requirements are catered to the customer,thereby providing the flexibility needed to maintaineffective security systems.

About the authors:LCDR Malcolm McLellan has been in the marine safety field for 12 years,with assignments to Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Mobile, ActivitiesEurope, and MSD Greenville. He is currently assigned to the Office ofPort and Facility Activities at Coast Guard Headquarters, where he han-dles all issues relating to vessel security.

LCDR Mark Willis has been in the Marine Safety and Security Field for15 years. He has had assignments in Marine Safety Office Puget Sound inSeattle, the Persian Gulf, Container Inspection Training and Assist Teamand Marine Safety Office Honolulu. He is currently the WaterfrontFacility Security Branch Chief in the Office of Port and Facility Activitiesat Coast Guard Headquarters.

Figure 3: Passengers are screened prior to ferry launch.


Current RequirementsSubchapter H requires all personnel on applicablevessels to have some degree of maritime securityknowledge, depending on the level of responsibilityof the individual; however, the regulations do not cur-rently require formal training. Rather, this knowledgecan be obtained through training or equivalent jobexperience.

Vessel applicability is stated in 33 CFR 104.105. Theregulations apply to most U.S. commercial vesselsand to foreign commercial vessels operating in U.S.waters. Foreign vessels with a valid International ShipSecurity Certificate certifying compliance with theISPS Code are deemed to be in compliance with most33 CFR Subchapter H requirements, including themaritime security knowledge provisions for vesseland company personnel.

Each vessel to which 33 CFR Subchapter H appliesmust have a designated Vessel Security Officer (VSO)in accordance with 33 CFR 104.215. All other vesselpersonnel must meet the requirements of 33 CFR104.220 or 104.225, depending on whether they havesecurity duties. Each applicable vessel owner/opera-tor is also required to designate a company securityofficer (CSO)2, and all company personnel with secu-rity duties must have appropriate security knowledgethrough training or equivalent job experience.3

Owners/operators of applicable waterfront facilitiesmust likewise designate a facility security officer(FSO)4, and all facility personnel must have somedegree of appropriate security knowledge throughtraining or equivalent job experience.5 Facility appli-

The Code of Federal Regulations (33 CFR SubchapterH) implements the Maritime Transportation SecurityAct of 2002 (MTSA)1. It also aligns, where appropri-ate, domestic maritime security requirements with theinternational maritime security standards containedin the International Convention for the Safety of Lifeat Sea, 1974 (SOLAS Chapter XI-2), and theInternational Ship & Port Facility Security (ISPS)Code.

The Coast Guard has partnered with the MaritimeAdministration (MARAD) and the United StatesMerchant Marine Academy (USMMA) to developmodel maritime security training courses and tablesof competence, and a voluntary maritime securitytraining course approval program, in accordance withsection 109 of the MTSA.

Internationally, there have been a number of recentdevelopments with respect to maritime security train-ing. The International Maritime Organization (IMO)has developed mandatory training requirements forship security officers (SSO) for future inclusion in theStandards of Training, Certification & WatchkeepingConvention, 1978, as amended (STCW). IMO has alsopublished a circular with guidance on company secu-rity officer training requirements, and similar guid-ance for port facility security officer training isanticipated in the near future.

The Coast Guard will implement the new interna-tional requirements and guidance when 33 CFRSubchapter H is revised. There will be transitionalprovisions for grandfathering existing certified per-sonnel at the time the regulations are revised.

Maritime Security TrainingThe specifics of federal and international requirements.

by LCDR DEREK A. D'ORAZIOChief, U.S. Coast Guard Marine Personnel Qualifications Division

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cability is stated in 33 CFR 105.105.

Since the regulations do not currently requireapproved training, the Coast Guard does not at thistime approve or certify any maritime security trainingcourses. However, as a matter of enforcement, theCoast Guard evaluates the qualifications of vessel,company, and facility personnel during inspectionsby assessing their knowledge and ability to carry outtheir security duties and responsibilities.

MTSA Section 109Section 109 of the MTSA, “Maritime SecurityProfessional Training,” required the Secretary ofTransportation, as delegated to MARAD, to developstandards and curricula to allow for the education,training, and certification of maritime security per-sonnel. MARAD and the Coast Guard have beenworking together to fulfill this mandate through ajoint committee that also includes the United StatesMerchant Marine Academy and the TransportationSecurity Administration. This group is informallyreferred to as the MTSA 109 committee.

USMMA, in coordination with the CoastGuard, collaborated with counterparts in Indiato develop IMO model courses for ship securityofficer (IMO Model Course 3.19); companysecurity officer (IMO Model Course 3.20); andport facility security officer (IMO Model Course3.21).6 These courses respectively align withapplicable ISPS Code requirements and withthe VSO, CSO and FSO requirements in 33 CFRSubchapter H.

USMMA, in coordination with the MTSA 109committee, developed competence tables andmodel training courses for the other classes ofpersonnel specified in the 33 CFR Subchapter Hregulations (in addition to VSO, CSO, andFSO):

· vessel personnel with specific securityduties,

· facility personnel with specific securityduties, and

· maritime security awareness for allother classes of personnel specified inthe regulations, including vessel andfacility personnel without securityduties.7

These non-proprietary competence tables and modelcourses, which align with 33 CFR Subchapter H andthe ISPS Code, are freely available to the

public on the MARAD Website at:www.marad.dot.gov/MTSA/MARAD%20Web%20Site%20for%20MTSA%20Course.html

In response to industry demand, the MTSA 109 com-mittee also developed a voluntary program forapproval and certification of maritime security train-ing courses under section 109 of MTSA. This pro-gram is funded by MARAD, and it is currentlyoffered at no cost to training providers. The goal ofthis program is to promote high quality, uniformtraining of maritime security professionals. Maritimesecurity training providers seeking course approvaland certification are encouraged to submit applica-tions under this program. Full details are availableon the MARAD Website referenced above.

International DevelopmentsIMO has developed mandatory training require-ments for ship security officers for inclusion inSTCW.8 These requirements will not become inter-nationally mandatory until 2009; however, countriesmay choose to domestically implement the new SSOrequirements sooner than that.

STCW will be revised to add a new regulation, VI/5,“Requirements for the issue of certificates of profi-ciency for ship security officers.” Under these newprovisions, candidates for certificates of proficiency

A Coast Guard crew in a 25-foot patrol boat guards the southern tip ofNew York City as the Staten Island Ferry, Andrew J. Barberi, approachesthe slip at the South Ferry Terminal. PA2 Mike Hvozda, USCG.


This would ensure that all ship personnel have secu-rity training and that the level of this training is com-mensurate with their onboard duties; however, STW37 was unable to reach agreement on the specifics ofthis issue. This issue will be further discussed at thenext MSC meeting, and at STW 38.

Future RequirementsThe Coast Guard will implement the new interna-tional requirements and guidance when 33 CFRSubchapter H is revised. Any formal training that isrequired would be accomplished in the same fashionas other STCW training, necessitating future CoastGuard approval of maritime security training courses.

It is envisioned that there will be transitional provi-sions for grandfathering existing certified personnelat the time the regulations are revised. However, it ispremature to predict exactly what will be required forcurrent personnel to be certified under the revisedregulations.

As of this writing, no timetable has been set as towhen the Coast Guard will revise 33 CFR SubchapterH. Full information will be published in the FederalRegister when the regulations are revised.

About the author: LCDR Derek A. D'Orazio is the Chief of theMaritime Personnel Qualifications Division at U.S. Coast GuardHeadquarters in Washington, D.C. He is a licensed attorney. He wasmost recently stationed at Marine Safety Office Houston-Galveston forfive years, where he served as the Senior Investigating Officer in thenation's largest petrochemical port.

Endnotes:1 The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 is codified at 46 U.S.C.Chapter 701: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode46/usc_sup_01_46_06_VI_10_701.html

2 33 CFR 104.210.3 33 CFR 104.220.4 33 CFR 105.205.5 33 CFR 105.210 & 105.215.6 For more details, access the IMO Website at: www.imo.org/home.asp7 A “Maritime Security for Military, First Responder and Law Enforcement

Personnel” model training course was also developed in conjunction withthe Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. This class of personnel is notreferenced in 33 CFR Subchapter H, but the course is designed for military,first responder, and law enforcement personnel without prior maritimebackground. Emphasis is placed on prevention of acts of terrorism inmarine and intermodal transportation systems.

8The term ship security officer, as used by the IMO, is synonymous with theterm vessel security officer used in 33 CFR Subchapter H.

9 MSC/Circ.1154: http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D12634/1154.pdf

10 The term port facility security officer, as used by the IMO, is synonymouswith the term facility security officer used in 33 CFR Subchapter H.

as SSO must have approved seagoing service of notless than 12 months—or appropriate seagoing serv-ice and knowledge of ship operations—and theymust meet the standard of competence set out in anew section A-VI/5 of the STCW code.

Section A-VI/5 contains a table that specifies theminimum standards of proficiency for SSO. The tablelists five separate competences encompassing 29 dif-ferent knowledge, understanding, and proficiencies,all of which are to be demonstrated throughapproved training or examination. Physical searchesand non-intrusive inspections also require practicaldemonstration by the SSO candidate.

IMO has also published Maritime Safety Committee(MSC) Circular 1154, dated May 25, 2005,“Guidelines on Training and Certification forCompany Security Officers” (cited as MSC/Circ.1154).9 This circular contains a competence table forcompany security officer that is very similar to thenew STCW Code section A-VI/5 competence tablefor SSO discussed above. It includes a practicaldemonstration requirement for physical searchesand non-intrusive inspections for company securityofficer candidates. Although not mandatory, coun-tries may choose to implement these requirements indomestic regulations.

More recently, the 37th session of the IMO Standardsof Training & Watchkeeping Subcommittee (STW 37)developed guidelines on the training and certifica-tion of port facility security officers.10 It is conse-quently anticipated that the IMO will be publishingan MSC circular for port facility security officer, sim-ilar to the one for company security officer, in thenear future and that this circular will contain a com-petence table for use in certifying port facility secu-rity officer candidates.

Finally, STW 37 reviewed STCW to identify otherareas that might need to include additional manda-tory security-related training requirements, in addi-tion to SSO, in support of the ISPS Code. The UnitedStates submitted a paper to STW 37 identifying theneed to incorporate mandatory security-relatedtraining provisions into STCW for ship personnelwith security responsibilities and for ship personnelwithout security responsibilities. The paper alsoidentified the options available for incorporation ofthese provisions into STCW.


International PortSecurity ProgramImplementation of international regulations.

by MR. MIKE BROWNU.S. Coast Guard International Port Security Program

The maritime industry is highly vulnerable to terror-ist exploitation. A series of terrorist attacks directed atthe United States and other nations in recent yearshave forced many governments to adopt a new per-spective towards terrorism and to take a newapproach to better deter terrorist acts (Figure 1).

To reach out and partner with other maritime nations,the Coast Guard developed the International PortSecurity (IPS) program. The IPS program currently con-sists of more than 30 Coast Guard officers and civilianprofessionals, stationed at Coast Guard Headquartersand at selected field offices around the world. It seeks topromote international port security by engaging inbilateral and multilateral discussions with tradingnations to share and align maritime security practices.

International port security liaison officers (IPSLOs)work with each of our trading partners. Liaison offi-cers are now assigned to work with European nations,Africa, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific governments,as well as with nations in Central and South Americaand the Caribbean islands.

Legal FrameworkThe United States has been working very hard tobuild a consensus and reach out to its internationaltrading partners to improve the level of maritimesecurity throughout the world to collectively deter,rather than respond to, acts of terrorism. With the sup-port of the United States and other governments, theInternational Maritime Organization (IMO) wroteand adopted the International Ship and Port FacilitySecurity (ISPS) Code. The ISPS Code took effect onJuly 1, 2004, and is binding on all IMO membernations.

At the same time IMO was working to develop theISPS Code, the U.S. Congress was drafting theMaritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), whichrequired that the U.S. Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS) learn about the antiterrorism meas-ures in place in ports throughout the world. TheSecretary of DHS delegated this responsibility to theCoast Guard.

The Coast Guard’s IPS program uses an acceptedinternational standard, the ISPS Code, as a point ofreference to engage in discussion regarding antiterror-ism measures in place in foreign ports. The IPS pro-gram also utilizes the International LabourOrganization (ILO) Code of Practice on Security inPorts. The ISPS Code focuses on the ship/port inter-face, which is a critical element of port security.However, the more overarching framework, as out-lined in the ILO Code, helps to fill gaps in the overallreview of security measures in place in a country.Looking at security holistically, with the roles of vari-ous levels of government and other stakeholders inte-grated into a comprehensive security regime toaugment the individual vessel and facility’s efforts,provides the best protection.

Country VisitsThe mandate of the IPS program is to visit all U.S.maritime trading partners in the next three years. TheCoast Guard has worked with international securityexperts to develop a system for determining the orderin which visits to countries will be requested. Some ofthe factors that will be considered include:

· cargo volume; · cargo value;

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· the number of vessels arriving in the UnitedStates from a particular country;

· the amount of cargo originating from a coun-try; and

· the amount of transshipped cargo.

Visits are predicated on receiving invitations from trad-ing partners to visit their ports, and to engage their gov-ernment in discussions on improving port security andaligning security practices.

The Coast Guard learned that many nations believedforeign port facilities would be examined in a similarmanner as the Transportation Security Agency (TSA)looks at an airport. This is not the case. The CoastGuard does not intend to check every lock or accesscontrol station, but only to get an overall idea of theprocess used and the scope of how successful the ISPSimplementation has been. A review of the ISPS Codeimplementation at a port facility will be more of aglobal overview of the security in place.

The ISPS Code is a performance-based standard, andthere are multiple ways to implement and achieve com-pliance. The IPS program looks at the port state’s imple-mentation philosophy and not the U.S. interpretation ofthe ISPS Code. The United States believes it can learnfrom another country’s approach as it hopes othercountries can learn from the United States. The CoastGuard in no way wants to infer that a port facility isexpected to do more than its government requires.

The Coast Guard begins to engage with a country, nor-mally through the IPSLO, well in advance of a visit.

Countries are formally notified by sending them a letterand package, which explains the program and whatwill hopefully be accomplished during the visit andrequests an invitation to visit their country. Backgroundinformation is shared regarding ISPS implementation,and areas of interest are outlined that the Coast Guardbelieves would be useful for discussion.

Upon arrival, the Coast Guard visit team normallyfirst meets with the designated authority or govern-ment agency responsible for port facility security—this might be the ministry of transport or a maritimeagency—and conducts an information exchange. Thisexchange is a good starting point to fully understandthe nation’s ISPS implementation process and howthe government undertakes its responsibilities in PartA, Section 4-“Responsibilities of ContractingGovernments” of the ISPS code.

The Coast Guard reviews the ISPS Code implementa-tion guidance that the country has developed for itsown port facilities and ships. This enables the team tobetter understand the decision-making process usedto implement the code. The ISPS Code uses a per-formance-based philosophy; however, the CoastGuard understands that another country may decideto take a prescriptive approach on certain require-ments, such as dictating fence heights, closed circuitTV coverage, or a designated access control system.The Coast Guard is also interested in learning aboutthe assessment and plan review process used by anation. For example, are recognized security organi-zations used? If so, how were they chosen, and whatauthority were they given?

Figure 1: Terrorist acts have prompted significant changes in the international port security environment. TheISPS Code and the Coast Guard’s International Port Security program are two complementary responses tothis new threat environment.


Next, the team visits representative ports that engagein trade with the United States. During these port vis-its, the team reviews and discusses ISPS Code imple-mentation issues and effectiveness of relatedantiterrorism measures (Figure 2). During the visit,the team seeks to learn more about:

· access control;· restricted areas;· handling of cargo;· delivery of stores/supplies;· security monitoring;· security policies and procedures; and· security training and exercises.

It is valuable to see first-hand examples of how theseissues are addressed, as well as how any security inci-dents are addressed or resolved. Neither the ISPS Codenor MTSA requires that specific types of physical secu-rity measures be imposed to ensure the security of thefacility, ship, and cargo. Nations, ports, and facilities arefree to decide the best combination of security meas-ures to meet their needs, while ensuring that the pur-poses of the ISPS Code are achieved. The U.S.government and Coast Guard fully respect that variousnations and ports will implement innovative andlocally useful practices to meet these security goals.

Discussions with many trading partners reveal thatmany countries draw upon a similar set of tools whenexamining their options for implementing effectivephysical security. These security tools often includewalls, fences, and barricades, lighting and signs,access control and searches, alarms, cameras andlocks, identification cards, guards, and patrol vehiclesand water craft. During the visits, the Coast Guardteam looks at these and other physical security meas-ures to understand how the total security posturedeveloped (Figure 3).

The Coast Guard team and the country’s port securitypersonnel maintain a continuous and active dialogueregarding each country’s practices, challengesencountered, and how they met them. Any questions,issues, problems, or best practices will be discussedwith the host government to achieve clarification. Theoverarching goal is to have a frank and open sharingof ideas so that both the United States and the coun-try being visited can learn from one another toimprove security in both countries. All nations thatinvite the Coast Guard to visit their ports to discussport security measures are invited to visit the UnitedStates and some of our ports to observe how we haveimplemented the ISPS Code.

ObservationsSince commencing these visits in spring, more than 40countries have been visited, representing every conti-nent. Overall implementation of the ISPS Code world-wide has been good. Most countries have reported theircompliance status to the IMO, and the United States has

had excellent participation with many of our tradingpartners. Most countries visited thus far have substan-tially implemented the ISPS Code.

There is good awareness of the requirements of theISPS Code, and physical security in most ports is gen-erally good. Sustainability may be a challenge forsome countries, and the management infrastructureto maintain effective oversight of continued imple-mentation of the ISPS Code must continue to evolvein some nations as well.

When the ISPS Code was first implemented, manynations, corporations, ports, and facilities expressedconcern about the added costs of improved facilitysecurity. These concerns were and are understandable;there can be significant costs involved in upgradingsecurity. Once stakeholders examined the issue ofimproving security against terrorist threats, however,many have found that the collateral benefits of improv-ing facility security justified the investment in securityinfrastructure for many reasons other than antiterror-ism and meeting the requirements of the ISPS Code.

Improved fences, walls, lighting, and access controlcan result in significantly reduced incidents of theft.Stowaways discovered onboard can be very costly toshippers. The same security measures that protectfacilities and ships against terrorism protect ships

Figure 2: The Coast Guard visits foreign ports to gain abetter understanding of ISPS implementation and to sharesecurity practices.

compliance with the ISPS Code are listed in U.S. PortSecurity Advisories, and the Coast Guard imposesconditions of entry on vessels arriving to the UnitedStates from ports in those countries. This subjects thosevessels to increased scrutiny, delay, and additionalcosts.

In the event that problems are noted during a countryvisit, the Coast Guard works very closely with thecountry to try to resolve the issues. If necessary, a planof action to improve shortcomings will be discussed.Finding 100-percent compliance all the time is notexpected. Things break, and systems can become inop-erable. The expectation of the visits is not to see 100-percent compliance but, more importantly, to see howcases of noncompliance are handled. The integrity ofeach nation’s maritime security system and its overalleffectiveness are really what interests the team.

It is the Coast Guard’s intent to follow up with the hostnation regarding any major security deficiencies orconcerns with ISPS implementation that are notedduring visits. The Coast Guard sincerely hopes thatany significant concerns identified during the visit canbe resolved and/or addressed within a 90-day periodfollowing the visit. The Coast Guard liaison officer(s)responsible for the designated country will workclosely with the host nation to accomplish this goal.

Final ThoughtsThe Coast Guard is partnering with internationalorganizations such as the Asia Pacific EconomicCooperation Forum and the Organization ofAmerican States to assist in capacity building. TheCoast Guard is actively engaged with IMO to improveimplementation of the ISPS Code. The United Stateshas been partnering with other countries throughInternational Organization for Standardization todevelop a standardized method for conducting portfacility security assessments and subsequent develop-ment of port facility security plans. The hope is thatthis effort will lead to a standardized approach, whichwill make it easier for those involved in maritimesecurity to achieve and maintain ISPS compliance.

It is the Coast Guard’s intent to continue to workclosely with trading partners and other internationalstakeholders. By working together, the overall secu-rity of the global maritime transportation system canbe raised to a level that will deter the actions of thosewhose intent is to cause it harm.

About the author: Mr. Mike Brown is one of the senior members of theInternational Port Security Team at Coast Guard Headquarters and hasbeen involved with the program since its inception. Mr. Brown is a retiredCoast Guard Captain with 30 years of service and holds master's degreesin political science and national resource strategy.


against stowaways gaining access to ships. Tightlycontrolled access and movement of trucks can signifi-cantly reduce motor vehicle accidents, reducingdown-time and the other costs of investigating acci-dents and damage to vehicles and cargo. Restrictingfacility access to authorized employees and guestsreduces threats to employee safety, and searches ofpersons entering and exiting facilities could preventinebriated persons or persons carrying weapons fromentering the facility.

Tidy, well-lighted facilities, free from the congestion ofunnecessary persons and vehicles, where employeesand visitors feel safe while being constantly aware theiractions are being monitored, operate with increasedefficiency. This results in significantly improved costsavings. Better cargo monitoring and accountabilityhave also led to increased customs revenues.

As a result of the visits, several highly effective, low-cost security measures have been identified. Thesebest practices can be implemented without large cap-ital investments. For example, one country con-structed low-cost ramps to facilitate the undersideinspection of vehicles. In another case, inexpensivelaminated pocket cards with emergency contact infor-mation were provided to workers to facilitate emer-gency communications. These best practices areposted on the Coast Guard’s IPSP Website atwww.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/mp/xfaqs.html.

Protecting United States’ PortsVessels coming from insecure foreign ports can pose asignificant threat to the ports in the United States andany other country that they call in. It is, therefore, veryimportant to secure the entire supply chain, includingthe foreign ports.

Nations that have not certified to IMO that they are in

Figure 3: Physical security is generally good in most facili-ties visited.


In the improvement of homeland security, few issuesare as challenging as cargo security. Despite theurgency to improve cargo security, it must be donefairly, with reasonable costs, and without slowing themovement of goods that drives the economic enginesof the United States. Sound risk management princi-ples must be evenly applied, and technology usedwhere appropriate and beneficial. Given these con-straints, there is only one way to make meaningfulprogress: Industry and government must worktogether on each and every step of the way.

The ChallengesThere are numerous and complex international sup-ply chains that move containers, bulk materials, vehi-cles, packaged and break-bulk articles, and hazardousmaterials of all kinds in and out of the United States.A typical international supply chain may have manydistinct segments, or nodes, that speed a cargo's jour-ney from the factory overseas to final distribution tothe retailer or consumer.

The overarching question remains: How is securityfor the foreign portions of the supply chains that arein the control of our trading partners secured? TheU.S. government does not have jurisdiction in othercountries, and individual companies may only haveinfluence on one or two links in the chain. Progress isbeing made by combining the government's authorityand jurisdiction with companies' willingness to insistthat suppliers and shippers improve securitythroughout the supply chain.

The RolesAs with national security, cargo security is a govern-ment responsibility. Law enforcement agencies and

the military perform their respective roles, and theregulatory agencies carry out a plethora of differentkinds of inspections and screening of cargo withintheir authorities and jurisdictions. An example is aCustoms and Border Protection (CBP) officer workingat a marine terminal, physically inspecting animported shipment of boxes of finished apparel. Theofficer is looking for contraband as well as trade vio-lations with regard tothe product itself.

There is another roleof the government:setting standards.Through regulationsand other methods,the government setsthe level of securityrequired or expected.The government thenchecks to see thatcompanies are meet-ing the standards.This process is calledverification, or audit-ing. To illustrate thisrole, envision that,while the CBP officeris examining theimported apparel inthe warehouse, aCoast Guard PettyOfficer is at the facil-ity's front gate, verify-ing that the guardforce is controlling

Cargo Security Progress through industry and government cooperation.

by MR. BASIL MAHERPresident and Chief Operating Officer, Maher Terminals, Inc.

by LCDR MIKE DOLANChief, U.S. Coast Guard Cargo Security Branch

Petty Officer 1st Class Michael Boyle andbomb sniffing dog Dusty inspect a con-tainer and truck for explosives as part ofthe annual Multi-Agency Strike ForceOperation in Long Beach Harbor. Morethan 300 containers and trucks wereinspected by the Coast Guard, localpolice departments, and the CaliforniaAir Resource Board, to ensure compli-ance with various federal, state and localregulations. Dave Hardesty, USCG.

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access in accordance with the facility's approved secu-rity plan. The Coast Guard did not specify exactlyhow access was to be controlled; it allowed the facilityto decide the best method. The petty officer is makingsure they are following their plan.

For their part, private companies have always hadgood corporate security as a standard business prac-tice, for such age-old reasons as theft prevention,quality assurance, infrastructure protection, andinsurance considerations. The actual act of installingand operating security systems is left to each com-pany. Under the theory of a free market, industry

seeks the best-value solutions for their security needs,and vendors compete to provide quality products tofill the need. It has long been recognized that goodsecurity ultimately improves business competitive-ness. Thus, the private sector holds a vast wealth ofknowledge and expertise in supply chain security.Whereas these practices used to be driven by effi-ciency and cost-effectiveness, now companies are alsomotivated to do their part for homeland security, aswell as to avoid having their company being surrepti-tiously used by terrorists. Companies are thinkingbroader than their immediate interests.

So how has government and industry workedtogether on cargo security since September 11,2001? Where are we, and what remains to bedone?

What Has Been AchievedThe Maritime Transportation Security Act of2002 (MTSA), a domestic law, was followedquickly by the International Ship and PortFacility Security (ISPS) Code, an internationalregime that is mandatory for countries that aresignatories to the International Convention forthe Safety of Life at Sea. These two legal instru-ments did something very important: They setup compatible security regulations for U. S.ports, commercial vessels, and foreign ports.This covers the maritime portion of the interna-tional supply chain, from foreign port to domes-tic delivery.

In 2002, the Coast Guard was tasked to write theregulations that implemented MTSA. It was ahuge task that had to be done quickly—soquickly, in fact, that the normal administrativerequirements for public comments on regula-tions were waived. It was at that point that CoastGuard leadership made two conscious decisions:open a dialogue with industry and make the reg-ulations performance-based.

Given all of the programs and initiatives that arebeing used to strengthen maritime security, per-haps the most important single activity is the dia-logue between industry and government. It isformal, like the new National Maritime SecurityAdvisory Committee, established in March 2005.It is also informal, like the networking thatoccurs during meetings of the Hampton RoadsArea Maritime Security Committee. It is a dia-logue that goes beyond the traditional regulatoryagency to regulated community interchange,although the MTSA regulations have certainly

The Coast Guard Cutter Escanaba, a 270-foot medium endurance cutterhomeported in Boston, enforces a safety zone around the M/V PalermoSenator as a small boat carrying a multi-agency inspection teamapproaches the cargo ship. PA2 Eric Hedaa, USCG.


generated a lot of those discussions.

As already mentioned, the MTSA regulations are per-formance based. Vessel operating companies and portfacilities have been allowed to develop their ownsecurity plans. This gives them some flexibility andallows them to use solutions that work best for theirbusiness type and particular operating location. Forexample, the regulations state that containers must bechecked upon entry onto a marine terminal, but howthat is accomplished and the frequency of subsequentchecks is not specified, until there is a change in thesecurity level.

Implementing the regulations has been a bumpy road,but the interaction and dialogue it has generated at alllevels has greatly helped educate everyone on thesalient issues. Solutions have emerged that would nothave been possible under the typical prescriptive regu-latory model. For example, when it came time to imple-ment facility security plans, the port terminals and theCoast Guard worked cooperatively to meet certaindeadlines, while recognizing the needs of the port busi-nesses to keep operating efficiently. Issues were openlydiscussed, so the important major security actions wereimplemented and not impeded by misunderstandingsover less important portions of the plans.

Future ChallengesThe role of technology in cargo security is a huge andcontinuingly evolving issue. We have seen new productdevelopment, grant programs, government research,international technical standards development, andvigorous debate on exactly what role technology shouldplay and when. Initially inadequate for the rigors ofmaritime transport, the physical equipment continuesto rapidly mature. Devices and applications for individ-ual container security are of particular interest, beingthe most affected by unit costs. The challenge is to judgewhen, how, and what technology is to be employedacross a portion of the supply chain to achieve valuablesecurity improvements.

Since an attack on the marine transportation system isgenerally accepted as being probable, the flow of com-merce during and after an event must be continued—not just as a matter of keeping the economy strong,but in recognition that the waterborne transportationsystem itself is an asset to be used for evacuations andto provide relief supplies to victims. The governmentmay need to apply controls on the physical systems.However, industry experts hold the knowledge that isneeded to truly discern and understand additionalthreats to the system, as well as the direct and indirecteffects of various actions that might be used to miti-

gate additional damage. How are the right peoplerapidly identified and consulted to enable good deci-sions to be made quickly? Government and industryleaders are collaborating and working on solutions tothis critically important problem.

A great challenge of cargo security is addressing theportions of supply chains that are overseas, not directlycontrolled by the U.S. government or domestic compa-nies. Programs such as the Customs-Trade PartnershipAgainst Terrorism have opened new approaches toincentive-based programs and the training of foreignsupply chain security specialists. Future work will seethe expansion of voluntary international standards forindustry use, as well as development and implementa-tion of supply chain security programs in the WorldCustoms Organization and possibly in theInternational Maritime Organization. Each organiza-tion and standard will strengthen security in additionalareas of the international spectrum, thus incrementallydenying the use of supply chains to enemies.

ConclusionThe United States recognizes the threat of terrorists

using the mechanisms of global trade to attack citi-zens in its homeland. Americans are fiercely competi-tive in the business world, and a healthy separation ismaintained between government regulations and thefree market. But, in this urgent effort to protect thehomeland, private business enterprises and govern-ment agencies are working closely together. If thegovernment sets high but fair standards, and industrypartners harness their immense collective power tosolve tough problems, the United States can ensure itstransportation system will not be used against it.

About the authors: Mr. Basil Maher is the President and ChiefOperating Officer of Maher Terminals, Inc. He is also a member of theNational Maritime Security Advisory Committee and President of theNational Association of Waterfront Employers.

LCDR Mike Dolan is Chief of the Cargo Security Branch at U. S. CoastGuard Headquarters. LCDR Dolan enlisted in the Coast Guard in 1991and has served in port operations positions in Port Canaveral, San Juan,and Norfolk.

Progress is being made by combiningthe government's authority and jurisdiction with companies' willing-ness to insist that suppliers and ship-pers improve security throughout thesupply chain.

The fishing vessel Mary Lou has set out for a day offishing. Suddenly, there is an explosion, and the boatquickly sinks in flames. Emergency crews race to thescene and find the area saturated by mines. The firsttrue test of the newly formed Central California AreaMaritime Security Committee (AMSC) was under-way. This event signaled the start of the LeadShield/Rogue exercise—a full-scale antiterrorismexercise, developed to test the committee’s ability toform a unified command and respond effectively to alarge-scale terrorist attack.


Figure 1: An aerial view of the port of Los Angeles–Long Beach.

Central California AreaMaritime Security

CommitteePort security put to the test.

by LCDR ANTHONY C. CURRY, Chief, Contingency Planning & Force Readiness,

U.S. Coast Guard Sector Los Angeles-Long Beach, Calif.

by Mr. ROBERT T. SPAULDING,Port Security Specialist,

U.S. Coast Guard Sector Los Angeles-Long Beach, Calif.

Central California Area Maritime SecurityCommitteeThe Central California AMSC was established inFebruary 2004, as mandated by the MaritimeTransportation Security Act of 2002. The committee’smission is to advise the federal maritime securitycoordinator on the identification of critical port infra-structure and operations, risks, and mitigation strate-gies and methods. The committee also advises on thedevelopment of a continuous overall port securityevaluation process that includes contingency plan

development and dissemination of maritimesecurity-related information to port stake-holders. The executive steering committee iscomposed of 15 voting members and sixnonvoting members and encompasses awide spectrum of government agencies, portoperators, labor unions, political representa-tives, and other maritime community mem-bers.

With such a diverse membership, a process-oriented structure is a critical component forsuccess. The National Incident ManagementSystem/Incident Command System, asdeveloped by the California Department ofForestry, was chosen by the executive steer-ing committee to give this organization theframework to function as both a preventionand a response entity. This concept hasproved successful for decades as a means of

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Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard, and acclaimedhomeland security expert and author Steve Flynn.

Testing the SystemAlthough the committee is less than two years old, ithas already been tested under two major exercises:Determined Promise ’04 and Lead Shield/Rogue(Figures 2, 3, and 4). During the latter full-scale exer-cise, for the first time, the Central California AMSCfunctioned as the core of a unified command. This gavenumerous port stakeholders the opportunity to be a

partof the readiness process from the initial planning stageto the “hot wash.” The experience enlightened portstakeholders to the fact that response is the appliedportion of prevention. This new perspective on thisprocess infused the numerous Central CaliforniaAMSC members with enthusiasm for making theirport complex the best prepared in the country.

Another key benefit of the AMSC is that all plans anddocuments that are produced by the organization aretruly team efforts. The first plan was the AreaMaritime Security Plan, which had the goal of


effectively unifying the efforts of numerous agencies.It enables the AMSC to put into place a system of con-tinuous improvement that utilizes lessons learnedfrom exercises and actual responses.

The committee is a collaborative effort, with member-ship from all aspects of the port community; it truly isan area committee. The Coast Guard chairs thisdynamic committee and has guided the group fromthe critical inception stage and continues to workclosely with myriad port stakeholders to maintain anatmosphere of ownership and partnership. TheFederal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) serves as the vice-chair of this committee. This is a huge benefit, as itgives the committee ready access to a wide range offederal criminal investigative and intelligence services.The combined leadership and expertise the CoastGuard and FBI bring to the committee provide a strongregulatory foundation and response expertise to han-dle any number of security-related challenges that facethe Port of Los Angeles–Long Beach (Figure 1).

The committee is composed of four sections in accor-dance with the ICS structure: operations,finance/administration, logistics, and planning/intel-ligence. Each of these sections is chaired by a votingmember agency. The operationssection is chaired by the LosAngeles Police Department; thefinance/administration section ischaired by the California Office ofEmergency Services; the logisticssection is chaired by the LosAngeles Sheriff’s Department; andthe planning/intelligence section ischaired by Immigration & CustomsEnforcement. Enthusiastic accept-ance of this organizational structure inspired theTransportation SecurityAdministration to copy the modeland form a similar committee thataddresses security challenges atLos Angeles International Airport.

The Central California AMSC meets on a quarterlybasis to discuss ongoing security initiatives, theprogress of grants within the port complex, and futuremulti-agency exercises. Motions for actions and activi-ties must be passed by a majority of the present votingexecutive steering committee. In addition, the commit-tee has hosted numerous distinguished guest speakers,such as then-Department of Homeland SecuritySecretary Tom Ridge, Senator Diane Feinstein,

Figure 2: Dolphins were used in exercise Lead Shield/Rogue todetect mines.

Figure 3: Mobile command post for exercise Lead Shield/Rogue.


improving the safety and the security of the LosAngeles–Long Beach Port complex. This plan is anevolving document that lists all critical infrastructuresand AMSC assets and provides important contactguidance within the AMSC hierarchy. In light of thehighly criticized governmental responses to recentnatural disasters, it was evident that there was a needto have a coordinated port evacuation plan.

In October 2005 the Central California AMSC held thefirst in a series of workshops that will help shape thefocus and contents of a new AMSC port evacuationplan. The purpose of the first workshop was to identifythe challenges faced by the port, regarding port evacu-

a t i o n ,recovery,and recon-stitution.The sectorc o n t i n -g e n c yplanningstaff con-solidatedthe find-ings of thisworkshopa n ddrafted aw h i t epaper thatcapturedand organ-ized a

wide variety of critical port concerns. The evacuationsubcommittee will use this white paper to collabora-tively develop a draft port evacuation plan that focuseson the safe and efficient evacuation of the ports of LosAngeles and Long Beach.

Once the port evacuation plan draft is complete, AMSCplans to test the plan during the upcoming PortSteptabletop exercise this summer. Refinements to the planwill be made based on the lessons learned during thisexercise. This process exemplifies the Central CaliforniaAMSC’s desire to engage only in exercises that test aplan and have thorough metrics to measure perform-ance, based on established criteria. Thus, lessonslearned during the exercise are captured in a meaning-ful way, and area plans are continuously improved.

Real-Life ApplicationBy working together during meetings, exercises, and

plan preparation, the AMSC member organizationshave formed strong relationships with each other thatwill be invaluable during any major crisis requiring acoordinated response. The first few hours of anyresponse effort are absolutely critical for first-respondercoordination. Recently, the Central California AMSCengaged its joint coordination center (JCC) in responseto the 2005 London terrorist attacks on mass transit.The JCC, similar to a crisis action center, is comprisedof personnel from numerous first-responder agencies.It was designed to coordinate joint agency preventativesecurity operations within the port complex duringincreased maritime security levels, or based on specificcredible intelligence. Within hours of the Londonattack, the JCC quickly and efficiently coordinatedincreased waterside and landside patrols by a widerange of law enforcement agencies. The intelligencegathered by the patrols was rapidly presented to theAMSC through the FMSC. Without a doubt, the JCChas proven itself as a worthwhile security instrumentthat requires only a minor investment of resources.

Due to enormous media interest in the port complex,the AMSC proposed the formation of a public rela-tions and joint information center subcommittee dur-ing the August 2005 quarterly meeting. Onceestablished, this group will be composed of a crosssection of member agency’s public information offi-cers. These personnel will work closely together toconsistently provide press releases, interview coordi-nation, and other vital public information services tothe unified command and the media.

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and recentnatural disasters have taught us the importance of hav-ing senior local government leadership and first respon-ders familiar with working together. The Area MaritimeSecurity Committee concept has proven itself a verysuccessful strategy. However, the strategy by itself is notenough. The reason this committee is so successful isdue to its Incident Command System structure, excel-lent interagency communication, and teamwork. About the authors: LCDR Anthony C. Curry is currently Chief ofContingency Planning & Force Readiness for U.S. Coast Guard Sector LosAngeles-Long Beach, Calif. He has served in the Coast Guard for 16 years.Previous assignments include MSO Honolulu; MSO/GRP Los Angeles-Long Beach; MSO Portland, Maine; and the National Maritime Center. Heholds a B.S. in management from Northern Illinois University and a M.S.in quality systems management from the National Graduate School.

Mr. Robert T. Spaulding is a Port Security Specialist for U.S. Coast GuardSector Los Angeles-Long Beach, Calif. He has spent 20 years on activeduty: 10 years U.S. Navy and 10 years USCG. He retired as a U.S. CoastGuard LCDR. Previous assignments include MSO Honolulu and MSOGalveston. He holds a B.A. in education from National University.

Figure 4: Training for exercise Lead Shield/Rogue.


In November 2001, 30 maritime stakeholders fromsoutheast Texas assembled in the Port of HoustonAuthority’s boardroom and unanimously agreed tocharter the area’s first port security committee. Fouryears later, the Houston-Galveston Area MaritimeSecurity Committee (AMSC) has grown into a strong-hold of over 70 appointed members, with a followingof 800 government and industry stakeholders, allserving to protect the second largest petrochemicalcomplex in the world.1

The ports of Houston, Texas City, Galveston, andFreeport are home to more than 140 MaritimeTransportation Security Act (MTSA)-regulated facili-ties, from barge cleaning operations to the world’sbiggest petrochemical producers. The area is home toDow Chemical’s largest chemical plant in the world,2

Exxon-Mobil’s largest refinery in the world,3 andShell’s largest refinery in the United States.4 All oper-ate under one Coast Guard Captain of the Port(COTP). One-fourth of the nation’s petroleum prod-ucts are refined just inside the Gulf Coast, along theHouston Ship Channel5; a 53-mile long, 45-foot deepman-made channel, dredged more than 90 years agoto accommodate deep-draft vessels. It was believedthat the inland channel was a safe location and wasless costly than operating along the Gulf Coast.

Today, the ports of Houston, Texas City, Galveston,and Freeport are densely landscaped with refineries,chemical plants, cruise ship terminals, and thenation’s second largest recreational boating commu-nity in Galveston Bay.6 Just south of the four ports, off-shore platforms dot the Gulf of Mexico. It is a 60-miledrive from Houston to the most southern port city ofFreeport, Texas, and, in this stretch of roadway, the

petrochemical infrastructure is neighboring the state’slargest city within a 10-county metropolitan area of5.1 million people.7

How does one COTP ensure that every MTSA-regu-lated commercial interest—as well as nonregulatedentities using the waterway, along with a broad groupof government employees—work together effectivelyto protect private assets and public infrastructure? TheArea Maritime Security Committee has been a tremen-dous vehicle used to drive the security agenda home,and, although it is difficult to measure success by whatmay have been prevented, the Houston-GalvestonAMSC has clearly been a port model worthy of notice.

Organizing Maritime Transportation SystemStakeholdersThe Houston-Galveston AMSC is comprised of a mar-itime industry subcommittee and law enforcementsubcommittee. Additionally, there is an executivesteering group made up of federal agency heads, theState of Texas, and chairpersons from the two sub-committees. The executive steering group sets theannual goals for the committee, ensuring alignmentwith Homeland Security directives. AMSC’s accom-plishments include a local communications systemwith 800 registrants and the development of an areamaritime security plan that has been receiving acco-lades from reviewers. AMSC also has several workgroups, comprised of volunteers who assist withdeveloping joint industry and government trainingprograms, exercises and drills, communications prod-ucts, and port coordination procedures.

Just as other Area Maritime Security Committees inthe nation are addressing unique issues in their ports,

Port Coordination in the Largest U.S. Petrochemical Complex A public/private partnership.

by LCDR D. HAUSERAssistant Chief of Response, U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Houston-Galveston

PREVENTION


the Houston-Galveston AMSC identified ways to con-solidate various port safety and security initiativesand unite the efforts of different committees. Forinstance, the training and public affairs workgroupsfrom the Central Texas Coastal Area Committee andHouston-Galveston AMSC have consolidated, whichprovided joint training opportunities and improvedindividual work-time efficiency, by reducing thenumber of meetings participants attended.

Port Coordination: Meeting the ChallengesDuring an elevated threat level in the nation’s num-ber-one port for foreign waterborne commerce,8 andwith more than 11,000 U.S. and foreign flag deep-draftvessels reporting into vessel traffic service annually,receiving security attainment status reports from reg-ulated facilities and vessels would likely strain localCoast Guard resources. Assistance was needed tocoordinate the receipt of attainment reports fromindustry during Maritime Security Level 3 (MARSEC3). Assistance came, and it was received from the verysame people whose companies the Coast Guard regu-lated. Industry volunteers tackled one of the toughestport management issues in the Houston-Galvestonarea when they developed the port coordination team(PCT) concept. They successfully bridged securityattainment information for the four port areas, plus

the offshore sector, linking it to the local federal mar-itime security coordinator (FMSC) during an elevatedMARSEC condition.

The industry-led PCT galvanized maritime stake-holders from across a large, regional port area andensured that the FMSC had a process in place torestart vessel movements and facility transfers after atemporary shutdown. Although facility and vesselowners and operators focused their security efforts onprotecting company assets, they were equally con-cerned about protecting the integrity of shared infra-structure like the man-made Houston Ship Channel.It was in their best interest to engage through theAMSC with other stakeholders to ensure that trafficmanagement schemes and procedures supported therestoration of maritime business.

It was expected that, during MARSEC 3, maritimecommerce would temporarily pause. The AMSCdetermined that a general instruction guide or pausechecklist was needed to ensure alignment with PCTprocedures. The Area Maritime Security Committeeestablished the pause workgroup in advance of thecompletion of MTSA vessel and facility security plans.Industry, together with the local Coast Guard, devel-oped a pause checklist9 for vessels and facility opera-tors that supplemented the port coordination teamprocedures. The checklist succinctly outlines theimmediate actions that vessel and facility operatorsmust take during MARSEC 3 to support the PCT

process. Thec h e c k l i s t ,used in con-

junction with facility and vessel security plans, hasbeen incorporated into the area maritime securityplan.

The combined ports of Houston-Galveston see a variety of traffic and service a variety of customers,including tankers, bulk carriers, rigs, cruise ships, barges, and container vessels. Pictured is a seg-ment of the Galveston ship channel during a busy day. PA2 James Dillard, USCG.


The port coordination team is comprised of membersfrom the ports of Houston, Texas City, Galveston, andFreeport, and offshore sector. As described in thePCT’s operating procedures: “These members repre-sent core constituents responsible for consolidatinginformation from their respective groups in order toprovide information to the COTP on port infrastruc-ture needs. The procedures further explain that as aconduit through which information flows, the PCTpermits the COTP to establish shipping priorities,implement port reopening protocols and better man-age the flow of vessel movement without compromis-ing the safety and security of the impacted ports.”10

Testing the Port Coordination ConceptSince September 11, 2001, the Port of Houston hasexperienced five jumps in maritime security condi-tions, either by an upgrade to MARSEC Condition 2or through modified MARSEC surges that requiredadditional Coast Guard resources and security meas-ures to protect critical infrastructure. Additionally, theAMSC sponsored two security exercises to test com-munications and PCT procedures. These secure lib-erty exercises activated the port coordination teamand required members to mobilize to the four portareas, communicate with MTSA-regulated facilities,and issue attainment reports through the operationssection to the federal maritime security coordinator.

During Secure Liberty II, the four ports and the off-shore sector stood up separate port command centersthat were located at each of the port offices. The portcommand centers were organized geographically andwere staffed by a port representative, industry mem-bers, and a Coast Guard liaison. The port coordinationteam, which is the core group responsible for collect-ing information from the different command centersand reporting it to the incident commander, mobilizedto the Houston-Galveston Marine Safety Office andaugmented the operations section. Vessel traffic serv-ice (VTS), co-located with the MSO, received attain-ment reports from underway vessels, and, since thevessel traffic service also has vessels docked at facili-ties, it was a natural fit to locate the port coordinationteam next to VTS to strengthen maritime domainawareness by having a common operating picture.

The port coordination team mobilized to MSOHouston-Galveston included:

· PCT liaison (chair of maritime industry sub-committee);

· Port of Houston liaison to the port commandcenter (industry rep);

· Port of Texas City liaison to the port com-mand center (industry rep);

· Port of Galveston liaison to the port com-mand center (industry rep);

· Port of Freeport liaison to the port commandcenter (industry rep);

· offshore liaison to the port command center(industry rep);

· non-VTS user representative (auxiliarywaterways recreational vessel rep); and

· law enforcement representative (chair of thelaw enforcement subcommittee).

Specific capabilities that exist at the primary portcoordination team gathering site in Houston include:

· closed circuit TV feeds from vessel trafficservice;

· real-time automatic identification targets;· limited access to the Coast Guard common

operating picture (C2PC);· Internet access;· telephone access; and · general administrative support.

With such a large contingency of facilities and vesseloperators, it was important to announce the exercisewell in advance, so that operators knew what toexpect during a simulated, temporary port shutdowntriggered by a MARSEC 3. During the exercise, facil-ity operators were given the choice to implement orsimulate implementing their security plans and meas-ures for MARSEC 3. Once each facility security officerwas satisfied that all security measures had beenat ta ined,each con-t a c t e dt h e i rrespectiveport com-mand cen-ter toreport thestatus oftheir facil-ity. Ap a u s echecklist,port command center contact information, and oper-ating procedures were provided prior to the exerciseon the AMSC’s Website, so all the participants knewwhat to do and who to contact.

During the Secure Liberty II exercise, more than 700port stakeholders were notified at 6:05 a.m. of the sim-ulated increase to MARSEC 3 through a notificationcall-out system. Forty-five minutes later, the first port

The Houston-GalvestonArea Maritime SecurityCommittee has a fleet offour ships:

· Relationship · Partnership · Stewardship · Leadership


coordination team member arrived at the MSO. At8:30 a.m., the port coordination team was fully func-tional. By 10:20 a.m., more than 80 percent of theMTSA facilities, including offshore, reported MAR-SEC 3 attainment of security measures for the entireHouston-Galveston COTP area.

Aggressive outreach about the exercise greatlyenhanced the speed with which attainment reportswere submitted and dually served to prepare indus-try for a real incident. The port coordination team hadaccess to the Internet at MSO Houston-Galveston andused a shared spreadsheet to enter data received bythe port command centers. Information was quicklydocumented and communicated to the federal mar-itime security coordinator.

To guarantee a successful transfer of port status infor-mation from the command centers in the field, thePCT must have a direct line of communication to theincident command staff, which is best accomplishedthrough a PCT liaison. The PCT liaison, Mr. RaymondButler, also serves as the AMSC maritime industrysubcommittee chairperson.

Other Possibilities Beyond Security The PCT concept is not limited to threat-level eleva-tions. Applying the procedures, either partially orwholly in small or large ports, can also easily beaccomplished for waterways management issues,such as vessel casualties or natural disasters. The PCTis designed so that elements can organize either geo-graphically or functionally, which aligns with thenational incident management system (NIMS) model.The PCT construct provides an expandable and flexi-ble organizational structure, regardless of the event.For instance, the PCT has been activated in Houstonduring heavy-weather incidents and duringextended, limited visibility closures, when the COTPdeemed it necessary. In these instances, the PCT mem-bers did not physically relocate to the different portareas. Various port stakeholders, representing con-stituents from different locations spanning the mar-itime transportation system, conducted operationalplanning and port status meetings telephonically.During these safety-related, waterways-managementevolutions, core constituents include:

· Port of Houston Authority;· Port of Texas City;· Port of Galveston;· Port of Freeport;· offshore port (lightering interests);· American Waterways Operators (such as tow

companies);

· West Gulf Maritime Association (such asagents and labor);

· Houston Pilots Association;· Galveston-Texas City Pilots Association;· oil refiners;· oil terminals;· chemical carriers;· non-VTS users (such as recreational and fish-

ing vessels); and · harbor tugs.

Once the PCT is activated for waterways-manage-ment issues, the PCT is naturally suited for recom-mending port reconstitution protocols to the COTPfor restoring commerce in the impacted port area.Recommended guidelines may include:

· imposing traffic measures to minimize over-taking situations;

· staggering the entry of vessels into theHouston Ship Channel;

· identifying particular vessels/cargos for pri-ority entry into the port(s); and

· identifying critical berths that require vesseldepartures.

Regardless if the incident or port waterways manage-ment issue has a safety or security focus, or requires anorganization based on function or geographic location,the PCT has been an extraordinary force, comprised ofthe best minds in the petrochemical industry.Establishing the port coordination team network hassuccessfully fused private and public entities, provid-ing the local FMSC with real-time information on thestatus of maritime interests in the ports.

It is with optimistic caution that some federal regula-tors look toward industry to self-regulate and advancestewardship ideals that transcend beyond the bottomline. The Coast Guard, through the COTP staff, viewsvolunteers from the private sector with grateful appre-ciation. Industry stakeholders from Houston, TexasCity, Galveston, and Freeport have been willing togive an inordinate amount of time to ensure a safe andsecure port area for the collective good of all maritimecommerce. Their stewardship clearly illustrates themeaning behind the four pillars posted on the indus-try-driven AMSC Website, which are the fleet of fourships: relationship, partnership, stewardship, andleadership. These are routinely referenced by the localCOTP as watchwords to industry and the Coast Guardcrews throughout the region.

In the FutureAs Coast Guard personnel who currently work with


the port coordination team transfer out of the areaand Sector Houston is born, the future of the portcoordination process will depend heavily on themaritime community’s continued involvement withthe AMSC. To ensure their participation, it is neces-sary that Coast Guard leadership continually facili-tate dynamics that foster industry’s investment in thesecurity of their ports by communicating the critical-ity of shared infrastructure and shared partnerships.

The PCT concept has functioned effectively in Houstonand Galveston and demonstrated that viable partner-ships with industry are rewarding and serve to lever-age resources when government assets are in highdemand. Established, professional relationships leadto solid partnerships and, in the case of the PCT, resultin practical port coordination procedures that encom-pass vital communication and notification protocols.

Rich with CapabilitiesAppointed AMSC members and numerous otherstakeholders attend bimonthly meetings, which typi-cally fill the Port of Houston Authority’s boardroom tostanding-room only. Those who come to meetings andjoin the workgroups possess an abundance of techni-cal skills and professional expertise in managing com-plex projects and building consensus. Although thelocal Coast Guard steers the port security agenda, theport community brings additional skills and a highlevel of enthusiasm to the process that helped shape asuccessful security planning program.

For more information on the Houston-Galveston AMSCor PCT procedures, please access www.amsc-hougal.com.

About the author: LCDR D. Hauser is Assistant Chief of Response atU. S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Houston-Galveston.

Endnotes1. Port of Houston Authority, “General Information: The Ports Present,”

(Houston: POHA, accessed October 30, 2005); available fromhttp://www.portofhouston.com/geninfo/overview2.html; Internet.

2. Dow Chemical Company, “The Dow Texas Operations Public Report,”(Midland: Dow, accessed October 30, 2005); available fromhttp://www.dow.com/publicreport/2002/local/texas_ops/overview/overview.htm; Internet.

3. Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, ExxonMobile ChemicalCompany (Houston: DOE, accessed October 22, 2005); available fromhttp://texasiof.ces.utexas.edu/texasshowcase/pdfs/casestudies/cs_exxonmobile.pdf; Internet.

4. Randi Kaye, American Morning, Cable News Network – CNN (AiredSeptember 23, 2003, transcript accessed October 27, 2005); available fromhttp://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/23/ltm.04.html;Internet.

5. Energy Capital Houston, “A World Class Industry,” (Houston: HoustonPublications, accessed October 30, 2005); available from http://www.ener-gycapitalhouston.com/articles/article04.html; Internet.

6. Bay Area Houston Economic Partnership, “Recreation,” (Houston: BayArea Houston, accessed November 8, 2005) available fromhttp://www.bayareahouston.com/Home/LivingEnvironment/Recreation; Internet

7. Wikipedia, “Greater Houston,” (Encyclopedia Online: accessed November1, 2005) available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Houston;Internet.

8. American Association of Port Authorities, “Port Updates,” (Alexandria:AAPA, accessed November 2, 2005) available from http://www.aapa-ports.org/pressroom/hurricane_updates.htm; Internet.

9. Area Maritime Security Committee – Houston Galveston, “PauseChecklist,” (Houston: AMSC, accessed October 10, 2005) available fromhttp://www.amsc-hougal.com/event.htm; Internet.

10. Area Maritime Security Committee – Houston Galveston, “PortCoordination Team Standard Operating Procedures,” (Houston: AMSC-PCT, accessed October 30, 2005) available from http://www.amsc-hou-gal.com/support/pctprocedures.pdf; Internet

Marine Safety Unit Houston is located on the Houston ship channel. PA2 James Dillard, USCG.


Asymmetric Migration

Stowaways, absconders, and deserters.

by LCDR MIKE CUNNINGHAMLegal Advisor, U.S. Coast Guard Inspections and Compliance Directorate

Asymmetric migration—stowaways, absconders, anddeserters—is not only an immigration problem, but aport security problem as well. U.S. Customs & Border

Protection (CBP) and the Bureau of Immigration andCustoms Enforcement (ICE) are the agencies with pri-mary responsibility for deterring, responding to, and

taking remedial action for illegalentry, even in U.S. maritime ports. TheCoast Guard has been working inclose cooperation with CBP and ICEto combat the problem of asymmetricmigration, not only to support otheragencies in enforcing U.S. immigra-tion laws and preserve the right of theUnited States to control its borders,but also to address the port securityrisk represented by these illegalmigrants.

Generally, an absconder is acrewmember who, without legalauthority, lands in the United States.A deserter is a crewmember who ispermitted to land in the United Statesbut overstays the legal authority toremain. A stowaway is a person whois secreted on a ship without the con-sent of the ship and who is detectedonboard the ship after it has departedfrom a port.

Some crewmembers are further char-acterized as a high-risk, detainonboard crewmember or high-riskcrewmember. This is a crewmemberwho has been denied permission toland in the United States and is anational of a country listed in theCoast Guard/CBP StandardOperating Procedures for respondingto high-risk crewmembers.

ANNEX IMinimum Standards for Contracted

Crewmember Security ServicesContracted security guards who are not desig-nated state or local law enforcement officersmust provide full name and date of birth to CBP[Customs & Border Protection]. CBP will conducta background check using CBP automatedenforcement systems. Contracted security services must meet orexceed the following standards to demonstratecompetency and adequacy to perform theassigned task: 1. Contracted security guards must be armed

with a firearm while on duty, consistent with therequirements and conditions of the facility, andthe laws and regulations of local, state, andfederal authorities. This includes proper cre-dentialing, licensing, and permitting, as appli-cable.

2. Contracted security guards must displayproper identification at all times, such as a lam-inated badge with a photograph that clearlyidentifies them as part of the contracted secu-rity service.

3. Contracted security guards must be fullyapprised of all applicable use of force require-ments and conditions within the particularjurisdiction, including requirements and condi-tions for use of force imposed by the facility.

4. Contracted security assigned to provide secu-rity services are to ensure that only thosecrewmembers authorized to disembark areallowed to do so. Pursuit of fleeing crewmem-bers and use of force in such situations mustcomply with the requirements and conditionsof the facility, and the laws and regulations oflocal, state, and federal authorities.

5. Security services must be contracted beforethe vessel is given permission to enter port.Contract must ensure the security services arein place before the vessel is allowed to moor oranchor in close proximity to land.

6. Security services must have a copy of theentire crew list, with the names of those whoare not authorized to go ashore highlighted.The security services must verify the identity ofany subject requesting to come ashore, check-ing the subject’s stated name against thatfound on the passport and/or seaman’s bookwith proper VISA, and checking the subject’sphysical appearance against those descriptorsfound in the document presented and againstthe photograph on the identity document.

7. Contracted security guards assigned to pro-vide security services at vessels on which CBPhas detained crewmembers shall be capableof communicating with the facility security,police, security dispatcher, local CBP, localUSCG, and vessel agent. Contracted securityguards shall provide their own communica-tions as part of the contractual agreementbetween the ship’s agent and the securitycompany as dictated by the situation. Forexample, if the terminal has a 24-hour opera-tions center, radio communications may beappropriate; otherwise a cellular telephone orfunctional equivalent may be required.

8. Contracted security guards must be providedwith sufficient shelter to protect against severeweather conditions such as high heat, oppres-sive sunshine, and extreme cold. The sheltermust be in the immediate vicinity of the gang-way but should not be so obstructed as to pre-vent the security guards from performing theirassigned duties.

9. Contracted security guards must be providedwith periodic breaks to use the restroom andeat meals at intervals not to exceed 4 hours,and no guard may stand watch for more than12 hours in a 24-hour period.

10. Contracted security guards must have writtenoperating procedures and contact numbersreadily available. See Annex II for a sampleformat.

PREVENTION


StowawaysThe Coast Guard takes the presence of a stowawayseriously. The presence of a stowaway indicates asecurity incident has occurred in which a personhas improperly gained access to the vessel, circum-venting vessel access control procedures. Cleargrounds also exist that the vessel does not complywith Coast Guard maritime security regulations orthe maritime security provisions of Chapter XI-2 ofthe International Convention for the Safety of Lifeat Sea (SOLAS) and the International Ship & PortFacility Security (ISPS) Code.

Coast Guard units take appropriate action toensure that the security, rights, and obligations ofthe United States are protected. This analysisincludes an examination of actions taken by thevessel to detect, detain, and report the presence ofstowaways prior to port entry, efforts that mayreduce the security risk posed by the stowaway.

The Coast Guard stowaway response policy hastwo aspects: responding to stowaways present onvessels and addressing the security issues in theports where stowaways originate. Responseactions in a stowaway case are based on the factsand circumstances in each case. These actions alsoinclude Coast Guard and interagency boardings;regulatory compliance examinations, either forcompliance with the ISPS Code or 33 C.F.R. part104, to determine any deficiencies in the shipsecurity system; support of CBP/ICE criminalinvestigations; and ensuring adequate security ifthe stowaway remains on board for repatriation.

With regard to the source of stowaways, the CoastGuard stowaway response policy includes provisionsto increase scrutiny for vessels arriving from portsthat generate significant numbers of stowaways. Italso includes outreach efforts to the governments ofsource countries, through the Coast GuardInternational Port Security Program, to improve thesecurity in those ports.

Absconders and High-Risk CrewmembersTo respond to the problem of high-risk crewmembers,the Coast Guard and CBP have entered into“Memorandum of Agreement Regarding theDetention of Certain High-Risk Crewmembers,”which came into force December 22, 2004. The pur-pose of the MOA and its accompanying standardoperating procedures (SOP) is to provide consistent,nationwide guidance; it also defines the respectiveroles of the Coast Guard and CBP regarding prevent-ing high-risk, detain-onboard crewmembers from

leaving their vessel and illegally entering the UnitedStates. Portions of the SOP are designated sensitivesecurity information and are not available for publicrelease.

CBP determines whether a foreign crewmember willbe allowed to disembark a vessel upon its arrival intothe United States. Foreign crewmembers may bedenied temporary permission to land in the UnitedStates for a variety of reasons. When a crewmemberhas been denied temporary permission to land in theUnited States and poses a high security risk to the port,the Coast Guard may assist CBP by ensuring that themaster, owner, agent, and/or operator of the vesselhas provided effective security measures to keep theidentified high-risk, detain onboard crewmemberfrom gaining illegal entry into the United States.

The SOP provides guidance for coordinating CBP andCoast Guard efforts to identify high-risk crewmem-bers and ensure that effective security measures are

ANNEX IIStandard Operating Procedure For Contracted Crewmember Security

1. Security services must be in place before vessel arrives pier-side or onboard as perCOTP Order.

2. Security services must have a complete crew list identifying those crewmembers thatare not authorized to go ashore.

3. Security services must maintain a detailed log (times, reasons, etc.) of all personsgoing aboard and going ashore.

4. A muster of all individuals that are not authorized to go ashore shall be conducted every4 hours.

5. Security services must have a communications plan that allows effective and continu-ous communications with appropriate security officials, to include the following:a. Facility Security (Contact frequency or telephone number)

(If applicable)b. Police (Local phone number)c. Contract Security (Contact frequency or telephone number)

Dispatcherd. CBP (Local phone number)e. Coast Guard (Local phone number)f. Agent (Local phone number)g. FBI (Local phone number)h. ICE (Local phone number)Consideration should be given to the need for language services to ensure that secu-rity personnel can properly communicate with the above officials and crew, especially high-risk crewmembers.

6. Valid crew must present proper documentation and must be cross-checked against thecrew list provided by CBP. Only those crewmembers identified as being in D-1 or D-2status are permitted to disembark the vessel. Questions related to whether a particu-lar crewmember is allowed to disembark shall be forwarded to the ship’s agent and, ifnecessary, CBP.

7. Non-crew, with proper identification, may board and leave the vessel. This may includevendors and service providers contracted to the ship (i.e., stevedores, agents).

8. Any attempt to disembark a vessel by persons not authorized to land (including stow-aways) shall be reported immediately to local security services (facility guard posts,facility managers), CBP, USCG, ICE, FBI, local police department(s), and the vessel’sagent.

9. If unauthorized individuals successfully disembark the vessel, contracted security serv-ices must immediately contact the agencies above, providing name, description, andcircumstances surrounding the situation. If possible, contracted security servicesshould coordinate with facility security personnel to locate and retrieve the abscondingcrewmember within the port facility.


put in place to prevent suchcrewmembers from gaining illegalentry into the United States.Furthermore, intelligence about aparticular vessel, crewmember, orother circumstances may warrantimplementation of other procedures,enforcement measures, or require-ments similar to those of the SOP.

Annex I to the SOP is the minimumstandards for contracted crewmem-ber security services. Annex II to theSOP is the Standard OperatingProcedures for ContractedCrewmember Security.

Annex VI of the SOP contains a listof countries from the FederalRegister published at 68 FR 2363.Aliens from these countries havebeen determined to warrant addi-tional monitoring in the interest ofnational security. Under the terms ofthe SOP, CBP will order the masterto detain onboard any crewmemberthat is an alien from an Annex VIcountry—or that intelligence sug-gests is a risk to security—and thathas not been permitted to land in

the United States. The Coast Guard will provide thenecessary enforcement authority to ensure that thevessel master, owner, agent, or operator has estab-lished effective security measures (Annexes I and II)to prevent high-risk crewmembers from abscondingand damaging or threatening the port.

Local or regional plans and procedures implementingthe SOP are acceptable as agreed upon in writing bylocal Captains of the Port (COTPs), CBP Port Directors,and CBP Border Patrol Chief Patrol Agents whereassigned. COTPs, Port Directors, and Chief PatrolAgents retain discretion to modify security measuresand plans as the situation dictates and may consideralternatives offered by the vessel’s master orowner/operator that would provide an equivalentlevel of security to ensure that high-risk crewmembersare detained onboard. It is expected that security planswill not conflict with applicable laws or regulations.

In certain circumstances the terms of the SOP andrequirements for contracted crew security may beextended to vessels with crewmembers who are notnationals of the countries identified by the SOP. Thesecases usually involve vessel owner/operators who havehad significant patterns of absconders from their vessels.

DesertersCoast Guard policy is that the vessel must report adesertion and update its notice of arrival information toreflect the changed crew. By regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 251.2,the vessel is also required to report deserters to CBP.

Deserters are crewmembers who have a valid visa andare permitted to land in the United States but fail toreturn to their vessel and depart as required. Thesecrewmembers have gone through a pre-screeningprocess that each crewmember must undergo prior tobeing permitted to land in the United States. Eachcrewmember must obtain a travel document such as apassport from his or her country and a visa from theDepartment of State. Each crewmember’s name iscompared against numerous criminal databases fromthe notice of arrival information provided to both CBPand the Coast Guard. Finally, each crewmember mustundergo inspection by a CBP officer upon arrival andmust be given specific authorization to land. CBP con-siders the vessel’s history—with particular regard todeserters and absconders—in determining if acrewmember is permitted to land. CBP will only per-mit the crewmember to land if it determines that, inthe unlikely event that he deserts, he will still not posea security risk to the United States.

With regard to crewmembers that CBP has permittedto land in the United States, the Coast Guard generallytakes no action. CBP has determined that thesecrewmembers pose an acceptable risk to the UnitedStates and, therefore, permit the crewmembers to land.If the vessel or its owner/operator has a recent historyor pattern of deserters, Coast Guard action is normallynot warranted, aside from notifying CBP of the pat-tern. Because the previous deserters were permitted toland and because CBP determined that the crewmem-ber under consideration likewise is permitted to land,the crewmember does not pose a security risk to theUnited States.

Nevertheless, a significant pattern of desertion doeselevate the security risk posed by the vessel, andCoast Guard policy recognizes this by allowingCOTPs to require crew security plans for a 12-monthperiod as with elevated risk absconders. A local CoastGuard commander may impose additional require-ments in consultation with CBP if, after analyzing thefacts and circumstances of a particular case, additionalmeasures are determined to be necessary to ensure thesecurity of the United States or to secure the rightsand obligations of the United States.

About the author: LCDR Mike Cunningham is a legal advisor with theCoast Guard Inspections and Compliance Directorate.

ANNEX VICountries From 68 FR2363, 16 January 2003

AFGHANISTANALGERIABAHRAIN

BANGLADESHEGYPT

ERITREAINDONESIA

IRANIRAQ

JORDANKUWAIT

LEBANONLIBYA

MOROCCONORTH KOREA

OMANPAKISTAN

QATARSAUDI ARABIA

SOMALIASUDANSYRIA

TUNISIAUNITED ARAB EMIRATES

YEMENTotal: 25 countries

63www.uscg.mil/proceedings

The Evolution of TWICCoast Guard and TSA have teamed up to implement a common biometric identification card for use in the maritime industry.

by LCDR JONATHAN MAIORINEChief, Standards Branch, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Port and Facility Activities

In response to the Maritime Transportation SecurityAct (MTSA) of 2002, the Coast Guard has teamed upwith the Transportation Security Administration(TSA) to work toward achieving one of the UnitedStates’ most challenging security goals: develop, test,and implement a biometric transportation securitycard for an estimated one million U. S. maritime trans-portation workers, including all credentialed mer-chant mariners. While the requirement to issue auniform identification credential for use across theentire maritime industry represented a significanttask, the MTSA mandate to incorporate a biometricwas immediately recognized as one of the mostdemanding aspects of the project for the Coast Guard.

Fortunately, when the Coast Guard joined the projectin November 2004, TSA was actively engaged inresearching and developing a Transportation WorkerIdentification Credential (TWIC) in response to theMTSA and the Aviation Transportation Security Act of2001 (ATSA). The ATSA is aimed at strengthening air-port access control points through the implementa-tion of a secure credential. While the ATSA does notrequire the use of biometrics, language in the act doesmandate that the use of biometrics be considered as ameans of identifying airport employees.

TSA had already completed a technology review andhad begun testing a biometric prototype TWIC whenthe Coast Guard offered to serve as a subject matterexpert in implementing the TWIC first in the maritimemode. The ATSA required consideration of the use ofbiometrics in the airline industry, and the MTSA man-dated the use of biometrics in the maritime mode.Therefore, teaming up Coast Guard and TSA in a jointrule-making project to implement a common biomet-ric identification card in the maritime mode was amove in the right direction. It was also in step withDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) policy advo-

cating sharing of resources, technology, and informa-tion between agencies to enhance homeland security.

The Biometrics ChallengeOn its Website, TSA defines biometrics as “automatedmethods of recognizing a person based on physiologi-cal or behavioral characteristics that are unique to anindividual.” Many people are familiar with the use ofdeoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and fingerprints in lawenforcement and forensic activities, but they may notrealize that both fall into the broad category that is bio-metrics. While television and movies might project thatthe use of biometrics is common and fully established,in actuality, its use as a means of personal identity ver-ification remains somewhat of an emerging industry.

Directed for use by such a large segment of the popu-lation, the TWIC will be the first of its kind in theUnited States. To establish a simple means by which aport worker can reliably identify himself or herselfinvolves the use of a complex system. Such a system,however, will benefit national security, facility own-ers, and port employees by limiting unescorted accessto secure areas and sensitive infrastructure to thoseindividuals with a legitimate need and who also passa security threat assessment.

ScopePreliminary estimates indicate approximately one mil-lion workers will be enrolled in the TWIC maritimeprogram. The MTSA-regulated industry, consisting of3,500 facilities, 10,000 vessels, and 60 outer-continentalshelf platforms, will be required to implement systemsand policies to support the card and have their securityplan updates approved by the Coast Guard.

The TWIC population, with regard to who is requiredto hold the credential, is mandated by the law itself,and this somewhat tangible data served as a corner-stone during the development of enrollment, card

Proceedings Spring 2006

PREVENTION


i s s u a n c e ,and datam a n a g e -ment plans.The devel-opment ofthe facility,vessel, and

platform opera-tional regula-tions, however,

poses a unique challenge due to the broadrange of operations, geographic locations, and varyingnumbers of workers requiring unescorted access tosecure areas.

The law clearly mandated that a biometric card will beissued. Developing the “how to use it” regulations isthe tough part. Impacted vessels vary from 30-foot pas-senger sport fishing boats to 800-foot cargo ships, andfacilities range from small riverfront fueling docks tomulti-acre container terminals, refineries, and chemicalplants. The challenge is to propose useful and work-able regulations and an implementation schedule tosupport the TWIC’s enhanced security capabilitieswithout overburdening industry. Currently, TWIC reg-ulatory development teams are exploring the differentcard authentication tools available to provide maxi-mum flexibility for regulated entities.

ImpactWhat are the security problems currently faced by thevarious modes of the U.S. transportation system andsupply chain that TWIC aims to solve? According toMr. John Schwartz, assistant director of maritime andsurface credentialing (MSC) programs at TSA, theseare: “the inability to positively identify individualsentering secure areas of the transportation system; theinability to assess the threat posed by individuals dueto a lack of background information, or the lack ofuniformly determined background information; andthe inability to protect current credentials againstfraud.” He added, “the TWIC will positively tie theperson to the credential, to the threat assessment.”

In storing a transportation worker’s physical biomet-ric, fingerprints, the TWIC will enable a one to onematch of the cardholder to the card itself with theassistance of an electronic reader. Through develop-ment and publishing of the standard to which readersmust comply, TSA encouraged competition amongprivate sector vendors and intends for customers tobenefit from the use of off-the-shelf technology.

The issue of interoperability itself has challenged thebiometrics industry as a whole. Due to the fact that

manufacturers can use a unique and proprietary algo-rithm to convert fingerprint images to templates forstorage within the TWIC, a card reader manufacturedby a different company may not be able to read theinformation stored by another. According to an arti-cle by Mr. Thad Rueter of Card Technology magazine,“to overcome that hurdle, vendors have worked todevelop interoperable templates, which are currentlybeing tested by the National Institute of Standardsand Technology.”

The TWIC is designed to be more secure than manyother forms of identification, in part due to the storageof encrypted information on a contactless chip. Otherinformation, including the cardholder’s name, photo,and biometric, will be stored within the card’s inte-grated circuit chip. Another feature of the TWIC sys-tem is the ability to cross reference a TSA-manageddatabase for expired or revoked cards and comparenames to threat-intelligence databases or watch lists.

Understandably, privacy and collection of personalinformation concerns have been voiced by personalprivacy advocates such as the Electronic PrivacyInformation Center (EPIC), who formally respondedto TSA’s public notification of intent to alter recordsystems in September 2004. According to EPIC, “TSAmust take into consideration the privacy interests ofthose whose information is gathered, and take greatcare to guard this information from excessive use,misuse, or even use in furtherance of a terrorist act.”

TSA maintains the TWIC program fully complieswith all federal privacy laws and that all of the infor-mation stored within the card is encrypted for addedsecurity. In addition, no personal information outsideof the holder’s name and photo will be visibly dis-played on the TWIC, unlike many driver’s licensesand other forms of identification that display a socialsecurity number or home address.

StatusIn April 2003 TSA initiated operational testing by con-ducting a six-month technology evaluation at 12 dif-ferent transportation facilities, not all of themmaritime. The evaluation successfully demonstratedTSA’s ability to open and manage enrollment centersand to produce and issue cards and the TWIC’s abil-ity to support physical and logical access control.Most importantly, the evaluation period providedTSA the opportunity to evaluate the feasibility andreliability of existing card-based technologies in thefield, including the integrated circuit chip, linear bar-code, magnetic stripe, optical memory stripe, and thetwo-dimensional barcode.

Sample TransportationWorker IdentificationCredential (TWIC),front and back.


The next phase of testing, protoype, was conductedfrom August 2004 to June 2005. These tests includeduse of the TWIC system at selected deepwater portsthroughout the country. According to TSA, the proto-type successfully tested advanced components of theTWIC, including its ability to manage a centralizedand uniform card production system, physical accessinterfaces, and the operation of a centralized identitymanagement infrastructure. While the actual numberof cards used for access control was less than antici-pated, the valuable lessons learned regarding the con-cept were incorporated in the planning stages forimplementation.

After missing the initial target date for issuance inAugust 2004, Congress requested that theGovernment Accountability Office (GAO) conduct anaudit of the TWIC program to identify the cause of thedelay and to document future challenges facing timelyimplementation. In December 2004 the audit was com-plete and cited three main issues for the delay.

According to the report, the first reason for the delaywas that TSA had difficulty in obtaining approval forthe prototype test from the Department of HomelandSecurity. GAO did recognize that DHS was a newlyformed agency at the time, with multiple legacy proj-ects and urgent security responsibilities, especially inthe aviation arena.

Second, TSA was tasked to work with DHS and Officeof Management and Budget (OMB) officials to identifyadditional information needed for a second cost-bene-fit analysis and alternatives analysis. This requiredadditional time, further delaying the prototype test.

The third reason cited by GAO for missing the August2004 deadline was a congressional request to conductadditional tests of various card technologies, whichresulted in another seven-month delay to the originaltesting schedule. Regarding the additional testing,GAO stated: “This analysis is typical of good programmanagement and planning and, while it may havedelayed the original schedule, the purpose of suchassessments is to prevent delays in the future.” TheGAO report can be found in its entirety atwww.gao.gov/new.items/d05106.pdf.

One Size Does Not Fit AllIn developing the TWIC regulations, TSA hasemployed industry working groups, union represen-tatives, other DHS offices, and internationally recog-nized standards organizations for assistance. TheCoast Guard has also received valuable guidance andsupport from the National Maritime SecurityAdvisory Committee’s Credentialing Workgroup.

Both agencies expect considerable feedback and rec-ommendations from industry and labor organizationsduring the notice of proposed rulemaking commentperiod that will precede the regulations.

Impact on Merchant MarinersDepending on their service, U.S. merchant marinerscurrently must carry a license (or Certificate of Registry,if a staff officer) or a merchant mariner’s document(MMD) or both, and, if they sail beyond the boundaryline, they must also carry a separate STCWEndorsement. These credentials are referred to generi-cally as merchant mariner credentials (MMC).

As the MTSA requires all individuals holding an MMCto have a TWIC, regardless of a need to access secureareas, the Coast Guard's National Maritime Center hasexpressed concerns over adding yet another credentialto the list of those already required for mariners. Toaddress this issue, the Coast Guard is currently evaluatinga draft proposal to combine all MMCs into a single form.

The current proposal would enable mariners to carry nomore than two documents, with the TWIC serving asthe identity document and the MMC, consisting of acombined license, MMD, and STCW endorsement,serving as the qualification document. Timing such achange to coincide with the TWIC roll-out would sim-plify the process for the more than 62,000 mariners whowould benefit from this consolidation.

ConclusionA significant contribution the Coast Guard brings tothe project is the technical appreciation for the vastdifferences among the numerous MTSA-regulatedfacilities, vessels, and outer continental shelf plat-forms, which are not easily amenable to a uniformapplication of the TWIC. Also, because Coast Guard isresponsible for the security plan approval process forall regulated vessels and facilities, it can assist withthe integration of all TWIC requirements and compo-nents in the existing security plans. While the task iscertainly not an easy one and the regulatory develop-ment process has taken much longer than expected,the final product will provide another tool to improvesecurity at U.S. seaports, while enhancing commerceand protecting personal privacy.

About the author: LCDR Jonathan Maiorine is currently serving as aTWIC project team member for the Coast Guard and is assigned as Chief,Standards Branch for the Coast Guard Office of Port and FacilityActivities. He is also overseeing the current update to Title 33, Code ofFederal Regulations Subchapter H, Maritime Security Regulations.

Special thanks to LTJG Nanine Nyman for assisting with the drafting ofthis article. She is currently serving as both a member of the TWIC proj-ect team and biometrics subject mater expert for the Coast Guard’s Officeof Port and Facility Activities.


Congress mandated the original Port State Controlprogram in the 1994 Department of TransportationAppropriations Bill. This bill required the CoastGuard to change its approach to foreign vessel exam-inations and hold those most responsible for substan-dard ships accountable, including owners,classification societies, and flag states.

Prior to September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard’s PortState Control program was increasingly successful inreducing substandard shipping through the stringentenforcement of regulations pertaining to vessel safetyand protection of the environment. After the terroristattacks of 9/11, it became imperative for the CoastGuard to identify and mitigate threats in the maritime

transportation infrastructure. The Coast Guard, in itstraditional role as the lead federal agency for maritimetransportation security, worked closely with theInternational Maritime Organization (IMO) todevelop the International Ship and Port FacilitySecurity (ISPS) Code.

The ISPS Code requires every vessel over 500 grosstons on international voyages, as well as facilitiesworldwide, to implement preventative measures toprotect against security incidents. It also designatesroles and responsibilities in the marine industry toensure maritime security.

In addition to adopting the provisions contained in the

Port State ControlExamination

Assuring compliance with ISPS and MTSA.

by LT RYAN ALLAINPort State Control Specialist, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Vessel Activities

by LT CRAIG TOOMEYPort State Control Specialist, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Vessel Activities

Figure 1: Foreign vessel security compliance examinations from May 2004 to November 2005.

Foreign Vessel Security ComplianceExaminations

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ISPS Code, Congresspassed the MaritimeT r a n s p o r t a t i o nSecurity Act (MTSA) of2002. MTSA requirescommercial vesselsover 300 gross tons oninternational voyagesand U.S. facilities toconduct comprehen-sive security assess-ments, develop andimplement securitymeasures, and carry outoperations in accor-d a n c e w i t h a napproved security plan.MTSAapplies to vessels, structures, and facilities locatedin, on, under, or adjacent to U.S. waters. The creation ofMTSA and the ISPS Code required the Coast Guard’sPort State Control program to expand significantly.

The Coast Guard Port State Control program met thischallenge by seamlessly integrating the enforcementelements of the new security standards with the tradi-tional marine safety legacy missions of enforcingsafety and environmental compliance standards. Inthe spring of 2004, the Coast Guard implemented anISPS/MTSA pre-enforcement campaign that preparedthe marine industry for complying with the newrequirements before the July 1, 2004, deadline.

The pre-enforcement campaign also provided CoastGuard Port State Control officers with an opportunityto work in cooperation with industry to ensure theirpreparation. During the pre-enforcement campaign,inspectors verified the implementation of securityprograms onboard foreign vessels. If inspectors founda foreign vessel not yet in compliance with one ormore aspects of the ISPS Code, the inspector issueddeficiencies to the vessel, but did not impose a majorcontrol action. The inspector then entered this infor-mation into the Coast Guard’s Marine Information forSafety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) database.

Since July 1, 2004, the enforcement of the ISPS Codeand MTSA regulations have been integrated into thedaily Port State Control activities throughout theCoast Guard (Figure 1). On a typical day, Coast GuardPort State Control teams carry out 25 ISPS securityinspections.

The Targeting MatrixThe Port State Control program uses a risk-based tool,or matrix, to identify a foreign vessel for a security or

safety examination. The matrix provides two benefits:First, targeting allows the Coast Guard to use itsresources more effectively. Since more than 7,600 for-eign vessels make over 60,000 U.S. port calls eachyear, the Coast Guard needs to use its resourceswisely and focus inspections on foreign vessels with ahistory of poor performance. Vessels associated with apoorly performing flag state, owner, operator, or char-terer or calling upon the United States from a countrywith poor ISPS compliance will likely get inspected.Using the matrix also benefits well-managed vessels.Those vessels receive less frequent examinations.

The targeting matrix, available on the Coast GuardPort State Control Website, www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/pscweb/Publication.htm, provides the maritimeindustry with an incentive to maintain effective secu-rity and safety programs onboard their vessels. Whenthe maritime shipping community does not imple-ment effective security and safety programs, they riskdelaying their vessels and incurring huge unexpectedcosts due to a Coast Guard imposed major controlaction.

The ISPS/MTSA Security Compliance Matrix con-tains five elements. Each element provides a scorebased on the risk factors due to ship management,flag state, the recognized security organization, secu-rity compliance history, and last ports of call. Oncescores are determined for each of the five elements,the Coast Guard Captain of the Port adds themtogether to generate an overall total score for a partic-ular vessel.

2004-2005 ISPS/MTSA Compliance The Coast Guard attributes the successful implemen-tation of the ISPS Code in the United States to themaritime industry’s advance preparation and the

Figure 2: Foreign vessel major security control actions from 2004 and 2005.

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Coast Guard’s pre-enforcement campaign. After theISPS Code took effect in July 2004, major controlactions, detentions, and expulsions by the CoastGuard were much lower than expected (Figure 2). Bythe end of 2004, the overall percentage of major con-trol actions was 1.5 percent. The current data fromJanuary to November 2005 show that this trend willcontinue and that this percentage will drop evenlower. The Coast Guard will publish final results for2005 in the Port State Control Annual Report, avail-able in early 2006 on the Port State Control Website atwww.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/pscweb/Publication.htm.

Major Control Action of VesselsThe two most commonly found ISPS deficienciesleading to vessel detention include a vessel’s failure to

meet restricted area requirements and maintainaccess control measures at the vessel point ofembarkation (Table 1). In many of these cases, CoastGuard personnel walked freely into ISPS-designatedrestricted areas without crewmember escort or chal-lenge.

The Coast Guard also identified crew and vessel secu-rity officer training shortfalls as another leading causeof vessel detentions. In most cases, vessel operatorschanged out personnel or quickly conducted emer-gency ship security officer (SSO) training sessions tomeet the minimum levels required.

Wide ranging ship security plan (SSP) non-conformi-ties also lead to many detentions. Some of the mostcommon problems included missing required recog-nized security organization audits, improper safe-guarding of the SSP, mismatches between SSP detailsand actual shipboard procedures, and inadequate pro-cedures to handle security incidents.

ConclusionThe international maritime community, including theshipping industry and port facility stakeholders,should be congratulated for successfully taking on thehuge challenge of implementing the security meas-ures required by the ISPS Code and MTSA. Not onlywas the rate of compliance much higher thanexpected during the first few months of implementa-tion, but all trends indicate increasing compliancerates. Ship operators who use the plan will protect theU.S. maritime infrastructure from terrorist attacks andother illegal activity.

About the authors: LT Ryan Allain and LT Craig Toomey are both PortState Control Specialists in the Office of Vessel Activities, Foreign &Offshore Vessels Division, at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters. LT Allain hasserved in the marine safety program for over seven years and was mostrecently stationed at Marine Safety Detachment Fort Myers, Fla., for threeyears, where he served as the supervisor. LT Toomey served on the CG CutterSpencer for two years as a Deck Watch Officer and Assistant Navigator andhas served in staff positions in Human Resources, Information Technology,and Marine Safety at Coast Guard Headquarters. LT Toomey was mostrecently activated from the Reserves under Title 10 to work with theMaritime Transportation Security Act Implementation Team.

Table 1: Leading causes of vessel detentions in 2004 and 2005, dueto ISPS noncompliance.

ISPS Code Description of Number of cite area of noncompliance enforcement actions taken 2004 2005ISPS Code, Part A Access Control 62 33Section 7.2.2ISPS Code, Part A Restricted Areas 48 20Section 7.2.4 ISPS Code, Part A Ship Security Officer 37 9Section 12.2ISPS Code, Part A Ship Security Plan 21 10Section 9.4 ISPS Code, Part A Training 13 5Section 13ISPS Code, Part A Logs/Records 11 5Section 10.1ISPS Code, Part A, Communications 7 2Section 7.2.7ISPS Code, Part A Screening Process 6 0Section 7.2.2 ISPS Code, Part A Other (ISPS/Security Related Deficiencies) 6 2ISPS Code, Part A Shipboard Personnel 5 1Section 13.3 ISPS Code, Part A Drills 3 3Section 13.4ISPS Code, Part A Declaration of Security 2 0Section 5ISPS Code, Part A Reporting Security Incidents 2 0Section 9.4.12SOLAS, Chapter Continuous Synopsis Record 1 0 XI-1 Regulation 5ISPS Code, Part A Response Procedures 1 0Section 9.4.4 ISPS Code, Part A Evacuation Procedures 1 0Section 9.4.6ISPS Code, Part A Vessel Security Level 1 1Section 7.1

TOTAL 227 91

The Coast Guard welcomes comments on its pro-grams. We frequently meet with vessel operators,

flag state representatives, and classification societiesto discuss matters of safety and security.

We welcome your comments or would behappy to meet with you.

Please contact us at this email address:

[email protected].


Increased Port Security

Burden or benefit to port operations?

by MR. CHRIS AUSTENChief Executive Officer, Maritime & Underwater Security Consultants (MUSC)

The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS)Code, which was designed to reduce the threat of ter-rorist infiltration into foreign ports and, thus, into theUnited States by ship, has become weakened by indif-ference and complacency on the part of many govern-ments and port authorities overseas. The ISPS Codewas introduced by the International MaritimeOrganization (IMO) in response to the perceived threatsto ships and port facilities in the wake of the September11, 2001, attacks in the United States (Figure 1).

In testimony before the U.S. Congress in February2004, RADM Larry Hereth, then-U.S. Coast GuardDirector of Port Security, said, “Full deployment ofthe ISPS Code will greatly enhance the Coast Guard’sport security posture by identifying and correctingweaknesses overseas, thus increasing our ability toprevent potential threats from reaching U.S. shores.”

According to the latest IMO statistics, “almost 94 per-cent of the Contracting Governments to the SOLAS[Safety of Life at Sea] Convention have approvedsecurity plans for 97 percent of the declared port facil-ities, which in total number is excess of 9,600 world-wide.” These assets had to be compliant with the ISPSprovisions by July 1, 2004.

However, while many ports and terminals have gonethrough the paper process of implementing the code,many are not much more secure today than they wereprior to July 1, 2004. This view is supported by discus-sions with cargo insurance underwriters, who see nosigns of reduction in claims for cargo theft since theimplementation date. The concern is that, if port cargothefts have not decreased, how secure have ports andfacilities become against infiltration of terrorists?

The apparent contradiction between the success of

port and facility compliance and continued cargothefts must be addressed and corrected. Identificationof the problem and its solution lies with governmentsand port authorities who must make greater effort tounderstand the reasons for the code and the benefitsto be reaped from its effective implementation.

Many ports are driven to address security matters notbecause of any directly perceived threat, but solely tocomply with legislation. Security is seen as an unwel-come obstacle to the operation of the port, and improve-ments in security andefficiency are frequentlyseen as being incompatible.

In the intensely competitivefield of port operations, acommercial operator isreluctant to take on burden-some extra security costs ifhe sees his competitorssomehow avoiding them.Concern about a potentialterrorist attack is not highon the list of a port author-ity’s priorities. It is not partof the daily grind and,therefore, not considered tobe a net contributor.

In many cases, ports, andthe terminal facilitieswithin that port, are givenno or minimal budgets forsecurity. Such lack ofinvestment can lead to poorsecurity assessments and aconsequentially weak and

Figure 1: Mr. Tom Ridge, then-Secretary of the Department ofHomeland Security, explains theimplementation of the MaritimeTransportation Security Act (MTSA)and Inter-national Ship and PortFacility Security (ISPS) Code. PA3Mike Hvozda, USCG.

PREVENTION


meaningless security plan. The result too often is thatthe security investment has been largely squandered onan inefficient and ineffective security system, whichmay appear to offer superficial improvements but, infact, presents scant deterrence to even petty thieves, letalone determined terrorists. Thereafter, the securityeffort becomes stalled, acts as a disincentive to staff, andoften is seen as disjointed in its implementation in suchareas as the installation of fencing, scanners, closed cir-cuit television (CCTV) cameras, and access card readers.This negative attitude to security is usually manifest atmanagement level, and, without support from man-agers, any initiative to improve security is almost cer-tainly doomed to fail.

There are many benefits to commercial operators of aholistic approach to security. Ports and terminals thathave efficient and effective security tend to showoperational improvements in their businesses andhigher degrees of motivation among their workforce.Good security can lead to spin-offs, such as bettermonitoring of workforce utilization; improvement ininteragency cooperation, rationalization and some-times reduction of guard force requirements; andreduction of losses through theft, smuggling, andhuman trafficking.

Critical Port Security FactorsTo achieve an effective and sustainable securityregime, some critical factors must be addressed. Theseinclude:

· Strong governmental leadership: Centraland local governments must provide cleardirection to ports and terminal operators todevelop effective security. Governmentsmust set standards for enforcement agencies,public bodies, and private companies. Theyshould provide guidance and advice andhave trained resources to monitor andenforce compliance.

· Interagency cooperation: A significant obsta-cle to effective security in ports is rivalry andreluctance to cooperate among agencies, suchas police, customs, coast guard, and navy.Robust leadership from the heads of theseorganizations is needed to align the objec-tives of the various departments, to shareinformation, and to agree on roles, bound-aries, and interfaces.

· Support from port or terminal managers:Lack of commitment from senior manage-ment will have a direct effect on the perform-ance of security officers, guards, and port

workers. The attitude of senior managementcan be gauged by the behavior of the guardsat the gate. Management is unlikely to beenthusiastic about supporting a system that itperceives as a waste of money, likely to slowdown throughput, and affecting the port’scompetitive position.

· Involvement of all port personnel in thesecurity program: Increasing the securityawareness of port workers is perhaps themost cost-effective way of improving secu-rity. Through briefings and training, workersin the port collectively can act as the eyes andears of the port security system. They detect,deter, and disrupt crime. An alert and watch-ful workforce will do much to persuade ter-rorists and criminals to look for an easiertarget. This workforce will look to their man-agers for support and encouragement.

· Funding for security planning and imple-mentation: The problem of funding can be adifficult one to overcome. In the first instance,support from governments or, for developingcountries, from donor organizations may benecessary to initiate the security process. As aside note, beware of the new breed of portsecurity “expert” that has emerged after 9/11;many of these experts have had no previousexperience in the subject. It is discouragingwhen ports are ill-advised and spend scarceresources on inappropriate and expensiveequipment, usually with little or no improve-ment in security.

· Business plan: A business plan should bedeveloped to allow the cost of security to becarried without degrading the competitiveposition of the port. Installing a security sys-tem is the first step. After that, the systemshould be refined, updated, and maintained.All this costs money and can have an effect onthe operation of the entire port. The securityplanning process must take into account thelong term funding for the security system.

In most cases these factors can be addressed mosteffectively on a whole port basis, rather than thepiecemeal, facility-specific basis that many countriesand ports have adopted.

The Port of NigeriaWhile many ports have taken a superficial and inef-fective approach to port security, there are some


instances where diligence and commitment to theplanning and implementation of security are startingto show real benefits to port operations. One exampleof this is Nigeria.

The ports and coastal belt of West Africa suffer highrates of crime against ships. Illegal boarding, theft,extortion, kidnap of crews, and hijacking occur regu-larly. Criminal gangs operate in ports, and intercom-munity fighting occasionally disrupts port operations.Problems are exacerbated by dilapidated port infra-structure, unreliable power supplies, and intermittentland and mobile communications. The challenge fac-ing Nigeria to meet the requirements of the ISPS Codehas been enormous. Nonetheless, the country hasadopted a thoughtful and structured approach tomeet the demands of the code that many other coun-tries would do well to emulate.

Nigeria is one of the world’s major exporters of oil.Ninety-five percent of the country’s revenues arefrom oil exports, and the United States and Europe areits biggest customers. A security incident involving atanker coming from Nigeria risks the shutdown ofexports and massive damage to the economy. Nigeria,thus, is motivated to see real improvements in secu-rity in its ports and territorial seas.

About two years ago, Nigerian President OlusegunObasanjo created the Presidential ImplementationCommittee on Maritime Safety and Security toimprove security. The members are from various gov-ernment ministries, the armed forces and enforcementauthorities, representatives of the maritime industry,and port workers. A maritime security consultant wasengaged as an adviser to the government on nationalmaritime security strategy, training, and organiza-tional development; national security planning; andthe design and implementation of an integrated,nationwide maritime domain security program.

The program is an ambitious one: A national com-mand, communications, and control system will bedeveloped, providing real-time monitoring of activi-ties in terminals at both regional control centers and atthe maritime security authority’s headquarters inLagos. A system of radar stations and vessel trackingsensors will provide continuous tracking of SOLASand non-SOLAS vessels in Nigeria’s national waters.A national smart card identification (ID) system forseafarers and other port workers is being imple-mented.

The security surveys of the various ports have pro-duced valuable information for the maritime authori-

ties. Through data collected, programs have been ini-tiated for rearrangement of services and removal ofredundant and scrap equipment. The primary moti-vator for this activity has been to improve security,but the other benefits include more efficient port lay-outs, quicker cargo throughput, and the freeing up ofwasted space for potential rental and additionalincome to the port.

Increased dialogue among agencies, workers’ repre-sentatives, and employers is helping to improve rela-tionships between agencies, between government andindustry, and between employers and workers’organizations. By introducing better communicationsand control at regional and national levels, additionallayers of supervision of the activities of governmentofficials will help to inhibit and reduce the endemicproblems of corruption in the ports. This will increaserevenues to the government and improve the attrac-tiveness of Nigerian ports to the shipping industry.

The maritime domain awareness system will helpimprove the government’s effectiveness at collectingdues and other fees from ship operators, assist inenforcing the country’s cabotage law, and, mostimportantly, monitor the activities of suspicious craftand stamp out hijacking, hostage-taking, and theft atsea.

Much work has been carried out to identify andappreciate the problems. Under the leadership of theMinister of Transport, Dr. Abiye Sekibo, there is asolid determination in government to instigatechange and improvement. Much remains to be done,but the foundations are being set.

The Port of VeniceIn Europe, the port of Venice (Figure 2) offers anotherexample where a structured approach to security isenhancing the port’s overall operations. Venice is thehome of one of the world’s busiest cruise line terminals,handling over one million passengers per year. Closeby is the industrial port of Maghera, the second largestin Italy with over 30 terminals handling oil products,hazardous chemicals, containers, and bulk products.There is fierce competition between Venice and otherports in the Mediterranean, and, following the intro-duction of the ISPS Code, terminal operators in the portwere concerned at the impact that the burden of addi-tional costs for security would have on their business.

Although not legislated within the ISPS Code, theport authority recognized that the most effective wayof introducing security to the port would be througha coordinated and integrated approach across the


whole port. A security assessment of the entire portwas carried out, along with those for each facility.From this, a strategy was developed based on an inte-grated security control center that would provideCCTV surveillance, perimeter and access control, andID card management for all the terminal operators.The plan involves the construction of a new 12-laneentry point into the port with automated barriers,search and waiting areas, and facilities for containerscanning and other forms of non-intrusive inspection.At the same time outdated roads are being upgradedand a new port access bridge is being built.

The new security system, operated and maintainedunder the control of the port, will allow the terminaloperators to concentrate on their core businesses.Apart from better security, terminal operators willgain from better truck turnaround times and quickercargo processing. By integrating port and terminalsecurity operations, savings of over 30 percent in

guard manning costs will be likely. Other benefitsinclude better supervision of workforce timekeepingand improved management of movements of trucksand containers within the terminals. From a safetyperspective, the system will provide the port with areal-time picture of the location of persons and vehi-cles within the port. This will allow more effectiveresponse to emergencies and better management ofevacuation.

The port is now able to extend its value-added serv-ices to terminal operators and, thus, increase its rev-enues. By centralized purchasing and installation ofsecurity equipment, the port authority and the termi-nal operators can take advantage of economies ofscale, thus optimizing procurement and maintenancebudgets.

Raising standards of security in ports can have a sig-nificant cost, both in the initial capital spent and inongoing operation and maintenance. However, bycareful and structured discussions with the variousstakeholders in the port and its terminals, thoseinvolved in enhancing security can also bring bettersafety, improved administration, and improved oper-ational efficiency, while at the same time reducingcargo theft and the risk of terrorist intervention.

About the author: Mr. Chris Austen, chief executive officer of Maritime& Underwater Security Consultants (MUSC), based in London, England,has worked on a variety of counter-terrorism, anti-piracy and crime pre-vention operations in Europe, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Indonesia,Malaysia, and Central America. He provided input to the InternationalMaritime Organization for the development of the ISPS Code and to theWorld Customs Organization for supply chain security.

Figure 2: The Port of Venice.


National Maritime Security Advisory Council

NMSAC is the primary and lead advisory committee for maritime security.

by MR. JOHN BASTEKExecutive Secretary, NMSAC

The National Maritime Security Advisory Committee(NMSAC) is the newest advisory group for the CoastGuard. The Maritime Transportation Security Act(MTSA) of 2002 established NMSAC in Section 70112.The committee was formed to advise the Secretary ofHomeland Security through the Commandant of theCoast Guard on matters relating to national maritimesecurity. Members were chosen based on their affilia-tion to a specific sector within the maritime industryor a recognized maritime association, in order to rep-resent the interests of a wide segment ofthe maritime population (Figure 1). Eachmember is required to have at least fiveyears of experience in maritime securityoperations, and all of the members arevetted and approved by the Secretary ofHomeland Security.

Congress made the NMSAC subject tothe Federal Advisory Committee Act(FACA), which requires an annual report,among other things. General informationon FACA committees can be found on theFACA Website at http://www.gsa.gov/.

Members and Committee MakeupThe members are from very diverse ele-ments within the maritime community—port management, facilities, organizedlabor, vessel owners/operators, supplychain, and academia. A wide array ofviews is represented, which is the value ofthis group. They can discuss every facetof a situation from individual perspec-

tives and, thereby, provide quality advice to theDepartment of Homeland Security or to the CoastGuard.

Each member can also solicit input from others withintheir specific maritime industry segment or element orrecommend others to participate on NMSAC work-groups. This capability ensures, again, that advice andrecommendations provided by NMSAC are built uponthe foundation of broad maritime industry expertise.

Christopher L. Koch President & CEO, World Shipping Council (NMSAC Chairman)Lisa B. Himber Vice President, Maritime Exchange for the Delaware River and Bay (NMSAC Vice Chair)Joseph H. Langjahr Vice President & General Counsel, Foss Maritime CompanyThomas E. Thompson Executive Vice President, International Council of Cruise LinesJohn C. Dragone Vice President – Operating Division, Maritrans Operating Company L.P.Mary Frances Culnane Manager, Marine Engineering, San Francisco Bay Area Water Transit AuthorityBasil Maher President and Chief Operating Officer, Maher TerminalsCharles Raymond Chairman, President, and CEO, Horizon LinesAlice K. Johnson Senior Supervisor, PPG Industries, Inc.Timothy J. Scott Global Director, Emergency Services & Security - The Dow Chemical CompanyMark Witten Sr. Regulatory Advisor, Gulf of Mexico Deepwater Business Unit, ChevronTexacoRobert R. Merhige III Retired Chief of the Port Police; Virginia Port AuthorityJeffery W. Monroe Director of Ports and Transportation, Portland, MaineWade M. Battles Managing Director - Port of Houston AuthorityJohn Hyde Director, Security & Compliance, Maersk Sealand Inc.William Eglinton Seafarers International Union of North America, AFL-CIOJames Stolpinski President, Local 1233 ILADavid Halstead Chief, Domestic Security Preparedness, FL Department of Law EnforcementTheodore L. Mar Chief, Marine Safety Branch - CA Dept of Fish and GameVictor Zaloom Director, Engineering Graduate Programs & Lamar University Center for Ports and Waterways

The original 20 members selected to the NMSAC are:

PREVENTION


The Designated Federal Official and ExecutiveDirector for the NMSAC is CAPT Frank Sturm, theChief of Port and Vessel Security at U.S. Coast GuardHeadquarters. Capt Sturm himself has much mar-itime experience with which to provide guidance andassistance to the committee.

NMSAC Purpose and CharterNMSAC is chartered “to advise, consult with, and makerecommendations to the Secretary of the Department inwhich the Coast Guard is operating, via theCommandant of the Coast Guard, on matters affectingmaritime security, including, but not limited to:

· developing a national strategy and policy toprovide for efficient, coordinated and effec-tive action to deter and minimize damagefrom maritime-related transportation secu-rity incidents;

· recommending actions required to meet cur-rent and future security threats to ports, ves-sels, facilities, waterways, and theirassociated inter-modal transportation con-nections and critical infrastructure;

· promoting international cooperation and

multilateral solutions to maritime securityissues;

· addressing security issues and concernsbrought to the committee by segments of themaritime transportation industry, or otherport and waterway stakeholders; and,

· such other matters, related to those above,that the Secretary may charge the committeewith addressing.”

Relation to Other Advisory CommitteesNMSAC, however, is only one of many federal advi-sory committees with an interest or charter dealingwith homeland security issues. Thus, as a new federaladvisory committee, it is important to identify the roleof NMSAC in relation to these other existing advisorycommittees.

Figure 2 is a visual representation of some of theserelationships. NMSAC is the primary and lead advi-sory committee for maritime security. The figure,however, shows where the interests or roles andresponsibilities of other federal advisory committeesare concurrent with or intersect with those ofNMSAC. A key activity, then, as the agenda for

Figure 1: First row, from left: John Dragone, Maritrans; Jeffrey Monroe, Port of Portland (ME) Port Director;Basil Maher, Maher Terminals; Bill Eglinton, Seafarer's International Union; Victor Zaloom, Lamar University;Robert Merighe, Retired Chief of Police, Virginia Port Authority; CDR Tina Burke, USCG. Second row, from left:Mary Frances Culnane, San Francisco Water Taxi Authority; Mark Witten, Chevron/Texaco; Ted Mar, State ofCalifornia; Chris Koch, World Shipping Council, Chair; Joseph Langjahr, Foss Maritime Company; JamesStolpinski, International Longshoreman's Association; John Bastek, Executive Secretary. Third row, from left:Capt Frank Sturm, USCG; John Hyde, Maersk; Thomas E. Thompson, ICCL; David Halstead, State of Florida;Lisa Himber, Delaware Marine Exchange, Vice Chair.(Not pictured: T.J. Scott, Dow Chemical; Alice Johnson, PPG Industries; Chuck Raymond, Horizon Lines; andWade Battles, Port of Houston.) YN1 Birchfield, USCG.


NMSAC evolves, is tomaintain awareness ofthe issues being under-taken in other venuesand to coordinateNMSAC’s work or inter-ests with these othercommittees as appropri-ate.

Summary of Meetings,A c c o m p l i s h m e n t s ,Current ActivitiesNMSAC met for the firsttime in March 2005, andthe committee meets atleast once a year bystatute. At the inauguralmeeting, the Commandant of the Coast Guard spoketo the NMSAC members about his vision for the com-mittee, set high expectations with respect to how thecommittee could help in furthering the goal of nationalmaritime security, and expressed his appreciation foreach member’s participation. RADM T.H. Gilmour,the Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security,and Environmental Protection (now AssistantCommandant for Prevention), as well as RADM LarryHereth, the Director of Port Security at that time, alsoparticipated in the inaugural meeting. They framedissues for consideration by the committee and helpedset the work of the committee off on the right path. Asa result of those initial discussions, five initial work-groups were conceived: the Communications,Consistency, Asymmetric Migration, Single Window(Data) Reporting, and Transportation Worker IdentityCard (TWIC) workgroups.

Shortly following the inaugural meeting, theTransportation Security Administration and the CoastGuard asked the NMSAC TWIC workgroup todevelop recommendations that would assist with thedrafting of a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)for the TWIC. The task statement requested that theworkgroup address 13 different areas of concernregarding potential TWIC processes and impacts.Given approximately one month to complete thiscomplex task, the TWIC workgroup quickly com-menced work and, after numerous conference callsand document exchanges, presented their recommen-dations in May 2005. The workgroup received highpraise for rapidly responding to this important taskand providing comprehensive recommendations,which are proving extremely useful to the govern-ment regulation drafting team in understanding theindustry’s stance on the issues presented.

Most recently, at theNovember 1, 2005, ses-sion, the committeeaccepted a task fromthe Coast Guard toidentify maritime pri-vate sector subjectmatter experts (SMEs)from all appropriatemaritime business andindustry sectors. TheseSMEs are needed toprovide advice andconsultation to theCoast Guard and otherDHS agencies onnational level maritime

matters during transportation security incident (TSI)response or recovery operations. Communicationsbetween government and private sector is a key ele-ment in the realm of homeland security. Establishingcommunication mechanisms supports strategies andgoals outlined in the Maritime TransportationSecurity Act of 2002, the National Strategy forMaritime Security, the National Response Plan, andseveral other guiding documents.

Engagement on Future Maritime Security ChallengesDespite the progress of the nation, the Department ofHomeland Security, and the United States CoastGuard on matters of maritime homeland security,there is still much work to be done to continue thwart-ing the ever-present terrorist threat. The NationalStrategy for Maritime Security, signed in September2005, and the eight supporting plans directed byHomeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)13outline concepts and recommendations to bring col-lective efforts to the next level. Overall, the eight sup-porting plans together serve to enhance internationalcooperation while maximizing Maritime DomainAwareness. This will create necessary layers of secu-rity meant to stop or deter threats against the UnitedStates, as far from our shores as possible, while alsoassuring continuity of the maritime transportationsystem. NMSAC is expected to play an important rolein providing private sector perspectives and advice tothe government during implementation of these sig-nificant plans and strategies.

About the author: Mr. John Bastek is currently the Executive Secretaryof NMSAC for the Coast Guard. He has worked for the Coast Guard fortwo years as a civilian after a 30-year active duty career. He has also heldpositions on the International Council for Cruise Lines, in the MaritimeGroup for Preston Gates LLP, and as a private consultant. He is a gradu-ate of the Coast Guard Academy, the University of Miami School of Law,and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Land SecurityAir Security Maritime Security

Federal Advisory Committees with a Role in Homeland Security

Homeland Security Advisory Council

National Infrastructure Advisory Committee

Committee on Commercial Operations

Aviation Security Advisory Committee

National Maritime Security

Advisory Committee

Safety/Transportation/Commerce

Chemical TransportationAdvisory Committee

Maritime TransportationSystem National

Advisory Committee

Figure 2: NMSAC’s relationship with other federal advisorycommittees.


Airborne Use of ForceArming Coast Guard aviation.

by LCDR MELISSA RIVERASpecial Missions Program Manager

U.S. Coast Guard Office of Aviation Forces, Office of Counterterrorism and Special Missions

by CDR AARON C. DAVENPORTDeputy Chief

U.S. Coast Guard Office of Counterterrorism and Special Missions

Securing the American Homeland is a challengeof monumental scale and complexity. But theU.S. government has no more important mission.

- President George W. Bush, in the National Strategy for Homeland Security

The Coast Guard will adjust to that change and beready to do what is necessary to ensure that mar-itime homeland safety and security are guaranteed.

- ADM Thomas Collins, Commandant of the U. S. Coast Guard

The U.S. Coast Guard transferred from theDepartment of Transportation into the newly createdDepartment of Homeland Security in March 2003. Fora service that traditionally considered search and res-

cue as one of its primary missions, this move wasmore than the physical shifting of departments. Itrequired a shift of many age-old paradigms aboutCoast Guard missions, as well as the way the serviceconducts its day-to-day business.

Maritime Strategy for Homeland SecurityTo prepare for this move, the Coast Guard releasedthe Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security inDecember 2002. In this document, the Coast Guardprovided its maritime homeland security (MHS) mis-sion statement:

“Protect the U.S. Maritime Domain and the U.S.Marine Transportation System and deny their use andexploitation by terrorists as a means for attacks onU.S. territory, population, and critical infrastructure.Prepare for and, in the event of attack, conduct emer-gency response operations. When directed, as thesupported or supporting commander, conduct mili-tary homeland defense operations.”

In support of this mission, the service’s strategicobjectives in maritime homeland security are:

· Prevent terrorist attacks within, and terroristexploitation of, the U.S. Maritime Domain.

· Reduce U.S. vulnerability to terrorism withinthe U.S. Maritime Domain.

· Protect U.S. population centers, critical infra-structure, maritime borders, ports, coastalapproaches, and the boundaries and seamsamong them.

· Protect the U.S. Marine TransportationSystem while preserving the freedom of theU.S. Maritime Domain for legitimate pursuits.

· Minimize the damage and recover fromFigure 1: A Coast Guard gunner sights in on a target from aCoast Guard helicopter.

“

“”

”

PROTECTION

attacks that may occur within the U.S.Maritime Domain as either the lead federalagency or a supporting agency.

Airborne Use of ForceWith the creation of the Helicopter InterdictionTactical Squadron (HITRON) in 1999, the main focusof the Coast Guard’s Airborne Use of Force (AUF)from helicopters was on counter drug operations.After September 11, 2001, a Coast Guard workgroupwas formed to research expanding AUF capability forapplication in maritime homeland security missions.This workgroup was comprised of key personnelfrom across the service; the group explored multipleAUF concepts and evaluated the rotary-wing fleetsize needed to execute new mission sets.

As a follow-on, Aviation Training Center Mobile, Ala.,established itself as the Coast Guard’s AUF Center ofExcellence. Within this command, the Aviation

Special Missions Branch was created to provide train-ing and standardization support to AUF initiatives,including:

· aerial tactics; · vertical insertion (fast roping);· rotary wing air intercept;· joint surface/air tactics;· CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological,

nuclear explosive) operations; and · aerial gunnery.

Arming Coast Guard helicopters is critical to meetingthe Department of Homeland Security’s missions(Figure 1). Coast Guard armed helicopters have beenused to meet maritime security requirements, includ-ing interdicting drugs, performing maritime securitypatrols, and protecting the public in U.S. ports andwaterways during national special security events.These events have included the Group of Eight (G8)

Figure 2: A Coast Guard aviation gunner provides aerialsecurity during a boarding exercise.


summit in Georgia, the national political party con-ventions in Boston and New York City, and PresidentReagan’s funeral in California. Armed helicoptersoperating from the decks of Coast Guard cutters haveinterdicted record amounts of illegal drugs in theCaribbean and Eastern Pacific. Eight Agusta Bell MH-68s provide the majority of this capability, basing fromHITRON in Jacksonville, Fla. However, due to thissmall number of armed helicopters, many airbornehomeland security missions are currently being con-ducted by unarmed aircraft.

The Coast Guard intends to equip all of its HH-65C andHH-60J helicopters—a total of 137 aircraft—with theability to be armed, providing weapons as funding per-mits. This will give the Coast Guard the ability torespond quickly to emerging security threats wherever itoperates. These armed helicopters will also continue toconduct all Coast Guard missions they currently per-form (Figure 2).

CapabilityCoast Guard aviation continues to adapt to the mar-itime homeland security mission. All air stations andaircraft type are supporting this mission with patrolsoffshore, in the ports and waterways across thenation. In addition, tremendous efforts are beingmade to determine how to provide a more robust avi-ation capability in the new department. One such pro-gram is the armed helicopter proof of concept.

In fall 2003 and spring 2004, the Coast Guard beganan HH-60J airborne use of force proof of concept atAir Station Cape Cod, Mass. The primary purpose ofthe proof of concept was to measure operational effec-tiveness, compared with the impact of fielding a mar-itime homeland security AUF capability at anestablished Coast Guard air station, in terms of man-power, training, and other resource costs. Based onfeedback and lessons learned during this project, theCoast Guard intends to use the model developed inCape Cod to spread AUF capability within its helicop-ter fleet.

In 2005, the Coast Guard modified all of the HH-60JJayhawk helicopters at Air Station San Diego for theAUF mission. This aircraft equipment includes:

· mounted M240 area fire weapons; · shoulder-mounted backup M14 weapons;

· aircraft hardening (armor); · pilot head-up display (HUD); · upgraded forward-looking infrared/electro-

optical (FLIR/EO) equipment; · an upgraded radio to allow for better com-

munications with local agencies; and · body armor for aircrews.

Beginning this year, a core group of pilots and gun-ners at San Diego will be trained in day and night tac-tics and aerial gunnery.

Key to AUF capability is interoperability with theCoast Guard’s tactical, maritime homeland security,and traditional law enforcement forces. Throughresearch and the AUF proof of concept, the prelimi-nary estimated costs of developing this capabilityhave been learned. With time, the cost of varioustypes of AUF capabilities and the scalability will bemore accurately determined.

In July 2005, the Coast Guard established the Office ofHomeland Security Operations & Tactics, withresponsibility for tactical policy and requirements.This new office will combine the efforts of the diverseaspects of the Coast Guard's MHS package. Research,testing, and tactics development are well underway inthe arenas of aircrew chemical, biological, and radio-logical equipment; rotary wing air intercept; and air-borne designated marksman capability.

While striving to serve the American public in themaritime homeland security mission, Coast Guardaviation continues to examine and expand its capabil-ities to meet the service’s strategic objectives.

About the authors: LCDR Melissa Rivera is a 1991 graduate of the U.S.Coast Guard Academy and an HH-60J Instructor Pilot/Flight Examinerwith more than 10 years of flight experience. Currently, she is a CoastGuard Airborne Use of Force/Aviation Special Missions ProgramManager. LCDR Rivera is a recipient of aviation awards from theFraternal Order of Daedalians, Association for Naval Aviation, NavalHelicopter Association and a heroism award from the Coast GuardFoundation.

CDR Aaron C. Davenport is a 1984 graduate of the U.S. Coast GuardAcademy and a 1995 graduate of the University of California at LosAngeles. He has served in Coast Guard boat force, afloat, and marinesafety operational commands, and his staff assignments includeCombatant Command Headquarters and Logistics Command Atlantic.CDR Davenport’s most recent assignment was command of Coast GuardCutter Valiant. He has been selected for promotion to Captain and for the2006 RAND Corporation Military Executive Fellowship.


After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, therewas an immediate and overwhelming focus ondomestic maritime security law enforcement opera-tions. The Coast Guard received unprecedented num-bers of requests to establish security zones athigh-value assets, such as naval vessels and facilities,critical port infrastructure, and nuclear facilities, toname just a few. The needfor such zones quicklyoutgrew the CoastGuard’s law enforcementresources. To meetincreased security require-ments in U.S. ports, water-ways, and coastal areas,with limited Coast Guardresources, many CoastGuard field commandersturned to state and localauthorities for assistancein enforcing these securityzones (Figure 1).

Law EnforcementWhile it was clear that theCaptain of the Port (COTP)could request other entitiesto assist in enforcing secu-rity zones, and that federalcase law long recognizedthat states had the abilityto confer arrest authorityfor federal criminal viola-

tions, many states had concerns as to whether or nottheir state law enforcement officers could enforce a fed-eral safety or security zone. To resolve the problem,Congress inserted a provision in the Coast Guard andMaritime Transportation Act of 2004 (CGMTA)1 toresolve these concerns. President George W. Bushsigned CGMTA into law on August 9, 2004.

Safeguarding theUnited StatesEnforcement of Coast Guardsafety and security zones.

by LCDR BRAD KIESERMANChief, Operational Law Group, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Maritime & International Law

by LCDR CHRISTOPHER F. MURRAYLegal Advisor, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Law Enforcement, Headquarters

by LCDR MIKE CUNNINGHAMLegal Advisor, U.S. Coast Guard Inspections & Compliance Directorate

PROTECTION

Figure 1: A Boston Police boat and a Coast Guard 25-footer secure Rowes Wharf during the 2004Democratic National Convention. PA3 Mike Lutz, USCG.


Section 801 of the CGMTA created a new § 701192 intitle 46, United States Code. Section 70119 clarifiedauthority for state law enforcement officers. Officerswith state criminal arrest powers may make felonyarrests for violations of most Coast Guard-establishedsafety and security zones, employed for domestic portsecurity operations.3

Before enactment of 46 U.S.C. § 70119, the CoastGuard contended that, consistent with well-settledlaw, state law enforcement officers are permitted toenforce federal statutes where such enforcementactivities do not impair federal regulatory interests.4

Many state agencies, however, desired congressionalclarification of that view.

Statute 46 U.S.C. § 701109 reads as follows: § 70119. Enforcement by State and local officers(a) In general.—Any State or local government lawenforcement officer who has authority to enforce Statecriminal laws may make an arrest for violation of a secu-rity zone regulation prescribed under section 1 of title IIof the Act of June 15, 1917 (chapter 30; 50 U.S.C. 191) orsecurity or safety zone regulation under section 7(b) of thePorts and Waterways Safety Act (33 U.S.C. 1226(b)) ora safety zone regulation prescribed under section 10(d) ofthe Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (33 U.S.C. 1509(d)) by aCoast Guard official authorized by law to prescribe suchregulations, if—(1) such violation is a felony; and(2) the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that theperson to be arrested has committed or is committing suchviolation.(b) Other powers not affected.—The provisions of this sec-tion are in addition to any power conferred by law to suchofficers. This section shall not be construed as a limitation of

any power conferred by lawto such officers, or anyother officer of the UnitedStates or any State. Thissection does not grant tosuch officers any powersnot authorized by the law ofthe State in which thoseofficers are employed.

Statute 46 U.S.C. § 70119does not create newauthority for the CoastGuard, nor does itinvolve the exercise ofCoast Guard lawenforcement authorityby state and local offi-cers. Instead, § 70119

grants federal arrest power in limited circumstances tostate or local government law enforcement officerswho have authority to enforce state criminal laws, pro-vided that the controlling state law does not precludesuch officers from exercising federal arrest power.Accordingly, employment of state and local officers toenforce Coast Guard security and safety zones must bepredicated on a review of the applicable state law pro-viding law enforcement powers to the officers, with aview to ensuring that state law does not bar them fromenforcing federal felony statutes.

Safety Zone EnforcementEven in those states where state law enforcement offi-cials are precluded from enforcing federal law, they stillmay be able to effectively enforce a security or safetyzone (Figure 2 & 3). These state law enforcement offi-cials, while without power to enforce federal law, wouldbe exercising their state powers to enforce state law.

For this scenario to be applied practically, the behaviorprohibited by the security or safety zone must also beprosecutable as a violation of state law, such as trespass-ing. This would be similar to the situation whereDepartment of Defense officials have arrested individu-als for trespass under 18 U.S.C. § 1382, whereby thewaters included within a security zone were essentiallytreated as part of a Naval reservation for purposes of thetrespass statute. Government ownership of the underly-ing water areas is not a requisite for enforcement.5

In situations where state law enforcement officials areprecluded from enforcing federal law, the state lawenforcement agency may assist by providing a plat-form from which Coast Guard boarding officers canengage in law enforcement activities.

Figure 2: A Coast Guard boat and a boat from the Alabama Marine Patrol work tomaintain a Coast Guard safety zone. PA3 Jonathan McCool, USCG.


In the absence of an express state law bar, therefore,appropriate state and local government law enforce-ment officers may make arrests for, and therebyenforce, felony and misdemeanor violations, includ-ing attempts, of Coast Guard safety and securityzones. These include nearly all the zones typicallyemployed in domestic port security.

Coast Guard/Law Enforcement CooperationRegardless of the form the assistance takes, whether itis direct enforcement of federal law, enforcement ofan underlying state law, or providing assistance in theform of boarding platforms, the Coast Guard seeks toestablish agreements, typically in the form of a mem-orandum of agreement (MOA). An MOA outlineshow the Coast Guard and the state agencies will assisteach other. These agreements, which are developedby the cognizant Coast Guard district commander,are thoroughly vetted by Coast Guard attorneys.

A memorandum of agreement ensures that leadagency and respective roles are clearly identified andthat the MOA and its contemplated activities areauthorized by law and in accordance with currentCoast Guard and state policy. Additionally, theseagreements tend to address potentially valuable assis-tance, including patrolling or monitoring of safety andsecurity zones, informing others of the existence of thezone, and detecting and reporting targets of interest.

To date, the Coast Guard has signed memoranda ofagreement on law enforcement assistance with anumber of states, including Maine, New Jersey,Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, andFlorida. A typical MOA is quite detailed and specifiesto the greatest degree possible legal authorities, com-mon definitions, and, perhaps most importantly, the

roles and responsibilities of each agency. These agree-ments can also contain addendums to address localneeds below the state level.

Coast Guard districts are continuing discussions witha number of other states, and Coast Guard hopes thatmore MOAs are signed. These agreements, along withthe assistance provided by state and local law enforce-ment, have been a powerful force multiplier in help-ing to ensure U.S. port security.

Endnotes1. Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-293,118 Stat. 1028.2. There is some question as to whether § 70119 is properly numbered. UntilTitle 46 is republished, the subject section’s precise location will be unknown.This memorandum refers to the subject section as “§ 70119” or “section70119,” reflecting the language in the CGMTA.3. The enumerated zones include “security zone regulation[s] under section 1of title II of the Act of June 15, 1917 (chapter 30; 50 U.S.C. 191) or security orsafety zone regulations under section 7(b) 24 of the Ports and WaterwaysSafety Act (33 U.S.C. 1226(b)) or [ ] safety zone regulation[s] prescribed undersection 10(d) of the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (33 U.S.C. 1509(d)).” CGMTA,Section 801.4. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Florida Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373U.S. 132 (1963); Op. Off. Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Assistanceby State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens (Feb. 5, 1996).5. See, for example, U.S. v. Allen, 924 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1991); U.S. v. De Jesus, 108F.Supp.2d 68 (D. PR. 2000).

About the authors: LCDR Brad Kieserman is Chief of the OperationalLaw Group, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Maritime and International Law.

LCDR Christopher Murray is Legal Advisor, U.S. Coast Guard Office ofLaw Enforcement. He served previously as XO, Coast Guard Cutter NeahBay. LCDR Murray is a 1995 graduate, with honors, of the U.S. CoastGuard Academy and a 2003 graduate, summa cum laude, of Ohio StateUniversity School of Law, where he was an articles editor of the OSU LawReview.

LCDR Mike Cunningham is the legal advisor to the Inspections &Compliance Directorate at Coast Guard Headquarters. Previous fieldassignments include MSO/Group Los Angeles-Long Beach and MSOPuget Sound. Previous legal assignments include the Office of Maritime& International Law, the Office of Legislation, and the Office of LegalPolicy & Program Development.

Figure 3: A Coast Guard boat patrols Boston Harbor. PA3 Andrew Shinn, USCG.


Maritime Safety andSecurity Teams A force for today.

by CDR AARON C. DAVENPORTUSCG Deputy Chief, Office of Counterterrorism and Special Missions

In September 2005, the National Strategy for MaritimeSecurity (NSMS) was promulgated, pursuant toNational Security Presidential Directive 41 andHomeland Security Presidential Directive 13. Thesedirectives state that forces must be trained; equipped;and prepared to detect, deter, interdict, and defeat ter-rorists throughout the maritime domain. The UnitedStates must build rapid-reaction forces (Figure 1) tosupport first responders with capabilities to respond toterrorist incidents that occur in the maritime domain.

Due to the unconventional nature of adversaries’ tac-tics, the United States’ traditional military and lawenforcement capabilities are stretched thin and, in

some scenarios, insufficient to counter a skilled anddetermined enemy, willing to sacrifice their lives fortheir cause. U.S. senior executive leadership has rec-ognized that additional specialized law enforcementand counterterrorism capabilities need to be devel-

oped and ready for use at a moment’s notice, to rap-idly deter and counter any attack. Responses must beswift and effective, with highly controlled and delib-erate action that limits collateral damage and instillspublic confidence.

Forces capable of such response must be highly profi-cient in close-quarters engagement and the use of pre-cision weapons and advanced tactics in lawenforcement scenarios. This level of proficiencyrequires forces trained to a higher standard than haspreviously existed, outside of a small select group ofspecial operators in the military and law enforcementcommunities.

Maritime Safety and Security TeamTo answer the call, the U.S. Coast Guard has built theMaritime Safety and Security Team (MSST). TheMSST is a prototype-integrated package that not onlymeets this emerging need by filling the gaps inadvanced law enforcement and counterterrorismcapability, but also enhances U.S. ability to more effec-tively execute traditional law enforcement and publicsafety missions. Maritime Safety and Security Teamsare capable of providing safety and security opera-tions in ports where they are assigned to operate andto deploy and respond to higher threat areas if neces-sary.

Twelve MSST units are currently in their initial opera-tional capability and are not yet fully staffed to sup-port all of their operational responsibilities. They arealso not yet fully trained to a standard that allowsthem to safely conduct full-spectrum specialized skillssuch as close-quarter combat tactics. Working in theirinitial capacity, MSST units have further determined aneed for additional capabilities to mitigate the risks in

Figure 1: A 25-foot Homeland Security response boatenforces a security zone for foreign naval vessels.

PROTECTION

continued on pg. 85

PORT SECURITY

A look from below the surface.

by MR. KENNETH MCDANIELHomeland Security Program Analyst, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Defense Operations

The Coast Guard’s ongoing efforts to improve its pres-ence, response, and recovery capabilities in the Ports,Waterways, Coastal Security (PWCS) mission area aregenerating new safeguards and additional layers of

port security. The Coast Guard recently unveiled one ofits newest tools in the ongoing efforts to detect, deter,and mitigate maritime threats during a demonstrationof an underwater port security system at Coast GuardIntegrated Support Command, San Pedro, Calif.

“Terrorists are always looking for ways to attack ele-ments of our infrastructure critical to our economy andour freedom,” said Coast Guard Pacific Area

Commander VADMHarvey Johnson duringthe demonstration of thesystem. “Our ports areabsolutely vital to thisnation, and we are con-stantly looking for waysto improve our ability toprotect them.”

Underwater PortSecurity System The Underwater PortSecurity System (UPSS)can detect, track, classify,and interdict intrudersand allows for theinspection of hulls and

pier structures. The UPSS adds an additional layer ofprotection to U.S. ports and, due to its modular andportable design, is capable of being deployed nation-wide on short notice.

The UPSS is composed of two elements: the underwa-ter inspection system and the integrated anti-swimmersystem (IAS). The underwater inspection system usesdivers who are trained to inspect ships’ hulls, piers,and conduct harbor-bottom searches (Figure 1). It alsoincludes remotely operated vehicles that can bedeployed underwater, when it may be too dangerousto use a diver (Figure 2).

“The Coast Guard has been lacking in this area forawhile,” said Petty Officer 2nd Class Jachob Smith, anelectronics technician previously assigned to theMaritime Safety and Security Team (MSST) in San

Pedro. “Before we had this system, it was all aboutcrews standing lookout watches. We were really lim-ited as to what we could see. Now, we can see verywell, in even cloudy or murky water.”

The second element of the UPSS is the integrated anti-swimmer system. The IAS is comprised of commer-cially available sonar sound heads, which areFigure Figure 2: ET2 Jachob

Smith prepares to deploy aremotely operated vehicle toconduct a pier inspection.

Figure 3: Maritime Safety and Security Team diversprepare for a search.

Port Security

Figure 1: Maritime Safety and Security Teamdivers conduct a pier search.

www.uscg.mil/proceedingsProceedings Spring 200684

85Proceedings Spring 2006

security operations. This recognition led to the devel-opment of specialized threat detection functions, suchas dive operations and explosive detection canineteams (Figure 2), which have been built within someMSST units as collateral duties.

OrganizationMSST units provide a dedicated active duty forcepackage that possesses specialized skills, capabilities,and expertise to perform a broad range of port secu-rity and harbor defense missions. Modeled after thePort Security Unit (PSU) and Law EnforcementDetachment programs, MSST units offer a comple-mentary Coast Guard capability that will be able toclose significant readiness gaps in U.S. strategic ports.MSST units are trained in maritime law enforcement(MLE) practices, enabling them to augment CoastGuard forces during major marine events, contingen-cies, and other Coast Guard law enforcement opera-tions.

MSST units are organized into a command cadre, twomobile security teams, plans and support sections.Each mobile security team consists of a watersidesecurity section and an MLE/force protection sectionthat can be deployed within 12 hours nationwide.MSST units will be fully mission-ready to conduct

Figure 2: A Coast Guard canine substance detectionteam searches a merchant vessel for explosives.

integrated to work with an advanced govern-ment-designed processor that automaticallydetects and tracks potential underwater threats,classifies underwater contacts, and alerts systemoperators to their presence.

Testing the SystemIAS is capable of guiding Coast Guard securityforces to the threat and provides high-frequencysonar images to positively identify the contact asa swimmer or diver, as opposed to marine life orsome other object. Smith said MSST divers havebeen sent underwater to try to trick the systemand to test its detection parameters, and, so far,the system has proven infallible.

“We’ve had the divers go at the system at allspeeds and from all angles, and it detects them

every time,” he said.

In most instances when thesystem is deployed, theCoast Guard will notify thepublic that specific securityzones have been put inplace. Should someoneinnocently enter a securityzone, the Coast Guard willmake reasonable efforts tocommunicate warnings tothem using underwaterloudhailers before usingmore forcible measures.

Many agree that this sys-tem is the next generationin port security and givesthe Coast Guard the upperhand in detecting a threat(Figure 3).

“This system adds a layerof security to our ports by providing specific pro-tection from underwater threats, and it reducesthe chances of success for a possible means ofattack,” said Johnson. “It is by no means a guaran-tee, but it is an important step forward.”

About the author: Mr. Kenneth McDaniel is a program analyst inthe Commandant’s Office of Defense Operations and serves as proj-ect manager for Underwater Port Security. He is a retired lieutenantfrom the Fairfax County, Va., Fire and Rescue Department and aU.S. Coast Guard Reserve Chief Warrant Officer with more than 26years of combined active duty and reserve service.


operations, without the need for supplemental train-ing or additional outfitting, through all MARSEC lev-els. The waterside security section is equipped witharmed response boats and staffing to support round-the-clock boat operations.

The waterside security section is principally designedto combat external threats and protect military loadouts, enforce security zones (moving and fixed),defend critical waterside facilities, and provide shore-side force protection for own unit and high interestvessels. The waterside security section is skilled inhigh-speed boat interdiction tactics and use of forceexpertise that eclipse current Coast Guard capabili-ties. Security tactics include active patrolling, estab-lishing a deterrent presence, and building awarenessof legitimate and suspicious activities in the port.

The MLE/force protection section is staffed by quali-fied MLE boarding officers and boarding team mem-bers, and includes marine science technicians whoprovide knowledge in port state control and othermarine safety activities. The MLE/force protectionsection is equipped with nonintrusive inspection anddetection systems, which significantly enhance CoastGuard capabilities to detect stowaways; chemical,biological, radiological, nuclear explosive (CBRNE)agents; and other contraband aboard commercial ves-sels. Coupled with armed fast boat capabilities, theMSST offers an integrated force package that can pro-vide both internal and external security and a lawenforcement presence for high interest vessels that isunmatched by other Coast Guard units. This section isalso trained in antiterrorism/force protection tactics.

MSST units have the capability to establish a secureperimeter along waterside and shoreside approachesfor its own unit, a limited number of high-value assetsand critical infrastructure where Coast Guard juris-diction permits, and are available to augment CoastGuard forces during pulse operations such as massmigrations. The command cadre and plans sectionleverage all mission area knowledge and expertise toaccomplish the many missions in the port. The planssection provides expertise in marine safety and regu-latory responsibilities and connects the MSST to thesectors, ensuring unit familiarity with port activitiesincluding:

· port security and other contingency plans;· critical infrastructure;· port vulnerabilities;

· threats; and · risk mitigation strategies.

Working in unison with sectors, the plans sectionhelps exercise and evaluate Area Maritime Securityplans, which are crafted by Area Maritime SecurityCommittees, comprised of government and private-sector stakeholders. Today’s port security missionrequires security zones enforced by boat crewstrained together in standardized, multi-boat tactics,with use of force expertise that enables them to makedeadly force decisions with minimal reaction time.

Port security in the new normalcy and in heightenedthreat homeland defense situations requires profes-sional boat handling and weapons skills on par withthose associated with combat boat tactics (Figure 3).The Coast Guard Special Missions Training Center(SMTC), formally the PSU training detachment, hasbeen training MSST personnel since 2001. SMTC isstaffed with 50 officers, enlisted personnel, and civil-ians and continues to offer training in advance tacticsand close-quarter combat skills. Special mission tac-tics, techniques, and procedures are trained by a cadreof highly qualified instructors. Upon completion ofthe course, MSST members are capable of performingand conducting high threat law enforcement andresponding to counterterrorism events.

About the author: CDR Aaron C. Davenport is a 1984 graduate of theU.S. Coast Guard Academy and a 1995 graduate of the University ofCalifornia at Los Angeles. He has served in Coast Guard boat force, afloat,and marine safety operational commands, and his staff assignmentsinclude Combatant Command Headquarters and Logistics CommandAtlantic. CDR Davenport’s most recent assignment was command ofCoast Guard Cutter Valiant. He has been selected for promotion toCaptain and for the 2006 RAND Corporation Military ExecutiveFellowship.

Figure 3: A Coast Guard gunner fires 7.62 MMrounds from a M240B machine gun.


strong. To this end, the National Response OptionsMatrix (NROM) was developed.

NROM FeaturesNROM provides senior leadership with pre-plannedresponses for immediate use following a maritime trans-portation security incident, or imminent threat of a mar-itime TSI, in one or more of U.S. ports, waterways, orcoastal approaches. In essence, this matrix is a quick reac-tion card or decision aid for use by senior leadership todirect a security posture that may transcend Coast GuardAreas (Atlantic Area and Pacific Area); significantlyimpact the maritime industry; change the MaritimeSecurity (MARSEC) Level; and perhaps affect or involveother DHS agencies or federal departments. For example,U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has alreadyjoined the Coast Guard in development of an interagencyNROM, with specific actions focused on response andrecovery. NROM is also available electronically to theCoast Guard Captains of the Port to engage their AreaMaritime Security Committees for planning and aware-ness training and to gain possible feedback for responseand recovery option improvements.

The NROM goal is to provide senior Coast Guard andCBP leadership with immediate, pre-planned, short-termsecurity options to prevent further attacks; protect themarine transportation system, maritime critical infra-structure and key assets, and high-density populationcenters; and recover from a TSI, through:

· changes in MARSEC Level governing securityactivities of Coast Guard forces and the maritimeindustry;

· closure or control of ports by specific port,regionally or nationally;

· expanded CBP law enforcement boardings toscreen crewmembers and remove detained-on-board crewmembers for immediate repatriation;

Since the events of September 11, 2001, tremendousresources have been expended by industry and govern-ment to prevent another terrorist attack against the U.S.and to protect critical infrastructure and key resources. Inthe past few years, the Department of Homeland Security(DHS) has been formed and interagency and public/pri-vate sector partnerships have been developed to thwartterrorist and criminal activity that would threaten U.S.interests, borders, and way of life. The Coast Guardstepped forward as the lead DHS agency for maritimesecurity and, with the passage of the Homeland SecurityAct of 2002 and the Maritime Transportation Security Act(MTSA) of 2002, has made Ports, Waterways and CoastalSecurity (PWCS) a primary mission.

But what if a terrorist attack should occur in a major U.S.port or within the U.S. Maritime Domain? How, andwhere, should the Coast Guard respond? Will theresponse actions mitigate further attacks or will theydamage the U.S. economy and erode public confidence?

Before the Senate Commerce, Science, and TransportationCommittee on September 9, 2003, the Commandant ofthe Coast Guard, Admiral T.H. Collins, stated: "…a terror-ist incident against our Marine Transportation Systemwould have a devastating and long-lasting impact onglobal shipping, international trade, and the world econ-omy. As part of a recent port security training exercise, amaritime terrorist act was estimated to cost up to $58 bil-lion in economic loss to the United States."

This statement underscores the importance of immediateresponses to maritime transportation security incidents(TSI), which are incidents resulting in a significant loss oflife, environmental damage, transportation system dis-ruption, or economic disruption in a particular area. Thisresponse must appropriately and proportionally addressthe local level, but also the national level, to keep publicconfidence in government high and the U.S. economy

National ResponseOptions MatrixSenior leadership’s quick response card to a maritimetransportation security incident.

by CAPT WAYNE C. DUMASChief, U.S. Coast Guard Contingency Exercises

RESPONSE &RECOVERY


· restriction of certain port activities and access tocertain facilities or vessels;

· deployment of specialized Coast Guard or CBPsecurity capabilities and law enforcement assets;

· an increase in vessel, crew, and cargo screening;· denial of entry or expulsion of certain vessels,

directing vessels to anchorages or safe berths;· potential changes in Coast Guard force protec-

tion level; and/or· identification of other agency points of contact

for notification or coordination of activities on anational level, regionally, or by specific ports;may also include port-specific Area MaritimeSecurity Committees or the maritime industryrepresentatives on the National MaritimeSecurity Advisory Committee (NMSAC).NMSAC is comprised of members from varioussectors of the maritime industry and was estab-lished to provide advice to the Secretary ofHomeland Security, through the Commandant ofthe Coast Guard, on matters of maritime security.

Confidence is high that, at the affected port level, theCoast Guard Captain of the Port/Federal MaritimeSecurity Coordinator, in coordination and cooperationwith CBP and other federal, state and local agencies andindustry stakeholders, will respond appropriately to mit-igate the effects of a maritime TSI. Additional and height-ened security measures will be imposed in the specificport of attack. MTSA requires the creation and approvalby the Coast Guard, exercise and updates to AreaMaritime Security Plans. Port Security Assessments, andvessel and facility security plans to deter, deny, prevent,protect, and respond to maritime TSIs. Elements of theseplans will be ordered into effect by the Captain of the Port.

NROM addresses the security posture needed beyondthe affected port by helping senior leadership answer thequestion: What additional or heightened security meas-ures need to be implemented immediately to prevent fur-ther attacks and protect the marine transportation system,maritime critical infrastructure, key assets, and high-den-sity populated areas from follow-on attacks on a regionalor national basis? These security measures may only tar-get certain aspects of the marine transportation system,while at the same time maintaining the legitimate flow ofcommerce and use of the maritime environment. By hav-ing pre-planned response options, senior leadership canreact quickly to immediately direct field units, industryand other governmental agencies to act appropriatelyand proportionately to prevent further terrorist attacksand disruption of maritime transportation.

Preplanned response options buy time. NROM securitymeasures are immediate and short-term actions.Concurrently with NROM measures, planning teams willprepare more robust and comprehensive plans based onadditional intelligence information, situational analysis,

and appropriate and available capabilities and will coor-dinate with other agency partners and with industry rep-resentatives via the NMSAC.

Rapid Interagency Information SharingThe quick response to the credible threat of terrorist activ-ity, or an actual TSI event, requires the rapid sharing ofinformation vertically and horizontally throughout theCoast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, theDepartment of Homeland Security, other federal andstate agencies, and the maritime community. The CoastGuard Command Center has developed an incidentreporting system, Critical Incident Communications, torapidly disseminate initial, limited information about crit-ical incidents throughout the Coast Guard and intera-gency partners. Security measure decisions based on theNROM will be communicated quickly to areas, districts,field units, and, as appropriate, to the maritime industryvia the Area Maritime Security Coordinator.

Both the Coast Guard and Customs and BorderProtection have extensive authorities within the maritimeenvironment. The Coast Guard Captain of the Port isresponsible for all vessel movements, including orderingvessels to depart ports and permitting vessels to return toports. The Coast Guard is responsible to ensure that ves-sels, including crew, passengers, and cargo, do not pose athreat to the United States. The Coast Guard is alsoresponsible for the protection of maritime infrastructure.

The CBP priority mission is to prevent terrorists and ter-rorist weapons from entering the United States. The CBPis responsible for the clearance of vessels, persons, andcargo arriving from foreign ports. CBP has the authorityto approve the lading and unlading of cargo and theembarkation and disembarkation of crew and passen-gers. CBP has the authority to examine, detain, and seizecargo and penalize carriers. By partnering on theNational Response Options Matrix, both agencies havecreated a model tool for rapid decision making and inter-agency security coordination to prevent attacks and pro-tect the marine transportation system, maritime criticalinfrastructure and key assets, and coastal high-densitypopulated areas.

The National Response Options Matrix is a model tool forinteragency security cooperation and coordination.Perhaps other federal agencies will join the Coast Guardand Customs and Border Protection in this collaborativeeffort to rapidly thwart terrorist attacks, while preservingthe flow of maritime commerce and legitimate use of themaritime environment.About the author: CAPT Wayne C. Dumas is a Coast Guard Reserve offi-cer who, for the past five years, has been on active duty in the Office of PortSecurity, Planning and Readiness and been an adjunct member of the G-OPD/G-MPP Homeland Planning Team. He was previously atPACAREA on the Maritime Homeland Security Planning Team. CAPTDumas was Commanding Officer of Port Security Unit 313 and N3/N5 ofNaval Coastal Warfare Unit 113. CAPT Dumas is currently assigned to G-RPE, Chief, Contingency Exercises.


On September 11, 2001, the dynamic of national secu-rity shifted drastically, with attacks on U.S. soil for thefirst time since the beginning of World War II. Unlikethe Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, the terrorattacks of 9/11 were aimed not at military targets, butat innocent civilians and the economic heart of theUnited States. These attacks signaled a distinct shiftfrom the Cold War paradigms that had dominatedU.S. strategic thinking and defense planning for morethan 50 years.

Suddenly, the tools of security anddefense the United States had reliedon were no longer effective at guaran-teeing the safety and security of thecountry or its people. This reality dic-tated a new maritime securityresponse posture from the U.S. CoastGuard. Today, at the forefront of thisemerging security mission is the newCoast Guard Maritime SecurityResponse Team (MSRT) based inChesapeake, Va. (Figure 1).

Developing the ForceInitial Coast Guard efforts to fill thiscapability gap in the post- 9/11 worldresulted in the development andfielding of a prototype unit, desig-nated the Enhanced Maritime Safetyand Security Team (EMSST) inChesapeake, Va. Based on specificauthority and guidance in the

Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, theCoast Guard began to equip, train, and deploy thisnew EMSST to execute a wide range of anti- andcounterterrorism and advanced interdiction missions.Specifically, this unit was designed as an integratedair, surface, and maritime military/law enforcementforce, capable of executing at-sea takedowns of hostilevessels or vessels seized by hostile forces.

Counterterrorism ForceBuilding the Coast Guard Maritime Security Response Team.

by LCDR JOSE L. RODRIGUEZChief, Operations and Training Division, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Counterterrorism and Special Missions

by LTC MICHAEL KICHMAN, U.S. ARMY (RET)Special Counterterrorism Advisor, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Counterterrorism and Special Missions

RESPONSE &RECOVERY

Figure 1: The Maritime Security Response Team conducts vertical insertion drills on a270-foot, medium endurance Coast Guard cutter.


continues to refine its capabilities, there is much workstill to be done. The MSRT needs additional assets andtraining to be fully mission-capable, as well as furtherintegration into all national CT response plans. The lat-ter is especially critical to ensure that no seam is leftuncovered for U.S. enemies to exploit.

The Long-Term SolutionWhile closely examining maritime security issues andpotential gaps in strategic counterterrorism responsecapabilities, DHS and National Security Council staffmembers came to a clear consensus that certain secu-rity requirements must be addressed in the near-termwithin the Maritime Domain, as well as other geo-graphic parts of the country. To accomplish this goal,the Coast Guard is working with its partners withinDHS and the executive branch to ensure that the U.S.maritime shield has the assets necessary to protectU.S. borders from all levels of threat. MSRT has beenasked to fill an articulated security gap in theMaritime Domain.

These enhancements to existing Coast Guard mar-itime capabilities are intended to provide the UnitedStates an integrated maritime shield, with a sharp-ened sword, fully capable of defeating all maritimethreats on the immediate horizon. While this CoastGuard vision provides a solution to combating mar-itime threats, the question of a fully resourced pro-gram remains. As the United States’ only multi-mission, milit a r y / l a w enforcement force, span-ning the homeland security to homeland defenseseam, t h e C o a s t G u a r d i s uniquely posi-tioned to house a national maritime counterterrorismforce. In an era of limited resources and unlimitedsecurity challenges, the Coast Guard also providesa logical home for the devel o p m e n t o f enhancedmaritime interdiction and counterterrorism forces, capable of employment either in t h e l a w enforce-ment or defense arenas.

As the United States continues to resource assets to fillseams identified by the currently emerging maritimesecurity strategies and plans, it is likely the CoastGuard will be called upon once again to leverage itsunique place in the national security structure, indefense of U.S. maritime borders. About the authors: LCDR Jose L. Rodriguez has served in the U.S. CoastGuard for 25 years and is an expert on Coast Guard Special Missions. Hisexperience includes command of Maritime Safety and Security TeamChesapeake, Tactical Law Enforcement Team South, Officer in ChargeRiverine Section, USMC Special Operations Training Group, IIMEF, andMLE School Instructor. LCDR Rodriquez deployed throughout LatinAmerica in support of Department of Justice, OPERATION SNOWCAP.

LTC Michael Kichman, U.S. Army (ret), is a special counterterrorism advi-sor to the U.S. Coast Guard Office of Counterterrorism and Special Missions.

The EMSST was designed around direct action sec-tions; a boat detachment; a chemical, biological,nuclear, radiological, and explosive (CBNRE) detach-ment; and lift and support aviation assets. These capa-bilities were designed to operate in concert to providethe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with ahighly capable maritime counterterrorism force for

employment inthe domesticM a r i t i m eD o m a i n .Additionally, theEMSST coulddeploy in directsupport ofDepartment ofDefense require-ments under theCoast Guard’sTitle 10 authori-ties. Prior to thestand-up of thisforce, no U.S.g o v e r n m e n tagency, outsidethe Departmentof DefenseS p e c i a lO p e r a t i o n sCommand, wascapable of suchintegrated andcomplex mar-itime counterter-rorism (CT)operations.

From its inception in spring 2004, EMSST wasdeployed in support of domestic maritime securityrequirements, both for Coast Guard law enforcementmissions and in support of other U.S. governmentagencies. As requirements are refined in emergingnational maritime security strategies and plans, thedemand for EMSST capabilities continues to grow.This growing demand, as well as a full recognition ofthe seam in U.S. maritime defenses, has resulted inEMSST capability becoming a permanent part of theCoast Guard force structure. This transition wasrecently marked by recognition of EMSST as an offi-cial part of the Coast Guard, with its redesignation asMaritime Security Response Team.

Today, the Coast Guard stands ready to protect anddefend U.S. maritime borders with a highly capablemaritime counterterrorism force (Figure 2). As the unit

Figure 2: A Coast Guard Maritime Safety andSecurity boarding team is delivered onto avessel, via vertical insertion, from an HH-60Jayhawk.


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NauticalNauticalEngineeringEngineering

QueriesQueries

92 www.uscg.mil/proceedingsProceedings Spring 2006

1. The ignition quality of diesel fuel becomes less critical as ___________.Note: Ignition quality is the ability of a fuel to ignite when it is injected into the compressed-air charge in the diesel engine cylin-der. A fuel with a good ignition quality ignites readily, with a minor ignition delay resulting in a smoother running engine withless noise and vibration. A fuel with a poor ignition quality will be delayed in its ability to ignite. The ignition quality of a fuelaffects the ease of starting the engine and its performance.

A. the amount of lube oil additives increaseIncorrect: Lube oil additives only provide for specific operational improvements of the lube oil to reduce frictionwhile the engine is in operation. Additives such as foam inhibitors, detergents, viscosity index improvers and TBNadditives that neutralize acid formation have no effect on the actual combustion characteristics of the fuel during nor-mal engine operation.

B. piston speeds increaseIncorrect: Since piston speed is a function of piston stroke and engine RPM, an increase in piston speed will resultfrom an increase in engine speed. This will decrease the available period for total combustion during the powerstroke, thereby becoming a critical factor and requiring a high quality fuel with a rapid ignition characteristic.

C. injection pressures decreaseIncorrect: Low quality fuels require higher preheat temperatures to reduce viscosity, which, if not provided, wouldresult in higher injection pressure in order to properly atomize and mix the fuel charge with combustion air for com-plete combustion.

D. engine speeds decreaseCorrect Answer: A decrease in engine speed provides an increase in the period of time available for total combustionof the fuel during the power stroke and provides additional time to compensate for ignition delay when using lowquality fuels.

2. Which of the following statements is TRUE concerning lifejackets?

A. Buoyant vests may be substituted for lifejackets.Incorrect: A life preserver is designed and constructed with material and workmanship to perform its intended func-tion in all weather conditions. Buoyant vests are designed for use only under ideal conditions and are not substitutesfor lifejackets nor are they required to meet minimum life preserver requirements.

B. Kapok lifejackets must have plastic-covered pad inserts.Correct Answer: Kapok pad inserts are to be covered with a flexible vinyl film not less than 0.006 inches in thicknessas cited by 46 CFR Part160.002-3(d).

C. Lifejackets must always be worn with the same side facing outwards.Incorrect: Lifejackets are designed to be donned correctly without prior demonstration, instructions, or assistance byat least 75% of the persons unfamiliar with the design. To meet this specification, it is required that the lifejacket iscapable of being worn inside out.

D. Lifejackets are not designed to turn a person's face clear of the water when unconscious.Incorrect: Lifejackets are designed to support the wearer in the water in an upright or slightly backward position,and are to provide support to the head so that the face of an unconscious or exhausted person is held above the water.


Prepared by NMC EngineeringExamination Team

3. The opposition to the establishment of magnetic lines of force in a magnetic circuit is called the circuit’s ______.

A. resistanceIncorrect Answer: Resistance is the opposition to current flow through the components of a circuit.

B. reluctanceCorrect Answer: The strength of magnetic flux is partly determined by the permeability of the material being mag-netized. Reluctance is inversely proportional to permeability. As an example, iron has high permeability and lowreluctance while an air gap has low permeability and high reluctance. Generator and motor magnetic circuits aredesigned with minimum air gaps to minimize losses due to reluctance and maximize magnetic flux strength.

C. impedanceIncorrect: Impedance is the total resistance of an AC circuit and its components including inductive and capacitivereactance.

D. inductanceIncorrect: Inductance is the characteristic of an AC circuit, which causes a delay in the change of magnitude of cur-rent flow due to the effects of a generated magnetic field produced in the circuit.

4. A vessel, which is subjected to “hogging”, has its ___________.

A. main deck under compressive stressIncorrect: When the main deck plating encounters compressive stresses, the vessel is said to be in a condition knownas "sagging." This occurs when the vessel is supported mainly by wave crests at the bow and stern.

B. main deck plating under tensile stressCorrect Answer: When the main deck plating of a vessel is encountering tensile stresses, the vessel is said to be in acondition of "hogging." This condition is most pronounced when the buoyant force of a wave is midship to the ves-sel, resulting in the bow and stern deflecting downward.

C. bottom plate under shearing stressIncorrect: Shearing stress is the tendency of one part of a body to slide over another part. This condition causes mate-rials to be cut or sliced.

D. bottom and deck plating under compressive stressIncorrect: A "hogging" condition will cause only the bottom hull plating to be under compressive stresses, while, atthe same instant, the main deck will be under tensile stress. A ship’s hull is essentially a hollow box beam, and, whenat rest, neither tensile nor compressive stresses are present.

NauticalNauticalDeckDeck

QueriesQueries

94

1. If your vessel has a list to port due to negative GM and off-center weight, the first corrective measure you shouldtake is to __________.Note: A negative metacentric height or “negative GM” is the result of an unstable condition when the center of gravity is above the vessel’s metacenter. Action must be takento reestablish stability either by removing weight from above the center of gravity or by adding weight below the center (or both) before continuing with cargo operations.A. move port-side main-deck cargo to the starboard side

Incorrect: Moving weight horizontally will initially lessen the list but will contribute nothing to improving the ship’sstability. Because the ship’s center of gravity is above its metacenter, the ship will continue to remain unstable andlist suddenly to starboard as soon as the relocated mass passes the vessel’s longitudinal centerline.

B. fill the starboard double-bottomCorrect Answer: By filling a double-bottom tank, the ship’s center of gravity is being lowered as weight is beingadded as low as possible. The most desirable action to take immediately is to ballast all double-bottom tanks that areempty until positive stability is established.

C. pump water from the port double-bottom to the starboard double-bottomIncorrect: This action is essentially the same as that in choice “A.” Shifting weight from port to starboard will notcorrect the ship’s instability.

D. pump water from the port double-bottom over the sideIncorrect: The removal of weight from below the center of gravity will increase instability.

2. Which type of GPS receiver has at least four channels to process information from several satellites simultaneously?Note: A navigational receiver aboard a vessel is able to track six to 10 GPS satellites simultaneously. There are four satellites, in each of six orbits, broadcasting navigationaldata. At the time of this writing, the GPS “constellation” consists of 29 satellites because five of the orbits contain a new satellite for the replacement of an older one.A. Sequential

Incorrect: The original GPS receivers of the 1980s were “sequential,” meaning that the receiver had to receive input, thenswitch reception in sequential order from one satellite to the next as only one channel was available. These receivers wereonly able to track the satellites “within view” through one receiving cycle at a time, resulting in a “slow” position deter-mination. Because these receivers were hampered by the relatively time-consuming process of switching satellite recep-tion, they were not useful to the aviation industry. The main reason for this initial design was to minimize cost and powerconsumption during the initial phases of GPS development. Sequential receivers are no longer manufactured.

B. ContinuousCorrect Answer: The significance of the “four channels” referred to in this question is that this is the minimum num-ber of satellites from which the receiver must acquire information in order to provide the user with an accurate posi-tion. Since six to 10 satellites are being monitored simultaneously, there is no time delay required to switch from onesatellite to another in sequential order. Quality GPS receivers, such as those used for maritime navigation, are nowdesigned with at least 12 channels. It is unnecessary for GPS receivers to be designed with more than 12 channels as nomore than 10 satellites may be “visible” at any one time.

C. MultiplexIncorrect: Multiplex reception is an improvement over the original sequential receiver. The receiver must still switchfrom one satellite to another, but now accomplishes this at a much faster rate of (typically) 50 Hertz, versus the 5 to 10Hertz rate of the original “sequential” receivers. A multiplex receiver acquires navigational data from one satellite for apredetermined “slice of time,” then switches to another satellite, for the same “slice of time,” to receive additional navi-gational data. If it is able to perform the switching fast enough, the receiver seems to be tracking all of the satellites simul-taneously. The hand-held receivers designed in the mid to late 1990s are multiplex, and many of them are still being used.

D. None of the aboveIncorrect: Choice “B” is correct.


95

Prepared by NMC DeckExamination Team

3. Before operating a non-oceangoing ship greater than 100 gross tons, it must have a fixed piping system to discharge oilymixtures ashore. This system must include __________.Note: Oceangoing ships of 400 gross tons and greater are required to have this equipment. (33 CFR 155.360)A. approved oily-water separating equipment

Incorrect: Although many small ships operating on U.S. Inland Waters are equipped with oily-water separators, thisequipment is not required on a non-oceangoing vessel.

B. a fixed or portable containment system at the shore connectionIncorrect: A containment system is not required at the shore connection to the oily-water discharge piping. This mustnot be confused with the required containment on deck at the cargo piping shore connection (33 CFR 155.310) or therequired containment under the fuel tank vent goosenecks during fueling operations. (33 CFR 155.320)

C. a spare pump in case the main pump is inoperativeIncorrect: For the purpose of discharging an oily mixture ashore, only one pump is required, even if “good engineer-ing” recommends two pumps.

D. at least one outlet accessible from the weather deckCorrect Answer: The required piping system must have at least one outlet fitted with a stop valve accessible for con-necting a discharge hose from the weather deck. This connection must be compatible with the facilities in the ves-sel’s area of operation. (33 CFR 155.410)

4. In a tropical cyclone in the southern hemisphere, a vessel hove-to with the wind shifting clockwise would be __________.Note: Wind blows from an area of high pressure toward—or into—an area of low pressure. Because of the effect of the earth’s rotation, the winddirection is diverted to the left in the southern hemisphere (right in the northern hemisphere) as viewed from above. Therefore, wind circulatesclockwise around a “Low” in the southern hemisphere. Don’t confuse this clockwise cyclonic rotation with the direction that the wind is “shift-ing,” as observed from aboard a vessel experiencing the cyclone. Shifting is defined as the gradual, progressive change in wind direction, as thecyclone approaches and passes a vessel. By monitoring this directional change, in addition to monitoring the barometer, mariners can determinetheir location relative to the cyclone’s center. When a vessel is ahead of an approaching storm, the barometer will be falling, and as the storm passes,the barometer will begin rising. The direction of cyclonic rotation can never change from clockwise to counterclockwise, or vice-versa, because atropical cyclone cannot cross the equator. Often, the best possible action is to hold the ship with its bow into the wind (hove-to) to minimize rolling.The condition to be avoided is having either (port or starboard) side to the wind and seas (broach-to).A. ahead of the storm center

Incorrect: The wind direction will remain constant if the vessel is on the storm’s track.B. in the dangerous semicircle

Incorrect: If a ship in the southern hemisphere is in the dangerous semicircle, the wind will be shifting counterclock-wise as the storm approaches and passes. This semicircle is the one to the left of the storm’s track in the southernhemisphere versus the right in the northern hemisphere. The semicircles are named “dangerous” and “navigable”because of the difference in wind speed between them. For example, if the rotational wind speed is 80 knots, and thestorm is moving at 20 knots along its track, the actual wind speeds in the dangerous and navigable semicircles are100 and 60, respectively.

C. directly behind the storm centerIncorrect: The wind direction will remain constant if the vessel is on the storm’s track.

D. in the navigable semicircleCorrect Answer: If a ship is coming into the navigable semicircle of a westbound approaching storm in the southernhemisphere, it will first encounter a southwesterly wind becoming westerly while the barometer is falling. Then, thewind will become northwesterly and the barometer will begin rising as the storm passes.

Proceedings Spring 2006www.uscg.mil/proceedings

A security guard checkspassengers' IDs beforeallowing them to boardthe cruise ship.PA3 Christopher Grisafe,USCG.

Lottie and her partner,Petty Officer 3rd ClassSteven Haban, during aninspection.PA3 Donnie Brzuska,USCG.

Coast Guard Petty Officer3rd Class ChristopherConnelly and New York CityPolice Officer Christie Meierconsult during a transit toSt. George terminal onStaten Island, N.Y.PA3 Kelly Newlin, USCG.

Coast Guard Station Los Angeles crewmembersescort a 3,000 passenger cruise ship from thePort of Los Angeles. PA1 Daniel Tremper, USCG.

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