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1 Malware Detection Prof. Ravi Sandhu Executive Director and Endowed Chair Lecture 14 [email protected] www.profsandhu.com © Ravi Sandhu World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! CS 5323

Prof. Ravi Sandhu Executive Director and Endowed Chairprofsandhu.com/cs5323_s18/L14.pdfVirus detection is undecidable Cohen dissertation (1985), paper (1987) Anti-virus (more generally

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1

Malware Detection

Prof. Ravi SandhuExecutive Director and Endowed Chair

Lecture 14

[email protected]

© Ravi Sandhu World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

CS 5323

Virus detection is undecidable Cohen dissertation (1985), paper (1987)

Anti-virus (more generally anti-malware) is a great business model Need regular updates Infinite supply of new malware

Malware can be stealthy Malware can be really stealthy

© Ravi Sandhu 2World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Highlights

© Ravi Sandhu 3World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Malware Detection Techniques

Nwokedi Idika and Aditya Mathur, A Survey of Malware Detection Techniques, Purdue University, Feb 2007.

© Ravi Sandhu 4World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Malware Detection Techniques

Nwokedi Idika and Aditya Mathur, A Survey of Malware Detection Techniques, Purdue University, Feb 2007.

MisuseDetection

Behavior-BasedDetection

© Ravi Sandhu 5World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Signature Limitations

Nwokedi Idika and Aditya Mathur, A Survey of Malware Detection Techniques, Purdue University, Feb 2007.

S needsregularupdates

© Ravi Sandhu 6World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Anomaly Based

TrainingPhase

DetectionPhase

Inferpatterns

Inferspecifications

© Ravi Sandhu 7World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Anomaly Based Limitations

Nwokedi Idika and Aditya Mathur, A Survey of Malware Detection Techniques, Purdue University, Feb 2007.

Blue area is false positivesIf white area extends outside blue area we have false negatives

Defeat signature-based detection Encrypted malware Polymorphic malware Metamorphic malware

Rootkit can misrepresent the existence or content of executable files

© Ravi Sandhu 8World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Stealthy Malware

You, I., and Yim, K. Malware obfuscation techniques: A brief survey. IEEE International Conference on Broadband, Wireless Computing, Communication and Applications, Nov 2010, pp. 297-300.

© Ravi Sandhu 9World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Encrypted Malware

Encrypted Main Body Decryptor Cleartext Main Body

Encrypted Main Body Key’ Decryptor

execute malware

Key

propagatemalware

© Ravi Sandhu 10World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Encrypted Malware

Encrypted Main Body Decryptor Cleartext Main Body

Encrypted Main Body Key’ Decryptor

execute malware

Key

propagatemalware

revealssignature

© Ravi Sandhu 11World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Polymorphic Malware

Encrypted Main Body Decryptor Cleartext Main Body

Encrypted Main Body Key’ Obfuscated Decryptor

execute malware

Key

propagatemalware

© Ravi Sandhu 12World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Polymorphic Malware

Encrypted Main Body Decryptor Cleartext Main Body

Encrypted Main Body Key’ Obfuscated Decryptor

execute malware

Key

propagatemalware

nosignature

© Ravi Sandhu 13World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Polymorphic Malware

Encrypted Main Body Decryptor Cleartext Main Body

Encrypted Main Body Key’ Obfuscated Decryptor

execute malware

Key

propagatemalware

nosignature

Execute in a sandbox and detect the signature after

decryption

© Ravi Sandhu 14World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Polymorphic Malware

Encrypted Main Body Decryptor Cleartext Main Body

Encrypted Main Body Key’ Obfuscated Decryptor

execute malware

Key

propagatemalware

nosignature

Execute in a sandbox and detect the signature after

decryptionMutation Engines automate this construction

© Ravi Sandhu 15World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Metamorphic Malware

Original Main Body Original Main Body

execute malware

propagatemalware

nosignature

Obfuscated Main Body

execute malware

Obfuscated Main Body

Obfuscated Main Body

execute malware

Obfuscated Main Body

propagatemalware

Dead-Code Insertion Register Reassignment Subroutine Reordering Instruction substitution Code transposition Code Integration

© Ravi Sandhu 16World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Obfuscation Techniques

Not visible in source code Reappears in binary code due to malware infected

compiler In theory could reappear in binary code due to other

components in binary execution workflow Loader Linker OS BIOS

© Ravi Sandhu 17World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Really Stealthy Malware

Ken Thompson. Reflections on trusting trust. Commun. ACM 27, 8 (August 1984), 761-763.

© Ravi Sandhu 18World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Malicious Compiler Inserts a Backdoor

Malicious CompilerBinary

OS Login module

Infected Login Binary

© Ravi Sandhu 19World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Malicious Compiler Inserts a Backdoor

Malicious CompilerBinary

OS Login module

Infected Login Binary

Assumption: Malicious behavior cannot be detected

in binary, but may be detectable in

compiler source

© Ravi Sandhu 20World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Self-Compiler

Compiler binary for language L

Compiler source for language L

Compiler binary for language L

© Ravi Sandhu 21World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Malicious Self-Compiler in Binary and Source

Compiler binary for language L

Malicious Compiler source for language L

Malicious Compiler binary for language L

© Ravi Sandhu 22World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Malicious Self-Compiler in Binary and Source

Compiler binary for language L

Malicious Compiler source for language L

Malicious Compiler binary for language L

Source code analysis will reveal malicious behavior

© Ravi Sandhu 23World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Doubly Malicious Self-Compiler in Binary and Source

Compiler binary for language L

Doubly Malicious Compiler source for language L

Doubly Malicious Compiler binary for language L

Source code analysis will reveal doubly malicious

behavior

© Ravi Sandhu 24World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Doubly Malicious Complier Binary Behavior

Doubly Malicious Compiler binary for language L

Compiler source for language L

Doubly Malicious Compiler binary for language L

OS Login module

Infected Login Binary

Doubly Malicious Compiler binary for language L

© Ravi Sandhu 25World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Doubly Malicious Complier Binary Behavior

Doubly Malicious Compiler binary for language L

Compiler source for language L

Doubly Malicious Compiler binary for language L

OS Login module

Infected Login Binary

Doubly Malicious Compiler binary for language L

No trace of malicious behavior

in source code

© Ravi Sandhu 26World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact!

Malicious Self-Compiler in Binary but not in Source

Malicious Compiler binary for language L

Compiler source for language L

Malicious Compiler binary for language L

Wheeler, D.A., Countering trusting trust through diverse double-compiling, 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pp.13-48, 5-9 Dec. 2005.

partial countermeasure