ASSESSMENT OF TECHNIP’S HSE STANDARDS AND

PROCEDURES IN TECHNIP’S ONSHORE

OPERATIONS IN GHANA. (CASE STUDY ON THE TEN PROJECT)

1

NKRUMAH ERNEST

BPS0001916

18th May, 2016

Supervisor : Mr. Emmanuel Sena Gohoho

REGIOMAL MARITIME UNIVERSITY PORTS AND SHIPPING DEPARTMENT

OUTLINE OF PRESENTATION2

1. INTRODUCTION

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4. PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND DATA ANALYSIS

5. FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6. REFERENCES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALARP: As Low As Reasonably Possible

EIA: Environmental Impact Assessment

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

HSE: Health Safety and Environment

JRA: Job Risk Assessment

PPE: Personal Protective Equipment

TP: Technip

TEN: Tweneboa, Enyenra and Ntomme

3

4SAFETY

KEY WORDS

People

Equipment

Materials

Environment

HAZARD Source or Situation or act with a

potential to cause harm in terms of Human Injury, ill health, Damage to Property, Workplace Environment or a combination of these

Risk is the combination of the likelihood and the consequences or severity of a specific hazardous event occurring.

RISK5

RISK ASSESSMENT

6

INTRODUCTION

BACKROUND

2.3 million fatalities Economic losses of 4% global GDP.

INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Technip was fined thousands of pounds for health and safety failings that led to the death of a worker. Old JRA and HSE activities are used for new contracts because of the time frame to meet clients expectations as well as the limited time and expensive cost involved in constructing a new one.

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To identify the current operations undertaken on TEN fabrication yard.

To identify discrepancies between TEN risk assessment activities and Technip’s HSE standards.

To conduct an analysis by comparing what is written in TP’s standard to practice on site.

To identify the main and highest causes of accidents happening at the TEN fabrication yard.

To identify the severity of accidents recorded at TP’s fabrication yard.

To suggest suitable model for subsequent and effective job risk analysis.

8INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

Upon completion, this project will give

Technip the awareness of the flaws in its

HSE procedures as well as possible variance

with its risk assessment on onshore

operations.

Introduce possible means of controlling the

potential risk in its onshore operations.

It will also add to existing knowledge in the

field of academia and will serve as a

reference manual for future projects.

9INTRODUCTION

JUSTIFICATION OF STUDY

The scope of the study is centered on

Technip’s onshore operations specifically on

the TEN project fabrication yard at Takoradi

Technip’s current HSE standard and

procedures.

TEN project onshore activity risk assessment

.

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INTRODUCTION

SCOPE OF STUDY

LITERATURE REVIEW11

Health and Safety Executive ,(2010) Five steps to risk

assessment.

Health and Safety Executive,(2004) Health and safety in

engineering workshops.

Alison and Joanne ,(2012) Report on the Review of

Health Risks for workers in the Waste and Recycling

Industry. (chapter 10)

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

STUDY DESIGN: Exploratory

DATA COLLECTION: Both Primary and Secondary source

DATA ANALYSIS: Both Qualitative and Quantitative

SAMPLING TECHNIQUES: Purposive and Random

TARGET POPULATION: TP personnel on site

TP personnel at the office(Managers)

RMU Safety Department

SAMPLE SIZE: 35

MODELS: Gap Analysis, Risk Matrix and Bow-tie XP

12

13

MODELS

RISK MATRIX

Risk matrices are one of the most widespread tools for risk evaluation. They are mainly used to determine the size of a risk and whether or not the risk is sufficiently controlled.

The low probability, low severity area (usually green) that indicates the risk of an event is not high enough, or that it is sufficiently controlled.

The high probability, high severity (usually red) which indicates an event needs a lot or more control measures to bring the probability or severity down.

The medium category (usually yellow) is in between these two areas.

GAP ANALYSIS

A gap analysis can be defined as a tool that enables an organization to compare its actual performance with its potential

Every gap analysis template must have a few essential components, as shown below:

STATE DESCRIPTION: 1.Your Current State 2.The Future State

BRIDGING THE GAP: 1. Gap Identification2. Gap Description

FACTORS AND REMEDIES: 1. Factors responsible for Gap2. Remedies, Actions and Proposals

BOW TIE XP

Define the Hazard and the Top Event which is the initial consequence

Identify the Threats which are the Top Event causes.

Identify the existing Protection Barriers each Threat

Identify for each Barrier their Escalation Factors

Identify for each Barrier their Escalation Factors Control

Identify the consequences

Identify the Recovery Measures

Identify for each Recovery Measure their Escalation Factors Control

For each Barrier, Recovery Measures and Escalation Factors Controls

identify the Critical Safety Tasks.

Reluctance of some respondents to grant interviews.

Accessibility to some respondents was sometimes denied due to safety and busy work schedules at working environment.

Difficulty in sourcing out relevant information on the internet due to protocols.

Limited time frame for the research to be

conducted.

16 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

DATA ANALYSIS

17 Level of education and occupational distribution of

respondents

EDUCATIONAL

LEVEL

FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE (%)

Tertiary 18 60

Senior

High/Technical

4 13.3

Others/Specify 8 26.7

TOTAL 30 100

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

12

3

7

3

5

OCCUPATION

Frequency

SOURCE: FIELD SURVEY 2016

DATA ANALYSIS cont.

18

POOR7%

AVERAGE40%

GOOD13%

VERY GOOD27%

EXCELLENT13%

HSE practiced on site

Accidents as a result of poor HSE management.

70%

30%

No

Yes

SOURCE: FIELD SURVEY 2016

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Welding Painting

Piping Mooring

Load out & Sea

fastening of

jumpers

Work at height

Lifting Bunkering

Grinding Coating

DATA ANALYSIS cont.

Operations being carried out at the TP Fabrication Yard

Among these activities , Bunkering, coating and painting was found to have significant environmental effects

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DATA ANALYSIS cont.Severity of accidents caused as a result of HSE failures

CHARACTERISTICS FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE (%)

NEGLIGIBLE 13 43.3

MODERATE 10 33.3

SIGNIFICANT 4 13.4

SEVERE 2 6.7

CATASTROPHIC 1 3.3

TOTAL 30 100

SOURCE: FIELD SURVEY 2016

HHFTDFFXJBIIJJIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

HSFAEBGFSFSGFJDSBGJ

HSASFGSAHGFGSAGF

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DATA ANALYSIS cont.

Inadequate Equipments

13%

Negligence50%

Over confidence

23%

Inadequate training

7%

Mental distraction

7%

Main Causes of Accidents

SOURCE: FIELD SURVEY 2016

Model 1 - Risk Matrix22

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Model 2 - Gap Analysis of JRA

JOB STEP HAZARD / HAZ EVENT

CAUSES (OF HAZARD OCCURRING)

EXISTING CONTROLS

I-RISKSev Prob I-R (H3 D Med)

ADDITIONAL CONTROLS/ ACTIONS & BY WHO?

R-RISKSev Prob R-R(H3 B Low)

Mooring Operations

Parting of mooring ropes

Rope in bad condition/ deterioration, age, fatigue.Contamination. Wear and tear, excessive strain, friction.Rope running over sharp edges.

Cut and re-terminate as required. Using correct cordage type/SWL (parting). Pre use inspection, experienced crew, good seamanship skills.

H4 - CMed

Good control at mooring station by person in charge.Maintenance /Schedule Log

H4 - BLow

JOB STEP HAZARD / HAZ EVENT

CAUSES (OF HAZARD OCCURRING)

EXISTING

CONTROLSI-RISKSev Prob I-R (H3 D Med)

ADDITIONAL CONTROLS/ ACTIONS & BY WHO?

R-RISKSev Prob R-R(H3 B Low)

Preparing for Mooring

1.Poor/Insufficient knowledge about the operation which needs to be done.

2. Communications errors.

Lack of

preparedness

and no Pre

arrival

meeting

(some call it

tool box

meeting).

Carry out a

check list pre

arrival meeting

before the pilot

arrives.

H3-C

Med

The Pilot will inform the captain about which

and how many lines are going to be used and

about if there is a need for a tugboat.

H3-B

Low

Battery run

down.

Radio not

working,

background

noise,

misundersto

od hand

signals.

Radio checks.

Clarify hand

signals prior to

starting.

Experienced

personnel.

H2 - B

Low

Safety Check List by mooring supervisor. H2 – B

Low

Lack of

preparedne

ss and no

Pre arrival

meeting .

Carry out a

check list pre

arrival

meeting

before the

pilot arrives.

H3-C

Med

The Pilot will inform the captain about

which and how many lines are going to be

used and about if there is a need for a

tugboat.

H3-B

Low

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Model 3 - Bow Tie Analysis

TERMINOLOGIES

Hazard: a source, situation or act with a potential to cause harm.

Loss of control over the hazard = top event

Top event: an occurrence being avoided.

Treats: factors that can cause a top event.

Consequences: outcomes as a result of a top event

Preventive barriers: prevent the treat from causing the top event.

Mitigative barriers: reduce the risk or consequences.

Escalation factor: any thing that can cause a barrier to fail

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FINDINGS

Some relevant activities were not stated in Technip’s JRA.

Certain JRA’s did not factor environmental concerns and controls.

The PPEs for various job operations was not stated in technip’s job risk assessments.

Jobs were not divided into task which could have highlighted all the necessary concerns of the operations to be carried out.

The need for awareness to be created concerning HSE since it can even be practiced in our homes where safety is a daily routine.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATONS AND CONCLUSION

CONCLUSIONS

Some discrepancies in Technip standards with respect to the Job risk assessment on the project were highlighted using the bow tie and gap analysis models. By far all the objectives set in the first chapter were meet despite some challenges.

From the study over confidence and negligence are the main causes of accidents on site although by international measures the company has the necessary structures in place as far as HSE management is concerned.

Personnel motivation as already practiced should be enhanced to enhance the company’s goal of creating an accident free work place.

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Pre operation and after operation procedures should be stated to ensure proper compliance with environmental standards.

Appropriate PPE for each job step should be stated.

Job steps in Technip’s JRA should be simplified into tasks as practiced by their sister companies.

Also the researcher recommend the bow tie analysis software tool as an effective means of assessing job risk.

As part of its company social responsibility more awareness should be created in educating the locals about basic HSE procedures which may be useful in case of any incidents which may affect locals as a result of the company’s line of work.

EIA must be thoroughly conducted as it helps to institute best environmental management practice through its environmental management plan

28RECOMMENDATIONS

Bamber,(2008). Development of HSE management.

Health and Safety Executive,(2010). Five steps to risk assessment.

HSE Books,(2005) Respiratory protective equipment at work: A practical guide HSG53 Third edition, ISBN 978 0 7176 2904 6. www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/hsg53.htm

ILO, (2004). Safe Work: Global Estimate of Fatal Work Related Diseases and Occupational Accidents. International Labour Organization

Searl A. and Joanne C. ( 2012). Report on the Review of Health Risks for workers in the Waste and Recycling Industry, (chapter 10).

Technip publications 2014/2015.

www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/indg174.htm

www.modern Ghana.com/news/460699/1/statement-Ghana-institute of safety and environment.html.

29REFERENCES

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