Property Case Digest 1

7/28/2019 Property Case Digest 1

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CHAVEZ vs PEA

FACTS:

Government signed a contract withCDCP to reclaim certain foreshore and

offshore areas of Manila Bay which also

included the construction of Phases I

and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal

Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out

all the works in consideration of fifty

percent of the total reclaimed land.

Pres. Marcos created and tasked PEA

to reclaim land, including foreshore and

submerged areas and to develop,

improve, acquire, lease and sell any and

all kinds of lands. By virtue of PD No.

1085, he transferred to PEA the lands

reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore

of the Manila Bay.

Then President Aquino issued Special

Patent granting and transferring to PEA

the parcels of land so reclaimed under

MCCRR Project. Subsequently, the

Register of Deeds of Paraaque issued

Transfer Certificates of Titles in the

name of PEA, covering the three

reclaimed islands known as the

Freedom Islands.

PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI, a

private corporation, to develop the

Freedom Islands through negotiationwithout public bidding. The JVA also

required the reclamation of an additional

250 hectares of submerged areas

surrounding these islands to complete

the configuration in the Master

Development Plan. The BOD of PEA

and Pres. Ramos approved the JVA.

Senate President Ernesto Maceda

delivered a privilege speech in the

Senate and denounced the JVA as the

"grandmother of all scams. As a result

joint investigation was conducted and

found out that JVA is illegal for

alienating reclaimed lands which is land

of public domain.

Pres. Ramos created a task force to

investigate the legality of JVA, which

tasked force upheld the legality of JVA

contrary to conclusions reached by

Senate committees. Inquirer and Today

published reports that there were on-

going renegotiations between PEA and

AMARI under an order issued by thenPresident Fidel V. Ramos.

Chavez, petitioner as a taxpayer, filed

the instant Petition for Mandamus with

Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of

Preliminary Injunction and Temporary

Restraining Ordercontending that:

a. government stands to lose billions of

pesos in the sale by PEA of the

reclaimed lands to AMARI

b. praying public disclosure of terms ofany negotiation pursuant to right of

people to information on matters of

public concern.


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c. assailing also the sale of PEA to

AMARI of lands of the public domain as

a blatant violation of Section 3, Article

XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting

the sale of alienable lands of the public

domain to private corporations.

PEA and AMARI signed the Amended

JVA and the office of the Pres. approved

under the administration of then Pres.

Estrada approved the Amended JVA.

Due to the approval of the Amended

JVA petitioner now prays that on

"constitutional and statutory grounds the

renegotiated contract be declared null

and void.

ISSUES:

I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL

RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE

PETITION ARE MOOT AND

ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF

SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;

II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS

DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO

OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE

GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF

COURTS;

III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS

DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION

OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;

IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS

LOCUS STANDITO BRING THIS SUIT;

V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES

OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON ON-

GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A

FINAL AGREEMENT;

VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN

THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE

AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFERTO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS,

RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE

RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987

CONSTITUTION; AND

VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE

PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THEISSUE OF WHETHER THE AMENDED

JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS

GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO

THE GOVERNMENT.

HELD:

First issu e: whether the princ ipal

rel iefs prayed fo r in the p et i tion are

moot and academic because of

subs equent events.

We rule that the signing of the AmendedJVA by PEA and AMARI and its

approval by the President cannot

operate to moot the petition and divest

the Court of its jurisdiction.


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PEA and AMARI have still to implement

the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin

the signing of the Amended JVA on

constitutional grounds necessarily

includes preventing its implementation.

Supervening events, whether intended

or accidental, cannot prevent the Court

from rendering a decision if there is a

grave violation of the Constitution.

Even in cases where superveningevents had made the cases moot, the

Court did not hesitate to resolve the

legal or constitutional issues raised to

formulate controlling principles to guide

the bench, bar, and the public.

The instant petition is a case of firstimpression.

There is a need to resolve immediately

the constitutional issue raised in this

petition because of the possible transfer

at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and

ownership to portions of the reclaimed

lands.

Second iss ue: whether the pet i t ion

meri ts dismiss al for fai ling to

observe the pr inc ip le governing the

hierarchy of cou r ts.

Principle of hierarchy of courts applies

generally to cases involving factual

questions.

The instant case raises constitutional

issues of transcendental importance to

the public. The Court can resolve this

case without determining any factual

issue related to the case.

Third issu e: whether the pet i tion

mer i ts dismiss al for no n-exhaust ion

of admin istrat ive remedies.

We rule that the principle of exhaustion

of administrative remedies does not

apply in the instant case.

The principle of exhaustion of

administrative remedies does not apply

when the issue involved is a purely legal

or constitutional question.

The principal issue in the instant case is

the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands

held by PEA in view of the constitutional

ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of

the public domain to private

corporations.

Fourth iss ue: whether pet i t ioner has

locus s tandi to br ing this su i t

Since the instant petition brought by a

citizen involves the enforcement of


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constitutional rights - to information and

to the equitable diffusion of natural

resources - matters of transcendental

public importance.

The petitioner has the requisite locus

standi.

Fif th issu e: whether the

cons t i tut ional r ight to information

includes of f ic ial informat ion o n on -

going negot iations before a f inal

agreement.

Section 7 Art. III and Section 28 Art. II of

the Constitution seek to promote

transparency in policy-making and in the

operations of the government, as well as

provide the people sufficient informationto exercise effectively other

constitutional rights.

The court distinguish between

information the law on public bidding

requires PEA to disclose publicly, and

information the constitutional right toinformation requires PEA to release to

the public.

Govt Auditing Code requires public

bidding on matters relating to the

disposition of property of PEA.

So PEA must on its own and without

demand from anyone, disclose to the

public matters relating to the disposition

of its property.

If PEA fails to make this disclosure, anycitizen can demand from PEA this

information at any time during the

bidding process.

Information on on-going evaluation o r

reviewof bids or proposals being

undertaken by the bidding or review

committee is not immediately accessible

under the right to information.

However, once the committee makes its

of f ic ial recommendat ion, there arises

a " def in i te proposi t ion"on the part of

the government.

From this moment, the public's right to

information attaches, and any citizen

can access all the non-proprietary

information leading to such definite

proposition.

The right to information, however, doesnot extend to matters recognized as

privileged information.

Since there is no claim by PEA that the

information demanded by petitioner is

privileged information, we rule,

therefore, that the constitutional right toinformation includes official information

on on-going n egot iat ionsbefore a final

contract.


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Sixth issue: whether st ipulat ions in

the Amended JVA for the t ransfer to

AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to b e

reclaimed, violate the Const i tut ion .

The ownership of lands reclaimed from

foreshore and submerged areas is

rooted in the Regalian doctrine.

Under the Spanish Law of Waters,

land reclaimed from the sea belonged to

the party undertaking the reclamation,provided the government issued the

necessary permit and did not reserve

ownership of the reclaimed land to the

State.

Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889

provides that property of publicdominion referred not only to property

devoted to public use, but also to

property not so used but employed to

develop th e nat ional weal th.

Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889,

a not self-executing provision; declarethat property of public dominion, when

no longer devoted to public use or to the

defense of the territory, shall become a

part of the private property of the State

upon declaration of the executive and

passing of a law by the legislative.

Act No. 1654 mandated that the

gov ernment shou ld retain t i t le to al l

lands reclaimed by the government. It

also vests in the government control and

disposition of foreshore lands.

Private parties could lease lands

reclaimed by the government only if

these lands were no longer needed for

public purpose and mandated publ icb idd ingin the lease of government

reclaimed lands.

This act made government reclaimed

lands sui generisin that unlike other

public lands which the government

could sell to private parties; thesereclaimed lands were available only for

lease to private parties.

This act did not repeal the provision of

Spanish Law of Waters allowing private

parties to reclaim parts of the sea with

governments permission and such

reclaimed lands remained private lands.

Act No. 2874 the Public Land Act

authorized the Governor-General to

"classify lands of the public domain, to

"declare what lands are open to

disposition or concession and also

limited alienable or disposable lands

only to those lands which have been

"officially delimited and classified.

This act categorically mandated thatdisposable lands of the public domain

classified as government reclaimed,

foreshore and marshy lands "s hal l be

dispos ed of to pr ivate par t ies by

lease only and n ot oth erwise.


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Government reclaimed, foreshore and

marshy lands remained sui generis, as

the only alienable or disposable lands of

the public domain that the governmentcould not sell to private parties.

Under Act No. 2874, the government

could not sell government reclaimed,

foreshore and marshy lands to private

parties, unless the legislature passed

a law al low ing th eir sale.

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It did not prohibit private parties from

reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to

Spanish Law of Waters and lands

reclaimed from the sea by private

parties with government permission

remained private lands.

The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit

individuals and corporations from

acquiring government reclaimed and

marshy lands of the public domain that

were classified as agricultural lands

under existing public land laws.

The prohibition on private parties from

acquiring ownership of government

reclaimed and marshy lands of the

public domain was only a statutory

prohibition and the legislature could

therefore remove such prohibition.

But the legislature did not repeal Act

2874 but continued the long established

State policy of retaining for the

government title and ownership of

government reclaimed and marshy

lands of the public domain.

Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the

Philippine National Assembly

readopted the prohibition in 1935

Constitution of sale of government

reclaimed, foreshore and marshy

disposable lands of the public domain.

All these lands are intended for

residential, commercial, industrial or

other non-agricultural purposes.

The government could sell to private

parties only those lands for non-

agricultural purposes not classified as

government reclaimed, foreshore and

marshy disposable lands of the public

domain.

This act states that disposable lands of

the public domain intended for

residential, commercial, industrial or

other productive purposes other than

agricultural "shal l be disposed of

under the provis ions of this chapter

and not otherwise."

Since then and until now, the only way

the government can sell to private

parties government reclaimed andmarshy disposable lands of the public

domain is for the legislature to pass a

law authorizing such sale.


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One reason for the congressional

authority is that Section 60 of CA No.

141 exempted government units and

entities from the maximum area of

public lands that could be acquired from

the State.

These government units and entities

should not just turn around and sell

these lands to private parties in violation

of constitutional or statutory limitations.

In case ofsale or leaseof disposable

lands of the public domain, CA No. 141

mandates the Government to put to

public auction all leases or sales.

CA No. 141 did not repeal Spanish Law

of Waters provision allowing privateparties to reclaim portions of the sea

with government permission. However,

this time the rec laimed is n ot

automat ical ly a private land .

It cou ld becom e pr ivate land only

after being classi f ied as al ienableagr icul tural land of the p ubl ic domain

open to disposition.

The Civil Code of 1950the

government must formally declare that

the property of public dominion is no

longer needed for public use or publicservice, before the same could be

classified as patrimonial property of the

State.

It also included as property of public

dominion those properties without being

for public use, are intended for public

service or the "developm ent of the

nat ional w ealth."

Thus, government reclaimed and

marshy lands of the State, even if not

employed for public use or public

service, if developed to enhance the

national wealth, are classified as

property of public dominion.

1973 Constitutions prohibited the

alienation of all natural resources except

agricultural lands of the public domain.

Under 1973 Constitution, private

corporations could hold alienable landsof the public domain only through lease.

Only individuals could now acquire

alienable lands of the public domain,

and pr ivate corpo rations became

absolutely b arred f rom acqui r ing any

kind of al ienable land o f the pub l ic

domain.

The constitutional ban extended to all

kinds of alienable lands of the public

domain, while the statutory ban under

CA No. 141 applied only to government

reclaimed, foreshore and marshy

alienable lands of the public domain.

PD No. 1084 Creating the Public

Estates Authority


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The ban in the 1973 Constitution on

private corporations from acquiring

alienable lands of the public domain did

not apply to PEA since it was

then, and until today, a fully owned

government corporation.

PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA

"to h old lands of the publ ic dom ain"even "in excess of the area permitted to

private corporations by statute." Thus,

PEA can h old t i t le to pr iv ate lands, as

wel l as t i t le to lands of the pu bl ic

domain.

In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed

foreshore and submerged alienable

lands of the public domain, there must

be legislative authority empowering PEA

to sell these lands in view of CA 141.

Without such legislative authority, PEA

could not sell but only lease its

reclaimed foreshore and submerged

alienable lands of the public domain.

Nevertheless, any legislative authority

granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed

alienable lands of the public domain

would be subject to the constitutional

ban on private corporations fromacquiring alienable lands of the public

domain.

Hence, such legislative authority could

only benefit private individuals.

The 1987 Constitution continues the

State policy in the 1973 Constitution

banning private corporations from

acquir in g any kind o f alienable land

of the publ ic domain.

Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987

Constitution allows private corporations

to hold alienable lands of the publicdomain only throug h lease.

As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,

the general law governing the lease to

private corporations of reclaimed,

foreshore and marshy alienable lands of

the public domain is still CA No. 141.

The constitutional ban strengthens the

constitutional limitation on individuals

from acquiring more than the allowed

area of alienable lands of the public

domain.

Without the constitutional ban,

individuals who already acquired the

maximum area of alienable lands of the

public domain could easily set up

corporations to acquire more alienable

public lands. An individual could own as

many corporations as his means wouldallow him.

The Amended JVA covers a

reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only


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157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare

reclamation project have been

reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15

hectares are still submerged areas

forming part of Manila Bay.

Under the Amended JVA AMARI will

acquire and own a maximum of 367.5

hectares of reclaimed land which will be

titled in its name in line of 70-30% of

total net usable area.

To implement the Amended JVA, PEA

delegated to the unincorporated PEA-

AMARI joint venture PEA's statutory

authority, rights and privileges to reclaim

foreshore and submerged areas in

Manila Bay.

The Threshold Issue

The threshold issue is whether AMARI,

a private corporation, can acquire andown under the Amended JVA 367.5

hectares of reclaimed foreshore and

submerged areas in Manila Bay in view

of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the

1987 Constitution.

Under Section 2, Article XII of the1987 Constitution, the foreshore and

submerged areas of Manila Bay are part

of the "lands of the public domain and

consequently "owned by the State."

As such, foreshore and submerged

areas "shall not be alienated," unless

they are classified as "agricultural lands"

of the public domain.

The mere reclamation of these areas by

PEA does not convert these inalienable

natural resources of the State into

alienable or disposable lands of the

public domain.

Likewise, the mere transfer by theNational Government of lands of the

public domain to PEA does not make

the lands alienable or disposable lands

of the public domain, much less

patrimonial lands of PEA.

CA No. 141 provides that "only thoselands shall be declared open to

disposition or concession which have

been off ic ial ly del imi ted and

classi f ied.

There must be a law or presidential

proclamation officially classifying thesereclaimed lands as alienable or

disposable and open to disposition or

concession and must not been reserved

for some public or quasi-public use.

PD No. 1085 authorized the issuance of

special land patents for lands reclaimedby PEA from the foreshore or

submerged areas of Manila Bay coupled

with President Aquino's actual

issuanceof a special patent covering

the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an

official proclamation classifying the


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Freedom Islands as alienable or

disposable lands of the public domain.

The Freedom Islands are thus

al ienable or dispo sable lands of the

publ ic domain, open to dispos i t ion or

conc ession to q ual if ied par t ies.

The classification of PEA's reclaimed

foreshore and submerged lands into

alienable or disposable lands open to

disposition is necessary because PEA istasked under its charter to undertake

public services that require the use of

lands of the public domain.

Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore

and submerged lands held by the PEA

would actually be needed for public useor service since many of the functions

imposed on PEA by its charter

constitute essential public services.

Absent two official acts a classification

that these lands are alienable or

disposable and open to

disposition and a declaration that these

lands are not needed for public service,

lands reclaimed by PEA remain

inalienable lands of the public domain.

PEA must observe the provisions of CA

No. 141 requiring public auction, in the

absence of a law exempting PEA from

holding a public auction.

For the Special Patent issued to PEA

expressly acknowledge that the

provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the

disposition of reclaimed alienable landsof the public domain unless otherwise

provided by law.

Executive Order No. 654 which

authorizes PEA "to determine the kind

and manner of payment in contracts it

entered into for reclamation does notexempt PEA from the requirement of

public auction.

No. 1445, the Government Auditing

Code required sale of valuable

government property through public

bidding.

It is only when the public auction fails

that a negotiated sale is allowed, in

which case the Commission on Audit

must approve the selling price.

At the public auction sale, only

Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for

PEA's reclaimed foreshore and

submerged alienable lands of the public

domain. Private corporations are barred

from bidding at the auction sale of any

kind of alienable land of the public

domain.

The failure of public bidding conducted

on December 10, 1991, by PEA

involving only 407.84 hectares is not a

valid justification for a negotiated sale of


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750 hectares, almost double the area

publicly auctioned.

Besides, the failure of public bidding

happened more than three years before

the signing of the original JVA on April25, 1995. The economic situation in the

country had greatly improved during the

intervening period.

The Ban on Private corporations or

associations holding alienable lands of

the public domain except by lease isclear and absolute.

A private corporation, even one that

undertakes the physical reclamation of a

government project, cannot acquire

reclaimed alienable lands of the public

domain in view of the constitutional ban.

Thus whatever repayment Scheme in

the contract entered by PEA if the

contractor or developer is a private

corporation like AMARI can only be paid

with leaseholds on portions of the

reclaimed lands to avoid a direct

collision with the Constitution.

The issuance of special patent and

certificate of title to PEA does convert

the FREEDOM ISLAND into private land

contrary to what defendants contended.

Registration is not a mode of acquiring

ownership but is merely evidence of

ownership previously conferred by any

of the recognized modes of acquiring

ownership.

Registration does not give the registrant

a better right than what the registrant

had prior to the registration.

The registration of lands of the public

domain under the Torrens system, by

itself, cannot convert public lands into

private lands.

Several laws authorize lands of thepublic domain to be registered under the

Torrens System without losing their

character as public lands.

Such registration, however, is expressly

subject to the condition in CA No. 141

that the land "shall not be alienated,encumbered or otherwise disposed of in

a mann er affect ing i ts t i t le, except

when author ized by Congress."

The need for legislative authority

prevents the registered land of the

public domain from becoming privateland that can be disposed of to qualified

private parties.


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Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or

a joint venture, the fact remains that the

Amended JVA requires PEA to "cause

the issuance and delivery of the

certificates of title conveying AMARI's

Land Share in the name of AMARI.

This stipulation still contravenes

Section 3, Article XII of the 1987

Constitution which provides that

private corporations "shall not hold such

alienable lands of the public domain

except by lease.

The Court must perform its duty to

defend and uphold the Constitution, and

therefore declares the Amended JVA

nul l and vo id ab ini t io.

Seventh issue: whether the Court is

the proper forum to raise the issue of

whether the Amended JVA is grossly

disadvantageous to the government .

Considering that the Amended JVA is

null and void ab initio, there is nonecessity to rule on this last issue.

Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts,

and this last issue involves a

determination of factual matters


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Republic vs. Court of Appeals

131 SCRA 532 (1984)

FACTS: The subject land in this case issituated 20 meters away from the

shores of Laguna de Bay. Said land was

owned by Benedicto del Rio. After the

death of Benedicto, the land was

acquired by his son Santos Del Rio. The

private oppositors in this case sought

and obtained permission from Santos

Del Rio to construct duck houses onsaid land. The private oppositors,

however, violated their agreement and

instead constructed residential houses

thereon. Santos then filed an ejectment

suit against the private oppositors and

later on sought to register the land.

Meanwhile, private oppositors

simultaneously filed their respective

sales applications with Bureau of Lands,

and they opposed Santos del Rios

application for registration.

The CFI of Laguna dismissed the

application for registration. Applicant

appealed and obtained a favourable

judgment from the Court of Appeals.The Director of Lands and the private

oppositors filed their respective petitions

for review on said decision to the

Supreme Court.

The Director of Lands contends that

since a portion of the land is coveredwith water four to five months a year,

the same is part of the lake bed of

Laguna de Bay and therefore it cannot

be the subject of registration.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the parcel of land

in question is public land; and

2. Whether or not applicant private

respondent has registerable title to the

land.

HELD: The inundation of a portion of

the land is not due to "flux and reflux of

tides." It cannot be considered a

foreshore land, hence it is not a public

land and therefore capable ofregistration as private property provided

that the applicant proves that he has

a registerable title. The purpose of land

registration under the Torrens System is

not the acquisition of lands but only the

registration of title which applicant

already possesses over the land.

While it is true that by themselves tax re

ceipts and declarations of ownership for

taxation purposes are not

incontrovertible evidence of ownership,

they become strong evidence of

ownership acquired by prescription

when accompanied by proof of actual

possession of the property. Applicant by

himself andthrough his father before him, has been i

n open, continuous, public, peaceful,

exclusive and adverse possession of the

disputed land for more than thirty (30)

years

and has presented tax declarations and

tax receipts.

Applicant has more than satisfied the

legal requirements. Thus, he is clearly

entitled to the registration in his favor of

said land.


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Antipolo v. Zapanta

FACTS:

On 8 August 1977, a single application

for the registration of two distinct

parcels of land was filed by two distinct

applicants before the then CFI Rizal,

Branch XV, Makati (the Registration

Court). One of the two applicants was

Conrado Eniceo. He had applied for

registration under the Torrens system of

a

parcel of land containing 258 sq. m. The

other applicant was "Heirs of JoaquinAvendao", and the land they were

applying for registration was a parcel

containing 9,826 sq. m. (the disputed

property) surveyed in the name of the

Municipality of Antipolo. Both parcels

were situated in the Municipality of

Antipolo. The application were approved

by the Registration Court on 26February

1980. ANTIPOLO took steps to

interpose an appeal but because it failed

to amend

the Record on Appeal, its appeal was

disallowed.

On 22 May 1981, ANTIPOLO filed a

complaint (Civil Case 41353) of the CFI

Rizal,

Branch XIII, Pasig against named "Heirs

of Joaquin Avendao", and their

assignees praying for nullification of the

judgment rendered by the Registration

Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property is of public

domain, and thus, could not be

alienated.

HELD:

At the time the application for

registration was filed on 8 August 1977,

the

disputed property was already devoted

to public use and public service.

Therefore, it was outside the commerce

of man and could no longer be subject

to

private registration. The claim of the

Avendano heirs that they merely

tolerated

occupancy by ANTIPOLO which had

borrowed the disputed property from

them, since

they had been in possession, since as

far back as 1916, erroneously

presupposesownership thereof since that time.


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Cebu Oxygen vs Bercilles

66 SCRA 481

Facts:

This is a case on a petition for thereview of the order of the Court of FirstInstance of Cebu dismissing petitioner'sapplication for registration of title over aparcel of land situated in the City ofCebu.

The parcel of land sought to be

registered was only a portion of M.Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. OnSeptember 23, 1968, the City Council ofCebu, through Resolution No. 2193,approved on October 3, 1968, declaredthe terminal portion of M. Borces Street,Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandonedroad, the same not being included in theCity Development Plan.

Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu fileda motion to dismiss the application onthe ground that the property sought tobe registered being a public roadintended for public use is consideredpart of the public domain and thereforeoutside the commerce of man.Consequently, it cannot be subject toregistration by any private individual.

Issue:

Whether or not the declaration of theroad as abandoned make it patrimonialproperty which may be the object of acommon contract.

Held:

Since that portion of the city streetsubject of petitioner's application forregistration of title was withdrawn frompublic use, it follows that suchwithdrawn portion becomes patrimonial

property which can be the object of anordinary contract.

Article 422 of the Civil Code expresslyprovides that "Property of public

dominion, when no longer intended forpublic use or for public service, shallform part of the patrimonial property ofthe State."

Property thus withdrawn from publicservitude may be used or conveyed forany purpose for which other realproperty belonging to the City may belawfully used or conveyed.


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Laurel v. Garcia (G.R. No. 92013)

Ojeda v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No.

92047)

ROPPONGI PROPERTY

FACTS:

These two (2) petitions for prohibition

seek to enjoin respondents from

proceeding with the bidding for the sale

of the 3,179 square meters of land at

306 Roppongi, 5-Chrome Minato-ku

Tokyo, Japan. The latter case also,

prays for a writ of mandamus to fully

disclose to the public the basis of their

decision to push through with the sale of

the Roppongi property.

The Roppongi case is one of the four

properties in Japan acquired by the

Philippine government under the

Reparation Agreement entered into with

Japan. The other three (3) properties

include Nampeidai Property (present

site of the Philippine Embassy

Chancery), Kobe CommercialProperty (commercial lot being used as

a warehouse and parking lot for

consulate staff) and Kobe Residential

Property (resident lot which is now

vacant).

The Reparations Agreement providesthat reparations valued at $550M would

be payable in twenty (20) years in

accordance with annual schedules of

procurements to be fixed by the

Philippine and Japanese governments.

The procurements are to be divided into

government sector and those for private

parties in projects, the latter shall be

made available only to Filipino citizens

or to 100% Filipino-owned entities in

national development projects.

The Roppongi property was acquired

under the heading Government Sector

for the Chancery of the Philippine

Embassy until the latter was transferred

to Nampeida due to the need for major

repairs. However, the Roppongi

property has remained underdevelopedsince that time.

Although there was a proposal to lease

the property with the provision to have

buildings built at the expense of the

lessee, the same was not acted

favorably upon by the government.Instead, President Aquino issued EO

No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or

entities to avail of separations capital

goods and services in the event of sale,

lease or dispositions. Thereafter, amidst

the oppositions by various sectors, the

Executive branch of the government

pushed for the sale of reparationproperties, starting with the Roppongi

lot. The property has twice been set for

bidding at a minimum floor price of

$225M. The first was a failure, while the

second has been postponed and later

restrained by the SC.

Amongst the arguments of the

respondents is that the subject property

is not governed by our Civil Code, but

rather by the laws of Japan where the

property is located. They relied upon the

rule of lex situs which is used in


17/21

determining the applicable law regarding

the acquisition, transfer and devolution

of the title to a property.

ISSUES:

1. Can the Roppongi property andothers of its kind be alienated bythe Philippine Government?

NO. There can be no doubt that

the property is of publicdominion and the respondents

have failed to show that it has

become patrimonial.

The property is correctly classified

under Art 420 of the Civil Code as

property belonging to the State

and intended for some public

service. The fact that it has not

been used for actual Embassy

service does not automatically

convert it to patrimonial property.

Such conversion happens only if

property is withdrawn from public

use, through an abandonment of

the intention to use the Roppongi

property for public service and to

make it patrimonial property.

Abandonment must be a certain

and positive act based on correct

legal premises.

The EO does not declare that the

properties lost their public

character, merely intending theproperties to be made available to

foreigners and not to Filipinos

alone, in case of sale, lease or

other disposition. Furthermore, it is

based on the wrong premise that

the Japan properties can be sold

to end-users, when in fact it

cannot.

Neither does the CARP Law re-

classify the properties into

patrimonial properties, merely

stating that sources of funds for its

implementation be sourced from

proceeds of the disposition of the

Government in foreign countries,

but not that the Roppongi property

be withdrawn from being classified

as a property of public dominion.

CONFLICT OF LAW

Furthermore, the respondents

argument that the Japanese law

and not our Civil Code shall apply

is incorrect. There is no conflict

of law in this situation. A conflict

of law arises only when:

a. There is a dispute over thet i t le or ownership of animmovable, such that thecapacity to take and transferimmovables, the formalities ofconveyance, the essentialvalidity and effect of the

transfer, or the interpretationand effect of a conveyance, areto be determined.

b. A foreign law on landownership and itsconveyance is asserted toconflict with a domestic lawon the same matters.

Hence, the need to determine

which law should apply. Both

elements does not exist in the

case. The issues are not

concerned with the validity of

ownership or title. There is no


18/21

question that the property belongs

to the Philippines. The issue is the

authority of the government

officials to validly dispose of

property belonging to the state

and the validity of the procedures

adopted to effect the sale, which

should be governed by Philippine

law The rule of lex situs does not

apply.

2. Does the Chief Executive, her

officers and agents, have theauthority and jurisdiction, to sellthe Roppongi property?

NO. A law or a formal declaration

to withdraw the Roppongi property

from public domain to make it

alienable and a need for

legislative authority to allow the

sale of the property is needed.

None has been enacted for this

purpose.

3. W/N EO No. 296 is constitutional?

The SC did not anymore pass

upon its constitutionality.


19/21

Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs

Zamboanga City

22 SCRA 1334

Facts:

Prior to its incorporation as a chartered

city, the Municipality of Zamboanga

used to be the provincial capital of the

then Zamboanga Province. On October

12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was

approved converting the Municipality of

Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec.

50 of the Act also provided that Buildings and properties which the

province shall abandon upon the

transfer of the capital to another place

will be acquired and paid for by the City

of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by

the Auditor General.

The properties and buildings referred to

consisted of 50 lots and some buildings

constructed thereon, located in the City

of Zamboanga and covered individually

by Torrens certificates of title in the

name of Zamboanga Province.

On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was

approved dividing the province of

Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboangadel Norte and Zamboanga del Sur.

Properties and the obligations of the

province of Zamboanga shall be divided

equitably between the Province of

Zamboanga del Norte and the Province

of Zamboanga del Sur by the President

of the Philippines, upon the

recommendation of the Auditor General.

However, on June 17, 1961, Republic

Act 3039 was approved amending Sec.

50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by

providing that All buildings, properties

and assets belonging to the former

province of Zamboanga and located

within the City of Zamboanga are

hereby transferred, free of charge, in

favor of the said City of Zamboanga.

Issue:

WON Zamboanga del Norte is deprived

of its private properties without due

process and just compensation.

Ruling:

The fact that the 26 lots are registered

strengthens the proposition that they are

truly private in nature. On the other

hand, that the 24 lots used for

governmental purposes are also

registered is of no significance since

registration cannot convert public

property to private.

Applying Art. 424 of NCC, all the

properties in question, except the two

(2) lots used as High School

playgrounds, could be considered as

patrimonial properties of the formerZamboanga province. Even the capital

site, the hospital and leprosarium sites,

and the school sites will be considered

patrimonial for they are not for public

use. They would fall under the phrase

"public works for public service"


20/21

Salas vs Jarencio

46 SCRA 734

Facts:

Facts:

On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of

the Court of First Instance of Manila,

acting as a land registration court,

rendered judgment declaring the City of

Manila the owner in fee simple of a

parcel of land containing an area of

9,689.8 square meters, more or less. Onvarious dates in 1924, the City of Manila

sold portions of the aforementioned

parcel of land in favor of Pura

Villanueva.

On September 21, 1960, the Municipal

Board of Manila, presided by then Vice-

Mayor Antono J. Villegas, adopted a

resolution requesting His Excellency,the President of the Philippines to

consider the feasibility of declaring the

City property bounded by Florida, San

Andres, and Nebraska Streets,

containing a total area of 7,450 square

meters as a patrimonial property of the

City of Manila for the purpose of

reselling these lots to the actualoccupants thereof. There is therefore a

precedent that this parcel of land could

be subdivided and sold to bona fide

occupants. The bill was passed by the

Senate and approved by the President

and became RA 4118.

Issue:

WON the property involved in RA 4118

is a private or patrimonial property of the

City of Manila.

Ruling:

The conclusion of the respondent court

that Republic Act No. 4118 converted a

patrimonial property of the City of Manila

into a parcel of disposable land of the

State and took it away from the City

without compensation is, therefore,

unfounded. In the last analysis the land

in question pertains to the State and the

City of Manila merely acted as trustee

for the benefit of the people therein for

whom the State can legislate in the

exercise of its legitimate powers.

If it were its patrimonial property whyshould the City of Manila be requesting

the President to make representation to

the legislature to declare it as such so it

can be disposed of in favor of the actual

occupants? There could be no more

blatant recognition of the fact that said

land belongs to the State and was

simply granted in usufruct to the City of

Manila for municipal purposes.


21/21

Davao Saw Mill61 Phil 709

Facts:

The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is theholder of a lumber concession from theGovernment of the Philippine Islands. Ithas operated a sawmill in the sitio ofMaa, barrio of Tigatu, municipality ofDavao, Province of Davao. However,the land upon which the business wasconducted belonged to another person.On the land the sawmill companyerected a building which housed the

machinery used by it.

In another action, wherein the DavaoLight & Power Co., Inc., was the plaintiffand the Davao, Saw, Mill Co., Inc., wasthe defendant, a judgment was renderedin favor of the plaintiff in that actionagainst the defendant in that action; awrit of execution issued thereon, and the

properties now in question were leviedupon as personalty by the sheriff. Nothird party claim was filed for suchproperties at the time of the salesthereof as is borne out by the recordmade by the plaintiff herein.

Issue:

Whether or not the machinery mounted

on foundations of cement and installedby the lessee on a lease land beregarded as real property.

Held:

The machinery which is movable in itsnature only becomes immobilized whenplaced in a plant by the owner of the

property or plant but not when so placedby a tenant, a usufructuary, or anyperson having only a temporary right,unless such person acted as agent ofthe owner.

Immobilization by destination or purposecannot generally be made by a personwhose possession of property is onlyTEPORARY, otherwise we will beforced to presume that he intended to

give the property permanently away infavor of the owner of the premises.

Documents

Property Case Digest 1