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PROPERTY CASE DOCTRINES CONCEPT AND KINDS MANECLANG v. IAC – “Land of Public Domain, No Appropriate” A creek, being a part of public domain is not susceptible to private appropriation and can't be acquired through acquisitive prescription. Thus, Maneclang can not ask the court to quiet the title of the creek and give him ownership of such. LAUREL v. ABROGAR It may be conceded that international long distance calls take the form of electrical energy, but it cannot be said that such international long distance calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities.On the other hand, Interest in business was declared to be personal property since it is capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties. MIAA v. CA – “Airport is not taxable” OGCC revokes the exemption of NAIA from real estate tax. Airport lands and buildings of MIAA are owned by the Republic. Under Article 420, those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, PORTS and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character are part of public domain. “Ports” includes seaports and airports. Since property owned by the republic is not taxable, NAIA should be exempt from tax. VILLARICO v. SARMIENTO – “public stairway, no right of way” A lot on which the stairways were built for the use of the people as passageway to the highway is for public use since it is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement. OWNERSHIP Arcaina Austria Bañadera Caraan Cheng Coloquio Diploma Lim Villarin Villarin

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Page 1: Property Case Doctrines

PROPERTY CASE DOCTRINES

CONCEPT AND KINDS

MANECLANG v. IAC – “Land of Public Domain, No Appropriate” A creek, being a part of public domain is not susceptible to private appropriation and can't be acquired through acquisitive prescription. Thus, Maneclang can not ask the court to quiet the title of the creek and give him ownership of such.

LAUREL v. ABROGAR – It may be conceded that international long distance calls take the form of electrical energy, but it cannot be said that such international long distance calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities.On the other hand, Interest in business was declared to be personal property since it is capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties.

MIAA v. CA – “Airport is not taxable” OGCC revokes the exemption of NAIA from real estate tax. Airport lands and buildings of MIAA are owned by the Republic. Under Article 420, those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, PORTS and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character are part of public domain. “Ports” includes seaports and airports. Since property owned by the republic is not taxable, NAIA should be exempt from tax.

VILLARICO v. SARMIENTO – “public stairway, no right of way” A lot on which the stairways were built for the use of the people as passageway to the highway is for public use since it is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.

OWNERSHIP

TAYAG v. LACSON – “tenant-farmers no right of ownership to execute a deed of assignment” The trial court cannot enjoin a party as registered owners of the property, from selling, disposing of and encumbering his property, for it is their right to do so without any other limitation than those established by law i.e. agrarian reform law, in accordance with Article 428 of the Civil Code. Ownership also includes the right to recover the possession of the property from any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such property, by the appropriate action for restitution, with the fruits, and for indemnification for damages. In this case, the respondents (registered owners) cannot be enjoined exercise their rights of ownership over the lands notwithstanding the Deed of Assignments executed in favor of the petitioners. The respondents are not parties to the said deeds and there is no evidence that they agree to it. Only the tenant-farmers were made party to the deed and in fact were deceived into signing the deeds when what they knew is that they were made to sign a mere receipt for the loan they procured from petitioner.

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HEIRS OF CABAL v. CABAL – Elementary is the rule that there is no co-ownership where the portion owned is already concretely determined and identifiable though not technically described. In the case at bar, the petitioner is also not entitled to acquisitive prescription since his possession was not in the concept of an owner. Tax declarations and receipts can only be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription if it is coupled with proof of actual possession.

DAVID v. BARDIN – The defense of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where registered land is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of the registered owner. One who purchases an unregistered land does so at his peril. His claim of having bought the land in good faith, i.e. without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, the property, would not protect him if it turns out that the seller does not actually own the property. On the other hand, those who bought the land who relied on a clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value.

CO-OWNERSHIP

PANGANIBAN v. OAMIL – Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. During the existence of the co-ownership and before a partition:

> No individual can claim title to any definite portion of the community property.> All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing. > Every co-owner has the absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the common property.

> Co-owner is free to alienate, assign or mortgage this undivided interest, except as to purely personal rights. The effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the property.

CRUZ v. CA – “once partitioned, no more co-ownership” The moment that there is a partition of a co-owned property, it ceases to be a co-ownership. Co-ownerships are terminated upon judicial or extra-judicial partition of the properties owned in common. Even if via a subsequent Memorandum of Agreement, they agreed to share the proceeds from the previously co-owned property, it is only concerned with the sharing of proceeds - NOT the co-ownership of property.

IMPERIAL v. CA – Inasmuch as the terms of the agreement between Adela and Melanio provide for 1/2 undivided share for Melanio over the two lots, and Melanio in effect waived his rights over 1/2 of the remaining Lot 1091 when he sold and appropriated solely as his own the proceeds from the sale of Lot 1052, law and equity dictate that Lot 1091 should now belong to the estate of Adela.

HEIRS OF PADILLA v. MAGDUA – No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.

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Page 3: Property Case Doctrines

RIGHT OF ACCESSION

CARRASCOSO v. CA – The right to choose between appropriating the improvement or selling the land on which the improvement of the builder, planter or sower stands, is given to the owner of the land.

PNB v. DE JESUS – “Bobong Mayor” PNB bought building and land from Mayor Ignacio and part of the building is not included in the title of the land. PNB invokes Article 448 saying that he is entitled to buy the land where part of his building stands. However, Article 448 refers to a piece of land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties (good faith builder and good faith land owner) and not to a case where a third person (PNB) acquires the property which the owner (Mayor Ignacio) himself is the builder and land owner. In fine, PNB is not in a valid position to invoke the provision of Art. 448.

SPS. RASDAS v. ESTENOR – “tolerance ended when children graduated” When the predecessor has knowledge that his possession of the property is by mere tolerance, the successors cannot be considered in good faith. Under Article 448 of the Civil Code, the builder in bad faith on the land of another loses what is built without right to indemnity. Petitioners were in bad faith when they built the structures since they had known that the subject property did not belong to them.

SULO v. NAYONG PILIPINO – “Lessee has no right of accession as a builder" The lessee is neither a builder in good faith nor in bad faith that would call the application of 448 (Rules on Good Faith B/P/S) and 546 (Necessary and Useful Expenses) since his rights are governed by Article 1678 (Right of Lessee to Useful Improvements and Ornamental Expenses). The introduction of valuable improvement on the leased premises does not give the lessee the right of retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a builder in good faith. Thus in this case, the court denied the claim of the petitioner-lessee that in making improvement of substantial value, they should be considered builders in good faith who have that right to retain possession of the property until reimbursement by respondent.

RIGHT OF POSSESSION

FRONDARINA v. MALAZARTE – Where the dispute over possession arises between two persons, the person first having actual possession is the one who is enttiled to maintain an action granted by law. Pieces of documentay proof like tax declarations, tax receipts and miscellaneous sales applications may be shown as proof of actual possession. Although tax declarations or real estate payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner thus may be used as a basis to claim ownership.

YU v. PACLEB – Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. To possess means to have, to actually and physically occupy a thing, with or without right. “Possession always includes the idea of occupation. It is not necessary that the person in possession should himself be the occupant. The occupancy can be held by another in his name.” Without occupancy, there is no

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possession.

Two things are paramount in possession:

(1) There must be occupancy, apprehension or taking.(2) There must be intent to possess (animus possidendi).

MALAYAN REALTY v. UY – Where the lessor has been deprived of its possession over the leased premises for so long a time, and it is shown that, the lessee was the recipient of substantial benefits while the lessor was unable to have the full use and enjoyment of a considerable portion of its property, such militates against further deprivation by fixing a period of extension.

SPS. VALDEZ v. CA – “if unlawful detainer, prove how and why is it unlawful” A petition for unlawful detainer must contain how respondents’ entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. When the complaint fails to aver such facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC.

Kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property:(a) accion interdictal (forcible entry and unlawful detainer);(b) accion publiciana; and(c) accion reivindicatoria

MANANTAN v. SOMERA – A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted before the proper MTC or MeTC within one year from the unlawful withholding of possession (counted from the date of plaintiff’s last demand on defendant to vacate the real property). In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them. Possession becomes illegal when plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under their contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.

USUFRUCTUARY RIGHT

NHA v. CA – A usufruct gives the right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constitutijg it or the law provides otherwise. On the other hand, the usufructuary has the duty to protect the owner's intersts. A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term and under such conditions as the parties may deem convenient subject to the legal provisions on usufruct; a usufructuary may lease the object held in usufruct.

In this case, Marcos had given Manila Seedling Bank Foundation usufrutuary rights over the property without specifying how long such rights is granted. The law limits any usufruct in favor of a corporation of a corporation or association to 50 years. A usufruct is meant only as a lifetime grant.

HEMEDES v. CA – The annotation of usufructuary rights in a certificate of title in favor of another does not impose upon the mortgagee the obligation to investigate the validity of its mortgagor’s title. In a usufruct, only the jus utendi and jus fruendi over the property is transferred to the usufructuary – the owner of the property maintains the jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform, and even destroy the same.

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EASEMENT

BOCO-MEDELIN v. CA – An acknowledgement of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to another. Mere material possession of land is not adverse possession against the owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner. Acts of possession executed by virtue of license or tolerance of the owner, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription. Under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by title and not through prescription.

NPC v. TIANGCO – “Kalayaan San Jose Transmission Line Project” An easement of a right-of-way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and the respondents would retain full ownership of the property taken. Nonetheless, the acquisition of such easement is not gratuitous. The limitations on the use of the property taken for an indefinite period would deprive its owner of the normal use thereof. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land taken.

GOLDCREST v. CYPRESS – The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed restrictions on its rights on the servient estate, to wit:

1. It can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the easement 2. It cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable originally contemplated 3. It cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously established 4. It cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use and preservation of the easement 5. It cannot alter or make the easement more burdensome 6. It must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary works on the servient estate; and 7. It should choose the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to cause the least convenience to the owner of the servient estate

UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL v. CHUNG – A voluntary easement of right of way is like any other contract, as such it is generally effective between the parties, their heirs and assigns, except in cases where rights and obligations are not transmissible. A voluntary easement can only be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. This being the case, the presence of an adequate outlet to a highway extinguishes only legal or compulsory easements but not voluntary easements.

INING v. VEGA – Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death. Given that the original owners died without children the siblings are co-owners of the land. As co-owners, they may use the property owned in common, provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. They have the full ownership of their parts and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,

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and may alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even substitute another person in their enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. “A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing” (DISCLAIMER: There really is no Easement Issue on this case)

ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE

GANCAYCO v. QC GOVERNMENT – A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity. When Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider such building or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance.

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPER v. CA – “mayor has power to reject and lock out nuisances like you” The mayor has police power such that he may deny the application of a permit in order to protect his inhabitants from pollution. When petitioner's factory was padlocked because of the failure to secure the necessary permits and the claim that the fumes coming from the factory may contain certain matters harmful to the people, the mayor's office was acting within its power.

POLLUTION BOARD v. CA – Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted. litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years.

REPUBLIC v. MARCOPPER – The Pollution Adjudication Board has adjudicatory powers over any pollution case. The authority of the mines regional directory is on the administrative and regulatory powers over mining operations and installations, it has no adjudicative powers over complaints for violation of pollution controll statutes and regulations.

“Pollution” refers to any alteration of the physical, chemical and biological propertiesof any water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines , or any discharge thereto of any liquid, gaseous or solid wastes as will or is likely to create a harmful environment.

PREVENTION OF DAMAGES

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Page 7: Property Case Doctrines

CAPILI v. CARDENA – A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actor’s position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner. In this case, the probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable hence the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is in order; in that it warrants a presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree, which caused the death of respondents’ daughter, was a result of petitioner’s negligence, being in charge of the school.

Arcaina Austria Bañadera Caraan Cheng Coloquio Diploma Lim Villarin Villarin