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PROPERTY SYNDICATE INFILTRATES THE COMMUNITY

SCHEMES OMBUD SERVICE

A LESSON ON HOW SYNDICATES OPERATE, HOW RIGHTS ARE

INFLUENCED AND HOW EASILY THEY MAY BE CAPTURED OR CONTROLLED

Published by #KnowYourSyndicates on 13 February 2020.

Please share this document and visit and share the knowyoursyndicates.com site with

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CONTENTS

1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 4

2 Brief Introduction and History with Respect to The Community Scheme Regulations ... 7

2.1 The Regulations ................................................................................................. 7

2.2 The Widely Publicised Allegations of Corruption and Maladministration Allegations with Respect to the EAAB and CSOS .......................................... 11

3 The Syndicate’s Elaborate Rights Capture, Alternatively Control Scheme .................. 12

3.1 Part 1 of the Elaborate Capture/Control Scheme – Influence Government, Infiltrate the EAAB and Circumvent Regulations ............................................ 12

3.2 Part 2 of the Elaborate Capture/Control Scheme – Establish STAP to Gain

Control of Arbitrations and/or Unduly Influence Arbitration Outcomes ........... 12

3.3 Part 3 of the Elaborate Capture/Control Scheme – Influence Government, Infiltrate the CSOS and Circumvent Regulations ............................................ 13

4 The Syndicate Operating Under the Auspices of NAMA and its Sinister Self-Regulating Objectives ....................................................................................................................... 13

4.1 Brief Introduction to NAMA............................................................................... 14

4.2 Brief Introduction to the Prominent Members of the Syndicate and their Lucrative Property Companies ........................................................................ 19

4.2.1 Chantelle van Heerden of Bellbouy Property Group and NAMA................ 19

4.2.2 Marina Constas of STAP, AOA, BBM Attorneys, CSOS and NAMA ......... 20

4.2.3 Karen Bleijs of STAP, CSOS, NAMA, BBM Attorneys, Alan Levy Attorneys, BWHM Property Group, Ismail Bleijs Attorneys and AJ Van Rensburg Attorneys...................................................................................................... 23

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4.2.4 Alan Paul Levy of Alan Levy Attorneys and NAMA .................................... 25

4.2.5 Elmo York-Stuart of STAP, NAMA and EY Stuart Attorneys ..................... 27

4.2.6 Trevor Simon of Fluxmans Attorneys, STAP, AOA and BBM Attorneys.... 27

4.2.7 Whitfields Property Management and Amiti of NAMA, and their Facilitators Kruger Stoltz Inc. Auditors, Sutherland Kruger Inc. Attorneys and Others 29

4.2.8 Koos Croukamp of NAMA, Insure City and MidCity Property Group ......... 32

4.2.9 Professor Graham Paddock of NAMA and Paddocks ................................ 32

4.2.10 Dr. Gerhard Jooste of NAMA, Pro-Admin Property Managers and Bright Light Solar ................................................................................................... 34

4.2.11 The Syndicate Deceivingly Pursues Court Precedents Disguised as Body Corporate’s .................................................................................................. 35

4.2.12 Standard Bank Holds the Trust Accounts of Whitfields and its Clients and A Senior Manager/Executive Thereof is Implicated in Alleged Wrongdoing . 36

5 Community Scheme Management: NAMA’s Deception with Respect to the Regulation of Managing Agents and the Fiduciary Obligations of Scheme Managers ................... 38

5.1 The Syndicate Deceivingly Portrays NAMA as a Regulator............................ 38

5.2 NAMA’s Managing Agents Categorically Deny They Have a Fiduciary Obligation Towards Community Schemes and Offenders Misconduct Themselves with Impunity ............................................................................... 44

5.3 Conspiring Trustees, NAMA Managing Agents and Other Members of the Syndicate Deceptively Allege That the Syndicate-Infiltrated CSOS has no Jurisdiction Over Breaches of Fiduciary Duties .............................................. 48

6 Poor Regulation of Managing Agents and the Syndicate’s Relentless Campaign to

Circumvent, Control or Influence Regulations and Regulators ..................................... 56

6.1 Ongoing Managing Agent Fraud, Maladministration and Other Widely Publicised Misconduct ..................................................................................... 56

6.2 Poor Regulation of NAMA Managing Agents and The Syndicate’s Ongoing

Modus Operandi and Adverse Influence with Respect to Regulations .......... 58

6.3 Brief Synopsis of the new Community Schemes Regulations Insofar as they Deficiently Relate to Managing Agents, and the Syndicate’s Modus Operandi with Respect Thereto ....................................................................................... 62

6.4 The Devious Attempt to Circumvent the Debt Collectors Act and Regulations.......................................................................................................................... 66

7 The Syndicate’s Establishment of the Sectional Titles Arbitration Panel (STAP) to Surreptitiously Control or Influence Arbitrations and Outcomes in its Favour .............. 70

8 The Syndicate’s Infiltration of the Community Schemes Ombud Service, its Adverse Influence Over Community Scheme Regulation and the Ongoing Threat to the Public ........................................................................................................................................ 78

9 Some Examples of How Ongoing Offences are Being Perpetrated with Impunity by

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Conspiring Trustees, NAMA Managing Agents and other Members of the Syndicate . 88

10 Sample of Public Complaints Against the Syndicate ..................................................... 95

10.1 Online Complaint Against BBM Attorneys, Karen Bleijs, Alan Levy, Suzanne

Coppin, AJ van Rensburg, Annette Horwitz and Retief & Meintjes ................ 95

10.2 Online Complaint Against BBM Attorneys ....................................................... 98

10.3 Some Online Complaints Against Alan Levy Attorneys (Member of the Syndicate) on Various Complaint Websites .................................................... 99

11 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 101

12 References ................................................................................................................... 102

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed herein are solely those of its authors and do not

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other sources, third party sites or their respective contributors referenced here from

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#KnowYourSyndicates also makes no representation nor warranties of any kind,

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this constitutes a fair use of any such copyrighted material as provided for under

section 12 of the South African Copyright Act of 78 of 1978.

We are critically thinking people, so any views expressed herein may be subject to

change. The views expressed herein are however based on much research, actual

experience and an abundance of evidence already in the public domain.

For convenience this document contains hyperlinks to sources to assist the

reader with validation, verification, further reading and research.

1 Introduction

“Even if a country has the best possible statutes and legal rules, any

attempts by its government to construct a fair and prosperous dispensation

for its citizens would fail if corruption within its society were rife. Corruption

erodes moral values as well as the credibility of public authorities and its

organs, undermines legal certainty and faith in the rule of law, leads to a

dysfunctional public and private sector, endangers the free market economy,

creates a breeding ground for organised crime, results in some people

becoming rich at the expense of others, increases levels of poverty,

impedes economic development, destroys the pillars of democracy, creates

a culture of dishonesty and leads to a lack of faith in a country’s

leaders.”1 (Snyman, 2014).

“Black’s Law Dictionary defines “‘public interest’ as follows: 1. The general

welfare of the public that warrants recognition and protection. 2. Something

in which the public as a whole has a stake especial[ly] an interest that

justifies governmental regulation” (Corruption Watch, 2012).

This paper, which is published in the public interest, sheds light on a syndicate (“the

Syndicate”) operating under the auspices of the National Association of Managing

1 Definition and offences dealt with under the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004.

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Agents (NAMA)2 and its ongoing threat to the public, more specifically to community

scheme property owners.3

The Syndicate has been influencing Government as set out herein, and has

infiltrated regulators such as the Estate Agencies Affairs Board (EAAB) and the

Community Schemes Ombud Service (CSOS)4 in an elaborate scheme aimed to

influence, capture5 or control property and other rights and otherwise circumvent

regulations. The Syndicate’s motivations lie, inter alia, in the extremely lucrative and

vulnerable community scheme property market, which market strength has been

described as follows:

• First National Bank reported in 2015 that sectional title market strength is

almost double that of full title (Fin24 Jul, 2015);

• According to Pam Golding Property Group,6 demand for sectional title units

increased from 10.9% of total plans approved in 2000 to 38% in early 2015,

with rising demand resulting in sectional title developments increasing by as

much as 550% since 2000 in some locations (Fin24 Nov, 2015);

• In 2017, Lightstone data showed that sectional title property makes up 34%

(59 935 units) of the total market stock for Johannesburg, yet accounts for

almost half of all transactions that took place in 2016, while demand has

continued to surge year-on-year outpacing that of full title (Property24 May,

2017);

• In 2018, Lightstone data revealed that “the number of South Africans buying

freehold homes has been steadily decreasing, with buyers opting for sectional

2 Registered directors include Chantal van Heerden (also Executive Director of Bellbouy Property Group and appointed NAMA National Chairperson on 20 November 2018), Bradley Neil Cowie (Estate Agent and Regional Director of NAMA), Phillip Guy Mclaughlin Pansegrouw, Marco Paulo SA de Oliveira (NAMA Gauteng East Director and Director of Solver Property Services), George Frederik Müller, Michael Frank Henwick, Otto Franx Holm, Glenton Smit. Other Director’s past and present include Dr Gerhard Jooste and Koos Croukamp.

3 Refer definition provided under section 2 hereof. 4 A public entity funded by taxes and levies, and purportedly established to serve the public and regulate the

conduct of parties within community schemes and to ensure their good governance. 5 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Definition of Capture, “an act of catching, winning, or gaining control by force,

stratagem, or guile”, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/capture, accessed on 30/01/2020. 6 A Member of the Syndicate.

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title7 and estate homes instead” (Private Property, 2018); and

• According to Marina Constas,8 a prominent member of the Syndicate, “there

are currently some fifty-six thousand Bodies Corporate in South Africa, with

around eight hundred thousand units, and the three thousand

homeowners’ associations registered contain five hundred and thirty

thousand homes” (PropertyWheel, 2019).

The remainder of this paper deals with the following:

• A brief history with respect to community scheme regulations and the widely

publicised allegations of corruption and maladministration at the EAAB

and CSOS;

• The Syndicate’s elaborate rights capture, alternatively control scheme

traversing this entire paper;

• A brief introduction to NAMA, the prominent Syndicate members operating

under the auspices thereof, and their sinister self-regulating and other

objectives;

• Community Scheme Management: NAMA’s Deception with Respect to the

Regulation of Managing Agents and the Fiduciary Obligations of Scheme

Managers;

• The poor regulation of managing agents, the Syndicate’s sinister modus

operandi and influence with respect thereto and the inevitable offences being

perpetrated with impunity as a result thereof;

• The Syndicate’s establishment of the Sectional Titles Arbitration Panel

(STAP) to surreptitiously control or influence arbitrations and outcomes in its

favour;

• The Syndicate’s ongoing influence within Government and over regulations,

and its infiltration of the Community Schemes Ombud Service in furthering

7 Including townhouses, flats or apartments, and duet houses. 8 Prominent member of the Syndicate.

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its sinister self-regulating and other objectives;

• Additional examples of misconduct and offences being perpetrated with

impunity by offending members of the Syndicate, trustees and other co-

conspirators which many readers hereof may already be familiar with, and in

terms of which this paper will provide insight into why it continues unabated;

and

• A small sample of public complaints raised against members of the Syndicate.

To demonstrate the modus operandi of the Syndicate and provide credibility to

statements made herein, this paper quotes extensively from sources, much being the

Syndicate’s own words and publications. This is done based on the principle of fair

use, in terms of section 12 of the Copyright Act 1978 and in terms of the disclaimer

provided earlier herein. Where sources are quoted herein verbatim, we apply our own

emphasis throughout this document and same will not be repeated where such

emphasis is applied.

For convenience, internal community scheme representatives who are duly elected by

the owners thereof to represent the owners, and including directors, shall hereinafter

also collectively be referred to as “trustees”.

This document contains hyperlinks to sources to assist the reader with

validation, verification, further reading and research. To further assist with any

further research, the directors of the various companies mentioned herein, insofar as

it has been possible to obtain them, are provided in the footnotes.

Many owners may have suffered at the hands of offending people and companies

dealt with herein, know that you are not alone! The content hereof will provide

insight into why you may never have obtained justice, and under the circumstances

described herein, you probably never will. This, together with the content hereof,

emphasises the need for the public to unite against the type of conduct described

herein.

2 Brief Introduction and History with Respect to The Community Scheme Regulations

2.1 The Regulations

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In terms of the Community Schemes Ombud Services Act 9 of 2011 (“CSOS Act”):

‘‘‘community scheme’’ means any scheme or arrangement in terms of

which there is shared use of and responsibility for parts of land and buildings,

including but not limited to a sectional titles development scheme, a share

block company, a home or property owner’s association, however

constituted, established to administer a property development, a housing

scheme for retired persons, and a housing co-operative as contemplated in

the South African Co-operatives Act, 2005 (Act No. 14 of 2005) and

‘scheme’’ has the same meaning”.

From a historical perspective, and following a myriad of public complaints, in 2003

the National Department of Human Settlements (NDHS) and the Department of Rural

Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) “started engaging with a particular focus on

developing a dispute resolution mechanism focusing on community schemes.

In 2009/2010 the NDHS developed a detailed business case document which paved

the way for the development of the CSOS Bill, which became an act on the 11th of

June 2011. Promulgation of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act [, about six

years later,] meant that the NDHS had the necessary mandate to establish the CSOS”

(CSOS, 2018).

The new community scheme regulations, which came into effect On 7 October 2016,

comprise the CSOS Act and regulations made in terms thereof,9 the Sectional Titles

Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 (STSMA) and related regulations of 2016,

including the management and conduct rules prescribed in terms of section 10(2) of

the STSMA,10 all of which shall hereinafter collectively be referred to as “the

Regulations”.11 At the same time CSOS also came into effect (Paddock, Paddocks -

Community Scheme Ombud Service – An Overview, 2016). A guide on the community

scheme regulations compiled by Syndicate member Marina Constas was also

published by Compeg (Constas, A Guide to the New Sectional Title Sectional

9 Regulations on Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011. 10 Other applicable legislations include: The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, the Housing Act

107 of 1997 and the Sectional Titles Act of 1986. 11 Came into operation when the President’s Proclamations 54 and 55 of 2016 appeared in Government

Gazette, No. 40334.

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Management Act, n.d.).

Graham Paddock, a prominent member of the Syndicate led the co-drafting of

the Regulations, and says the following about it:

“Since late 2004, with Prof. C.G. van der Merwe, Joseph Maluleke and

others, I have been working on a project to produce the ‘Third

Generation’ statutes…Drafts of these laws have been circulated amongst

a range of government departments and now that they have been placed on

Parliament’s 2007 legislative programme [and] we expect that they will be

enacted later in 2007 or early in 2008…

This statute will create an independent body tasked with facilitating and

arranging the efficient and cost effective resolution of disputes which arise in

all 'community schemes', being of those with shared management and

financial responsibility” (Paddocks, 2007, p. 2)

CSOS operates as a national public entity12 funded by way of, amongst other things,

levies collected from community schemes and other public taxes. According to the

NHBRC, EAAB and CSOS 2018/19 Annual Reports, “[t]he total [CSOS] income for

the FY was R236 741 000, consisting of a Government grant of R31 105 000, levy

income of R195 672 000, dispute resolution income of R424 000, and interest received

of R9 403 000” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2019).

12 An organ of State in terms of which the Bill of Rights imposes a duty on the State to protect and serve the public.

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Prior to the new Regulations, which were influenced and co-drafted by the

Syndicate,13 sectional title schemes were regulated in terms of the Sectional Titles

Act 95 of 1986 (STA) and “[t]he [STSMA] does not repeal the STA…but does repeal

and amend some of its sections. The idea behind the [STSMA] is to remove the

management and regulation of

sectional title schemes from the

[STA]” (Trafalgar Property

Management).14

According to Steenkamp and Lubbe

“Paddock (2011, p.1) explains that

some of the changes effected by the

new legislation are simply ‘technical

adjustments’, such as updated

descriptions, removing superfluous

provisions and adding cross-

references. Van der Merwe (2011,

p.134; 2014, pp.1–43), Maree

(2015c, p.1) and Bechard (2015a,

p.1) concur that the three new sets of

legislation have gone a long way to tidy up loose ends and clarify points of uncertainty”

(Steenkamp & Lubbe, 2017, p. 46).

Trafalgar says that “the Prescribed Management Rules (Annexure 8 of the STA)

replaced [all] pre-existing Rules on [1 June 1988]” (Trafalgar, n.d.), following which

those STA PMR’s were replaced by the new STSMA PMR’s on 7 October 2016, and

Durham confirms that “the management and conduct rules are subject to the

provisions of the Act and may therefore not be inconsistent with any provision of the

Act” (Durham, 2015).

13 See Paddocks website at https://www.paddocks.co.za/advice/private-consulting/ and Facebook post at https://www.paddocks.co.za/advice/private-consulting/, and also refer Paddocks CSOS overview article at https://www.paddocks.co.za/paddocks-press-newsletter/community-scheme-ombud-service-an-overview/, accessed January 2020.

14 Trafalgar Property Management is a dominant managing agent and member of NAMA.

Figure 1 - First generation versus third generation sectional title legislation

Source:

http://www.saaa.org.za/Downloads/Publications/AUD007%20A%20comparison%20of%2

0first%20and%20third%20generation%20sectional%20title%20legislation.pdf, pg. 46.

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Community schemes are mostly managed by managing agents whose regulation is

reportedly limited to the accounts entrusted to them, which is dealt with further under

section 6.2 hereof. The trust accounts are regulated by the Estate Agencies Affairs

Board (EAAB)15 in terms of the Estate Agencies Affairs Act 112 of 1976 (EAAA). The

executive authority of both CSOS and the EAAB vests in the Minister of Human

Settlements.

2.2 The Widely Publicised Allegations of Corruption and Maladministration

Allegations with Respect to the EAAB and CSOS

Shortly after its establishment,16 CSOS quickly became

embroiled in corruption and maladministration

scandals, including irregularities with respect to R80m

of public funds deposited into the now infamous VBS

Bank (Corruption Watch, 2018). The EAAB was

already the ongoing subject of similar widely publicised

allegations of corruption and maladministration, and including “[i]rregular registration

of estate agents; [r]eceiving cash from estate agents in return for favours;17 and

[a]cting as estate agents without proper consent” (Collins, 2018). Some articles on

these subjects, albeit not exhaustive,

were published by Mail and Guardian

(Skiti, Sabelo; Jika, Thanduxolo,

2018), Fin24 (Fin24 Kloppers, 2011),

Property Professional in 2018

(Property Professional, 2018) and in

2019 (Property Professional, 2019)

and Netwerk24 (Netwerk24, 2018).

15 The EAAB reported to the Minister of Trade and industry since 1976 and was transferred to the Department of Human Settlements around 17 May 2012.

16 On 7 October 2017. 17 More commonly known as corruption.

Figure 2 - Fin24 Report on EAAB Maladministration

https://www.fin24.com/Companies/Property/EAABs-shocking-maladministration-

20110904

Figure 3 - CSOS VBS Scandal Sunday Times

Source: https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-

times/business/2018-08-22-ombud-faces-suspension-

over-vbs-bank-scandal/

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3 The Syndicate’s Elaborate Rights Capture, Alternatively Control Scheme

In the relentless pursuit of its sinister objectives which are set out herein,18 and

enabled by the fragmented and deficient regulatory oversight of community

schemes (CSOS, 2018), the Syndicate devised an elaborate and evolving scheme

whereby its offending members and co-conspirators are enabled to surreptitiously

operate above the law to whatever extent possible, and to gain control over, capture

or influence property and related rights (“the Elaborate Capture Scheme”). This

took shape in three primary parts as follows.

3.1 Part 1 of the Elaborate Capture/Control Scheme – Influence Government,

Infiltrate the EAAB and Circumvent Regulations

Part one of the Syndicate’s Elaborate Capture Scheme was to deceptively position

NAMA as a purported “authority” and “regulator” of its managing agents and their

conduct, and to influence Government and regulations with the aim of

circumventing regulations. Some of this has already been touched on the in the

foregoing and will be expanded on throughout sections 4 through 11 hereof.

3.2 Part 2 of the Elaborate Capture/Control Scheme – Establish STAP to Gain

Control of Arbitrations and/or Unduly Influence Arbitration Outcomes

Part two of the Syndicate’s Elaborate Capture Scheme was to capitalise on the

revenue, stealth, influence and control opportunities afforded by arbitration, which

was previously imposed on sectional title owners under the now repealed STA PMR

71. Furthermore, by establishing the so-called Sectional Titles Arbitration Panel to

achieve those ends and which is dealt more specifically under sections 7 and 8 hereof,

while otherwise introduced briefly under section 4.2.2 hereof.

18 Dealt with briefly under section 4 hereof.

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3.3 Part 3 of the Elaborate Capture/Control Scheme – Influence Government,

Infiltrate the CSOS and Circumvent Regulations

Part three of the ongoing and evolving Elaborate Capture Scheme, and traversing

all other parts thereof, is the Syndicate’s influence and activities within Government

and regulatory bodies and its infiltration thereof, including but not necessarily limited

to the EAAB, CSOS and apparently less successfully, the Council for Debt Collectors.

This is dealt with more specifically under sections 6 and 8 hereof, and this paper also

deals with flagrant abuse of power by the Syndicate’s offending members and others

subjecting vulnerable members of the public to the unabated and disgraceful

lawlessness19 of offenders as described herein.

4 The Syndicate Operating Under the Auspices of NAMA and its Sinister Self-Regulating Objectives

This section first introduces the National Association of Managing Agents (NAMA) and

its sinister objectives, and then provides some insight into the prominent members

of the Syndicate operating under the auspices thereof, as well as their lucrative

property-related companies. The Syndicate and NAMA are synonymous, so

reference to the one implies the other. As a precursor, and to emphasise its ongoing

threat to the public, the following has been reported in the media about a certain

Phillip Guy Mclaughlin Pansegrouw, being the exact name of a registered Director

of NAMA (it is unknown if they are one and the same person, but the message herein

remains relevant to this paper regardless):

“Four of the kingpins in the Medilife medical aid scheme were granted bail

on Monday in the Pietermaritzburg Regional Court, four years after the

scheme collapsed under allegations of fraud, leaving unpaid members'

claims of about R37 million. Former principal director of Medilife…and his

auditor Phillip Guy Mclaughlin Pansegrouw were each granted R30 000

bail…[having been] arrested last Thursday” (News24, 2001).

19 Cambridge Dictionary, Lawlessness, Defined as “behaviour that is illegal or not controlled by laws”, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/lawlessness, accessed on 26 January 2020.

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4.1 Brief Introduction to NAMA

NAMA is a “powerful industry

representative” (BBM Attorneys May,

2011) which was established in 2001 and

subsequently registered as a section 21 private company with a board20 accountable

to its owners and members. According to Property24, “[t]he establishment of NAMA

was approved by the [EAAB] - the regulatory body for the South African property

industry” (Property24, 2014).

NAMA’s increasing strength and dominance results from relationships formed with,

amongst others, Government institutions such as those depicted in Figure 5. NAMA

“represent[s] [its Managing

agents] and Service Providers

[and] has over 450 members,

managing a portfolio of levies in

excess of R170 million per annum

and continues to grow… [NAMA’s]

members collectively represent

an impressive 11,529 body

corporates…and 1451 home

owner associations” amounting to

a total of 4.9 million units. (Gray, 2015).

According to Mike Addison of Addsure,21 a dominant member of NAMA providing

insurance to community schemes:

“NAMA…[was] formed by the industry for the industry…it is an

organisation with a purpose to look out for the interests of its managing

20 Registered directors include Chantal van Heerden (also Executive Director of Bellbouy Property Group and appointed NAMA National Chairperson on 20 November 2018), Bradley Neil Cowie (Estate Agent), Phillip Guy Mclaughlin Pansegrouw, Marco Paulo SA de Oliveira (NAMA Gauteng East Director and Director of Solver Property Services), George Frederik Müller, Michael Frank Henwick, Otto Franx Holm, Glenton Smit. Other Director’s past and present include Dr Gerhard Jooste and Koos Croukamp.

21 Mike Addison publicized that “Addsure is a strong NAMA supporter and affiliate member [who] support[s] and participate[s] in the NAMA events and training in all regions, and encourage[s] other insurance advisors working with bodies corporate and HOAs to do same” (Addison, Sectional Title Insurance and NAMA, 2015).

Figure 4 - The National Association of Managing Agents’ Logo

Source: https://nama.org.za/

Figure 5 - NAMA Stakeholders

Source: https://www.slideshare.net/CoenieGroenewald1/nama-being-a-member-of-nama-

68050527

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agent members rather than being a statutory entity or public

protector…NAMA has representation…on the Regulations Board22

which makes formal recommendations to the legislators in respect of

Sectional Title… Expert affiliated members such as legal experts,

maintenance specialists, insurance advisors, underwriters, etc. …

participate in NAMA events. It’s a meeting of minds that helps to shape

the managing agent profession…

When I am asked by trustees attending NAMA events to recommend a

managing agent, I simply suggest that they look around the room at the

agents who are present” (Addison, 2015).

Marina Constas of the Syndicate also asks “[i]f your Managing Agent is not a

member of NAMA, ask why” (BBM Attorneys February, 2014).

NAMA’s mission includes:

• “To promote the common interests of managing agents;

• To represent the collective views of [NAMA’s] members to…public

authorities and to other interested organisations; [and]

• To initiate, promote and support adoption of legislation” (Groenewald,

National Association of Managing Agents - Shaping Our Profession, 2016).

Benefits of NAMA membership includes:

• “Networking opportunities including opportunities to meet and exchange

information with … colleagues and associated industry professionals”

(Groenewald, National Association of Managing Agents - Shaping Our

Profession, 2016);

• Opportunities to be marketed into community schemes;

22 Late Greer Moore-Barnes “was appointed as a founding Director of the National Association of Managing Agents (NAMA) in 2001 [and] was [later] appointed by the Minister in 2009 to represent NAMA as an alternate director on the Sectional Titles Regulations Board during which time she was active in promoting and achieving important changes…and additionally served as one of NAMA’s accredited trainers for more than five years” (own emphasis) (Bellbouy, n.d.).

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• Opportunities to farm business from

within community schemes

uninterrupted and with little to no

interference from the authorities,

whether it be done abusively,

lawfully or unlawfully;

• Apparent protection from

accountability or prosecution for

misconduct or offences; and

• Membership fees range between

R4,374.00 to R62,000.00 (at a 10%

discount), per annum (NAMA, 2020).

Notwithstanding it is already apparent from the foregoing, the NAMA website23 and

various other publications24 also make it abundantly clear that the Syndicate

“serves” NAMA, and that NAMA serves the interests of manging agents and other

industry service providers who share common interests, goals and purpose. To

ensure their dominance and increased profitability through, inter alia, the

uninterrupted abuse of community schemes and owners, the Syndicate pursues the

following primary objectives:

• Becoming legally independent, self-regulating and increasing the growth

and profitability of its members, and in terms of which Jan le Roux of the

Syndicate25 proposes that it is “time for the industry to regulate itself as that

could save millions” (Property Professional, 2018);

• Being recognised as a purported “authority” in the industry (Deysel, M &

Van Heerden, M, 2014); and

23 https://nama.org.za/. 24 Refer references section of this article for some of them. 25 Chief executive of industry body Rebosa which also represents NAMA.

Figure 6 - Extract from NAMA’s Membership Fees Debit Order Authorisation

Source: https://nama.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/NAMA-Debit-

Order-Request-and-Authorisation-Form.pdf

Page 17 of 116

• Maintaining influence within

Government and over

regulations, including leading

the co-drafting of regulations

(Paddocks, 2017), and

designing, influencing and

otherwise controlling public

complaint and dispute resolution

mechanisms, thereby enabling it

to easily intercept and dispose

of complaints that could

interfere with the Syndicate’s

sinister objectives and modus operandi.

The continued growth of NAMA’s membership base is achieved through a calculated

and sustained marketing, networking and influencing campaign aimed at “creat[ing]

strategic alliances with organizational leaders26 to effectively align and support

NAMA initiatives” (Deysel, M & Van Heerden, M, 2014). This is achieved through,

inter alia, ongoing publications, roadshows, presentations, breakfast events and other

“[s]ocial events such as golf days

[which] have…ensured a more relaxed

interaction between industry role

players” (Groenewald, National

Association of Managing Agents -

Shaping Our Profession, 2016). There is

also the NAMA Indaba,27 often spanning

several days and including gala dinners

and cocktail parties, which “is fast becoming the most prestigious event on the

sectional title calendar” and which is also frequented by the likes of CSOS and EAAB

(BizComminity, 2015). The NAMA Indaba, golf days and other NAMA events are

26 Including State Organs and the likes of Standard Bank and Nedbank who are corporate members of NAMA. 27 Visit https://nama.org.za/past-events/ and conduct Internet searches for information on NAMA events.

Figure 7 - Left to right: Mr Themba Mthethwa, Chief Ombud of CSOS; Prof. Graham Paddock; Mr Marco de Oliveira,

Regional Director of NAMA JHB East; Mr Bryan Chaplog, CEO of EAAB; Mr Koos Croukamp, National Chairman of

NAMA at the 2015 NAMA Indaba.

Source: http://www.paddocks.co.za/_newsletters/Paddocks%20Press%20-

%20June%202015.html

Figure 8 - 2015 NAMA Indaba Sponsors

Source: NAMA Facebook Page

Page 18 of 116

sponsored substantially by Syndicate members.

The Syndicate includes and maintains a wide network of mutually beneficial legal

practitioners within which collusion appears to be rife. Community scheme property

owners who are not yet enlightened to the modus operandi, ulterior motives, influence,

power and protection that the Syndicate’s

members appear to have, naïvely trust them

with their property and their rights.28 The

judgement in the matter between Mboso v

Standard Bank of South Africa29alludes to

how easily attorneys may breach the trust

their clients place in them and with little to no

consequences, and this judgement reflects the

reality other members of the public are

experiencing and witnessing. The public also

naïvely relies on such “regulators” as the Law

Society to deal with the likes of the Syndicate,

so it appears foolish to blindly trust any

attorney with an unconditional mandate.

During 2010 NAMA achieved a 23%

membership increase (BBM Attorneys

December, 2010, p. 4), while in 2012 NAMA’s

then Chairman, Dr Gerhard Jooste, claimed

that “2011 was an outstanding year in which Nama steadily increased its credibility

and good standing in the Sectional Title Industry in South Africa. The National [NAMA]

Indaba held in May last year contributed in no small measure to this. We are

experiencing more and more that Bodies Corporate insist on having a Managing Agent

which is a member of NAMA. We also experience more acknowledgements from

the Authorities” (BBM Attorneys February, 2012).

28 The matter between Mboso v Standard Bank of South Africa (19416/2016) [2018] ZAWCHC 20 (19 February 2018) provides some telling insight into the conduct of attorneys, pay specific attention to the issue of attorney mandates which are easily abused.

29 (19416/2016) [2018] ZAWCHC 20 (19 February 2018).

Figure 9 - 2015 NAMA Golf Day Sponsors

Source: Nama Facebook Page

Page 19 of 116

NAMA’s select few honorary members (NAMA, n.d.), which NAMA refers to as its

experts and over achievers who serve NAMA, are depicted below. Some of them

will be described in more detail in the section that follows, but from Figure 10 below,

and alluding to their common purpose, their property companies are immediately

apparent to the right thereof. All of them benefit substantially from community

schemes.

4.2 Brief Introduction to the Prominent Members of the Syndicate and their

Lucrative Property Companies

The Syndicate operates under the auspices of NAMA, with NAMA being the channel

through which the Syndicate pursues its sinister objectives. The Syndicate is therefore

synonymous with NAMA. The Syndicate’s prominent and influencing role players

are briefly introduced below, and where known and

relevant, their offending conduct.

4.2.1 Chantelle van Heerden of Bellbouy Property

Group and NAMA

Chantal van Heerden, Executive Director of Bellbouy

Property Group (Bellbouy, n.d.), recently became

NAMA’s National Chairperson around September

2017, which position she took over from Koos Croukamp

who is dealt with later. She previously held the position

Barbara Shingler - Managing Director of Ballito Estates (Pty) Ltd.

Elmo York-Stuart - Director of EY Stuart Attorneys which provides services to the sectional titles industry and to property developers.

Graham Paddock is the owner of various property-related companies having the name Paddocks included.

Dr Gerhard Jooste, the ex-Chairman of NAMA, a “leading managing agent” (Paddocks, 2009), erstwhile Managing Director of Pro Admin property managers, current partner at Bright Light Solar VCC and writes, trains and otherwise consults for Paddocks and NAMA (The Agent Article, 2020).

Tertius Maree is the owner of Tertius Maree Associates Sectional Title Attorneys.

Justin Mason is the Chairman of Sectional Title Solutions - a Property Developer.

Marina Constas is Director at BBM Attorneys.

Greer Dawn Moore-Barnes was the founder of the Bellbouy Property Group.

Figure 10 - NAMA Honorary Members

Source: https://nama.org.za/nama-honorary-members

Figure 11 - Chantel van Heerden Executive Director of Bellbouy and

Chairman of NAMA

Source: https://www.bellbuoy.co.za/meet-the-

directors

Page 20 of 116

of NAMA’s Chairman for the East Cape & Border region since 2015 when she took

over from the late Greer Moore-Barnes of Bellbouy (Bellbouy, n.d.).

According to Bellbouy’s website:

“The Bellbuoy Group has come a long way since its formation in 1996 by the

late Greer Moore-Barnes, Garry McWilliams from Bruce McWilliams

Industries and Michael White from Lexicon Attorneys…Operating from a

small office in Deal Party with one client, this vision grew to where the

company is today: the largest Managing Agent in the Eastern Cape…

Shannon Moore-Barnes, employed with the Bellbuoy Group since January

1998 and Chantel van Heerden, employed with the Bellbuoy Group since

July 2001, are the Executive Directors (with Garry McWilliams and Michael

White retaining Non-Executive Director roles)… (Bellbouy, n.d.)

“[Late Greer Moore-Barnes] was appointed as a founding Director of

[NAMA] in 2001 [and] was [later] appointed by the Minister in 2009 to

represent NAMA as an alternate director on the Sectional Titles

Regulations Board during which time she was active in promoting and

achieving important changes…and additionally served as one of NAMA’s

accredited trainers for more than five years” (Bellbouy, n.d.).

4.2.2 Marina Constas of STAP, AOA, BBM Attorneys, CSOS and NAMA

Marina Constas is a Director at BBM Attorneys30 for over 22 years, erstwhile

Director of CSOS,31 honorary member of NAMA, and an attorney and arbitrator who

co-authors “Demystifying Sectional Titles”32 with Karen Bleijs. Bleijs worked with

Constas at BBM Attorneys for many years, and their extremely close and ongoing

30 Director of BBM Attorneys since 1997. 31 1 March 2016 to 31 December 2018 following which she is still playing an advisory/handover role because the

CSOS annual financial report for 2019 shows payments were made to her. 32 First edition published around 2004, second edition published around 2009 and the latest edition published in

2019.

Page 21 of 116

business relationship extends as far back as

2003 (PropertyWheel, 2019), and which

relationship Bleijs has falsely denied under

oath as dealt with further under sections

4.2.3, 7 and 8 hereof.

Constas’ has extremely close

relationships with most, if not all prominent

members of the Syndicate dealt with herein,

and her BBM Attorneys employees move between companies.

Constas established the Sectional Titles Arbitration Panel (STAP) in 2012 from

which she and several of the below Syndicate members and colleagues served as

arbitrators in community scheme disputes. Constas’ STAP and the elaborate rights

capture, alternatively control scheme with respect thereto, is dealt with under section

7 hereof.

The following provides some telling insight into the conduct of BBM Attorneys and

supports what is said about the Syndicate in this paper:

• The judgement in the matter between Body Corporate of the Bend v Holgado

and Others,33 which judgement deals with, inter alia, “whether Biccari Bollo

Mariano Incorporated (BBM Attorneys) had authority to represent the

applicant in launching these proceedings”.34 In the judgement the following

apparently punitive order is made against BBM Attorneys:35

“The application launched by Biccari Bollo Mariano

Incorporated under case number 17295/2014 was not authorised

by the Body Corporate of the Bend Sectional Title Scheme No

SS217/04 and trustees; and is therefore set aside...

Biccari Bollo Mariano Incorporated is ordered to pay the costs

of the respondents in the main and counter-application de bonis

33 (17295/2014) [2018] ZAKZPHC 44 (25 July 2018). 34 Par 1 of the judgement. 35 Par 53.

Figure 12 - Karen Bleijs (left) and Marina Constas (right)

Source: https://propertywheel.co.za/2019/10/new-book-released-demystifying-

sectional-title

Page 22 of 116

propriis on a scale as between attorney and own client” (2018).

DSC Attorneys says the following about such punitive cost orders as that made

above:

“In some situations, the Courts may award attorney and client costs,

or a portion of these costs, to the successful litigant in a case.

However, [although] this is seldom done [,it is done] where a Court

believes that a litigant’s conduct in the course of the litigation has

been such that a punitive costs order is warranted” (DSC Attorneys,

n.d.).

• The judgement in the matter between Catling and Another v Constas N.O

and Another36 (2019), in terms of which Constas’ arbitration award37 was set

aside,38 suggesting misconduct on her part.39 This was shortly after she

was astonishingly appointed to the CSOS board.40 More on this judgement

under sections 4.2.7, 7 and 9 hereof;

• The online complaint dealt with under section 10.1 hereof lodged by a

member of the public against, inter alia, BBM Attorneys, Karen Bleijs and

Marina Constas’ close colleague Annett Horwitz. In the online lawyers’

responses to the complaint, he/she also confirms that “BBM…are not the

most ethical attorneys” (also refer Trevor Simon’s conduct under section

4.2.6 hereof) and the complaint is eerily similar to other complaints by

members of the public; and

• The online complaint by some member of the public against BBM Attorneys

provided under section 10.2 hereof. Also take note of the comment with

36 (26471/2016) [2019] ZAGPJHC 350 (17 September 2019). 37 Arbitration concluded around 8 June 2016. 38 See paragraph 44 of the judgement. 39 Section 33 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 reads as follows: “(1) Where – (a) any member of an arbitration

tribunal has misconducted himself in relation to his duties as arbitrator or umpire; or (b) an arbitration tribunal has committed any gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings or has exceeded its powers; or (c) an award has been improperly obtained, the court may, on the application of any party to the reference after due notice to the other party or parties, make an order setting the award aside.” (State, 1965).

40 Constas became a director of CSOS on 1 March 2016.

Page 23 of 116

respect to the Law Society at the end of the section.

4.2.3 Karen Bleijs of STAP, CSOS, NAMA, BBM Attorneys, Alan Levy Attorneys,

BWHM Property Group, Ismail Bleijs Attorneys and AJ Van Rensburg

Attorneys

Karen Bleijs is a NAMA affiliate and erstwhile Director

of Karen Bleijs Attorneys,41 BWHM Property Group,42

Ismail Bleijs Attorneys43 and AJ Van Rensburg

Attorneys. Karen Bleijs was previously employed by

Marina Constas44 at BBM Attorneys with whom she

co-authors “Demystifying Sectional Titles”45 and

continues to share a mutually beneficial relationship.

Bleijs also served on Constas’ STAP (PropertyWheel,

2019), and was employed as a senior associate by

Alan Levy Attorneys with whom she continued to act in

association with, together with their close mutually

beneficial business associate Suzanne Coppin of

Coppin Attorneys. Suzanne Coppin also happened to work at BBM Attorneys before

opening her own practice.46 Bleijs, who is also an attorney and arbitrator, tellingly

closed her law firm to take up a full-time role as adjudicator at CSOS though

Marina Constas, handing her clients to Suzanne Coppin.

41 Never registered so it is assumed she practiced under her company BWHM Property Group, see fn. 42. 42 Registered around 2014 and de-registered around 2019, directors: Karen Bleijs, Stuart Willock who is also

Director of NAMA (East Rand), Lee-Anne Hendry (real estate agent) and Tshepo Maesela (real estate agent). 43 Appears to have been registered as Chilligan Trading 36 and in terms of which her directorship ceased

around the end of 2013. 44 Karen Bleijs was employed by BBM Attorneys between 2003 and 2007. 45 First edition published around 2004, second edition published around 2009 and the latest edition published in

2019. 46 Suzanne Coppin undertook her articles of clerkship at BBM Attorneys, has also served as both a sectional

title trustee and chairperson and owns sectional title properties, and she took over Karen Bleijs’ clients when she closed her law firm, Karen Bleijs Attorneys, around July 2019 to take up a full-time position as adjudicator at CSOS.

Figure 13 - Karen Bleijs

Source:

https://albertonrecord.co.za/byline_bio_box/karen-

bleijs/

Page 24 of 116

Demonstrating her utter lack of

credibility and the risk she poses to

the public as an adjuducator at

CSOS, Bleijs has absurdly denied

under oath that she has any relationship

with Constas or anyone else at CSOS, and has also falsely denied under oath that

she has ever been employed by Alan Levy Attorneys. She did so forgetting that she

had previously admitted under oath that she does have an extemely close relationship

with Constas, and Alan Levy himself confirmed in writing that Bleijs was employed by

him, and it is notable that another person in the amploy of Alan Levy also worked for

Karen Bleijs. Furthermore, Figure 15 and Figure 14 also tell a very different story.

Providing some more insight into Bleijs’ misconduct and modus operandi, she would

propose arbitrators from within the Syndicate, and with whom she is extremely close,

to arbitrate disputes in which she

was representing a party to the

dispute. She would also procure

alleged “witnesses” from within

NAMA, such as Mr. Frederik Nel of

Curasure (see Figure 16), who is

also a member of the Syndicate and

extremely close to Bleijs. All of this

would be while concealing their

relationships from parties. They

would also interact at NAMA events

during the arbitration proceedings,

unbeknownst to parties, or at least

one of the parties, all of which is unlawful and in contravention of arbitration rules dealt

with under section 7 hereof.

In the above respects, take a look at what a complainant says about Karen Bleijs,

Figure 14 - Alan Levy Letterhead Footonote

Source: https://alattorneys.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/My-personal-inform.pdf

Figure 15 - Source: ALA’s Twitter feed

Figure 16 - NAMA Event with Karen Bleijs, Mike Addison and Frederik Nel

Source: https://www.wizardmidrand.com/sectional-title-seminar/

Page 25 of 116

AJ van Rensburg Attorneys, Suzanne Coppin, Alan Levy, BBM Attorneys and Marina

Constas’ close colleague Annette Horwitz online, under section 10.1 hereof. The

complaint is eerily similar to other complaints by members of the public.

Also take a look at the Bleijs and Alan Levy’s misconduct in the next section 4.2.4

hereof.

4.2.4 Alan Paul Levy of Alan Levy Attorneys and NAMA

Alan Paul Levy is a Director at Alan Levy

Attorneys where he “personally handle's all

matters of the firm” (Attorneys.co.za, 2020).

Alan Levy is also a practicing attorney and

arbitrator47 and was appointed “regional

representative” of NAMA around May 2014.

Alan Levy previously employed Karen Bleijs

as a senior associate, and thereafter

continued to work in association with her and

their mutually beneficial business associate

Suzanne Coppin of Coppin Attorneys. Alan

Levy admits he employed Karen Bleijs while

Karen Bleijs, under oath, denies it.

Furthermore, a person who was in the employ of Alan Levy also worked for Karen

Bleijs at Karen Bleijs Attorneys.

An example of legislative contraventions facilitated by Alan Levy is as follows, and in

terms of which the matter was handed to Karen Bleijs while she was still in his employ:

• The financial trustee of a certain body corporate discovered financial

irregularities and questioned the NAMA managing agent and other trustees

thereon;

• Instead of providing the information and answers the financial trustee was

47 Directors: Alan Paul Levy, Mark Alan Millner, Verton Shunmugam Moodley, Tamaryn Yafit Nowitz.

Figure 17 - Alan Levy of NAMA and ALA

Source: ALA Facebook Page

Page 26 of 116

legally entitled to and in terms of which he was obliged to seek answers in his

fiduciary capacity, the offending trustees unlawfully procured the services of

Alan Levy and Karen Bleijs to further refuse it;

• The above-mentioned procurement was done in the absence of an approved

budget, duly constituted trustee meeting and duly constituted meeting of the

owners. Levy and Bleijs, advising and acting for the offending trustees and

wilfully acting in contravention of STSMA PMR’s 26(2) and 27(4), their STA

equivalents, section 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa48 and

the Legal Practitioners’ Code of Conduct, tellingly advanced the following in a

letter to the financial trustee:

“[the offending trustees] are under no obligation whatsoever to

entertain any of [your] concerns, nor [are you] in a position to

demand detailed responses, nor to judge [them] on the adequacy of

explanations furnished by [them,] and neither to suggest that [they

are] acting in bad faith…

[You are] not entitled to demand detailed explanations or evidence

supporting your unsubstantiated findings nor to request detailed

accounts from [the offending trustees], missing information,

minutes, record or invoices…

[You] are invited to commence legal proceedings against [the

offending trustees], which proceedings will be vigorously defended

[at the cost of the body corporate] and in respect of which

proceedings a punitive cost order will be sought against [you]”

To obtain even more insight into the questionable conduct of Alan Levy/Alan Levy

Attorneys, take a look at what a complainant says about them and the above Syndicate

members online, under section 10.1 hereof and others under section 10.3 hereof. The

former complaint is eerily similar to other complaints by members of the public.

48 1996.

Page 27 of 116

4.2.5 Elmo York-Stuart of STAP, NAMA and EY Stuart Attorneys

Elmo York-Stuart is the founder and Director of EY Stuart

Attorneys, honorary member of NAMA, and an attorney and

arbitrator specifically providing services to the property sector.

Stuart started his career “as professional assistant at Shapiro

and Partners, [and subsequently] founded…EY Stuart

Attorneys, Inc. on 1 April 1988” (Attorneys.co.za, 2020). EY

Stuart Attorneys are “a law firm in Pretoria…[specialising] in

the fields of…Sectional Title matters... [and has also

established its name] within the marketplace for [its] expertise

in Property Development work” (EY Stuart Inc., 2020).

Stuart also served on Marina Constas’ STAP with Constas,

Bleijs and Trevor Simon, and attended university with a Director49 of Couzyn

Hertzog and Horak Attorneys, which relationships were concealed from parties

when he served as arbitrator in sectional title disputes to which they were all connected

or involved.50 Stuart, Bleijs and other members of STAP would also switch roles

between arbitrator and attorney in various arbitrations while concealing their

relationships from parties to the disputes. Stuart, while acting as arbitrator, would even

interact intimately with purported “witnesses” during those arbitrations and without

disclosing it to parties to the dispute, which purported “witnesses” were procured by

his fellow STAP members, who were representing certain parties in the dispute, from

within the Syndicate. The AOA Rules dealt with under section 7 hereof explicitly

requires disclosure of such things.

4.2.6 Trevor Simon of Fluxmans Attorneys, STAP, AOA and BBM Attorneys

Trevor Simon who was previously a director of BBM Attorneys working closely with

Marina Constas and Karen Bleijs, also served on Constas’ STAP as an arbitrator in

49 The chairman. 50 The legal practice of Couzyn Hertzog & Horak was founded by the late Paul Couzyn in 1929. His first partner

was Hans Strijdom who later entered the political arena and went on to become Prime Minister of the then Union of South Africa.

Figure 18 - Elmo York-Stuart

https://www.attorneys.co.za/AttorneyHome

Page.asp?AttorneyID=4087&CompanyID=

1092

Page 28 of 116

sectional title disputes (refer BBM’s Sectionally Speaking

December 2012 newsletter). Mr Simon now works at

Fluxmans Attorneys and the following is said about him on the

Fluxmans Attorneys website: “After practicing in various legal

practices in Cape Town, Sydney and Johannesburg, [Simon]

joined Fluxmans as a Director in 2014…[He was also]

appointed to the Panel of Arbitrators for Sectional Title

disputes [being Constas’ STAP]” (Fluxmans Attorneys, n.d.).

BBM’s Sectionally Speaking December 2012 newsletter says

the following about Simon when he was still a director at BBM

Attorneys:

“Trevor Simon is a Director of BBM…Trevor commenced his legal career

in 1991 in Cape Town with Gelb, Simon & Shapiro... In 2003, Trevor moved

to Australia where he practiced as a solicitor in Sydney. Trevor returned to

South Africa in 2007 when he joined [BBM Attorneys]. Trevor’s main focus

of practice is in the Commercial Litigation and Property Litigation field where

he acts for property developers, sectional title schemes, homeowners'

associations and individual owners whilst maintaining a practice advising

individuals and businesses in commercial transactions. Trevor is also

involved in Sectional Title Arbitration and litigation work where he represents

various role players, including Bodies Corporate and individual owners.

Trevor acts as an Arbitrator and is a member of the Association of Arbitrators

Sectional Title Alternative Dispute- Resolution Panel” (BBM Attorneys Dec,

2012).

Simon’s apparent misconduct is demonstrated by him advising opposing parties in

the same matter without disclosing it until a crucial deciding point in the process, and

in terms of which no refund was ever offered to the affected client to compensate him

for the apparent misconduct. In this respect, Simon alleged he did so “inadvertently”,

notwithstanding he billed his client substantially for allegedly having read all

the documentation naming the opposing party, and that he provided services

with respect to the matter over a period of about six months. From the facts of

this issue, it can be inferred Simon was seeking to maximise his financial benefits

Figure 19 - Trevor Simon of Fluxmans Attorneys

Source: http://www.fluxmans.com/our-

attorneys/directors/trevor-simon/

Page 29 of 116

while underestimating his clients’ resolve in pursuing the matter, but realised that his

client meant business and that his deception could ultimately be exposed. It is also

telling that the legal representatives of the opposing party happened to be Alan Levy

and Karen Bleijs.

Similar conduct to the above is described under the complaint by a member of the

public under section 10.1 hereof implicating BBM Attorneys in apparent

misconduct.

4.2.7 Whitfields Property Management and Amiti of NAMA, and their

Facilitators Kruger Stoltz Inc. Auditors, Sutherland Kruger Inc. Attorneys

and Others

Whitfields Property Management (“Whitfields”)51 a major client of above-mentioned

Syndicate members, is a dominant managing agent

and member of NAMA administering over

“27,563+” units in “416+” complexes

countrywide.52 Whitfields’ services includes

insurance53 provided to community schemes through Whitfields’ sister company,

Amiti,54 with which it shares common directors,55 resources and the same registered

business address.

The trust accounts of Whitfields and its many clients are held at Standard Bank,

and it just so happens that an apparent property-related executive56 of Standard

Bank is implicated with Whitfields and others in an alleged conspiracy to commit

illegal acts, which is dealt with further under section 4.2.12 hereof.

51 Directors: John Anthony Whitfields, James Frost Stevens Arthur Albert Stokes Botha, Rene Lourens, Jean Pietersen, Martin David Stumbles, Andrew Mark Simpson, Mark Vaughan Friebus. It is uncertain if the Whitfield Group Holding Company Inc. international property investment company referred to at the following link, of which John Whitfields is also the CEO, is related to Whitfields in any way, but may be worth looking into further: https://connectedinvestors.com/company/the-whitfield-group-holding-company-inc.

52 The Whitfields website is located at http://www.whitfields.co.za/. 53 See Amiti website at https://www.amiti.cloud/sure.html. 54 Registered as Amiti Connect and whose website is located at https://www.amiti.cloud/index.html. 55 Directors are John Anthony Whitfield and Andrew Mark Simpson (who are both directors of Whitfields),

together with Johan Antowan Nothling and Theunis Christiaan de Klerk. 56 Which Standard Bank has been alerted to and has not denied the persons role in the Bank.

Figure 20 - Whitfields Logo

http://www.whitfields.co.za/

Page 30 of 116

Whitfields uses and markets the services of the following enabling members of the

Syndicate into community schemes:

• Kruger Stoltz Inc. (KSI) serves as the auditors for Whitfields and over 200

of its clients. Whitfields offers 25% discount to those community schemes who

also use KSI as their auditors, enabling Whitfields to influence audits and

conceal financial misconduct. In terms of the Auditing Profession Act 26 of

2005 and related IRBA Code of Professional Conduct for Registered Auditors,57

registered auditors are obliged to be and act independently, while STSMA

Prescribed Management Rule (PMR) 26(5)(a) explictily prescribes that “[t]he

audit of a body corporate’s annual financial statements must be carried out

by an independent auditor”. Such scandals as “KPMG’s involvement in

state capture” (Buthelezi, 2018) emphasises the need for auditor

independence;

• Karen Bleijs, Alan Levy Attorneys, Constas’ BBM Attorneys and

Sutherland Kruger Inc. Attorneys provide, inter alia, legal and debt collection

services to Whitfields. Whitfields itself also levies fees with respect to debt

collection, thereby meeting the definition of a debt collector in terms of the

57 IRBA Code of Professional Conduct for Registered Auditors (Revised November 2018) - Final.pdf located at https://www.irba.co.za/upload/IRBA%20Code%20of%20Professional%20Conduct%20for%20Registered%20Auditors%20(Revised%20November%202018)%20-%20Final.pdf, accessed on 21 January 2020.

Figure 21 - Kruger Stoltz Inc. Auditing for Whitfields and Over 200 of Whitfields’ Clients

Source: http://www.beanies.co.za/

Page 31 of 116

Debt Collectors Act58 (DCA)

(Property24, 2014).

Notwithstanding the above,

Whitfields explicitly denies in its

contracts with community schemes

that it is a debt collector, implying

Whitfield’s was, or still may be, acting in contravention of the DCA in these

respects, while it appears to be acting in flagrant contravention thereof in other

respects. Should Whitfields be committing any offences it may in any event be

irrelevant because, and demonstrating the Syndicate’s influence, Marina

Constas claims that a source at the DCA said “[it is] unlikely that prosecution

would be recommended against a managing agent”59 (Property24, 2014);

• Sutherland Kruger Inc. also represents

Whitfields, Karen Bleijs and conspiring

trustees in court matters implicating them

personally in alleged misconduct and

offences,60 and in terms of which they, acting in conspiracy with offending

trustees, abuse their offices and trust funds (other peoples’ money) to fund

personal litigation costs and agendas. Sutherland Kruger Inc. also acted for

the trustees in the matter between Catling and Another v Constas N.O and

Another61 (2019) in terms of which Marina Constas’ arbitration award62 was

set aside,63 and again suggesting misconduct on their part.64 This was shortly

after Constas was appointed to the CSOS board as dealt with further under

58 114 of 1998. 59 Dealt with further under section 6.4 hereof. 60 And in terms of which relief is also sought against them personally. 61 (26471/2016) [2019] ZAGPJHC 350 (17 September 2019). 62 Arbitration concluded around 8 June 2016. 63 See paragraph 44 of the judgement. 64 Section 33 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 reads as follows: “(1) Where – (a) any member of an arbitration

tribunal has misconducted himself in relation to his duties as arbitrator or umpire; or (b) an arbitration tribunal has committed any gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings or has exceeded its powers; or (c) an award has been improperly obtained, the court may, on the application of any party to the reference after due notice to the other party or parties, make an order setting the award aside.” (State, 1965).

Figure 22 - Alan Levy and Karen Bleijs with Stilus who Alan Levy Attorneys Assists

with Debt Collection

Source: Stilus Facebook Page

Figure 23 - Sutherland Kruger Inc. Logo

https://sutherlandkruger.com/about-us/

Page 32 of 116

section 8 hereof.65 The owners in the matter apparently proved they were not

indebted to the body corporate, and the matter alludes to the type of abuse

and misconduct being otherwise witnessed. In this respect also refer the

public complaints dealt with under section 10 hereof; and

• It is also notable that senior and other employees of Whitfields also worked for

BBM Attorneys.

4.2.8 Koos Croukamp of NAMA, Insure City and MidCity Property Group

Koos Croukamp is the erstwhile National Chairman of

NAMA66 (Khwela City Property Services, 2020) and “[Chief

Operating Officer] of the Midcity Property Group67

[whose] Board of Directors [is also] chaired by…the Board

of Directors of NAMA” (Croukamp, 2020). Croukamp is

also a Director of Insure City which acts “as a short term

insurance broker specifically in regard to sectional title…”

(Croukamp, 2020). While occupying the position of NAMA’s

National Chairperson, his “vision for NAMA [was] to add

even more value to its members [because NAMA]

essentially belongs to its members” (Property24, 2014).

4.2.9 Professor Graham Paddock of NAMA and

Paddocks

Professor Graham Paddock is an honorary member of,

and “highly recommended by” NAMA (Paddocks, 2010),

65 Constas became a director of CSOS on 1 March 2016. 66 July 2013 to September 2017 and who was previously the chairperson of the NAMA Gauteng North region. 67 Which he has been part of since 2005 and is responsible for Sectional and Full Title Management.

Figure 25 - Koos Croukamp

https://www.property24.com/articles/nama-

undergoes-brand-upliftment/20530

Figure 24 - Graham Paddock

Source: https://www.paddocks.co.za/

Page 33 of 116

led and co-drafted the community scheme Regulations.68 He is also the owner and

registered Director of:

• Paddocks Publishing69 and Paddocks Education70 whose market includes

community schemes, Government, regulators, managing agents and other

property sector service providers. Paddocks is being “retained by the CSOS to

train its staff” (Paddock, Paddocks - Community Scheme Ombud Service – An

Overview, 2016) and to amend Regulations, and appears to have been

marketing its training to Government for some time with the influencing and co-

drafting of the Regulations being an inroad. This was alluded to in May 2007

when Mr Paddock tellingly wrote that “[i]n addition to the primary objective of

resolving community scheme disputes the service will also, finances

permitting, provide basic education for those who live in and manage

community schemes” (Paddocks, 2007, p. 2);

• Paddocks also provides consulting and legal services marketed under

Paddocks Consulting, in terms of which telephonic “advice” alone is offered

at R490 per 10 minutes, amounting to R2,940.00 per hour;71 and

• Although Paddock Holdings

and Paddock Lifestyle share

the same business location as

the afore-mentioned Paddocks

companies, the registered

directors thereof appear to be

family members Samuel Edward Paddock and Keri Anne Paddock.

Paddocks Lifestyle may be related to the Paddocks Lifestyle Estate

development in Dainfern, Fourways,72 Johannesburg, suggesting the Paddock

68 See Paddocks website at https://www.paddocks.co.za/advice/private-consulting/ and https://www.paddocks.co.za/paddocks-press-newsletter/summary-of-the-community-schemes-ombud-service-2018-roadshow/, and Paddocks Facebook page post at https://www.facebook.com/PaddocksSectionalTitleTraining/photos/message-from-prof-graham-paddocki-am-very-pleased-to-announce-that-the-sectional/10154807926958273, sites accessed in January 2020.

69 Registered in 2000. 70 Company registered in 2013 with co-director being Amanda Claire Paddock. 71 See Paddocks reply to query by a certain Brian on its website, https://www.paddocks.co.za/paddocks-press-

newsletter/scheme-management-solely-by-an-executive-managing-agent/, accessed on 09/01/2019. 72 https://paddocksestate.co.za/.

Figure 26 - The Paddocks Lifestyle Estate

Source: https://paddocksestate.co.za/

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family also possibly invests in, develops and manages property.

4.2.10 Dr. Gerhard Jooste of NAMA, Pro-Admin Property Managers and Bright

Light Solar

Dr Gerhard Jooste is a lifetime honorary member of

NAMA who “started his business career in 1990…[and]

became the Managing Director of [Pro Admin property

managers in Pretoria] in 1994. Under his leadership the

company grew to one of the leading Managing Agents in

Pretoria with 90 employees servicing more than 15 000

clients in 2017. Gerhard helped to establish [NAMA] and

served as [its] first non executive chairman…from 2001

until 2012. During this period he engaged regularly with the [EAAB] and various

state Departments…For his contributions he was awarded life honorary membership

of NAMA. He is [also] one of the appointed

sectional title trainers of NAMA. [He] left Pro

Admin in 2017 to join Bright Light Solar as a

professional partner”73 (Bright Light Solar VCC,

2020). Bright Light Solar conveniently has a

long list of solar projects on its website which are

predominently relating to body coporates.74

Marina Constas wrote that she personally

“rushed around from airport to airport

undertaking roadshows in every province” with

Dr Gerhard Jooste during 2014, and that she

shares a “close and contented” relationship

with him (BBM Attorneys February, 2014).

73 Bright Light Solar VCC website is located at https://brightlightvcc.co.za/. 74 Body Corporate solar projects listed on Brigh Light Solar VCC’s website at

https://brightlightvcc.co.za/projects/.

Figure 27 - Dr. Gerhard Jooste

Source: https://brightlightvcc.co.za/staff-

member/dr-gerhard-jooste/

Figure 28 – NAMA Form to Collect Contributions to Fund the Body Corporate’s

Appeal in Body Corporate of Empire Gardens v Sithole and Another

Source: https://www.angor.co.za/news/nama-request/

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4.2.11 The Syndicate Deceivingly Pursues Court Precedents Disguised as Body

Corporate’s

Demonstrating some of the

Syndicate’s modus operandi,

collective power and advantage

over the general public, its

prominent members collect

“contributions”, paid into the

account of Elmo York-Stuarts’ EY

Stuart Attorneys, to surreptitiously

fund litigation in pursuit of court

precedents in their favour (see

contribution form depicted in Figure

28 above).

An example of the above is the

appeal deceivingly pursued by the

Syndicate, and disguised as the

body corporate in the matter between

the Body Corporate of Empire

Gardens v Sithole and Another75

(also see court of first instance’s

judgement in 2015).76 The Syndicate

ultimately failed, with the appeal

being dismissed by the Supreme Court and the the body corporate apparently

being saddled with the litigation costs. All of this is also evident from NAMA’s

letter depicted in Figure 29.

75 (240/2016) [2017] ZASCA 28; 2017 (4) SA 161 (SCA) (27 March 2017). 76 The Body Corporate of Empire Gardens v Sithole (Nedbank Ltd Intervening) (14219/2014) [2015] ZAGPPHC

741 (2 November 2015).

Figure 29 – NAMA Letter for Funding Appeal to the Supreme Court (own underlining applied)

Source: https://www.angor.co.za/news/nama-request/

TO ALL NAMA MEMBERS

REQUEST FOR CONTRIBUTIONS BY NAMA MEMBERS AND OR THEIR CLIENTS

EMPIRE GARDENS CASE

During July and August 2016 NAMA presented communication to its members in the matter of the Body Corporate of Empire Gardens vs Sithole and Nedbank limited (High court case number 14210/2014), where the Body Corporate brought a sequestration application against the co-owner (Respondent) of a unit in the sectional title scheme.

The sequestration application became opposed by both the Respondent as well as the bondholder, Messrs Nedbank Limited, who intervened in the sequestration application.

On 2 November 2015 the Body Corporate’s sequestration application was regrettably dismissed with costs as, in summary, the court was of the view that “there is no reasonable prospect that an actual payment will be made to any other creditor but the Applicant” (being the Body Corporate).

The Body Corporate applied for leave to appeal and the court granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.

The outcome of this case is of crucial importance to the industry as a whole as it should finally bring certainty in the industry as to what exactly constitutes an “advantage to creditors” in insolvency scenarios.

The question in the appeal is therefor whether it is necessary for a body corporate to illustrate an actual pecuniary advantage to creditors when it seeks to sequestrate the estate of one of its members due to a failure to pay levies.

The body corporate is a sui generis juristic person and creditor in the insolvent estate of a member. In our view mere payment to creditors resulting from a sequestration order is not the only factor to be considered in these type of sequestration applications.

When a body corporate exhausted all execution procedures without success and not receiving payment of its levies from a member, it is therefore entitled to have the estate of its member sequestrated so as to bring that member’s continued liability for future levies to an end and to have the defaulting member replaced by a paying member.

In our opinion this in itself constitutes an advantage sufficient for the sequestration of a defaulting member. The appeal is expected to be heard during the first half of 2017. NAMA wish to thank those members who have already contributed based on the previous communication issued.

The aim is to collect an amount of R 250 000.00 to support the body corporate to continue with the appeal.

Nedbank Limited indicated that they are no longer opposing the appeal and will therefor abide by the outcome.

This effectively means that the body corporate may not have recourse with a cost order against the bank and will have to carry the costs.

If any costs are to be recovered from the proceedings such costs will be refunded to NAMA who will in turn fund similar initiatives for the benefit of its members and the Sectional Title Industry.

It is our recommendation and request that contributions are made to NAMA to support this cause.

We attach hereto a contribution form to be completed for ease of administration and trust that our members and their clients will contribute to this important matter.

Yours Truly, Coenie Groenewald | STSM [UCT] Chief Operating Officer National Association of Managing Agents

Page 36 of 116

4.2.12 Standard Bank Holds the Trust Accounts of Whitfields and its Clients and

A Senior Manager/Executive Thereof is Implicated in Alleged Wrongdoing

The dominant corporate members of NAMA are Standard Bank and Nedbank

(NAMA, 2020), with Whitfields’ trust accounts and those of its community scheme

clients known to be held at Standard Bank. An apparent property-related executive

of Standard Bank,77 offending members of the Syndicate, some senior management

of Investec, an executive of Adams and Adams Attorneys and others are accused

of, inter alia, conspiring to commit apparent fraud, abuses of office or proximity

thereto and abuse of trust funds entrusted to them.

The mutually beneficial and strategic nature of the relationship between Standard

Bank or other banks and Whitfields is emphasised by the types of products and

services provided by banks, including but not necessarily limited to, insurance, home

loans, trust accounts and loans to troubled body corporate’s against which banks

could charge as much as 16% interest (Cobbett, 2012). Therefore, an offending

senior employee of such banks who conspires with Whitfields and others, and who

naturally strives for bank bonusses, could inflict substantial and irreparable harm

to property owners whose trust accounts or home loans are held with those banks.

One way the above is being done is through a conspiracy to fabricate debt through

fraudulent, extortive and otherwise illegal means. After the debt has been fabricated

through such means, the bank may benefit from repossessing the owners’

property, while the offender(s) may benefit from performance recognition resulting in

bonusses, but such benefits to conspirators and banks, and the victims’ pain and

suffering, would not necessarily end there, because:

“[o]nce the legal fees are added, the amount escalates very quickly and

owners can find themselves [owing] their bondholder and the body

corporate a total that is greater than the value of their unit” (Paddock,

Can a body corporate accept a unit from an owner to settle substantial

overdue levies? Graham Paddock, 2019).

77 Which Standard Bank has been alerted to and not has not denied the accused’s role in the Bank.

Page 37 of 116

Making matters worse, the above-mentioned illegal conduct could even be facilitated

by the Syndicate’s members who have infiltrated CSOS and are adjudicating

disputes there, some of which is dealt with under section 8 hereof, and in terms of

which prominent members of the Syndicate recommend that:

“[w]hen owners fall into substantial arrears, the body corporate should

launch an application with the [CSOS]. There need be no legal cost

involved, the administrative cost is minimal and an adjudicator’s order can

be used as if it were a High Court or a Magistrates Court order”

(Paddock, Can a body corporate accept a unit from an owner to settle

substantial overdue levies? Graham Paddock, 2019).

CSOS’ dispute mechanism is reportedly inefficient (see end of section 8 hereof), so

some offending members of the Syndicate opt to bypass CSOS altogether and seek

default judgements in court, which been shown to be surprisingly quick and easy to

do, especially where helpless victims do not have the means to defend themselves for

whatever reason. The devastation to the victim and its loved ones that follows a

judgement granted under such apparently criminal circumstances as descried above

includes, but is not limited to, a poor credit record, loss of property, possible job loss

or inability to secure employment because some companies are reluctant to employ

people with poor credit records or their policies prohibit it. All of this also appears to

amount to improper conduct under the Debt Collectors Act78 as dealt with under

section 6.4 hereof.

A telling read with respect to alleged fraud relating to property is the High Court matter

between Mboso v Standard Bank of South Africa,79 in terms of which the

“[a]pplicant believed that she had already settled the outstanding bond and that the

debt was caused by fraudulent transactions from her bond account”. In the

judgement Judge Andrews deals with, amongst other things, the constitutional right

to housing and equality before the law80 (2018).

78 114 of 1998. 79 (19416/2016) [2018] ZAWCHC 20 (19 February 2018). 80 Paras 10 and 33 of the judgement.

Page 38 of 116

5 Community Scheme Management: NAMA’s Deception with Respect to the Regulation of Managing Agents and the Fiduciary Obligations of Scheme Managers

From all the foregoing it is abundantly apparent that the Syndicate’s prominent,

leading and influencing members, their respective property-related companies and

their network of beneficiaries benefit substantially from community schemes and

owners. They therefore have a vested interest in influencing Government,

regulations and regulators in their favour or becoming completely unregulated.

The next sections deal further with the Syndicate’s modus operandi in these respects.

As a precursor, in terms of the new community scheme Regulations the following

definitions have been provided with respect to the management of community

schemes:

• “‘managing agent’ means any person who provides scheme management

services to a body corporate for reward, whether monetary or otherwise,

including any person who is employed to render such services”;

• “‘scheme management service’ means any financial, secretarial,

administrative or other service relating to the administration of a scheme”; and

• “‘executive managing agent’ means a managing agent appointed to carry out

all the functions and powers of the trustees in terms of [STSMA PMR 28]”.

5.1 The Syndicate Deceivingly Portrays NAMA as a Regulator

In pursuit of its sinister self-regulating, profit-pursuing and other objectives, and to

circumvent regulations that may hinder its relentless pursuit thereof, the Syndicate

deceivingly portrays NAMA as a regulator of managing agents. In these respects,

the following false and deceptive allegations have been publicised by the Syndicate:

• NAMA “plays an active role in [the] industry in regulating [its] Managing

Agents” (BBM Attorneys February, 2011, p. 3);81

81 Marina Constas, prominent member of the Syndicate.

Page 39 of 116

• NAMA “is the umbrella body for all Managing Agents, and it is advisable

for a…Managing agent to hold NAMA membership…[i]f your Managing

Agent is not a member of NAMA, ask why?” (BBM Attorneys February, 2014);82

• Those “managing agents who are members [of NAMA] subscribe to a code

of conduct and are obliged to be fit and proper” (Arde, Keep an eye on your

body corporate, 2013).83 Tellingly the code of conduct is nowhere to be found

on NAMA’s website, however a 2008 version was found on the Holm Managing

Agents website (click “code of conduct” to view it); and

• Through NAMA the “[t]he industry formed its own regulatory body – [being

NAMA]” (Trafalgar Property Management, 2020).84

A regulatory body is however defined as follows, none of which applies to NAMA,

but which definition provides insight into why a primary objective of NAMA is to be

recognised as a purported industry “authority” (see NAMA’s objectives under

section 4.1 hereof):

“a public authority…responsible for exercising autonomous authority over

some area of human activity in a regulatory or supervisory

capacity…Regulatory authorities are [, inter alia,] commonly set up to

enforce safety and standards, and/or protect consumers in markets

where there is a lack of effective competition or the potential for the

undue exercise of market power…[The actions of] regulatory agencies

[established by Government and which have] statutory authority…are

generally open to legal review”85 (Wikipedia, 2019).

Notwithstanding NAMA meets none of the above, there is an immediate

contradiction apparent between the above-mentioned definition, which is what one

82 Marina Constas, prominent member of the Syndicate. 83 Mike Addison, member of the Syndicate and Director of Addsure “[m]anagement [which] works closely with

managing agents, trustees and owners to offer clients a specialist service of exceptional quality. This includes proper advice for bodies corporate, workshops and training for owners, trustees and managing agents, and a host of administrative services aimed at servicing the body corporate’s needs” (Addsure, 2020).

84 Trafalgar Property Management, another dominant member of NAMA; Own emphasis applied to all these sub-paragraphs.

85 The issue of legal review is specifically pertinent when considering NAMA aims to be “legally independent”; own emphasis.

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would rightfully expect from a “regulator”, and the Syndicate’s own admissions that:

“NAMA…[was] formed by the industry for the industry…it is an

organisation with a purpose to look out for the interests of its

managing agent members rather than being a statutory entity or public

protector”86and “NAMA is and remains a voluntary organisation and

hold[s] no regulatory power”.

Even more abundantly transparent contradictions become apparent from NAMA’s

highly deficient and questionable, if not laughable “Complaints Procedure” and

in terms of which the alleged “code of conduct” NAMA refers to above is tellingly

nowhere to be found on its public-facing website. From a plain reading of the below

extract from the complaint “Terms and Conditions”, which is located at the end of the

“Complaints Form” under the “Contact Us” page of NAMA’s website, 87 it is clearly

designed to stifle complaints and protect the Syndicate, not to “regulate conduct”,

which has already been proved when members of the public try to lodge complaints:

• “NAMA is and remains a voluntary organisation and hold[s] no regulatory

power;

• Our Codes and documentation merely act as a guideline and any member or

person who do not wish to engage into correct business practices will act on

their own accord;

• NAMA cannot terminate membership or act against members outside the

scope of its disciplinary processes;

• NAMA do not investigate matters [that] are of a contractual or management

nature;

• All complaints must be endorsed by the Trustees / Directors;

• Where a member has been found guilty of an offence by a Court of

Law…membership of a member may be terminated after such termination

86 Mike Addison of NAMA, refer section 4.1 hereof. 87 See NAMA’s Complaints Procedure and Terms and Conditions on its website at https://nama.org.za/contact-

us/, accessed on 12/01/2020.

Page 41 of 116

is…ratified by a majority decision of

all the Full Members at an Annual

General Meeting of the Members;

• NAMA only acts as a portal for

promoting [communication] between

the parties concerned to find an

amicable solution to the complaint

received;

• NAMA do not undertake to present

any outcome on complaints received

nor do we commit to provide feedback

or agree to provide feedback;

• NAMA Members will have the

opportunity to respond to complaints

received but is not required to do so

[and]…[i]f a response is received NAMA

may provide feedback under the

standard disclaimer to the complainant;

• [A complaint referred] to the

disciplinary committee…will incur a

non-refundable deposit at an amount determined by the Committee [and]…[i]f

the Ethical Committee must refer the matter for advice or legal intervention the

complainant will be liable for all costs” (NAMA, 2020).

In addition to the above anomalies and the “code of conduct” being notably absent

from its public-facing website, there is also no auditable or verify-able complaints

procedure provided by NAMA either, against which one may track the progress of a

complaint. Probably the most utterly absurd and conspicuously deliberate action-

avoidance mechanism designed by NAMA in the above “Terms and Conditions” is the

ridiculous requirement that “[a]ll complaints must [first] be endorsed by the

Trustees / Directors” before they can even be submitted and in terms of which:

• The requirement poses an obvious dilemma for complainants who wish to

Figure 30 - NAMA's Online Complaint Form

Source: https://nama.org.za/contact-us/

Page 42 of 116

complain against NAMA managing agents who are conspiring with “Trustees

/ Directors” to commit offences, and is abundantly transparently designed to

immediately relieve NAMA of any need, duty or requirement to act at all; and

• The fact that NAMA has no intention of “regulating” or acting against the

conduct of its managing agents is further supported by its widely publicised

disclaimer that “[w]hile the managing agent has a contractual duty to the body

corporate…the body corporate is ultimately liable for any actions of the

agent, as he or she is ostensibly acting under their mandate” (Your Property,

2015). It is again utterly absurd, yet revealing that the Syndicate should

publicise such deceptive allegations as the body corporate is liable for the

misconduct of the managing agent, which agent acts on the instructions

of the trustees, and in terms of which they are both entrusted with body

corporate property and funds, not the other way around.

The fact that NAMA does not deal with complaints is supported by the following:

• An attempted complaint by a member of the public in terms of which NAMA

simply refused to respond to the following communication, which was

submitted by the complainant after being directed by NAMA to first complete

its “complaint’s form”:

“I took a look at your complaints form, and it requires that any

complaint logged by an owner must be endorsed by at least one

trustee. What if the trustees are colluding with the Managing

Agent? Fraud and theft [complaints] have been opened with both

the Managing Agent and the trustees being implicated as suspects

after I uncovered numerous financial anomalies while in my

position as financial trustee, and the trustees and managing

agent have since been trying to cover their tracks…and therefore

both the trustees and managing agent are now covering for each

other. I have read your Code of Conduct, and my rights as an

individual owner are being contravened where information is now

being withheld and the managing agent is assisting the trustees to

contravene the [STA] so your requirements certainly don’t lend

themselves to an owner, who has collected sufficient evidence to

Page 43 of 116

support irregularities and misconduct, being able to lodge a

complaint. I would also be interested to know what punishment is

handed down to any managing agent who is a NAMA member who

is found guilty of misconduct i.e. what are the consequences to the

MA if any?

I would appreciate [i]f you could respond with your thoughts so I

know whether I should proceed with the complaint…”; and

• A public post by a certain “Rosemary Snead” made on Paddocks website,88 in

which she alleges that “you don’t receive any correspondence [when lodging

relevant complaints with CSOS]”. Paddock’s of the Syndicate whose owner

led the co-drafting of the Regulations which are purportedly aimed to

provide the public with a cost-effective and accessible dispute mechanism,

and again demonstrating the Syndicate’s ulterior motives, tellingly responds

as follows: “we are more than happy to help, however we do not give free

opinions / advice”89 (Paddocks, 2009). Paddocks’ rate for consulting and

advice offered via telephone is R490 per 10 minutes, which amounts to

R2,940.00 per hour.90 Why, pray tell, did Paddocks, who we the taxpayer

are funding to co-draft Regulations and to train CSOS, not offer to address

the alleged lack of performance with CSOS?

Even more revealingly, in the High Court in PGP Body Corp Administration CC v

The Trustees of the body Corporate Club Kerkira,91 Pam Golding Properties

alleged that that NAMA board members themselves don’t even comply with

NAMA’s rules, which is apparent from paragraph 17 of the judgement which states

that:

“[a]fter the trustees terminated [the contract of Pam Golding

Properties’92(PGP), another NAMA Member], it subsequently appointed

88 On 01/10/2017 at 17:20 – see end of article. 89 On 08/12/2017 at 11:03. 90 See Paddocks reply to query by a certain Brian on its website, https://www.paddocks.co.za/paddocks-press-

newsletter/scheme-management-solely-by-an-executive-managing-agent/, accessed on 09/01/2019. 91 (AR 403/11) [2012] ZAKZPHC 81 (26 October 2012). 92 Body Corp Administration CC.

Page 44 of 116

[Glen] Smit93 [who was previously employed by PGP] as its new managing

agent. [PGP submitted that Smit was a Board Member of [NAMA and

was acting] contrary to the provisions of [NAMA]” (2012).

5.2 NAMA’s Managing Agents Categorically Deny They Have a Fiduciary

Obligation Towards Community Schemes and Offenders Misconduct

Themselves with Impunity

Even further contradicting the Syndicates foregoing false and deceptive portrayal

of NAMA as being a regulator of its managing agents and their conduct, and

notwithstanding the utter absurdity thereof, members of the Syndicate categorically

deny that NAMA managing agents owe any fiduciary obligation towards their

community scheme clients, even conveniently deflecting responsibility for their actions

to the trustees as already touched on in the foregoing section. This absurd notion

is however refuted by the following:

• Mike Addison94 of the Syndicate who happens to rely on insurance premiums

from community schemes, confirms that “[m]anaging agents…[are the]

custodians of significant amounts of money [and] they also manage and

advise on the management of property assets” (Addison, Insurance and the

managing agent, 2017);

• Simon Dippenaar and Associates confirms that “[a] managing agent is literally

the agent of the trustees and therefore is subject to all their duties and

obligations. The agent is expected to act with professionalism at all times.

Agents who do not act with due care and skill may be liable for any loss

caused as a result of their negligence or neglect. Notwithstanding the fact

that trustees have ultimate fiduciary responsibility, the agent is also

responsible for prudent financial management of the scheme…the agent’s

duties are not enshrined in the legislation but in the contract. However, those

93 Currently the Kwazulu Natal Regional Director of NAMA, previously employed by Pam Golding Properties (PGP) Margate as its sectional title manager and in terms of which PGP is a member of NAMA (https://www.property24.com/articles/sect-title-admin-specialised/3799).

94 Of Addsure which provides insurance to community schemes.

Page 45 of 116

duties must uphold the trustees’ responsibilities in terms of the PMR’s…”

(Simon Dippenaar and Associates, 2017);

• According to Private Property, “[t]he word ‘fiduciary’95 refers to a very simple

concept. It is a trust relationship between the owners and the trustees. The

duty of trust or fiduciary duty means that the person responsible will

exercise his powers in good faith and he will not act in his own interest or

for another’s gain, but for the people (the owners of the sectional title units)

he represents… [Anyone] who acts in breach of his fiduciary relationship

can be held liable to the body corporate for any loss suffered as a result

of his actions”96 (Private Property, 2018);

• In the court matter between PGP Body Corp Administration CC v The

Trustees of the body Corporate Club Kerkira,97 at paragraph 18 of Judge

President Patel’s judgement, it also states the following with respect to the

fiduciary duty of managing agents:

“It is not entirely clear from the provisions of Management Rule 46

[of the STA] whether the managing agent’s contract of appointment

is regarded as a contract of service or a mandate which creates a

fiduciary relationship between the Body Corporate and the

managing agent. But in CE van der Merwe ‘Sectional Titles’ in

Lawsa 2 ed vol 24 (2010) para 466 the following is observed:

‘Since the managing agent is managing the affairs of the body

corporate, it is submitted that he or she stands in a fiduciary

relationship to the body corporate. An executive organ of the

body corporate, namely the trustees, appoints him or her. The

managing agent would thus owe both a duty of trust as well as

95 Wikipedia, Fiduciary, “a person who holds a legal or ethical relationship of trust with one or more other parties (person or group of persons). Typically, a fiduciary prudently takes care of money or other assets for another person” and fiduciary duty as existing “to ensure that those who manage other people's money act in their beneficiaries' interests, rather than serving their own interests”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiduciary, accessed on 8 January 2019.

96 Own emphasis. 97 (AR 403/11) [2012] ZAKZPHC 81 (26 October 2012).

Page 46 of 116

a duty of care and skill towards the body corporate.’” (2012).

It therefore comes as no surprise that the Syndicate even designed STSMA PMR 28

of the new Regulations98 it influenced and co-drafted to deliberately detract from,

alternatively completely obliterate managing agent obligations by deviously

obscuring managing agent with the Syndicate’s newly introduced concept of the more

costly “executive” managing agent. This, together with what has already been

exposed in the foregoing, again demonstrates NAMA has no intention whatsoever

to “regulate” the conduct of its managing agents. Instead, the Syndicate and its sinister

influence and power enables offending NAMA managing agents and trustees

because the Syndicate benefits at the expense of the cash-cow community schemes

and owners.

The true intentions of the afore-mentioned Syndicate-influenced STSMA PMR 28,

which is to facilitate the shocking lack of accountability of NAMA and its members,

becomes even further apparent from the Syndicate’s numerous deflective and

propogandist publications claiming such things as the “trustees…are ultimately

responsible because they [explicitly] have a fiduciary responsibility [in terms of

section 8 of the STSMA]…to the members of the body corporate. The trustees

appoint the managing agent to provide a service to the body corporate” (Arde, Keep

an eye on your body corporate, 2013).

The EAAB deals with fiduciary obligations on its website (EAAB, Legal Matters -

Trustees' Duties and Powers, 2020) while Van der Spuy says the following about it:

“[Trustees] must ‘act with the care, diligence and skill which can reasonably

be expected of a person who manages the affairs of another.’ This is a far

reaching, onerous provision and the onus will be on the trustee to prove

that he or she acted as such, in the event that he or she is accused of

maladministration. No…instrument can exempt a trustee from this

liability.” (Van der Spuy, 2018).

98 Influenced and co-drafted by members of the Syndicate.

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The above-mentioned accountability hot potato provides a recipe for collusion

between mutually beneficial trustees, NAMA managing agents, and others which

translates into a buffet of abuse and lawlessness fuelling a feeding frenzy which

could rival that being alleged before the State Capture Commission, and takes

various forms such including that described below.

Where conspiring trustees are found to be in persistent breach of their fiduciary

obligations, and from which co-conspiring NAMA managing agents and other

members of the Syndicate also benefit, they abuse their offices and, inter alia,

embezzle scheme trust funds to unlawfully pursue appeals against such orders to

circumvent their personal liability. Karen Bleijs, Alan Levy Attorneys and Sutherland

Kruger Inc., to name a few, associate with and facilitate such misconduct, and the

punitive cost order made against BBM Attorneys in the matter between Body

Corporate of the Bend v Holgado and Others,99 and of which Marina Constas is a

director and who was also a director of CSOS, demonstrates BBM Attorneys’

apparent abuse of schemes and owners. DSC Attorneys says the following about

the type of cost order made against BBM Attorneys in the judgement:

“In some situations, the Courts may award attorney and client costs, or a

portion of these costs, to the successful litigant in a case. However,

[although] this is seldom done [,it is done] where a Court believes that a

litigant’s conduct in the course of the litigation has been such that a punitive

costs order is warranted” (DSC Attorneys, n.d.).

Fisher-French (Fisher-French, 2015) provides the following insight into the

pervasiveness of such lawlessness as mentioned in the foregoing:

“Although there are provisions contained in the [STA] which deal with the

conduct of trustees, a powerful group can become untouchable…Deon

Botha of Rentmaster which deals with managing credit and legal risk for

residential property investors, says structures can get hijacked by a

small group of insiders who manipulate it according to their own

agenda and stonewall owners...[A member of the public]…complain[ed]

99 (17295/2014) [2018] ZAKZPHC 44 (25 July 2018).

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that the trustees of his sectional title development do not implement

processes and procedures according to the [STA]. [The complainant said

that] ‘The main culprits are businessmen with their own modus operandi

and agenda who are corrupt and are intimidating owners with litigation

using body corporate funds. They have now become untouchable and

are continually being voted in through proxies from their friends and

associates and have been since 2010’” (Fisher-French, 2015).

Such above-mentioned trust fund abuse is prohibited by STMSA PMR’s 6(3)100 and

14(3)101 and as stated by Paddocks’ as follows:

“[s]ectional owners frequently complain that trustees spend scheme

money on expenses that are not covered by the body corporate’s

approved budgets…[whereas] [t]he law requires that trustees must

spend the body corporate’s money in accordance with budgets

approved by owners” (Paddock, Paddocks - What can owners do when

body corporate trustees go rogue?, 2019).

More insight into the unabated misconduct of conspiring trustees and members of

the Syndicate being enabled by the apparent regulatory vacuum and Syndicate-

influenced environment is provided under section 9 hereof.

5.3 Conspiring Trustees, NAMA Managing Agents and Other Members of the

Syndicate Deceptively Allege That the Syndicate-Infiltrated CSOS has no

Jurisdiction Over Breaches of Fiduciary Duties

Again demonstrating the Syndicate’s afore-mentioned modus operandi and that it has

no intention of “regulating” the conduct of NAMA managing agents whatsoever, is

that conspiring trustees and NAMA managing agents insist that the Syndicate-

infiltrated CSOS has no jurisdiction to find that they have breached any fiduciary

100 STSMA PMR 6(3) provides that “[a] trustee who has any direct or indirect personal interest in any matter to be considered by the trustees must not be present at or play any part in the consideration or decision of the matter concerned”.

101 STSMA PMR 14(3) provides that “A trustee is disqualified from voting in respect of “any proposed or current contract or dispute with the body corporate to which the trustee is a party; and any other matter in which the trustee has any direct or indirect personal interest”.

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duties when disputes are lodged with CSOS, and in terms of which it is telling they

would do so considering NAMA managing agents allegedly “subscribe to a code of

conduct”, and:

• This could be a reason why the Syndicate-infiltrated CSOS fraudulently,

alternatively deceptively omits the names of offending trustees and NAMA

managing agents, who are parties to the application, from its adjudication

orders, especially those agents providing billable services to CSOS. In

some cases CSOS even absurdly finds that it is the scheme that allegedly

breached its fiduciary duty, notwithstanding such duty does not exist

considering it is the trustees and managing agent who are entrusted by the

scheme owners, and not the other way around;

• Such misconduct also enables the embezzlement of trust funds, and

considering the conspiring trustees and NAMA managing agents are the

gatekeepers to the trust funds, the Syndicate, which benefits extensively

from such funds, has a vested interest in offenders escaping prosecution

or removal from office; and

• It therefore comes as no surprise that, notwithstanding the Syndicate’s

prominent members acknowledge that CSOS must be an “independent body

tasked with facilitating and arranging the efficient and cost effective resolution

of disputes which arise in all 'community schemes'” (Paddocks, 2007, p. 2),

syndicate members such as Marina Constas and Karen Bleijs were

appointed at CSOS in directorship and adjudication roles, while Whitfields is

administering its property; and

• It is even less of a surprise that the Syndicate members who led the co-

drafting of the Regulations were paradoxically even “expect[ing]…[managing

agents would also] serve as part-time [CSOS] adjudicators” (Paddocks,

2007, p. 2), and which inadvertently also reveals the Syndicate’s ulterior

motives with respect to positioning CSOS as being best-placed to “regulate”

managing agents and not the EAAB which is dealt with further in the next

section 6 hereof.

The utterly absurd notion that CSOS has no jurisdiction with respect to the foregoing

fiduciary obligations does however again expose the Syndicate’s ulterior motives

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with respect to its influence over the Regulations and infiltration of CSOS in that

it contradicts the purported purpose of the Regulations, which Judge Binns-Ward

describes as follows in his judgement in the matter between Coral Island Body

Corporate v Hoge102 which should be read together with Paddocks’ telling online

synopsis thereof:

“Compelling constitutional and social policy considerations informed the

introduction of the legislation that is manifest in the [CSOS] Act. The

promotion of access to justice by those not easily able to afford to litigate

in the civil courts was but one of those considerations. Another was the

social utility to be achieved by the provision of a relatively cheap and

informal dispute resolution mechanism for the disposal of community

scheme related issues.

It requires little insight to appreciate that those commendable policy

considerations would be liable to be undermined if the courts were

indiscriminately to entertain and dispose of matters that should rather have

been brought under the [CSOS] Act. Whilst judges and magistrates may

not have the power to refuse to hear such cases,103 they should, in my view,

nonetheless use their judicial discretion in respect of costs to discourage

the inappropriate resort to the courts in respect of matters that could,

and more appropriately should, have been taken to the [CSOS].104” (2019).

It is notable that the prayers under section 39 of the CSOS Act also appear to provide

for financial relief against those who are found in breach of their fiduciary duties

rendering them personally liable for losses, as follows:

• Prayer 1(e) of section 39 of the CSOS Act provides for an “order for the

payment…of any…amount”; and

102 (22991/2017) [2019] ZAWCHC 58; 2019 (5) SA 158 (WCC) (23 May 2019) par 10. 103 Cf. Standard Credit Corporation Ltd v Bester and Others 1987 (1) SA 812 (W) at 815-819 (also reported

at [1987] 3 All SA 96), endorsed in Agri Wire (Pty) Ltd and another v Commissioner of the Competition Commission, and Others [2012] ZASCA 134; [2012] 4 All SA 365 (SCA); 2013 (5) SA 484, at para. 19 (in note 9) and in this Division in Marth NO v Collier and Another [1996] 3 All SA 506 (C); sed contra In re: Nedbank Limited v Thobejane and related matters [2018] ZAGPPHC 692, [2018] 4 All SA 694 (GP), 2019 (1) SA 594.

104 Cf. Derero v Derero 1934 WLD 19 at 21-22 and Goldberg v Goldberg 1938 WLD 83 at 85-86, both of which judgments are mentioned in discussion in Standard Credit Corporation v Bester supra.

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• Section 56 of the CSOS Act supports prayer 1(e) by explicitly providing that “[i]f

an adjudicator’s order is for the payment of an amount of money or any other

relief which is within the jurisdiction of a magistrate’s court…[or]…High

Court…the order may be enforced as if it were a judgment of [that

respective court]”.

However, in the Syndicate infested environment and the Syndicate-infiltrated

CSOS, Complainants who wish to (try and) hold offending trustees and managing

agents accountable for misconduct through CSOS should however be mindful of the

following Western Cape High Court Judgement as interpreted by Paddocks:105

“Section 38 of the CSOS Act states that an application to the CSOS must

include a statement setting out the relief sought by the applicant, which relief

must be within the scope of one or more of the prayers for the relief

contemplated in section 39. [NAMA Members] often find that applicant’s take

a shotgun approach when making applications to the CSOS for relief, by

asking the CSOS to make orders based on very wide and often ambiguous

prayers for relief.

In Joseph Maria Balk v Marius Matthews and Others, which involved an

appeal against certain parts of a ruling by an adjudicator, the Western Cape

High Court warned of the dangers of failing to comply with the formalities of

the CSOS Act dealing with jurisdiction. The appeal turned on the question

whether the adjudicator had the necessary jurisdiction to grant the relief

which he did. Ultimately the High Court upheld the appeal with costs and set

aside the relevant parts of the adjudicator’s order, because it found that –

• the respondent (being the applicant in the CSOS adjudication) did not

ask for relief in the manner that they were required to in terms of

section 38 and therefore the respondent was not entitled to the relief

that was granted; and

• the adjudicator went beyond the scope of the relief that he was

105 A prominent member of the Syndicate as already dealt with under section 4.2 hereof.

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required to determine in terms of the provisions of section 38(3)(a) [of

the CSOS Act]… the High Court explained that the adjudicator was

required to exercise his powers in terms of the jurisdiction afforded to

him and could not, because the proceedings may be less formal,

ignore the provisions within which he exercised his jurisdiction under

the CSOS Act.

It is therefore very important for any potential applicant to ensure that their

application complies with the strict requirements set out in section 38 and

that their relief sought falls within the scope of section 39” (Freitas dos

Santos, Box smart at the CSOS, 2019).

The above also suggests that expert and costly legal assistance may be required

when applying for dispute resolution through CSOS, because how would an ordinary

applicant otherwise know how to frame their application so it “complies with the strict

requirements”?, which could in turn conflict with section 54 of the CSOS Act and Judge

Binns-Wards’ judgement dealt with earlier. The contradictions appear to be endless

when it comes to community schemes and the Regulations.

So, if our courts are discouraging owners from bypassing the Syndicate-infiltrated

and influenced CSOS (see section 8 for more on this), how else does one obtain

relief against offending and conspiring managing agents and trustees? Property

owners appear to be confronted with the proverbial catch 22 designed by the

Syndicate for the Syndicate. With respect to offending managing agents one

could possibly lodge a complaint with the National Consumer Commission (NCC) in

terms of the Consumer Protection Act (Act No 68 of 2008) (CPA),106 given it is not

also being influenced, and in terms of which it would only apply to managing

agents. In this respect Dr Gerhard Jooste of the Syndicate says the following:

“…the management agreements with the Bodies Corporate fall under the

jurisdiction of the CPA, unless the Body Corporate has a turnover that

exceeds R2 million per annum...Chapter 2 of the CPA provides the

Consumer with a number of fundamental rights, including…[s]pecifically,

106 Signed into law on 24 April 2009.

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parts F (Right to fair and honest dealing), G (Right to fair, just and reasonable

terms and conditions) and H (Right to fair value, good quality and safety) will

apply to the management agreements and service delivery of Managing

Agents. To what extent clients will be able to rely on these sections in

practice when unhappy with the Managing Agent remains to be seen.”

(Jooste D. G., 2012).

Although Mr Jooste refers to managing agreements in the above extract, the Syndicate

also appears to have those in hand, with Mike Addison of the Syndicate encouraging

“NAMA members…to have a written contract in line with the model NAMA

managing agent contract … [because they will be]…a lower risk for an insurer”,

such as Addison’s Addsure and Whitfields’ Amiti (Addison, 2015). Should smart

community schemes however wish to deviate from NAMA’s “model contract”, the

Syndicate’s members such as Paddocks will eagerly “prepare management

agreements” for them at a fee, and which will inevitably be drafted in favour of NAMA

members. Paddocks bills upwards of R2,940.00 per hour just for telephonic advice

so this could also be a costly exercise in every respect (Van der Merwe, Scheme

management solely by an executive managing agent, 2018).107

Yet another hurdle is that, although the new Regulations require that the body

corporate insure against losses incurred as a result of fraud and dishonesty on the

part of trustees, managing agents or the like, there is also a possibility of never being

able to recover such losses through the insurance when considering:

• The despicably poor regulation of NAMA managing agents and other

Syndicate members and their influence within and infiltration of regulatory

bodies which is dealt with under sections 6 and 8 hereof;

• Such insurance is also conveniently being provided by the Syndicate,108

and in terms of which “Professor Graham Paddock and his team at

107 Author Zerlinda van der Merwe is the General Manager and Specialist Community Schemes Consultant at Pam Golding Property Management Services (Pty) Ltd (Van der Merwe, Zerlinda van der Merwe LinkedIn Profile, 2020).

108 In these respects, and posing yet another hurdle for owners wishing to enforce their rights, it is telling that members of the Syndicate outright refuse to provide insurance and other information, a flagrant violation of STSMA PMR’s 26(2) and 27(4).

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Paddocks, Marina Constas and her team at BBM, Tertius Maree109 and his

team [and] Alan levy,]…[consult] on various related matters and when

compiling advice, opinion and training material” (Addison, The Sectional Title

Insurance Guide, 2017), so it again appears there may be a lot of influence

and control by the Syndicate for the Syndicate;

• Conspiring trustees, NAMA managing agents and other members of the

Syndicate wilfully refuse to provide insurance and other information to

owners, making it extremely hard, if not impossible for them to defend or

enforce their rights,110 and notwithstanding it being a flagrant violation of

STSMA PMR’s 26(2) and 27(4) and section 32 of the Constitution of the

Republic of South Africa,111 and in terms of which they even brazenly ignore

adverse orders already made against them with respect thereto. Even the

EAAB confirms that “trustees are under a duty to provide clear and accurate

accounts and produce any information or other documents relating to the trust

when required to do so by beneficiary” (EAAB, Legal Matters - Trustees' Duties

and Powers, 2020);

• Victims may be subjected to laborious, lengthy and costly court processes

in terms of which the Syndicate has undue advantage and is apparently able

to easily obstruct justice, tamper with court evidence and engage the

judiciary ex-parte by doing such things as:

o Delivering letters to the Deputy Judge President in which Syndicate

members112 insist that “the matter can and should be disposed of

without considering or perusing” relevant pages exposing the

Syndicate and its modus operandi; and

o Which, according to Snyman (Snyman, 2014, p. 323), is an offence

against the administration of justice, “committed by exhorting the

109 Honorary member of NAMA as depicted in Figure 10 hereof. 110 Their latest modus operandi is to claim they cannot provide information because of the recent Protection of

Personal Information Act 4 of 2013, notwithstanding no personal information has been requested or they could just as easily mask any personal information.

111 1996. 112 Elmo York-Stuart, Karen Bleijs and Ferdinand Trűter of Couzyn Hertzog and Horak via Bernhard van der

Hoven Attorneys and Advocate TALL Potgieter (SC) acting on their behalf.

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judiciary to embark on a course of action which is in clear conflict with its

duties, for example, asking the judiciary to refuse to give credit to a

certain class of evidence, irrespective of its intrinsic merits”.

• In addition to the above, faith in the justice system is severely dwindling and in

terms of which:

o Raymond Edward Chalom, “[a] Johannesburg lawyer [for over 50 years,

alleges that]…the South African judiciary is corrupt, with some judges

collaborating with each other to rig court outcomes, abuse cost orders for

political purposes, tamper with evidence and cause files to disappear”.

Also refer “Corruption In The South African Judiciary” (Unknown Author,

2019) and “Corrupt magistrate sentenced to 15 years in prison” (Child,

2018);

o Burger argues that “[a]ttempts to remove honest professionals and appoint

dishonourable and incompetent people at the highest echelons of the

criminal justice system have severely undermined the rule of law in

South Africa” (Burger, 2016);

o The Facebook page of a certain Mr Johan le Roux makes serious

allegations of corruption within the property sector and the judiciary

(Le roux, 2020);

o An Eyewitness News article titled “SAPS Considered Most Corrupt

Institution in SA – Survey” sums up public perceptions in the wake of

widely publicised corruption scandals implicating SAPS or its members

(Manyathela, 2019);

o Top prosecutors are being implicated in alleged corruption, including

those fired by President Cyril Ramaphosa (Cohen, 2019) and others

receiving “hefty sentences” and fines (The South African Government

News Agency, 2017); and

o The Special Investigation Units’ recent raids on masters of High Court

following public allegations of corruption and theft (S Skiti, 2020).

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6 Poor Regulation of Managing Agents and the Syndicate’s Relentless Campaign to Circumvent, Control or Influence Regulations and Regulators

Having exposed the Syndicates abundantly transparent deception with respect to

portraying NAMA as a purported “regulator” of its managing agents and their conduct,

and the financial and other benefits the Syndicate reaps from, inter alia, the flagrant

abuse of community schemes and property owners, the next sections turn to other

reasons why the Syndicate has a vested interest in influencing and infiltrating

Government and regulators to circumvent regulations and become “legally

independent”.

6.1 Ongoing Managing Agent Fraud, Maladministration and Other Widely

Publicised Misconduct

Further demonstrating the Syndicate’s modus operandi and unashamed bias in

favour of managing agents and trustees who happen to be the gatekeepers into

the lucrative trust accounts of community schemes:

• Paddocks of the Syndicate113 confirmed in 2019 that “[t]he vast majority of

complaints [its representatives] get about the management of sectional title

schemes, are from owners who claim that their scheme’s managing agent

and/or trustees are in some way failing in their duties”;

• Paradoxically, nowhere does the author of the article, De Klerk of Paddocks,

bother to address this issue, instead she immediately deflects by remarking

that “[i]t is interesting how we are able to recognise the failures of others, while

often being blind to our own responsibilities”, and absurdly proceeds to “shed

light on some of the lesser known [and completely unrelated] duties of

owners” (De Klerk, Paddocks - Owners have duties too, 2019);

• De Klerk’s devious strategy is exposed when she goes on to market to

potential conspiring offenders being complained of that “[i]f you are a trustee

or managing agent struggling with owners…and you would like legal

113 A prominent member of the Syndicate as already dealt with under section 4.2 hereof.

Page 57 of 116

advice and/or assistance in this regard, don’t hesitate to contact

[Paddocks]…for a no obligation quotation” (De Klerk, Paddocks - Owners

have duties too, 2019); and

• De Klerk’s utterly bizarre article confirms the Syndicate’s deception with

respect to the allegations that NAMA “regulates its managing agents” and their

conduct which was dealt with under section 5.1 hereof and which is dealt with

further in the sections that follow.

It is also telling that a representative of Paddocks would behave in the manner

described above given they know, or reasonably ought to know of the widely publicised

fraud, maladministration and other offences by manging agents and their co-

conspirators including, but not limited to, the following:

• During 2011 IOL (Cokayne, 2011) and Property News (Property News, 2011)

reported on the misappropriation of up to R80m by Constantia Sectional Title

Managers (CSTM),114 a managing agent of about 450 bodies corporate at the

time, and in terms of which “close to 100 000 people were affected [and] there

was ‘no magic wand’ with money quickly coming to those affected…The Wendy

Mechanik case as well as the [CSTM] case once again put the [managing

agent] Industry under the spotlight for all the wrong reasons” (BBM Attorneys

February, 2012). Demonstrating her closeness to CSTM, Marina Constas115

had, just prior to these horrific scandals, been thanking “Whitfields and

[CSTM] for the recent seminars held at their offices” (BBM Attorneys October,

2010). It is also telling that Marina Constas quickly offered the following

services to the CSTM victims through the EAAB, and which is published on

the EAAB’s website:

“Due to the legal doctrine of ‘supervening impossibility of

performance’ all bodies corporate which might have contracted with

CSTM to administer their sectional title affairs will now be obliged to

utilise the sectional title management services of any other

114 Also see “Recent Articles regarding Fraud in the Industry” by Specialist Community Schemes Property Accountants (SA Commercial Prop News, 2020).

115 A prominent member of the Syndicate as already dealt with under section 4.2 hereof.

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reputable sectional title management firm, should they choose to do

so. Attorney Marina Constas, of the firm, Biccari Bollo Mariano

Inc., has indicated that, by virtue of the extensive knowledge and

networking experience that she has gained within the sectional

title administration sphere, she would be available, at a greatly

reduced rate, to assist any affected bodies corporate both to

source alternate sectional title management companies

appropriate to their needs and, also, to lodge claims for any

amounts that might due and owing by CSTM to those bodies

corporate.” (EAAB, 25 May 2011 UPDATE: Constantia Sectional

Title Management (PTY) Limited (In provisional liquidation) (CSTM),

2011).

• Demonstrating little change, and notwithstanding the above CSTM debacle,

IOL’s later article, published in 2013, confirms that “[i]f you own a sectional title

property…you are 10 times more likely to lose money through fraud and

dishonesty at the hands of your managing agents than due to fire damage

[, demonstrating] a failure on the part of the regulator and the system at large”

(Arde, Keep an eye on your body corporate, 2013);

• In 2014 Private Property again reported on “a recent incident in which a

managing agent defrauded a sectional title scheme to the tune of R1.2-

million” (Jacobs, 2014); and

• The 2012/2013 EAAB Annual Report also records that “[d]uring the 2011/12

financial year 225 new claims were lodged against the Fund. The

overwhelming majority of these claims arose from the misappropriation

and/or misuse of trust monies by managing agents engaged in the

administration of sectional title schemes” (EAAB, 2013, p. 32).

The ongoing anarchy within the sector, enabled by the apparent Syndicate-

influenced regulatory vacuum described in the next section below, is even further

demonstrated by some examples of how offences are being perpetrated with impunity

by offending NAMA members, conspiring trustees and others under section 9 hereof.

6.2 Poor Regulation of NAMA Managing Agents and The Syndicate’s Ongoing

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Modus Operandi and Adverse Influence with Respect to Regulations

The disgraceful absence or lack of effective regulation leaving owners at the

mercy of the Syndicate, offending NAMA managing agents and trustees, is

confirmed by Mr Jimmy Baloyi116 of the EAAB when he stated in 2013 that “[the

EAAB’s] jurisdiction over managing agents is limited to their trust accounts, [and]

we don’t have authority over their conduct” (Arde, Keep an eye on your body

corporate, 2013). Paddocks also confirmed the shocking lack of regulation over

managing agents when it publicised in 2009 that:

“[t]here is no law that specifically regulates the managing agency

industry… When it became clear to the Government that this new industry

was entrusted with very large amounts of housing consumer money,

that these funds were at risk and [that] the industry needed regulation,

the Minister of Trade and Industry decided that the most pressing concern

was to provide some form of insurance against theft of these funds…[He

therefore] issued a notice declaring that ‘collecting or receiving moneys’ due

to a body corporate or share block company or developer was an ‘estate

agency service’. In this way managing agents became ‘estate agents’

[and] they became obliged to keep their clients’ money in trust accounts

and any money stolen from these accounts was covered by the EAAB’s

Fidelity Fund [in terms of the EAAA117]…

[However], [n]o part of the [EAAA], its regulations or the Code of

Conduct applicable to estate agents under its provisions deals with the

activities of managing agents. The EAAB’s jurisdiction over managing

agents extends only to their levy collection activities, not the wide range

of administrative, legal and financial services they render. So the result is

that the public is protected against theft of monies from managing agents’

trust accounts, but managing agency remains largely unregulated…

The EAAB initially suggested that managing agents should form a

116 EAAB acting executive manager of enforcement in 2013. 117 Estate Agencies Affairs Act 112 of 1976.

Page 60 of 116

national association with voluntary membership. [NAMA] was

accordingly formed and it presented a Code of Conduct designed for

managing agents to the EAAB in October 2003…

Managing agents [must] pay to the EAAB a registration fee for each

managing agency business and for each of the principals involved in that

business to whom it issues Fidelity Fund Certificates. Portfolio managers

remain unregistered. Managing agency businesses also pay the EAAB one

half of the interest that accrues on monies in their trust accounts and is not

claimed by their clients [and which funds the insurance programme providing

cover against fraud and theft of trust funds]…

The [previously applicable STA] makes no mention of managing agency at

all…[and] no provision in or under [the STA] regulates the conduct of

managing agents” (Paddocks, 2009).

It can be inferred that the Syndicate’s question, “is not time for the industry to

regulate itself as that could save millions” (Property Professional, 2018) relates to

the second last paragraph of the above extract. However, to obtain any relief through

the Syndicate-infiltrated EAAB, which is already the subject of numerous allegations

of corruption as dealt with under section 2.2 hereof, one would first need to have a

complaint and claim successfully processed through the Syndicate-infiltrated EAAB,

and which the Syndicate would have a vested interest in stifling insofar as it exposes

or interferes with its sinister modus operandi. Such stifling of complaints lodged

with the EAAB is in fact occurring, with complaints either not being dealt with

at all, or are dealt with irregularly.

The Property Practitioners Bill (PPB) apparently aims to change the status quo with

respect to the poor and influenced regulation, in that:

• The PPB “repeals the 43-year-old Estate Agency Affairs Act of 1976 (Act 112

of 1976)” (LexisNexis, 2019); and

• The PPB also “extends regulations to all property practitioners” (Snymans

Inc. Attorneys, 2015), and explicitly “includes any person who for

remuneration manages a property on behalf of another” (Property

Proffessional, 2019).

Page 61 of 116

Prior to it being signed into law on 2 October 2019, the PPB posed an imminent threat

to the Syndicate’s self-regulating

objectives and the brazen

lawlessness of its offending members

and co-conspirators. It is therefore not

without coincidence that the Syndicate

“insist[ed] that a sub-committee at the

EAAB [be] set up to fully investigate the

exact needs of Managing Agents”,

and lobbied to “include a Managing

Agent on the board of the EAAB [and

to] transfer the umbrella body function

from the EAAB to [CSOS]” (BBM

Attorneys February, 2012).

Dr Gerhard Jooste of the

Syndicate118 also rallied “that it would

be most suitable for [CSOS] to take

over the [limited] regulation of managing agenc[ies] from the [EAAB]…not because

the EAAB is incapable of doing the job but because the EAAB is not fundamentally

suited to doing the job and the CSOS is!” (Paddocks, 2009).

The above-mentioned submissions of the Syndicate may appear reasonable to

anyone who is ignorant to its modus operandi and ulterior motives and the fact that

it has infiltrated CSOS as dealt with further under section 8 hereof, but it can easily

be inferred from all the foregoing, and that which follows, that the Syndicate was

deviously aiming to circumvent the looming Property Practitioners Bill (PPB)

because of the threat it poses to the Syndicate and its modus operandi.

118 A prominent member of the Syndicate as already dealt with under section 4.2 hereof.

Figure 31 – 2017 NAMA King Price Indaba with EAAB

Source: BBM Attorneys November 201 Edition https://us13.campaign-

archive.com/?u=7412849832c282b25dfcefde5&id=33df4bdb3f

Page 62 of 116

The Syndicate however knows that it still has ample time to influence the PPB

regulations in its favour as was done with respect to CSOS, because notwithstanding

the Property Practitioners Act 22 of

2019 (PPA) “has been signed into

law by the President… [it] … will …

not become law before …

promulgation occurs in the

Government Gazette” (Property

Proffessional, 2019). This can still

take about six years if the

promulgation of the CSOS regulations

are anything to go by. The Syndicate’s

intention in these respects has already

been expressed in the following

statement:

“Despite industry, through our representative body Rebosa [, which also acts

for NAMA,] going to great lengths to…offer alternatives to ensure that the

best interest of the property industry were taken into account [, the

PPA] has been signed into law…According to legal advice provided to

Rebosa there’s no need to panic as nothing will happen until a formal

declaration has been made through the Government Gazette that the new

law is enacted…[The Syndicate is]…now looking forward to being

involved in the drafting of the regulations to clarify key operational aspects

of [the PPA]… …[our main concern is that we need] powers to control

situations” (Property Proffessional, 2019).

6.3 Brief Synopsis of the new Community Schemes Regulations Insofar as

they Deficiently Relate to Managing Agents, and the Syndicate’s Modus

Operandi with Respect Thereto

In the foregoing section, the Syndicate confirmed that the regulation of managing

agents is limited to “their levy collection activities”, and that there is no existing

regulation with respect to the “wide range of administrative, legal and financial

Figure 32 – EAAB Queries Being Handled by the Syndicate

Source: https://www.rebosa.co.za/rebosa-eaab-online-query-form/

Page 63 of 116

services they render” (Paddocks, 2009). Considering the Syndicate conveniently

led and co-drafted the new community schemes Regulations, and that it proposed

that CSOS is best “suited” to “regulate” managing agents, it is telling that the Syndicate

did not exploit the opportunity to address obvious deficiencies in the existing

“regulations”. Instead, the new Regulations:

• Do not remediate that “no provision in or under [the old STA] regulate[d]

the conduct of managing agents” (Paddocks, 2009);

• Omit important scheme security-orientated rules that previously existed,

including those “various [explicit] provisions that [formed] part of the managing

agent’s contract” (Paddocks, 2009);

• Offer no explicit relief against managing agents, nor any penalties for

managing agent misconduct, other than the limited ability for owners to apply

to compel their compliance with their contracts and purported codes of

conduct, or to terminate their contract,119 all of which must inevitably be done

through the Syndicate-influenced and infiltrated CSOS;

• Introduced a devious loophole with the introduction of section 41 of the CSOS

Act, which apparently aims to legitimise offending and unlawful conduct by

providing that “[a]n application for an order declaring any decision of an

association or an executive committee to be void, may not be made later than

60 days after such a decision has been taken”, and window-dressed with the

discretion of a Syndicate-influenced “Ombud” to condone a late submission

(Freitas dos Santos, Paddocks - Time and tide wait for no man, 2019);

• Notwithstanding the Syndicate’s influencing members acknowledge that

CSOS must be an “independent body tasked with facilitating and arranging

the efficient and cost effective resolution of disputes which arise in all

'community schemes'”, they were tellingly “expect[ing]…[managing agents

would also] serve as part-time [CSOS] adjudicators” (Paddocks, 2007, p.

2) while paradoxically yet revealingly lobbying that CSOS is best-placed to

regulate managing agents; and

119 In terms of section 39(5) of the CSOS Act.

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• A most outrageously risky aspect of the community scheme regulations, and

which is embarrassingly obviously open to abuse, is STSMA PMR 21(3)(d)

which states the following, and in terms of which such risk is emphasised by

the millions lost by “botched” investments which Paddocks knows about

intimately (Bodies corporate lose millions in managing agent's accounting

botch, 2008):

“(3) The body corporate may, on the authority of a written trustee

resolution, invest any moneys in the reserve fund referred to in

sections 3(1)(b) of the Act in a secure investment with any institution

referred to in the definition of “financial institution” in section 1 of the

Financial Services Board Act, 1990 (Act No. 97 of 1990)”

(Paddocks, n.d.).

Figure 33 below also provides a telling comparison between the now repealed

prescribed management rules (PMR’s) made under the STA, and those that replace

them (or not) under the STSMA PMR’s made in terms of the new Regulations co-

drafted by the Syndicate.

Page 65 of 116

Old Prescribed Management Rules (PMR's) New Prescribed Management Rules (PMR's)Old PMR 3(1)(a) provides that a body corporate use the “duly

appointed managing agent ” address for legal notice and

service.

Provided for under new PMR 4(1)(b).

Old PMR 5(b) states that “the managing agent or any of his or

her employees or an employee of the body corporate may not

be a trustee unless he or she is an owner of the body

corporate ”.

Provided for under new PMR 6(1).

Old PMR 27 states that “[n]o document signed on behalf of this

body corporate, shall be valid and binding unless it is signed by

a trustee and the managing agent…or by two trustees ”.

Provided for under new PMR 10(1).

Old PMR 29(2)(b) deals with insurance against loss of monies

resulting from “fraud or dishonesty committed by any insured

person being any person in the service of the body corporate

and all trustees and persons acting in the capacity of managing

agents of the body corporate ”.

Provided for under new PMR 7.

Old PMR 32(2)(e) states that the trustees must supply the rules

to, amongst others, “the managing agent ” on requestProvided for under new PMR 27(4) and 27(5).

Old PMR 35(2) states that that the trustees must, on request by

an owners or “managing agent ” supply “all or any of the books

of account and records available for inspection ” by the

requestor.

Provided for under new PMR 26(2).

Old PMR 42 deals with the “Managing Agent’s Control of Funds ”

in terms of the EAAA.

Appears not to have been transferred to the new

Regulations.

Old PMR 46 deals with “The Appointment, Powers and

Duties…entrusted to the managing agent , including the power

to collect levies ”.

Only those provisions dealing with the

appointment of managing agents provided for

under new PMR 28(5) with the caveat “under the

supervision of the trustees ”. Default appointment

termination provisions not transferred in favour of

managing agents.

Old PMR 47 deals with the “Mandatory Provisions in Managing

Agency Contract ”.

No mandatory contract requirements or

provisions transferred to the new Regulations.

Old PMR 48 deals with the managing agents’ “Records of

Administration ”.

Appears not to have been transferred to the new

Regulations.

Old PMR 49 deals with the “Notice and Minutes to Managing

Agent ”.Provided for under new PMR 11(3) and 11(4).

Old PMR 54 also deals with notices to “the managing agent ” Provided for under new PMR 54.

Old PMR 67(3) deals with proxies where the “managing agent "

is again mentioned.Provided for under new PMR 20(6).

Old PMR 70 again deals with the “managing agent ” insofar as it

relates to other “Statutory and General” matters.

Replaced by new PMR 30 and does not mention

managing agent only body corporate.

Old PMR 71 deals with notices to the “managing agent ” with

respect to Determination of Disputes by Arbitration”.

Explicitly excluded from the new Regulations

because it has been replaced by the obligatory

CSOS dispute resolution mechanism which is

being influenced or controlled by the Syndicate.

Old prescribed conduct rules also contain provisions referring to

the “managing agent ”.

Managing agent also mentioned in prescribed

conduct rules.

Figure 33 - Comparison Between old STA PMR's and new STSMA PMR's

Page 66 of 116

6.4 The Devious Attempt to Circumvent the Debt Collectors Act and

Regulations

Making matters even worse, as if the foregoing wasn’t enough, and to exploit

property owners and tenants who they apparently refer to as “the goose that lays the

golden egg” (Council for Debt Collectors, 2018), the Syndicate even “applied to the

Minister of Justice to have Managing Agents exempted from the requirement to

register as debt collectors” (BBM Attorneys December, 2010, p. 4). Marina

Constas’ subsequent comments below, made during 2014, suggest that the

Syndicate was partially unsuccessful in this attempt:

“Managing agents, trustees and directors of community schemes may

be falling foul of the Debt Collectors Act…If a managing agent is

collecting debt [including levies allegedly in arrears] on behalf of a body

corporate or other community scheme for reward, then they are required to

register as a debt collector with the Council [for] Debt Collectors…

A debt collector is defined in the [Debt Collectors Act120] as, inter alia, a

person who for reward collects debts owed to another on the latter’s behalf.

The activities involved in the collection of a debt could be simply the sending

of letters of demand and telephone calls calling for payment. Many, if not

most, managing agents do attend to these steps when an owner has

fallen into arrears with his or her levy account…

Constas says when the managing agent charges for each letter and

telephone call (or other activity intended to encourage payment of the arrear

amount), there can be no doubt that the managing agent is collecting

the debt for reward and falls squarely within the definition of a debt

collector” (Property24, 2014).

From the above extract, and under normal circumstances of course, it would be

surprising that Syndicate members such as Whitfields Property Management

appear to misrepresent in their management agreements that they are not debt

120 114 of 1998.

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collectors, notwithstanding they are levying such fees as described above.

However, in addition to the influence the Syndicate has within Government and its

infiltration of regulators, Constas wrote that “according to [the Syndicate’s] source

in the Council [for] Debt Collectors…[it is] unlikely that prosecution would be

recommended against a managing agent for failure to register as a debt collector”

(Property24, 2014), which again may explain the brazen lawlessness being

witnessed and experienced in the sector.

Notwithstanding the Syndicate appears to have failed in its abovementioned

exemption application, and which seems to be confirmed in the Council for Debt

Collectors’ letter dealt with below, the Syndicate publicised the following, and in terms

of which you may recall from section 6.2 hereof that the Syndicate wants the “industry

to regulate itself as that could save millions” (Property Professional, 2018) and that

it has been lobbying to move the regulation of trust accounts away from the EAAB:

“After extended negotiations with the Debt Collector’s Council, Dr.

Gerhard Jooste of [NAMA] has reported that the issue has been settled.

The Debt Collectors Council has formally confirmed in a letter to NAMA that

managing agents who collect levies do not need to open a separate

account under the Debt Collectors Act. The managing agent’s use of a trust

account opened under section 32 of the EAAA for levy receipts is considered

compliance with the requirements of the Debt Collector’s Act…Thanks are

due to NAMA and the Debt Collectors Council for their ongoing efforts

on behalf of the managing agency industry” (Paddock, Paddocks -

Application of the Debt Collectors Act to Managing Agency, 2014).

Apparently not satisfied that the Minster of Justice had not granted managing

agents an exemption from registering as debt collectors, the Syndicate appears to

have deviously attempted to influence a last-minute amendment to the looming

Property Practitioners Bill just before it was signed into law by the President. A

telling extract from the Council for Debt Collectors’ letter to the Portfolio Committee on

Human Settlements in these respects reads as follows:

“There has been a long history between the actions of managing agents

and the statutory regulator for the debt collection industry… No [exemption

with respect to Section 60(1) of the Magistrate's Court Act which deals with

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the ‘Prohibition of recovery of fees or remuneration by certain persons in

connection with the collection of debts’] has been granted in respect of estate

agents or managing agents...Moreover, should they do so they would be

contravening Section 60(2) of the Magistrate's Court Act, and could be

charged in a criminal court for contravening the aforesaid Section, unless

they have been registered as debt collectors in terms of the [Debt Collectors]

Act…

The Council received a huge amount of complaints against managing agents

who charged exorbitant fees for the collection of those arrear amounts….The

exploitation of tenants who had fallen into arrears was often referred to by

the managing agent industry as the goose that lays the golden egg…

NAMA…lodged an application for exemption from the Debt Collectors Act in

terms of Section 26 of the Debt Collectors Act…

It was during the course of numerous discussions that NAMA decided to

withdraw their application for exemption as the parties was in agreement that

the recovery of arrear rent and levies for reward placed those managing

agents who recovered those amounts squarely under the Debt Collectors

Act.

In terms of the proposed [Property Practitioners Bill] amendment there is an

attempt to amend the Debt Collectors Act by inserting the exclusion of

managing agents from the Act…

The catastrophic consequence of such an exclusion on the public cannot

be underestimated…The proposed amendment act makes no provision for

any [alternative] body or control and one can only assume that for debt

collection functions managing agents would once again become

unregulated…

The proposed amendment should it be granted would have a severe

negative impact on consumers. The actions and fees charged by

managing agents would be unregulated and as has happened in the past

would lead to exploitation of consumers who have fallen into arrears with

their rents and levies. We only became aware of the proposed amendment

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when one of our registered managing Agents inquired whether he can now

deregister and charge his own fees.

The Council was not informed of the proposed amendment nor asked

for comment. The Council was not even consulted as a stakeholder as

can be seen from the stakeholders consulted as set out in Paragraph 4 of

the Memorandum to the proposed Bill.

I hope that the Councils concerns can be addressed before the Bill is

approved.” (Council for Debt Collectors, 2018).121

The following extract from the Debt Collectors Act,122 which lists the type of “improper

conduct” being perpetrated by offending members of the Syndicate, could provide

additional reasons why the Syndicate may so adamantly seeking to be released

therefrom (State, 1998), just in case “[the Syndicate’s] source in the Council [for]

Debt Collectors” is wrong with respect to “[it being] unlikely that prosecution would be

recommended against a managing agent” (Property24, 2014) (also refer the “Debt

Collectors Act: Code of Conduct”):123

“15(1) A debt collector may be found guilty by the Council of improper

conduct if he or she, or a person for whom he or she is vicariouslv liable –

(a) Uses force or threatens to use force against a debtor or any other

person with whom the debtor has family ties or a familial or

personal relationship;

(b) acts towards a debtor or any other person with whom the debtor

has family ties or a familial or personal relationship, in an

excessive or intimidating manner;

(c) makes use of fraudulent or misleading representations, including–

(i) the simulation of legal procedures;

121 The Council for Debt Collectors’ supporting presentation to the Portfolio Committee of Human Settlements is located at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/180904CDC.pptx, accessed on 19 January 2020.

122 114 of 1998. 123 South African Government, Debt Collectors Act: Code of Conduct, https://www.gov.za/documents/debt-

collectors-act-code-conduct, accessed 11/02/2020.

Page 70 of 116

(ii) the use of simulated official or legal documents;

(iii) representation as a police officer, sheriff, officer of court or

any similar person; or

(iv) the making of unjustified threats to enforce rights;

(d) is convicted of an offence of which violence, dishonesty, extortion

or intimidation is an element;

(e) spreads or threatens to spread false information concerning the

creditworthiness of a debtor;

(f) contravenes or fails to comply with a provision of the code of

conduct contemplated in section 14;

(g) contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of this Act; or

(h) behaves or acts in any manner amounting to conduct, other than

that mentioned in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) or (g), which

is improper in terms of a regulation.” (State, 2003).

7 The Syndicate’s Establishment of the Sectional Titles Arbitration Panel (STAP) to Surreptitiously Control or Influence Arbitrations and Outcomes in its Favour

Having largely dealt with part one of the Syndicate’s Elaborate Capture Scheme in

the foregoing sections, this section turns to part two of the Syndicate’s Elaborate

Capture Scheme, which was to capitalise on the revenue, stealth, influence and

control opportunities afforded by arbitration, which was previously imposed on

sectional title owners under the now repealed STA PMR 71, and which modus

operandi the Syndicate adapted when the new Regulations came into effect by

infiltrating CSOS which is dealt with further under section 8 hereof.

To provide insight into the opportunity’s provided by arbitration to offenders

and conspirators, this sub-section:

• Provides an overview of the nature of arbitration and its historical applicability

to sectional title schemes; and

• Deals with the elaborate scheme devised by the Syndicate, having many

Page 71 of 116

legal practitioners in its midst, to gain control over the assignment of

arbitrators in sectional title disputes. This devious scheme empowered

conspirators to influence and predetermine arbitration outcomes in their

favour, and otherwise conspire to milk the proverbial community scheme

cash cow and parties to disputes.

In the context of community scheme arbitrations under the now repealed STA PMR

71:

“[a]rbitration, [is] a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), [and] is a

way to resolve disputes outside the courts. The dispute will be decided by

one or more persons [being the arbitrator(s) or adjudicator(s)]…which

renders the ‘arbitration award’. An arbitration award is legally binding on

both sides and enforceable in the courts…[and]…the parties [are obliged]

to hold all existing or future disputes to arbitration, without necessarily

knowing, specifically, what disputes will ever occur…

The parties waive their rights to access the courts and to have a

judge…decide the case…There are limited rights of review…of arbitration

awards…[and more specifically] an erroneous decision cannot be easily

overturned…

Arbitral proceedings and an arbitral award are generally non-public, and

can be made confidential…

If the arbitrator or the arbitration forum depends on [someone like a

company, association like NAMA or body corporate] for repeat business,

there may be an inherent incentive to rule against [the opposing

party]…” (Wikipedia, 2019).

In the matter between Body Corporate of the Pinewood Park Scheme No 202 v

Dellis (Pty) Ltd (2012)124 the Supreme Court found that arbitrations in terms of STA

PMR 71 were not statutory, but consensual i.e. by agreement., while the judgement

124 (SCA) [2012] ZASCA 105; [2012] 4 All SA 377 (SCA); 2013 (1) SA 296 (SCA) (1 June 2012) at par 15.

Page 72 of 116

in the matter between Telcordia Technologies Inc v Telkom SA Ltd125 (2006) (also

see Government’s media statement for a synopsis thereof) deals with the contractual

nature of arbitrations and grounds for review of arbitration awards, and which

judgement members of the Syndicate leverage substantially.

In the above-mentioned Pinewood Park v Dellis matter, the court’s rationale with

respect to community scheme arbitrations being consensual, was that if a person

buys into a community scheme, he or she agrees to abide by the already in-force

rules of that scheme. From a purely technical perspective the judgement makes

sense, however the reality was very different in the context of community schemes as

follows:

• The Syndicate itself publicised that “[t]he academic thought leaders, in the law

of sectional titles in South Africa (Professors CG van der Merwe and GJ

Pienaar)126 agree that rules made by bodies corporate are ‘the product of the

legislative power of an autonomous statutory association’

[and]…Regulation 6(1), made under the Sectional Titles Schemes

Management Act (“Act”)…states: Rules…must be considered to be and

interpreted as laws made by and for the body corporate of that scheme”

(Paddock & Durham, 2016); and

• Considering the management rules can only be changed by unanimous

resolution of the body corporate by its existing members, it follows that a

prospective buyer may find it extremely difficult, if not impossible to buy into

any sectional title scheme unless agreeing to the existing rules. Therefore,

in the absence of consenting to an already existing “contractual” arbitration

clause, a prospective buyer could be completely excluded from this more

affordable housing market. This predicament inevitably leads one to

conclude that the acceptance of such an arbitration clause was more imposed

125 (26/05) [2006] ZASCA 112; [2006] 139 SCA (RSA) ; 2007 (3) SA 266 (SCA); [2007] 2 All SA 243 (SCA); 2007 (5) BCLR 503 (SCA) (22 November 2006).

126 Prof. Van der Merwe appears to be close to Nama, apparently attending such events as the NAMA conference held on 6 to 7 May 2011 which included “Professor Corrie Van Der Merwe, Professor Graham Paddock, Tertius Marée, Mike Addison” (BBM Attorneys February, 2011, p. 3), the latter three attendees being known influencing members of the Syndicate.

Page 73 of 116

and less consensual.

For a naïve, trusting, uninformed and vulnerable member of the public, arbitration

appears to be a legitimate and accepted dispute resolution mechanism in terms of

which one expects arbitrators and attorneys will conduct themselves ethically, lawfully

and impartially. However, its dark side quickly emerges in the context of conspiring,

offending or racketeering syndicates who easily operate undetected as a result of,

inter alia, the afore-mentioned private nature of arbitration and the extremely “limited

rights of [arbitration] review” (Wikipedia, 2019) which Marina Constas of the

Syndicate herself acknowledged when commenting as follows on the threatening new

Regulations looming at the time:

“As the law stands now, the only recourse you have to overturn the award,

is to approach the High Court on the basis that the Arbitrator showed bias,

exceeded his powers, or followed the incorrect procedure. The merits of

the award cannot be attacked [, however] with the new section of the

[CSOS] Act allowing for appeal, we are going to be faced with disgruntled

losers who will go on appeal…” (BBM Attorneys February, 2011, p. 9).

Notwithstanding devious, conspiring and seasoned arbitrators can easily

disguise misconduct, it becomes increasingly more difficult to identify or prove

misconduct when a party’s own legal representation is a member of the Syndicate

and/or conspiring with the Syndicate for personal gain. Furthermore, offending

members of the Syndicate, many being seasoned legal practitioners, easily

masquerade their misconduct as being “mere errors” which cannot be reviewed.

It is also telling that Marina Constas of the Syndicate chooses to use the words

“disgruntled losers” in her above-mentioned comments considering her own

arbitration awards are being reviewed and set aside, suggesting misconduct on

her part. This becomes apparent from an analysis of the High Court judgement in

Catling and Another v Constas N.O and Another (2019)127 which is also dealt with

under sections 4.2.2, 4.2.7, 7 and 9 hereof;

127 (26471/2016) [2019] ZAGPJHC 350 (17 September 2019).

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Considering STA PMR 71 obliged owners to refer disputes to arbitration, the

prominent members,128 lobbied extensively for mandatory arbitration clauses to be

included in the rules of all community schemes, where not already done. The inclusion

of such an arbitration clause was an important foundational component of this part

of the Elaborate Capture Scheme, and was followed by the Syndicate, spearheaded

by Marina Constas, establishing its so-called Sectional Titles Arbitration Panel

(STAP). STAP was a platform from which offending Syndicate members would,

unbeknownst to victims, propose each other to serve as arbitrators in community

scheme disputes in which they were acting for parties to the dispute. This almost

guaranteed outcomes in the Syndicate’s favour.

The following SA Property News article briefly outlines the circumstances under which

STAP was formed, and which was shortly after Marina Constas revealed another

apparent threat to the Syndicate in that “written complaints to the Registrar of Deeds

[against arbitrators who are overcharging] will lead to [them] not being appointed in

future” (BBM Attorneys February, 2011, p. 9):

“[According to Marina Constas of BBM Attorneys] ‘[t]he normal route of

arbitration [through the Registrar of Deeds] is not achieving what the

legislators originally intended, and sectional title owners need access to a

more affordable, expedient process’…

Spearheading the development of this process, [Marina Constas and]

BBM Attorneys…joined forces with dispute settlement specialist Equillore

and [NAMA] in an initiative that aims to streamline sectional title disputes…[It

will be] better than having to go to the registrar in every deeds office, [but]

there are still serious concerns [because a] few of the people being

appointed as arbitrators [through the Deeds Office] have no experience at

all in sectional title matters…Many arbitrators are overcharging, and in a

recent, simple matter the arbitrator, an advocate, charged R54 000,

whereas these types of matters should cost a maximum of R15 000…

128 Most of whom are seasoned legal practitioners having a wide network of supporting and benefitting friends and associates within the legal system and otherwise.

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Some interested parties had thought a solution may lie in the appointment

by the Chief Registrar of a nominee with a specialist sectional title

background…it is now clear this won’t happen at this time…‘In terms of

[STA PMR] 71, a registrar can have a nominee, but after numerous meetings

with the representatives of the Chief Registrar, it is clear that they will not

relinquish their duty to appoint a nominee. They are, however, willing to

work with the Association of Arbitrators [(AOA)] to appoint from a

specialist panel, which is what Equillore, BBM Attorneys and NAMA are

now putting together…[This includes introducing more mediation into the

mix] in view of the fact that mediation will shortly become compulsory with

our court system [, and will need training such as that offered by the

Syndicate]” (SA Property News by SJ Bosch & Y Hung, 2012).

In addition to the hidden agenda which should already be apparent from the above,

Constas paradoxically implies on the one hand that unqualified arbitrators were

being appointed through the Deeds Office, while on the other hand that qualified

advocates were being appointed to arbitrate but that they were overcharging,

notwithstanding standard junior advocate rates happen to be anywhere upwards of

R11,000 a day. Emphasising her apparent deception and the ulterior motives of

the Syndicate in these respects, the rates charged by the Syndicates members who

served on Constas’ STAP are as follows:

• Elmo York-Stuart, Karen Bleijs, Trevor Simon and Marina Constas charge

between R11,000 to R30,000 per day each, with Constas even admitting that

she “thrive[s] on [disputes]” which obviously benefit her financially and

otherwise in a substantial way (BBM Attorneys September, 2010, p. 4);

• Adding to the massive costs would be the legal and other fees charged by the

Syndicate’s STAP members, many of whom were surreptitiously switching

between arbitrator and attorney between matters in which they and other

members of the Syndicate would play an opposite role while concealing their

relationships;

• It is most telling that in one arbitration in which Syndicate member Elmo York-

Stuart served as arbitrator and Karen Bleijs represented the body corporate,

and in terms of which they concealed their relationship from parties, Bleijs

Page 76 of 116

insisted that Stuart demand R100,000.00 deposit for his fees, following

which Stuart insisted on a R50,000.00 deposit being paid to him as a retainer

for his arbitration fee before he would even proceed with the matter, all of which

utterly contradicts the Syndicates false propaganda alluded to in the

foregoing; and

• An interesting read on the subject of legal costs is provided by the article by

Geffen published in The Star titled “The exorbitant price of justice” (Geffen,

2013).

Considering the Registrar of Deeds would not relinquish his control to the Syndicate

but was willing to work with the AOA, it is without coincidence that Constas and other

fellow Syndicate members, who also happen to be fellow-members of the AOA,

lobbied the AOA’s support ad endorsement and thereby convinced the Registrar of

Deeds to relinquish his control and authority to the Syndicate.

The Syndicate then proceeded to quickly establish STAP and populate it with the

above-mentioned members of the Syndicate,129 including Constas’ herself130 albeit

she did not explictily advertise it as was done with the others (BBM Attorneys Dec,

2012). This enabled almost unfettered abuse of power by the Syndicate in

arbitrations to which its offending members were assigned, and in terms of which the

following unlawful, harmful and revealing misconduct ensued:

• Article 11.1 of the 8th edition AOA rules, previously Section 8.3 of the 6th edition

thereof, clearly states

“When a person is approached in connection with his or her possible

appointment as an arbitrator, he or she shall disclose any

circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his or

her impartiality or independence. An arbitrator, from the time of

his or her appointment and throughout the arbitral proceedings,

shall without delay disclose any such circumstances to the parties

129 Mr Trevor Simon of BBM Attorneys, Ms Karen Bleijs of Karen Bleijs Attorneys and Mr Elmo-York Stuart of EY Stuart Attorneys.

130 Constas was being proposed by her fellow STAP Syndicate members to arbitrate disputes of clients they were representing.

Page 77 of 116

and the other arbitrators unless they have already been informed by

him or her of these circumstance”

• There was a telling amendment made to the abovementioned clause,

between the 6th edition and later editions of the AOA Rules, in that the words

“Upon accepting appointment, a prospective arbitrator shall sign a

statement to [that] effect” were removed, and one wonders what could

possibly have influenced that. Nonetheless, this does not change the

obligation to disclose stated above;

• Notwithstanding the afore-mentioned legal obligation, offending members of

the self-professed “specialised [STAP] panel” specifically proposed each

other or their associates to arbitrate disputes in which they represented one of

the parties, and in terms of which they unlawfully concealed their

relationships;

• Making matters worse, some STAP members would even conspire to

procure alleged “witnesses” from within NAMA and interact with them and

each other at the NAMA events described under section 4 hereof, during

arbitration proceedings, without consent from opposing parties and

without disclosing it;

• STAP Syndicate members would also procure alleged “experts” from

within the Syndicate, and notwithstanding article 29 of the 7th and 8th editions

of the AOA rules states that such alleged “expert shall, before accepting

appointment, submit to the arbitral tribunal and to the parties a description of

his or her qualifications and a statement of his or her impartiality and

independence”, such disclosure also did not occur under STAP arbitrations

albeit STAP members did not require disclosure because they already knew it

at the expense of parties from whom it was concealed; and

• Their conduct in these all these respects directly conflicts with the

fundamental right of parties to an impartial, lawful, just and fair adjudication of

disputes which is enshrined in the Bill of Rights, and it demonstrates their

wilful disregard of the law and rules. Karen Bleijs of the Syndicate, who

is now adjudicating disputes at CSOS, has even admitted such wilful disregard

of the rules and law under oath.

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All the foregoing demonstrates the substantial threat the Syndicate poses to the

public with respect to its infiltration and adjudication of disputes at the CSOS, and

which is dealt with further in the next section.

8 The Syndicate’s Infiltration of the Community Schemes Ombud Service, its Adverse Influence Over Community Scheme Regulation and the Ongoing Threat to the Public

The Syndicate’s influence and activities with respect to the EAAB and other authorities

have already been dealt with in the foregoing sections, while this section deals with

the Syndicate’s modus operandi, infiltration and activities with respect to CSOS, and

in terms of which Marina Constas confirmed at the end of 2010 that “[i]In the New

Year [2011], [the Syndicate] will be focusing on [CSOS] and relations with

Municipalities” (BBM Attorneys December, 2010, p. 4).

The looming (at the time) CSOS Regulations and dispute resolution mechanism again

threatened the Syndicate’s sinister self-regulating and other objectives, including the

threat to the income being generated through community scheme arbitration which

was dealt with in the foregoing section in that the CSOS Act would supposedly provide

for a dispute resolution mechanism “without the involvement of legal

representation on behalf of any of the parties”.131

The above-mentioned threats were alluded to by Paddock of the Syndicate when he

wrote in 2007 that “Managing agents…will need to keep themselves informed of

these developments which will affect their businesses” (Paddocks, 2007, p. 2),

and by NAMA’s National Chairman132 when he wrote in 2014 that “[t]imes are

changing fast and [NAMA members] need to re-establish [themselves] within the

dynamic and competitive industry of Property” (Deysel, M & Van Heerden, M, 2014).

CSOS is the “regulatory authority for all community schemes in South Africa” and was

established to (purportedly) act in the public interest, and it came into effect on 7

October 2016 with a mandate to:

131 Coral Island Body Corporate v Hoge (22991/2017) [2019] ZAWCHC 58; 2019 (5) SA 158 (WCC) (23 May 2019) par 9.

132 Koos Croucamp at the time.

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• “Regulate the conduct of parties in community schemes;

• To regulate, control and quality assure all scheme governance

documentation;

• Provide [an accessible and cost effective] dispute resolution service;

• Provide stakeholder training, consumer education and awareness for property

owners, occupiers and other stakeholders; and

• Ensure that the organisation is managed in an efficient and sustainable

manner” (CSOS, 2018).

Bullet point four above dealing with training was probably influenced by Professor

Graham Paddock whose companies and network of beneficiaries, including NAMA

members, are benefiting substantially from providing such training and was touched

on with under section 4.2.9 hereof and otherwise throughout this paper. Bullet point

3 above has been taken care of by populating the CSOS dispute resolution

mechanism with members of the Syndicate as was previously done under Marina

Constas’ STAP dealt with under section 7 hereof.

As dealt with further below, the Syndicate has been occupying controlling positions at

CSOS notwithstanding the Syndicate led the co-drafting of the Regulations and knows

they were aimed to create, in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of South

Africa,133 “an independent body tasked with facilitating and arranging the efficient

and cost effective resolution of disputes which arise in all 'community schemes'”

(Paddocks, 2007, p. 2). The regulatory framework for community schemes was, prior

to the enactment of the new Regulations and CSOS, largely fragmented with no

regulatory body in place to deal with complaints or disputes, and a myriad of

complaints was received by Government from disgruntled property owners which

purportedly prompted Government to establish CSOS (CSOS, 2018).

As already dealt with under section 7 hereof, prior to CSOS coming into effect, most,

if not all sectional title schemes were historically obliged to refer disputes to

133 1996.

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arbitration134 which was often controlled or influenced by the Syndicate through

its so-called STAP and network of beneficiaries. The “traditional arbitration clause

typically involve[d] the appointment of an external135 arbitrator (usually at a very

high cost)” (Freitas dos Santos, Is arbitration an internal dispute resolution

mechanism?, 2019), as was also demonstrated under section 7 hereof. Judge Binns-

Ward alludes to the fact that CSOS was meant to change this in his judgement in the

matter between Coral Island Body Corporate v Hoge136 which reads as follows:

“[T]he cost of litigating [community scheme] disputes in the courts is

beyond the reach of the vast majority of individual owners of sectional

title units [which is a reason why] the [CSOS] Act was enacted as part of

the tranche of sectional title-related reform measures adopted by the

legislature nearly a decade ago. The [CSOS] Act provided for the

establishment of a service to provide for a dispute resolution mechanism in

community schemes…without the involvement of legal representation

on behalf of any of the parties” (2019).137

It is therefore telling that just about every attorney and his dog, and especially the

metaphorical dogs from within the Syndicate, are marketing their legal services as

being necessary to succeed in CSOS adjudications. Furthermore, that so many of

them are providing such services to offending trustees/directors, NAMA managing

agents and other co-conspirators who apparently have unfettered access to an

abundance of other peoples’ money, and who happen to be the gatekeepers into

the community scheme trust accounts entrusted to them which are easy to abuse

with impunity because the poor Regulations, and dismal failure of the

authorities, are enabling it.

Considering the threat posed by the establishment of CSOS (if there ever was a threat

when considering how easily the Syndicate has infiltrated it), the Syndicate wasted

no time in engaging CSOS, offering “partnership, information and advice” and even

134 STA PMR 71 in terms of which the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 applied. 135 The dispute was adjudicated externally to the community scheme. 136 (22991/2017) [2019] ZAWCHC 58; 2019 (5) SA 158 (WCC) (23 May 2019) at par 9. 137 Which posed a threat to the litigation income of the Syndicate and its network of beneficiaries.

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hosted a nationwide “CSOS roadshow” through NAMA during 2014/2015.138 It is also

not without coincidence that:

• NAMA and Paddocks139 became listed as “critical stakeholders” of CSOS

(CSOS, 2015, p. 20) after the “CSOS roadshow”, which was not depicted in

CSOS’ prior annual reports. It is yet unknown why members of the Syndicate

are listed as “critical stakeholders” while there seems to be no credible and

independent representative of community scheme owners listed as a “critical

stakeholder”;

• The Syndicate influenced and co-drafted the Regulations (Paddocks, 2017),

and “played an important role in advising the Government on a number of

critical aspects that will pave the way for change in the South African legal

framework” (BBM Attorneys February, 2012), with NAMA even being

“represented on the Sectional Titles Regulations Board” (BBM Attorneys

December, 2010, p. 4);140

• Marina Constas also personally provided training during 2015 to CSOS at

her BBM Attorneys offices and elsewhere (CSOS, 2016, p. 46); and

• Notwithstanding the abundantly transparent conflicts of interest when

considering Constas’ role within BBM Attorneys and NAMA whose self-

regulating and other objectives are diametrically opposed to the purported

purpose of CSOS, Marina Constas was shockingly appointed to the CSOS

board on 1 March 2016 (CSOS, 2016, pp. 5, 17, 53).141 In terms of section

4(3) of the CSOS Act, CSOS “acts through its Board”, and in terms of section

138 CSOS financial year. 139 Directors of Paddocks Education: Graham John Paddock and Amanda Claire Paddock registered in 2013;

Paddocks publishing directors: Graham Paddock, registered in 2000; Paddock Lifestyle Directors (same registered address as other and could be related to the Paddocks Lifestyle Estate in Fourways): Samuel Edward Paddock and Keri Anne Paddock; Paddock Holdings Directors (registered at same address as others): Samuel Edward Paddock.

140 Late Greer Moore-Barnes “was appointed as a founding Director of the National Association of Managing Agents (NAMA) in 2001 [and] was [later] appointed by the Minister in 2009 to represent NAMA as an alternate director on the Sectional Titles Regulations Board during which time she was active in promoting and achieving important changes…and additionally served as one of NAMA’s accredited trainers for more than five years” (own emphasis) (Bellbouy, n.d.).

141 In terms of section 6 of the CSOS Act limiting her term to 3 years, her appointment ended 31 December 2018 while the CSOS 2018/2019 Annual Report shows she was still paid to attend decision-making meetings during 2019.

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9(g) of the CSOS Act:

“[a] person may not be appointed as or remain as a member of the

Board, as the case may be, if that person has or acquires an

interest in a business or enterprise which may conflict or

interfere with the proper performance of his or her functions as a

member of the Board”.

Following her surprising yet telling appointment to CSOS’ board of directors,

Constas wasted no time in even further asserting herself and BBM Attorneys, the

Syndicate, NAMA and other business associates by co-ordinating various meetings

between the Syndicate and CSOS. BizCommunity reported on this during July 2016

as follows:

“[a]ccording to specialist sectional title attorney Marina Constas, recent

discussions on the [CSOS] Act between various stakeholders have heralded

good news. Constas was recently invited to be part of the Department of

Human Settlements’ delegation at the Council of Provinces’ Select

Committee hearing on the CSOS Act…Constas acted in a support role to

the delegation in parliament, offering input on questions from the different

Figure 34 – CSOS Board of Directors 2016

Source: CSOS Annual Report 2015/2016 https://csos.org.za/annualreport/csosar2015_16.pdf

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political parties relating to the

legal aspects of the [CSOS] Act

and regulations. Constas was

also involved in [NAMA's]

meeting with the executive of

CSOS, [and she states that]

‘With the proclamation of both

the CSOS Act and the [STSMA]

imminent, cooperation like this

is very positive. It is extremely

encouraging that the ombud

and his team are engaging with important industry stakeholders, so that

they will be well placed to resolve disputes in community schemes once

these Acts are proclaimed’” (BizCommunity, 2016).

In terms of her CSOS appointment,

Marina Constas conveniently sat on,

amongst others, the Legislation,

Adjudication and Transformation

Committee (CSOS, 2017, pp. 10 - 13),

and her role conveniently included

the responsibilities listed in Figure

36 (CSOS, 2019, p. 35).

It was most convenient that Constas

had already established STAP and

populated it with her fellow Syndicate

members, as dealt with under section 7

hereof, so she was naturally “grateful

that when [CSOS] comes into effect a

panel of Sectional Title adjudicators will be appointed, who have been properly vetted”

(BBM Attorneys, 2011, p. 8).

It is therefore without coincidence that her close friend and business associate,

and prominent member of the Syndicate, Karen Bleijs, was also appointed at

Figure 35 - NAMA meets with CSOS: pictured at the meeting are (from left) Khwezi Ngwenya, Coenie Groenewald (COO of

NAMA), Marco De Oliveira (Regional Director of NAMA), Themba Mthetwa, Advocate Nomazotsho Memani, Marina

Constas (NAMA and CSOS), Dinkie Dube, Ndivhuo Rabuli and Brad Cowie (Regional Director NAMA)

Source: https://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/570/147587.html

Figure 36 - Marina Constas' CSOS Responsibilities

http://csos.org.za/anualreport/CSOS_Annual_Report_2018_19.pdf

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CSOS as a full-time adjudicator. It is also telling that this appointment was made

just after CSOS, the Minister of Human Settlements, the MEC for Human Settlements

and the State Attorney were all alerted to the Syndicate, its modus operandi and the

brazen lawlessness of its offending members, and more specifically that of Karen

Bleijs and Whitfields Property Management. It is even more telling that:

• Bleijs closed her lucrative law

firm, Karen Bleijs Attorneys, to

take up her full-time dispute

adjudication role at CSOS

(PropertyWheel, 2019);142

• Notwithstanding the evidence to

the contrary, Bleijs brazenly

provides false and misleading

information under oath with

respect to her relationships with

Marina Constas, Alan Levy and Elmo York-Stuart, going so far as denying she

has any relationship with Constas whatsoever in one affidavit, which contradicts

another affidavit in which she admits she does have a relationship with Constas.

Furthermore, also denying she has ever been employed by Alan Levy Attorneys

and denying she has a close relationship with Elmo York-Stuart, all of which is

shown to be despicably dishonest in the foregoing sections, and more

specifically sections 4 and 7 hereof;

• Bleijs and Constas’ strategic client, Whitfields Property Management, also

took on CSOS’ property administration as soon as it was established (Whitfields

Property Management, 2017), with Whitfields unduly influencing CSOS

adjudications in its favour with incredible ease;

142 Handed her clients to her and Alan Levy’s business associate Suzanne Coppin of Coppin Attorneys and Sutherland Kruger Inc. Attorneys who also represents Whitfields and Bleijs in court matters in which they are implicated in gross misconduct and alleged ongoing offences.

Figure 37 - Karen Bleijs Attorneys Closed per Website

http://www.bleijs.co.za/kbalaw.co.za/ (accessed January 2020)

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• CSOS assists Karen Bleijs and Whitfields Property Management to

circumvent accountability where they are implicated in wrongdoing in

community scheme disputes;

• Elmo York-Stuart is appearing in

photographs after private meetings

held with CSOS officials as

depicted in Figure 38 (NAMA,

2017);

• Paddocks “has been retained by

CSOS to train its staff” (Paddock,

Paddocks - Community Scheme

Ombud Service – An Overview,

2016); and

• Graham Paddock made some telling contradictions in his newsletter of May

2007 in which he first alleged that the Regulations he was influencing and co-

drafting would “create an independent body, [being CSOS]” but then

revealingly goes on to say that “[w]e expect that experienced managing

agents be well-placed to serve as part-time [CSOS] adjudicators”

(Paddocks, 2007, p. 2).

From the above the Syndicate is clearly benefitting from public funds while

occupying strategic influential positions within CSOS that can easily be abused to the

Syndicate’s advantage and against the public interest.

Most conveniently of all, Bleijs and any other members of the Syndicate who may

be adjudicating disputes at CSOS “have the same privileges and immunities from

liability as a judge of the High Court”,143 enabling them to misconduct themselves

and abuse their positions with impunity, whereas arbitrators who are found guilty of

misconduct by our courts could be saddled with costs. The ongoing threat to the

public simply cannot be over-emphasised. Community scheme property owners

who wish to enforce their rights against the Syndicate may have little choice but to be

143 In terms of section 37(1) of the CSOS Act, own emphasis.

Figure 38 - Elmo York-Stuart of EY Attorneys with the CSOS Chief Ombud and Head of Legal

https://www.facebook.com/pg/nama.org.za/posts/

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subjected to the Syndicate’s own members masquerading as independent and

impartial adjudicators.

The obligation on owners or tenants to seek relief through the Syndicate-infiltrated

CSOS is confirmed by the fact that private arbitration has explictily been forbidden

under point 7 of Annexure “A” to CSOS’ “Circular on Amendment of Rules in Terms of

the STSMA”,144 and is also alluded to in Judge Binns-Ward’s judgement in the matter

between Coral Island Body Corporate v Hoge145 which reads as follows:

“It requires little insight to appreciate that those commendable policy

considerations would be liable to be undermined if the courts were

indiscriminately to entertain and dispose of matters that should rather have

been brought under the Ombud Act. Whilst judges and magistrates may

not have the power to refuse to hear such cases,146 they should, in my view,

nonetheless use their judicial discretion in respect of costs to discourage

the inappropriate resort to the courts in respect of matters that could,

and more appropriately should, have been taken to the Community

Schemes Ombud Service.147” (2019).

Gagai of the Office of the Chief Justice says the following with respect to CSOS

directives, offences and orders, some of which appears not to apply to the Syndicate’s

members, alternatively the Syndicate’s members disregard it for reasons provided

herein:

“Any person who fails to co-operate with the Service by amongst other

things, failure to comply with a directive issued under this [CSOS] Act, failure

to or refusal to give data or information, or giving false or misleading data

or information when required to give information under the [CSOS] Act,

144 Signed on 1 August 2019. 145 (22991/2017) [2019] ZAWCHC 58; 2019 (5) SA 158 (WCC) (23 May 2019) par 10. 146 Cf. Standard Credit Corporation Ltd v Bester and Others 1987 (1) SA 812 (W) at 815-819 (also reported at

[1987] 3 All SA 96), endorsed in Agri Wire (Pty) Ltd and another v Commissioner of the Competition Commission, and Others [2012] ZASCA 134; [2012] 4 All SA 365 (SCA); 2013 (5) SA 484, at para. 19 (in note 9) and in this Division in Marth NO v Collier and Another [1996] 3 All SA 506 (C); sed contra In re: Nedbank Limited v Thobejane and related matters [2018] ZAGPPHC 692, [2018] 4 All SA 694 (GP), 2019 (1) SA 594.

147 Cf. Derero v Derero 1934 WLD 19 at 21-22 and Goldberg v Goldberg 1938 WLD 83 at 85-86, both of which judgments are mentioned in discussion in Standard Credit Corporation v Bester supra.

Page 87 of 116

can be found guilty of an offence and be liable on conviction to a fine or

imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years or to both such fine and

imprisonment (section 34 of the Act). An order of an adjudicator is

enforceable as if it were a judgment of a court of law (section 56 of the

Act).” (Gagai, 2015). Also see Joss’ comments on this (Joss, 2017).

Considering a CSOS adjudication order148 is final and binding it is therefore of the

utmost importance that CSOS and its adjudicators are independent, act

transparently, in good faith, lawfully, impartially and that there is no perception of

bias. Notwithstanding the obvious lack of independence already described herein,

CSOS and its adjudicators even tellingly refuse to provide any declaration of

independence when requested by parties to a dispute.

Although CSOS adjudications may be appealed on a question of law only149 (Gagai,

2015), is utterly defeats the purports of the CSOS Act and merely serves to provide

even further opportunity for the conspiring members of the Syndicate to be unjustly

enriched while appellants suffer even more irreparable harm.150 Constas below

comments prior to the enactment of the new Regulations also says a lot in these

respects:

“My only major concern is that in terms of the Community Schemes

Ombudsman’s Bill, an award will be appealable. Currently [an arbitration]

award is not subject to appeal, only to review. This is undeniably a

[threatening] weakness in the legislation. As the law stands now, the only

recourse you have to overturn the award, is to approach the High Court on

the basis that the Arbitrator showed bias, exceeded his powers, or followed

the incorrect procedure. The merits of the award cannot be attacked. With

the new section of the [CSOS] Act allowing for appeal, we are going to

be faced with disgruntled losers who will go on appeal…” (BBM

148 Which amounts to an administrative action in terms of the Promotion of Access to Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA).

149 Section 57(1) of the CSOS Act which conveniently omits relief provided for under PAJA. 150 The Syndicate and CSOS may argue that there can be no irreparable harm if the courts set aside the award,

however that does not account for the pain and suffering and time loss that parties will endure in such circumstances, while the Syndicate remains largely protected and is living large at the expense of victims.

Page 88 of 116

Attorneys February, 2011, p. 9).

With all the foregoing in mind, it comes as no surprise that under Constas’ self-

professed “expert” watch and guidance while occupying her position on the CSOS

board, and charged with overseeing the implementation of CSOS’ informal, cost

effective and accessible dispute resolution mechanism, that the following has been

publicised in the media:

“[i]t is clear that the CSOS are not meeting their undertaken

requirements to the property owners who pay the monthly levies for their

services and there are a number of basic incompetencies rife throughout

the organisation. Our experience of the two-year report card has been that

adjudicators arrive late or not at all for hearings. Poor decisions that are

made in adjudication are being referred to the High Courts for relief,

which is costly and counterproductive and can potentially be stuck in the

system for a number of years. There is also non-adherence to their own

practice directive timelines” (Renecle, 2018).

9 Some Examples of How Ongoing Offences are Being Perpetrated with Impunity by Conspiring Trustees, NAMA Managing Agents and other Members of the Syndicate

In the conveniently poorly regulated and Syndicate-influenced environment dealt

with in all the foregoing sections, it remains extremely easy to defraud trust funds

and owners and otherwise act unlawfully, and just as easy to conceal it by abusing

Syndicate-designed regulatory provisions such as those enabling conspiring

offenders to raise special levies at will (Constas, Special levies can be raised without

body corporate's consent, 2015).

The following demonstrates some additional types of misconduct and offences being

perpetrated with impunity by offenders, and being facilitated by the benefitting and

offending members of the Syndicate. This list is by no means exhaustive:

• Electricity rates are being illegally manipulated to, inter alia, conceal

maladministration, force smaller units to surreptitiously fund the greater

electricity consumption of other units such as those that are larger and more

populated, and to fund common property usage in contravention of prescribed

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participation quotas;151

• Conspiring trustees and members of the Syndicate are illegally and wilfully

levying fees and charges to levy accounts in contravention of STSMA PMR’s

25(4) and 25(5), and some of which is dealt with further below;

• Conspiring trustees and members of the Syndicate are flagrantly

disregarding adverse orders and findings made by tribunals made against

them;

• Premiums are surreptitiously being inflated by offending NAMA managing

agents, in amounts small enough to avoid detection, and which may quickly

become lucrative when done across multiple schemes. For example. if a

NAMA managing agent controls about 450 schemes in its portfolio, and

defrauds each community scheme by only R100 per month, offenders may

easily pocket around R540,000.00 per annum (R100 x 450 x 12 =

R540,000.00);

• Conspiring NAMA managing agents, other members of the Syndicate and

trustees are unlawfully benefitting from trust funds through, inter alia:

o Unauthorised private property renovations, repairs and maintenance

which is unlawfully funded from trust funds; and

o Unauthorised trust fund payments made for products and/or services,

some of which the conspirators refuse, alternatively are unable to provide

any proof that such products and/or services were ever delivered. Making

matters worse, in some cases conspirators even submit expense claims for

the same alleged products and/or services already paid for, apparently

meeting all the elements of fraud;

o Conspiring trustees and members of the Syndicate are, in the absence of

due authorisation and in terms of which they are personally parties to the

151 In terms of the STSMA, “’participation quota’, in relation to a section or the owner of a section, means the percentage determined in accordance with the provisions of section 32(1) or (2) of the [STA] in respect of that section for the purposes referred to in section 32(3) of that Act”, and in terms of STA PMR 31 “the liability of owners to make contributions…shall…be borne by the owners…in accordance with the participation quotas attaching to their respective sections”.

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matters, abusing trust funds to fund their personal litigation costs152

and otherwise pursuing litigation unlawfully in the absence of approved

budgets and due authorisation. In these respects, they also tamper with

court evidence, influence, or attempt to influence the judiciary and

fraudulently inflate bills of cost to circumvent the liability for orders made

against them; and

o Conspiring trustees and members of the Syndicate are pursuing

judgements in courts (and very easily so) grounded in fraud and

extortion aimed at depriving owners of rights and property and otherwise

pursuing sinister agendas, some of which was already dealt with under

section 4.2.12 hereof, and is dealt with further below.

• Suppliers from within the Syndicate are unlawfully being procured to

undertake common property improvements without due and proper

authorisation, in contravention of the Regulations and some of which have even

unanimously rejected by the owners at a general meeting (suggesting

possible kickbacks);

• Conspiring trustees and NAMA managing agents fraudulently misrepresent

what transpires at general meetings of the owners, exacerbated by the fact that

many owners do not attend meetings and that NAMA managing agents have

manipulated the prescribed proxy form to bypass restrictions imposed by the

STSMA PMR’s, which is being done as follows and doe in the absence of a

valid resolution of the owners of the scheme:

o STSMA PMR 5(3) provides that “[t]he notification by a member to a body

corporate of the appointment of a proxy must be substantially in

accordance with Form C of Annexure 3”, while STSMA PMR 15(3)(c)

provides that “[t]he notice of a general meeting must be accompanied

by…a proxy appointment form in the prescribed format”;

152 STSMA PMR 6(3) provides that “[a] trustee who has any direct or indirect personal interest in any matter to be considered by the trustees must not be present at or play any part in the consideration or decision of the matter concerned” and STSMA PMR 14(3) provides that “A trustee is disqualified from voting in respect of “any proposed or current contract or dispute with the body corporate to which the trustee is a party; and any other matter in which the trustee has any direct or indirect personal interest”.

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o Form C further provides that “[i]n terms of section 6(5) of the Sectional Titles

Schemes Management Act 2011 a member must be represented in person

or by proxy at meetings of body corporate and a person may not act as a

proxy for more than two members of the body corporate”; and

o The Prescribed wording of Form C is as follows (see Figure 40 below):

“I/We, the undersigned owner(s) and member(s) give notice to the

body corporate of the above scheme that I/we appoint a proxy to

speak and vote at the general meetings (including adjournments)

and on the terms set out below…

Proxy (insert one full name)”

o Which is being replaced by NAMA managing agents and conspiring

trustees with (see Figure 40 below):

“I/We, the undersigned owner(s) and member(s) give notice to the

body corporate of the above scheme that I/we appoint a proxy to

speak and vote at the general meetings (including adjournments)

and on the terms set out below. My proxy has the power to

substitute a third party instead of him/herself as my agent if

he/she is not able to exercise this proxy appointments due to

the restriction contained in the privisio to section 6(5) of the

Sectional titles Schemes Management Act, 2011…

Proxy name (insert one full name/or failing which the Chairman)”

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More substantial abuse of office and trust funds arises when anyone discovers

and acts against irregularities and misconduct, hereinafter referred to as “the

Victim(s)”. In this situation the conspiring NAMA managing agents and

trustees/directors, being the offenders, unlawfully abuse the schemes’ trust funds to

fund their personal legal representation and agendas, and fraudulently misrepresent

facts with respect thereto. Notwithstanding the already obvious financial

disadvantage, to silence and stifle the Victims, and bearing in mind that in terms of

section 25 of the Constitution, “[n]o one may be deprived of property except in terms

of law of general application and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property”:

• The Offenders also do such things as fabricate or fraudulently misrepresent

indebtedness,153 thus depriving Victims of voting and other rights, and their

ability to themselves stand or be elected as trustees because this could hinder

153 Willful contravention of section 11(2) PMR 25(5) of the STSMA, Debt Collectors Act. And other laws.

Figure 40 - Proxy Form as Manipulated by NAMA Managing Agents

Figure 40 – Proxy Form C to the Regulations

Source: STSMA Regulations

Page 93 of 116

or further expose offending conduct. Paddocks’ of the Syndicate

misleadingly recommends that “[a]n owner who is unhappy that the trustees

are exercising their executive powers properly, can of course nominate

themselves, or someone they think will be more responsible, for election as a

trustee at the next annual general” (Paddock, Paddocks - What can owners do

when body corporate trustees go rogue?, 2019), which is notwithstanding

Paddocks know that:

o Marina Constas of the Syndicate and who infiltrated CSOS to control

adjudications had “been lobbying for” (BizCommunity, 2013) regulations

that prevent owners who are the Victims of the offending Syndicate

members’ debt fraud scam (“the Syndicate’s Debt Fraud Scam”) referred

to above, from becoming trustees, and that the Syndicate has “been

vociferous in [their] views on this issue” (Constas, Trustees in Arrears

with Levies - Be Warned!, 2013); and

o The Syndicate’s Debt Fraud Scam includes illegally, and wilfully in

contravention of STSMA PMR’s 25(4) and 25(5), levying legal and other

fees to the accounts of Victims, in the absence of judgements and taxation

and which is aimed to maximise the offenders’ financial and other benefits.

In these respects, the Syndicate even has help from the likes of other

influential and powerful co-conspirators including senior employees at

the likes of Standard Bank, Investec, Adams and Adams, Sutherland

Kruger Inc. Attorneys, Karen Bleijs of CSOS, Kruger Stoltz Inc.

Auditors. De Klerk of Paddocks correctly states the following about such

fees:

“Naturally, the body corporate will want to recover the legal

expenses it has incurred in the collection of arrear contributions from

the member, but if the member fails and/or refuses to agree to pay

such legal fees (which they almost always will), the management

rules prescribed under the [STSMA] require that the body

corporate get the fees taxed before it can be legally recovered

from the member. Therefore, trustees cannot simply add the body

corporate attorney’s fees to the members levy account upon receipt

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of the invoice from the instructed law firm…

It is possible for the body corporate rules to provide for a penalty to

be charged if an owner fails and/or refuses to pay his contributions

timeously, but it is important to note that the trustees can only add

such penalty to an owner’s levy account if it is specifically provided

for in rules, which have been approved by the Community Schemes

Ombud Service. In addition, the penalty needs to be reasonable in

the circumstances. Has the owner been given fair warning that a

penalty will be added to his account if he does not settle his debt,

and has he been given an opportunity to explain why he has fallen

behind on his payments and negotiate a payment plan? If not, the

imposition of a penalty may not be reasonable” (De Klerk, Dealing

with levy defaulters in a lawful way, 2019).

• The above conspiracy causes substantial irreparable harm to the Victims

and imposes the risk of, inter alia, job loss, inability to apply for credit and

loss of property;

• Alluding to the afore-mentioned, in the judgement in the matter between

Catling and Another v Constas N.O and Another154 (2019) and in terms of

which Sutherland Kruger Inc. represented the body corporate, Marina

Constas’ arbitration award was set aside and the owners were found not to be

indebted to the body corporate as had been alleged by the trustees, and which

was also dealt with under sections 4.2.2, 4.2.7, 7 and 8 hereof;155

• The foregoing misconduct may also explain why the Syndicate has been

attempting to circumvent the Debt Collectors Act and Regulations and the

Property Practitioners Bill dealt with further under sections 6.2 and 6.4

hereof; and

• Some other insightful information on the issue of (alleged) debt and the

collection thereof can also be found in the articles written by Aarde (Arde,

154 (26471/2016) [2019] ZAGPJHC 350 (17 September 2019). 155 Act 42 of 1965.

Page 95 of 116

There’s a limit to what debt collectors can charge you, 2013), Zungu (Zungu,

2019), Smith (Smith, 2016), Constas 2015 (Constas, Special levies can be

raised without body corporate's consent, 2015) and Constas 2017 (Constas,

Are Your Trustees Overly Officious?, 2017).

Demonstrating the Syndicate’s power and influence is the suspicious failure of various

authorities to act against such offending conduct, including SAPS, the Law Society,

CIPC, IRBA, Minister of Human Settlements and CSOS who have all been alerted to

the Syndicate and the alleged misconduct of its offending members, some of them

since as far back as 2012. Offenders confidently and brazenly persist while

members of the public continue to suffer irreparable harm at their mercy.

10 Sample of Public Complaints Against the Syndicate

The below are some complaints lodged on sites offering legal assistance or where

members of the public may raise complaints against service providers.

10.1 Online Complaint Against BBM Attorneys, Karen Bleijs, Alan Levy,

Suzanne Coppin, AJ van Rensburg, Annette Horwitz and Retief & Meintjes

The following single online complaint which implicates/refers to many of the prominent

members of the Syndicate and which is eerily similar to other complaints by members

of the public, was made on the Just Answer Website - South African Law and

implicates numerous members of the syndicate in just one matter. Considering Karen

Bleijs’ company BWHM Property Group provided property management services and

that Alan Levy is referred to as the attorney in the matter below, it can be inferred that

the arbitrator was Karen Bleijs.

“Complainant: [P]lease [help me find an expert attorney] but not the following

lawyers as I have used and/or gotten [poor assistance] from them

before and was not happy with their service: BBM, Alan Levy,

Page 96 of 116

Retief & Meintjes, AJ Van Rensburg,156 Anne Horwitz [a close

colleague of Marina Constas]…

[My case] was dragged [out] and…I objected to [the arbitrator

because] she is also a managing agent…My attorney at the

time went ahead with her despite my objections. My attorney

attended the [pre-arbitration meeting] and there [were] no minutes,

process, procedure etc. [provided to me,] only times for [the]

delivery of [documents in the proceedings]. The [arbitration] was

postponed twice and then held on 9 & 10 May 2012. [The

arbitration proceedings were] highly irregular, no minutes

were taken…[and] the [arbitrator also] did not tape

proceedings.

I did not know what to do as I was not being informed by my

lawyer. The [arbitrator] even congratulated the chairperson of

[body corporate] on her witness statement in front of my

witness…

After submitting the [heads of argument my] attorney…then

became the [attorney acting for the managing agent]…

Sorry, I know without seeing all my docs it's hard but please I need

to do something soon. This is my house. The first one, and only

one I have, and I can't afford to lose it. I want to recoup my

losses and sell and move and put all this behind me…

[I] just wanted to add two other attorneys who I am not happy

with Karen Bleijs, and Suzanne Coppin.157 I will not appreciate

hearing from them. They botched my parents’ complex cases.

156 Karen Bleijs was a director of AJ van Rensburg law firm, and she together with the other known Syndicate members being BBM (Marina Constas) and Alan Levy are described out under section 4.2 hereof, while Annette Horwitz is an extremely close college and business associate of Marina Constas who also established STAP with Constas.

157 Karen Bleijs and Suzzane Coppin are both members of the Syndicate as already dealt with under section 4.2 hereof.

Page 97 of 116

Online Lawyer: I can and will advise you to speak to the guru of Sectional Titles

Prof Graham Paddock.158 He might be able to refer you to

someone who might be able to assist you…

I have also had interaction with BBM and they are not the most

ethical attorneys. Unfortunately some attorneys are only

interested in the amount of fees they can debit and the merits of

the matter become secondary to them.

Once you have secured the services of a competent attorney, he

will have to start proceedings for defamation against this

chairperson, and also request the arbitrator to recuse herself,

because her objectivity is in jeopardy. Even the appearance

of bias towards one party (whether it is discussing the case with

one party and not the other, or whatever the case may be) is

grounds for her recusal, and if she refuses [apply for a] review

of the arbitration.

If there is any point or issue you want me to elaborate on, feel free

to ask me, but I don't think you need online legal advice. You need

someone who could handle your case, and for that you need a

specialist sectional title lawyer and Graham Paddock is the best

person to give advice on that. As far as your attorneys are

concerned…[t]hey may not act for the managing agent, it is a

conflict of interest…

Complainant: Thank you for your response...Will contact Paddock today. I

received a ruling on the [arbitration] today from my last attorney

who now wants to close my file it seems with or without my

instruction as they are saying they made the managing agent

their client and they need to close my file as I am a conflict of

interest which I know to be wrong…

158 Graham Paddock is also a prominent member of the Syndicate as already dealt with under section 4.2 hereof.

Page 98 of 116

Also the [arbitrator] apparently ruled on 3 Sept but signed [the]

docs on the 14th [on] the letterhead of the opposing attorney

which seems highly irregular and my last attorney, Alan Levy

says that they went to the opposing attorney's offices to discuss a

matter and found out about the ruling through them and that's how

they got a copy. This all seems highly illegal to me. Where is

the justice? [The arbitrator said] she destroyed the minutes

of the arbitration.

I am actually stunned by the blatant disregard for ethics and or

justice in this case.

Online Lawyer: In my opinion there are more than enough grounds for review of

the arbitration. It sounds more like jungle justice to me.” (Just

Answer, 2012).

10.2 Online Complaint Against BBM Attorneys

Complainant: illegal collection methods!!!! Be warned!!! I own a rental unit

where the tenant vacated the unit and the levy fell behind with one

month. I was not informed of this by my managing agent nor the

agent managing the complex. I just received a account from an

attorney of which i was not ever phoned, or emailed by them to

inform me of the problem. They sent a letter of demand to my

tenant by the registered slip is made out to a company and not

myself or my tenant. Obviously my tenant will not collect the letter

of demand as it was not made out to any person that she knows.

After pointing out the mistake to them they just refuse to except

there mistake and now they charged me a heap off legal fees

without me even knowing about the problem. I believe this was

done on purpose to increase the account without me knowing

about the matter. Other people should be warned about Biccari

Bollo Mariano attorneys [i.e. BBM Attorneys’] illegal

collection methods. I am in the process of lodging a complaint

against them with the law society to force them to comply with legal

Page 99 of 116

collections.” (Juan, 2018)

Note that at the end of the above complaint the complainant states that “I

am in the process of lodging a complaint against them with the law society to

force them to comply with legal collections”. What the complainant may

probably know by now is that the Law Society appears not to act against

members of the Syndicate complained of.

10.3 Some Online Complaints Against Alan Levy Attorneys (Member of the

Syndicate) on Various Complaint Websites

“Complainant: “[We] [a]pproached Alan Levy attorneys159 to evict a non paying

tenant. We had to deposit over R5000 to get the process going.

We where (sic) told that they would have to notify the tenant of

breach and had to send her a breach letter. This letter cost us

over R1000 and could have been typed in 5 minutes. It was

emailed not even hand delivered. A rental contract cost over

R1600, and the rest of our deposit was used up for so called work

that did not solve anything. Even if I was called to tell me that their

offices are going to be closed I was charged. I was charged for

leaving me a voice mail. I was charged for receiving my emails.

We needed help, but instead with ended up someone else

taking our money for nothing. Now we have to pay another

deposit at the next lawyer and hope they do not do the same.”

(fefa, 2013)

“Complainant: Due to the current economic climate I was forced to sell my house.

The house was sold at auction in September 2012. The attorneys

dealing with the sale are Alan Levy Attorney's & Conveyancers,

their lawyer is Ms Tebogo Tisane. There are serious delays

concerning the sale which Alan Levy Attorney's accredit to

159 Member of the Syndicate which also Employed Karen Bleijs as Senior Associate as dealt with under section 4.2 hereof.

Page 100 of 116

Nedbank Lawyers Hammond and Pole. According to Ms Tebogo

Tisane she has been waiting for Nedbank Lawyers since

November 2012 to lift the interdict in order for this sale to come to

a conclusion. We have now reached the limit of our patience

and wish to have immediate answers concerning this

inappropriate behaviour of both the company's lawyers. Ms

Tisane has had the very same status since end of October 2012,

in addition she took a full 30 day holiday without allocating the case

to someone who could further the sale. We are very unhappy with

the constant passing the buck when we are the ones [paying] the

lawyer fees.” (MartinFourie2, 2013)

“Complainant: Alan Levy is representing PVE body corporate in Midrand and

apparently I was unable to pay my levies as one of the owners in

PVE property. I did inform the Estate management immediately of

my inability to pay levies due to losing my job. I have been in

contact with Estate management and always replied when they

communicated and yet they handed over my account to Allan

Levy. Later I made arrangements with the Trustees to pay and the

trustees agreed to withdraw my account from the Attorneys. After

the case was withdrawn from Alan levy Attorneys I then settled the

account. However I found out recently that Allan Levy have sent

a record of a judgement for unpaid levies against me on ITC, yet

the account was settled already. Im unhappy with the fact that

Alan Levy failed to inform me before sending my record to ITC

and that they sent it while the debt was already settled and the

account was also not their responsibility any more as it was

requested by trustees to be withdrawn from them i dont know

they acted under whose authority or instruction.” (Precy123,

2013).

Page 101 of 116

11 Conclusion

From all the facts provided herein, and in terms of which the Syndicate’s own

publicised words and conduct has been extensively referenced, there can be little

doubt that the Syndicate is influencing Government in its favour and abusing

offices of trust and power to the detriment of the public. Its Elaborate Capture

Scheme, designed to satisfy its own sickening greed at the expense of others, is

causing untold and ongoing irreparable harm to many property owners.

The fact that senior employees/executives of certain major banks stand accused

of conspiring with others to commit such horrific illegal acts as described herein,

and which banks’ employees are expected to act with integrity, especially when it

comes to other peoples’ money, only makes things worse, shines a spotlight on

their credibility, raises questions with respect to their dealings and calls into question

the true nature of those banks’ relationships with the Syndicate.

The authorities are dismally failing to act, notwithstanding they have had much of

the information contained herein for many years, which dictates that the public has

little choice other than to act for and defend itself. Arm yourself with knowledge,

know your rights and unite against the Syndicate and the utterly despicable

conduct of its offending members.

The most concerning issue of all is: if this has happened with respect to the

property sector it is highly likely it is happening with respect to other sectors.

WE MUST DEMAND REGULATORY INDEPENDENCE AND OUR RIGHTS BACK!

#KnowYourSyndicates

#InvestigateTheLawSociety

#GiveBackOurRights

#ProtectThePublic

#NAMAMustFall

#InvestigateTheSyndicate

#ProsecuteOffenders

#CorruptionMustFall

Page 102 of 116

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