Prosecution’s Memorandum Affirming the Power of the Impeachment Court to Issue Subpoena Duces Tecum Et Ad Testificandum on Certain Justices and Records of the Supreme Court

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Congress ofthe Philippines ,-.

: I, " , ~ i ! ~ J .c, '.'!' 1 'i .'Senate '''',,\ ' : 'I .-: I;;' t ( , 1

SITIING AS THE IMPEACHMENT T ~ i ' ~ O r , l R r ' " of I I " , , , , , j . , , ~

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT

OF RENATO C. CORONA AS CHIEF

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE PHILIPPINES

REPRESENTATIVES NIEL C, TUPAS, JR.,

JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA, LORENZO R.

TANADA III, REYNALDO V. UMALI,ARLENE J. BAG-AO (other complainants

comprising at least one third (1/3) of

the total Members of the House or

Representatives as are indicated

below.)

x-----------------------------------------------------------x

MEMORANDUM

'12 FEG -8 All :23

Case No. 002-2011

AFFIRMING THE POWER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COURT TO ISSUE

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM ET AD TESTIFICANDUM ON CERTAIN JUSTICES

AND RECORDS OF THE SUPREME COURT

COMPLAINANT HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, through their

PROSECUTORS, respectfully submits the instant Legal Memorandum to the

Senate Impeachment Tribunal:

PREFATORY

The approval of the request of the Impeachment Complainant House of

Representatives of the Honorable Impeachment Court to issue subpoena duces

tecum on Supreme Court records including certain specific minutes of its

deliberations and subpoena ad testificandum on certain Associate Justices is very

crucial to the proper "prosecution" and management of the articles of

impeachment such as Article 7 and Article 3 by the House Prosecutors, and as



2

importantly, the just, precise, and fitting resolution by the Impeachment Court of

this accountability trial . Denial of the Prosecutor's right to access the necessary

evidence to prove its case is seriously disadvantageous to its capacity to manage

and "prosecute" the impeachment complaint. Prohibiting access to these

evidence only makes it difficult, if not impossible, to try and impeach a Justice of

the Supreme Court on the ground of partiality or bias in rendering a decision. The

Senators-Judges and the Prosecutors will be greatly, if not decisively hampered in

prosecuting or pursuing Article VII, for example, on the grant of a temporary

restraining order on the Watch ist Order of the Justice Department against

former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo considering the necessity of

testimonial and documentary evidence' to prove partiality or bias of the

respondent in the said case and partiality as proven by his efforts to distort the

Supreme Court decision on the effectivity of the TRO.

The Prosecutors maintain that the principles of separation of powers or

even claims to confidentiality of court records1

cannot diminish or curtail the

constitutional mandate of an Impeachment Court as the sole authority to try

impeachment cases. Even if, arguendo, the Impeachment Court were to decide

that heads of the three branches of government may not be summoned by the

Impeachment Court, it does not allow for the blanket denial of the Court's power

to subpoena members of the said branches, which in this case, are Associate

Justices of the Supreme Court.

In fact, the Impeachment Court has already issued subpoena on officials of

the executive branch including the BIR Commissioner and the registrars of deeds

of local government units. The Impeachment Rules also grants the Court the

power to subpoena even members of Congress including Senators to testify in

the trial. In fact, the Impeachment Court has already subpoenaed the Clerk of

Court and ordered her to produce certain records considered by the Supreme

Court as inaccessible to any person or body without the Court's permission.

Suddenly changing tact and exempting the Supreme Court from this Honorable

1 Respondent's counsel publicly announced their intention to file an opposition to the Prosecution's

subpoena of certain records and justices of the Supreme Court for violation of the doctrine of separation

of powers and confidentiali ty. The Prosecution has yet to receive such opposition.



3

Court's subpoena powers does not make the Supreme Court a co-equal body of

the Impeachment Court but a superior body which essentially subjects the

Impeachment Court to its jurisdiction.

There is no basis to the fear that the subpoena in issue will affect the

separation of powers doctrine-no power of the Supreme Court will be

diminished and the Impeachment Court will not alter or reverse standing

decisions of the Supreme Court.

While the Senate may be deemed a co-equal branch of the Judiciary, the

Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court cannot be considered a co-equal

branch of the judiciary and therefore cannot be deemed to violate the

principles of separation of powers when it issues subpoena duces tecum and ad

testificandum on other branches of government. This is because, in its sphere,

the Impeachment Court is supreme and a class of its own; in its domain the

Impeachment Court is the master. The Impeachment Court has a mandate to

perform, and that is, to determine the accountability of public officers and their

fitness to remain in office. Exempting public officers from being tried

exhaustively on otherwise relevant evidence because of privilege will not

promote and in fact will disintegrate the power of the Impeachment Court as

such. Separation of powers, including checks and balances, should not be

counterposed to the principles of accountability. The Congress, not any other

branch of government, is assigned the heavy task of impeaching and trying all

impeachable officials under the Constitution. Sitting as an Impeachment Court,

the Senate is not functioning as a legislative body and its issuance of subpoena

cannot be equated with its normal exercise of ordinary functions and duties.

The impeachment proceedings are mainly an issue of accountability rather

than an issue of separation of powers. This is precisely the reason why the

impeachment provision in the 1987 Constitution was not placed under Article V

on the Executive, Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Judiciary but

rather it was placed under Article XI on Accountability of Public Officials. While

members of Congress, and other ordinary mortals for example may be charged



4

for crimes and other offenses in ordinary courts, the Chief Justice is immune from

suit for any alleged transgression of our laws and his oath of office. The only

accountability mechanism left is impeachment and such accountability

mechanism cannot be impaired by clipping the Impeachment Court's power to

subpoena the necessary evidence to try an impeached public official.

As to generalized claims to confidentiality, such claim cannot also be allowed

to impair the Impeachment Court's power to subpoena Supreme Court

deliberations. The supposed possible restriction of frank and open discussion

among justices in deliberating a case as a result of disclosure, even if true, cannot

defeat the constitutional power of the Impeachment Court to ferret out the truth

and objectively decide an impeachment case. In fact, there is no genuine nexus

between disclosure and frank discussion considering that members of Congress

have given their frank opinions on bills, committee reports and congressional

investigations despite the public nature of their proceedings. If disclosure will

make weaklings of our Supreme Court justices, such is not the fault of the

demand for disclosure but rather the fault of the justices who are required to

express their views whether their deliberations are public or not. It cannot be

argued that Justices may self-regulate honest expression of opinions out of

supposed fear that a possible future impeachment proceedings may possibly

subpoena minutes of their deliberation.

Additionally: The rule of confidentiality in relation to the co-equal status of

the Branches of Government is not and has never been absolute, and was not

instituted solely for the sake of promulgating such a rule. This is a rule which is

supposedly premised to allow for alleged frank and unfettered exchange of

opinions. But even if true, this purpose does not include discussions of fraudulent

transactions or discussions that subvert the essence of jUstice, impartiality and

independence. Certainly, where the exchange of opinions delve on the unethical,

illegal or criminal, the rule of confidentiality and co-equality will not shield it from

examination and accountability. This is the raison d'etre fo r the institution of the

Impeachment Court; this is the whole rationale for making magistrates



5

accountable to the people. Public officers cannot hide under the cloak of secrecy

to further their misdeeds.

Generalized claims to confidentiality, even if based on "internal rules" of the

Supreme Court, cannot trump the power of the Impeachment Court to issue

subpoena as said power is based, not on an "internal rule", but on the

Constitution.

The defense in fact has included in their list of witnesses to be subpoenaed

a number of Associate Justices of the Supreme Court as well as their records

(Defense Compliance dated 30 January 2012). This means that even

respondent himself does not believe that the exercise of subpoena powers bv

this Honorable Court violates the separation of powers doctrine or claims to

confidentiality.

In fact, the Chief Justice or any respondent for that matter, must not be

denied his right to access any evidence that he deems necessary for his defense

for to do so violates his constitutional right "to meet the witnesses face to face,

and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the

production of evidence in his behalf". No one can deny respondent that right on

the ground of separation of powers or confidentiality as this would certainly deny

him his due process rights to put up a reasonable defense to prove his innocence.

The mandate of the Impeachment Court to ferret the truth in an

impeachment trial is of supreme public interest. Whatever public interest that

may be supposedly hurt, if ever, by disc/osing court deliberations cannot trump

the public interest served by an impeachment trial which allows both parties the

necessary means to present their case.

It would be impossible fo r the Impeachment Court to objectively decide

either to convict or acquit respondent Chief Justice on the basis of incomplete

and disjointed evidence resulting from the failure to subpoena important

testimonies and records that would provide the Impeachment Court sufficient



6

basis to render a decision. Clipping the Impeachment Court's subpoena power

clearly impairs its function as such.

In the case of Senate vs. Ermita

2

, respondent Chief Justice voted in favor of

Executive Order 464 which was intended to withhold information from and derail

the Congressional investigation on, among others, the "Hello Garci" issue. The

Prosecution prays of this Impeachment Court not to allow Respondent to restrict

access by the Impeachment Court of the necessary information and evidence

needed in the search for truth, on the basis of generalized claim to confidentiality

and separation of powers.

ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS

I. Exercise of the subpoena power of the Impeachment Court does not

violate the doctrine of separation of powers

When a Chief Justice is impeached by the House of Representatives, the Senate

sits as an Impeachment Court pursuant to its exclusive Constitutional mandate

under Sec. 3, Art XI of the Constitution to hear and decide the impeachment case:

"(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all

cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators

shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the

Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall

preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without

the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."

(Emphasis supplied).

Hence, when the Senate acts as an Impeachment Court, it is not acting as a co

equal branch of the Supreme Court bound to accord the Supreme Court absolute

deference; instead, it is performing a Constitutional check upon the Supreme

'GR 169777, April 20, 2006



7

Court. Impeachment, after all, is the only accountability mechanism under the

Constitution on impeachable officials immune from prosecution, and therefore,

accountability. The reason for this basic check and balance is to prevent the

abuse of the security of tenure granted by the Constitution to public officers who

are required to be independent by nature of their office such as Supreme Court

justices.

More importantly, our Constitution does not merely treat impeachment as a

method of checks and balances by one power over another, but as an instrument

of enforcing or securing public accountability. As noted by Justice Adolf Azcuna in

his concurring opinion in Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. vs. House of Representatives3

,

our Constitution does not only consider impeachment as a check upon the

Supreme Court but as an instrument of enforcing or securing public

accountability. Thus, our Constitution places the provision on impeachment, not

in Articles VI, VII and VIII on governmental powers, but in Article XI on

Accountability of Public Officers. This placement is clearly intentional and meant

to signal the importance of the accountability of public officers and the

importance of impeachment in exacting accountability.

In order for the Impeachment Court, to fulfill its Constitutional mandate as part

of the Constitutional accountability mechanism and to hold the Supreme Court

justices accountable to the people, it must insist upon its power to subpoena

documents and witnesses even from the Supreme Court. For any court that does

not insist upon its subpoena power only renders itself inutile. Section 1, Rule 21

of the Rules of Court provides that a subpoena is a process directed to a person

requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action.

Without this compulsory process, no witness can be compelled to attend nor can

records be produced. Without a subpoena, the prosecution is denied the

opportunity to prove the articles of impeachment while the defense can hide

witnesses and documents that prove wrongdoing thereby evading accountability

and justice.

, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003



8

It should be noted that the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials

promulgated by the Senate of the Fifteenth (15th) Congress expressly confers

upon the Senate th e power to issue subpoenas ad testificandum and duces tecumto compel th e attendance of witnesses and th e production of relevant

documents. Par. V of th e Rules provides:

"V. The Senate shall have to compel th e attendance of

witnesses, to enforce obedience to its orders, mandates, writs, and

judgments, to preserve order, and to punish in a summary way

contempts of, and disobedience to, its authority, orders, mandates,

writs, or judgments, and to make all lawful orders, rules, and

regulations which it may deem essential or conducive to the ends of

justice. And th e Sergeant- at- Arms of the Senate, under th e

direction of the President of the Senate, may employ such aid and

assistance as may be necessary to enforce, execute and carry into

effect th e lawful orders, mandates, and writs of th e Senate."

In U.S. v. Nixon, for instance, the United States Supreme Court brushed aside and

in the end totally rejected the claim of Presidential co-equality to prevent the

prosecutors and the grand jury from perusing and deliberating on presidential

communications, now known as the Water-Gate scandal, precisely because truth

and accountability must prevail, and considerations of frankness and openness in

any decision-making process are absolutely irrelevant when th e decision-making

process is itself the means to commit an injustice, a wrongdoing or a crime. There

are no sacrosanct walls when public officers breach their oaths of office.

The Impeachment Court's own Rules on Impeachment does not limit its power to

issue subpoena. Certainly, there is no prohibition to subpoena records of the

Supreme Court. This is rightly so because the Constitution grants to the Senate

plenary power to hear and decide th e impeachment case when it gave it sole

authority to conduct the impeachment trial. The plenary power of th e Senate



9

over the impeachment trial means that it has absolute control over the

proceedings and its power cannot be unduly limited.

If the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court, has previously subpoenaed the

Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) of Chief Justice Corona,

which the Supreme Court had in fact unilaterally declared as confidential despite

the clear mandate of the Constitution requiring them to disclose the same, why

should we allow the limitation of such previously exercised subpoena power?

Why adopt a different rule now at this crucial juncture?

Due to the nature of the charges against the Chief Justice, there is a specific need

for evidence in the impeachment trial, i.e. identified SC records that are relevant

to the issues subject of the impeachment to prove the wrongdoing of the Chief

Justice. How can the prosecution, for example, prove that the Chief Justice was

partial and biased when he engineered the issuance of the Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO) to give former Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) the

chance to escape criminal prosecution and accountability, if the records that

prove the same are in the possession of the Supreme Court and cannot be

accessed by the prosecution and the Impeachment Court? For example, while

the SC on November 18, 2011 voted 7-6 that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to

comply with an essential condition for the issuance of the TRO against the

Department of Justice (DOJ) watch ist order thereby rendering said TRO not

effective, the Chief Justice ordered the promulgation of a Resolution that was

contrary to that Decision. He in fact ordered that a Resolution be released

claiming that the Supreme Court found that there was sufficient compliance by

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of the conditions of the TRO and that the same was

effective.

Clipping the Impeachment Court's power to issue a subpoena will be a violation

of, not only its own Rules but also its Constitutional mandate to act as an

Impeachment Court and essentially render it subject to the jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court.



10

Even if we presume that the Impeachment Court is a "co-equal" branch

of the Supreme Court, subpoena of SC justices and records cannot be

disallowed for violating the separation of powers doctrine,

The 1987 Constitution separates governmental power among the

legislative, executive and judicial branches to avert tyranny by "safeguard(ding)

against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of

the other." However, the principle of separation of powers recognized that a

"hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another

would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself

effectively"; hence, the separation of powers between the branches is not

absolute.

Our Constitution contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed

powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness

but interdependence, and autonomy but reciprOCity. Well said, the boundaries

established by the Constitution delineating the powers of the three branches

must be fashioned "according to common sense and the, , . necessities of

governmental co-ordination," This constitutional design requires an internal

balancing mechanism by which government powers cannot be abused.

In the case of Senate vs. Ermita

4

which questioned the constitutionality of

EO 464, the Supreme Court upheld the doctrine of executive privilege but found

the Presidential issuance partly infirm, specifically Sections 2 (b) and 3 which

required government officials below the heads of executive departments to

secure consent from the President before appearing in congressional hearings

and investigations. The Court acknowledged that Congress has the right to

obtain information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of

legislation. Thus, if the executive branch withholds such information because it is

privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be

respected.

4 GR 169777, April 20, 2006



11

II. The general claim to confidentiality cannot trump the power of this

Honorable Court to subpoena court records and Justices of the

Supreme Court.

The claim that frank exchange of ideas among justices will be constricted

or restrained out of fear that their deliberations will possibly be subpoenaed by

an Impeachment Court, should one be constituted in the future, is without basis.

The Senators and Congressmen publicly deliberate their opinion and vote on a

congressional investigation, a bill or a committee report, and they cannot be said

to have restricted their frank opinions on a matter. The fact that this

impeachment trial is public does not in any way mean that the senators will be

restrained in expressing their views and their votes.

The need to find the truth in these impeachment proceedings is of public

interest, on the other hand, there is no clear and convincing public interest that

may be claimed by refusing to disclose evidence that may be presented in the

Impeachment Court.

In any case, the issue has been rendered moot because the justices of the

Supreme Court, both those who have voted for or against the TRO on the watch

list order for example have already publicly discussed their decisions,

deliberations and the basis of their votes.

Further, the defense has listed in its Compliance the list of witnesses they

will summon which included Justice Arturo Brion, Justice Roberto Abad and

Justice Presbitero Velasco as well as court records. This means that the

Respondent also believes that this Impeachment Court has the power to

subpoena witnesses and records.



12

In fact, if the Respondent Chief Justice were to require court records and

testimonies of justices to prove his innocence, the prosecution will not interject

objections precisely because his due process rights allows him to use th e

necessary tools to defend himself and we should never deprive him of that

recourse.

The claim to generalized confidentiality will fail the function impairment test,

which means that ability of the investigating body will be seriously affected by

unfounded claims to confidential ity. This Honorable Court will find it difficult to

explain its decision, whether to acquit or to convict Respondent Corona, if only

half of th e evidence was allowed to be presented before it.

III. Confidentiality cannot override the right of the Impeachment Court

and the people to information and the truth

A. The right of the people to information on matters of public

concern under Sec. 7, Art. III, Constitution, is self-executory and is not subject to

limitations except those provided by law. This reading of Sec. 7 is based on:

(a) the text of the provision, which states: "The right of the people to

information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official

records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or

decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy

development, shall be afforded th e citizen, subject to such limitations as may be

provided by law."

(b) the text of a related provision, i.e., Art. II, Sec. 28, Constitution, "Subject

to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, th e State adopts and implements a

policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."

There is no statute that exempts deliberations of the Supreme Court

from public scrutiny.



13

Hence, in Guingona et al. v. Commission on Elections5

, the Supreme Court

itself declared: "I t is not enough, however, that the information petitioners seek

in a writ of mandamus is a matter of public concern. For mandamus to lie in a

given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law

from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. In this case, respondent

Comelec failed to cite any provision of law exempting the information sought

by petitioners from the coverage of the government's constitutional duty to

disclose fully information of public concern." Internal rules on confidentiality

cannot defeat the power of an Impeachment Court.

And in Province ofCotabato v. GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domains6: "In

the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the

exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people

in democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital

issues confronting the nation so that they may be able to criticize and participate

in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective

manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among

a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes

desired by the people."

The intent of the constitutional right to information, as pOinted out by

Constitutional Commissioner Wilfrido V. Villacorta, is "to adequately inform the

public so that nothing vital in state affairs is kept from them.,,7

It would be inconsistent for us to elevate the Supreme Court to a

pedestal different from the platforms on which accountable government

agencies have been asked to divulge information of public concern.

In U.S. v. Nixon, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that its ruling

addressed "only the conflict between the President's assertion of a generalized

5G.R. No. 191846, May 6, 2010

6 G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008

7 Akbayan et al. v. Aquino et aI., G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 200S.



14

privilege of confidentiality and the constitutional need for relevant evidence in

criminal trials" and that the case was not concerned with the balance "between

the President's generalized interest in confidentiality . . . and congressional

demands for information."Thus, while the Nixon Court recognized the Presidential communications

privilege based on the independence of the executive branch, it also considered

the effect of the privilege on the effective discharge of the functions of the

judiciary.

B. There is nothing sacrosanct about the Supreme Court

deliberations of cases. Simply refer to the text of the opinions in People v. et

al.8, where they liberally quoted letters and relevant portions of their

deliberations. And nothing happened. The Supreme Court did not crumble. If at

all, the references to the otherwise "confidential" deliberations strengthened

the Supreme Court. In fact, one of the Justices in the Caruncho Jr. case said

there is nothing so earth-shaking about opening the deliberations of the

Supreme Court to public scrutiny:

"The more complex nature of our cases, the fact that the passing of the

buck stops with this Court, and the resolution of the majority of cases through

minute resolutions warrants a greater amount of confidentiality in our

deliberations. However, I have an open mind on the matter. If the Supreme

Court considers opening our deliberations to the general public or at leastdecides to have a stenographer taking verbatim notes of every matter

discussed during our sessions, I will have no objections. In that way, litigants

and the general public would have a way of knowing when the need arises on

how we arrive at our decisions especially where petitions are denied on minute

resolutions. Unfounded and unfortunate speculations about the decision

making process would disappear and the interests of justice would thereby be

served."

8G.R. No. L-57804, January 23, 1984,



15

C. The confidentiality/privilege argument is contrary to the right to

know the truth. The existence of this right is beyond cavil. The Chief Justice

himself said in his Separate Opinion in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth

Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010:

OF TRUTH AND TRUTH COMMISSIONS

The fundamental base upon which a truth commission

is created is th e right to the truth. While the right to the truth

is yet to be established as a right under customary law or as a

general principle of international law, it has nevertheless

emerged as a "legal concept at the national, regional and

international levels, and relates to the obligation of the state

to provide information to victims or to their families or even

society as a whole about the circumstances surrounding

serious violations of human rights." (emphasis added)

D. Publicizing the proceedings of the Supreme Court in the very

limited context of this trial before this Impeachment Court will no t hurt

whatever al/eged public interest there may be in keeping absolutely secret the

deliberations of the Supreme Court. That the publication of such deliberations

would make weaklings of the Supreme Court, would preclude them from

deciding independently and impartially, perhaps fairly and justly, and would

render their decisions subject to popular pressure, renders so obvious that

confidentiality or secrecy as means towards this public interest is in fact the very

reason that subverts the public interest that it seeks to accomplish. How could an

all boys' club discussion bring independence and impartiality when the very

secluded nature of such discussion leads to partiality, dependence and

patronage, if not corruption, because kept from the prying eyes of the public, and

indeed, this Impeachment Court?



16

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

If we render inutile the powers of the Impeachment Court or allow the

Respondentto

hinder the subpoenaof

the necessary evidencefor

the

prosecution on the ground that it violates the separation of powers and the rule

on confidentiality, then, it will be very difficul t if not impossible for the people to

convict a sitting justice for partiality and bias in favor of a party litigant. This

absurd result could not have been intended by the Constitution.

Impunity is when one commits crime and gets away with it. It has reigned

during the time of Pres. Gloria Arroyo through various tools that aims to preempt

serious investigations and avoid accountability.

We humbly ask this Honorable Court not to allow impunity disguised as

generalized claims to confidentiality to prevail over this impeachment

proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Complainant House of Representatives through its

prosecutors, respectfully pray that this Honorable Impeachment Court allow the

subpoena of certain justices of the Supreme Court and its records, including

relevant minutes of Supreme Court deliberations requested by the Prosecutors

and immediately grant the subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum of the same.

Other forms of relief, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for.

Respectfully submitted.

Pasay City, February 8, 2012.



By:

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Republic of the Philippines

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PROSECUTORS

Copy Furnished (By Personal Service):

Justice Serafin R. Cuevas (Ret.) et al.Counsel for Respondent Chief Justice Renato CoronaSuite 1902 Security Bank Centre6776 Ayala AvenueMakati City, Philippines 1226

Documents

Prosecution’s Memorandum Affirming the Power of the Impeachment Court to Issue Subpoena Duces Tecum Et Ad Testificandum on Certain Justices and Records of the Supreme Court