PRR Localizing Development Ch2

7/29/2019 PRR Localizing Development Ch2

1/37

C h a p t e r t w o

a Ccl Fmk pc Dvlm

Despite the reCent upsurge in interest, partiCipatory De-

vlm lc b lck ccl cl. allc

m mll dll jd b ll m l,c m , mv ccbl, bld

cl cl, d mv dmd d vc. p

ccl cll l dd

m, bd cc dvlm lc,

d d c dv cx d v m. t c

mk c k b m .

t l dd c v

dvlm l, mc dvlm v

vd mk vm l.

t c b b bf v cc mk l-

, k cc d j dvlm lc. i v

x bc l b dc-

cc cvl c l. t c cvl c

l dc vb cvl c c l m mk

d vm l d ll c mk,

vm, d cvl c l c lcl dvlm. t

c c dvlm v ld,

m , b dd m cvl c l.

t mk ld xdd dc v lm cvl c l l cd d c, cl-

, ql d l dm, d d

dc m cq cll d cc.

Participatory development

policy is beset with a lack

conceptual clarity . . .

. . . with many millions o

dollars justifed by little m

than buzzwords.


2/37

l o c a l i z i n g d e v e l o p m e n t : d o e s p a r t i c i p a t i o n w o r k ?

50

Market Failure

Mk l bl llc c cl

t l v : c m v

m m ; m m mlz cl v

mk b c cm; l m cd m c cmm d b vdd b

mk mcm, l m mk.

al ql d v c cx b c d

c mk, mk l d d v d

b . t, , cc mk l

c l cm dc l , d

mk l dl c llc l

. Cc mk l

cl cll dvlm (h d slz 2001Dvj d Kb 2005). t m cll db

c qbl cl b m

dvlm.

M mk l cd b xl

c c dc c ( b) b (jd) b

vlvd . exl x mklc

xc d d vc b dvdl

cqc, v v, l vlvd

dc.

a v xl cc dvdl m d b ll c dc. i c, c c

c b b dvdl m. exml cld

cm ll vm v

cl . nv xl ld vdc

d d vc, bc ll cd ll c

d d vc m.

a v xl x dvdl m d

cv ll b dc. i c, b c

b d b dvdl m. exml

v xl llv m c d dvlm

ll c b b. pv xl ld d

dc d d vc, bc ll cmd

ll b d d vc c.

Cd l cl c xl c

l dvdl cd cmlm c

Although inequality and

poverty can coexist with

both efcient and inefcient

markets, market ailures tend

to deepen poverty traps and

inhibit growth.


3/37

a c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k f o r p a r t i c i p a t o r y d e v e l o p m

c ld v

l l qlbm (h 2000,

145). w c bl lbl cc d

cd , cd

mk l m mk b

. t mk l bl lv blm, v . Fml d ml c cc m

x m b lbl, xml, mk c dc-

bl d bjc ml d -k.

a m c mk l xc c-

db m. im mmc

m m dvdl v m m .

p ld cll v v ll cc ml cd m-

k, xml, d l ll ml ld l bc

dcl cmmcl bk cllc lbl m bl l.

pv d ql x bc mk l, d

mk l x bc v d ql. B

l ql db c c ml c m-

k l c l cd d lb mk. Mk l

c l ld l kd db cl

c, ld v .

a v c l d

dcd m l v bc mc-

m c cd mk mc, c, dcl, dc m vm l, dc-

, cl cl. i ql , db

bl, bc d World Development Report 2006:

Equity and Development v dm ql (l,

, cl ) c c c m dd mbl-

d bc d mbl b (wld Bk 2006; r

2006). t ql db b c d

b dm d bv l l m-

cl v c d dc l dcv

. Cd d cl mk l d v d

mc , d mm m c b b cd

b d ql cm d .

Cd, c, cll lb k l ld-

ld. illc, mlm, d dbd lkl mk

v dcl c k bk ccl v.

Important causes o mark

ailure include externalitie

o which coordination ailu

are a special case, and

constraints in the distribu

o inormation.


4/37


52

ev l lc mk bl cll ld

ld dc, ll k ld v dcl v

lcl d jdcl m l m

. i m ld, cd cl c d

dc b ldld d lb: ldld cll

bl dm dd b c c, bl bv . sc -bd ql m

lkl b ll d cl m d

k v m c .

iq, c c x v cl c mk

, , cc . i dd, c cmb

mk l m cc d c l

c l l dl b b

. t c vd l vm v

c v mv cmb, xmlvd vc c l, dc, cd, c

cmm c mk ll bl d b

mlm ld m qlz v cc

v d ql .

Government Failure

t cc lk vm lv mk l

blm cd, m mm, d ql lccz vm. gvm l cc lc

lcl v mk c llc l c

cm dcd b mk (Bl 2006).

i l d vm l, c cmm

ll lcl m, m lcl l, c vm

l dmcc mk. Lk mk l, v

m d lcl l ld l m d

cd.

Inormation ailures. t clc m l vc

c bl vm k c

cz. ic l mllc cvd

cl clc dd, bld d d v

ld dc l c k . Dclz

l blm, bc b vm cl

Inequity can combine with

market ailures to magniy

inefciencies and can result

in situations in which the

aggregate loss in welare

is disproportionately borneby the poor.

Looking to government to

solve market ailures is

problematic . . .


5/37


l c blc cc m d vm

kld cz c.

a c vm l m mm

c c m lv

m . gvm k v m -

m cz c ccdl b cc blcjc, bd llc, d l l d d.

Coordination ailures. gvm cll bjc v-

cd l, c l m l b

bl fc dc mk l v d cc

v l lbb, c, b. Cd

l c l cv lcl m v

d cdd m c, l c b

md b cv ld, lzd c

l c ( l cllcv c). Cd lc c dmc blm c bm m blc -

v, c dl c cl d clc d

ld cmm (wld Bk 2004). t c l l

l ml v m cc (B 2008), lv

c vlbl cvl d c .

Inequity.J c mk l, bd v-

m l ql ll dl . p d

ll l d m v m b

l d vm cd. i lvl bl c

d-d ql, c lkl fc cl ; c cml l, lc

c xc c m d l,

b m m d (B

2008).

o cll dvlm dd , ,

d blc dm m-

k. C vm lv mk l d d q

m d k mk cc? C mk k

v v vc c l, l, d dc-

vm bl d ? C vm vd

cd d c dvd v c ll

? w lvl vm l ll mll lv

m d cd blm l md l

bl ?

. . . because it

suers rom problem

coordination, inorm

asymmetry, and inequ

Just as in the case o

market ailure, the burden

government ailure reque

alls disproportionately on

the poor.


6/37


54

a mk d vm dmll ccd

cll m d cd lc j

l mk d vm b l lk b

m. il cm v dmd dvlm

cc bl lv mk l d dd

ql m cdcv l- clv (wld Bk 2005; acml d rb 2006).

Civil Society Failure

t dml l lcl c dvlm bld

cv lcl cvc . t l J hbm (1991

cvl c cvd b blc c c

z, cllcvl d blcl, c d c d mk. t, cvl c mbcll lkd

cv c mk d vm.

a cv cvl c cl c cz

c, vll z k d cllcv b

i c c dvdl cz. t m civi

societyd nongovernmental organization(ngo) d

cbl, b cvl c mc m cllc ngo

a dd b cl J alxd (2006, 4), dll, cv

c

ld vl d cc

cl ccm d dmcc m m. sc

l ld, l m d

k b m c cl, xc, bc

v cmmm cmm cl .

a cllcv vll mblz cz d vl

d cmm lcm cv, cd

bd c, l z, cl mvm

v kd, dc cv, d v ml d

ml c d dvcc z bl cv

c cv.1

Fll hbm, cm v cl

czd dml cvc c dvlm c

Bl (2004, 2008) c v d

One o the challenges o

policy making is to understand

where, when, and how to

balance the power o the state

against the reedom

o markets.

Historians have increasingly

recognized how undamental

civic action is to the

development process.


7/37


c , c id d C, dd ml b-

w d d cl. id, l dcd

l vd dc d cvd cvc d-

zd d d dl. i id, c, b

l 19c, lbl ld cd ecumene(blc )

ld d vb cvc d dmcc l c d. McClk (2006) d Mk (2010) c-

l cl q dvlm k

d dc b v, c cl

dvlm v d clm. a cv d cv cvl

c ll cz vm d mk,

ld m ccbl, d cl cl cmc

d dmcc cv.

i dl , , l cmlm

c, v cm dlcl b: cvl c vlv cl-lcv c, jc, , d cl m c l;

dll, bd cl cc, ccm, d

db.2 i c, mk vlv dvdl c ll d-

vdl l mxmz d l.

Fm d dd ccll zd dv lb,

ql, m l. gvm d b -

zd d lc, l c dc ;

dd d ll c. i c, cvl

c d b mblzd d cmm d -

cl ql (alxd 2006). all dd bl-c d c v ccl. Mk d vm

l d q v bc cv d d cvl

c, d cvl c l c xcb mk d v-

m l. w qll l, k

cc; ql dc mk blcd b

qlz vlc cvc , d dc vm

mlz blcd b ccbl d

cm m cvl c.

Civil Society Interaction with Markets and Governments

Cvc c mk d vm cfcl:

b ld ccbl, cmbl q, d

d q m mblzd cz

cl d l vm cl d v c c.


8/37


56

ab l, mk ld b mvd ll b

mxmz. i m c, -m m

d d ccd b cz. smll

bc cvc ccbl, lcl ld

ld b ld , c , d v x

c. Cvc c lm v m; b cv dc c dc-mk c

vm d mk c b d d c

m c v (b dc m

lm ).

i c mk, ll-c cvl c c

cd cm , c,

l m bv dml cm. t bv

cld cc d l lv (c d d d

dl) ll cc cl, c, dqbl, c cll d c x. p m cvl c

b bl, m ld, b

lm c l d, d, mbl, d c

bv. w c ll, cvl c l c

q, c dcm cc

c dcm cl cmm. t

cvl mvm ud s, ab s t

d ab rblc e, sld mvm pld

d -dmcc ll ilmc rblc i c

xml cvl c cv. Cvl c c b c cvl c cck vm. sc cck ll

d , b c mm b cll dml ,

xml, vl m m l

v xm c .

i dd cd c, cvl c l

dc l cmc cv (mcc z

m xml). Mv, cv cvc c l c

bl vm l cl, b

cl cl k m m d c cl

lcv l cd d c. td c m-

cv, d d, d c k l

m cd d jb ll xml cvl c cv.

a d cvl v m ccl d vm. i

vm d ccbl, d ld

ccbl b cvl c. Cvl c k mc m cvl

To be eective, civic action

oten has to orce agents o

government and the market

to act against their private

interests and in the interest

o citizens.

In its interaction with markets,

a well-unctioning civil society

acts frst as a watchdog.


9/37


cv cc cllcv c,

c cl c cv bc c-

v cz cbl cvl .

sm cl ll pm (1993) d cll cc

cl cl. t m dl d d blc

m ccll mc k, mk vl mlcd l cv d lc (M d r

2004).

Mk c cvl c v b vd

m dc d vc, xml, b d

c cvl c z c

. gvm cvl c ml , -

vd m d m fc d cl ,

cld l b ll d lcl z.

gvm l m , d v c, cvl ccv d jm- c dvlm c.3

Markets, Government, and Civil Society at the Local Level

Cvl c, mk, d vm c v lvl

lbl, l, bl (/dc), d lcl (c/vll/

bd). ec lvl q cll, md

, d cv c.

Mk l k dl c lvl. Mk l

lbl q lbl cd d l ccl , c, wld td oz (wto) m

m. Mk l l lvl cc

vm d cl bk. Mk l lcl lvl m

b ddd b lcl c c mccd d mc-

c. t lvl c m dd mk

l. t mm v b c mll c-

q l c, xml; c cllcv

lbl m q lbl c.

gvm l d lvl. Cc b lbl

vc ddd b ud n m d b -

b d m vm. t c vm

ld b llcd lvl m cm dl m. sm

c, c l d, lc, d l-

, c b bl dclzd. i llc c

lcl lvl, d- d b cdd (Bd d

An engaged civil sphere

makes a critical contribut

to good government by

keeping it transparent and

accountable.


10/37


58

Mkj 2006). Lcl vm c b b md b

cz c, d b bl d d

cz bc b m d l c c. B

m v dcl cd dc mk c cmm

(bc cmm xl llv). Mv

dclz ld l l cl cm.t, ml d dclz q d

dv b-ld cv ddv

m cll cd blm. i l, v

lcl blc d b dclzd c d d

d , v m, d q d

v cmm d lcl kld d

cmm llv cm cl. pbl

d d vc cll ll c cld

d d, lcl cl, d vll d. o cmm-l c c bd d c l b lcll

md. Cvl, blc d m; c

cm cl, bc ccl cmlx; q

cl cd, ld ll b md cll (xml

cld l vcc cm d l ).

t dclz vm c cld, v

ml l dclz vm l. Lcl v

m l mb , cld bc dm

cc mcm b c v c cmmc c, lck

cv lcl cm, d lck cvc cc. w c, lc d fc v l ,

l lck ccbl cz, d dclz

c llc dc c cll xcb -k d

c (Bd d Mkj 2006; Bl 2006). i mk

dc b dclz dvl c,

m dd d d l vm

l d lvl vm, ll l cv

c l, d blc cd lc c

l lc- cmc .

J mk d vm d lvl, d

cvl c. M lcl ll k b cvl c

lvl -, cx

lc (alxd 2006). B c b c

c lbl blc d lbl cvl c (xml

The optimal design

o decentralization requires

trading o the advantages

o better-aligned incentives

against the disadvantages

o more challenging

coordination problems.


11/37


cld mvm cmb clm c (

lbl dvlm m mk dm-

lm). a vb cvl c l lvl m

j k mk cv czb l

mk d vm l. scl mvm v md mk

ccbl b x mc l cl d (xml rl nd l ccl mv mbl

). t v qlzd d l xcldd cl

(cld d l L amc d

s ac) d d dmcc ( id) d

vm ( id). t l dvlm cll

bld v ccl cck d blc m mk,

vm, d cvl c cm d cc

k c .

t cc lcl cvl cz z mlv cllcv ld lcl cc-

bl; c vm (cl cmm, blc

vll m); md mk l c lck cc cd

c (mccd d mcc ); d dcl

m cmm c ( mm ,

). i vm c dclzd lcl lvl,

m v cz c d cc lcl

vm l c cv m.

Lcl cvl c c l v m lk l

cvc . Fll r d Mll, lcl vm, cmm- z, d lcl cvc b

d cvc cv. i vl mll lcl ecumenesdvl

cc d l m b xc d d

md d vd ml , m v cc

cvc cl l lvl.

Defning Civil Society Failure

Cvl c l c b bdl c

cvc c b l

dc cc.4 i c cc bc bl c

cllcvl. F xml, dvdl m b bl c-

d c d mk cllcv dc ld lv ll

mmb b v l bc dvdl

Just as markets and

governments operate at

dierent levels, so does

civil society.

Civil society ailure can be

broadly thought o as a

situation in which civic ac

is either absent or operate

in a way that results in a n

reduction in efciency.


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60

c - b ( d cmm)

i c l cc b bl mblz cllcvl

l b, d ,

bl d , l l l v

cz dcd.

How does participation occur?Cllcv c cc . idvdl v dcd c cvc

v b bl lv cll cllcv

c d c cmm . Fl c c b d

vdl cv c d cc cllcv

c. t c l b v d l cv

c cv. F c, cv c c

c m dc dmcc. i l

c c b vc d d

ev c, v, m b m c vlbl lcl c c cv c xl

dd ab s d s ac; vlbl

c (, bc l ), cv

c cld c ll. i l cl mvm

vlbl d lcl c

(K 2007). sc c c b (ll

cc lcl m) cld (mk c cc dcl)

ecv cvc c q v m

d d lcl d bl mblz

cz m k dv m.Participation bd m cv v cv, cld

ll:

c dc mk clv c dlbv bd mk v

c llc dc

cb c, ml d, cl lb cc blc d vd blc vc

m d c blc d v vcvd

v m d vlvm -

cv

m bd cmm ( c, dc cm lv lcl cfc)

lc lc lcl v.


13/37


iml, dlcl, d d-bd mv dc d-

vdl c cvc cv. iml mv v

d cmc d lcl b dvdl m b

c. F c, cmm dvlm jc cm

vll d bld lcl c, dvdl

m c m cd jc d cc d d d ; m v

lcl ccl lc d l mv c lc

m c. idlcl mv v d d d

bl. i m c, c, lm l d

dl cmmm, mk c cm-

m jc x m. id-bd mv

v d cl l d. exml cld l

bld mq cc mblz c

d vll.pc l m c. t m bv

c m, c dd dvdl cmc , ml-

m , d ml bl, m c. pc

l vlv cl c, c c b bvl

dvdl cbd m m

cmml blc l, c m d mmb

ddvd c, c , b. t m l b cc

c. y m v cd l-c v

lzd dcm dl, mk cll cll-

mblz m dvlm cv. Cmm v ccmd cv b m m b d

bl b kd x cl b b.

idvdl, mbddd cl cl d k,

ll blc ll c d b b dcd c.

t dc c ml dvdl dc, -

v, cvc cv m cv l cv

d cllcvl. al dvdl m c,

c bl m b bl cm cllc-

v dc. pc b clc cll cllcv

c d b dd m c b dvd-

l. Fm, dvdl dc c dl c-

cd bl c; dvdl blv

ll b cv bl c c, ll b l

cld c.

Instrumental, ideological,

identity-based motives ind

individuals to participate

civic activities.

Participation entails some

costs. The most obvious is

the opportunity cost o tim

which is higher or the poo


14/37


62

Mc ol (1965) zd lm 50

cc m cl dvc mk dvdl c

cmm , l l-d dvdl ll c

cv cmm . ol ccd

xl b mll, l mll

blc d ld d d l .

ud cd ll l c? ud

cd ll blv m

v md cdbl? om (1990) mz l

cl m, m c, d mv

cv cllcv c, b l ld bv

dm cc cllcv c mm

cmm. a l cllcv c,

cd cl m dl b l d cl m v d. t cl cld

cll dd bd cmm, dd cmm

cd c; l m cmm

lcl cd; m m cllcv

dc, c mlv bjc cllcv ;

dd c, v c d m

vl l; l-c d dl ccd mcm lv

cfc; d bc xcv vm c. i dv

cd, om k ccll b cmm

l c mm; m d cl l d lcl c dvlm.

ic d mmz k b m

cllcv c v l dcd, D

(2009) d c cd c:

1. a v d c c,

v l k d v l

d .

2. a v d c c, v

blv ll ll k d.

t cd l-c m b m

md b xcd b ccd b . t c

d c, v, bc v m, ll

bl v blv v l ll c cll

Under what conditions will a

group o people cooperate?

Under what conditions will

they trust one another enough

to believe that the promises

they have made are credible?


15/37


i c, ll ll k b

c. t cd cd dd , b

ll blv v l ll k

d. t, cd m l-c

bl cl cllcv c.

w, , cd d c l vm b cd m? w m l

mk cdbl, c c?

pl m bl clll vm -

dl d c cdcv cllcv c.

pl m m cl ll ccc:

1. Mutual aection. Cd cld c

b cl d cz l

m .

2. Pro-social disposition. i l k m md cdbl, v bc

ml c, c v l-

l. Ll kd c b d b -cc cl

d b; mmb cmm lz m

c x l m l

c. Ll c l bc c

cl m cb m l d

v -cl d d .

icv c l l c. pl m lkl k m cv c -

k m c

v l k m lc. t cv

c c b dd:

3. External enorcement. exl cm m md

q xlc cc cd b

bld c d , c

d ll , bc ml ,

dl ld (c c, ld, d dl

panchayat[vll ccl]). t xl c d v

c: v c c cm x ll ld l

mk cdbl cmmm , d m ll

b cd b bl ll b k. Cllcv c

c b m ccl c ccl , d

People are more likely to kagreements i a cooperat

inrastructurea set o

institutions that ensures

that keeping promises is in

the interest o every party

everyone else keeps them

in place.


16/37


64

l c c l cvc c, j cvl c

l c c l. w xl c

c b d c m, ll

cllcv m, c

cld l c.

4. Reputation as a capital asset. ev bc xcm, l ll k m vl

. r bcm cl bc

dvdl m , ld cl cd,

v l-m l.

5. Long-term relationships. i l-m l,

bcm cl c cmld, bc

bl dvdl cdbl cc

am, , mll cd. t cv c

cl l, cmm m m c bk m.

i cc, ccc 3, 4, d 5 cld bld

ll l m cllcv c l

ll l cml m. hv, D

(2009) , cdbl m mdm

ld b cv d l c d b

dcd lv m c

vm. i c dvdl cd bcm

mc d cvl cfc cl d, cc l-c m m b dd cv, ld cvc

l (C d rvll 1993).

w dvd l bd mll cl, c

mc, d lcl l, cc c c b

cd. i, c, ml v cd d c

dd m bl d c, c dd

cmmm m lcl , vl

c ld l cll ll . t, lkd

m mk c b.

t m, v, l mk m dl qbl. hl

ccl c, c c l id d w ac, c

dd l c m d k c l

cl c, m mk c c b l cv

d dl dd ql .

Capacity or cooperation

can be enhanced where

individuals are bound together

in multiple social, economic,

and political relationships.


17/37


Coordination ailures in civic action. w mk cvc c

cv m cx d cv ? w cl-

l lcl cmm c cv cc cllcv

c?

t m m c cvl c l bbl c-

d l. a m dvlv dc lcllvl dc cd blmb ll l m

cd b jc m m dcl.

sc dvl b m ml cd l ll

d. Cd l lcl lvl v m c:

lck cv c ( mk dvd-

l m cllcv cdbl) d bc mcm

l dvdl v lc, cmm,

c ( , -cl d).

Cd cll jc c cm-m bl m lcl . F jc k,

dvdl cmm v c v

m . t l v c cv, c

l d d lc d v

d m c. i ll dvdl l dvc

d dd cllcv c, d cmm ld

cc, ld dl d d dc lcl lvl-

d. i cc, m cmm d ld v,

v c, vlvd m cllcv c m

cmm c, cv cv c.t c cv c c cm

dvlm jc. s jc mv cllcv

mm b cmm-md d

vd cl cv dvdl c b cm-

m cm l b lm v. t d ld

b m cv dl ld

cml m m jc, cdd -

d bd c, d d c m

md b dvdl d d. t d ld l b m

lkl ccd cmm d vlvd md b c

m dd cdbl bc c dvdl blvd

m md b v dvdl, bd l-m d

bl vl m ld l cm m

cmm. idll, d ld dc ddl

The most important sourc

civil society ailure is prob

coordination ailure.

The presence, or absence

a cooperative inrastructu

aects the outcomes o

development projects.


18/37


66

cv vbl cv vm

c d d c d vlbl. i bc

l-m cmm

d ld d v -k, c l

. t, d l-m cm m

d c m dvdl cmm bxml cv cv c.

Cd xml, dclzd m c vl

l ccl v lc bc cll

md v dc m. a m, m

dd bc lc ld b vd vll m

, vll c q cc vll

ccl. t md m lcl c d lc

kld mv v , c lk b vll

d cl vm, d ld lcl vm blcllccbl. i cl vm k d c

c, dc md vll m ld b cd

i c, vll ld dcd m

c c m, bc b ld b

c. t jc m c, cmm-bd

ld l bc k bl c cl

lcvl md dc.

s cm c m mm cmm-

d ll. i cmm qd ll l d l

d b d l d l lcd, cv cmm ll l. i

cmm d m cllcv c, ld v

dl m c mm. i dd , cmm

c ld b vzd d llcd fcd

m l.

a xml cv c l

cl c dclz c cm m t

(2007) k C.5 t k ml q: h c v

v blc d b xld bc m

ccbl? t C dclzd

lcl vm m bl v bc b

lc d d vc (d cc, d m,

k, m cl cl, ). sm vll vm

vd d blc d d vc, vd


19/37


bl ll. accd t, xl v-

c m vll lcl ld , c

vd ml ccbl. a ld

cllc dvdl ml bl d .

o t dlvll ml ,

vll cc, d l l ml d ml v cl ccc ccl t

mml, m b cm ( v-

d jdc lcl vm), d m b

mbdd (c lcl cl mmb).6

w bd ld vl dm-

v bd lcl vm, mbddd cl v

cl bl cb d ,

t (2007, 356). i mbddd cl, cv

ccbl m ml d v blc d.

t q d m d cvc cl cl.

wv cl cl c m v, d

m mbdd c (c cc ) bl

ld vll cl ccbl v blc d,

Cmm p mmb bd m mmb.7 i

c, vll ml c b b cm d mbd-

dd; bl v cvl ml

ccbl. L l l l mll, bc

m mk m l cv.a m d clm md b t bcc -

-d cl dmcc m v

c v c v blc d b vll

vm. imlm lc d d

vml mc, cll dmcc -

k (t 2007, 370).

i c d lcl dmcc, xll

dcd mvm cv c cm

m , c mvd cm l dclz-

m c lm, c bll

mv ql c. Cd c s

id Kl. Kl l l cl

m mz dc, l, d m ql, b

l 1996 ml -d m dcd m

In countries with strong

traditions o electoral

democracy, externally

induced improvements in

cooperative inrastructure

that come rom the state

substantially improve the

quality o participation.


20/37


68

cl. al Kl bld l d d

lc, c cd lcl d

mmb .

Fll cl mdm 1993, c

mdd vm dvlv c d

dmccll lcd vll ccl (gram panchayats), Kl b l d dcl d dl c m dc

lz (hll d ic 2003). t m d l

l. i dvlvd 40 c dvlm bd vll

ccl, dvlvd bl ccl, d d

xv l cm d

m cz b d z m c

panchayatm.

t cm d l c bd d

cml ( xml, k cmm m d dvlm m ld cjc vll m, c

cd cl c). id dlb

d (mmb blc) dvdd c-md

cmm. t dc c ld c

l dc d dd c. t c, c

ml ll dc Kl, d d c

cc cl dc mk b blc c

dmd d z dvdl bc llc

vm-bdzd v b. t c b cld

b v m c cz dlbv l d vll c md l c

l m cv blc vc dlv.

i Kl, dc v b dmcc cd

dmd c l b c

c l b l b vd c mk

l ml l mbdd dclzd

m vm cm . t cd

mcm d lk cvl c.

Lc Kl lm 100 cmc

id v m 66 c; l l

cvc mblz bc lb cd

cmm mvm. Lcl c Kl dd

m cc; d b cl dmccll d l

cll cz c v ld b

In Kerala, India, the state

created mechanisms that

strengthened its links with

civil society.


21/37


lcl vm. i bc Kl ll-dvld dmcc

d c d, lkl l cm

ld v kd.

t ll dd l cllcv c,

m dd cx, , d cl

cv c. t lcl cmm m v vlvd cl cllcv

c, x c c m xcld m ddvd

, d m bl. Lcl cllcv

c m m b cv m c,

c, b cl mm. smll, d vl-

l vm x c

cv cvc cl d cv ll m d dmcc

m d mlc cc lcl

c.Culture and civic identity. Cd cvc c lcl

lvl l cd b m cllcv dc,

m c, b ccl d cl c.

i mll, cll m cmm, m m v

d c ml.8 i m c, c cld

l cmm c d dc v -

dl . M ll, cmm cll d

l dvdl c ll c

c, l cl cllcv c.

s lc c cmm cll d d cmmc. F c, c cvl c cmm

l d b dc c c-

; mbl , c f ld llc;

d cl ccl.

o k b cl d cvc d c

cc cllcv c b k b m

r (2008) cll mblc blc d. r bld k

C (1999, 2001), dm cllcv c d

d b c d . C bc m

ll. M mdl cllcv c m, mlcl,

m x cmm kld. w dvdl

l cllcv c m, c dmc, md

dvdl a k , m , c, cv,

bl mv, d cd b dvdl B. idvdl B,

To ully understand the na

o a ailure o collective

action, it is important tounderstand how context,

history, and culture shape

the nature o cooperative

inrastructure.


22/37


70

, k ll b dvdl a d k dvdl a

k v b dvdl B. idvdl a, , k

dvdl B k dvdl a k, d . t cmm

kld m m m b ld

cmm dd l m: v k

v l l.i c, cck l dd l bbll ll b qckl

cd b bl dd c kll

, d c l. i c cd

d cmm dd cmm kld m

c. i l cd c cd

cllcv cv, c c cc bc. Cmm kl

d bl c cc bd c m

d cl cl, c ml dc

cllcv c.

9

i d dd cllcv c, , ccl

dd cl cx mblc blc d

cl . y mblc blc d mlv dc

d c. t c k v m, cld

bl c d m c lm; c

, c mq d ml; d dc l v, c

vl. all m ccc blc d,

c b mll vl (cm b

d dc bl cm m

d) d mm xcldbl ( bl d cc d).

id ccd mblc blc d cl c

v bv. pcll id dmd b -cl

Mlm m Jv. t c dcd ll

ddc c b ml Jvz c

(rckl 2002). t dlcl b Jv bl c

c cllcv, cl d cv (B 1986

545). B mc bl xd m

gotong royong(ml c), c bcm mk

id lm d b cc l

d. sk, id, md

dv (ilmc, -ilmc, l, Cmm

c b cll ke gotong royong

(gotong royong-). Gotong royongvdd m cll l

mc cl.

Symbolic public goods

acilitate the social basis

or collective action.


23/37


w sk d, c 1967, cc, s,

dcd n od cmc lc. ecll l

, lc dd -d

lc lc bl d

b l . a m lm

dcll c gotong royong mld vll d c. Gotong royongbcm k lm

dvlm l , cll mblz

l lb. i d c lcl d cll

id , s blvd d b l -

d dvlm d cd cv d cllb-

v m. B l 1970, sk d svadaya(l-l)

d b d cmb gotong royong, d svadaya gotong

royong(mblz)bcmcl mlm dvl-

m lc (B 1986).i dld lcl dvlm Jv cm-

m, sllv (1992) dm cmb

cc d cl svadayald m cd

lb. t b d id, d cb lb d c

dvlm jc. Cllcv c m, xc-

. Mblz cmm d: cvd b

vll dm (kepala desa) mll, bc d md

b xcd c d jc d

d llcd ld b vdd lcll. i c, d ld cvl

mblzd cb m cmm. ev xcd cb lb; dvdl ld d cld b lbld

c cv d c cl, lcl, ml, d

v cl c.

i m, id lcl ld ccd mblc

blc d lm, dl md dl bl

md dvdl bv cmm. a m

dk cx ml dc,

c ccl cd blc c.

s -d ldd d l m

dcd, d bl mvm

lv dd . t mvm cvd

c-cv b, c, x m

cmm c. s d dm d md

mlcl v x c, b l cvd xcll v

dc d m dvlm cm.

Indonesia consciously

built symbolic goods by

establishing a communita

ethic (gotong royong) as s

policy via school curricula

public education campaig


24/37


72

i dcd, b dmcc d d

ccd dclz lcl d cl

d dc vm, vll ld id

b cl qd. B, c v d dm

, gotong royong b m dd. i

b dl lzd bd b vl cmm c, c m d

m b d id. a 2004 v scd

ub pv pjc vl (pd, r, d rmb 2010

lvl c blc d cc m

, 47 c, 59 c d

c ml bc d bl. t

lvl c l cqc: cmm id

cb 37 c c vll blc d. id

ccll dcd cmm dl cl c lcl lvl, mv cc

cllcv c.

r bld mblc blc d, c m

ml c dc bv l

lc bjcv. al (2005) vd xml m

id, , , xlcl md

c cmm d m cllcv

d cl cmm-bd mm. Bd

v cvl d v d, al k dd

vll Km d m vll vm l 1920 cv cm

m-md cv md b 1990. h d

cvd b dclz dc mk

lcl lvl d b xlc dc cmm mmb

vl blc d d bld b vm

cl d lcl ccl.

Vll ccl d cv ccl dm md

m l d d c

vll m cll vlvd cl m (al 2005). e c vll b

ccl ccl mmb d dm

cd ml d ml c l

c.

The state can also attempt

to directly manipulate

preerences to induce

behaviors that are in line with

its policy objectives.


25/37


Inequality and the role o elites. o d dv

lcl c cc mv mc b b-

c c d llc blc d d b. t

cl bd c cmm

v m, dclz dc mk

d jc mm l m c cm d bc mc.

Lcl cmm m dvl c d b

l v b l l ql. i l

m dd b ql d c

lcl cvc l.

t ml l ql cllcv c

cm m ol (1965), zd c v

v blc d, ql cld cl

cllcv c bc ld b l vd d, ll d. ecm v

xdd bc vl (Bld d pl 2006;

Bd, gk, d Kvv 2006).

Bld, Bd, d Bl (2006) mmz x.

t ql c v mb d cdc c

cllcv c, v :

h cm m c c l dmd blc

d b l c c m, m-

m b l bl dv m v. i

c c , m dc

cllcv c. i cld l l c

cllcv bjcv cvd b c vd m d

vd lb.

p c l m dc b dmd

c d bl xc l m .

t, l m c c

cmm m clb ld l b

l lkl d cld cl.

iql m c c cbd blc d, b m l dc l

m c ll, ol (1965) .

Cllcv v blc d m b

b v ql d lm cl ql,

One o the purported

advantages o local

participation is its capaci

improve the match betwe

benefciaries preerences

the allocation o public goand benefts.

Olsons seminal insight wa

that i the rich have a stro

interest in the provision o

public good, inequality ca

acilitate collective action

. . . later theorists have

demonstrated that the lin

between inequality and

collective action is more

ambiguous.


26/37


74

v ql d. iql

cld v Ud c cllcv c.

t l dvd cx c cllcv c

blm, cmm d d c

w cmm mmb v lvd l m dxc c cl d cmc l v

l m v cmm dvl c

l b q d cv c

bcm mc m l. rl cmm cc

zd b ql cm d l, c ll l c

ld ql d cl . t cmm

d ql , c m ml v

b c, d , . t m c ml m

ld v l vll d l dc

. i c , ql cmbd cv c; lcl dl ld blv cllc

v c b , ll cc.

i c , ccl cllcv c cm

ql, ol mdl. B, D (2009) dm

mdl d m, ll

d cb c, ql c b

xl. t , v m,

c cld c c ld m cc

cm ld mk m ld v b

bc cllcv c. i dc

l , m b cd cv

cm mk m b ld v b

c, b ld v b c

Cql, cv qlbm cld b d c

ld b xld v l m.

al v l d c d

lz c ql m: ddvd m v

c cc d d

b bjc r d wl (2004) cll c c. F c, c dvd m hd c m

m c ccc c d c mv

mbl. t bl l mll xl c

dvdl m l c cl l m c

v cl c. F l c, b

Inequality traps can

create situations in which

successul collective action

exploits the poor.


27/37


c vd m m ;

l bm, l d xl c c lm

, c dcm d xl, d blck mbl.

iql c l mc xcl ddvd

d m.

a m c l b ql d cl-lcv c l l l lcl dvlm. a fl

d l l c c, l

dm l c k l cl v cm-

m dvlm c vdd b lcl cmm

(, xml, abm d pl 2004). i c, d

c cllcv c mz ld c cl

mvm ll m m dcd mddl d cl

(M d sb 2004).

o blm dd l l dvlm m l d l. el

c b m dcd m xcd mmb cm-

m, c b l d m l. Elitec l

m l bl dm c, l,

c . n ccc mll xclv; l

dvdl m m b mll. t

lv q c l dc dmc

d fc .

w d cl cllcv c d blc

dbc c blc vc, cmm m,

l lc bvl cl c

b cv cv c: l c l

mblz cmm, d , d d m d

cllcvl dv, l-c bv. Lcl dvlm

jc dmd l cd ld; dcd l

bc, d d jc dc-

m, m cc, d m cv

vd b lcl jc. t cl

c b dcbd m bvl c (r d ibz2005; Bd d D 2006).

hv, v bvl l v cl k d k

m cl c. t, bc lcl jc

lkl b l m cll lkd ld. i

dvl c cl, d b b

Elite control can be an

eective part o the

cooperative inrastructure

when power is used to

acilitate collective action

toward the public good.


28/37


76

dcd ld , m c lkl

b ld b l, c d l cfc

Cl bcm mlvl c l xc blc

c v b. C c m l v

, cld , c, d db b

cl lv.i m d c m cc

, ll, mcl blc dcllm. Cllm

cc ld llc blc c d d

k d l cld cl d

.

i dmcc , c m cmm

dvl ld c, c bvl mlvl

c cl cmm: ld

d d b lvl vm; d c cmm m mblc blc d v

dvld cmm; d, t xml m C

dmcc m ccbl x. i dmc

, cllm ll cqc cl m d l

m. B dld dvdl d m

ld cl bl, bld llc, lc

t lcl cx l dm l c

c dmcc dclz. Bd d Mkj

(1999, 2000) cc mdl l c lcl cm

. t d lvl c dd dx lcl c, lcl d

l, d v cm b

lcl lcl d . wl

c mk cb c lc, c

d c v. a v v b

. Lvl lcl c d dd

db lc, ccmc , d x

md. Dmcc dclz ll l d

ql vc, c b m d l

dvcd . i ll l d l lcl ql d

db , mk x c mc m

cc lcl cx.

Cllm dmcc cc l b

cz d lc dcd ml c,

Control becomes malevolent

capture when elites extract

public resources or their

private beneft.

It is important to distinguish

capture rom clientelism.


29/37


dc xc cz v dc m

c cc mlm, d d vc (Kcl d

wlk 2007, 2). a Bd d Mkj (2011) ,

(dmcc) cllm vl m v cqc

dvlm. F, c dcd d -m b

qck lcl c m d v d (,bdzd d) d cb dvlm

l m (dc, l). pv , mv, d

b dcd d v x v

mbl c v. V m l md b

lcl ( l cl lcl

) b x v m dcl m-

. t cqc llc qll dbd v

m dv bc. Cllm c dc cc

d xcb ql v bc xlc c.w lcl dvlm jc, m

dd l l d d b l cl,

c cb cv c lcl lvl;

cllm; d c. udd lcl c

ql d lcl cl d lcl l l

v d ll dm bl c ll

cl b . exlcl cz c

d dmc cld l d dd c ql

mv c m, c mdd cl m

d m vll ccl, d m xcl-vl c , m d d m

dc vlc c.

Group composition and collective action. t mb

cmm mk dc, cll c dc

d d c. g d c m mm-

b mmb . Cql, dvdl

m blc dvdl cv c

dv m d.

t c l cmm v m m

ld cllcv c m dcl cv m

l cmm. hv, al d L F (2005)

, m c m b m dcv,

bc dv m ll d kll l cmlm l

dc c. t c lkd

Clientelism in democratic

settings occurs when

relationships between citi

and politicians are predic

on a material transaction.

The number o groups in

a community can make a

dierence, particularly i e

group has a distinct ident

and preerences.


30/37


78

dc c m c cv vd dm

d cfc.

t l b z cmm d cc

cllcv c bd . a ol

(1965) , l cmm l v m d, bc

mc c dvdl dc mll. Mv, bld d ( xcldbl), dvdl

blc d dcl l , dc cv

cllcv c. t m k l

group-size paradox. hv, c (xcldbl) bl

d, ol l vd, l bl dc

m m. Mv, eb d r (2000)

ml c c cl, l v

cc cm m v d xcldbl

( , ccc v d).t dd m, cd c

l d mblz c l d xlv lc

ld. t ml c c c

xml , b bc, b , c

m d bc m c, m vbl

bcm d m k bcm ld

Cql, mblz ld lkl l

l mb l ld b m d .

i cl l cmm, m

ql cmm, m cmm m cllcv c l. t mc c cmlx

d l dd dl cllcv c

x ddc cmm,

cv c, c c,

lvl v, d x lc d lcl .

Inormation ailures. a d dv dclz

lv m m l bl d

cl vm bv c l

cll, dmvl, cll m cl dc

mk. t lck m bcm cll c

c l vbl, c l

v m. Dclz m mk vm m

v d cz b mk m xm c

z. w dclz cll lv m blm

Larger, more unequal, or

more heterogeneouscommunities are not

necessarily more prone to

collective action ailure.


31/37


b mv mc b lc dc d c

bc mcl q.

im l cvc ll l lk

b cvl c, , d mk. sc l dl

vl d l cld ql d . t

cld mc vlbl m b c bc c vll bd, cz kld ll

d bcc cd, d cd d -

c. g ql cb l mmc m;

c d m l l lkl v b ccd

k, b cc l l vm, m dc-

(d ), d cc fc

dc mk. Lck m d c l m

lcl d cl ccbl (Km 2007). t c-

c m l (b m md, m cm, cd cdbl m d l b)

l mv bl cz mblz mlv

ld d mk m ccbl. w b m,

cz bcm m d b bl mk m md

lcl dc, c l lcl ccbl.

ev bc lcl ccbl, b m m

bl cz m md v d cc-

bl , c blc cl dcl d c m

b m v d (h 2009).

i c vm, lbb c, d mkdmd , ql cmm c blm

c d m d

c v m vc. ev mblz, ql m c

d lk cvc (eb d r 2006).

M ql cmm ll v m lzd lbb, c

v d c vm lck m b

c d cz. M lzd lbb m

l b m cv vc . Cql, v-

m m b m fcd b c xm d

d mk c dc. t, eb-r mdl,

ql c cl cvl c l.

slv mc v m lvl

d, l lkl vlv vl lcl

l. hv, lv m mmqlz

Inormation ailures in

the civic arena are largely

ailures in the links betwe

civil society, the state, anmarkets.


32/37


80

cc m b c d

. Dc c c m b c

c m ccbl d v lc. w

v m mv c d mk

d cc cz mblz m mcl q

Conclusions

Fd, l, d dv lc dc

c dvlm. p dvc k v

lld b dllm, c v mm

clz, vl. i m, xcv clz

v ll, c v clm lc

c.t v b l c v wld w ii

d ( c 1). i c d xld,

clz m v b. advc d vcd

vdbl d llc c, b

d b lmd b l d mk, v

m, d cvl c l; ql; d cxl dd

b c m.

t d ddl; ll-b cd

b b mv c c d c

lk m m. t blm m mm d cd c mk d vm l c cvl c

Dc b , , d m lcl c

v . t d b md dd

cv c; l l; d cmc

lcl, d cl c d b cd lclz dc

mk v c v m.

Notes

1. ecv cvc c c l v ml cqc v cz, cll mll cm cx m c, c, bl m bl c l b cvl mblz mmb d c mj bm (K 2004). t

Equalizing access to

inormation is relatively

straightorward . . .

. . . but citizens may need

to conront the structures

o power directly to use

that inormation to make

governments more responsive

to them.

Participatory development

policy needs to be driven

by a thoughtul diagnosis

o the interaction betweenmarket, government, and civil

society ailures.


33/37


c cvl c l , bl, bl qlbm l .

2. t jc d m v m c c d . B v cl m dm d j, d cvc c mblzd bd m.

3. s Bd (2005) lb . a lk-

cc m vm, mk, d cvl c xm m m ccbl l ( 3.2 wld Bk 2004). w cz/cl z cllcvl, b c lc d d v

x vc. t c lc d lc mk- cmc vc vd. t cmc c bml, dcl m vc vd vm bcc, vm c dl v vc mk b v v vd dlv blc vc cz. t 2004 World Development Reportc b

c cz c ld vc vd ccbl. t l

vlv lcl ccbl; cz d vm bl vc v b lc m mv mm c b v . t dclzvc v cmm, l vd d dc cl d mm cz, xc cl ld m dcl ccbl.

4. t dd bcmk mk d vm l c-d p cc l l-d dvdl b p mm bjc c m, vxd c d cl. i cvc , c cb md b xd; dlbv c dd cc. Fm, cdd c c c m

d bl cc. F , d cvl c l lv . t l Kl h l m . F dc ldcc cmm l, hm d Kkc (1981), Bldd pl (1996), ak (2001), d Bd (2005).

5. i c c, t vd 316 vll vc d C.

6. Vll ml zd d vll d d, c C l l ckd d Cll rvld b bql bld. L zd dvll cl ll.

7. Vll cc c b mbddd, bc p mmb bd m k cc cv. B c, v cl vll ml mblc cd c ml ccl lcm c ml d d ldp mmb lm l mmb mlccl d m d ml cv.


34/37


82

8. t c l cl bld cllcv d. Fm cll l c l dvlm lc, rd wl (2004) d Lm d smll (2008).

9. s Bcd (2009) x ld d cllcvm.

Reerences

abm, a., d J.-p. pl. 2004. pc Dvlm: wCl C. i Culture and Public Action, d. V. r d M. wl21033. sd, Ca: sd uv p.

acml, D., d J. a. rb. 2006. Economic Origins o Dictatorship anDemocracy. n yk: Cmbd uv p.

al, a. 2005. evml: Cmm, im gvmd Mk evml sbjc Km, id. Curren

Anthropology46(2): 16189.al, a., d e. L F. 2005. ec Dv d ecmpmc.Journal o Economic Literature43(3): 762800.

alxd, J. 2006. The Civil Sphere. n yk: oxd uv p.ak, M. 2001. Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis. Cmbd, Ma

Mit p.Bld, J.-M., p. Bd, d s. Bl. 2006. idc. i Inequality

Cooperation and Environmental Sustainability, d. J.-M. Bldp. Bd, d s. Bl, 19. pc, nJ: pc uvp.

Bld, J.-M., d J.p. pl. 1996. Halting Degradation o NaturaResources: Is there a Role or Rural Communities?oxd, u.K.: Cld

p.. 2006. Cllcv ac d Cmm. i Inequality

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