Pub Corp Lapid

8/13/2019 Pub Corp Lapid

1/38

TATEL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

FACTS:

Residents of barrio Sta. Elena filed complaints against the petitioner because of

the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside hiswarehouse which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to thesmoke, obnoxious odor, and dust emitted by the machine.

A committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to inestigate thematter. !he committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roadsand the surrounding residential houses. Resolution "o. #$ was passed by the %unicipal&ouncil of Virac declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a publicnuisancewithin the puriew of Article '$( of the "ew &iil &ode..

Respondent municipal officials further contend that petitioner)s warehouse was

constructed in iolation of *rdinance "o. +, series of +$-#, prohibiting the constructionof warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios withoutmaintaining the necessary distance of # meters from said block of houses to aoidloss of lies and properties by accidental fire.

/etitioner assailed the alidity of the ordinance and aerred that what isprohibited is the construction of warehouses and not the use of the warehouse forstorage of abaca and copra. 0t also contended that the ordinance is discriminatory sinceother warehouses are allowed to operate within the icinity without being prosecuted.

ISSUES:

1hether *rdinance "o. +, S. +$-# of the %unicipality of Virac isunconstitutional and oid

HELD:

2es. *rdinance "o. +, series of +$-#, is a legitimate and alid exercise of policepower by the %unicipal &ouncil of Virac and is not unconstitutional and oid as claimedby the petitioner. !he &ourt also emphasi3ed the criteria of a alid ordinance as follows4 5+6 0t mustnot contraene the &onstitution or any statute7 5#6 0t must not be unfair or oppressie7

56 0t must not be partial or discriminatory7 5(6 0t must not prohibit but may regulatetrade7 5-6 0t must be general and consistent with public policy7 and 5'6 0t must not beunreasonable.


2/38

LLDA vs CA

FACTS:

Sec( 586 of the charter of 99:A proides that the 99:A shall hae the exclusie

;urisdiction to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any pro;ects oractiities affecting the said lake. !hen RA nregulated fish pen occupied almost +? of the

entire waters which is iolation of 9aguna lake carrying capacity. 99:A sered notice to

the general public to the concerned owner who illegally constructed their fish pen andfish cages.

@ish pen owner filed in;unction against 99:A on the ground that proision of

99:A had been repealed by RA


3/38

LIM vs. PACQUING

FACTS:

!he &ity of %anila granted Association of :eelopment &orporation to operate;aialai pursuant to *rdinance "o.


4/38

VILLACORTA vs. BERNARDO

FACTS:

!his is a petition for certiorari against a decision of the &ourt of @irst 0nstance of

/angasinan annulling an ordinance adopted by the municipal board of :agupan &ity.

!he ordinance in question is *rdinance ##, or BAn *rdinance RegulatingSubdiision /lans oer parcels of land in :agupanF, passed by the %unicipal Doard.

!he court a quo declared the ordinance as oid because it conflicts with andexpands Act ($', which is a national law. @irst of all Sec.+ of the ordinance requires thatall subdiision plans be submitted to the &ity Engineer before it can be approed by the:irector of 9ands. Sec. of the ordinance further proides that a certification of the cityengineer is needed before registration of subdiision plans can be made with theRegister of :eeds. Section # also proides a serice fee for subdiision plans. 9astly,

the ordinance also imposes a penalty for iolations committed. All of the aforementionedsections of the ordinance contraenes Act ($' as the latter does not require submissionof plans to the city engineer, nor the issuance of a certification by the same, nor does itproide any penalties.

!he &ity of :agupan argues that the ordinance brings to a halt the surreptitiousregistration of lands belonging to the goernment.

ISSUE:

0s *rdinance ## alid, considering the laudable purpose for its enactmentH

HELD:

"*. !he powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot beheld alid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and?ormake a general law subordinated to a local ordinance.

!his adice is especially addressed to the local goernments which exercise thepolice power only by irtue of a alid delegation from the national legislature under thegeneral welfare clause. 0n the instant case, *rdinance "o. ## suffers from the additionaldefect of iolating this authority for legislation in contraention of the national law by

adding to its requirements.


5/38

CRUZ vs. PARAS

FACTS:

!he municipal corporation of Docaue, Dulacan prohibits the exercise of a lawfultrade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such as clubs

employing hostesses. 0t is contended that the ordinance assailed as inalid is taintedwith a nullity, the municipality being deoid of power to prohibit a lawful business,occupation or calling, petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to dueprocess and equal protection of the laws were iolated as the license preiously giento them was in effect withdrawn without ;udicial hearing. !he issue is whether or not amunicipal corporation can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of nightclubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such as clubs employing hostessesH

ISSUE:

1hether the act of the %unicipality of Docaue is legalH

HELD:

"*. 0t is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night

clubs. !hey may be regulated but not preented from carrying on their business. All that

petitioners would hae to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A

refusal to grant licenses, because no businesses could legally open, would be sub;ect to

;udicial correction. !hat is to comply with the legislatie will to allow the operation and

continued existence of night clubs sub;ect to appropriate regulations. 0n the meanwhile,

to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an

affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business


6/38

QUEZON CITY vs. ERICTA

FACTS:

!he Iue3on &ity &ouncil passed *rdinance "o. '++J, S'( regulating the

establishment, maintenance and operation of priate memorial cemetery or burialground within the ;urisdiction of Iue3on &ity

Section $ of said ordinance states that4 At least six 5'6 percent of the total areaof the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased personswho are paupers and hae been residents of Iue3on &ity for at least - years prior totheir death, to be determined by competent &ity Authorities. !hen, the Iue3on &ity&ouncil passed a resolution requesting the &ity Engineer, Iue3on &ity, to stop anyfurther selling and?or transaction of memorial park lots in Iue3on &ity where the ownersthereof hae failed to donate the required 'K space intended for paupers burial./ursuant to this petition, the Iue3on &ity Engineer notified respondent Cimlayang

/ilipino, 0nc. in writing that Section $ of *rdinance "o. '++J, S'( would be enforced.

Respondent Cimlayang /ilipino filed with the &ourt of @irst 0nstance of Ri3alDranch LV000 at Iue3on &ity a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamuswith preliminary in;unction, seeking to annul Section $ of the *rdinance in question. 0talleged that the same is contrary to the &onstitution, the Iue3on &ity &harter, the 9ocal

Autonomy Act, and the Reised Administratie &ode. !he trial court rendered thedecision declaring Section $ of *rdinance "o. '++J, S'( null and oid.

/etitioners argue that the taking of the respondent)s property is a alid andreasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is

intended for the burial ground of paupers.

ISSUE:

0s Section $ of the ordinance in question a alid exercise of the police power

HELD:

"o.!here is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six 5'6percent of the total area of an priate cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceasedpaupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare

of the people.

The ordinance is actually a taking without compensationof a certain area from apriate cemetery to benefit paupers. 0nstead of building or maintaining a publiccemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to priate cemeteries.


7/38

ORTIGAS COMPANY AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. FEATI BANK

FACTS:

*n %arch (, +$-#, plaintiff, as endor, and Augusto /adilla y Angeles and

"atiidad Angeles, as endees, entered into separate agreements of sale oninstallments oer two parcels of land, known as 9ots "os. - and ', Dlock +, of theCighway Cills Subdiision, situated at %andaluyong, Ri3al. *n uly +$, +$'#, the saidendees transferred their rights and interests oer the aforesaid lots in faor of oneEmma &hae3. >pon completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiffexecuted the corresponding deeds of sale in faor of Emma &hae3. Doth theagreements 5of sale on installment6 and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations orrestrictions that4 !he parcel of land sub;ect of this deed of sale shall be used the Duyerexclusiely for residential purposes

:efendantappellee, maintains that the area, has been declared a commercial

and industrial 3one, per Resolution "o. #


8/38

BALACUIT vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

FACTS:

B*rdinance '( N *rdinance penali3ing any person, group of persons, entity orcorporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any moie or otherpublic exhibitions, games, contest or other performances to require children betweenseen 5


9/38

Sangaang vs IAC

FACTS:

>pon the instruction of %akati %ayor 2abut, studies were made on the feasibility

of opening streets in Del Air Village calculated to alleiate traffic congestion along the

public streets ad;acent to DelAir Village. !he studies reealed that subdiision plan of

DelAir were approed on a condition that its ma;or thoroughfares connecting the public

streets and highway shall be opened to public traffic.

0t is only necessary in the interest of the general public to open to traffic to traffic

to Annapola, %ercedes, Oodiac, upiter, "eptune, *rbit and /aseo de Roxas. !he

petitioner contended that upiter streets are for the exclusie use of DAVA residents.!hey also appeal that the demolition and opening of *rbit streets has loss of priacy of

DAVA residents and depriation of property without due course.

ISSUE:

1hether the %ayor of %akati may order the opening of the streets

HELD:

2es. !he opening of upiter Street was warranted by the demands of the

common good, in terms of traffic congestion and public coneyance, same as the

opening of *rbit Street. !here is no taking of property or expropriation without ;ust

compensation. !he act of the mayor is in the concept of police power.


10/38

PILAPIL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

/riate respondent &olomidas purchased a parcel of land and claimed a roadright of way which leads towards the "ational Road and ends at the portion of petitioner/ilapil)s property where a camino vicinal exists all the way to said "ational Road. !he&olomidas tried to improe the road or camino vicinal, but the /ilapils harassed andthreatened them. !he /ilapils also threatened to fence off the camino vecinal.

ISSUE:

1hether &olomidasP act of improing the camino vicinallegalH

HELD:

"*. !he property of proinces, cities and municipalities is diided into propertyfor public use and patrimonial property. !he first consists of the proincial roads, citystreets, municipal streets, squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and publicworks for public serice paid for by the said proinces, cities or municipalities. 0n thepresent case, it is beyond dispute that the establishment, closure or abandonment ofthe camino vecinal is the sole prerogatie of the %unicipality of 9iloan. "o priateproperty can interfere with such a right.

>nder Datas /ambasa Dlg. < 5!he 9ocal =oernment &ode6, the Sangguniang

Dayan had the power to adopt 3oning and subdiision ordinance or regulations sub;ect

to the proision of existing laws, and to proide for the construction, improement, repair

and maintenance of municipal streets, aenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks andother public places, regulate the use thereof and prohibit the construction or placing of

obstacles or encroachments on them. A camino vecinal is a municipal road. 0t is also

property for public use. /ursuant, therefore, to the aboe powers of a local goernment

unit, the %unicipality of 9iloan, through the Sangguniang Dayan had the unassailable

authority to 5a6 prepare and adopt a land use map, 5b6 promulgate a 3oning ordinance

which may consider, among other things, the municipal roads to be constructed,

maintained, improed or repaired and 5c6 close any municipal road


11/38

MACASIANO vs. DIOKNO

FACTS:

!he %unicipality of /araQaque passed an ordinance which authori3es the closureof certain streets and the establishment of a flea market theron. !hrough a resolutionpassed by the municipal council, the mayor entered into a contract for the operationmaintenance and management of a flea market with respondent /alanyag, a sericecooperatie.

/etitioner Drig. =en. %acasiano, /"/ Superintendent of the %etropolitan !raffic&ommand, ordered the destruction of said stalls. /etitioner %acasiano wrote /alanyaggiing the latter ten 5+6 days to discontinue the flea market otherwise the market stallsshall be dismantled.

!he trial court howeer upholds the alidity of the ordinance.

ISSUE:

1hether the ordinance is constitutionalH

HELD:

2es. !he property of proinces, cities and municipalities is diided into propertyfor public use and patrimonial property. 5Art. 423, Civil Code). 0n the present case, thelocal roads are used for public serice and therefore considered public properties./roperties of the local goernment which are deoted to public serice are deemedpublic and are under the absolute control of &ongress. 5 rovince o! "amboanga del

#orte vs. City o! "amboanga.) Cence, local goernments hae no authority whatsoeerto control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is estedupon them by &ongress.

Section + of the 9ocal =oernment &ode proides closure of roads N BA localgoernment unit may likewise, through its head acting pursuant to a resolution of itssanggunian and in accordance with e$isting law and the provisions o! this Code, closeany barangay, municipal, city or proincial road, street, alley, park or square. #o suchway or place or any part thereo! shall be closed without indemni!ying any person

pre%udiced thereby. A property thus withdrawn !rom public use may be used orconeyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit

concerned might be lawfully used or coneyed.F


12/38

CRUZ vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT

FACTS:

/adre Rada market was authori3ed to be operated as a public market of the &ityof %anila by irtue of Resolution "o. #, as amended by Resolution "o. (', bothseries of +$($. !he management of said market represent by petitioner &ru3 wrote%ayor Villegas that the management was withdrawing threefourths of the area of themarket from the direct superision and control of the &ity !reasurer)s *ffice effectie onune +-, +$


13/38

HEIRS OF !UANCHO ARDONA vs. REYES

FACTS:

!he /hilippine !ourism Authority wishes to expropriate #J# hectares of land fordeelopment into integrated complexes of areas with potential tourist alue. /etitioners

filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of /ublic >se. !hey contend that the land isalready for land reform and that it should seek the approal of the &ourt of AgrarianRelations. &@0 granted writs of possession. /etitioners brought instant petition beforeS& to en;oin execution. !he basic issues are whether or not there is noncompliancewith the Bpublic useF requirement under the eminent domain proision of the Dill ofRights7 whether or not there is disregard of the land reform nature of the property beingexpropriated7 and whether or not there is impairment of obligations of contracts.

ISSUE:

1hether /!A has authority to expropriate such landH

HELD:

2es. !here is compliance with the requirement of public use. !he statePs powerof eminent domain extends to the expropriation of land for tourism purposes althoughthis specific ob;ectie is not expressed in the &onstitution. !he policy ob;ectie of theframers can be expressed only in general terms such as social ;ustice, local autonomy,conseration and deelopment of the national patrimony, public interest, and generalwelfare among others. !o include specific programs like tourism as expressconstitutional proisions would make the &onstitution more prolix than a bulk code andwould require the framers to be impossibly prescient. !he particular mention in the&onstitution of agrarian reform, among others, merely underscores the magnitude of the

problems sought to be remedied by these programs. !hey do not preclude nor limit theexercise of the power of eminent domain for such purposes like tourism and otherdeelopment programs. !he concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes.!he idea that Bpublic use is strictly limited to clear cases of Buse by the publicF has beendiscarded.


14/38

CHIONGBAN vs. ORBOS

FACTS:

/ursuant to Article L, Section +J of the +$J< &onstitution, &ongress passed RA"o. '


15/38

MAGTA!AS vs. PRYCE

FACTS:

1hen /A=&*R opened a branch in &agayan de *ro, there was an instant

opposition from different sectors of the community, including the local goernment. 0nfact, the %ayor of the city of &agayan de *ro brought this instant petition attackingamong others, gambling as intrinsically harmful and citing arious proisions of theconstitution and seeral decisions of the court. !he Sannguniang panglungsod passedan ordinance prohibiting the operation of casinos in their place.

ISSUE:

1hether the Sangguniang /anglungsod may pass an ordinance prohibiting theoperation of casinos

HELD:

"*. !he power of /A=&*R to centrali3e and regulate all games o chanceremains unimpaired. /: +J'$ has not been modified by the 9ocal =oernment &ode,which empowers the local goernment to preent or suppress only those forms ofgambling prohibited by law.

&asino gambling is authori3ed under /: +J'$. !his decree has the status of astatute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Cence, it was notcompetent for Sangguniang /anglungsod of &agayan de *ro city to enact ordinancesprohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and prohibiting the

operation of casinos. !hose ordinances are contrary to /:+J'$ and the public policyannounced therein, therefore ultra ires and oid.


16/38

ALVAREZ vs. GUINGONA

FACTS:

/etitioners questioned the constitutionality of R.A. , amongothers, the 0RAPs and the share in the national utili3ation proceeds are considered itemsof income.


17/38

TY vs. TRAMPE

FACTS:

!he respondent court ruled that the schedule of market alues and theassessments based thereon prepared solely by respondent assessor are alid and

legal, they haing been prepared in accordance with the proisions of Sec. #+# of R.A.


18/38

!AVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Respondent /roincial Doard of Antique abolishes the office of the /roincialEngineer. /etitioner questioned the said action and contends that the abolition was acircumention of the constitutional mandate on security of tenure and intended only toweed out proincial officials and employees who opposed the /roincial DoardPscandidacy in the +$


19/38

MARIANO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

/etitioners assail section # of R.A.


20/38

BASCO vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION

FACTS:

/A=&*R was created and was granted a franchise to establish, operate and

maintain gambling casinos within the territorial ;urisdiction of the /hilippines. 0tsoperation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino B/hilippine !ouristF.

Subsequently, /: +J'$ was passed to enable the goernment to regulate andcentrali3e all games of chance authori3ed by existing franchise or permitted by law,under the following, among others, declared policy. Bb6 !o establish and operate clubsand casinos, x x x 5+6 generate sources of additional reenue x x x, 5#6 createrecreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improe the country&s e$istingtourist attractions, and '3)minimi(e, i! not totally eradicate, all the eils, malpractices andcorruptions that are normally prealent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubsand casinos without direct inolement.F 0t is reported that /A=&*R is the third largest

source of goernment reenue.

Dut the petitioners are questioning the alidity of /: +J'$. !hey contend that /:+J'$4 +6 constitutes a waier of the right of the &ity of %anila to impose taxes and legalfees and #6 its exemption clause is iolatie of local autonomy.

ISSUE:

1hether /: +J'$ is null and oid

HELD:

/: +J'$ is not null and oid. !heir contention is without merit for the followingreasons4

a. !he &ity of %anila, being a mere %unicipal corporation, has no inherent right toimpose taxes. !he &harter or statute must plainly show an confer that power orthe municipality cannot assume it.

b. !he &harter of the &ity is sub;ect to control by &ongress, which has the power tocreate and abolish %unicipal corporations due to its general legislatie powers. 0fcongress can grant the &ity the power to tax, it can also proide for exemptionsor een take back the power.

c. !he power of local goernments to regulate gambling thru grant of franchise,licenses or permits was withdrawn and was ested exclusiely on the "ational=oernment. "ecessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees, which is aconsequence of the issuance of licenses or permits, is no long ested in the &ity.

d. 9ocal goernments hae no power to tax instrumentalities of the "ational=oernment. /A=&*R is a goernment owned or controlled corporation with anoriginal charter. As such, it should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.


21/38

*therwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or sub;ected to control by amere local goernment.

LIMBONA vs. MANGELIN

FACTS:

0n +$$J, /resident Estrada issued E* no. (Jto facilitate the process ofenhancing the capabilities of local goernment units in the discharge of their functionsand serices. !he oersight committee has been tasked to formulate and issue theappropriate rules and regulations necessary for its effectie implementation. !heB:eolution Ad;ustment and Equali3ation @undF was created to address the fundingrequirements of the program. !he :D% was directed to set aside an amount to bedetermined by the committee based on the deolution status appraisal sureysundertaken by the :09=. !he initial fund was to be sourced from the aailable saingsof the national goernment. !he committee has been authori3ed to issue the

implementing rules and regulations goerning the equitable allocation and distribution ofsaid fund to the local goernment units.

!he proince of Datangas represented by =oernor %andanas, filed a petition forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus to declare as unconstitutional and oid certainproisions contained in the =AA of +$$$, #, and #+, insofar as they uniformlyearmarked for each corresponding year the amount of /-billion of the 0RA for the 9ocal=oernment Serice Equali3ation @und and imposed conditions for the release thereof.

ISSUE:

1hether the assailed proisions in the =AAPs of +$$$, #, and #+ and the*&: resolutions iolates the constitutional precept on local autonomy

HELD:

2es. !hey are iolatie of the constitutional precept on local autonomy. As theconstitution itself declares. 9ocal autonomy, both administratie and fiscal, means amore responsie and accountable local goernment structure instituted through asystem of decentrali3ation. @iscal autonomy includes the power of the 9=>s to amongothers, allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. !he assailedproisions in the =AAPs of +$$$, #, and #+ and the *&: resolutions effectiely

encroach on the fiscal autonomy en;oyed by the 9=>s. !hey cannot be upheld.


22/38

TAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

D/ JJ- was enacted to create a new proince, to be known as the /roince of"egros :el "orte, in the 0sland of "egros. 0t proides, among others, that BSec. (. Aplebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new proince which are the areas affectedx x x.F

/etitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional and it is not inaccordance with the 9ocal =oernment &ode Sec , A. L+ of our &onstitution mandatesthat, B"o proince, x x x may be created, x x x except in accordance with the criteriaestablished in the local goernment code, and sub;ect to the approal by a ma;ority ofthe otes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.F Sec. +$< of the 9ocal =oernment&ode enumerates the condition which must exist to proide the legal basis for thecreation of a proincial unit and these requisites are4 BA proince may be created if ithas territory of at least three thousand fie hundred square kilometers, x x x.F

/ublic respondents argue that D/ JJ- should be accorded the presumption oflegality, claiming that the said law does not infringe the &onstitution because therequisites of the 9ocal =oernment &ode hae been complied with. !hey further arguethat the remaining cities and municipalities of the /roince of "egros *ccidental, notincluded in the area of the new /roince of "egros del "orte, did not fall within themeaning and scope of the term Bunit or units affected.F

ISSUE:

1hether D/ JJ- is constitutional

HELD4

"o, D/ is not constitutional. 0t can be plainly seen that the constitutional proisionmakes it imperatie that there be first obtained Bthe approal of a ma;ority of otes in theplebiscite in the unit or units affected.F !hus, it is inescapable to conclude that theboundaries of the existing proince would necessarily be substantially altered in orderthat there can be created the proposed new proince. !wo political units would beaffected4 the first would be the parent proince because its boundaries substantiallyaltered and the other would be of those in the area subtracted from the parent proinceto constitute the proposed proince.


23/38

F"#$s vs D#%"n

FACTS:

/ursuant to the proision of Sec + par 5d6of RA


24/38

V%an&$va vs Cas'an$(a

FACTS:

!here is in the icinity of /ublic market of San @ernando, /ampangga a

strip land what is commonly known as talipapa. !he petitioner claim that they hae the

right to remain and conduct business in the area by irtue of a preious authori3ation

granted to them by municipal goernment while the respondent deny this and ;ustify the

demolition of their stalls as illegal consideration on public property. %unicipal &ouncil of

San @ernando adopted Res. "o. #+J authori3ing #( members of @ernando >nited

%erchant and !raderPs Association to construct permanent stags.

!he action was protested while the case is pending, the council adoptedRes. "o. #$ which declared the sub;ect area B the parking palce and as the public pla3a,

impliedly reoking Res "o. #+J. !he decision was apparently not enforced, the

petitioner is not eicted the Associations of &oncerned &iti3en and &onsumer of San

@ernando, /ampangga filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Res. #$ to

restore the sub;ect property to its original and customary use as a public pla3a.

VicenteA. %acalino, as officer in charge of the *ffice issued resolution to demolish the

stalls in the area.

Iss&$:

1hether public pla3a is susceptible for contractual obligation

H$(:

A public pla3a is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the

sub;ect of lease or any contractual undertaking. Article +#


25/38

CITY OF MANILA vs. CA

FACTS:

0rene Sto. :omingo buried her husband in a lot at the "orth &emetery, whichwas leased to her by the &ity of %anila for a period of fifty years. @ull payment of therental therefor of /-. is eidenced by the said receipt which appears to be regularon its face. Delieing in good faith that, in accordance with Administratie *rder "o. -,Series of +$


26/38

MANILA vs. TEOTICO

FACTS:

=enaro !eotico file a complaint for damages against the city of manila, its

mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police for thedamages he had sustained when he fell inside an uncoered and unlighted catch basinor manhole on /. Durgos Aenue as he stepped down from the curb to aboard a

;eepney.

&ity of %anila howeer contends that the present case is goerned by Section (of Republic Act "o. ($ 5&harter of the &ity of %anila6 and not by Article #+J$ of the&iil &ode, because Republic Act "o. ($ is a special law intended exclusiely for thecity of manila.&@0 rendered a decision faoring the city of %anila, the &ourt of Appealsaffirmed the &@0Ps decision but ordered city of %anila to pay damages.

ISSUE4

1hether the case is goerned by Section ( of Republic Act "o. ($

HELD

"o. !he case is not goerned by Section ( of Republic Act "o. ($ but by Article#+J$ of the &iil &ode. 0n Article #+J$ of the &iil &ode, it is not necessary for theliability therein established to attach that the defectie roads or streets belong to theproince, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. 1hat said articlerequires is that the proince, city or municipality hae either Gcontrol or superisionG oer

said street or road. Een if /. Durgos Aenue were, therefore, a national highway, thiscircumstance would not necessarily detract from its Gcontrol or superisionG by the &ityof %anila, under Republic Act ($.


27/38

!IMENEZ V. MANILA

FACTS:

!he eidence of the plaintiff 5petitioner herein6 shows that in the morning ofAugust +-, +$


28/38

public buildings and other public worksG in particular and is therefore decisie on thisspecific case.

GUILATCO vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN

FACTS:

0t would appear from the eidences that on uly #-, +$


29/38

MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE vs. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION

FACTS:

/ursuant to Sangguniang Dayan Resolution, the %unicipality of /araQaque filed

a complaint for expropriation against priate respondent, oer two parcels of land to be

used for a sociali3ed housing pro;ect. Respondent filed an answer and alleged that the

complaint failed to state a cause of action because the complaint was filed pursuant to a

resolution and not an ordinance as required by RA


30/38

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

!he Sangguniang /anlalawigan of petitioner passed a resolution in +$JJauthori3ing the proincial goernor to purchase or expropriate priate propertycontiguous to the proincial capitol for the purpose of establishing a pilot farm for nonfood and nontraditional agricultural crops and housing pro;ect for the goernmentemployees.

!he land sought to be expropriated belongs to the San oaquins, which at thetime the complaint is filed, the goerning law was D/ < which authori3esexpropriation by mere resolution of the municipal council.

!he &ourt of Appeals suspended the expropriation proceedings and requirespetitioner to submit the requisite approal of the :AR to conert the classification of theproperty from agricultural to nonagricultural. Cence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

1hether such is alidH

HELD

"*. !he power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by &omprehensieAgrarian Reform 9aw 5&AR9 or RA ''-


31/38

PATALINGHUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

!he Sangguniang /anglunsod of :aao &ity enacted ordinance number ', forthe expanded 3oning ordinance of :aao &ity. Section J of which proide that funeralparlors shall be established not less than - meters from any residential structures,churches and other institutional buildings.

/etitioner commenced the construction of his funeral parlor, but his permit toconstruct the building was cancelled because the construction of the funeral parlor waswithin the -meter radius measured from the nearest residential structure owned by1ilfred !eepot, which is leased by laundry businesses. /etitioner argued that !eepot)sbuilding is for commercial purposes since a business was being undertaken therein, andits classification as residential in tax declaration is not conclusie.

ISSUE:

1hether such was considered commercial 3oneH

HELD:

2es. Een if !eepot)s building was declared for taxation purposes as residential,once a local goernment has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for3oning purposes must preail. @urthermore, a tax declaration is not conclusie of thenature of the property for 3oning purposes. >nder Section ## of the Real Estate !ax&ode, tax declaration does not bind a proincial or city assessor. 0n fact, a piece of landdeclared by the tax payer as residential may be assessed by the proincial or cityassessor as commercial because its actual use is commercial.

%ore importantly, the declaration of the said area as a commercial 3one through

a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power


32/38

FRIVALDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

*n %arch #, +$$-, @rialdo filed his &ertificate of &andidacy for =oernor. 9ee,another candidate, filed a petition w? the &*%E9E& praying that @rialdo be disqualified

for not yet being a citi3en of the /hilippines. :uring the elections, @rialdo garnered thehighest number of otes. 9ee filed a petition praying for his proclamation as the electedgoernor. At J4 pm of une , +$$-, 9ee was proclaimed goernor. @rialdo filed anew petition w? &*%E9E& seeking the annulment of the une proclamation of 9eeand his own proclamation. Ce alleged that on une , +$$-, at #4pm, he took hisoath of allegiance as a citi3en of the /hilippines after his petition for repatriation under/.:.


33/38

GREGO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

Dasco was remoed from his position as :eputy Sheriff by the S& upon a findingof serious misconduct in an administratie complaint lodged by a certain "ena

!ordesillas.5"ew 9=& "*! yet in effect then6. Subsequently, Dasco ran as a candidatefor councilor and won 5"ew 9=& already in effect6. After his term, Dasco soughtreelection twice and won on both reelections. /etition for disqualification was filedagainst Dasco, using section ( 5b6 of the 9=&U but dismissed. !he issue is whether ornot the petition for disqualification was correctly dismissed

ISSUE:

1hether dismissal was alidH

HELD:

"o. 0t was correctly dismisses. Sec. ( 5b6 of the 9=& does not applyretroactiely to those remoed from office before it took effect on an. +, +$$#. DascoPselection to office as city councilor in the +$JJ, +$$# and +$$- elections wipe away andcondone the administratie penalty against him, thus restoring his eligibility for publicoffice. 0t must be noted that there was nothing to condone in the first place. Dasco was"*! sub;ect to any disqualification at all under Sec. ( 5b6 of the 9=&, which appliesonly to those remoed from office on or after an. +, +$$#. 0n iew of the irreleance ofthe issue posed by petitioner, there is no more reason to dwell on the matter.


34/38

MERCADO vs. MANZANO

FACTS:

Ernesto S. %ercado and priate respondent Eduardo D. %an3ano werecandidates for ice mayor of the &ity of %akati in the %ay ++, +$$J elections. !he otherone was =abriel V. :a3a 000. !he results of the election were as follows4

Eduardo D. %an3ano +,J-

Ernesto S. %ercado +,J$(

=abriel V. :a3a 000 -(,#nited States.

ISSUE:

1hether %an3ano can alidly be elected as Vice %ayor haing dual citi3enshipH

HELD:

2es. !he disqualification of priate respondent %an3ano is being sought under( of the 9ocal =oernment &ode of +$$+ 5R.A. "o.


35/38

DAVID vs COMELEC

FACTS:

0n his capacity as barangay chairman of Darangay


36/38

HELD:

2es. 0n light of the brief historical background, the intent and design of thelegislature to limit the term of barangay officials to only three 56 years as proidedunder the 9ocal =oernment &ode emerges as bright as the sunlight. !he cardinal

rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and gie effect to the intent ofthe law. And three years is the obious intent.

FARINAS vs BALBA

FACTS:

&arlito D. :omingo was a member of the Sangguniang Dayan of San "icolas,

0locos "orte. *n %arch #(, +$$(, he resigned after going without leae to the >nited

States. !he %ayor, Angelo Darba, recommended Edward @arinas to fill the acancy. Ce

is also recommended by the Sangguniang Dayan of San "icolas directed to the %ayor.

!he resolution regarding to the recommendation was submitted to Sangguniang

/anlalawigan of 0locos "orte in compliance with Section -' of the 9ocal =oernment

&ode. Sangguniang /anlalawigan disapproed the resolution for the reason that the

authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Dayan members are lodged to the

=oernor.

*n the other hand, despite the disapproal, the respondent still appointed

@arinas. 9ater on, he took an oath. *n une +(, +$$(, petitioners filed with the R!& of0locos "orte a petition quo warranto and prohibition. !he !rial &ourt uphold the

appointment.

ISSUE:

1ho can appoint the replacement in case of a permanent acancy in

Sangguniang Dayan caused by the cessation from office of a member who does not

belong to any political part.

HELD:

!here is only one goerning appointment to Sanggunian Dayan. Any acancytherein caused by the cessation from office of a member with or without a political partymust be made by the =oernor upon the recommendation of the said Sanggunian.


37/38

BUNYE vs ESCAREAL

FACTS:

!he Sandiganbayan preentiely suspended petitioners from office pending trial

for iolation of a proision of the Anti=raft and &orrupt /ractices Act for enacting

B8apasiyahan Dlg (-F, and based on which they forcibly took the management and

operation of the new public market in Alabang from &ooperatie named 8ilusang

%agtitinda.

/etitioner assailed said, suspensions will toll the operations of the 9=> without

the mayor, Vice mayor and ' councilors who were suspended, one that nothing can

possibly compromised or hampered by their remaining office since the proceeding will

no longer be for the purpose receiing eidence, hence, they insisted that the order

suspending them should be set aside as a grae abuse of the &ourtPs decision.

ISSUE:

1hether or not petitioners arguments alid to reconsider the SandiganbayanPs

order of suspension

HELD:

"o. !he court found no merit in the petitioners argument s. !he sole ob;ectie of

an administratie suspension is to preent the accused from hampering the

inestigation with his influence and authority oer possible witness or to keep him fromreceiing eidence, that preentie suspension is %andatory.

!he fear of the petitioner that the %unicipal corporation of %untinlupa will be

paraly3ed for $days when are preentiely suspended is remote. !here will still remain

J councilors who can meet as the Sanguniang Dayan.


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Documents

Pub Corp Lapid