Yosef Lapid--The Third Debate

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The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist EraAuthor(s): Yosef LapidSource: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), pp. 235-254Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600457 .

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3/21

236 Prospects f nternational heoryn a

Post-Positivistra

it Bunge, 1983:270). One finds, n the other

hand, a prescription ora rigorous

philosophy-avoidancetrategy or the practicing

ocial scientist. specially n the

early tages

f

theorizing,o this rgument oes, misplaced ursuits f epistemology

and

philosophy

f

science re bound to be inconclusive nd are likely o come at the

expense of actual research Rosenberg,1986).

Be that s it may, t s hardly isputable hat hedemiseof theempiricist-positivist

promise or cumulative ehavioral ciencerecently as forced cholars romnearly

all the ocialdisciplineso reexamine heontological,

pistemological,

nd

axiological

foundations

f

their scientific ndeavors. As a result, the human sciences are

currently ndergoing n acute bout of self-doubt

nd heightenedmetatheoretical

ferment.

ndeed,

some of the most

highlyprized premises

f

Western

cademic

discourse concerning he nature of our social

knowledge, ts acquisition, nd its

utility-including hibboleths

uch as

truth, rationality, objectivity, reality,

and

consensus, -have come

under

renewed

ritical

eflection

Fay, 1985).

AnthonyGiddens (1979:238) has identified ourtypicalresponses to this re-

awakeningof metatheoreticalmpulses following he collapse of the positivist

orthodoxy: he despairing, he dogmatic, he celebratory, nd his own,thecall

for

a systematic econstruction f social theory.Alarmed by the conspicuous

absence

of a

single shared

conviction

bout the nature and destination f social

theory, he despairing esponse rticulates n instinctiveesirenot tobe disturbed

by foundational,

r

meta -scientific,roblems.Noting hat xperts

n

metascience

rarely gree among themselves, hisresponseclings o pre-Kuhnian erities bout

objectivity,estability,nd falsificationnd encourages ocial scientistso go on with

some

useful

or

practical

work.

Unfortunately,

his

retreatist

attern

neither

addresses

nor

settles he issues raised by the current

ntellectual ransfiguration.

Worse till, hecreative otential f the risis s ost

n

thehaste

f

wanting o

know.

The dogmatic esponse uffers rom imilar imitations.n theface ofexpanding

confusion nd as a result f a foundationalistraving

o

restore ntellectualecurity,

this

response ppeals

to an authoritative

igure

uch

as Karl

Marx or

Max Weber.

As Giddens indicates,however, his reversion o dogmatism voids rather than

confronts he core problem. Certainty s perhaps

artificiallyestored,

but

at an

excessive scientific price.

In sharpcontrast o the firstworesponses, he third ffirmsnd

celebrates

he

supposedly liberating otential

f

the

Babel

of

theoretical oices

urrently

ound-

ing over the ruins of the positivist roject.

t casts

a

new

light

on the

endemic

diversity

f theories

by questioning

he

assumption

hat

convergence

f

belief s

necessary

or

maturity

n

science.

t

seriously

xamines

nsteadthe

possibilityhat,

within imits,diversity f viewpointsmightbe fully compatiblewithscientific

rationality

nd

objectivity.

his

is an

optimistic

esponse,

nd thus Giddens

cau-

tiously pproves. He insists, owever, hat imply

mbracing-or compounding-

this

condition

f

theoretical luralismmay

nadvertentlyggravate

he

crisis.

His

fourth

esponse, ystematiceconstruction,

ddresses his

roblem ytrying

o order

and

transcend

diversity

without

ubstituting

new

orthodoxy

for

the

old one

(Giddens, 1979:240).

As we shall see shortly,

his

far-reaching

nd still

volving

ntellectualransition

n

the

philosophical

nd social

disciplines

has left

ts markon international elations

scholarship. ollowing

he idealismversus

realism chism

f the

1920s

and

1930s,

and transcendinghe more recent history ersus cience exchange

of

the 1950s

and

1960s,

n the ate 1980s the

discipline

tands n the midst f a third

discipline-

defining

ebate

(Maghroori

nd

Ramberg,1982;

Holsti, 1985a; Banks, 1986).

It

is

noteworthy

hat

n

terms

f

methodological

nd theoretical

nnovations

he field

f

international elationswas

and still s an absorber

nd

importer,

ot a

producer

n

itsown

right Halliday, 1985:408). Hence,

prima

acie,

there re

reasons to

suspect

that

ust

as the second debate -the

history

ersus science

controversy-was


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4/21

YOSEF LAPID

237

wedded to the ascendance of positivismn Western ocial science, o is the third

debate linked, historically

nd

intellectually,

o

the

confluence f diverse anti-

positivistichilosophical

nd

sociological

rends.

Submittinghat the thirddebate

in

international

elations

heoryparallels the

intellectual erment hat ther ocial sciences re presently ndergoing nd that his

debate onstitutes diffuse nd stillmaturing isciplinaryffort

o

reassess heoretical

options n a post-positivistra, this ssay xplores hedebate's tiology nd assesses

its mplications or urrent nd future rospects

or

heoretical rowth. lthough ll

fourresponses numeratedby Giddens are embryonicallyresent

n

the

context

f

the third ebate,this tudy ingles ut one of them-the celebratory attern-as its

main

focus.' This

optimistic

eactionhas

been

chosen

for

three

principal

easons.

First,

t

s

a

salient

nd

provocative esponse

which

merits

pecial

onsideration

n

view

of

a lingering uspicion that something s stillradicallywrong

with

nternational

theory.2What,one might sk, s the nature nd

the

origin

f this

pparent urge

of

optimism? re we truly n theverge

f

a new

ra n

theory

r are we

simply itnessing

an international elations ersion f the obsessive iscoverer's omplex ?3

Second,

from

more

practical oint

of

view,

he

celebratory attern

s

intriguing

because

of

ts xplicit ocus

on

some putativemoments

f

specialproductivity

hich

are

presumably mplicit

n

the current

ntellectual

ransition.

t

is

interesting,

n

other words,to see what types

f

theoretical pportunities nd potentialities ave

been attributed

o

the currentdebate

and what

kind of

theoretical

rojects

re

expected

to

best realize

such

promises.

And

finally,

s hinted

by Giddens's

fourth

pattern, ystematic econstruction,

he

celebratory esponse

needs

constructive

critical elimitation

n

ordertoanticipate nd preempt hedangers f ndiscriminate

theoretical lation.

In

direct nswer o thesequeries

and

concerns

we

posit

hat he

deeper roots nd

implications f the current eason of hope in internationalelations heory re best

explored

in

the context

of

a focused effort

o

understand ome

seemingly

ar-

reaching ramifications

f the

new, post-positivisthilosophy

nd

sociology

of

science. The

following nalysis

s

presented

n four

consecutive

tages.

The first

acknowledges

and

explains

the

difficulty

ome

have

in

identifying

coherent

debate

n

the

emerging

Babel

of

discordant heoretical oices

n

the nternational

relations ield.The second seeks to bring the

third

debate into sharper focus by

highlightingts distinctive ost-positivistrofile.

he thirddelimits he

parameters

of

the

celebratory esponse

nd

explores

the

grounds

for he

optimisticquation

of

the current

ebate

with

promising rowth

n

international elations

heory. he

fourth

section

issues a

general warning concerning

some notable hazards

of

misplaced r extravagantheoretical opes.Whileacknowledginghe considerable

'

Brief reference will be made later to the despairing response. The orthodox Marxist attack on the

dependency and world system

pproaches provides good examples

for the

dogmatic pattern see

Denemark

and Thomas, 1988). The systematic

econstruction esponse

is

certainly ery mportant

nd deserves

separate

attention. But

I

agree with Preston that as formulated

by

Giddens

it comes close to

step

number one in

the

direction of a new orthodoxy

Preston, 1987:75). And like him

I

believe that having ust escaped from one

straitjacket

here s

no point

n

pushing so early

for

new

one

(Preston, 1987).

As an

example, however,

Hoffman's

(1987) plea for dopting Critical

Theory as the next tage

n

nternational elations heory ertainly ualifies

for

the systematic econstruction ategory.

For an

interesting xchange sparked by

Hoffman's

uggestion,

ee

articles

by Renger (1988b) and Hoffman 1988).

2

See, for instance, Waltz's (1979:18) lament: Nothing seems to accumulate, not even criticism. Or see

Rosenau's (1980:129) despair over

the

process

of

paradigm deterioration which,

n

his view,

is

underway

n

the

study

of world affairs.

Reflecting

his

spirit,Gilpin (1984:287) has recently uggested that

the

discipline,

no less

than

its

object

of

study,

s in a

state

of

anarchy.

'

This complex originatesfrom

orokin 1956:3-20) and refers o the periodic emergence n the ocial sciences

of would-be

new

Columbuses who discover

hereto undetected eaps

of

growth

n

social theory.




5/21

238 Prospects f nternational heoryn a Post-Positivistra

promiseof the current ntellectual erment,he concluding section singlesout

enhanced

reflexivitys the most important

ontribution o

date

of

the current

theoretical estructuring.

The Third Debate: Disarray

or Theoretical

Restructuring?

Few observers

would

seriously ontest he suggestion hat he field

f international

studies

has

experienced

n

recent

years

sustained theoretical ffervescence. ut

beyond vague

uneasiness ver the

fact hat

no

reduction

eems

to be

obtaining

n

the diversity

f

conceptualizations

nd

higher-orderheories,

ne looks

n

vain for

more

specific

onsensus

on

the current tate

nd future

irection

f the

discipline.

Echoing Giddens's despairing response, we

find at

the pessimistic nd

of

the

spectrum

cholarswho are either eluctant

r unable to

detect coherent

attern

n

the

rampant heoretical peculation.

uch observers

eplore

the

dazing pace

with

which

new deas are superficiallyntroduced

nto

nternationalelations heory, nly

to be discarded subsequentlywith nexplicableurgency.They seem thoroughly

confused by the amount of debris

on

the battlefield f international elations

theory Der Derian, 1987:11) and feelunderstandablyrustrated

t

facing hisvast

intellectualisarray

with

ewguides

on

making

hoices

Lyons,1986:643). Hence,

they onclude that in both theory nd practice nternational olitics an bring n

despair.

This is an

occupational

hazard

in

the field

for

which

here s

no

remedy

(Morgan, 1987:301).

Others,

o be

sure,

would

strongly isagree

with

uch

a

gloomy eading Holsti,

1985a:4). They would counter hat he ively horus

f

contending heoretical oices

in

the field

f international elations

onstitutes

dialogue

or a debate with

he

power

to transform

he nternational elations iscipline. et evenamongthis roup

there sconspicuouslyittlegreementboutwho sdebatingwhom, longwhat ines

of

contention,

nd

withwhat

prospects

f

success.

For

in

sharp

contrast

withboth

previous debates, the residual

confusion ver the

source, nature,direction,

nd

potential onsequences

of the current ntellectual ransition emains xtensive.

t

reaches far beyond technical isagreements ver nomenclature r head countsof

would-beparadigmatic ombatants Holsti, 1985a:5).4

At

first

ight

t is

therefore

ifficult o avoid the

conclusion

that

nternational

relations

heory

has

recently p-graded

ts

profile

s a

fundamentally

ontested

domain

Biersteker, orthcoming).

his

perhapspartially xplains

hereluctance

o

bring

the current

xchange

nto focusas an

intelligible

debate.

But, precisely

n

view

of

this

reluctance,

t

is imperative

o

highlight ome notable commonalities

among thosewho do acknowledge coherent nd consequentialpattern n the

current

ntellectual

acophony

n

the nternationalelations ield.

or

at a minimum

one

finds,

or

xample,

shared

recognition

hat he

third ebate marks clear end

to the

positivistpistemological

onsensus

hatwas

hardly

haken

n

the ourse

of

the

history

ersus

science controversy.Whereas

the

second debate was preoccupied

with

quarrels over methodologynarrowly efined,the third debate is typically

expected

to

facilitate

railblazing

deas

about the

nature nd

progression

f knowl-

4 The nature f the thirddebate may vary

onsiderably long ontological, pistemological, nd axiological lines.

Its scope may fluctuatewidely depending on whetherone opts for a restrictive escriptionof the debate-as a

focused exchange

betweenrealism and neorealism versus all comers and

challengers Keohane, 1986)-or

for a

far

broader

characterization which

specifies

the

emergence

of

a

genuinely multiparadigmatic nternational

relationsdiscipline as

the

outstanding novelty f

the current ntellectual ransition Alker and Biersteker,1984;

Holsti, 1985a). And finally,moving long the plane

of knowledgeversus power, the significance f the debate may

varydepending on whether ne sees it as a battlebetween good and bad ideas in an

insuLlatedcienitificrenia

r

as a series of

intenselypolitical happenings

(Ashley, 1989) occur-ring etween vestedcuLltuLral,conomic, and

political nterestsBiersteker,forthcoming).




6/21

YOSEF

LAPID

239

edge

in the international elations ield.One also finds shared

appreciation

hat

theory n thisfield s in the process f beingrestructured, restructuring

hich

s

recognizedmoreover s being linkeddirectly

o a similar et

of

debates

ccurring

n

contemporaryocialand political heory Hoffman, 988:91).

The following nalysis makes no attemptto deny or expunge the possibly

irreducible mbiguities f the current ntellectual ransition

n

the discipline. ts

purpose s simply

o

refer o certain hemes

n

the

new

philosophy

nd

sociology

f

science

n

order

to

clarify

he

etiology

f

the current ebate

and

its

promises

nd

limitations.

The Third Debate:

A

Post-Positivist rofile

Especiallywhencomparedwith he simplisticoherence f the positivist hilosophi-

cal

movement, ost-positivism

s not a

unitary hilosophical latform.

t

presents

itself s a rather ooselypatched-up

mbrella or

confusing rray

f

only

remotely

related philosophical rticulations. ence, ifone wishesto refermeaningfullyo

post-positivism

s an

alternative hilosophical osition-perhaps ushering

n

a new

era

in


heory-one

first

must

dentify

ome areas of con-

vergence

n

the general deas presented y

this new

philosophy

f

science.

A

detailed analysis

of

such convergentpost-positivist

iews

is, however,

well

beyond

the

scope

of

this

paper.5

will

deliberately

estrict

my

attention o

three

themeswhich eem to have been particularlynfluential

n

determining he

tone,

agenda,

and mood

of

the currentdebate

in


heory. hese

themes-the preoccupationwithmeta-scientificnits paradigmatism),he concern

with

underlying remises nd assumptions perspectivism),nd the drift

owards

methodologicalpluralism (relativism)-are,

of

course,

interrelated.

hey will,

however, e treated eparately ere to elucidatemore learlyheir istinctmpact n

the current

heoretical ebate.

The

Concern

ith

Meta-Scientific

nits

Paradigmatism)

Post-positivism

as

wrought

notable

change

in

the

understanding

nd choice of

proper

units f

analysis

n

the study

f

scientific

evelopment.6

n

sharp

contrast o

the

positivist

hoice

of

the

empirically

orroborated

aw or

generalization

s the

fundamental

nit f

scientific

chievement,

henew

philosophy

f

science nsists

hat

only relativelyong-lived, arge-scale,

nd multi-tieredonstructs-such s

para-

digms Kuhn, 1962), research-programmesLakatos,1970),

research

raditions

(Laudan, 1984), super-theories Gutting, 980), globaltheories Hooker,1987),

and

weltanschauungen Wisdom, 1987)-should qualify

as basic

knowledge-

producing, nowledge-accumulating,

nd

knowledge-conserving

nits.

For

theories

do

not

come to us

separately;

hence

they

hould not be handled as

self-contained

entities.

Above

all, the new philosophical ostureportrayscientific nowledge s a triadic

complex consisting

f

1)

a

phenomenic

xis

covering

he

empirical

ontent f

scientific

heories; 2)

an

analytic

xis

covering hypotheses, xplanations,

nd

theoretical

models;

and

3)

a thematic xis

covering eality-defining

ssumptions,

epistemological remises,

nd other

types

f

distinctlyideological

r

metaphys-

'There is now a voluminous body of literature which seeks to

identify

he

basic themes of the dramatic

revolutions n our

understanding

of

science.

See

Laudan et al.

(1986:141-224), in particular,for a readable

summary f both

convergent

nd

divergent

hemes n the new

philosophy

f

science.

6This

change is

known n the philosophical iterature s the problem of choosing a proper unit of

epistemic

appraisal (Bernstein,1983:24; Pandit, 1983:19; Campbell,

1984:28-30;

Laudan et

al., 1986:154).




7/21

240

Prospects f

nternational

heory

n a

Post-Positivist

ra

ical ngredients.7he novelty

f this

nderlying ost-positivistroject-postulating

an irreduciblyhree-dimensionalpace

for scientific

nowledge-is

the

explicit

negationof the cardinal positivist remise

which ffirms

he eliminability

f

the

human Margolis,1987:xxii) nd places or replaces)the

scientist

at

the center

f

the social-intellectual-ethicalomplexknown s science Hooker, 1987:10).

Paradigmatism

hus

sserts

hatmeta-scientificonstructsome

and

go

in

complete

packages.

t

follows

hat

nly

broader

conjunctures

f

interrelated

heories,

nclud-

ing their nstated remises nd underlyingssumptions,

an

qualify

s

properunits

of

development nd appraisal

in

science.

It

follows, urthermore,

hat

empirical

evidence

n

the

usual

sense

of

registering objectively

hat one

sees is

of

only

limited utility

n

scientific valuative

appraisal.

For

in

sharp

contrast

with

the

phenomenic xis, the thematic xis-although challengeable

erhaps

n

some

other

way (Wisdom, 1987:160)-is not refutable y direct empirical bservation. his

partially xplains,

s Holton

pointsout, why

cience

s not

one

great

totalitarian

engine taking veryonerelentlessly

o

the same inevitable

oal

(quoted

in

Stent,

1988:37). At the same time t also raises the challengeof formulatinglternative,

rational riteria f evaluative ppraisal

which

cknowledge nd confront ather

than

deny

or

ignorethe non-empirical

ature

f

at leastone

integral omponent

f

all scientific

nowledge Wisdom,1987:160).

Returning

o our

principal oncern

with

nternational elations

heory,

submit

that

paradigmatism -in

the

specific

ense

of an

enhanced

post-positivist

oncern

withmeta-scientificonstructs hich ncorporatentegral hematic

omponents s a

precondition

f

scientific

ntelligibility-presents

tself

s

one

of

the most notable

characteristics

f

the

third

ebate.

For

even

a

cursory lance

t the

iterature eveals

that tudies nvolving ivariate nd multivariateelations, hich

lourished hrough-

out

the 1960s and

early1970s,

now

are held

n

generaldisreputeViotti

nd

Kauppi,

1987:580). The intellectualxchange s no longerbetween ndividual cholarsor

isolated theories, ut between models McKinlay

nd

Little,

1986), paradigms

(Banks, 1985; Holsti,1985a),

research

rograms Keohane, 1984;

Kratochwil nd

Ruggie, 1986; Hermann

and

Peacock, 1987),

research traditions

Biersteker,

forthcoming),

r discourses

Ashley, 989).

The

chosen

unitdiffers

n

accordance

with

respective references

or

Kuhnian, Lakatosian,Laudanian,

or other

more

fashionally post-modernist

onstructs. ut

we

find

n

each case a

remarkable

concurrencewith he

underlying enet

which

postulates

hat

ignificant

heoretical

modifications

nd choices must

always

take into account the

supportive

meta-

scientific

omains

n

which

hey

re

holistically

mbedded.

It is

in

thisgeneral context, suggest,

hatone can

best

understand he marked

popularityf countless ffortso recastthefragmentedheoreticalurnout f the


field in

terms

of

contendingmeta-theoreticalonstructs

(Banks, 1985; Holsti, 1985a; McKinley

nd

Little,1986;

Viotti

nd

Kauppi, 1987).

There

is

also

the

related

propensity

o

go beyond imple hopping

ists f

would-be

paradigms

or

perspectivesby launching

more ambitious

projects

of

paradigm

demolition

Vasquez, 1983), paradigm ynthesisMaghroori

nd

Ramberg, 982),

or

paradigmproliferationRosenau, 1980). And, arguably,

uch

is

the

ogic

that lso

informs,

or

nstance.Kratochwil nd

Ruggie's

choice

of

the

historicallyvolving

research

rogram internationalrganization)

verthe solated

heoryregimes)

s

their

prime

unit

of

evaluative

ppraisal 1986).

The commondenominatorof these endeavors is the implicit eliefthatthesubstitutionf newmeta-theoreticalonstructsormoretraditional nits fscientific

7

In this nalysis follow rguments presented by

Holton (1987) and Wisdom 1987). Holton's triad consists f

phenomentc,nalyttc,nd

themattc

xes (Stent,

1988:36-37). Wisdom's roughly imilar onstruct onsists f empirical

content,mbeddedntology,nd weltanschauungWisdom, 1987:140).




8/21

YOSEF

LAPID

241

appraisal is somehow essential

to

locating

and stimulating

enuine theoretical

growth. ortunately-as

ndicated y the tendency o up-grade

heoretical evisions

to would-be paradigm lashes r putative

progressive r degenerative roblem-

shifts -the mpact

ofparadigmatismn current heoretical reoccupations

n the

internationalelations ieldhas started enetrating ellbeyond technical ecasting

of its fragmented heoretical orpus

into revamped nd more

fashionably olistic

blueprints.New

questions are being raised about the dynamics

f

emergence,

persistance, nd the decline

of

meta-theoretical

onstructs

n

the field Biersteker,

forthcoming). he extent

to which contending paradigms are truly incom-

mensurable -incompatible

nd even incommunicable

ith ne

another-is more

seriouslyxamined Krasner,1985).

And

thepotential

orfruitful

ialogue

between

or

syntheses

f contending aradigmaticpproaches s more ystematically

xplored

(Keohane and Nye, 1987; S. Smith,1987:201).

Most mportant,

n

thisprocess

f

expanding

paradigmatism

he third ebate has

progressivelyaken

the format

f a

discourse

bout

the

choice of analytic rame-

works Banks,1985:20). In thismore ophisticatedenseparadigmatismocuses n

the difficult ask

of

formulating

nd

applying

valid-as opposed

to invalid-

evaluativeprocedures

at

the paradigmatic

evel (McKinley

nd

Little,1986:269).

Needless

to

say,

for the timebeing these promising evelopments

ave expressed

themselves

mainly

n a far

greater ensitivityo,

rather

han he ctual

resolution f,

new and hereto gnoredsets

of

meta-theoretical

roblems.

But

giventhis,

t

s still

possible

o

summarize

yreiteratingheremarkable ole played

bythepost-positivist

reformulation

f

the unit

of

scientific

ppraisal in determininghe specifically

inter-paradigmatic rofile

f

the current

ebate

n

international

elations heory.

This

I

submit

ifferentiates

n a

fundamental ather

han faddishwaythe current

controversy

rom

ts

two

predecessors

n the field.

The

ocus n

Premises

nd

Assumptions:erspectivism

In

addition

o

the reformulation

f

the

unit

f

scientific

chievement, ost-positivism

also invokes

a

deliberate

shift

to the

thematic

evel

of

underlying ntological,

epistemological,

nd

axiological premises

nd

assumptions.8

uch

a

refocusing

s

considered

necessary

n

view

f theremarkable

willingness

f

bothnatural

nd

social

scientists

o

disregardempirical

data

that

appear

to contradict heories hat

for

them)

have reachedthematic tatus.

ometimes, herefore,mpasses

n

the

growth

f

knowledgemay

be created

and

reproduced

ess

by

observational

mistakes

in

the

phenomenic xis)

or

by narrowly

efined heoretical

laws

in

the

analytic xis)

than

by generalized risesof basicpresuppositionsthethematicxis).9

Once a

set

of

guiding

ssumptions

s

elevated

o

thematic

tatus,

he

perspectivist

argument uggests,

t

becomes

highly

esistant

o

both vidence

nd

logical

riticism

(Laudan

et

al.,

1986:154).

And

occasionally,

nderthefiat

f

premises

hat ndure

n

the face

of

all negative tests, he entire process

of

theorizingmay

be forced to

preceed long

unacceptably

estrictive

r

misleading

ines.For

nstance,

s indicated

by

the bizarre

ack of

interest

manifested

y

Marxism owards

nationalism,

uch

malfunctions

ay

result

n an

excessive

reoccupation

ith

marginal roblems

while

even

criticallymportant

henomena

re

ignored.

8See, however,Dawson's (1985:373-80) critical istinction etween strong nd weak perspectives nd their

implications or the objectivity

f the social sciences.

For an

interesting ttempt

o differentiate etween paradigms

and perspectives,

ee DeMey

(1982:222-26).

9

Gadamer's

prejudgments,

Holton's themata, Schumpeter's

vision, Polanyi's tacitdimensioll,

or Laka-

tos's hard core are,

n

a sense,

different rticulations f the same

post-positivist

nsightwhichposits hat, lthough

it s often eft

mplicit,what s assumed by

a

given

theory an be far more significant

han what s explicitlytated.




9/21

242

Prospects f nternational heory

n a Post-Positivist

ra

Highlighting ssumptions s an important ourceof our scientific

gnorance s

different, owever,

from

submitting

hat

they lways erve to distort heoretical

inquiry.To the contrary,imilarsetsof assumptions nvariably erve

as enabling

sources

of

valid scientific

nowledge.'0 erspectivismubmits,

n

short,

hat

we are

encapsulated n setsof presuppositionswhichmay hinder

or

facilitateheoretical

growth.And if guiding ssumptions re the source of bothour

ignorance nd our

knowledge,t follows hat thefocalpoint f challenge n science hould

becomeour

weltanschauungen Wisdom, 1987:154).

It

should

not

be

difficult o

establish

hat the

currentdebate

in

international

relations heory lso is characterized y a shift

f

attention oward hedomain of

thematic remises

nd

assumptionsHaas, 1986).

This

refocusing xpresses tself

n

a manifest

agerness

f nternationalelations

cholars,

rom

ven

radically pposed

theoretical amps,

to

leave the phenomenic

nd

analytic lanes n order to devote

more

energetic ttention

o

the hidden

domain

of

key underlying

ssumptions.

Perspectivisms implicit,

or

nstance,

n

insights oncerning he inescapabilityf

theory nd in ensuingconcernswithbecoming theprisoner funstated ssump-

tions Keohane, 1986:4).

It

is manifest lso

in a

moreexplicit ensitivityo theneed

to

become clearly ware

of

the perspective

which

gives rise to

theorizing Cox,

1981:128). As a result, ditors nd theorists

n

thefield eem farmorewilling ow to

concede that

readers

re

entitled

o an

exposition

f

underlyingresumptions

n

theoreticalnalyses Rosenau, 1986:854). Notably, ne even hears

the echoes of

perspectivism

n

the embattledbastion

of

international

elations mpiricism, he

data

movement,

ith

prospective

ustomers

ow

dutifullydvised

o

check

which

dataset is the most suitable

n

terms

of

the nature of its underlying

heoretical

assumptions Maoz, 1988:165).

To

be

sure,

he

perspectivist

ccent s most

udible

among

a smallbut vocal

group

of post-positivist,post-structuralist,nd post-modernistritics fmainstream

international elations heory.

As indicated

by

Richard

Ashley's ecentwork, hese

rebels utilize deconstructive nd genealogical ools deliberately

esigned

to

automaticallytarget ssumptive

heoretical

eadquarters.

hese intellectual ech-

nologies postulate

hat

meaning

nd

understanding

re not intrinsic o the world

but,

n

the

contrary,

re

continuouslyonstructed,efended,

nd

challenged.

heir

main

purpose

s

to

problemize nswers,

make

strange

whathas become

familiar,

and

reverse he

process

of construction

n

order

to

reveal

how

problematic

re the

taken-for-granted

tructures

anarchy

for

instance)

of our

social

and

political

world

Ashley,1988, forthcoming; lker, orthcoming).

The

growing

ascination

ith

he

thematic

omponent

f our current

nowledge

of worldpolitics s byno means restrictedo an elitevanguardof post-modernist

rebels. n a

perfect xample

of

perspectivism,

s that

term s used

in

this

essay,

Robert

Jervis a leading


modernist )

as

recently

emon-

strated hatmodernists an be

quite effective-and,

of

course,

far more accessible

than their

post-modernist olleagues-in exposing major assumptivetraps

in

current

heoryJervis, 988).

To

be

sure,

unlike he

rebels, ervis

as no intention o

deconstruct he

anarchy

ramework. n the

contrary,

e is

evidentlympressed

with ts

upposedlyproven apacity

o stimulate nd

sustain alid theoretical

rowth

(Jervis, 1988:319).

But

he is nonethelessdetermined o demonstrate

how

the

simplifications

f

the

anarchy framework-especially

when

amplified

by game

theory implifications-lead s

to

concentrate

n

questions hat re

not

entral,whileat the same time,wemarginalizemany mportant ueries Jervis, 988:349).

' As Wisdom points out, What the Weltanschauung ffects s

to promote what comes within he poinlt f view

and

discourage

what falls

outside it: what

s discovered n its name can be

valid

if

satisfactorilyested;

what s

not

investigated s a loss. But what

s

gained

s

not herebynvaltd rdstorted Wisdom, 1987:138; my emphasis).




10/21

YOSEF LAPID

243

Although

t is

possible

to

argue

that he preoccupationwithunderlying ssump-

tions s anything ut new to

international elations heory,my point s thatthis

preoccupationhas acquired new significancen the contextof the third

debate.

Perspectivism,s defined n this

tudy, enotes omethingmore fundamental han

a ritualisticnsistence hat we must examine our assumptions bout the behavior

of

the actors n internationalrenas more carefully Young, 1986:121). It

refers

more to a

rejection

f

empiricism

n

favor

of a

theoretical

pproach

that

ccepts

the place of data in a subordinate

position Halliday, 1985:412). On the basisof

these brief llustrations,t seemsreasonableto concludethatperspectivismn

the

sense

of

a

strongpost-positivistocus

on

thematic remises nd assumptionshas

been internalized

s

a

foremost haracteristicf the third

debate

in

international

relations

heory.

The

Drift

oward

Methodologicalluralism: elativism

The currentfierce ttackon science,objectivity,ruth, nd even rationalitynd

logic, says J.O. Wisdom, may

well be the fiercest ver mounted in history

(1987:159; also see Bernstein, 986). The new epistemologyssociatedwith

Fleck,

Polanyi, uhn,Feyerabend

nd

others s, ndeed, ften ttacked s having

xtremely

relativisticmplications Bunge, 1983:261). This new relativism, osits

Robert

D'Amico, s

far

moreradical

than

previous ersions ecause

t

s secondorder, hat

is, itquestionsnot ndividual

ssertions or their ack of evidencebut the

mplied

and

embedded standards, riteria, orms nd principles hatmakeudgmentsossible

and

give

them

rivilegedtatus D'Amico, 1986:139; myemphasis).By

undermining

objectivity

nd

truth,

his relativizationf

philosophical hinking

as

greatly

om-

plicated he task

of

providing ffective

egitimation

f

knowledge

nd has

rendered

problematiche demarcation f sciencefromnon-science.

The

massivemove

toward

relativism

as had at

least

three

noteworthy

amifica-

tions.

First,

ll versions

f

methodological

onism

eeking

o

institutionalize

tandard-

ized, explicit, nd unchanging riteria or

regulating

cientific

omains-including

the positivist onception

of

the scientificmethod

Tianji, 1985:415)-have

been

rendered uspect y thisnew ntellectuallimate. ar

from

onsenting

hat

pistemic

criteria re destined

o

remain

ssentially nchanged

over time nd

place,

the

new

epistemology napologetically uggests

hat t

is itself

ocially

mutable nd

histori-

cally ontingent. nd, followingmethodologically

rom uch

epistemological

elativ-

ism,

a

vigorouspluralism

s called for. When it comes to theoreticaldeas 'let the

hundredflowers

loom '

(Hooker,

1987:56).

Second, thegrowingrecognition f a multitude f potentially ruitfulesearch

strategies

lso has facilitated better

nderstanding

f science s a

polymorphic

s

opposed

to monolithic

ntity Wisdom, 1987:140).

As the end

product

f

scientific

activity,

ocial

knowledge

s now

more

typically

een

as

a

complex

of

equally

privilegedbut only loosely ntegratable

orms

Margolis, 1987).

And

since these

distinct

ypes

of

knowledge

are set

apart by

characteristic

modes

of

theoretical

growth,

t s essential

o

differentiate

hem

ccordinglyWagner

nd

Berger,1985).

Finally,

he

post-positivist

ndorsement

f

epistemological

nd

methodological

diversity

as undermined heclassic ascination

ith cientific

onsensus, esulting

n

a

new-wave

preoccupation

with

scientific issensus

Laudan, 1984:13)11

This

intriguingclipse

of consensus s

a

prime

desideratum

n

social cience

s of

primary

importance,or tsignals collapseofthehighlynfluential uhnian quationofan

This trend s fed partially y the post-modernist ortrayal f consensus as a horizon that s never reached

(Lyotard, 1984:61).




11/21

244

Prospectsf

nternationalheory

n

a Post-Positivist

ra

inability

o achieve

paradigmatic

onsensuswith

n inability

o achieve

significant

theoretical

rowth.'

Returning

o

our

main focus of interest,

we note

that the post-positivist

ent

towardrelativism

nd

itsensuing

methodological

amifications

ave clearly

nflu-

enced the toneand substance fthe third ebate n nternationalelationsheory.t

is

hardly ccidental,

or

nstance, hat

despitehigh

motional

nd intellectual

takes,

the

currentontroversy

as

not

been

characterized ythe

focused

ntransigence

hat

marked he two

previous

debates. n tune

with he

post-positivist

plea

for

olerance

in matters

heoretical

Ball,

1987:34),

scholars

have resisted

he temptationo seize

upon

the current

ntellectual ransition

s

an

opportunity

o

impose

a new

set

of

exclusive pistemological

rinciples

nd prescriptions.

Reflecting

deepening

suspicion

of methodological

monism, ven

scholars

who

are otherwise ympathetic

o

positivist

rthodoxy

ow

feel obliged

to concede

the

dangers f monolithic

ogmatism

J. Snyder,

988:190).

The

discipline

s a whole

now seems

favorably

isposed

to consider

alternative

pistemologies

rather han

replacement fone kindof scienceby nother R. Snyder, 985:531). In tunewith

the newpolymorphic

mage

ofscience, t

s nowpossible o posit

hat

both

old

and

new

willbe sciences

lthough

he

purposes

nd

evaluations

will e

different

or

ach

(R. Snyder,

1985:531).

The growing

cceptance

of

methodological

luralism

lso

is

manifest,

n the

endorsement f pluralist

igor

s

the

most

promising

methodologicalosture

for

the fieldof

international

elations

Jervis, 985),

n

the nsistence

n

openness

to

criticism

t every

turn

(Ashley,

1989:30),

in the vision

of thriving

multiple

disciplines

f

international

elations Alker

and

Biersteker,

984:123),

or, even

more explicitly,

n

promptings

o adopt

the

dictum

f

let a thousandtheoretical

flowers loom

Beal, 1980:55).

In

summary,

he present

osition

s indeed

one of

ferment nd transition,markedby pluralismn values,methods, echniques nd

perspectives

Dunn,

1987:79).

Finally,

t

was perhaps

nevitable hat

he

expanding

cceptance

f

a

polymorphic

image

of

science

nd

the

growing

opularity

f

methodological

luralism

lso would

lead

to

reexamination

f cientificissensus

nd ts elationship

o

cientificrogress.

As a result, he earch

for un-Kuhnian

ersions

f

progress

s already

well

underway

in

international

elations

heory Beal,

1980;

Mansbach

nd

Ferguson,

1986).

Irre-

spective

f

other

disagreements

oncerning

he

theoretical

rospects

f the

field,

ne

now finds

onsiderable

onsensus hat

the way

forward or international

elations

theory] hat inds

tself

n

difficultiess

notto

pursue

normalcy'

f

the

Kuhniankind

but to

work

owards diversity

f

strong

aradigms Halliday,

1985:412).

The

Grounds

for Post-Positivist

ptimism

Granted hat ome

post-positivist

essages

have

been

trickling

own

from

he new

philosophy

f science,

why hould

these enets

ranslatentogreater

ptimism

bout

the prospects f

nternational

elations heory?

n

what

basis

and

in what ense

can

one posit

hat he

third ebate provides

timulus,

ope, and

even

excitement

n

the

demandingbusiness

of

analyzing

nternational

elations ?Banks,

1985:20).

What

are

the new

promises

of

international

elations theory

from a

post-positivist

standpoint,

nd

what

s

the

post-positivist

ubstitute

or

the embattled

nd

rapidly

fadingEl Dorado ofpositivistcience?

In

seeking

n

answer

o this

uestion

twillbe useful o take second ookat the

threepost-positivist

hemes

hat urfaced

n our

previous

iscussion.

loser scrutiny

12

Ball

(1987:15-16)

identifies hree

more or less distinct

hases

in Kuhn's reception

by political cientists,

ith

the

current tagebeing

one

of outright epudiation.




12/21


13/21

246 Prospects f

nternational

heory

n a Post-Positivistra

summarize,

n

both their

hindering

nd their

nablingcapacity,

hematic

ssump-

tions

an

inspire onsiderable ptimism

bout

the

growth

nd

prospects

f

nterna-

tionalrelations heory.

The belief that social scientists re invariably

etter

quipped

to

cut through

assumptive s opposed to empirical mpasses is perhaps overlyoptimistic.'5 y

pointing, onetheless, o the nonempirical phere

of

thematic remises

nd

pre-

suppositions,perspectivism

as

facilitated relative

liberation

f

theory

from

observation Gergen, 1987:2). And this iberation

was

destined

o

be interpreted y

at

least some

scholars s a

good

reason

for renewed

hopefulness. Having passed

through

a

phase

in

which

facts have

dominated

theory,

ne of them

notes

approvingly,

the

ogic

of

our

scholarship

s

carrying

s into

phase

n which

heory

dominates

acts

Banks, 1986:9).

This takes

us

directly

o

perhaps

the

richestmine

of

optimism

mbedded

n

the

post-positivistredosof the thirddebate. Like

other

socialscientists,nternational

relations heorists

an

deriverenewed

onfidence

n

their

cientificredentials

rom

the post-positivist ove toward relativismnd methodological luralism.For the

positivist cientific romise was arrogant

nd brutal

n

its simplicity:This is the

modelof a scientificnterprise,ake t

or

leave

it

Elias, 1987:xix).

For too

ong thetragedy

f nternationalelations

cholarswas,

of

course,

hat

hey

proved incapable of either fruitfullydoptingor decisively ejecting he grail of

positivist cience.

Via

positivism

he

discipline

became locked

in a

sterile

and

frustrating orshipful elationship

o

the

natural

ciences. resentlymerging rom

this elf-imposed ositivist rap,many cholars

re

favorablympressed y the new

latitude

f

maneuver ffered y

multitude f

post-positivistdioms

f

enquiry.And

althoughnotably acking he exclusive

uster f the

positivistmantle

f

science, he

post-positivistounterpart-or counterparts-are

far

more ccommodating

n

their

acknowledged ostureoftolerance nd humility.

The endorsement

f

methodological luralism,

he

emergence

f

a

polymorphic

image

of

science,

and the

reassuring

notion

that

in

the social sciences even

permanent

issensus s

not a

scientific

isasterhave

neutralized

he

once

intimidat-

ing bite of the positivist anti-scientificabel. Small wonder thatcurrentlyssued

verdicts

f condemnation o a lifeof intellectual

luralism Holsti, 1985b:695)

no

longer carrytheirtraditionalmessage

of

scientificespair. Following necessary

period

of

digestion

f

post-positivistdeas,

it s

now

more fashionable

o

posit

that

'much f the strength f the discipline omes

from

he pluralityf its theoretical

orientations Walker,1987:8).

Arguably

t s this

feeling

f an

exceptional openingup

of international

heory

whichabove all sustainsthe hope that,by presenting nprecedented heoretical

potentialities,

he

mpact

f

the

third ebate

may

xceed

by

far

he

ignificance

f

the

two

previousones.

For

some the

main

opportunity

s

to overcomeU.S.-inspired

nationalistic arochialism

nd

create genuinely nternationalheory pplicableto

all

(Holsti, 1985a;

S.

Smith,1987:204).

Others eem

more concerned

with

related

problems

f

paradigmatic ectarianism,dentifyingpportunities

or

new

and

more

energetic yntheses

f

realism

nd

Liberalism

Nye, 1988)

or

realism nd Marxism

(Linklater, 986; Halliday, 1987b).

Still others have identified

pportunities

or

revamping

he

empiricist-positivist

orthodoxy

with holistic

Snyder,1988)

or

interpretive Kratochwil

nd

Ruggie,

1986) correctives;grounding political

realism

and

international heory

n

the

supposedly superior principlesof a realist philosophyof science (Wendt,

15

In

fact,

as Wisdom

points out, problems at the

weltainschauungen

evel

may

prove

far more

difficult

o

overcome

than

problems at theoretical r empirical

evels see Wisdom,

1987:153-54).




14/21

YOSEF LAPID 247

1987:369); endorsing he epistemological oundations f criticalheory s the next

stage

n

the development f International elations heory

Hoffman,1987;

see

also Ashley, 987); and adopting post-structuralistiscourse

which,we are told,

expands the agenda of social theory, osingquestions hatotherdiscourses

must

refuse

o ask (Ashley, 989: 1).

Other interpretationsf the precise nature

of

the post-positivist

romise are

readily vailable.What eems common o many f thesetheoretical

rojects s their

striking

mbition. n their

ombined ffect he

themes f

paradigmatism, erspec-

tivism, nd relativism-inconjunctionwith he post-positivistlea fortolerance n

matters heoretical-apparently ave generated reservoir f

energywhich eemsto

be

best released by theorizing n a grandiose cale. Indeed,

as

Rosenau remarks,

this s not a timefornit-picking,orfinding aultwith ogue

definitions,mprecise

formulationsnd skeweddata (1986:850).

The Limits ofPost-positivist ptimism

How durable and consequentialwill the current eason of hope

be in the interna-

tionalrelations iscipline?Are we truly n the verge

of

a new era in international

theoryr s tmore ikely hat he drenaline ush fthethird

ebate, ike thers,will

have only negligible ong-term mplications? definitivenswer

to

this

question

would be risky nd premature t this point,for we must keep in mindthat the

current urge

of

optimisms admittedly euristic.

t

is,

n

otherwords,

n

enthusiasm

of

newly nitiated epartures ather han sobercelebration

f

safe arrivals.Hence

prudence and fairness nd the post-positivistpirit f tolerance tself emand a

patient waiting f further,more substantive,esearch indings.

Having acknowledged his t snonethelessppropriate o add some observations

on

the hazards

of

excessive post-positivistptimism.

n

referring

o

possible

problems

nd

difficulties, ypurpose s

not to

deprecate

he

revitalizing

heoretical

energy eleased by the

third

debate.

It

is rather

o further elimit

ts

scope

in the

spirit

f

constructiveriticism.

or

clarity

nd

consistency

e

will

return,

or

he ast

time,

to

the three post-positivistrademarks

f

the third debate.

Starting

with

paradigmatism,

ne

should notice

n

particular

he

danger

of

misappropriating

thisvaluable post-positivistorrective or propaganda

and

polemical

uses. Philoso-

phers

of

science

have

long suspected,

n

fact,

hat ne

major

reason social

scientists

turn o philosophys to fabricate

more

respectable

nchor

for

he laim

f

being

progressive

cience

Rosenberg, 986:340).

There are reasons

o

suspect

hat uch

a line of reasoning may stand behind some current ttempts o reconstructhe

corpus

of

international heory

n

terms

f

paradigms,

research

programs,

nd

othermeta-scientificnitsof analysis.

Consider the

fact

that,

s

typically pplied

to the international elations

field,

Lakatos's methodology f scientific ppraisal has consistentlyesulted

n

rather

optimisticeadings

f both

tspasttheoretical rowth

nd

itsfuture

rospects.'6

his

mightbe a fortunate oincidence,but one is alerted by

Hermann and Peacock's

candid confession

hat the main

reason

for

theirdecision

to move

from

he

two

prevailing ogics

of

inquiry the neo-positivist

nd Kuhnian

methods)

to

a

Lakatosianmethodology

f

scientific

ppraisal

s that he first wo-but

presumably

not the third-lead invariably

o

negative ssessments

f

the

comparative

tudy

f

foreign olicy.The excessivelyavalier nterpretationf Lakatos'smethodologys

16

Such is, ndeed, the warrant orthe passports

f

hope recently ssued

forneorealism

Keohane, 1984), regimes

analysis Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986), and the comparative study of foreign policy Hermann

and

Peacock,

1987:16-22).




15/21

248 Prospects f

nternational

heory

n a Post-Positivistra

particularlytriking

n

thiscase.

For

one

looks n vain

foreven gestures

o

the key

term of progressive r degenerativeproblem-shift. et in the absence of this

concept t s virtuallympossible o accomplishwhat hese wo cholarshave explicitly

set out

to

do, to refermeaningfully

o

Lakatos'smethodforpurposes f theoretical

appraisal Hermannand Peacock,

1987:16-22).17

But the problemgoes far beyondcavalier nvocations f would-bephilosophical

authorities.

With

the consolidation

f

international

elations s

a

dividing

disci-

pline, contending ets of criteriafor udging scientific cceptability roliferate.

Ironically,

his

pens up tempting pportunities

or

nstant cientific

edemption

f

vast bodies

of

theoretical iteratureby simple

shifts

f epistemic tandards

of

appraisal.

Would-be scientific ontributionsuch

as

Allison's models

of

foreign

policy ecision-making, hichmight e consideredunacceptable

f

udged by strict

positivistriteria,may appear more promising

f

interpretive

r

hermeneutical

standards re invoked Ball, 1987:104-09).

Without

uestioning he considerable

merits

f

multiple riteria

or

valuating laims,

cholars n

the field hould beware

lest they ome to resemblethe proverbial rcherwho shoots his arrow and then

draws a bull's

eye

around it.

. . .

Especially

if

seen

as a

miracle

drug,

enthusiastic

paradigmatism

hich

makes ight

f the critical istinction

etweenpromising nd

misleading

ines

of

nquiry

t

the

meta-scientificevel

might

ead us

straight

ntonew

butequally damagingtraps t theparadigmaticevel.

A

more ober

ook at

the truemerits

f

post-positivisterspectivismeveals t east

three noteworthy isks.First, he preprogrammingapacity f assumptive rame-

works s oftenvastly xaggerated r reified. erspectivisman play a constructive

role only n so far s it acknowledges he historic nd dynamic haracter f cognitive

schemes nd assumptive rameworks. therwise, we lock the subject nto himself

unable ever

to

see more than he knows DeMey, 1982:225). This reminder eems

particularly ertinentn viewof the stillpopular rehearsals f rigid matrixes f

underlying ssumptions

which

mechanisticallyncapacitate ealist hinking

bout

contemporary

world affairs

O'Meara, 1984:250; Taylor, 1984:4). Seen

in

this

simplistic

manner-but not

otherwise-perspectivism

s

revealed

n the

debate over

realism

may ustifiably

e dismissed s

a sourceof

confusion

Goldmann, 988).18

This takesus

to

a second set

of

hazards,namely

hat

f

embedding

hefixation

n

guiding ssumptions

n a

superficial nderstanding

f

the

ramificationsf whathas

been

popularized by

Kuhn and

by Feyerabend

s the

incommensurability

hesis.

This

in

turn an result

n

equallydamaging

denials

or

exaggerations

f the

problem

of

comparison nd communication etween

ets

of

thematic

ssumptions.

Rather

than

defining

he

problem wayby ssuming

utomatic ommensuration

portraying

models as merelydifferent facets of the same complex reality Young,

1986:120]

and instead

of

building up

the

problem

to

suicidal

proportions by

insisting

hat

genuine paradigms

are defined

y

their undamentalncommensu-

rabilities

with

ther nterpretations Biersteker, orthcoming)],

cholars nterested

7

In

fairness, hese

scholars do acknowledgethat It

may

be

stretching

oo

far to call these various

contributions

a researchprogram

n the spirit fLakatos

Hermann and Peacock,

1987:30). But the fact

remainsthat hey

do invoke

Lakatos's authorityfor

what can be

uncharitablyportrayed as

propaganda purposes. For to

take

Lakatos's scheme

seriously would involve among

other things that we

distinguishbetween core and

auxiliary

assumptions,directing

our defenses and/or criticisms

ccordingly

. . that our criticisms e

retrospective nd

directed against adjustments in the

protective belt of the

program

in

question; and . . .

that we

udge

the

success-to-datef research raditionnd of the heonesomposingt n termsfprogressivenessr degenerationf uccessive

adjustmentsnd auempts

tproblem-solvingBall,

1987:34-35, my emphasis).

18

Fortunately thers

have acknowledgedthefact

that ssumptions

do not

stayunmodified ver time

and have

approached realism

as a

knot of

historically

onstituted tensions and

contradictions which

might

be

re-

constituted n a more critical nd creativemanner

Walker, 1987;

see also

Ashley,1984).

As

Musgrave points

out

(1981:378),

it s

necessary

not

only

to

distinguish

etweendifferent

ypes

f

assumptions

ut also to remember

he

possibility

f a

concealed change

in

the nature

of a

single assumption

due

to

ongoing

criticism.




16/21

YOSEF

LAPID

249

in understanding

he implications

f

post-positivisterspectivism

or nternational

theory

must pay considerably

more attention

to philosophical

efforts o devise

new

roads to commensurability

Pearce,

1987;

Rengger,1988a).

A third anger

whichmerits

riefmention n

this ontext

urksn the

often-voiced

concern hat he shift ffocus oward he ofty omainof guiding ssumptions ill

come at the

expense of empirical

r lower

eveltheoretical

tudies. hould it

drift

into

such parasiticdirections,

he post-positivist

liberation f

theory romdata

could indeed

lead us into

the dead end of

metatheory

Skocpol,1987:12).

Finally,we willbriefly

xamine the

notorious itfalls

f

post-positivist

elativism.

To be sure, methodological

pluralism

richlybenefits

from all the virtues

of

relativism. nfortunately,

t

also suffersrom

omeof tsworse

vices Gellner,

985).

If adopted

uncritically

r

taken

to

its ogicalconclusion,

methodological

luralism

may

deteriorate

nto condition

f

epistemological

narchy

nderwhich

lmost ny

position

an legitimately

laim

qual hearing.

And to the xtent

hat uch an equality

between different

ypes of knowledge

prevails,

mere theoretical

proliferation

becomes practicallyndistinguishableromgenuinetheoreticalrowth.

It is hardly

secret, f

course, that the

international

elations ield

s already

seriously

fflicted y

some

of

the

hazards

of unreflective ethodological

luralism.

Within ertain imits,

he

field

eems

well advised

to distance tself

rom

conomics

and follow n the

footsteps f

sociology

n

reinterpreting

ts

own

lack

of

definition

and theoretical

acophony

s

selective

dvantages Hirsch

t al., 1987:333).

For,

like

sociology,

he field

f international elations

must

ypicallyeal with

multiple

realities Holsti,

1986). Hence it

must resolutely

esist

the seductive ure

of

economics

with its self-imposed

ncapacity

o

see

more

than

singledimension

f

most

phenomena

Hirsch

t

al., 1987:333).

Having

aid

that,

ne

must dd

that

he

Newton syndrome

nd the

seemingly niversal

desire

to

engage

in grandiose

theorizinghave alreadyresulted n an excessive fragmentationf the field.To

borrow

an apt metaphor,

he field

of international

elations ndeed

resembles

nothing

s much as

the Learnean

Hydra;each

time

ne

conceptual

head

is lopped

off,

nother

wo

ppear

in its

place Rengger,

988b:81).

f the relativisticxcesses

of

methodological

pluralism

and fickle llegiances

ead

to

hopeless

theoretical

incoherence,

he optimistic

message

f post-positivistluralism

ronicallymayresult

in

a

backlash

f

some

new

dogmatic

ersion

f

methodological

monism.

In

Lieu of Conclusion:

A

Pianissimo

Bravo?

Much more could be

said on the

promises

and hazards

of

post-positivism

n

international elations heory. t is certainly sefulto note that the thirddebate

offers s

many

dead ends

as

it

opens promising

aths

for

future

research.But

acknowledging

uch hazards

s not

to

deny

that heoretical

reativity

ay

be

greater

today

than

at

any

time

ince

the emergence

f

international

elations

s

a

distinct

discipline.

or

we must

keep

in mind saiah Berlin's

brilliantnsightoncerning

he

propensity

f

all great

liberating

deas to turn into

suffocating

traitjackets

(1979:159).

When

all

anglesare

carefully onsidered,

he

hazards

are

not

sufficient

to

seriously

hallenge

the conclusion

hat

the

third

debate has

indeed generated

some

unparalleled

theoretical otentialities.

ndeed,

the

next decade

could be

an

exciting

imefor

cholarship

Keohane

and

Nye, 1987:753).

Whether hesetheoretical otentialities illbear fruitn theforeseeable uture

remains to

be

seen,

but

one

thing

seems

reasonably

lear.

For

many years

the

international

elations

iscipline

as had thedubioushonor

of

being

mong

the east

'9

To appreciate

how

compelling he fear

of disciplinary aralysis

hrough xcessive

pluralism

nd relativism

an

become, consider

Peter Rossi's 1980

presidential ddress

before

the AmericanSociological Association

n

which

he

argues

for a dominant

model even if such

a model were to exclude

his

own work

cited

n

Crane,

1986:443-44).




17/21

250 Prospects f

nternational

heory

n a Post-Positivist

ra

self-reflexivef the Western ocial sciences Frost, 1986:11). In the words of one

critic,

hefield

has

allowed tself

o deteriorate o the evelof a

welcoming epository

forphilosophical

nd

theoretical aricature Walker,1988:84). The third ebate s

the beginning

of

a slow

but progressive

oss of

patience with this posture

of

intellectual ibernation. he debate has stimulatedheoretical nd epistemological

ferment n

international elations theory,forging inks

with

other disciplines

undergoing

similar

process.

t has

called

attention o

new notions

of

scientific

objectivity,orcing reconsideration

f therole

of

the

nternationalelations heorist

in

the

scientific

rocess.

t has

called

into

questionreceived riteria

or

evaluating

theoretical

onstructs

such

as

empirical validity, rediction, nd explanation),

allowing theories

to

be reexamined in terms

of

their historical ontext,their

ideological nderpinnings,he forms

f

society

which

hey oster

r

sustain,

nd

the

metaphors

nd

literary ropes

hat nform heir onstruction.

Although the controversy ueled by post-positivistdeas in some ways has

aggravated he dangersof epistemologicalnarchism,

t

also has alerted cholars o

the problemof understanding thenotionof criticism hereknownmethodsof

refutation re inapplicable Wisdom, 1987:136). Althoughwe may be unable to

disprove

a themata r

a

weltanschauung

ith

traditional

mpirical

r

logical

methods,we may findthemto be overly estrictive

r

impossible o workwith, s

shown

byJervis's ritique f the anarchy/gameheory rameworkr by Kratochwil

and

Ruggie's

rebuff

f

positivism

n thecontext

f

regime nalysis 1986:766).2 One

would think hat

nalyses uch as Jervis's1988)

would

reducethevery eal threat

f

the international

elations field being seduced by economics. And although

positivism

s still

erymuch live

n

thefieldAlker

nd

Biersteker, 984),

t

has been

retreating

o

ever thinner nd more tolerant ersions, s indicated yJackSnyder's

(1988) advocacy

f

hybridmethods.

In the space cleared by the weakening f deeply rooted urges for firm ounda-

tions, nvariant ruths, nd unities f knowledge, n optimistic ope is

now

being

planted-as hinted ythedemandtomakeroom

for

new problematiques Ashley,

1988:189)

and

to

open up the field

o critical

pproaches

whichhave hitherto een

marginalised, eglected, r dismissedbythediscipline Der Derian, 1988:189)-

that,

s

in

other ocial

disciplines, nowledge

n

the field

f


may

be cumulative not in

possessing ever-more-refinednswers

about fixed

questions

ut n

possessing

n ever-rich

epertoire

f

questions Cronbach, 986:4).

In

this

process, hediscipline'sevel

of

reflexivity

nd its

means

for

ustaining

ritical

and self-conscious

irection ave been

vitally

nriched.And

as

Der Derian

says

n a

different

ontext, Taking

into

account

the

complexity

nd the breadth

of

the

subject, ne is inclined obe intellectuallyver-ratherthanunder-equipped for

the task

Der Derian, 1987:5).

The task,

s

highlighted y the

third

debate,

s

neither he discovery

f some

ahistorical nd

universal cientificmethod

nor the

attainment

f some

objectively

validated

ruth bout

worldpolitics.

t

s rather matter

f

promoting morereflexive

intellectual nvironmentn which

debate, riticism,

nd

novelty

an

freely

irculate.

The international

elations cholarly ommunity-like

ll

communities

f

nquiry-is

communicativelyonstituted,

nd its success s

partially

onditioned

y

ts

ability

o

sustain nd enhance

the

quality

f

argument

n the

context

f

deeply

entrenched

paradigmatic iversity.2'

he

proper

attitude

or

uch

situations,uggests

erence

Ball, is less one

of

live and let ive thanoftalkingnd listening 1987:4).

20

Wisdom calls this the

cenablinig

r-iterion. t asks whether

weltanschauting cani

do its ob or gets n the wvay

of

its

own

goal (Wisdomii, 987:161).

21

Reflexivitys buiilt, bove all, on a dialogical niotionif scientific -ationalityColapictro, 1987:283). Fol all

attempt

o

go beyond dialogical reflexivityn the direction f praxis, eeJackson anidWillmott1987).




18/21

YOSEF

LAPID

251

The

international

elations

discipline

must ocate

and

eliminate

Rosenau-type

MABS (related

research

reas separated

by

redundant

walls

of

mutually

ssured

boredom ).

Those

who

labor

hard

to integrate

econstruction

nto

the

normal

business

of international

elations

cholarship

must

be

on alert

not

to

give

the

impression hat to show a subject to be a construction s to render its de-

construction

mperative

Connolly,

984:164).

Should

that

happen,

Rosenau's

more

familiar

MAB-type

mines

could

be

accidentally

eplaced

by

MAD-type

ooby

traps

paradigms

or

discourses

ocked

in

a deadly

embrace

of

mutually

ssured

deconstruction ).

As it delights

n the

ight

f its newly

ound reflexivity,

he

field

must ake

care

not

toburn

up

in the

heat

of hyper-reflexivity

Rose,

1979).

To an

unprecedented

degree,

however,

nternational

elations

cholars

now

seem

ready

to concede

that

they

must

ome

tounderstand

what

hey annot

r will

notembrace

Geertz,

1986).

Arguably,

here

is

some

cause

for

optimism

n the realization

hat

the

current

intellectual

ransition

portends

new pluralism

s the cutting-rather

han

the

polemical-edge of internationalheory Der Derian, 1988:190). On that ccount

alone

wecan

agree,

hope,

that he

exclusive

nd chloroforming

orld

f the

1950s

.

. .

is one

to

which

few

friends

of

International

Relations

or social

science

more

generally

wouldwant

to return Halliday,

1987a:216).

And

on this

minimal

asis

for one am

prepared

to add

a

pianissimo

bravo

to the cheers

of those

already

celebrating

he

would-be

splendors

of

post-positivism

n international

elations

theory.

References

ALKER,

H.

R. (forthcoming)

he

Presumption

f

Anarchy

n

World

Politics

mimeo).

ALKER,

H. R.,JR., AND T. J.

BIERSTEKER.

(1984) The DialecticsofWorldOrder. Internationaltudies

Quarterly

8:121-42.

ASHLEY,

R. K.

(1984)

The

Poverty

f

Neorealism.

nternational

rganization

8(2):225-86.

ASHLEY,

R. K. (1987)

The Geopolitics

of

Geopolitical

Space.

Alternatives

2(4):403-34.

ASHLEY,

. K.

(1988)

Untying

he Sovereign

State:

A Double

Reading

of the Anarchy

Problematique.

Millennium

7(2):227-62.

ASHLEY,

R. K.

(1989)

Living

On

Border

Lines:

Man,

Poststructuralism,

nd War.

In

Internationall

Intertextual

elations:

The Boundaries

f

Knowledge

nd

Practice

n World olitics,

dited

byJ.

Der

Derian

and

M. Shapiro.

Lexington,

Mass.: Lexington

Books.

BALL,

T., ed.

(1987)

Idioms

f

nquiry.

Albany:

State

Documents

Yosef Lapid--The Third Debate