Pub Off Gador

Pub Off Digest – Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170

Gador v. COMELEC Facts:

1. Current petition is to enjoin COMELEC to include Gador's name (petitioner) in the list of candidates for Mayor of the City of Ozamiz which shall be printed and distributed soon to all voting centers in the City of Ozamis.

2. Gador is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent in the January 30, 1980 local election;

3. He filed his certificate of candidacy on January 7, 1980. Thereafter, he tried several times to communicate with the COMELEC chairman in order to find out about the status of his application.

4. He filed this petition in view of the announcement made by the President that the COMELEC resolution extending the period for filing of the certificate of candidacy from January 4-10 had been denied and that because of the great possibility that he may not be included in the list of candidates to be voted for which is to be printed soon and distributed in Ozamiz City.

Issue: WON the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980 is valid? NO. Ratio:

1. B.P. 52: "The sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980."

2. Petitioner admits that the President had not extended the period for the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

3. This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Coquilla v. COMELEC, Alvarez

Doctrine: You cannot acquire legal residence in the Philippines while still a citizen of another country such as the U.S which requires residence in order to be naturalized as a citizen (presumes that the legal residence is in the US) Facts:

1. Petition to set aside a COMELEC resolution ordering the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Teodulo M. Coquilla for the position of mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar.

2. Coquilla was born in 1938 of Filipino parents in Eastern Samar. He grew up, stayed and resided there until 1965 when he joined the U.S. Navy. Subsequently he was naturalized as a US citizen.

3. Coquilla retired from the US Navy in 1985 and he remained in the US since then.

4. In 1998. he returned to the Philippines to take out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000.

5. Later on, he was able to be repatriated under the law and in 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines on November 10, 2000.

6. November 2000 - petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. -> Granted.

7. February 2001 - he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two (2) years.

8. Incumbent mayor of Oras (Alvarez) sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

9. In the elections, Coquilla was able to get the highest number of votes. Thereafter, he was proclaimed as Mayor and then he took his oath of office.

10. COMELEC granted Alvarez's petition and cancelled the COC of Coquilla.


a. All things considered, the number of years he claimed to have resided or stayed in Oras, Eastern Samar since 1985 as an American citizen and permanent resident of the U.S.A. before November 10, 2000 …. cannot be added to his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14, 2001 to cure his deficiency in days, months, and year to allow or render him eligible to run for an elective office in the Philippines.… respondent is short of the one-year residence requirement before the May 14, 2001 elections.

Issue: 1. (Procedural) WON the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide

this case notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner? YES.2. (Substantive) WON petitioner had been a resident of Oras,

Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy? NO.

3. If yes, WON the COMELEC was justified in cancelling Coquilla's COC for this reason? YES.

4. WON Coquilla was denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his motion to be allowed to present evidence?

Ratio:1. COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide the case. The rules are:

a. The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted.

b. But those against whom no final judgment of disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections, should continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners.

c. *From R.A. No. 6646, Sec 6: Effect of Disqualification Case

2. Coquilla was not a resident for the period required by the law.a. §39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160)

provides:i. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the

Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (Emphasis added)

b. The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation,"21 but rather to "domicile" or legal residence,22 that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."

c. A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).

d. In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.

e. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.


f. It is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by "constantly declaring" to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. Such acts are insufficient.i. The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be

waived:1. either separately, when one acquires the status

of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or

a. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under §1328 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR)29 and thus waive his status as a non-resident.

2. at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship.

ii. In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner’s status when he entered the country (on October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000) is the statement "Philippine Immigration [–] Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added inscription "good for one year stay."31

iii. It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. 32 He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.

g. Conquilla's contention: his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because §117 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.i. As held in Nuval v. Guray,35 however, registration

as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidate’s lack of residency.

3. SC holds that COMELEC was justified in cancelling COC. a. OEC, SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The

certificate of candidacy shall state: i. that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy

for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office;

ii. if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent;

iii. the political party to which he belongs; iv. civil status; v. his date of birth;

vi. residence; vii. his post office address for all election purposes;

viii. his profession or occupation; ix. that he will support and defend the Constitution of

the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;

x. that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities;

xi. that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country;

xii. that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion;

xiii. and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.


b. OEC, SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking … to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation… is false.

c. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.

4. No.a. Under §5(d), in relation to §7, of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral

Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in nature. The holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur.

b. In any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard since he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before the COMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to petitioner’s claim, are complete and intact in the records.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the Commission on Elections en banc are AFFIRMED. Go v. COMELEC, Montejo, Antoni Facts:

1. This seeks to nullify the resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc which disqualified to run for the office of governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte, because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions and the

withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor was filed late by twenty eight minutes from the deadline.

2. Go is the incumbent representative of the 5th District, province of Leyte, whose term of office will expire at noon on 30 June 2001.

3. Feb 27 2001 - Go filed with the municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte.

4. Feb 28 2001 at 11:47 PM- Go filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the province of Leyte.

a. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. However, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor.

5. The deadline for filing/withdrawal of COC was midnight of that same day and there were a few minutes left and so she decided to fax a copy of the affidavit of withdrawal to her father. The fax copy was received by the Baybay office on March 1 2001 at 12:28 a.m. The original copy thereof was received at 1:15 p.m. on the same day.

6. Montejo and Antoni filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, at Tacloban City a petition to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that petitioner filed certificates of candidacy for two positions, namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte, thus, making her ineligible for both.

7. Law Department, COMELEC, under Director Jose P. Balbuena, made a study of the cases without affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard or to submit responsive pleadings.

a. Report and recommendation by the Law Dept:i. Found that Go falsely represented in her certificate of

candidacy for Provincial Governor, and under oath, that she is ELIGIBLE for the said office; a material


fact required by law to be sworn to and contained in certificates of candidacy.

ii. Likewise, Go falsely represented in her certificates of candidacy, under oath, that she will OBEY THE LAWS, ORDERS, DECRESS, RESOLUTIONS AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED AND ISSUED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES; a material fact required by law to be sworn to and contained in certificates of candidacy.’

iii. Citing Sec. 73 of OEC: 'No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them.'

iv. Clearly, … both her certificates of candidacy for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte and Governor of Leyte were still subsisting and effective making her liable for filing two certificates of candidacy on different elective positions, thus, rendering her ineligible for both positions…

8. COMELEC approved the recommendation. Issue:

1. Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Baybay, Leyte? YES.

a. Must the affidavit of withdrawal be filed with the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed? YES.

2. Was Go deprived of due course? YES. Ratio:

1. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the law.[14] We hold that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate of candidacy for governor.

a. OEC, Sec. 73: i. "A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy

may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.

ii. "No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."

b. There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality.

c. While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed,[16] such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law. (Me: But since the law does not say isn't the administrative law free to fill in where the law is silent?)

d. Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such

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candidacy. The COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declared petitioner ineligible for both positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy.

2. In the meantime, however, the Law Department, COMELEC conducted an ex-parte study of the cases. It did not give petitioner an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner was not required to submit a comment or opposition to the petitions for cancellation of her certificates of candidacy and/or for disqualification.

a. Section 3, Rule 23 of said Rules on petition to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy explicitly provides: "Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding. - The petition shall be heard summarily after due notice. (emphasis supplied)

b. Obviously, the COMELEC en banc in approving the report and recommendation of the Law Department, deprived the petitioner of procedural due process of law.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition.

De Guzman v. Board of Canvassers, Lucero Facts:

1. Petition is for the SC to issue a writ of mandamus addressed to the provincial board of canvassers of the Province of La Union:

a. to meet and reject and annul all the votes adjudicated to the respondent Juan T. Lucero, and

b. to proclaim and certify the petitioner elected for the office of provincial governor of La Union after correcting the election return

c. Ground: i. While the canvassers had found that Lucero garnered

more votes compared to De Guzman, Lucero's COC was not duly sworn to, as required by law, while the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner Tomas de Guzman, was prepared and filed in accordance with the requirements of the law;

ii. that in view of these facts the respondent Juan T. Lucero has not, and could not have, been a legal candidate for the office in question, and could not have been certified elected for the office of provincial governor.

d. Lucero filed a demurrer:i. That the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-

matter in litigation; ii. court had no jurisdiction over the persons of the

defendant members of the extinguished provincial board of canvassers of La Union;

iii. that the facts alleged in the complaint did not constitute a cause of action.

Issue:1. WON Lucero has filed a certificate of candidacy in accordance

with the law, 2. And in case he has not , whether the writ applied for should be

issued? Ratio:

1. Section 41 of Act No. 3030 , amending section 471 of the Election Law, provides that the provincial board of canvassers or the Governor-General, as the case may be, shall certify elected for the offices of senator or member of the House of Representatives and for provincial officers only those who shall have obtained the highest number of votes, and filed their certificates of candidacy in accordance with the provisions of section 404 of this law.

2. Section 404, as amended by section 3 of the same Act No. 3030 , provides that no person shall be eligible for the office of senator, representative or any provincial office, unless within the time fixed by the law, he shall file a certificate of candidacy duly verified.

a. Two constructions of duly verified:i. ". . . only when the corresponding receipt has been

issued and the certificate filed can it be presumed that it has been duly verified and filed." -> This was met by Lucero.


ii. That the COC should be sworn to -> Not met however…

1. SC: In the case before us the certificate of the respondent Juan T. Lucero was defective, lacking the formality of the oath. This irregularity might have justified the elimination of the name of Juan T. Lucero as a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor, if an objection on the part of the petitioner Tomas de Guzman had been made in due time.

2. Yet we are of the opinion that this irregularity does not invalidate the election for the fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to.

3. Constructions of Election Law:a. If Election law provides that an

irregularity is fatal to the validity of the ballot or of the returns, or when the purpose and spirit of the law would be plainly defeated by a substantial departure from the prescribed method -> mandatory

b. If Election law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him who was obligated to observe it, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of voters and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the popular will -> directory and harmless irregularity

c. Lio Luna v. Rodriguez: It has been announced in many decisions that the rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the election, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part…. When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have not done their duty.

4. We hold that the legal provision here in question is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would have been fatal to the recognition of the status of Juan T. Lucero as candidate. BUT after the people have expressed their will honestly, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the respondent who was certified by the provincial secretary to be a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor, has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy.

5. The situation is somewhat like that of a voter placing his ballot in the box. There are certain requirements of the law, affecting the vote, which have been considered by this court as of a mandatory character until the ballot is placed in the ballot box; but we have held that the validity of the count cannot be questioned, nor the vote stricken out after the ballots had been placed in the ballot boxes, simply for non-compliance with such provisions.


6. After the termination of the election, public interest must be made to prevail over that of the defeated candidate, and we cannot declare that the election of the respondent Juan T. Lucero was illegal, and that he should quit the office for which he was elected, simply by reason of a defect in his certificate of candidacy, which defect could have been corrected before the election, but which cannot be cured after its termination, and after the result of the election was published by the provincial board of canvassers, respondents herein.

Demurrer is SUSTAINED and mandamus is DENIED. Villarosa v. COMELEC, Atty. Restor, Ricardo Quintos (opponent candidate) Facts:

1. Petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the COMELEC disallowing the use by petitioner of the nickname “JTV” for the purpose of her candidacy in the May 11, 1998 elections.

2. Villarosa was a candidate as representative for the lone district of Occ. Mindoro in the May 11 1998 elections. She was proclaimed duly elected thereto on May 27, 1998.

3. March 27, 1998 - She filed her COC in which she stated her nickname as JTV.

4. Restor filed a letter-petition with COMELEC asking for the invalidation or cancellation of “JTV” as the official nickname of petitioner as declared in her certificate of candidacy, and the nullification of all votes cast in the said nickname, on the ground that petitioner is not publicly known by that name. She was more known as Girlie.

5. COMELEC en banc, in a resolution, granted Restor's letter-petition. Villarosa received a fax copy of this Resolution at 5:32 in the afternoon of May 11, 1998, at which time voting has ceased

and canvassing of votes in some precincts has already gone underway.

6. Villarosa filed MR -> Denied. Issue:

1. WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it: a. ruled on private respondent Restor’s letter-petition without

according notice and hearing to petitioner? YES.b. took cognizance of the letter-petition which was not filed

by a real party in interest? YES.c. resolving the letter-petition en banc, instead of first

referring it to one of its Divisions? YES.d. disallowing petitioner’s use of the nickname “JTV” and

ordering the election officers of Occidental Mindoro to consider invalid all votes cast in that appellation?

Ratio:1. No due process accorded to Villarosa - It is clear that

COMELEC passed upon the letter-petition without affording petitioner the opportunity to explain her side and to counter the allegations of private respondent Restor’s letter-petition. Due process dictates that before any decision can be validly rendered in a case, the twin requirements of notice and hearing must be observed.[6] Evidently, the conclusion of the Commission in the assailed Resolution … was drawn purely from the allegations of the letter-petition and for this reason, the Commission acted in excess of its jurisdiction.

a. What about COMELEC ruling that deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration?i. SC: Even as it seeks reconsideration of the said

resolution by invoking due process, it does not purport to embody petitioner’s grounds and arguments for reconsideration… In filing this “Urgent Manifestation and Motion” on the second day of canvassing of votes, and immediately after receipt of the contested resolution, it is obvious that

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petitioner’s immediate concern for doing so was not mainly to exercise her right to be heard, but to have the Commission seasonably reconsider the May 11, 1998 Resolution while canvassing was still at the precinct or municipal level.

ii. While the filing of a supplemental motion for reconsideration is not a matter of right, it is believed that the judicious thing for the Commission to have done, considering the obvious due process issues brought about by the May 11, 1998 Resolution, was to afford petitioner a chance to explain why she should be allowed to use the nickname “JTV”, such as by requiring her to submit a supplemental motion for reconsideration…. Thus, we find that respondent COMELEC acted imprudently and in excess of its jurisdiction in treating the “Urgent Manifestation and Motion” as petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and in summarily dismissing the same.

2. Defective because not a real party-in-interest - The COMELEC Rules of Procedure require that all actions filed with the Commission be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest.[9]

a. The letter-petition does not allege that the protestant, herein private respondent Restor, is a candidate for any position in the May 11, 1998 elections, or a representative of a registered political party or coalition, or at the very least, a registered voter in the lone district of Occidental Mindoro --- as to stand to sustain any form of injury by petitioner’s use of the nickname “JTV”.

b. Absent such essential allegation, the letter-petition stood defective and should have been dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action.

3. Petition should have first been referred to division before being decided upon by the en banc

a. Sarmiento v. COMELEC: Section 3, Article IX(C) of the Constitution[11] required all election cases to be first heard and decided by a division of the Commission, before being brought to the Commission en banc on reconsideration.

b. Contention: Petition raised administrative issues and not quasi-judicial ones.i. “Administrative” connotes, or pertains, to:

1. “administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or things.”

2. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon. (University of Nueva Caceres vs. Martinez: )

ii. Quasi-judicial: applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

iii. A directive by the Commission to disallow petitioner’s use of the nickname “JTV” for purposes of her candidacy, on the basis of Resolution No. 2977 clearly necessitates a determination of whether petitioner is in fact not generally or popularly known as such in the locality of Occidental Mindoro. Indubitably, since it involved the application of law or rules to an ascertained set of facts, it called for the Commission’s exercise of its adjudicatory powers and falls within the concept of an “election contest” in the sense contemplated by Section 3, Article IX(C) of the Constitution.

4. In view of the fact that the election protest of private respondent Quintos is presently pending in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, we resolve to leave this matter to the resolution of the said body as the sole judge of all contests respecting the election, returns and qualifications of its members.

PETITION is GRANTED. Sanciangco v. Rono (Minister of Local Government)




Subject provisions:

Sec. 13. Effects of filing of certificate of candidacy. (1) Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Integrated National Police, as well as officials and employees of government-owned and government-controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, shall ipso facto cease in office or position as of the time he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, however, that the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Members of the Cabinet, and the Deputy Ministers shall continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the filing of their certificates of candidacy. (2) Governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or barangay officials shall, upon filing certificate of candidacy be considered on forced leave of absence from office. (Emphasis supplied) Facts:

Petition for certiorari. May 17, 1982 Barangay elections - Sanciango was elected

barangay captain of Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City. Later on, he was elected President of the Association of Brgy.

Councils of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of said association.

As the president, he was also later on appointed (by the Pres. of the Phil) as a member of the city's Sangguniang Panglungsod.

March 27, 1984 - Sanciangco filed his COC for the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa (Legislative) elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao Alliance -> He did not win.

Later on, invoking Art. 5, Sec. 13(2) of BP 697, he informed the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod that he was resuming his duties as member of that body. -> Elevated to the Minister of Local Govt who ruled that since he is an appointive official he is deemed to have resigned from the filing of his COC.

Sanciangco contention: Sec. 13(2) does not distinguish between elective and appointive officials and so the legislative intent is clear that even appointive Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision.

Issue: (Matter of construction of provision) WON Sanciangco has

ceased to hold his office by virtue of his filing of his COC? YES.

Ratio: Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the

Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections.

a. With regard to the contention of the provision not distinguishing: i. … taking into consideration the nature of the

positions of the officials enumerated therein, namely, governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative intent to distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2), as contrasted to appointive positions in section 13(l) under the all-encompassing clause reading "any person holding public appointive office or position," is clear.

Court goes to the legislative intent as can be gleaned from the BP proceedings

a. The legislative intent to cover public appointive officials in subsection (1), and officials mentioned in subsection (2) which should be construed to refer to local elective officials, can be gleaned from the proceedings of the Batasan Pambansa

b. Manner by which he came upon the office is the basis for determining whether appointive or elective.

No violation of the equal protection clause - Nor do we perceive any violation of the equal protection clause, as petitioner contends, since Section 13 of B.P. Blg. 697 applies alike to all persons subject to such legislation under like circumstances and conditions. Neither can petitioner justifiably contend that he was removed from office without due process of law since it was of his own choice that he ran for a seat in the Batasan Pambansa. The consequence that followed his unsuccessful attempt at the elections arose from law.


It goes without saying that although petitioner, by filing his certificate of candidacy for the Batasan Pambansa ceased, ipso facto, to be an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, he remains an elective Barangay Captain from which position he may be considered as having been on "forced leave of absence." He also continues as President of the Association of Barangay Councils but will need a reappointment by the President, as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City as the law speaks of "members who may be appointed by the President."

WRITS prayed for are DENIED. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation, Marcelino Tongco v. NLRC, Pineda Facts:

1. From September 17, 1981 to January 26, 1989, Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the PNOC-EDC as a clerk when his employment was terminated.

2. 1987 - While holding the position of Geothermal Construction secretary in the PNOC-EDC, Pineda decided to run for councilor of the Municipality of Kananga in Leyte in the local elections scheduled in January 1988 and filed his COC for the position.

3. Pineda was elected for such position however he exhibited a bit of hesitation in taking up the position

4. Nevertheless, Pineda took his oath of office in June, 1988 as councilor-elect of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte and thereon assumed his duties as such. He however also continued working as secretary in the PNOC-EDC.

5. In response to an inquiry, the legal department of PNOC-EDCrendered an opinion to the effect that Manuel S. Pineda should be considered ipso facto resigned upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy in November, 1987, in accordance with Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.

6. Pineda made several inquiries, one even to the DLG secretary and such secretary said that he can continue occupying the 2 positions and receiving some form of compensation for them.

7. PNOC-EDC informed Pineda that his employment was being terminated pursuant to Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, effective upon receipt of notice, and (2) that he was entitled to "proper compensation" for the services rendered by him from the time he filed his certificate of candidacy until his actual separation from the service.

8. Pineda filed an illegal dismissal case with the NLRC against PNOC-EDC. Arbiter & NLRC ruled in his favor.

Issue:

1. WON an employee in a government-owned or controlled corporations without an original charter (and therefore not covered by Civil Service Law) nevertheless falls within the scope of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code? YES.

Ratio:

1. When the Congress of the Philippines reviewed the Omnibus Election Code of 1985, in connection with its deliberations on and subsequent enactment of related and repealing legislation… it was no doubt aware that in light of Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution: (a) government-owned or controlled corporations were of two (2) categories (original charter & organized under general law).

2. Yet Congress made no effort to distinguish between these two classes of government-owned or controlled corporations or their employees in the Omnibus Election Code or subsequent related statutes, particularly as regards the rule that any employee "in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

3. Be this as it may, it seems obvious to the Court that a government-owned or controlled corporation does not lose its character as such because not possessed of an original charter but organized under the general law.

4. Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.— Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled


corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

5. What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, even those organized under the general laws on incorporation and therefore not having an original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code. In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended.

PETITION is GRANTED. Quinto, Tolentino v. COMELEC Dec 1, 2009 decision Facts:

1. Petition assailing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the COMELEC.

2. Controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES).

3. Dec 1997 - Congress enacted RA 8436

Issue:1. WON the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of

R.A. No. 9369, a reproduction of Section 66 of the OEC, which, as shown above, was based on provisions dating back to the American occupation, is violative of the equal protection clause? YES.

Ratio:

1. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those

who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.

2. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:

a. It must be based upon substantial distinctions;b. It must be germane to the purposes of the law;c. It must not be limited to existing conditions only; andd. It must apply equally to all members of the class.

3. Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

a. Reasons for previous discrimination of appointive officials: i. Prevent the use of a governmental position to

promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate.

ii. Promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public.[34]

iii. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.

4. (Influence) If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/189698.htm#_ftn34


Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post

5. (Danger of neglect in current work) As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.

6. (Final note with regard to EQPC) There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.

7. (Overbroad) First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.

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