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Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

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Page 1: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

Public Choice Theory

Microeconomics

Dr. D. Foster

Page 2: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

Political Choices . . . Political Choices . . . Economic ReasoningEconomic Reasoning

Not how the system shouldshould work . . . How the system doesdoes work.

Are politicians/bureaucrats/employees …-- rational ?-- self-interested ?-- like the rest of us ?

Page 3: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

Two Basic Decisions: Two Basic Decisions: How much to tax? How much to tax? How much to spend?How much to spend?

Vote for a new defense system? Vote for a new social program?

What is the downside ?What is the downside ?

Does President Haeger President Haeger want more $ for NAU? Does Paul Gosar Paul Gosar want more $ for USGS?

Is there any incentive to keep costs down ?Is there any incentive to keep costs down ?

Page 4: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

Characteristics of the Public SectorCharacteristics of the Public Sector

Choices are enforceableenforceable.-- stop lights-- military draft-- drug laws-- eminent domain

Choices are restrictedrestricted (“lumpy”)-- Grand Canyon: buses or train?-- Chose candidate A or B?-- Is there any difference . . .

Page 5: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

The Median Voter ModelThe Median Voter Model

If preferences are peaked . . . If we vote for the person closest to us . . .

Candidates should congregate near the middle!

Candidate A wins !!

median voter

50%50%

A BA’ B’A”

Page 6: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

Voting SystemsVoting Systems

What’s so great about majority rule?What’s so great about majority rule?-- It is just like football !!

The market results in proportionalproportional “rule.”

Public choices may be inconsistent.inconsistent. Public choices may be inefficient.inefficient.

Point voting ? Continuous elections ? Non-geographic voting ?

Page 7: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

Inconsistent outcome: Inconsistent outcome: Want a park?Want a park?

City council has 3 choices for land parcel:A – Turn it into a park.B – Use it for low-income housing.C – Allow for commercial development.

Polling indicates that:40% favor A > C > B35% favor B > A > C25% favor C > B > A

How do you frame a vote between just two ?How do you frame a vote between just two ?

Page 8: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

Inefficient outcome: Inefficient outcome: Build a road?Build a road?

A road can be built that benefits 3 people. The cost is $300, and each would pay an equal share. They benefit as follows: John – $ 200$ 200 George – $ 90$ 90 Janet – $ 80$ 80

Will they vote to raise taxes to pay ?Will they vote to raise taxes to pay ?

What can we do to alter the outcome ?What can we do to alter the outcome ?

Page 9: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

Why is inefficiency a rational outcome?Why is inefficiency a rational outcome?

VotersVoters – information is costly (rational ignorance) -- Does your vote count ? -- Can you trust political ads ?

Special interestsSpecial interests -- Spread costs; concentrate benefits. -- How about a Help-Dr.-Foster tax ? It’s a dime.

BureaucratsBureaucrats -- What are their incentives ? -- Whom do they serve ?

Page 10: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

Case Study: 1986 Congressional RaceCase Study: 1986 Congressional RaceDistrict #1 – State of HawaiiDistrict #1 – State of Hawaii

Page 11: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

Cec Heftel wants to run for Governor !

He is currently the US Rep. for District 1.

Mid-summer 1986

One problem: He must resign to run !

So, he resignsSo, he resigns

Page 12: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

Need #1Need #1: Fill vacancy through Jan. 1987.

Need #2Need #2: Select nominees for general election.

Need #3Need #3: Elect Congressman in November.

Mid-summer 1986

PrimarySeptember

GeneralNovember

Elections

Solution: Combine #1 & #2 in September.Solution: Combine #1 & #2 in September.

Page 13: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

The PlayersThe Players Mid-summer

1986Primary

SeptemberGeneral

November

Elections

Pat Saiki (R)Pat Saiki (R)

Neil Abercrombie (D)Neil Abercrombie (D)

Mufi Mufi Hanneman (D) Hanneman (D)

Page 14: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

The RulesThe RulesAnyone can vote in the primary.Anyone can vote in the primary.

Mid-summer 1986

PrimarySeptember

GeneralNovember

Elections

The TwistThe TwistSaiki has no discernable competition.Saiki has no discernable competition.

Page 15: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

A graphical look at public supportA graphical look at public support

Mid-summer 1986

PrimarySeptember

GeneralNovember

Elections

N.A. M.H. P.S.

Page 16: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

September Results:September Results:

Pat Saiki wins Pat Saiki wins Republican primary.Republican primary.

Mufi Hanneman wins Mufi Hanneman wins Democratic primaryDemocratic primary

Mid-summer 1986

PrimarySeptember

GeneralNovember

Elections

Neil Abercrombie wins Neil Abercrombie wins Special Election !!!Special Election !!!

Page 17: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

November Results:November Results:

Mid-summer 1986

PrimarySeptember

GeneralNovember

Elections

Pat Saiki wins Pat Saiki wins election !!!election !!!

Page 18: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

RepublicansRepublicans voted for voted for MufiMufi in in primary - the “weaker” candidate, primary - the “weaker” candidate, and and he winshe wins!!!!!!

RepublicansRepublicans & & DemocratsDemocrats have an have an incentive to vote for their favorite in incentive to vote for their favorite in the special election; the special election; Neil winsNeil wins!!!!!!

Abercrombie supporters Abercrombie supporters voted for voted for Saiki in general election - Saiki in general election - retribution against Mufi’s campaign.retribution against Mufi’s campaign.

What happened ?What happened ?

Page 19: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

SaikiSaiki won a second term (1988-1990). won a second term (1988-1990). SaikiSaiki ran for senate in 1990 - lost ran for senate in 1990 - lost

-- was selected to run SBA by Bush I. -- was selected to run SBA by Bush I. AbercromieAbercromie ran again, and won, in 1990. ran again, and won, in 1990.

-- served until 2010. -- served until 2010. HannemanHanneman lost 1990 race for District 2. lost 1990 race for District 2.

-- later served on Honolulu City Council. -- later served on Honolulu City Council. Cec Cec HeftelHeftel lost bid for governorship. lost bid for governorship.

DebriefDebrief

Page 20: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

AbercromieAbercromie wanted to be governor in 2010. wanted to be governor in 2010. -- resigned from District 1 seat in 2010! -- resigned from District 1 seat in 2010!

HannemanHanneman becomes Honolulu mayor in 2004. becomes Honolulu mayor in 2004. -- re-elected in 2008. -- re-elected in 2008. -- wants to be governor in 2010! -- wants to be governor in 2010!

AbercromieAbercromie wins primary and general elections. wins primary and general elections. DjouDjou becomes interim Rep. for District 1. becomes interim Rep. for District 1.

-- loses general election. -- loses general election.

Debrief IIDebrief II

Page 21: Public Choice Theory Microeconomics Dr. D. Foster

Public Choice Theory

Microeconomics

Dr. D. Foster