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Public Opinion, Democracy, and MarketReform in Africa

MICHAEL BRATTONMichigan State University

ROBERT MATTESUniversity of Cape Town

E. GYIMAH-BOADIUniversity of Ghana

v


published by the press syndicate of the university of cambridgeThe Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom

cambridge university pressThe Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru, uk40 West 20th Street, New York, ny 10011-4211, usa477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, vic 3207, AustraliaRuiz de Alarcon 13, 28014 Madrid, SpainDock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa

http://www.cambridge.org

C© Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi 2005

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exceptionand to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,no reproduction of any part may take place withoutthe written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2005

Printed in the United States of America

Typeface Sabon 10/12 pt. System LATEX 2ε [tb]

A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Bratton, Michael.Public opinion, democracy, and market reform in Africa / Michael Bratton, RobertMattes, E. Gyimah-Boadi.

p. cm. – (Cambridge studies in comparative politics)Includes bibliographical references and index.isbn 0-521-84191-7 – isbn 0-521-60291-2 (pb.)1. Africa, Sub-Saharan – Politics and government – 1960– – Public opinion. 2. Democracy –Africa, Sub-Saharan – Public opinion. 3. Legitimacy of governments – Africa,Sub-Saharan – Public opinion. 4. Africa, Sub-Saharan – Economic conditions – 1960– –Public opinion. 5. Africa, Sub-Saharan – Economic policy – Public opinion.6. Capitalism – Africa, Sub-Saharan – Public opinion. 7. Free enterprise – Africa,Sub-Saharan – Public opinion. 8. Public opinion – Africa, Sub-Saharan.i. Mattes, Robert B. ii. Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel. iii. Title. iv. Series.jq1879.a15b74 2004320.967–dc22 2004043555

isbn 0 521 84191 7 hardbackisbn 0 521 60291 2 paperback

vi


Contents

List of Tables and Figures page xii

Acknowledgments xv

Introduction 1A Tale of Two Presidents 1Taking Account of Adjustment 3Setting an Agenda 5Overview of Contents 9

part i: framework

1 Africa’s Hybrid Regimes 13A Decade of Political Reforms, 1990–2001 15Two Decades of Economic Reform, 1982–2001 19Dual Transitions: Compatibilities and Contradictions 23Demand, Supply, and Regime Consolidation 26Deriving Public Opinion 31

2 Studying Public Opinion in Africa 34Competing Theories, Rival Hypotheses 35Toward a Learning Approach 44Survey Research in Africa 50The Afrobarometer 53An Appropriate Method? 55A Quest for Comparison 59

part ii: popular attitudes to reform

3 Attitudes to Democracy 65Understandings of Democracy 65Support for Democracy 72Rejection of Alternative Regimes 76

ix


x Contents

Satisfaction with Democracy 81Wide But Shallow 84The Extent of Democracy 94

4 Attitudes to a Market Economy 97The Popular Development Agenda 98Between State and Market 104Awareness of Economic Reforms 112Support for Economic Reforms 117Satisfaction with Economic Reforms 122Economic Patience? 126

5 Economic and Political Behavior 130Living Standards 131Securing Economic Livelihoods 135Compliance with the Law 141Varieties of Political Participation 143Defending Democracy? 155From Attitudes to Behavior 157

part iii: competing explanations

6 The Structure of Society 163Demographic Determinants 164Varieties of Subnationalism 169The Burden of Poverty 176Structural Models 181

7 Cultural Values 185Self-Defined Identities 186Interpersonal Trust 193An Emergent Individualism 197Cultural Models 200

8 Awareness of Public Affairs 203The Spark of Education 204Exposure to Mass Media 208Cognitive Engagement 211Political and Economic Knowledge 213The Eye of the Beholder 216Cognitive Models 219

9 Performance Evaluations 222Evaluating the Economy 223The Corruption of the State? 228Assessing Regime Performance 235Grading the Government 238A Representation Gap? 241Performance Models 246


Contents xi

10 Institutional Influences 250Associational Life 251Party Identification 256Political Participation 261Economic Participation 265Institutional Models 266

part iv: explaining reform constituencies

11 Modeling Attitudes to Reform 271Modeling Demand for Democracy 272Modeling the Supply of Democracy 277Modeling Demand for a Market Economy 282Modeling the Supply of Economic Reform 286Paths to Reform: A Learning Process 289

12 Predicting Political Participation 295Voting 296Protesting 300Communing and Contacting 301Vote Choice 304Defending Democracy 308Political Participation: Cause or Effect? 309

13 Deciphering Regime Consolidation 315The Effects of “Country” 316Demand, Supply, and Regime Consolidation (Revisited) 320The Consolidation of African Political Regimes 324The Correlates of Consolidation 327Economic versus Political Legacies 333Paths of Political Change 337

Conclusions 343The Study of Africa 344Theories of Social Change 347Strategies of Development 351

Appendices

A. Items, Constructs, and Indices 355B. Sampling Method 392C. Imputation of Data 397

Notes 401

Index 457


List of Tables and Figures

tables

1.1 Political Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2001 page 171.2 Extent of Compliance with Economic Reform Programs,

Sub-Saharan Africa, 1997 232.1 Political and Economic Reforms in Afrobarometer

Countries 552.2 The Effects of Political Fear on Public Opinion 593.1 Popular Understandings of Democracy 683.2 Rejection of Authoritarian Rule, by Country 773.3 Multivariate Correlates of Satisfaction with Democracy 843.4 Essential Features of Democracy 883.5 Expectations about Future Political Regimes 923.6 Comparison of Popular and Expert Democracy Rankings,

circa 2000 964.1 Most Important Development Problems 994.2 Donor and Popular Priorities for Development 1034.3 Popular Trust in Institutions 1084.4 Popular Understandings of Economic Reform Programs 1154.5 Perceived Beneficiaries of Economic Reform 1264.6 Economic Patience 1275.1 Self-Reported Occupations, by Country 1325.2 Self-Reported Employment, Southern Africa, 1999–2000 1335.3 Supplementary Economic Activities 1365.4 Survival Strategies 1385.5 Voter Turnout, by Country, 1996–2000 1456.1 Ethnic Pluralism, by Country 1716.2 Poverty, by Country 1766.3 The Effects of Social Structure on Attitudes to Reform 1827.1 Self-Defined Group Identities 187

xii


Tables and Figures xiii

7.2 Interpersonal Trust, by Identity of “Other” 1957.3 The Effects of Cultural Values on Attitudes to Reform 2018.1 Exposure to News Media 2098.2 The Effects of Cognitive Awareness on Attitudes

to Reform 2209.1 The Effects of Performance Evaluations on Attitudes

to Reform 24710.1 Dimensions of Political Participation 26310.2 The Effects of Institutional Influences on Attitudes

to Reform 26711.1 Demand for Democracy, Explanatory Factors Compared 27311.2 Supply of Democracy, Explanatory Factors Compared 27811.3 Supply of Democracy, Dimensions of Performance

Compared 28011.4 Demand for a Market Economy, Explanatory Factors

Compared 28311.5 Supply of Economic Reform, Explanatory Factors

Compared 28712.1 Political Participation, Explanatory Factors Compared 29712.2 Political Participation, Explanatory Factors Compared

(continued) 30512.3 Vote Choice by Ethno-Linguistic Group 30613.1 Attitudes to Reform, Country Effects 31813.2 The Prospects for the Consolidation of Democracy (PCD),

Selected African Countries 32813.3 Correlates of Democratization 32913.4 Regression Estimates of the Prospects for Democratic

Consolidation 33413.5 The Prospects for the Consolidation of Democracy, by

Postcolonial Political Legacies 338

figures

1.1 Rejection of One-Man Rule 61.2 Satisfaction with Economic Reform Programs 73.1 Awareness of Democracy 673.2 Support for Democracy 733.3 Rejection of Alternative Regimes 773.4 Satisfaction with Democracy 823.5 Depth of Democratic Commitments 913.6 Trends in Attitudes to Democracy, South Africa

and Nigeria 933.7 Extent of Democracy 954.1 Economic Self-Reliance 105


xiv Tables and Figures

4.2 Preference for Government Provision 1094.3 Awareness of Structural Adjustment Programs 1164.4 Support for Economic Reform Policies 1184.5 Perceptions of SAPs’ Effects on Inequality 1245.1 Shortages of Basic Human Needs 1345.2 Varieties of Political Participation 1485.3 Contacts with Leaders 1515.4 Willingness to Defend Democracy 1566.1 Support for Democracy, by Poverty 1776.2 Number of Economic Reform Policies Supported,

by Poverty 1786.3 Satisfaction with Political and Economic Regimes,

by Poverty 1806.4 Variations in Regime Satisfaction, by Poverty

(Standardized Scores) 1807.1 Group Chauvinism, by Identity 1907.2 Interpersonal Trust 1948.1 Awareness of Public Affairs, by Education 2058.2 Support for Democracy, by Education 2068.3 Number of Economic Reform Policies Supported, by

Education 2078.4 Knowledge of Leaders 2148.5 Rejection of Authoritarian Rule, by Information 2168.6 Attitudes to Political Regimes, by Importance of Political

Procedures 2189.1 Satisfaction with the National Economy 2249.2 Satisfaction with Economic Conditions, by Economic

Growth 2259.3 Trust in State Institutions 2299.4 Trust in State Institutions, by Perceived Corruption 2329.5 Performance of Democratic Regimes 2369.6 Policy Performance of the Current Government 2399.7 Satisfaction with Democracy, by Presidential Popularity 245

10.1 Voluntary Associations, Mean Number of Memberships 25210.2 Party Identification 25810.3 Winners and Losers 26011.1 Path Model of Attitudes to Reform 29012.1 Path Model of Mobilized Participation 31113.1 Demand and Supply for Political Regimes 32113.2 The Consolidation of Political Regimes, Selected African

Countries 32513.3 Paths of Political Change, Selected African Countries,

1999–2002 34013.4 Consolidation of Democracy by Duration of Political

Regime 341

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Introduction

This book explores public opinion in the parts of Africa that have recentlyexperienced political and economic reforms. What views do Africans holdabout democracy and a market economy? How do they behave in responseto liberalization? Why do citizens think, feel, and react as they do? Andwhat are the implications of mass opinion for the consolidation of fragilenew regimes? In short, we explore the nature of public opinion – its content,origins, and outcomes – in all its glorious diversity in the leading reformistcountries of the sub-Saharan subcontinent.

Needless to say, very little is presently known about these subjects. Thus,our first task is descriptive: to fill a gaping empirical hole and to help givevoice to otherwise silent majorities of ordinary men and women. But wealso harbor theoretical ambitions and an abiding interest in public policy.Why does public opinion vary cross-nationally and among different socialand opinion groups within countries? What sort of theory – of interests,identities, or institutions – best explains African patterns of mass attitudesand action?1 By accounting for popular demands and satisfactions – or, morelikely, dissatisfactions – this book enters evidence into long-standing, oftenheated, debates on the suitability of political democracy and market-friendlypolicies to African needs and conditions.

To introduce our topic, we present two vignettes – one apiece about demo-cratic and market reforms – that illustrate the above preoccupations. Theseshort stories point to a variety of regime paths being taken by African coun-tries and to distinctive patterns of popular response. In the process, we beginto situate public opinion as both a cause and a consequence of change.

a tale of two presidents

In Africa today, civilian leaders who ignore the constitution pose a moreinsidious threat to democracy than coup plotters in the military. As electedrulers have come to enjoy the benefits of public office, they often have been

1


2 Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa

tempted to cling to power by bending the law. It is not uncommon for leadersto try to amend the national constitution, either to sideline opponents forthe presidency, or to extend the number of terms that a president can serve.Among others, Sam Nujoma of Namibia and Frederick Chiluba of Zambiahave used these tactics. Both tried to persuade their compatriots that theydeserved a third term in office, even in the face of explicit constitutionalprohibitions. In wanting to overturn presidential term limits, they sought tocircumvent democratic reforms made a decade earlier.

Nujoma, Namibia’s founding father, was first elected in 1989 with 57 per-cent of the vote, a solid mandate that was increased in presidential electionsin 1994. As his second term unfolded, Nujoma gave conflicting signals abouthis intentions: at first he declared he would step down to make way for ayounger candidate; but he later allowed that his future would be left upto the ruling South West Africa Peoples’ Organization (SWAPO). Feigningresponse to a popular groundswell and arguing that the country could illafford a damaging succession struggle, Nujoma accepted the unanimous ac-clamation of an extraordinary party congress in 1998 that he should stayon. An amendment to the constitution was rammed through the NationalAssembly, where SWAPO enjoyed a comfortable super-majority, which al-lowed Nujoma to run again in the 1999 presidential elections. He won athird term, now with 77 percent of the vote.

Chiluba had similar ambitions, but was less effective in realizing them. Hetook office after resoundingly defeating Zambia’s founding father, KennethKaunda, in a landmark transition in 1991. Chiluba was reelected five yearslater with an almost undiminished majority. In this election, however, heeliminated competition from Kaunda (whose parents were born in Malawi)by trumping up a charge that the latter was not a Zambian citizen. Belatedly,in May 2001, just six months before he was due to step down, Chilubapublicly floated the possibility of a third term. He managed to persuadethe ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), to renominatehim as its presidential candidate, but in the process precipitated a split inthe party. Lacking enough votes in parliament to change the constitution,Chiluba expelled all his leading opponents from the MMD, including thenational vice-president and several cabinet ministers. A few days later – in theface of popular protests by student, labor, and church groups and moves byparliamentarians to begin impeachment – the president dramatically reversedhimself: he went on national television to announce that he would not seeka third term.

Many factors explain why Nujoma’s power play succeeded and Chiluba’sfailed. The former president could capitalize on his reputation as the liberatorof his country from colonial rule, whereas the latter came to power as asecond-generation, compromise candidate. Nujoma was apparently moreskillful than Chiluba in managing splits within his own party and turningthem to his own advantage. And perhaps Zambians, unlike Namibians, had


Introduction 3

already learned from bitter experience that a single leader should not bepermitted to stay in office too long.

To fully appreciate whether leaders can get away with manipulating thecore rules of the democratic game, we contend that attention should be paidto public opinion. As third-term debates came to a head in both countries, weconducted national probability sample surveys in Namibia and Zambia that,among other questions, asked people about their attitudes to governmentby a strong leader. Specifically, did they approve or disapprove of a form ofgovernment in which “we abolish parliament and political parties so thatthe president can decide everything?” The results were strikingly differentacross the two countries: in Namibia, only a bare majority (of 57 percent)rejected one-man rule; yet in Zambia, an overwhelming majority (91 percent)did so.

Thus the profile of public opinion in Namibia, where almost half of thepopulation indicated they would not resist a strong leader, was acquiescentto Nujoma’s bid to change the constitution to suit his own ambitions. InZambia, however, Chiluba confronted a much more politicized populacethat clearly rejected any seizure of power by another would-be strongman.While these popular preferences may or may not have been communicateddirectly by the people to the president, they certainly found expression viacivic organizations, political parties, and the parliament. As a reflection ofpopular disaffection with a leader’s machinations, public opinion appar-ently played a role in determining whether a nondemocratic gambit wouldsucceed.

taking account of adjustment

As well as influencing the course of events, public opinion is shaped by policyperformance. In recent years, African countries have undertaken economicreform programs that aim to encourage economic growth by adjusting thestructure of the national economy. The scope of such reforms, includingactual implementation, has varied greatly from country to country, as illus-trated by the divergent paths recently taken by Mali and Nigeria.

Originally an agricultural economy, Nigeria was self-sufficient in food atthe time of independence and an exporter of cocoa, palm oil, groundnuts,and cotton. The development of oil resources in the 1970s, however, led toan economic boom that financed the rapid expansion of the state sector. Nu-merous public enterprises were established in industry and manufacturingthat, together with the civil service, came to account for more than 60 per-cent of formal employment. Imports of capital goods and raw materials tosupport these enterprises, along with the consumer luxuries that Nigeriansincreasingly demanded, produced a ballooning trade deficit. By the 1980s,the government could no longer finance its own expenditures and was forcedinto debt.



When General Ibrahim Babangida grabbed power in 1985, he movedquickly to restructure the Nigerian economy. Following a referendum oninternational borrowing that revealed a strong streak of popular economicnationalism, Nigerian policy experts undertook to design their own struc-tural adjustment program (SAP) in 1986. It aimed to restore fiscal discipline,diversify the economy away from dependence on oil, and address the grow-ing debt burden. This homegrown product won the approval of the WorldBank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which made the countryeligible for the disbursement of loans and the rescheduling of arrears.

Yet the economic reform program became severely distorted by corrup-tion. From the outset, the oil boom allowed the personal enrichment of toppublic officials who entered into lucrative deals with foreign oil companies.An economic downturn in the 1980s due to falling world oil prices createdeven greater incentives for graft, which infamously led successive militaryadministrations in Nigeria into spectacular avarice. By the mid-1990s, Gen-eral Sani Abacha allowed Nigeria’s oil refineries to collapse and maneuveredhimself, his cronies, and members of his family into controlling positions inthe oil import business. By the time Abacha died in mid-1998, the govern-ment had dropped all pretense of systematic economic management. Publicenterprises were looted and capital took flight. Life worsened for ordinarypeople as education and health services collapsed, average life expectancystalled at about fifty years, and Nigeria slipped from being a middle-incomecountry to being a low-income one.

Under these circumstances, public confidence in the government’s eco-nomic strategy was bound to be extremely low. In the first place, only 40 per-cent of the respondents in a national probability sample survey in January2000 had even heard of the SAP, in part because many respondents were tooyoung to remember the public debates about a program introduced in 1986.Among those who had heard of the SAP, a mere 14 percent were preparedto express satisfaction with the way it had been implemented. This judg-ment accords with a World Bank assessment that, by 1997, Nigeria haddemonstrated poor compliance with an orthodox package of recommendedreforms.

The case of Mali presents a different picture. Much less well endowedwith natural resources than Nigeria – it has no oil and two thirds of itsland area is desert – Mali embarked on a promising path of policy reformthat attracted a measure of support from both international donors and thegeneral public.

Malian governments were initially opposed to a market-based economy.From 1960 to 1968, the independence government of Modibo Keita at-tempted to install a regime of rural socialism whose political bankruptcywas signaled when party militants resorted to confiscating food grains fromfarmers. The succeeding military government of Moussa Traore opened the


Introduction 5

door to World Bank and IMF support by, among other reforms, allowingstaple foodstuffs to be traded privately. Unwilling to surrender control, how-ever, Traore permitted only token privatization of the rural economy andviolently repressed demands for political freedoms raised in the streets byurban demonstrators. He was finally ousted in a coup in 1991, which wasfollowed by a democratic election in 1992 that installed Alpha Omar Konare,a reformer with a more wholehearted commitment to restructuring theeconomy.

Like other West African governments, the Konare administration hadno choice but to accept a 50 percent devaluation of the national currency(the CFA franc) in January 1994. But, of its own accord, it also adoptedmeasures to resume the liberalization of agricultural marketing, introduce avalue added tax, and initiate the sale of publicly owned utility companies.Gradually, Mali began to harvest the fruits of these reforms. Growth in realdomestic product averaged 5 percent between 1994 and 1998, though it laterslowed again. The export of rice increased substantially and the country ap-proached self-sufficiency in this staple food. Although cotton prices dropped,livestock exports boomed. And, for the first time in years, improvements inthe management of the government’s finances allowed public employees tobe paid on time.

Accordingly, survey research shows that Malians are much more satisfiedthan Nigerians with their country’s economic reform program. Interestingly,exactly the same proportion of adults in both countries (40 percent) is awareof the existence of an official SAP, though in Mali, where reforms are morerecent, lack of policy knowledge is due less to age than to lack of education.The big difference between the two countries, however, is that many moreMalians (39 percent) say they are satisfied with the reform package as imple-mented, a figure nearly three times higher than in Nigeria. To be sure, SAPsattract only minority satisfaction in both countries, but Nigerians expressan almost total lack of confidence in the economic policies implementedby corrupt military dictators. These findings suggest that significant pro-portions of Africans attend to national policy developments and form theiropinions accordingly. In the contrasting cases of Nigeria and Mali, the pol-icy performance of governments apparently affected the size of any popularconstituency for economic reform.

setting an agenda

On the basis of these case comparisons, we find it worthwhile to explore moresystematically the role of public opinion in the evolution of democratic andmarket regimes in Africa. Several avenues for elaboration immediately cometo mind.



22

30

31

25

20

30

32

13

36

8

34

26

70

61

57

62

66

54

51

65

37

61

33

31

0 20 40 60 80 100

Tanzania

Zambia

Botswana

Malawi

Ghana

Uganda

Nigeria

Zimbabwe

Mali

Lesotho

South Africa

Namibia

Cou

ntry

Percent

Reject Reject strongly

57

91

figure 1.1. Rejection of One-Man Rule

Do these findings apply elsewhere? The countries mentioned so far –Namibia, Zambia, Mali, and Nigeria – were chosen because their nationalpopulations display extreme values on relevant public attitudes. Figure 1.1shows that, across twelve African countries for which we have data,Namibians express the very lowest rates of rejection of one-man rule,whereas Zambians are second highest. Figure 1.2 shows that, across nineAfrican countries that had implemented a SAP, Nigerians were among themost dissatisfied and that Malians were among the most satisfied.

Thus, the cross-national results point in the same directions as the casecomparisons. In countries where, in the past, strong leaders entrenched them-selves in power for multiple terms in office (as did Nyerere in Tanzania, Bandain Malawi, and Rawlings in Ghana), public opinion runs strongly againstone-man rule. In Malawi, widespread popular opposition (87 percent, al-most Zambian levels) contributed to President Muluzi’s reluctant decisionin March 2003 to forego a third term bid. In countries where the authori-ties have abandoned SAPs and incited economic nationalism against globalfinancial institutions, satisfaction with SAPs is low. In Zimbabwe, for ex-ample, satisfaction is even lower than in Nigeria (just 3 percent). And vice


Introduction 7

Percent who say they are “satisfied/very satisfied” or “dissatisfied/very dissatisfied”

South Africa

figure 1.2. Satisfaction with Economic Reform Programs

versa: in countries that have demonstrated a measure of compliance withthe market-based policy recommendations of the World Bank and IMF andpeople have seen modest improvements in the economy (for example, inTanzania and Uganda), public opinion shows relative satisfaction with SAPs.Strikingly, in Tanzania, almost as many people say they are satisfied with thecountry’s economic reform program as express dissatisfaction (41 percentversus 44 percent).2

But cross-national comparisons also raise new questions. One-man ruleis roundly rejected in Botswana in a context where leaders have refrainedfrom ruling in brutal fashion or attempting to outstay their welcome. Thiscase raises other possibilities, including that the rejection of one-man rule is aproduct of a popular syndrome of democratic preferences based on extendedexperience with open, multiparty politics. Moreover, satisfaction with struc-tural adjustment is very low in South Africa, plumbing Nigerian depths. Inthis case, public unease cannot be attributed to a failure of orthodox stabiliza-tion measures because, under the guidance of African National Congress’s(ANC) economic team, the government has balanced the public budget andcontrolled inflation. Nor has creeping corruption in South Africa reached



anything resembling Nigerian levels. Instead, dissatisfaction with SAPs inSouth Africa must be due to other factors such as the poor performance ofthe economic regime at generating jobs and reducing some of the starkesteconomic inequalities in the world. Thus, to understand the diverse sourcesof public opinion, we must move beyond monocausal, country-case com-parisons in favor of more rigorous multivariate analyses of a large numberof observations.

Another item on the agenda for this book is the theoretical status ofmass attitudes and behavior. Is public opinion a cause or a consequence ofregime change? The vignettes presented in the previous sections indicate thatthe arrow can point in either direction. With reference to presidential termlimits, public opinion appears to have preceded political change by makinga formative contribution to both Nujoma’s success and Chiluba’s failure.In the language of statistical modeling, popular rejection of strongman rulewas an independent variable that helped to predict the fate of presidentialefforts to reverse recent constitutional reforms. But we have also observedthat populations that have experienced government at the hands of “life”presidents are likely to overwhelmingly reject one-man rule. In this regard,public opposition to the reemergence of strongmen is also a reaction to harshpolitical experience that people remember well and do not wish to repeat.Thus, public opinion is also a product of popular learning.

In the case of structural adjustment programs, we have portrayed publicopinion mainly as reactive. In expressing low satisfaction with SAPs, citi-zens were seen as responding to relatively effective policy implementation inMali and to the serious corruption of the economic reform effort in Nigeria.Thus public opinion was treated as a dependent variable, a phenomenon tobe explained, in this case principally in terms of the government’s record atpolicy performance. At some stage in the process of reform, however, publicattitudes take on an independent existence. For example, as satisfied cus-tomers of a SAP begin to emerge, as in Tanzania when small-scale vendorswelcomed the lifting of trading regulations, constituencies congeal in favorof sustaining and extending market-based reforms. Thus, attitudes and be-haviors that start out as reactions to an external policy stimulus can, in turn,become catalysts of reform in their own right.

In this book, we start and end with whole regimes. At this macro level,we are interested in big questions about the status of, and prospects for,democratic and market reforms in Africa. We would like to know whetherpublic opinion helps or inhibits the probability of consolidating new forms ofpolitical and economic organization in various countries. At the core of thebook, however, is a microlevel investigation. For most of the presentation, wetreat public opinion as a set of mass initiatives for reform or public reactionsto reforms introduced by national and international elites. The bulk of thechapters that follow are devoted to describing the profile of public opinionand analyzing its origins and outcomes.


Introduction 9

overview of contents

Part I of this book proposes a framework for analyzing popular orienta-tions. Chapter 1 sets the scene by summarizing recent trends in political andeconomic liberalization, noting variations across African countries. It alsodissects the literature’s prevailing theory of the consolidation of democracy,finds it wanting, and substitutes a model of supply and demand for a rangeof regimes. We also derive a series of propositions about the profiles of publicopinion that might be expected to prevail in Africa’s new, hybrid systems.

Chapter 2 introduces the Afrobarometer and discusses the survey researchmethodology of this study. It situates Round 1 Afrobarometer surveys in re-lation to previous similar work in Africa and abroad, and emphasizes thecomparative ambition of the present enterprise. A key element of this chap-ter is a literature-based review of competing explanatory frameworks. Inexamining what others have written about popular attitudes to emergentdemocracies and markets, we derive hypotheses for tests with African data.We note in other world regions, for example, that democratization attractsmore widespread public support than reforms to introduce a market econ-omy. As it happens, the Africans we interviewed feel the same way.

The book then proceeds by successive steps to document Afrobarometerresults, to propose explanations, and then to test these. In the process, wegradually increase the sophistication of statistical techniques, beginning withunivariate description, exploring tentative bivariate connections, introduc-ing controls via single-stage multivariate regression models, and concludingwith comprehensive path analyses. Readers may wish to pick and chooseextracts from the text depending on their interests: those intrigued by empir-ical African realities will find Parts II and III most engaging; those concernedwith the testing of theory may wish to spend more time on Parts I and IV.

Part II describes how people think, as well as what they do, in relationto reform. Chapter 3 records attitudes to democracy in African countries,characterizing popular support for this type of political regime as wide butshallow. Chapter 4 narrates economic attitudes, stressing popular ambiva-lence to market-based capitalism. Chapter 5 adds new information on theextent of popular engagement among Africans in informal economic activi-ties and formal political processes. While it would be wrong to assume thatpublic opinion is uniform across social groups within a country, we start byemphasizing cross-national variations. For example, we find that about twothirds of Africans interviewed say that they prefer democracy to any otherform of government, but that Batswana (the citizens of Botswana) exceed,and Basotho (the citizens of Lesotho) fall short of, this average.

In Part III we ask why liberalization reforms attract differential levelsof popular support and mass satisfaction. Applying candidate theories tothe Afrobarometer data, we test the impacts of social demography, culturalvalues, and institutional influences, as well as considerations of cognitive



awareness and performance evaluation (see Chapters 6 through 10). Con-trary to the historical and anthropological emphases of African studies, wefind that explanations of public opinion on the sub-Saharan subcontinent arenot well served by frameworks based on social structure or cultural values.Instead, we substitute a popular learning approach that posits that peoplearrive at opinions about democracy and markets on the basis of knowledge,reasoning, and experience. In our view, the evolution of public opinion de-pends on two key considerations: first, emerging popular understandings ofwhat a democracy or a market actually is; and second, mass perceptions ofwhat, in practice, these regimes actually do.

Part IV (Chapters 11 and 12) expands and refines this emerging explana-tion. The object is to comprehensively model both popular attitudes (demandfor, and perceived supply of, democracy and a market economy) and massbehavior (specifically, various forms of participation in the political process).We confirm that demand for reforms hinges critically on the quantity andquality of scarce information available to citizens. And the perceived supplyof democratic and market regimes is a function of popular evaluations ofthe performance of leaders, institutions, and regimes. Weaving these strandsof explanation together, we find that demand for democracy is largely in-trinsic (as a goal valued in and of itself), but that evaluations of the supplyof economic reform are highly instrumental (depending on improvements inthe material conditions of life). Moreover, political participation is mostlya product of institutional mobilization. In all cases, Africans develop theirorientations to reform less from formal education and more from directexperiences in adulthood.

The book concludes (in Chapter 13) with interpretation of “country”differences. What does it mean that being a Nigerian is a significant pre-dictor of popular satisfaction with democracy or that being a Tanzanianpowerfully explains support for market reforms? Precisely which economicor institutional attributes are signified by these geographic attributes? Analy-sis returns to country characteristics as represented by aggregate data derivedfrom Afrobarometer surveys and other independent sources. By this last stepwe find that political legacies matter. Among other paths, a history of settlercolonialism is not conducive to the consolidation of democracy; but pastepisodes of multiparty rule – however brief – are extremely helpful. Basedon such findings, the book ends with some broad-gauged speculations aboutthe sustainability of recent democratic and market reforms in the parts ofAfrica we have studied.

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