PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT, VOL. 12,193-207 (1992)

Public sector personnel management in three African countries: current problems and possibilities

HARRY TAYLOR University of Manchester

SUMMARY Following visits to three less developed countries (LDCs) in Sub-Saharan Africa (Tanzania, Kenya and Zimbabwe) to study public sector personnel systems, the author offers a review of personnel practice in Civil Service and parastatal organizations. In the main, despite a recognition that personnel issues were crucial to organizational success and thereby, ultimately, to economic development, the personnel function was found to be a largely reactive administra- tive operation, often combined with non-personnel ‘housekeeping’ roles and lacking a strategic role within the organization. Reasons for this restricted role are suggested and include a lack of alternative models of best personnel practice, the historical legacy of colonial adminis- tration, and the continuing need for administrative controls in the face of favouritism and corruption. Prospects for reform are considered in the light of current conditions and the view is advanced that changes in the personnel practices and policy are most desirable and urgent in the parastatal sector, and that a reformed parastatal sector might serve as a model for selective improvements to personnel management in the Civil Service.

INTRODUCTION: THE RESTRICTED ROLE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Efficient management of the public sector has increasingly come to be recognized as one key component of the economic development of LDCs, and the effective utilization of ‘human resources’ is seen as a major determinant of such efficient management. The organizational manifestation of the concern for human resources is usually a personnel function or department. Unfortunately the personnel function in public sector organizations in LDCs has rarely possessed the status and credibility necessary to play a major influencing role in organizational change. This problem was well documented by Osgediz several years ago:

‘In most developing country governments, personnel departments play a relatively passive (sometimes even negative) role, administering these (mostly outdated) rules rather than actively developing and pursuing poli- cies for improving public sector management’. (Osgediz, 1983, p. 42).

Since the publication of that report it is apparent that the problem still exists and continues to act as a brake to administrative reform and improvement. The analysis by the World Bank (1989) of the problems and prospects of Sub-Saharan Africa

Harry Taylor is Lecturer in Personnel Management in the Institute for Development Policy and Manage- ment, University of Manchester, Precinct Centre, Manchester, UK.

027 1-2075/92/020193-15%07.50 0 1992 by John Wiley t Sons, Ltd.

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again identifies weak public administration as one of a number of factors inhibiting ‘sustainable growth’, and its recommendations reveal a view that little has changed in the 8 years since Osgediz’s (1983) work with respect to personnel management. The report calls for ‘better’ personnel management in terms of staff testing, competi- tive entrance examinations, regular appraisals, promotion on merit, accurate person- nel records and selective improvements in the pay structure (World Bank, 1989, p. 56). Such proposals are hardly revolutionary in terms of generally accepted good personnel practice in more developed countries, but the failure of personnel manage- ment in the public sector of LDCs to achieve even these basic standards represents a significant challenge.

This article will attempt to address the reasons for this continuing restricted role for personnel management in the public sector of LDCs and make some suggestions as to what might be done to improve the situation. The author visited three LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa (Tanzania, Kenya and Zimbabwe) and conducted a number of interviews with senior officials and policy makers in Civil Service organizations, parastatals and their regulatory bodies, and with the heads of various management education institutes. The material that follows is an analysis of the problem and its causes. In order to facilitate the discussion, the model of role possibilities for the personnel function suggested by Tyson and Fell, based on a ‘building site’ meta- phor, will be utilized (Tyson and Fell, 1986). They distinguish three roles:

Clerk of works: the administrator whose day to day concerns are with checking and recording the flows of materials and workforce, and resolving minor incon- sistencies. This role has only a minimal managerial input and has no strategic input. Contracts negotiator: a troubleshooter who manages short-term conflicts between the main contractor and sub-contractors. Negotiating skill and tactical flexibility are the key requirements. This is basically a non-strategic short-run focus role, although critical in times of crisis. Architect: responsible for creating the ‘vision’ and ‘grand plan’ involving long- term strategic choices.

(See Appendix for development of this model.) When translated into personnel management terms, each of these three role models

(and mixtures thereof) can be observed in organizations in the West. The ‘clerk of works’ role corresponds to the personnel administration role, i.e. maintaining personnel records, administering conditions of service, monitoring manpower levels, and possibly also being concerned with employee welfare. The contracts negotiator corresponds to the ‘hard-nosed’ industrial relations negotiator, and the ‘architect’ corresponds to the emergent strategic Human Resources Manager who is involved in top-level corporate planning and decision-making. Although Tyson and Fell describe these roles in an even-handed way, the clear implication from their work is that the ‘architect’ role is the preferred option for the future. The trend in the West, towards a notion of human resources management as a proactive business- oriented function, aimed at making a contribution to corporate strategy, is confirma- tion of this. The implications of the recommendations of the World Bank Report on Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 1989) relating to administrative reform, includ-

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ing reform of personnel management in the public sector, also indicate that in LDCs the personnel function needs to display a more change-oriented role.

However, within the public sector organizations studied in the three LDCs (both Civil Service and parastatals), by far the most predominant role for personnel was the ‘clerk of works’ role with very little evidence of the ‘contracts negotiator’ or ‘architect’. An almost universal sentiment expressed was that personnel had not ‘been given the attention it deserved’, and the result has been that the personnel function has generally wielded very little power or influence and that insufficient attention has been given to addressing manpower issues in many organizations, thereby adversely affecting efficiency and effectiveness.

It may, of course, be argued that the problems described here are also experienced in the more developed economies, especially in the public sector, and that the ‘archi- tect’ role in the West is also more of an aspiration than a reality at present. Whilst this may be true, the almost all-pervading incidence of the ‘clerk of works’ role in LDC organizations and the special factors which inhibit a progression from this role, underline the view that the problems of personnel management differ between developed and less developed countries and require different solutions. The next section explores the reasons for the failure to go beyond the ‘clerk of works’ role that appears, on the basis of information gathered in the three countries, to be specific to LDCs.

FACTORS INHIBITING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BROADER ROLE FOR PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN LDCs

Lack of viable alternative models of personnel practice

In the three countries concerned, the British left behind on independence a system of administration adapted from the British Civil Service to suit the needs of colonial administration. The two systems were based on the same values. The view of personnel management implicit in these systems was the ‘Establishments’ model, which was almost wholly mechanical, concerned with numbers and ‘head-count’, meticulous record-keeping and ensuring consistency of treatment for civil servants through highly regulated and centralized ‘schemes of service’. Because of the relative stability of the system, these essentially bureaucratic notions did not carry any negative conno- tation that might be ascribed to them today. In addition to this there was also the (some would say peculiarly British) view that specialist attention to personnel issues was unnecessary, even undesirable, because it cut across the notion of ‘amateur pragmatism’ which implied that a ‘good chap’ could apply his administrative skills to good effect in many different areas of work. Thus at this time, the early 1960s, the British Civil Service and its satellites in the colonies were steeped in an administra- tivehureaucratic ethos suited to a relatively stable environment.

Although this ethos pervaded both the ‘home’ Civil Service and the colonial Civil Services, there were differences between the two in terms of structure and emphasis, but these differences further reinforced the notion of ‘amateur pragmatism’ in the colonial Civil Services. The ‘law-and-order’ orientation of the colonial system led to the dominance of provincial administration over centralized technical expertise. Provincial administrators, at whatever level, exercised a very wide range of powers

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and functions and it was felt that specialization was inappropriate in such circum- stances .

Since then in the UK, of course, starting with the Fulton Report in 1968 (Committee on the Civil Service Report, 1968), but especially in the Thatcher years, this ethos is being displaced by a more ‘managerial’ approach reflecting a more turbulent environment and a deliberate attempt to revitalize the public sector in pursuit of efficiency and excellence rather than complacency and conformity. Examples of this change are the privatization process in the parastatal sector and, within the Civil Service itself, the introduction of efficiency audits, the Financial Management Initia- tive, the review of personnel work in the Civil Service (Cassels, 1983), the introduction of local recruitment, reviews of appraisal and disciplinary procedures, and exper- iments with performance-related pay (see Tyson, 1988).

In contrast the public sector in the three LDCs appears to have been locked in a ‘time warp’ since independence. In a recent review of public administration in Eastern Africa it was concluded that:

‘. . .little has been done since independence to remodel African public administration for the challenge of independent statehood’ (Mutahaba, 1989, Preface xiii).

It may be tempting to explain this failure in terms of economic constraints and lack of resources and whilst these undoubtedly must have some influence, it must be said that extensive resources have been made available and used up in numerous exercises to remodel the structures of the civil services in the three countries. However, the administrativehureaucratic ethos and culture are maintained and it is these less easily definable qualitative issues that have been locked into a ‘time warp’. It is in this context that we see the continuing preponderance of the ‘clerk of works’ approach to personnel management in LDCs.

It may also be tempting, especially in the cases of Tanzania and Zimbabwe, to blame it all on socialism (currently a popular pastime). The argument goes that socialism with its centralized planning and direction requires a bureaucracy to sustain it and socialist values encourage group conformity (and mediocrity?) over individual initiative and excellence. However, there is reason to cast doubt on this view. First, how socialist is socialist? In the case of Zimbabwe the answer has to be-not very socialist at all. Second, this argument takes no account of Kenya, which shares the same problem to a large degree, but is not socialist (either actually or nominally). Third, with varying degrees of effort, commitment and success, all three countries are making some attempt to move towards ‘liberalization’.

A more convincing argument, I believe, is that several conditions for reform have prevailed in developed countries (I am using the UK as my primary example) which are absent for the most part in the three LDCs. The first of these factors is an absence (in developed countries) of a thoroughgoing ‘political’ influence in public sector personnel decision-making. In contrast, ‘political’ interference in personnel matters is endemic to LDCs in matters such as hiring, promotions and dismissals. Nepotism, tribalism and corruption also serve to prevent the development of ratio- nally thought-out and implemented personnel policies and keep the personnel function anchored in an embarrassed subservience. Although ‘political’ infiuence in public sector personnel matters is not unknown in developed countries, there tends to be

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a reasonable degree of balance between the political and managerial spheres. In LDCs this is clearly a big problem which transcends the personnel function and pervades whole organizations and is too large an area to be effectively dealt with in this article (see Leonard, 1987), although the problem is returned to below (p. 208). Bearing in mind this very important first factor as a broad context, I intend to concentrate on a further two conditions existing in developed countries but absent in LDCs, which are specific to the personnel function. These are:

- A viable alternative and successful model of personnel management that could be considered by the public sector as being capable of emulation.

- A supply of talent both in the form of trained individuals who decide to make a career as personnel specialists, and also a collective group who represent the occupation, promote it to outsiders, and who exchange and develop ideas within the occupation.

Let us consider the British situation first of all. Throughout the first 60 years of the twentieth century the British Civil Service was regarded as a ‘model employer’ to be envied and emulated by employers and employees in other spheres of employ- ment. The provision of career structures, security of employment, extensive pension and benefit rights, and an early acceptance of collective bargaining as a means of conflict resolution, meant that Civil Service employment was highly sought after and attracted the cream of the labour market. During the last 30 years, however, the Civil Service has slipped back from its position as ‘model employer’. The growth of large-scale organizations in the private sector, the rise of multinational corpor- ations, and the growth of sophisticated management methods based on the human relations movement rather than the earlier more blatantly exploitative techniques of industrial management, all served to produce policies and practices in the private sector more progressive than those found in the Civil Service. To quote just a few examples, the private sector has pioneered ‘best practice’ in the following areas:

- The development of open and participative performance appraisal systems. - Basing immediate rewards and long-term promotion on merit and performance

rather than on seniority. - The adoption of recruitment procedures whose primary objective is to recruit

the right person rather than ensure that all sections and interested parties have a say in the decision.

- Introduction of initiatives relating to improving communication, involvement and participation of employees.

I am not suggesting that all private sector employers have been paragons of good personnel practice, but nevertheless the leading employers have provided powerful and highly visible alternatives to standard Civil Service employment conditions. Two consequences have flowed from this. First, Civil Service employment is less attractive difficulties in recruitment and retention are now a common feature, especially after training in skills which are marketable in the private sector (e.g. tax inspectors, scientific officers, technologists, economists, accountants). Second, the aspirations of those who wish to stay in the public sector are raised by knowledge of practices in the private sector. Thus, for these reasons alone the public sector has needed

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to respond by emulating private sector personnel policies. Also, and perhaps more crucially, this process of emulation has been accelerated by the changes mentioned earlier, which have had as their aim the introduction at least of performance manage- ment and efficiency notions to the public sector, if not the actual disciplines of the market. Therefore, because of the availability of an alternative model and political ideology that has seen public sector organizations as needing to be more like private sector organizations, the public sector has been able to adapt personnel practice from the private sector, some of which was outlined earlier.

In contrast, however, there is a lack of alternative models of ‘best practice’ in the countries visited. To take the example of Tanzania, only 6% of the total population is in formal employment, the vast majority of the population working in subsistence agriculture. Nearly all of those in formal employment work for either the Civil Service or parastatals. There has been until quite recently an expectation that the public sector would absorb almost the whole of the output of the higher education system. Hence the administrativehureaucratic ethos pervades a whole class of Tanzanian society and no alternative view of how employment could be managed differently is available.

In Kenya and Zimbabwe the situation is somewhat different. In these countries there is a sizeable private sector and a multinational presence, and here the argument has to be modified to the extent that, whilst in these two countries there may be a visible alternative way of managing the employment relationship and consequently organizing the personnel function, it is not seen as a viable comparator for the public sector. The public and private sectors are seen as quite distinct in these two countries, and what may be seen as appropriate employment practices for the private sector are not viewed as applicable to the public sector, because of the perception that multinational companies (MNCs) are more wealthy or more likely have different types of goals. Given that there is not, as in the case of Britain, a significant and comprehensive political and cultural shift in values questioning the whole basis on which public services are provided and a clear preference for market-related solutions, there does not exist a strong motivation to make comparisons. The poor performance of parastatal organizations (to be discussed later) may serve as an exception but, as we shall see, parastatal employment conditions are still largely bound by the straitjacket of Civil Service schemes of service.

The second important ‘personnel-specific’ condition for reform raised above (see p. 197) was that there should be a supply of talent capable of delivering and operating the alternative model. Watson (1986), in his discussion of the personnel management occupation, argues that the development of the personnel function depends not only on a demonstrated demand for such a specialism, but also on a supply of individuals and institutional groups willing to make a career in the field, design an entry route, provide training and construct a legitimate justification for the existence of the specia- lism. As Watson says:

‘The spread of specialized personnel departments is as much an outcome of organizational politics and career or occupational advancement as it is a matter of system needs’ (Watson, 1986).

Taking the individual level first of all, an obviously important factor is the lack of training in management skills in general and training in recent developments

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and possibilities in personnel management in particular. Although efforts to provide this training have occurred through sponsorship programmes of foreign aid, to enable managers to learn new knowledge and skills in Western institutes of higher learning (including my own Institute), in the personnel management area at least, they have been unsuccessful in creating a ‘pool of talent’ with an alternative approach to person- nel management, other than the ‘establishment’s’ view, possibly for two reasons:

The teaching of personnel management does not always keep pace with latest developments in personnel practice and many have actually perpetuated the ‘establishment’s’ view of personnel. Those being trained overseas have not, as yet, been trained in suflicient numbers to represent a ‘critical mass’ necessary to energize a change in culture and role, with the frequently noted result that those returning to their organization from overseas training, although brimming with new ideas, are quickly reassimilated into the administrative/bureaucratic culture (part of the ubiquitous ‘transfer of training’ problem).

At the institutional level, the contrast between the UK and the three LDCs is notable. In the UK the Institute of Personnel Management is a highly developed and successful body, which provides the main means of entry to the occupation. Despite an almost pathological concern for the status and credibility of the function vis u vis other managerial functions, and uncertainty about the nature of the personnel role, the Institute has managed to establish that the normal route to a career in personnel management is through its own Education Scheme and thereby to corporate membership. Although the Institute does not control entry to the ‘profession’ as the more established professions do (e.g. law, medicine, chartered accountancy), the frequency with which untrained, unsuitable people are appointed to the personnel function because a place cannot be found for them elsewhere, is now diminishing as the demands on the skills of the personnel practitioner increase. The Institute’s role as a pressure group is also significant. It is among a handful of professional bodies whose representations to policy-makers on employment matters in government and elsewhere are carefully listened to, if not always acted upon. At a lower level, the extensive branch structure provides an important forum for the exchange of ideas and ‘best practice’ and it is at this level that an important interface is established between public and private sector practitioners. Finally, through its various publica- tions and Codes of Practice, the Institute has attempted more or less successfully to construct a legitimate justification for the specialism in the face of two challenges to its legitimacy: one is ‘Anyone can do it-it’s just common sense!’, and the second is that ‘personnel needs to be given back to the line managers’.

The overall conclusion about the importance of the specialist personnel function in the UK in the 1980s is provided by McKay and Torrington (1986), who argue that despite the recession of the early 1980s personnel management is in good shape, i.e. is found in all but the smallest organizations in both the public and private sector and is continuing to acquire Board level representation, due partly at least to the efforts of the Institute of Personnel Management (McKay and Torrington, 1986).

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In contrast, the situation in the three LDCs is very different. In Tanzania there is no professional institute for personnel practitioners. In Kenya, the Institute of Personnel Management of Kenya has been in existence only since August 1988, and whilst it has made good progress in establishing a structure for its 200 + members, its education programme is still at the planning stage and the Institute needs assistance with curriculum development, teaching materials, textbooks and teaching staff. It is also notable that the Institute’s membership is concentrated mainly in the private sector (and to a limited number of parastatals), rather than in the public sector where, for reasons mentioned earlier, there appears to be a failure to recognize the possibility of emulating personnel practice in the private sector, and thus the benefits of membership may not be apparent. In Zimbabwe the Institute of Personnel Management of Zimbabwe has been in existence for 25 years and has 2,000 members. Whilst probably the most vigorous and well-developed institute in the region, it also suffers from a lack of resources, especially to further develop its education programme, which is currently based on less than ideal correspondence tuition rather than face-to-face teaching in colleges, and again also from an under-representation of the public sector. Therefore, we can see that the ‘infrastructure’ for personnel practitioners in the form of the professional institute is either not available or at best under-resourced.

The contribution that such institutes could make to developing the personnel occu- pation is considerable. As well as providing funds for training individuals in the West in personnel skills that may or may not be applicable ‘back home’, aid agencies ought also to consider the benefits of providing assistance to local professional insti- tutes to develop their educational programmes. This in the long term may be the best way to achieve the ‘critical mass’ necessary to bring about the development of the personnel function towards a more proactive ‘architect’ role. It would also have the added advantages that the professional development so achieved would be culture-specific and relevant, and that such development would be locally ‘owned’. Beyond the purely educational role, these institutes would also provide an important ‘bridge’ between Civil Service, parastatals and the private sector, providing a network of contacts, a vehicle for the exchange of ideas and a focal point in influencing national policy and precedents. In addition to this, there may be considerable benefit in including personnel management into undergraduate degree programmes in public administration, recognizing that not all personnel management activities can or should be carried out by professionally qualified specialists. The subject needs to be included in the broader training of general administrators, provided that the subject is dealt with in a practical rather than an overly theoretical way, and taught by those with some experience in the field (conditions that are not often met in universities in both developed and developing countries!).

In concluding this section, it has been argued that the failure to break away from a ‘clerk of works’-type personnel role in the public sector in the three LDCs has been due to the absence of viable alternative models of personnel practice. These have been available in the UK and in other developed countries (but not in the LDCs), because two conditions were satisfied. First, there is a willingness and a need to compete with private sector employment practices. Second, a supply of talent exists (both individual and institutional) to deliver such a role and level of professiona- lism. Whilst this hypothesis has not been tested ‘scientifically’, I believe it does explain for the most part the low status of the personnel occupation in these LDCs. There

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are, however, a number of other specific factors which in some ways are a reflection of this hypothesis and in other ways are separate from it. These will now be examined.

The legacy of colonial administration

Reference was made earlier to the notion of ‘amateur pragmatism’, which involves a belief that a good generalist could apply his skills across a range of subject areas, given a ‘trained’ mind (i.e. a university degree!) plus a smattering of common sense. Thus, specialization was somewhat frowned upon by colonial administrators. The Regional and District Commissioners (DC) system of administration was the archety- pal manifestation of this notion. The DC enjoyed a wide range of powers across many administrative matters and in addition also exercised judicial functions. By and large the system was successful for a time (leaving aside the question of ‘successful for whom?’), because there was a relatively stable environment and there was an acceptance of the authority of the colonial administrator.

This reluctance to specialize has been one of the values held in the ‘time warp’ referred to earlier, but it has had a particular effect on the organization and structure of the personnel function in the public sector LDCs, namely that the personnel role is often combined with other disparate and peripheral roles, emphasizing its continued marginalization from the real decision-making process. A good example of this is the role of the Director of Manpower Development and Administration (DMDA) in the various government ministries in Tanzania, where the DMDA con- trols sections such as Personnel Administration, Manpower Planning, and Training, but also is responsible for Accounts, Financial Administration, Office Management and Administration, and Protocol and Transport. Whilst initially this broad-ranging role may appear to be influential on the basis of ‘having fingers in many pies’ this is, in my view, an illusion. If it is believed that the ‘clerk of works’ role is all that is required from the personnel function then, of course, there is no reason why other administrative functions should not be added in-if the function is not contri- buting to policy-making, then it may as well provide a broad-based administrative service. If, however, we wish the personnel function to perform a broader role, i.e. move towards the ‘architect’ role in having the function ensure that manpower considerations are taken into account when formulating organizational objectives and plans, then the current arrangement is unsatisfactory on two counts.

First, the time now spent on routine non-personnel administration needs to be spent on more strategic personnel matters. Second, the skills required for the two roles are quite different. With the current arrangement it is unlikely that one person can combine all the skills required to control the various functions-in all likelihood he or she will favour one aspect of the role, based on his or her own individual preferences and specific skilldtraining and, perhaps subconsciously, give emphasis to that. The only real way in which these roles can be combined is by concentrating on routine administration, keeping the records straight, and ensuring that established procedures are adhered to. The ‘architect’ role, however, requires skills of a different order-the ability to analyse a complex reality and offer policy changes to improve the contribution of human resources, and also the social skills necessary to ‘sell’ solutions to often sceptical managers. Given that the stable environment which enabled the ‘pragmatic amateur’ to survive has now been replaced by an uncertain and turbulent environment where it is increasingly recognized that the development

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of the human resource is central to the process of economic development, then I would argue that the time has come to create a fully specialized and professional personnel function able to contribute to policy formulation. Continued preference for a wide-ranging administrative role only serves to slow down such a development.

A continuing need for administrative procedures

The administrativeibureaucratic ethos described earlier, and a structure for the per- sonnel function which reflects the ‘general administrator’ role outlined on page 201, I have argued to be limits on the further development of the personnel role of the public sector of LDCs. I have suggested that the movement towards a more ‘manager- ial’ approach, emphasizing performance and accountability, would go hand in hand with the development of the personnel function towards an ‘architect’ role. Notions of flexibility, freedom to act, and decentralization are seen as highly desirable and necessary for introduction to the public sector in the West. However, when one considers why the administrative model was first constructed in Britain in the mid- 19th century, it becomes clear that this model cannot be totally abandoned in present day LDCs. Prior to the 1854 Northcote Trevelyan Report, public service posts were little more than sinecures or opportunities for bribery, corruption and the amassing of personal wealth. There was little consistency of treatment and no real commitment to serving the public. These are just the conditions which still exist to varying degrees in the public sector of many LDCs. The aforementioned administrative reforms in Britain of open competition for entry, provision of pension and benefits and the development of impersonal bureaucratic rules (rather than personal whim), were an attempt to reduce the temptation and ability of public servants to seek personal advantage. By and large the reforms achieved the required effect (although most people believe that ‘who you know’ still does have some impact).

Therefore, in seeking to move towards a more ‘managerial’ approach, it has to be recognized that the ‘administrative’ model possesses features which will continue to have value for LDCs. The incidence of corruption, bribery and patronage varies widely within and between LDCs and is difficult to measure, but all observers recog- nize it as an important characteristic of public administration in LDCs. In fact, corruption, bribery and patronage are frequently so entrenched that the situation is best described as a ‘system within a system’, or ‘bureaucratic feudalism’. The bureaucracy is the official system but underneath this (often quite thin) veneer is a ‘can of worms’ of informal networks, tribal affiliations, and regular ‘kick-backs’. It is easy for a Westerner to condemn these practices as immoral, inequitable and ultimately inefficient, but this overlooks the strong cultural norms in many LDCs towards ‘looking after one’s own’, i.e. a‘ legitimized expectation that those reaching positions of influence would, within reason, look after their families and promote the interests of their tribe.

Of what value then is the bureaucratic/administrative system in LDCs? It is possible to argue that it exists only to provide a respectable ‘front’ for the activities mentioned above. Whilst this is in some cases undoubtedly true, it can also be argued that the bureaucratic/administrative system does act as a constraint to completely unfet- tered politicking and in-fighting, and provides an alternative rational model for decision-making. In the absence of such a system providing some degree of regularity and stability, public administration would rapidly collapse. Therefore, the extent

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to which public administration can move away from the ‘administrative’ model to a more ‘managerial’ model is constrained by the continuing value of the administrative approach in LDCs. In terms of the personnel function, it seems likely that the ‘clerk of works’ role will need to continue and thus may act as a constraint to the develop ment of a broader role (see Venkatasubramanian, 1982).

PROSPECTS FOR REFORM

Having speculated on the reasons for the failure of the personnel function to develop a more proactive managerial role in the public sector of LDCs, attention will now be turned to prospects for change and reform. It has to be said that there is little cause for optimism when discussing reform prospects in the personnel area, when specific problems are overlaid with a much more general problem of chronic demotiva- tion and a lack of commitment in most areas of the Civil Service and parastatals. Although the extent of this general problem varies within and between LDCs, the causes appear to be:

- Low wages. Either in absolute terms, because of egalitarian pay policies reflecting socialist ideals, or comparatively, in relation to private sector reward levels. This leads to ‘moonlighting’ and the development of outside business interests. Commitment to public service becomes secondary or non-existent.

- Luck of incentives. Generally civil servants on the same grade receive the same level of pay regardless of performance.

- Poor transport and lack of basic facilities. This leads to lateness and absenteeism and distraction from the duties of the post.

Overcoming these problems is not merely a case of adjusting personnel policies and strengthening the personnel function. What is required is a complete change in organizational culture and a determination to do things differently (not necessarily slavishly copying Western management precepts). This requires, more than anything, a political will which is currently lacking. The fact remains that the inefficient and ineffective status quo is valuable to two groups. Firstly, the political leadership in some LDCs seem to have reached the conclusion that a poorly-run, inefficient, and grossly overmanned public sector is the lesser of two evils when compared to the alternative of improving efficiency by reducing the size of the public sector, thereby creating a large pool of educated unemployed, who may be perceived as an unwanted source of political challenge. Secondly, the senior officials and managers within the public sector have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, because currently it offers them the opportunity to dispense patronage and wield power. Reform would jeopardize that patronage and power.

A general analysis of the social, cultural and political bamers to administrative reform in LDCs is beyond the scope of this article. However, this need not prevent us from speculating briefly about what could be attempted if a genuine political will to reform the public sector in LDCs were in evidence. Little distinction has been made between Civil Service and parastatal organizations in the discussion so far. The literature on the ownership, structure, performance and management of parastatal organizations is extensive and reflects a concern that the problems of

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parastatals are different from those of Civil Service organizations to which they are tied. In the three LDCs visited, much concern was articulated, both in private discussions and in media coverage, over the poor performance of parastatals. The most frequently voiced criticisms were:

- The unreliability of the services provided and the high costs. - The large losses made by many parastatals, imposing a severe strain on the

Exchequer. - Poor quality of management. - Corruption.

Again, it is beyond the scope of this article to engage in a general review of the management of parastatals, but since there appears to be an increased interest in improving performance in parastatals (how genuine that interest is remains to be seen), it is perhaps in this area that the urgency and opportunity to reform person- nel practices is greatest and thus some specific suggestions can be made.

The major personnel problem of parastatal organizations appears to be the continu- ing link to the Civil Service, in terms of both conditions of service and staffing. The detailed ‘schemes of service’, which provide guidance on many matters relating to the employment of civil servants, are bureaucratic, inflexible and, as discussed earlier, designed to ensure consistency of treatment (which, of course, they manifestly fail to deliver). Whilst this may be acceptable in a Civil Service department or Minis- try, it is much less appropriate in organizations attempting to move towards a more direct performance culture where incentives may be desirable. Yet parastatals are constrained by the requirements of ‘parity’ with the Civil Service, and various Parasta- tal Commissions are created to ensure it. Parastatals also often draw their staff from the mainstream Civil Service. This has two negative consequences. First, the better civil servants use transfers to parastatals as a bridge to more lucrative employ- ment in the private sector and thus parastatals suffer from retention problems. Second, the less marketable transferees from the Civil Service bring with them the bureaucra- tic/administrative ethos, which is not appropriate to public enterprises. One is left with the impression that the reform of parastatals (in other operational areas as well as personnel matters, e.g. regulation of price structures), is somewhat analogous to putting a boxer in a ring with one hand tied behind his back. Without wishing to enter the ‘privatization’ debate, it has to be recognized that enterprises in public ownership are pulled in two directions. One is the need for public accountability which emphasizes regularity, propriety and consistency, whereas the other is for initiative, enterprise and efficiency. Whether or not some form of privatization is seen to be appropriate, perhaps the time has come, in terms of personnel matters, to cut the umbilical cord to the Civil Service and create:

- A distinctive corporate culture which emphasizes excellence and initiative, rather than administrative consistency.

- A new type of ‘entrepreneurial cadre’ selected on the basis of commercial aware- ness and flexibility.

- A reward system, either individual or group-based, related to the achievement of commercial targets, which would result in pay levels at least 15-20 per cent higher than those in corresponding grades in the mainstream Civil Service. (The

Personnel management 205

extra pay would only be available if the targets were met and would therefore be self-financing.)

I am aware that these suggested changes might be criticised as being a typically Western solution to an African (or other LDC area) problem, and as such they cut across various sets of values (e.g. African communalism or egalitarian socialism). This may be true, but if there is a genuine desire to make parastatals perform more like organizations in developed countries (i.e. emphasizing efficiency, enterprise, initiative and flexibility), then these notions deserve at least to be considered and adapted. Obviously, much more work needs to be done on relating ‘modern’ manage- ment methods to the particular problems of LDCs, and thus I have no illusion about the difficulties that imposing these ideas without adapting them to local culture would give rise to.

Finally, it is interesting to note that suggesting that it is in the parastatal sector that personnel reforms should commence, is a reversal of the usual direction of change. Typically, changes in government regulations relating to public sector employment have led to changes of schemes of service in the Civil Service, and these have then been transposed into parastatal employment regulations. If, as sug- gested, the ‘umbilical cord’ between the Civil Service and parastatals were severed and reforms were to commence in parastatals, then the reformed personnel practices in parastatals might come to serve as the emerging ‘alternative model’ required to influence change in the mainstream Civil Service.

CONCLUSION

The suggestions and analysis above are essentially based on impressions obtained in a short space of time by someone whose role in experiencing and managing the employment relationship is very different from that which exists in LDCs. The per- spective may suffer from being that reflecting an over-Westernized approach, but it may also bring a ‘fresh pair of eyes’ to the subject. Whichever view one takes, it is clear that some of the arguments and issues raised here require more systematic research. Some possible questions for further research might be:

- How does the employment relationship differ between developed countries and LDCs, and how does this affect the role of personnel management?

- What are the most appropriate strategies for creating a ‘supply of talent’ for the personnel specialism?

- What, precisely, are the key contextual variables that influence the organization of the personnel function in specific LDCs?

Despite these gaps in knowledge and a lack of hard evidence, I would draw the following specific conclusions to the attention of policy-makers:

- The parastatal sector is in need of, and ready for, reform. Attempts to recast the employment relationship of public sector employees should begin in this sector and then be held up as models for reforming the rest of public sector employment.

206 H. Taylor

An ‘infrastructure’ for personnel management in LDCs needs to be created. Support for local professional institutes could be an important way of achieving this, and may encourage the much-needed interchange between public and pri- vate sector personnel practice in LDCs. The practice of combining personnel responsibilities with other ‘housekeeping’ roles should be curtailed to enable a specialist ‘dedicated’ personnel function to be created, which will thereby have a greater opportunity to operate at a higher level than the ‘clerk of works’ role.

REFERENCES

Cassels, J. (1983). Review of Personnel Work in the Civil Service. HMSO, Committee on the Civil Service Report (The Fulton Report) (1968). Cmnd 3638. HMSO, Leonard, D. K. (1987). ‘The Political Realities of African Management’. World Development,

McKay, L. and Torrington, D. (1986). The Changing Nature of Personnel Management. Insti- tute of Personnel Management,

Mutahaba, G. (1989). Reforming Public Administration for Development: Experiences from Eastern Africa. Kumarian Press,

Osgediz, S. (1983). Managing the Public Sector in Developing Countries: Issues & Prospects. World Bank S t a f Working Papers, No. 583, Management & Development Series No. 10. World Bank, Washington D.C.

Tyson, S. (1988). ‘The Dilemmas of Civil Service Personnel Management’. Personnel Manage- ment, September, 49-53.

Tyson, S. and Fell, A. (1986). Evaluating the Personnel Function. Hutchinson, Venkatasubramanian, A. K. (1982). ‘Appropriate Administrative Ideology for Democracy

Watson, T. J. (1986). Management, Organisation and Employment Strategy. Routledge & Kegan

World Bank (1989). Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth-A Long-term

15 (7), 889-910.

& Development’. Indian Journal of Public Administration, 28,322-333.

Paul, pp. 186-7.

Perspective Study. World Bank, Washington, D.C.

APP

EN

DIX

: MO

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