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December 2007 Field Note Delhi has witnessed a new initiative that involves private entrepreneurs via Build, Operate, and Transfer contracts. This field note looks at both the achievements and challenges in the use of these contracts for public toilets. It presents some significant lessons for meeting the sanitation needs of the city as a whole. Public Toilets in Urban India Doing Business Differently The Water and Sanitation Program is an international partnership for improving water and sanitation sector policies, practices, and capacities to serve poor people 45200 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized

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December 2007

Field Note

Delhi has witnessed a new initiative that involves private entrepreneurs via Build, Operate, andTransfer contracts. This field note looks at both the achievements and challenges in the use of thesecontracts for public toilets. It presents some significant lessons for meeting the sanitation needs of thecity as a whole.

Public Toilets in Urban India

Doing Business Differently

The Water and Sanitation Programis an international partnership forimproving water and sanitation sectorpolicies, practices, and capacities toserve poor people

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Executive Summary

India faces a daunting urban sanitation challenge. Over

one-fourth of urban households lack a private toilet and there is

an evident lack of hygienic facilities in public places. Communal

facilities may be essential not simply as a convenience to

travellers and shoppers, but as the only possible means of

providing access to sanitation in crowded slums that are

characterized by small plots and little open space.

Historically, municipalities were the main providers of public

toilets, but these facilities suffered from poor maintenance and

cleanliness and were largely avoided by the public.

Today, pay-and-use public toilets have become well established

across India, most of them funded by municipalities and a large

proportion operated by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)

or small contractors. These are often better maintained than

standard municipal toilets and are consequently more popular

with the public.

While NGO- and Community-Based Organization (CBO)-run toilet

complexes are now quite common, much less has been done to

develop the role of the private sector in financing, developing,

and managing public toilet complexes. Recently, however, the

city of Delhi has witnessed a new initiative that involves private

entrepreneurs via Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) contracts.

Some 60 public toilet blocks have been developed, and a novel

feature of the contracts is that the operators are allowed to use

the external walls of the premises as advertising space. This

enables them to generate substantial revenues.

The results of this innovation have been mixed, but some

contractors have provided an excellent service. This field note

looks at both the achievements and challenges in the use of

BOT contracts for public toilets in Delhi, and draws out some

important lessons for meeting the sanitation needs of the city

as a whole.

In Delhi, the idea of private sector development of public toilets via Build,Operate, and Transfer contracts first emerged in 1998. It offered two benefits:private financing of public infrastructure and an incentive for maintenance.

The BOTInitiative in DelhiPrivate sector development of publictoilets via Build, Operate, and Transfer(BOT) contracts is relatively new inIndia. In Delhi, the idea first emerged in1998 under the auspices of the NewDelhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC).Fumes International, a local company,had noticed the dismal state of publictoilets in the city and approachedNDMC with an idea. It proposed toconstruct new toilet blocks using itsown resources, then operate themfor a fixed period, after which ownershipwould transfer to the municipality.The right to use the road-facing wallsof the complexes as advertisingspace would enable the operatorto offset some of the developmentcosts. The NDMC agreed.

The proposal was attractive asit potentially offered twoimportant benefits:

1. Private financing of publicinfrastructure. The new services wouldbe both financed and operated by thecontractor. All the municipality had to dowas provide the land and monitor thefacilities once they were running. Inreturn, it would receive a monthly licencefee from the operator, funded byadvertising revenue.

2. An incentive for maintenance. Itwas anticipated that the potential foradvertising revenue would create anincentive for the contractor to constructa good quality building and keep itin working order—many toilet blocksdeveloped under this contract featuredwell-kept gardens and plants.

On the initiative of the operators, BOTcontracts now include a clause allowing

Public Toilets in Urban India:Doing Business Differently

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Communal toilet facilities fall into two broad categories: community toilets, which are provided to meet the basic needs ofpoor residential areas; and public toilets, which serve mobile populations in public places such as shopping centers, as wellas bus and train stations. This field note is concerned with the latter. The three most common management models forpublic toilets are shown below, though there are numerous variations on these themes.

Public sector management Toilet blocks owned and maintained by municipal agencies. Usually, no charge islevied on users. These are becoming rarer as cleanliness and maintenance aregenerally poor, there being no real obligation or incentive for caretakers to maintaina good service.

Private leasing Toilet blocks built using municipal funds but operated by NGOs, private contractorsor individuals who are responsible for routine maintenance and charge user fees.The municipality may provide water and power supplies free of charge, and/orretain responsibility for structural repairs. The nongovernmental organization SulabhInternational operates a huge number of pay-and-use toilets on this basis, many ofthem in public places but some serving poor residential areas.

Private sector development Toilet blocks funded, constructed, operated, and maintained by the private sector,usually on land provided by the municipality. User fees apply. Under Build, Operate,and Transfer contracts, ownership of the premises transfers to the municipality whenthe lease period expires, typically after five or seven years.

Box 1: Management Models for Public Toilet Facilities in India

the operator to landscape the site,making it more attractive both tousers and advertisers.

Toilet blocks built under this andsubsequent contracts had separatefacilities for men and women (four tosix compartments for each) plus twoor three urinals and one or twoshowers. The first site proposed bythe private contractor was at a busyshopping complex in a high incomeneighborhood. Subsequent sites wereselected in consultation with the NDMCand it was initially possible to find placeswith both a high demand for toiletsand strong advertising potential. Thecontract period for this first batch wasset at 10 years; subsequent contracts,though, had shorter periods.

To exploit the advertising potential,the private contractor entered intoa contract with a public outdooradvertising1 agency that paid thecontractor to use the advertising spaceand thus bore the business risk. Thecontractor employed a caretaker on afixed salary, and set user charges atRe. 1 (US$0.02)2 for the urinal andRs. 2 (US$0.05) for the toilet, in linewith limits set by the NDMC. Theproject was a great success—both theprivate contractor and the outdooradvertising agency made goodrevenues, users received a good qualityservice, and the municipality wasrelieved of the onerous task of providingpublic toilets in some key locations.

Globally, the practice of subsidizingpublic services from advertisingrevenue is now widespread(see Box 2).

Following the successful pilot, in 2002 the New Delhi Municipal Corporationissued an open tender for additional 40 sites. The toilets soon proved to beprofitable but it was advertising, not service delivery, that generated the profits.

JCDecaux makes a wide range of street furniture from billboards to automaticpublic conveniences, and has very efficient systems for their installation andmaintenance. The company operates in over 800 cities in 40 countries and in2005 generated revenues of US$2.5 million.

For decades, bus shelters in the Netherlands were subject to graffiti andvandalism. In the 1990s, JCDecaux offered to finance and build new sheltersin a number of cities, and thereafter to maintain them, with an obligation torepair damage within 24 hours of it being reported. In exchange, it acquiredthe right to display advertisements in bus shelter windows. The companynow owns most of the bus shelters in the Netherlands and the results havebeen impressive.

The approach is based on three principles:

• Offer the best, receive the best.

• Don’t compromise on maintenance.

• Don’t sub-contract operation and maintenance.

Recently, JCDecaux won its first contract in India, for 192 bus stops inNew Delhi.

Box 2: Financing Public Facilities through Advertising

1 Outdoor advertising is also known as billboard orhoarding space.2 USD 1 = INR 39.13 (as of October 10, 2007). Conversionrates are from www.xe.com; all conversions in the textare approximations.

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Public Toilets in Urban India:Doing Business Differently

Expansion ofthe ProgramFollowing the successful pilot, in 2002the NDMC issued an open tender foradditional 40 sites. Bidders wereselected solely on the basis of theirtechnical skills and experience; therewas no financial bidding. The monthlyadvertisement licence fees per publictoilet were fixed at Rs. 5,000 (US$128)for the first two years, Rs. 8,000(US$204) for the subsequent two, andRs. 10,000 (US$255) for the fifth andfinal year. From 64 pre-qualifying bids,eight companies were selected—mostof them engineering or constructioncompanies—and each was assignedfive toilet complexes.

At this time, the NDMC had no revenueobjective for the toilets and the monthlylicence fee was fixed low because theadvertising potential was unknown.Since the operators had little knowledge

of advertising, they appointed outdooradvertising agencies to exploitthe value of their road-facing walls. Thetoilets soon proved to be profitablebut it was advertising, not servicedelivery, that generated the profits;operation and maintenance costsexceeded revenue from users by asubstantial margin.

At this stage the operators kept thetoilets clean and in good working order,for several reasons. First, monitoringsystems were in place and the NDMChad the right to terminate contractsin the event of poor performance.Second, there was a general perceptionthat the advertising potential woulddrop if the toilets were poorlymaintained. Third, contractors wantedto build up a track record in anticipationof contract extensions or new business.

The results were satisfying and in 2002the NDMC issued a second opentender, this time for 25 sites. By this

time, the revenue potential of thefacilities was evident and this promptedthe municipality to adopt an alternativetender procedure where bidders wouldno longer be assessed on their technicalmerits; instead they would bid for theadvertising licence fee. The marketprice for the fee would therefore beestablished through competition. Theexpectation was that operators’ profitmargins would drop but remain at aviable level, while municipal revenuewould rise. On this occasion most of thecontracts went to outdoor advertisingagencies, who were able to make higherbids for the licence fee than normalcontractors, since the latter would haveneeded to appoint a third party to dealwith the advertising component. Asexpected, monthly licence fee paymentswent up dramatically, from an averageof Rs. 7,000 (US$179) per month toRs. 50,000 (US$1,279); some wereas high as Rs. 75,000 (US$1,918),depending on the location.

Encouraged by the NDMC experience,the Municipal Corporation of Delhi(MCD) also decided to tender for newpublic toilets, using the same criteria toassess bids. However, contractualdisputes meant that only a small portionof these toilet blocks came to be built.

• The contract is for five to seven years, after which ownership transfers tothe municipality.

• The municipality provides land free of cost but retains the title; it providespower, water, and other facilities on payment.

• The contractor must build sound and aesthetically appealing facilities, athis own cost, and may plant flowers and shrubs around each convenience.

• The contractor must maintain the complex, keep it clean (internally andexternally), and provide continuous clean water, exhaust fans, hand dryers,tissues, soap, towels, and so on.

• User charges are limited to Rs. 2 (US$0.05) per head for a compartment,Re. 1 (US$0.02) for a urinal.

• The contractor may use road-facing walls for advertising, paying a licencefee and tax.

• The municipality may terminate the contract if conditions are breached.

Box 3: Key Content of the Delhi Build, Operate, andTransfer Contracts

5

Encouraged by the New Delhi Municipal Corporation’s experience, theMunicipal Corporation of Delhi also decided to tender for new public toilets.Contractual disputes meant that only a small portion of these blocks were built.

Fixed licence fee, contractor Financial bidding,uses advertising agent contractor does not

use an agent

Initial investment 800,000 800,000

User fee revenue (240 users per day) 60,000 60,000

Advertising revenue 960,000 1,680,000

Total revenue 1,020,000 1,740,000

Operation and maintenance (see Table 2) 295,500 295,500

Licence fee 84,000 600,000

Statutory advertisement tax 108,000 108,000

Depreciation (-) 160,000 160,000

Gross income 372,500 576,500

Income tax (30%) 111,750 172,950

Net income 260,750 403,550

Depreciation (+) 160,000 160,000

Net after-tax cash flows 420,750 563,550

Internal rate of return (five-year contract) 44% 65%

Net present value (five-year contract) 925,158 1,510,666

Internal rate of return (seven-year contract) 48% 67%

Net present value (seven-year contract) 1,393,633 2,163,973

Table 1: Typical Income per Annum from BOT Toilet Complexes in Delhi (in Rs.)

The CommercialViability of PublicToilet ComplexesIt is difficult to present a genericfinancial picture for BOT toilets inDelhi, since many of the variables arelocation-specific, but typical incomesfor the operating models usedsince 1998 are presented in Table 1.These are based on informationobtained from interviews withoperators. The first scenario is that

established between 1998 and 2000,where the contractor appoints anoutdoor advertising agent. The secondis that which emerged after 2002,where the winning contractor managesthe advertising aspect directly. Bothscenarios provide good returnson investment, whether the contractperiod is five or seven years. It is clear,however, that the bulk of the operator’srevenue comes from advertising andthat operation and maintenance costsare almost five times greater thanrevenue from user fees.

Outcome of the2002 ContractsThe increased revenue was a bonus forthe NDMC and the MCD. However, fromthis point onwards there was a markeddeterioration in the performance of BOTtoilets, with much lower operation andmaintenance standards than had beenachieved under the 1998 and 2000contracts. One reason for this was thatthe monitoring mechanisms that hadoperated under the initial contracts were

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Electricity 46,000

Salaries 112,000

Materials (mops, soap, and so on) 34,000

Painting (quarterly) 16,000

Plants, greenery 34,000

Staff uniforms 2,000

Coupons and tickets, and so forth 5,000

Electrical fixtures (replacements) 11,000

Plumbing maintenance 12,000

Overhead tank replacement (every two-three years) 5,500

Borehole/pump maintenance 8,000

Mirrors, beading 5,500

Floor polishing 4,500

Total 295,500

Table 2: Typical Annual Running Costs (in Rs.)

Source: Based on information supplied by operators.

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not applied to the new ones, either bythe NDMC or the MCD. Profits werederived from advertising revenue, andwith insufficient user revenue to coveroperating costs there was little incentiveto spend money on cleaning andmaintenance. Having no expertise inrunning toilet complexes, most ofthe advertising agencies hadsub-contracted this task to smallentrepreneurs. The sub-contractorswere responsible for funding andexecuting all operation and maintenancetasks, in exchange for which they werepaid between Rs. 5,000 (US$128) andRs. 15,000 (US$384) per month andallowed to retain user fee revenues. Thesub-contractors soon realized that theirservice was loss-making and so beganto cut corners in the absence of anyenforcement of their obligations by themunicipality or main contractor. Theconsequences were disastrous—someopted to minimize opening hours whileothers understood that closing thedoors was the most profitable option.

Challenges AheadMotivation to maintain the toiletcomplexes was further weakened whenit became clear that there were fewprospects for contract renewal orexpansion after 2007. NDMC officialsdeclared that there were now sufficientBOT toilets, while both the NDMC andthe MCD announced plans to bundleall of their BOT toilets into a singlecontract. Most operators knew theycould not win such a large contract andfrom then on sought to reduce theiroverheads further.

More recently, the NDMC and the MCDhave indicated their intention to makeBOT toilets free to users in future, onthe basis that provision of sanitaryfacilities is a government responsibilityand that the contractors are alreadyearning high revenues from advertising.

Lessons from theDelhi ExperienceA number of cities including Chandigarhand Jaipur have now adopted theBOT model, and Mumbai hasannounced plans to do so in the nearfuture. The Delhi experience illustratesboth the benefits and risks of this formof private sector participation andprovides some valuable lessons forinvestments elsewhere.

• The importance of financial incentives.A fundamental weakness of thecontracts awarded since 2002 is thatthere is no financial incentive to keepthe facilities operational, since all ofthe operators’ profit comes fromadvertising revenue. It is also clearthat companies are prepared toadvertise on filthy toilets provided thebuilding looks presentable externally.

• The need for monitoring andaccountability mechanisms.Whatever financial incentives are inplace, the need for monitoring andenforcement of contract conditionsis fundamental, including thetermination of contracts in thecase of serious nonperformance.Ineffective monitoring after2002 was a critical gap.

• The need to prioritize servicedelivery. Excluding technical criteriafrom the bidding process can resultin contracts being awarded toorganizations that have neither thecapacity nor motivation to fulfil thepublic service component of thelease, without which the facilitieshave no purpose.

Options forImprovingService DeliveryWhile the outcomes since 2002 havebeen disappointing, the inclusion ofadvertising rights in the contract doesat least make toilet complexesprofitable, so that cleaning andmaintenance is commercially viableas part of the total package. Thechallenge is to design and superviseBOT contracts so that the publicservice element—even if it generateslittle profit—is delivered to anacceptable standard. The followingcould help in achieving this.

Assess Local Demand BeforeDeveloping New Toilet Blocks

It may be that some complexes weresited in locations with high advertisingpotential but only limited demand fortoilets. There is evidence from otherschemes that where demand is

high, toilets can be profitable evenwithout advertising revenue(see Box 4). Local demand shouldbe a prerequisite for awarding acontract, and the size of the facilityshould be appropriate to its anticipatedlevel of use.

Revitalize Monitoring andStrengthen Accountability

Municipalities need to monitor andenforce contract compliance, butmonitoring systems are commonlyneglected and easily undermined.There are no easy answers herebut some creative options couldperhaps be explored, for example,holding an annual competition forthe best-kept toilet complex. Mediainterest would add transparencyto the process and increasemunicipal accountability, as couldsystems for consumer monitoringand feedback.

Data provided by SulabhInternational for one toilet complexin a very busy location in Delhiindicate that, above certain usagelevels, user fee revenue can exceedoperation and maintenance costs.The facility has 20 seats and sixshowers and each user pays Rs. 2(US$0.05) per visit to use them,while the urinals are free. Onaverage, 700 people per day usethe facility, producing revenues ofRs. 42,000 (US$1,074) per month(Rs. 504,000, or US$12,890, perannum). The operation andmaintenance costs are reportedas being Rs. 400,000 (US$10,230)per annum.

Box 4: Profitable ToiletComplexes

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Public Toilets in Urban India:Doing Business Differently

Many cities have now adopted the Build, Operate, and Transfer model, andsome have announced plans to do so in the near future. The Delhi experienceillustrates both the benefits and risks of this form of private sector participation.

Increase the Lease Period

With lease periods fixed at just five orseven years, operators have beenunder great pressure to recover theirinvestment quickly. Longer leaseperiods would enable them to makelonger term cost recovery plans withproper attention to maintenance of thepremises. This said, operators may feelless pressure to deliver a high qualityservice when they have the reassuranceof a long contract period—unless ofcourse they face the risk of penaltiesfor poor performance.

Review the Assignment ofResponsibilities and Revenues

The current practice of assigningfinancial responsibility for operation andmaintenance to sub-contractors isclearly not viable. It should, however,be possible to design a package wherethe sub-contractor is paid enough tocover the costs of cleaning, but notmaintenance, and is motivated to keepthe premises in good order by retainingall or a defined portion of the usercharges. The operator would then beresponsible for maintenance and repaircosts, which would be covered byadvertising revenue.

If user fees are abolished, as currentlyproposed, then it is difficult to seehow cleaning and maintenance willbe achieved. There will be no financialincentive to do it and compliancewill depend on enforcement by themunicipality, which has been very poorto date.

Review the Bidding Criteria

The dual objectives of service deliveryand advertising revenue have so farproved to be incompatible. One optionfor resolving this would be to amendthe bidding criteria for operators, for

example, giving a weighting of80 percent to operational factors and20 percent to financial aspects.

Bundle BOT Contracts

Bundling a large number of toiletcomplexes into a single contract wouldsimplify municipal administration andreduce the monitoring burden, since themunicipality could inspect a few facilitiesregularly and on that basis deal with theportfolio as a whole. Assigning all publictoilets in a city to one contractor could,however, be counter-productive since itwould eliminate competition. A set ofbundled contracts, each awarded to adifferent operator, may therefore bemore appropriate. This would also limitthe competition to larger operators and

would increase the likelihood of attractingbidders with proven competence and areputation to protect.

There may also be scope for puttinga mixture of sites into each bundledcontract so that the operator is forcedto serve some high priority locationsthat are not commercially attractive,subsidizing them with income from morelucrative sites. Again, the key would beenforcement to prevent the operator‘cherry picking sites’: maintaining theprofitable ones while neglecting the rest.There is also some thinking of initiatingthis model in low income areas. However,the applicability of this model in highdensity, low income communities,particularly in slum settlements, requiresfurther investigation.

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Water and Sanitation Program-South AsiaWorld Bank55 Lodi EstateNew Delhi 110 003India

Phone: (91-11) 24690488, 24690489Fax: (91-11) 24628250E-mail: [email protected] site: www.wsp.org

December 2007

WSP MISSION:To help the poor gain sustained accessto water and sanitation services.

WSP FUNDING PARTNERS:The Governments of Australia, Austria,Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UnitedKingdom, the United States of America;the United Nations Development Programme,The World Bank, and the Bill and MelindaGates Foundation.

AusAID provides WSP-SAprogrammatic support.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS:This field note was peer reviewed byCatherine J. Revels, Pete Kolsky, andSomnath Sen

TASK MANAGEMENT TEAM:Soma Ghosh Moulik, Sara Almqvist, andVivek Raman

PREPARED BY:Jeremy Colin and Sander Nijssen

RESEARCHED BY:Sander Nijssen

Editor: Anjali Sen GuptaPictures by: Sander NijssenCreated by: Write MediaPrinted at: PS Press Services Pvt. Ltd.

ABOUT THE SERIES

WSP Field Notes describe andanalyze projects and activities inwater and sanitation that providelessons for sector leaders,administrators, and individualstackling the water and sanitationchallenges in urban and rural areas.The criteria for selection of storiesincluded in this series are large-scaleimpact, demonstrable sustainability,good cost recovery, replicableconditions, and leadership.

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed are entirely those of the author andshould not be attributed in any manner to The World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or tomembers of its Board of Executive Directors or the companies they represent.

ConclusionThe Delhi BOT initiative has been verysuccessful in attracting private sectorinvestment in public toilets. However,the model has been less successful insecuring the delivery of high qualityservices where the contracts were notwell managed and where the selectionof sites vis-à-vis sanitation demandswas skewed. It has not found a

universal solution to the sanitationneeds of public spaces—especiallythose in poor areas—but it neverthelessprovides valuable insights into both theopportunities and challenges presentedby BOT contracts. Finding privatesector incentives to deliver high quality,affordable sanitation services remains achallenge but in this case the outcomescould be improved significantly througheffective monitoring and enforcement ofcontract conditions. This confirms that,whether services are delivered in-houseor contracted out, the role of themunicipality remains paramount.

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What impact, if any, does this information have on:

•You: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

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•Your organization: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

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•Your colleagues: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

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What are the main lesson(s) you have learnt from the information contained in this field note?

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Would you like to share any study/research similar to the information in this field note?

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Public Toilets in Urban India:Doing Business Differently

FEEDBACK FORM

5. Give up to three subjects/issues in the Water Supply and Sanitation sector that interest you and you would like toknow more about:

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ii) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

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6. Do you know anyone else who might benefit from receiving our publications?If yes, provide the following details (optional)

Name: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Designation: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Organization: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Address: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

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Phone Numbers: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

E-mail: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Area of work: Government / NGO / Private Sector / Academia / Consultant / Bilateral Agency / Dev Bank / any other

7. Please provide your particulars:

Name: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Designation: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Organization: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Address: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Phone Numbers: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

E-mail: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Area of work: Government / NGO / Private Sector / Academia / Consultant / Bilateral Agency / Dev Bank / any other

8. Indicate your area of interest:

� Water

� Sanitation

� Rural

� Urban

Water and Sanitation Program-South Asia

E-mail: [email protected] Web site: www.wsp.org

E 32 Agargaon, Sher-e-Bangla NagarDhaka 1207, BangladeshPhone: (880-2) 8159001-14Fax: (880-2) 8159029-30

20 A Shahrah-e-JamhuriatRamna 5, G-5/1Islamabad, PakistanPhone: (92-51) 2279641-46Fax: (92-51) 2826362

55 Lodi EstateNew Delhi 110 003, IndiaPhone: (91-11) 24690488-89Fax: (91-11) 24628250