Puboff Cases - June 22 and 24

8/9/2019 Puboff Cases - June 22 and 24

1/206


2/206


3/206

hereby declared NOTa citizen of thePhilippines andthereforeDISQUALIFIED fromcontinuing to serveas Mayor of BaguioCity. He is ordered toVACATE his office andsurrender the sameto the Vice-Mayor ofBaguio City once thisdecision becomesfinal and executory.

No evidence was adduced for therespondent as in fact he had noAnswer as of the hearing.

On May 5, 1992, respondent (Labo)filed his verified Answer, insistingthat he is a Filipino citizen and

continue to maintain and preservehis Filipino citizenship; that he doesnot hold an Australian citizenship;that the doctrine ofres judicatadoes not apply in citizenship; andthat "existing facts support hiscontinuous maintenance andholding of Philippine citizenship"and "supervening events nowpreclude the application of theruling in the Labo v. Comelec caseand the respondent (Labo) nowhold and enjoys Philippine

citizenship.

No evidence has been offered byrespondent to show what theseexisting facts and superveningevents are to preclude theapplication of the Labo decision.(emphasis supplied)

The Commission is bound by thefinal declaration that respondent isnot a Filipino citizen. Consequently,respondent's verified statement in

his certificate of candidacy that heis a "natural-born" Filipino citizen isa false material representation."(Rollo, pp. 45-48; GR No. 105111)

Up to this moment, petitioner Labo still failed tosubmit a scintilla of proof to shore his claimbefore this Court that he has indeed reacquiredhis Philippine citizenship.

Instead, petitioner relies in the US case ofVancev. Terrazas (supra). Suffice it to state that

petitioner has already pleaded Vance in hismotion for reconsideration in Labo v. Comelec(supra; Rollo, p. 375). Having been previouslypassed upon, the Court sees no pressing need tore-examine the same and make a lengthydissertation thereon.

At any rate, the fact remains that he has notsubmitted in the instant case any evidence, if

there be any, to prove his reacquisition ofPhilippine citizenship either before this Court orthe Comelec. On this score alone, We find nograve abuse of discretion committed byrespondent Comelec in cancelling his (Labo's)certificate of candidacy and declaring that he isNOT a Filipino citizen pursuant to our ruling in the1989 case ofLabo v. Comelec (supra).

Petitioner Labo claims, however, that Sec. 72 2ofthe Omnibus Election Code "operates as alegislatively mandated special repatriationproceeding" and that it allows his proclamation as

the winning candidate since the resolutiondisqualifying him was not yet final at the time theelection was held.

The Court finds petitioner Labo's strainedargument quixotic and untenable. In the firstplace, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code hasalready been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646,to wit:

Sec. 6. Effect of DisqualificationCase. Any candidate who hasbeen declared by final judgment to

be disqualified shall not be votedfor, and the votes cast for him shallnot be counted. If for any reason acandidate is not declared by final

judgment before an election to bedisqualified and he is voted for andreceives the winning number ofvotes in such election, the Court orthe Commission shall continue withthe trial and hearing of the action,inquiry, or protestand, upon motionof the complainant or anyintervenor, may during the

pendency thereof order thesuspension of the proclamation ofsuch candidate whenever theevidence of his guilt is strong.(emphasis supplied)

A perusal of the above provision would readilydisclose that the Comelec can legally suspend theproclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception ofthe winning number of votes notwithstanding,especially so where, as in this case. Labo failed topresent any evidence before the Comelec to


4/206

support his claim of reacquisition of Philippinecitizenship.

Furthermore, we need only to reiterate what wehave stated in Labo v. Comelec (supra), viz.,:

Under CA No. 63, as amended byP.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenshipmay be reacquired by a direct act

of Congress, by naturalization, or byrepatriation. It does not appear inthe record, nor does the petitionerclaim, that he has reacquiredPhilippine citizenship by any ofthese methods. He does not pointto any judicial decree ofnaturalization or to any statutedirectly conferring Philippinecitizenship upon him. . . .

Petitioner Labo's status has not changed in thecase at bar. To reiterate, he (Labo) was

disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. Hiselection does not automatically restore hisPhilippine citizenship, the possession of which isan indispensable requirement for holding publicoffice (Sec. 39, Local Government Code).

Still, petitioner takes pains in raising a newargument not litigated before the respondentComelec. Petitioner claims that he has reacquiredhis Filipino citizenship by citing his application forreacquisition of Philippine citizenship filed beforethe Office of the Solicitor General pursuant to PD725 and Letter of Instruction No. 270 3(Rollo, pp.

116-119; G.R. No. 105111).

To date, however, and despite favorablerecommendation by the Solicitor General, theSpecial Committee on Naturalization had yetacted upon said application for repatriation.Indeed, such fact is even admitted petitioner. Inthe absence of any official action or approval bythe proper authorities, a mere application forrepratriation, does not, and cannot, amount to anautomatic reacquisition of the applicant'sPhilippine citizenship.

II. GR No. 105384

Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court didnot issue a temporary restraining order as regardsthe May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comeleccancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy, saidresolution has already become final andexecutory. Ortega further posits the view that asa result of such finality, the candidate receivingthe next highest number of votes should bedeclared Mayor of Baguio City.

We agree with Ortega's first proposition.

At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition (GRNo. 105111) on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his(Labo's) certificate of candidacy had alreadybecome final and executory a day earlier, or onMay 14, 1992, said resolution having beenreceived by petitioner Labo on the same day it

was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in theinterim no restraining order was issued by thisCourt.

Thus, Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Codeprovides:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due courseor to cancel a certificate ofcandidacy

xxx xxx xxx

(e) The decision, order, or ruling ofthe Commission shall, after five (5)days from receiptof a copy thereofby the parties, be final andexecutory unless stayed by theSupreme Court. (emphasissupplied)

A similar provision is also found in Sec. 3, Rule 39of the Comelec Rules of procedure, to wit:

Sec. 3. Decisions final after five

days. Decisions inpre-proclamation cases andpetitions to deny due course to orcancel certificates of candidacy, todeclare a candidate as nuisancecandidate or to disqualify acandidate, and to postpone orsuspend elections shall becomefinal and executory after the lapseof five (5) days from their

promulgation, unless restrained bythe Supreme Court. (emphasissupplied)

The resolution cancelling Labo's certificate ofcandidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipinocitizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992constrains Us to rule against his proclamation asMayor of Baguio City.

To begin with, one of the qualifications of anelective official is that he must be a citizen of thePhilippines. Thus, the Local Government Codeprovides:


5/206

Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a)Anelective local official must be acitizen of the Philippines; aregistered voter in the barangay,municipality, city, or province or, inthe case of a member of thesangguniang panlalawigan,sangguniang panlungsod,sangguniang bayan, the districtwhere he intends to be elected; aresident therein for at least one (1)year immediately preceding theday of the election; and able toread and write Filipino or any otherlocal language or dialect. (emphasissupplied)

Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipinocitizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for thecontested office. Philippine citizenship is anindispensable requirement for holding an electiveoffice. As mandated by law: "An elective local

official must be a citizen of the Philippines."

The issue here is citizenship and/or Labo'salienage the very essence which strikes at thevery core of petitioner Labo's qualification toassume the contested office, he being an alienand not a Filipino citizen. The fact that he waselected by the majority of the electorate is of nomoment. As we have held in Frivaldo v.Commission on Elections (174 SCRA 245 [1989]):

. . . The fact that he was elected bythe people of Sorsogon does not

excuse this patent violation of thesalutary rule limiting public officeand employment only to thecitizens of this country. Thequalifications prescribed forelective office cannot be erased bythe electorate alone. The will of thepeople as expressed through theballot cannot cure the vice ofineligibility, especially if theymistakenly believed, as in this case,that the candidate was qualified.Obviously, this rule requires strict

application when the deficiency islack of citizenship. If a person seeksto serve in the Republic of thePhilippines, he must owe his totalloyalty to this country only, abjuringand renouncing all fealty andfidelity to any other state.

This brings us to the second issue raised bypetitioner Ortega, i.e., whether the disqualificationof petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega)receiving the next highest number of votes to be

proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor ofBaguio City.

We hold in the negative. The disqualification ofpetitioner Labo does not necessarily entitlepetitioner Ortega as the candidate with the nexthighest number of votes to proclamation as theMayor of Baguio City.

We make mention of petitioner Ortega because inhis petition, he alleges that:

. . . the May 11, 1992 electionswere held with both hereinpetitioner (Roberto Ortega) andrespondent LABO having beenvoted for the position of Mayor andunofficial results indicate that if thename of respondent LABO weredeleted from the list of candidates,herein petitioner (Ortega) will beentitled to be proclaimed as Mayor-

elect of Baguio City. (Rollo, p. 7, GRNo. 105384; emphasis supplied)

and further prays this Court "to proclaim as theMayor-elect of Baguio City the candidate who mayhave garnered the most number of votes after theexclusion of the name of respondent candidateLABO." (Rollo, p. 15, Ibid.) Implicit, therefore, ispetitioner Ortega's desire to be proclaimed Mayor-elect of Baguio City.

As discussed hereunder, however, the Court findsOrtega's prayer devoid of merit.

While Ortega may have garnered the secondhighest number of votes for the office of citymayor, the fact remains that he was not thechoice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo wasoverwhelmingly voted by the electorate for theoffice of mayor in the belief that he was thenqualified to serve the people of Baguio City andhis subsequent disqualification does not makerespondent Ortega the mayor-elect. This is theimport of the recent case ofAbella v. Comelec(201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:

While it is true that SPC No. 88-546was originally a petition to denydue course to the certificate ofcandidacy of Larrazabal and wasfiled before Larrazabal could be

proclaimed, the fact remains thatthe local elections of Feb. 1, 1988 inthe province of Leyte proceededwith Larrazabal considered as abona fide candidate. The voters ofthe province voted for her in thesincere belief that she was a


6/206

qualified candidate for the positionof governor. Her votes was countedand she obtained the highestnumber of votes. The net effect isthat petitioner lost in the election.He was repudiated by theelectorate. . . . What matters is thatin the event a candidate for anelected position who is voted forand who obtains the highestnumber of votes is disqualified fornot possessing the eligibilityrequirements at the time of theelection as provided by law, thecandidate who obtains the secondhighest number of votes for thesame position cannot assume thevacated position. (emphasissupplied)

Our ruling inAbella applies squarely to the case atbar and we see no compelling reason to depart

therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost inthe election. He was repudiated by the electorate.He was obviously not the choice of the people ofBaguio City.

Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111)originally filed a disqualification case with theComelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking todeny due course to petitioner's (Labo's)candidacy, the same did not deter the people ofBaguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who,by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelecto be voted upon, the resolution for his

disqualification having yet to attain the degree offinality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code).

And in the earlier case ofLabo v. Comelec(supra), We held:

Finally, there is the question ofwhether or not the privaterespondent, who filed the quowarranto petition, can replace thepetitioner as mayor. He cannot. Thesimple reason is that as heobtained only the second highest

number of votes in the election, hewas obviously not the choice of thepeople of Baguio City.

The latest ruling of the Court in thisissue is Santos v. Commission onElection, (137 SCRA 740) decided in1985. In that case, the candidatewho placed second was proclaimedelected after the votes for hiswinning rival, who was disqualifiedas a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as

stray. In effect, the second placerwon by default. That decision wassupported by eight members of theCourt then (Cuevas,J., ponente,with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr.,Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente,Alampay, and AquinoJJ.,concurring) with three dissenting(Teehankee, acting C.J., AbadSantos and Melencio-Herrera) andanother two reserving their votes(Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.). One wason official leave (Fernando, C.J.)

Re-examining that decision, theCourt finds, and so holds, that itshould be reversed in favor of theearlier case of Geronimo v. Santos(136 SCRA 435), which representsthe more logical and democraticrule. That case, which reiteratedthe doctrine first announced in

1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes (23Phil. 238) was supported by tenmembers of the Court (Gutierrez,

Jr., J., ponente, with Teehankee,Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera,Plana, Escolin, Relova, De laFuente, Cuevas and Alampay,JJ.,concurring), without anydissent, . . . . There the Court held:

. . . it would beextremely repugnantto the basic concept

of the constitutionallyguaranteed right tosuffrage if acandidate who hasnot acquired themajority or pluralityof votes isproclaimed a winnerand imposed as therepresentative of aconstituency, themajority of whichhave positively

declared throughtheir ballots that theydid not choose him.

Sound policy dictatesthat public electiveoffices are filled bythose who havereceived the highestnumber of votes castin the election forthat office, and it is afundamental idea in


7/206

all republican formsof government thatno one can bedeclared elected andno measure can bedeclared carriedunless he or itreceives a majority orplurality of the legalvotes cast in theelection. (20 Corpus

Juris 2nd, S 243, p.676)

The fact that acandidate whoobtained the highestnumber of votes islater declared to bedisqualified or noteligible for the officeto which he was

elected does notnecessarily entitlethe candidate whoobtained the secondhighest number ofvotes to be declaredthe winner of theelective office. Thevotes cast for a dead,disqualified, or non-eligible person maybe valid to vote thewinner into office ormaintain him there.However, in theabsence of a statutewhich clearly assertsa contrary politicaland legislative policyon the matter, if thevotes were cast inthe sincere belief thatthat candidate wasalive, qualified, oreligible, they shouldnot be treated asstray, void ormeaningless.

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of acandidate receiving majority votes does notentitle the eligible candidate receiving the nexthighest number of votes to be declared elected. Aminority or defeated candidate cannot be deemedelected to the office.

Indeed, this has been the rule in the United Statessince 1849 (State ex rel. Dunning v. Giles, 52 Am.Dec. 149).

It is therefore incorrect to argue that since acandidate has been disqualified, the votesintended for the disqualified candidate should, ineffect, be considered null and void. This wouldamount to disenfranchising the electorate inwhom sovereignty resides. At the risk of beingrepetitious, the people of Baguio City opted toelect petitioner Labo bona fide, without anyintention to misapply their franchise, and in thehonest belief that Labo was then qualified to bethe person to whom they would entrust theexercise of the powers of the government.Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to bedisqualified and cannot assume the office.

Whether or not the candidate whom the majorityvoted for can or cannot be installed, under nocircumstances can a minority or defeatedcandidate be deemed elected to the office.Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortegais not a larger number than the 27,471 votes castfor petitioner Labo (as certified by the Election

Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; GR No.105111).

The rule would have been different if theelectorate fully aware in fact and in law of acandidate's disqualification so as to bring suchawareness within the realm of notoriety, wouldnonetheless cast their votes in favor of theineligible candidate. In such case, the electoratemay be said to have waived the validity andefficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplyingtheir franchise or throwing away their votes, inwhich case, the eligible candidate obtaining the

next higher number of votes may be deemedelected.

But this is not the situation obtaining in theinstant dispute. It has not been shown, and nonewas alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriouslyknown as an ineligible candidate, much less theelectorate as having known of such fact. On thecontrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by noless than the Comelec itself in its resolution datedMay 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the citymayor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate

of candidacy had not yet become final and subjectto the final outcome of this case.

As aforesaid, the ineligibility of a candidatereceiving majority votes does not entitle thecandidate receiving the next highest number ofvotes to be declared elected. Ortega failed tosatisfy the necessary requisite of winning theelection either by a majority or mere plurality ofvotes sufficient to elevate him in public office asmayor of Baguio City. Having lost in the electionfor mayor, petitioner Ortega was obviously not thechoice of the people of Baguio City.


8/206

As a consequence of petitioners' ineligibility, apermanent vacancy in the contested office hasoccurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor, in accordance with Sec. 44 of the LocalGovernment Code, to wit:

Chapter 2. Vacancies andSuccession

Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies inthe Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occursin the office of the governor ormayor, the vice-governor or thevice-mayor concerned shall becomethe governor or mayor. . . .(emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSEDfor lack of merit. Petitioners both being ineligiblefor the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City and

in view of the vacancy created in said office, thevice-mayor elect of said city in the May 11, 1992elections is hereby declared Mayor of Baguio Cityafter proclamation by the City Board ofCanvassers. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.: concurring and dissenting

There is no need for me to discuss Mayor RamonL. Labo, Jr.'s reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.In the first case brought to us, Labo, Jr. v.COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 [1989], I dissented fromthe resolution denying his motion forreconsideration.

It is my view that since Mayor Labo never validlyacquired Australian citizenship, he never lost hisPhilippine citizenship. His oath of allegiance toAustralia was null and void because he was notqualified to be an Australian citizen. This is clearfrom the certification of Australia's Embassy

officials. To me, a null and void act cannot havethe positive and serious effect of stripping aFilipino of his natural-born citizenship.

Labo's taking an oath as citizen of a foreigncountry was based on his marriage to a citizen ofthat country. It turns out, however, that Labo'smarriage was bigamous and void because hisAustralian wife had an existing valid marriage

when she tied the knot with him. Not beingmarried to her, Labo could not become anAustralian. Not being qualified to become anAustralian citizen, his oath of allegiance to thatcountry was meaningless act. It should notdeprive him of his Philippine citizenship. I cannotbelieve that Mayor Labo gave up his citizenship inorder to acquire a stateless status.

I, however, concur in the Court's reiteration of therule that it is thevice-mayor elect who succeeds the disqualifiedmayor-elect and not the losing candidate for

mayor.

I have to be consistent with my ponencia inGeronima v. Santos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985]. TheGeronimo ruling is even more applicable to thiscase because on May 11, 1992, the day of theelections, Labo was not yet disqualified. He wasallowed to vote and to be voted for. The COMELECdecision disqualifying him became final andexecutory only on May 14, 1992. In the meantime,the citizens of Baguio had already stated who wastheir choice for Mayor. He had already beenelected.

I would like to repeat some observations made inmy dissent in the first Labo case:

xxx xxx xxx

I agree with the Court that thecitizen of the Philippines must takepride in his status as such andcherish this priceless gift that, outof more than a hundred othernationalities, God has seen fit togrant it to him. We love thePhilippines; it is the land of ourbirth; it is the home of our people.

The emotions kindled by love ofcountry cannot be described.

But precisely because of theinestimable value of Philippinecitizenship, we should neverdeclare a Filipino as having lost hiscitizenship except upon the mostcompelling consideration.


9/206

Let us be realistic. There must beover two million Filipinos who arescattered all over the worlddesperately trying to earn a living.

They endure loneliness andseparation from loved ones, bearwith racial discrimination, sufferrape and other forms of abuse,brave the perils of foreign cultures,and put up with the failings of theirown Government in looking aftertheir welfare. Being in foreigncountries, most of them yearn fortheir homeland and realize whatthey have lost. Only now do theyappreciate what they used to takefor granted.

If some of them may have beenforced by circumstances toseemingly renounce theircitizenship, let us not summarily

condemn them.

xxx xxx xxx

Citizenship is a political and civil right no lessimportant than freedom of speech, liberty ofabode, right against unreasonable searches andseizures, and other basic guarantees of the Bill ofRights.

In deciding cases involving citizenship, I believethat the presumptions should be in favor of itsretention and against its loss. We apply this

principle to cases involving civil liberties. Weshould also apply it to a sincere invocation ofPhilippine citizenship. We should not lightly strip aperson of his natural born status but shouldaccord to him every possible interpretationconsistent with the exercise of a right that wasvested in him from birth.

In view of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT thepetition and to order the proclamation andassumption of office of Baguio Mayor RamonLabo, Jr.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.: concurring and dissenting

There is no need for me to discuss Mayor RamonL. Labo, Jr.'s reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.In the first case brought to us, Labo, Jr. v.COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 [1989], I dissented fromthe resolution denying his motion forreconsideration.

It is my view that since Mayor Labo never validlyacquired Australian citizenship, he never lost hisPhilippine citizenship. His oath of allegiance toAustralia was null and void because he was notqualified to be an Australian citizen. This is clearfrom the certification of Australia's Embassyofficials. To me, a null and void act cannot havethe positive and serious effect of stripping aFilipino of his natural-born citizenship.

Labo's taking an oath as citizen of a foreigncountry was based on his marriage to a citizen ofthat country. It turns out, however, that Labo'smarriage was bigamous and void because hisAustralian wife had an existing valid marriagewhen she tied the knot with him. Not beingmarried to her, Labo could not become anAustralian. Not being qualified to become anAustralian citizen, his oath of allegiance to thatcountry was meaningless act. It should notdeprive him of his Philippine citizenship. I cannotbelieve that Mayor Labo gave up his citizenship in

order to acquire a stateless status.

I, however, concur in the Court's reiteration of therule that it is thevice-mayor elect who succeeds the disqualifiedmayor-elect and not the losing candidate formayor.

I have to be consistent with my ponencia inGeronima v. Santos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985]. TheGeronimo ruling is even more applicable to thiscase because on May 11, 1992, the day of theelections, Labo was not yet disqualified. He was

allowed to vote and to be voted for. The COMELECdecision disqualifying him became final andexecutory only on May 14, 1992. In the meantime,the citizens of Baguio had already stated who wastheir choice for Mayor. He had already beenelected.

I would like to repeat some observations made inmy dissent in the first Labo case:

xxx xxx xxx

I agree with the Court that thecitizen of the Philippines must takepride in his status as such andcherish this priceless gift that, outof more than a hundred othernationalities, God has seen fit togrant it to him. We love thePhilippines; it is the land of ourbirth; it is the home of our people.

The emotions kindled by love ofcountry cannot be described.


10/206

But precisely because of theinestimable value of Philippinecitizenship, we should neverdeclare a Filipino as having lost hiscitizenship except upon the mostcompelling consideration.

Let us be realistic. There must beover two million Filipinos who are

scattered all over the worlddesperately trying to earn a living.They endure loneliness andseparation from loved ones, bearwith racial discrimination, sufferrape and other forms of abuse,brave the perils of foreign cultures,and put up with the failings of theirown Government in looking aftertheir welfare. Being in foreigncountries, most of them yearn fortheir homeland and realize whatthey have lost. Only now do they

appreciate what they used to takefor granted.

If some of them may have beenforced by circumstances toseemingly renounce theircitizenship, let us not summarilycondemn them.

xxx xxx xxx

Citizenship is a political and civil right no lessimportant than freedom of speech, liberty of

abode, right against unreasonable searches andseizures, and other basic guarantees of the Bill ofRights.

In deciding cases involving citizenship, I believethat the presumptions should be in favor of itsretention and against its loss. We apply thisprinciple to cases involving civil liberties. Weshould also apply it to a sincere invocation ofPhilippine citizenship. We should not lightly strip aperson of his natural born status but shouldaccord to him every possible interpretationconsistent with the exercise of a right that was

vested in him from birth.

In view of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT thepetition and to order the proclamation andassumption of office of Baguio Mayor RamonLabo, Jr.

Footnotes

1 The first time was in Ramon L.Labo, Jr., v. Comelec (176 SCRA 1[1989])

2 Sec. 72. Effects of disqualificationcases and priority. TheCommission and the courts shallgive priority to cases ofdisqualification by reason ofviolation of this Act to the end thata final decision shall be renderednot later than seven days beforethe election in which thedisqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has beendeclared by final judgment to bedisqualified shall not be voted for,and the votes cast for him shall notbe counted. Nevertheless, if for anyreason, a candidate is not declaredby final judgment before an electionto be disqualified and he is votedfor and receives the winningnumber of votes in such election,his violation of the provisions of the

preceding sections shall notprevent his proclamation andassumption to office.

3 PD 725 authorizes the SpecialCommittee on Naturalization(created under LOI 270) to acceptand process petitions forrepatriation, as follows: (1) Filipinowomen who lost their Philippinecitizenship by marriage to aliens:and (2) natural born Filipinos whohave lost their Philippine citizenship

may reacquire Philippine citizenshipthrough repratriation by applyingwith the Special Committee onNaturalization by applying with theSpecial Committee onNaturalization created by Letter ofInstruction No. 270, and, if theirapplications are approved, takingthe necessary oath of allegiance tothe Republic of the Philippines,after which they shall be deemed tohave reacquired Philippinecitizenship. The Commission on

Immigration shall thereupon cancelcertificate of registration.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995


11/206


12/206

However, such bill did not pass theSenate. Having failed on suchmoves, petitioner now filed theinstant petition for the sameobjective, as it is obvious that he isafraid to submit along withrespondent for the judgment andverdict of the electorate of the FirstDistrict of Leyte in an honest,orderly, peaceful, free and cleanelections on May 8, 1995. 12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of theCommission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) findingprivate respondent's Petition for Disqualificationin SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking offpetitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate ofCandidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) cancelingher original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealingwith two primary issues, namely, the validity ofamending the original Certificate of Candidacy

after the lapse of the deadline for filingcertificates of candidacy, and petitioner'scompliance with the one year residencyrequirement, the Second Division held:

Respondent raised the affirmativedefense in her Answer that theprinted word "Seven" (months) wasa result of an "honestmisinterpretation or honestmistake" on her part and, therefore,an amendment shouldsubsequently be allowed. She

averred that she thought that whatwas asked was her "actual andphysical" presence in Tolosa andnot residence of origin or domicilein the First Legislative District, towhich she could have responded"since childhood." In anaccompanying affidavit, she statedthat her domicile is Tacloban City, acomponent of the First District, towhich she always intended toreturn whenever absent and whichshe has never abandoned.

Furthermore, in her memorandum,she tried to discredit petitioner'stheory of disqualification byalleging that she has been aresident of the First LegislativeDistrict of Leyte since childhood,although she only became aresident of the Municipality of

Tolosa for seven months. Sheasserts that she has always been aresident of Tacloban City, acomponent of the First District,

before coming to the Municipality ofTolosa.

Along this point, it is interesting tonote that prior to her registration in

Tolosa, respondent announced thatshe would be registering in

Tacloban City so that she can be acandidate for the District. However,

this intention was rebuffed whenpetitioner wrote the Election Officerof Tacloban not to allow respondentsince she is a resident of Tolosa andnot Tacloban. She never disputedthis claim and instead implicitlyacceded to it by registering in

Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent'sclaim of "honest misinterpretationor honest mistake." Besides, theCertificate of Candidacy only asks

for RESIDENCE. Since on the basisof her Answer, she was quite awareof "residence of origin" which sheinterprets to be Tacloban City, it iscurious why she did not cite

Tacloban City in her Certificate ofCandidacy. Her explanation thatshe thought what was asked washer actual and physical presence in

Tolosa is not easy to believebecause there is none in thequestion that insinuates about

Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the

Certificate of Candidacy speaksclearly of "Residency in theCONSTITUENCYwhere I seek to beelected immediately preceding theelection." Thus, the explanation ofrespondent fails to be persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent'sdefense of an honest mistake ormisinterpretation, therefore, isdevoid of merit.

To further buttress respondent's

contention that an amendment maybe made, she cited the case of

Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957).The reliance of respondent on thecase of Alialy is misplaced. Thecase only applies to the"inconsequential deviations whichcannot affect the result of theelection, or deviations fromprovisions intended primarily tosecure timely and orderly conductof elections." The Supreme Court inthat case considered the


13/206


14/206

Manila. She could not have servedthese positions if she had not beena resident of the City of Manila.Furthermore, when she filed hercertificate of candidacy for theoffice of the President in 1992, sheclaimed to be a resident of San

Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter offact on August 24, 1994,respondent wrote a letter with theelection officer of San Juan, MetroManila requesting for thecancellation of her registration inthe permanent list of voters thatshe may be re-registered ortransferred to Barangay Olot,

Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifestthat she could not have been aresident of Tacloban City sincechildhood up to the time she filedher certificate of candidacy becauseshe became a resident of manyplaces, including Metro Manila. Thisdebunks her claim that prior to herresidence in Tolosa, Leyte, she wasa resident of the First LegislativeDistrict of Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent's conductreveals her lack of intention tomake Tacloban her domicile. Sheregistered as a voter in differentplaces and on several occasionsdeclared that she was a resident ofManila. Although she spent herschool days in Tacloban, she isconsidered to have abandoned suchplace when she chose to stay andreside in other different places. Inthe case ofRomualdez vs. RTC (226SCRA 408) the Court explained howone acquires a new domicile bychoice. There must concur: (1)residence or bodily presence in thenew locality; (2) intention to remainthere; and (3) intention to abandonthe old domicile. In other wordsthere must basically be animusmanendi with animus nonrevertendi. When respondent choseto stay in Ilocos and later on inManila, coupled with her intentionto stay there by registering as avoter there and expressly declaringthat she is a resident of that place,she is deemed to have abandoned

Tacloban City, where she spent herchildhood and school days, as herplace of domicile.

Pure intention to reside in thatplace is not sufficient, there mustlikewise be conduct indicative ofsuch intention. Respondent'sstatements to the effect that shehas always intended to return to

Tacloban, without theaccompanying conduct to provethat intention, is not conclusive ofher choice of residence.Respondent has not presented anyevidence to show that her conduct,one year prior the election, showedintention to reside in Tacloban.Worse, what was evident was thatprior to her residence in Tolosa, shehad been a resident of Manila.

It is evident from thesecircumstances that she was not aresident of the First District of Leyte"since childhood."

To further support the assertionthat she could have not been aresident of the First District of Leytefor more than one year, petitionercorrectly pointed out that on

January 28, 1995 respondentregistered as a voter at precinct No.18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doingso, she placed in her VoterRegistration Record that sheresided in the municipality of Tolosafor a period of six months. This may

be inconsequential as argued bythe respondent since it refers onlyto her residence in Tolosa, Leyte.But her failure to prove that shewas a resident of the First District ofLeyte prior to her residence in

Tolosa leaves nothing but aconvincing proof that she had beena resident of the district for sixmonths only. 15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied

petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration16

of theApril 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her notqualified to run for the position of Member of theHouse of Representatives for the First LegislativeDistrict of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:

After deliberating on the Motion forReconsideration, the CommissionRESOLVED to DENY it, no newsubstantial matters having beenraised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution


15/206

granting the petition fordisqualification. 18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued aResolution allowing petitioner's proclamationshould the results of the canvass show that sheobtained the highest number of votes in thecongressional elections in the First District ofLeyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC

reversed itself and issued a second Resolutiondirecting that the proclamation of petitioner besuspended in the event that she obtains thehighest number of votes. 19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995,petitioner averred that she was the overwhelmingwinner of the elections for the congressional seatin the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995based on the canvass completed by the ProvincialBoard of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioneralleged that the canvass showed that sheobtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the

36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. Acopy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexedto the Supplemental Petition.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifyingpetitioner from running for the congressional seatof the First District of Leyte and the publicrespondent's Resolution suspending herproclamation, petitioner comes to this court forrelief.

Petitioner raises several issues in her Original andSupplemental Petitions. The principal issues may

be classified into two general areas:

I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was aresident, for election purposes, ofthe First District of Leyte for aperiod of one year at the time ofthe May 9, 1995 elections.

II. The Jurisdictional Issue

a) Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELECproperly exercised its jurisdiction indisqualifying petitioner outside theperiod mandated by the OmnibusElection Code for disqualificationcases under Article 78 of the saidCode.

b) After the Elections

Whether or not the House ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunalassumed exclusive jurisdiction overthe question of petitioner'squalifications after the May 8, 1995elections.

I. Petitioner's qualification

A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC'sSecond Division reveals a startling confusion inthe application of settled concepts of "Domicile"and "Residence" in election law. While theCOMELEC seems to be in agreement with thegeneral proposition that for the purposes ofelection law, residence is synonymous withdomicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency tosubstitute or mistake the concept of domicile foractual residence, a conception not intended forthe purpose of determining a candidate'squalifications for election to the House ofRepresentatives as required by the 1987

Constitution. As it were, residence, for thepurpose of meeting the qualification for anelective position, has a settled meaning in our

jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or theexercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civilobligations, the domicile of natural persons istheir place of habitual residence." In Ong vs.Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicileto mean an individual's "permanent home", "aplace to which, whenever absent for business orfor pleasure, one intends to return, and depends

on facts and circumstances in the sense that theydisclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing,domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact ofresiding or physical presence in a fixed place" andanimus manendi, or the intention of returningthere permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies thefactual relationship of an individual to a certainplace. It is the physical presence of a person in agiven area, community or country. The essentialdistinction between residence and domicile in lawis that residence involves the intent to leave when

the purpose for which the resident has taken uphis abode ends. One may seek a place forpurposes such as pleasure, business, or health. Ifa person's intent be to remain, it becomes hisdomicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as hispurpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus,quite perfectly normal for an individual to havedifferent residences in various places. However, aperson can only have a single domicile, unless, forvarious reasons, he successfully abandons hisdomicile in favor of another domicile of choice. InUytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinctionquite clearly:


16/206

There is a difference betweendomicile and residence."Residence" is used to indicate aplace of abode, whether permanentor temporary; "domicile" denotes afixed permanent residence towhich, when absent, one has theintention of returning. A man mayhave a residence in one place and adomicile in another. Residence isnot domicile, but domicile isresidence coupled with theintention to remain for an unlimitedtime. A man can have but onedomicile for the same purpose atany time, but he may havenumerous places of residence. Hisplace of residence is generally hisplace of domicile, but it is not byany means necessarily so since nolength of residence withoutintention of remaining willconstitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residenceand domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteriaof political laws. As these concepts have evolvedin our election law, what has clearly andunequivocally emerged is the fact that residencefor election purposes is used synonymously withdomicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "theterm residence. . . is synonymous with domicilewhich imports not only intention to reside in a

fixed place, but also personal presence in thatplace, coupled with conduct indicative of suchintention." 25Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated thesame doctrine in a case involving thequalifications of the respondent therein to thepost of Municipal President of Dumaguete, NegrosOriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that theabsence from residence to pursue studies orpractice a profession or registration as a voterother than in the place where one is elected doesnot constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled isthe concept (of domicile) in our election law thatin these and other election law cases, this Court

has stated that the mere absence of an individualfrom his permanent residence without theintention to abandon it does not result in a loss orchange of domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on theresidence qualification for certain electivepositions have placed beyond doubt the principlethat when the Constitution speaks of "residence"in election law, it actually means only "domicile"to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section5, I remember that in the 1971Constitutional Convention, therewas an attempt to requireresidence in the place not less thanone year immediately precedingthe day of the elections. So myquestion is: What is theCommittee's concept of residenceof a candidate for the legislature? Isit actual residence or is it theconcept of domicile or constructiveresidence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President,insofar as the regular members ofthe National Assembly areconcerned, the proposed sectionmerely provides, among others,"and a resident thereof", that is, inthe district for a period of not lessthan one year preceding the day of

the election. This was in effect liftedfrom the 1973 Constitution, theinterpretation given to it wasdomicile. 29

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The nextquestion is on Section 7, page 2. Ithink Commissioner Nolledo hasraised the same point that"resident" has been interpreted attimes as a matter of intention

rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, wouldthe gentleman consider at theproper time to go back to actualresidence rather than mereintention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we mightencounter some difficulty especiallyconsidering that a provision in theConstitution in the Article onSuffrage says that Filipinos livingabroad may vote as enacted bylaw. So, we have to stick to theoriginal concept that it should be bydomicile and not physicalresidence. 30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House ofRepresentatives, 31 this Court concluded that theframers of the 1987 Constitution obviouslyadhered to the definition given to the term


17/206

residence in election law, regarding it as havingthe same meaning as domicile. 32

In the light of the principles just discussed, haspetitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied theresidency requirement mandated by Article VI,Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of whatsignificance is the questioned entry in petitioner'sCertificate of Candidacy stating her residence in

the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7)months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in acertificate of candidacy which ought to bedecisive in determining whether or not andindividual has satisfied the constitution'sresidency qualification requirement. The saidstatement becomes material only when there is orappears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwiserender a candidate ineligible. It would be plainlyridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and

knowingly make a statement in a certificate ofcandidacy which would lead to his or herdisqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitionermerely committed an honest mistake in jottingthe word "seven" in the space provided for theresidency qualification requirement. Thecircumstances leading to her filing the questionedentry obviously resulted in the subsequentconfusion which prompted petitioner to writedown the period of her actual stay in Tolosa,Leyte instead of her period of residence in the

First district, which was "since childhood" in thespace provided. These circumstances and eventsare amply detailed in the COMELEC's SecondDivision's questioned resolution, albeit with adifferent interpretation. For instance, when hereinpetitioner announced that she would beregistering in Tacloban City to make her eligibleto run in the First District, private respondentMontejo opposed the same, claiming thatpetitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not TaclobanCity. Petitioner then registered in her place ofactual residence in the First District, which is

Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently

noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. Aclose look at said certificate would reveal thepossible source of the confusion: the entry forresidence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately bythe entry for residence in the constituency wherea candidate seeks election thus:

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address):Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FORELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot,Tolosa, Leyte

8. RESIDENCE IN THECONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TOBE ELECTED IMMEDIATELYPRECEDING THEELECTION:_________ Years andSeven Months.

Having been forced by private respondent toregister in her place of actual residence in Leyte

instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appearsthat petitioner had jotted down her period of stayin her legal residence or domicile. The

juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 thefirst requiring actual residence and the secondrequiring domicile coupled with thecircumstances surrounding petitioner'sregistration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led toher writing down an unintended entry for whichshe could be disqualified. This honest mistakeshould not, however, be allowed to negate thefact of residence in the First District if such factwere established by means more convincing than

a mere entry on a piece of paper.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner'sdomicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner'sdomicile could not possibly be in the First Districtof Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, inits assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintainsthat "except for the time when (petitioner)studied and worked for some years aftergraduation in Tacloban City, she continuouslylived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites

certain facts as indicative of the fact thatpetitioner's domicile ought to be any place whereshe lived in the last few decades except Tacloban,Leyte. First, according to the Resolution,petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, MetroManila where she was also registered voter. Then,in 1965, following the election of her husband tothe Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel,Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 andthereafter, she served as a member of theBatasang Pambansa and Governor of MetroManila. "She could not, have served thesepositions if she had not been a resident of Metro

Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where theconfusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that anindividual does not lose his domicile even if hehas lived and maintained residences in differentplaces. Residence, it bears repeating, implies afactual relationship to a given place for variouspurposes. The absence from legal residence ordomicile to pursue a profession, to study or to doother things of a temporary or semi-permanentnature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus,the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not


18/206

have been a resident of Tacloban City sincechildhood up to the time she filed her certificateof candidacy because she became a resident ofmany places" flies in the face of settled

jurisprudence in which this Court carefully madedistinctions between (actual) residence anddomicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs.Teves, 33supra, we stressed:

[T]his court is of the opinion and soholds that a person who has hisown house wherein he lives with hisfamily in a municipality withouthaving ever had the intention ofabandoning it, and without havinglived either alone or with his familyin another municipality, has hisresidence in the formermunicipality, notwithstanding hishaving registered as an elector inthe other municipality in questionand having been a candidate for

various insular and provincialpositions, stating every time that heis a resident of the lattermunicipality.

More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 Weexplained that:

A citizen may leave the place of hisbirth to look for "greener pastures,"as the saying goes, to improve hislot, and that, of course includesstudy in other places, practice of his

avocation, or engaging in business.When an election is to be held, thecitizen who left his birthplace toimprove his lot may desire to returnto his native town to cast his ballotbut for professional or businessreasons, or for any other reason, hemay not absent himself from hisprofessional or business activities;so there he registers himself asvoter as he has the qualifications tobe one and is not willing to give upor lose the opportunity to choose

the officials who are to run thegovernment especially in nationalelections. Despite such registration,the animus revertendi to his home,to his domicile or residence oforigin has not forsaken him. Thismay be the explanation why theregistration of a voter in a placeother than his residence of originhas not been deemed sufficient toconstitute abandonment or loss ofsuch residence. It finds justificationin the natural desire and longing of

every person to return to his placeof birth. This strong feeling ofattachment to the place of one'sbirth must be overcome by positiveproof of abandonment for another.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in itsabove-cited statements supporting its propositionthat petitioner was ineligible to run for the

position of Representative of the First District ofLeyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring topetitioner's various places of (actual) residence,not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignoredsettled jurisprudence on residence in election lawand the deliberations of the constitutionalcommission but also the provisions of theOmnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35

What is undeniable, however, are the followingset of facts which establish the fact of petitioner'sdomicile, which we lift verbatim from theCOMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution:36

In or about 1938 when respondentwas a little over 8 years old, sheestablished her domicile in

Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City).She studied in the Holy InfantAcademy in Tacloban from 1938 to1949 when she graduated fromhigh school. She pursued hercollege studies in St. Paul's College,now Divine Word University in

Tacloban, where she earned her

degree in Education. Thereafter,she taught in the Leyte ChineseSchool, still in Tacloban City. In1952 she went to Manila to workwith her cousin, the late speakerDaniel Z. Romualdez in his office inthe House of Representatives. In1954, she married ex-PresidentFerdinand E. Marcos when he wasstill a congressman of Ilocos Norteand registered there as a voter.When her husband was electedSenator of the Republic in 1959,

she and her husband lived togetherin San Juan, Rizal where sheregistered as a voter. In 1965, whenher husband was elected Presidentof the Republic of the Philippines,she lived with him in MalacanangPalace and registered as a voter inSan Miguel, Manila.

[I]n February 1986 (she claimedthat) she and her family wereabducted and kidnapped toHonolulu, Hawaii. In November


19/206

1991, she came home to Manila. In1992, respondent ran for electionas President of the Philippines andfiled her Certificate of Candidacywherein she indicated that she is aresident and registered voter of San

Juan, Metro Manila.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts

found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is thatpetitioner held various residences for differentpurposes during the last four decades. None ofthese purposes unequivocally point to anintention to abandon her domicile of origin in

Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner wasborn in Manila, as a minor she naturally followedthe domicile of her parents. She grew up in

Tacloban, reached her adulthood there andeventually established residence in different partsof the country for various reasons. Even duringher husband's presidency, at the height of theMarcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close

ties to her domicile of origin by establishingresidences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdaysand other important personal milestones in herhome province, instituting well-publicized projectsfor the benefit of her province and hometown, andestablishing a political power base where hersiblings and close relatives held positions ofpower either through the ballot or byappointment, always with either her influence orconsent. These well-publicized ties to her domicileof origin are part of the history and lore of thequarter century of Marcos power in our country.Either they were entirely ignored in theCOMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of theCOMELEC did not know what the rest of thecountry always knew: the fact of petitioner'sdomicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

Private respondent in his Comment, contends thatTacloban was not petitioner's domicile of originbecause she did not live there until she was eightyears old. He avers that after leaving the place in1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) thereinfor many years and . . . (could not) re-establishher domicile in said place by merely expressingher intention to live there again." We do not

agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. Asdomicile, once acquired is retained until a newone is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact ofpetitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leytewas her domicile of origin by operation of law.

This domicile was not established only when herfather brought his family back to Leyte contrary toprivate respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. Tosuccessfully effect a change of domicile, one mustdemonstrate: 37

1. An actual removal or an actualchange of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention ofabandoning the former place of

residence and establishing a newone; and

3. Acts which correspond with thepurpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof basedon these criteria, the residence of origin should bedeemed to continue. Only with evidence showingconcurrence of all three requirements can thepresumption of continuity or residence berebutted, for a change of residence requires anactual and deliberate abandonment, and one

cannot have two legal residences at the sametime. 38 In the case at bench, the evidenceadduced by private respondent plainly lacks thedegree of persuasiveness required to convincethis court that an abandonment of domicile oforigin in favor of a domicile of choice indeedoccurred. To effect an abandonment requires thevoluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's formerdomicile with an intentto supplant the formerdomicile with one of her own choosing(domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued

that petitioner lost her domicile of origin byoperation of law as a result of her marriage to thelate President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. Forthere is a clearly established distinction betweenthe Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and"residence." 39 The presumption that the wifeautomatically gains the husband's domicile byoperation of law upon marriage cannot be inferredfrom the use of the term "residence" in Article110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code isone area where the two concepts are welldelineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on thisspecific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is anobvious difference betweendomicile and residence. Both termsimply relations between a personand a place; but in residence, therelation is one of fact while indomicile it is legal or juridical,independent of the necessity ofphysical presence. 40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:


20/206

Art. 110. The husband shall fixthe residence of the family. But thecourt may exempt the wife fromliving with the husband if he shouldlive abroad unless in the service ofthe Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 orto the concepts of domicile or residence as they

affect the female spouse upon marriage yieldsnothing which would suggest that the femalespouse automatically loses her domicile of originin favor of the husband's choice of residence uponmarriage.

Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 ofthe Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a sumarido donde quiera que fije suresidencia. Los Tribunales, sinembargo, podran con justa causa

eximirla de esta obligacion cuandoel marido transende su residencia aultramar o' a pais extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fijede residencia" in the aforequoted article, whichmeans wherever (the husband) wishes toestablish residence. This part of the article clearlycontemplates only actual residence because itrefers to a positive act of fixing a family home orresidence. Moreover, this interpretation is furtherstrengthened by the phrase "cuando el maridotranslade su residencia" in the same provision

which means, "when the husband shall transferhis residence," referring to another positive act ofrelocating the family to another home or place ofactual residence. The article obviously cannot beunderstood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotesthe possibility of transferring from one place toanother not only once, but as often as thehusband may deem fit to move his family, acircumstance more consistent with the concept ofactual residence.

The right of the husband to fix the actual

residence is in harmony with the intention of thelaw to strengthen and unify the family,recognizing the fact that the husband and thewife bring into the marriage different domiciles (oforigin). This difference could, for the sake offamily unity, be reconciled only by allowing thehusband to fix a single place of actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code isfound under Title V under the heading: RIGHTSAND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND ANDWIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article

109 which obliges the husband and wife to livetogether, thus:

Art. 109. The husband and wifeare obligated to live together,observe mutual respect and fidelityand render mutual help andsupport.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled ifthe husband and wife are physically together. Thistakes into account the situations where the couplehas many residences (as in the case of thepetitioner). If the husband has to stay in ortransfer to any one of their residences, the wifeshould necessarily be with him in order that theymay "live together." Hence, it is illogical toconclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and notto "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced witha situation where the wife is left in the domicilewhile the husband, for professional or otherreasons, stays in one of their (various) residences.

As Dr. Tolentino further explains:

Residence and Domicile Whetherthe word "residence" as used withreference to particular matters issynonymous with "domicile" is aquestion of some difficulty, and theultimate decision must be madefrom a consideration of the purposeand intent with which the word isused. Sometimes they are usedsynonymously, at other times theyare distinguished from one another.

xxx xxx xxx

Residence in the civil law is amaterial fact, referring to thephysical presence of a person in aplace. A person can have two ormore residences, such as a countryresidence and a city residence.Residence is acquired by living inplace; on the other hand, domicilecan exist without actually living inthe place. The important thing for

domicile is that, once residence hasbeen established in one place,there be an intention to stay therepermanently, even if residence isalso established in some otherplace. 41

In fact, even the matter of a common residencebetween the husband and the wife during themarriage is not an iron-clad principle; In casesapplying the Civil Code on the question of acommon matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence


21/206

has recognized certain situations 42 where thespouses could not be compelled to live with eachother such that the wife is either allowed tomaintain a residence different from that of herhusband or, for obviously practical reasons, revertto her original domicile (apart from being allowedto opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43

this Court held that "[a] married woman mayacquire a residence or domicile separate fromthat of her husband during the existence of themarriage where the husband has given cause fordivorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wifeeither to obtain new residence or to choose a newdomicile in such an event. In instances where thewife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to liveseparately from her husband either by taking newresidence or reverting to her domicile of origin,the Court has held that the wife could not becompelled to live with her husband on pain ofcontempt. InArroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 theCourt held that:

Upon examination of theauthorities, we are convinced that itis not within the province of thecourts of this country to attempt tocompel one of the spouses tocohabit with, and render conjugalrights to, the other. Of coursewhere the property rights of one ofthe pair are invaded, an action forrestitution of such rights can bemaintained. But we are disinclinedto sanction the doctrine that anorder, enforcible (sic) by process ofcontempt, may be entered tocompel the restitution of the purelypersonal right of consortium. Atbest such an order can be effectivefor no other purpose than to compelthe spouses to live under the sameroof; and he experience of thosecountries where the courts of

justice have assumed to compel thecohabitation of married peopleshows that the policy of thepractice is extremely questionable.

Thus in England, formerly theEcclesiastical Court entertainedsuits for the restitution of conjugalrights at the instance of eitherhusband or wife; and if the factswere found to warrant it, that courtwould make a mandatory decree,enforceable by process of contemptin case of disobedience, requiringthe delinquent party to live with theother and render conjugal rights.

Yet this practice was sometimescriticized even by the judges whofelt bound to enforce such orders,

and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D.52), decided in 1883, Sir JamesHannen, President in the Probate,Divorce and Admiralty Division ofthe High Court of Justice, expressedhis regret that the English law onthe subject was not the same asthat which prevailed in Scotland,where a decree of adherence,equivalent to the decree for therestitution of conjugal rights inEngland, could be obtained by theinjured spouse, but could not beenforced by imprisonment.Accordingly, in obedience to thegrowing sentiment against thepractice, the Matrimonial CausesAct (1884) abolished the remedy ofimprisonment; though a decree forthe restitution of conjugal rightscan still be procured, and in case ofdisobedience may serve inappropriate cases as the basis of anorder for the periodical payment ofa stipend in the character ofalimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence ofthe United States, only one court,so far as we can discover, has everattempted to make a preemptoryorder requiring one of the spousesto live with the other; and that wasin a case where a wife was orderedto follow and live with her husband,who had changed his domicile tothe City of New Orleans. Thedecision referred to (Bahn v. Darby,36 La. Ann., 70) was based on aprovision of the Civil Code ofLouisiana similar to article 56 of theSpanish Civil Code. It was decidedmany years ago, and the doctrineevidently has not been fruitful evenin the State of Louisiana. In otherstates of the American Union theidea of enforcing cohabitation byprocess of contempt is rejected. (21Cyc., 1148).

In a decision of January 2, 1909, theSupreme Court of Spain appears tohave affirmed an order of theAudiencia Territorial de Valladolidrequiring a wife to return to themarital domicile, and in thealternative, upon her failure to doso, to make a particular dispositionof certain money and effects thenin her possession and to deliver toher husband, as administrator of


22/206

the ganancial property, all income,rents, and interest which mightaccrue to her from the propertywhich she had brought to themarriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11)But it does not appear that thisorder for the return of the wife tothe marital domicile was sanctionedby any other penalty than theconsequences that would be visitedupon her in respect to the use andcontrol of her property; and it doesnot appear that her disobedience tothat order would necessarily havebeen followed by imprisonment forcontempt.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married tothen Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitionerwas obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the CivilCode to follow her husband's actual place ofresidence fixed by him. The problem here is that

at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places ofresidence, among which were San Juan, Rizal andBatac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which ofthese places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family'sresidence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos hadfixed any of these places as the conjugalresidence, what petitioner gained upon marriagewas actual residence. She did not lose herdomicile of origin.

On the other hand, the common law concept of"matrimonial domicile" appears to have beenincorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential

experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of1950, into the New Family Code. To underscorethe difference between the intentions of the CivilCode and the Family Code drafters, the termresidence has been supplanted by the termdomicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69)distinctly different in meaning and spirit from thatfound in Article 110. The provision recognizesrevolutionary changes in the concept of women'srights in the intervening years by making thechoice of domicile a product of mutual agreementbetween the spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the termresidence may mean one thing in civil law (orunder the Civil Code) and quite another thing inpolitical law. What stands clear is that insofar asthe Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rightsand obligations of husband and wife the termresidence should only be interpreted to mean"actual residence." The inescapable conclusionderived from this unambiguous civil lawdelineation therefore, is that when petitionermarried the former President in 1954, she kepther domicile of origin and merely gained a newhome, not a domicilium necessarium.

Even assuming for the sake of argument thatpetitioner gained a new "domicile" after hermarriage and only acquired a right to choose anew one after her husband died, petitioner's actsfollowing her return to the country clearly indicatethat she not only impliedly but expressly choseher domicile of origin (assuming this was lost byoperation of law) as her domicile. This "choice"was unequivocally expressed in her letters to theChairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought thePCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestralhouse in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . tomake them livable for the Marcos family to have ahome in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitionerobtained her residence certificate in 1992 in

Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother'shouse, an act which supports the domiciliaryintention clearly manifested in her letters to thePCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straightto her home in San Juan, as it was in a state ofdisrepair, having been previously looted byvandals. Her "homes" and "residences" followingher arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merelyqualified as temporary or "actual residences," notdomicile. Moreover, and proceeding from ourdiscussion pointing out specific situations wherethe female spouse either reverts to her domicileof origin or chooses a new one during thesubsistence of the marriage, it would be highlyillogical for us to assume that she cannot regainher original domicile upon the death of herhusband absent a positive act of selecting a newone where situations exist within the subsistenceof the marriage itself where the wife gains adomicile different from her husband.

In the light of all the principles relating toresidence and domicile enunciated by this courtup to this point, we are persuaded that the factsestablished by the parties weigh heavily in favorof a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim oflegal residence or domicile in the First District ofLeyte.

II. The jurisdictional issue

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of theCOMELEC had already lapsed considering that the

assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24,1995, fourteen (14) days before the election inviolation of Section 78 of the Omnibus ElectionCode. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it isthe House of Representatives Electoral Tribunaland not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction overthe election of members of the House ofRepresentatives in accordance with Article VI Sec.17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiringrendition of judgment within a specified time isgenerally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so


23/206

that non-compliance with them does notinvalidate the judgment on the theory that if thestatute had intended such result it would haveclearly indicated it." 50 The difference between amandatory and a directory provision is oftenmade on grounds of necessity. Adopting the sameview held by several American authorities, thiscourt in Marcelino vs. Cruzheld that: 51

The difference between amandatory and directory provisionis often determined on grounds ofexpediency, the reason being thatless injury results to the generalpublic by disregarding thanenforcing the letter of the law.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a casecalling for the interpretation of astatute containing a limitation ofthirty (30) days within which adecree may be entered without the

consent of counsel, it was held that"the statutory provisions which maybe thus departed from withimpunity, without affecting thevalidity of statutory proceedings,are usually those which relate tothe mode or time of doing thatwhich is essential to effect the aimand purpose of the Legislature orsome incident of the essential act."

Thus, in said case, the statuteunder examination was construedmerely to be directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that theCOMELEC should have abstained from rendering adecision after the period stated in the OmnibusElection Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies inthe fact that our courts and other quasi-judicialbodies would then refuse to render judgmentsmerely on the ground of having failed to reach adecision within a given or prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P.881, 52 it is evident that the respondent

Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear anddecide a pending disqualification case underSection 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives ElectoralTribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdictionover the issue of petitioner's qualifications afterthe May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say thatHRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of allcontests relating to the elections, returns andqualifications of members of Congress begins onlyafter a candidate has become a member of theHouse of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being

a member of the House of Representatives, it isobvious that the HRET at this point has no

jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the idealsenshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to eitherto ignore or deliberately make distinctions in lawsolely on the basis of the personality of apetitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was

made on such a ground here. Surely, manyestablished principles of law, even of election lawswere flouted for the sake perpetuating powerduring the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on thesesacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit ofEDSA ourselves bending established principles ofprinciples of law to deny an individual what he orshe justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so,we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes ofthe past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitionerpossesses the necessary residence qualifications

to run for a seat in the House of Representativesin the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC'squestioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7,May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to orderthe Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaimpetitioner as the duly elected Representative ofthe First District of Leyte.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

PUNO,J., concurring:

It was Aristotle who taught mankind that thingsthat are alike should be treated alike, while thingsthat are unalike should be treated unalike inproportion to their unalikeness.1 Like othercandidates, petitioner has clearly met theresidence requirement provided by Section 6,Article VI of the Constitution.2 We cannotdisqualify her and treat her unalike, for theConstitution guarantees equal protection of thelaw. I proceed from the following factual and legalpropositions:


24/206

First. There is no question that petitioner's originaldomicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents weredomiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in

Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place.Petitioner went to school and thereafter workedthere. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile,both her domicile of origin and her domicile ofchoice. Her domicile of origin as it was thedomicile of her parents when she was a minor;and her domicile of choice, as she continued livingthere even after reaching the age of majority.

Second. There is also no question that in May,1954, petitioner married the late PresidentFerdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, herdomicile became subject to change by law, andthe right to change it was given by Article 110 ofthe Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. The husband shall fix theresidence of the family. But thecourt may exempt the wife from

living with the husband if he shouldlive abroad unless in the service ofthe Republic. 3 (Emphasis supplied)

In De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano, 4

this Court explained why the domicile ofthe wife ought to follow that of thehusband. We held: "The reason is foundedupon the theoretic identityof person andinterest between the husband and thewife, and the presumption that, from thenature of the relation, the home of one isthe home of the other. It is intended to

promote, strengthen, and secure theirinterests in this relation, as it ordinarilyexists, where union and harmony prevail."5 In accord with this objective, Article 109of the Civil Code also obligated thehusband and wife "to live together."

Third. The difficult issues start as we determinewhether petitioner's marriage to former PresidentMarcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her

Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that hermarriage by itself alone did not cause her to loseher Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil

Code merely gave the husband the right to fix thedomicile of the family. In the exercise of the right,the husband may explicitlychoose the priordomicile of his wife, in which case, the wife'sdomicile remains unchanged. The husband canalso implicitlyacquiesce to his wife's priordomicile even if it is different. So we held in de laVia, 6

. . . . When married women as wellas children subject to parentalauthority live, with theacquiescence of their husbands or

fathers, in a place distinct fromwhere the latter live, they havetheir own independentdomicile. . . .

It is not, therefore, the mere fact ofmarriage but the deliberate choice of adifferent domicile by the husband that willchange the domicile of a wife from what itwas prior to their marriage. The domiciliary

decision made by the husband in theexercise of the right conferred by Article110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Anyand all acts of a wife during her coverturecontrary to the domiciliary choice of thehusband cannot change in any way thedomicile legally fixed by the husband.

These acts are void not only because thewife lacks the capacity to choose herdomicile but also because they arecontrary to law and public policy.

In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former

President Marcos exercised his right to fix thefamily domicile and established it in Batac, IlocosNorte, where he was then the congressman.Atthat particular point of time and throughout theirmarried life, petitioner lost her domicile inTacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicilehas been fixed by operation of law, it was notaffected in 1959 when her husband was electedas Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal andwhere she registered as a voter. It was not alsoaffected in 1965 when her husband was electedPresident, when they lived in Malacaang Palace,and when she registered as a voter in San Miguel,

Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as amember of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister ofHuman Settlements and Governor of Metro Maniladuring the incumbency of her husband asPresident of the nation. Under Article 110 of theCivil Code, it was only her husband who couldchange the family domicile in Batac and theevidence shows he did not effect any suchchange. To a large degree, this follows thecommon law that "a woman on her marriage losesher own domicile and by operation of law,acquires that of her husband, no matter wherethe wife actually lives or what she believes or

intends."

7

Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpretthe effect of the death on September 28, 1989 offormer President Marcos on petitioner's Batacdomicile. The issue is offirst impression in our

jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thoughtcontend for acceptance. One is espoused by ourdistinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr.,heavily relying on American authorities. 8 Heechoes the theory that after the husband's death,the wife retains the last domicile of her husbanduntil she makes an actual change.


25/206

I do not subscribe to this submission. TheAmerican case law that the wife still retains herdead husband's domicile is based on ancientcommon law which we can no longer apply in thePhilippine setting today. The common lawidentified the domicile of a wife as that of thehusband and denied to her the power of acquiringa domicile of her own separate and apart fromhim. 9 Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasonssupport this common law doctrine. The firstreason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstoneis derived from the view that "the very being orlegal existence of the woman is suspended duringthe marriage, or at least is incorporated andconsolidated into that of the husband." 10 Thesecond reason lies in "the desirability of havingthe interests of each member of the family unitgoverned by the same law." 11 The presumptionthat the wife retains the domicile of her deceasedhusband is an extension of this common lawconcept. The concept and its extension have

provided some of the most iniquitousjurisprudence against women. It was undercommon law that the 1873 American case ofBradwell v. Illinois12 was decided where womenwere denied the right to practice law. It wasunblushingly ruled that "the natural and propertimidity and delicacy which belongs to the femalesex evidently unfits it for many of the occupationsof civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator."Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. JusticeDavide in CJS 13and AM JUR 2d 14 are Americanstate court decisions handed down between theyears 1917 15 and 1938, 16 or before the timewhen women were accorded equality of rightswith men. Undeniably, the women's liberation

movement resulted in far-ranging statelegislations in the United States to eliminategender inequality. 17 Starting in the decade of theseventies, the courts likewise liberalized theirrulings as they started invalidating laws infectedwith gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the USSupreme Court in Reed v. Reed, 18 struck a bigblow for women equality when it declared asunconstitutional an Idaho law that requiredprobate courts to choose male family membersover females as estate administrators. It held thatmere administrative inconvenience cannot justifya sex-based distinction. These significant changes

both in law and in case law on the status ofwomen virtually obliterated the iniquitouscommon law surrendering the rights of marriedwomen to their husbands based on the dubioustheory of the parties' theoretic oneness. TheCorpus Juris Secundum editors did not miss therelevance of this revolution on women's right asthey observed: "However, it has been declaredthat under modern statutes changing the statusof married women and departing from thecommon law theory of marriage, there is noreason why a wife may not acquire a separatedomicile for every purpose known to the law." 19 In

publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law,Second (Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputableAmerican Law Institute also categorically statedthat the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held.

As the result of statutes and court decisions, awife now possesses practically the same rightsand powers as her unmarried sister." 20

In the case at bench, we have to decide whether

we should continue clinging to the anachronisticcommon law that demeans women, especiallymarried women. I submit that the Court has nochoice except to break away from this commonlaw rule, the root of the many degradations ofFilipino women. Before 1988, our laws particularlythe Civil Code, were full of gender discriminationsagainst women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam

Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, cited a few of themas follows: 21

xxx xxx xxx

Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives

Not generally known is the fact thatunder the Civil Code, wives sufferunder certain restrictions ordisabilities. For instance, the wifecannot accept gifts from others,regardless of the sex of the giver orthe value of the gift, other thanfrom her very close relatives,without her husband's consent. Shemay accept only from, say, herparents, parents-in-law, brothers,

sisters and the relatives within theso-called fourth civil degree. Shemay not exercise her profession oroccupation or engage in business ifher husband objects on seriousgrounds or if his income is sufficientto support their family inaccordance with their socialstanding. As to what constitutes"serious grounds" for objecting, thisis within the discretion of thehusband.

xxx xxx xxx

Because of the present inequitablesituation, the amendments to theCivil Law being proposed by theUniversity of the Philippines LawCenter would allow absolute divorcewhich severes the matrimonial ties,such that the divorced spouses arefree to get married a year after thedivorce is decreed by the courts.However, in order to place the


26/206


27/206

(Del Rosario v. DelRosario, CA, 46 OG6122);

(d) Where thehusband hascontinuously ca

Documents

Puboff Cases - June 22 and 24